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Author SHA1 Message Date
Zhengchao An 76b3c085b5 refactor(kms): fold the KmsClient layer into KmsBackend and complete lifecycle overrides (#5501) 2026-07-31 08:31:21 +00:00
houseme 78d6918c52 feat: extend hotpath coverage across crates (#5505)
Add opt-in hotpath feature surfaces to every workspace crate and wire the root rustfs feature passthrough for function, allocation, and CPU profiling.

Add a focused set of function-level measurements for scanner, heal, lock, target replay, IAM, KMS, Keystone, trusted proxy, and capacity paths without adding request-scoped primitive wrappers.

Co-authored-by: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
2026-07-31 05:42:19 +00:00
Zhengchao An dd11145a26 feat(kms): record operation metrics in the retry policy engine (#5500)
* feat(kms): record operation metrics in the retry policy engine

Instrument policy::execute — the single choke point every outbound Vault
call and credential exchange already flows through — so no call site
needs its own instrumentation:

- rustfs_kms_backend_operations_total (counter): operation, op_class,
  outcome (success / fatal / budget_exhausted / deadline_exceeded /
  cancelled)
- rustfs_kms_backend_attempt_failures_total (counter): operation,
  error_class (retryable_conn / retryable_status / fatal /
  attempt_timeout)
- rustfs_kms_backend_operation_duration_seconds (histogram): wall-clock
  duration including retries and backoff
- rustfs_kms_backend_operation_attempts (histogram): attempts used

Metric labels carry only static enum values (operation names, classes,
outcomes) — never key identifiers, key material, ciphertext, or tokens.
Emission goes through the process-global metrics facade recorder, the
same pattern the rest of the workspace uses, so no new wiring is needed
in rustfs/src.

Tests drive a paused-clock runtime under a thread-local debugging
recorder, so counts, attempts, and even the recorded (virtual-clock)
durations are asserted deterministically with zero real sleeps.

Refs rustfs/backlog#1569 (part of rustfs/backlog#1562)

* test(kms): add Vault fault-injection matrix

Offline cases inject transport faults locally and are fully
deterministic: a refused connection is retried up to the configured
budget, and a stalled connection is cut off by the per-attempt timeout
instead of hanging. Ignored cases run against a real dev Vault
(RUSTFS_KMS_VAULT_ADDR) and pin the fail-closed auth behavior: an
invalid token and a missing key each resolve in exactly one attempt.

Every case asserts through the policy metrics recorded by a
thread-local debugging recorder, which doubles as the request-count
assertion even against a real server. Throttling and recoverable 5xx
responses cannot be forced on a stock dev Vault; those paths stay
pinned by the scripted-Vault wiring tests and the engine tests.

Refs rustfs/backlog#1569 (part of rustfs/backlog#1562)
2026-07-31 02:56:44 +00:00
Zhengchao An f718e72e24 perf(ecstore): deduplicate concurrent lazy bucket-metadata loads (#5498) 2026-07-31 02:27:03 +00:00
houseme e06c9c02c6 feat: add hotpath primitive profiling coverage (#5492)
* chore(deps): refresh google cloud dependencies

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>

* feat: add hotpath primitive coverage

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>

* feat: extend hotpath profiling features

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>

* fix: gate OPA hotpath client wrapping

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>

* fix: avoid request-scoped hotpath primitive wrappers

Preserve the original bounded channel and stream semantics in EC and RIO request paths while keeping hotpath CPU profiling as a separate opt-in feature that implies base hotpath instrumentation.

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
2026-07-31 01:59:13 +00:00
Zhengchao An a2fe5d7d88 feat(admin): add KMS key lifecycle endpoints and deletion reference gate (#5496)
* feat(kms): add key lifecycle operations to the backend contract

Add enable_key/disable_key/rotate_key to KmsBackend with conservative
defaults returning the typed UnsupportedCapability error, mirroring
remove_expired_key. KmsManager gains matching pass-through methods and
drops cached key metadata after every successful state mutation so the
next describe observes backend truth. The local backend overrides
enable/disable, delegating to its state-machine-gated client methods;
rotation stays rejected, matching its advertised capabilities. New
dedicated policy actions kms:EnableKey and kms:DisableKey complete the
KMS action taxonomy alongside the existing kms:RotateKey.

* feat(admin): add KMS key enable/disable/rotate endpoints

POST /v3/kms/keys/enable, /v3/kms/keys/disable and /v3/kms/keys/rotate,
following the existing /v3/kms/keys handler conventions: key_id body
with keyId query fallback, {success, message, key_id, key_metadata}
responses, and 503 JSON while the KMS service is absent. Error mapping
keeps InvalidOperation/ValidationError at 400 like the sibling handlers
and surfaces UnsupportedCapability as 501 so a backend capability gap is
never mistaken for a missing key. Existing /v3/kms/keys handlers are
untouched apart from a visibility change on a private query helper.

* feat(kms): gate scheduled key deletion on bucket encryption references

Implement the DeletionReferenceChecker seam left by the deletion worker:
before any material is destroyed, every bucket's SSE configuration is
checked for a default KMS key reference and a hit blocks the removal.
The gate fails closed - an unpublished object store, a failed bucket
listing or an unreadable per-bucket encryption config all report a
blocking reference - because destroying key material is irreversible
while a blocked removal is simply retried on the next sweep. Registered
during init_kms_system before the service can start, so every worker
spawn observes it. Storage access goes through a new kms section of the
root storage facade.
2026-07-31 01:37:07 +00:00
Zhengchao An cad8246ffb feat(kms): route Vault operations through the retry policy engine (#5495)
* test(kms): add a scripted loopback Vault for policy wiring tests

A minimal HTTP/1.1 responder that serves canned Vault responses in order
and records the method/path sequence, so wiring tests can assert exactly
how many requests a code path performed (retries, read-confirm) without
a live Vault server.

* feat(kms): route Vault operations through the retry policy engine

Wire every outbound vaultrs call in the KV2 and Transit backends through
policy::execute, completing the wiring half of the operation policy work
(the engine landed separately):

- Reads (KV2 read/read_metadata/read_version/list, transit read/list/
  encrypt/decrypt, health checks) run as ReadIdempotent: bounded retries
  with exponential backoff and jitter on 429, recoverable 5xx, and
  connection-level failures; 400/401/403/404 stay fatal.
- Writes (KV2 set/CAS set/delete_metadata, transit create/update/rotate/
  delete, metadata writes) run as MutatingNonIdempotent: exactly one
  attempt under the per-attempt timeout, never replayed. CAS conflicts
  in the rotation protocol pass through unchanged as the concurrency
  signal they are.
- Each attempt takes a fresh credential snapshot, so a retry after a
  credential rotation uses the new token.
- Read-confirm recovery for lost create responses: when a create finds
  an existing key that is exactly what it would have produced (same
  algorithm, enabled, usable material, and for request-level creates the
  same usage/description/tags), it reports the stored key as the create
  result instead of KeyAlreadyExists. Any divergence keeps failing.
- Deletes treat already-deleted records as completed deletes (KV2
  version records; transit metadata already did), so re-running an
  interrupted deletion converges.
- A failed existence pre-check inside create now fails the create
  instead of falling through to a blind overwrite (fail closed).
- The policy module sheds its allow(dead_code) now that it is wired.

Wiring tests run against a scripted loopback Vault and assert request
counts and endpoints for the retry, single-attempt, CAS-conflict, and
read-confirm paths.

Refs rustfs/backlog#1569 (part of rustfs/backlog#1562)
2026-07-31 00:51:02 +00:00
Zhengchao An b4901abd17 fix(admin): keep data usage endpoint available (#5494) 2026-07-31 00:11:14 +00:00
Zhengchao An 1d383e239d fix(iam): separate OIDC role and claim policies (#5493) 2026-07-30 23:53:06 +00:00
Zhengchao An 2e29c330a9 feat(kms): enforce shared key state machine across backends (#5489)
* feat(kms): enforce shared key state machine across backends

Unify the key state x operation matrix behind a single gate in
backends/mod.rs and wire it into the Local, Vault KV2 and Vault Transit
backends: Disabled keys reject encryption, data key generation and
rotation while still allowing decryption and lifecycle recovery;
PendingDeletion keys reject everything except decryption and
cancellation (including repeated deletion scheduling); cancellation now
requires an actual pending deletion everywhere. This closes the missing
gates on KV2 encrypt/generate and Local generate_data_key, and stops
enable_key from silently reverting a pending deletion.

Decryption is deliberately left ungated in Disabled/PendingDeletion — an
explicit, documented and tested deviation from AWS KMS, since gating it
would break reads of existing objects the moment a key is disabled.

Add shared contract tests driving the full matrix offline for Local (and
via ignored tests against a live Vault for KV2/Transit), a stateless
contract for Static, an SSE-shaped regression proving existing envelopes
stay decryptable after disable, and a pin on the known-risk Enabled
default of Transit's synthesized metadata fallback.

Refs rustfs/backlog#1571 (part of rustfs/backlog#1562)

* feat(kms): persist deletion deadlines and run a restartable deletion worker (#5491)
2026-07-30 23:24:39 +00:00
Zhengchao An 3921336b23 feat(kms): AppRole login with background token renewal and fail-closed expiry (#5487)
* feat(kms): add AppRole configuration surface for Vault auth

Extend VaultAuthMethod::AppRole with secret_id_file (re-read on every
login so external rotation is picked up), a configurable auth mount
(default "approle"), and an optional fail-closed safety window. All new
fields are serde(default) so previously persisted configurations keep
deserializing, and the strict admin-configure deserializer accepts them
as optional.

Environment selection: setting RUSTFS_KMS_VAULT_APPROLE_ROLE_ID switches
both Vault backends to AppRole; the secret_id comes from
RUSTFS_KMS_VAULT_APPROLE_SECRET_ID_FILE (path stored, file wins) or
RUSTFS_KMS_VAULT_APPROLE_SECRET_ID, following the static secret-key file
precedent. validate() rejects AppRole configs without a role_id, without
any secret_id source, or with an empty mount.

Also append the CredentialsUnavailable error variant used by the
fail-closed credential gate.

* feat(kms): implement AppRole login with background renewal and fail-closed expiry

Implement the AppRoleLogin token source (vaultrs approle login +
renew-self) and wire lease-bound credentials through the provider:

- Each successful login/renewal installs a new client generation in the
  ArcSwap; in-flight requests finish on the generation they captured.
- A background renewal task refreshes at half the lease TTL: renewable
  tokens are renewed in place, everything else (or a failed renewal)
  falls back to a fresh login. Auth exchanges run under the typed retry
  policy (OpClass::Auth) and failed cycles retry on a fixed cadence, so
  the provider recovers once Vault does.
- Fail-closed: current() refuses to hand out a token inside the
  configured safety window of its expiry (default: one attempt timeout),
  returning CredentialsUnavailable instead of sending a request whose
  token may lapse mid-flight.
- Refreshes are single-flight: concurrent triggers for the same
  generation coalesce into one login.
- The renewal task's owner handle lives on the KMS service version:
  stop() shuts it down explicitly and reconfigure recycles it via
  cancel-on-drop when the old version is discarded.
- The secret_id file is re-read on every login attempt; missing or empty
  files fail the attempt without contacting Vault. Crate-owned copies of
  tokens and secret_ids are zeroized on drop, and Debug output of every
  credential-carrying type stays redacted (leak regression tests).

The renewal machinery is covered by paused-clock tests driving a
scripted token source: renew-at-half-TTL timing, login fallback,
fail-closed window entry and recovery, prompt task recycling, and
coalesced concurrent refreshes.

* feat(kms): add Vault Agent token file authentication

Add the TokenFile source: the token is read from an agent-managed sink
file (RUSTFS_KMS_VAULT_TOKEN_FILE or the TokenFile auth config) and
re-read once per poll interval (default 30s) through the existing
renewal loop, so a token rotated by the agent installs a new client
generation within one poll of the atomic replace. Each successful read
extends the token's observed validity to twice the poll interval; a
file that disappears or turns empty keeps failing the refresh until the
fail-closed window trips, and heals the provider as soon as it is
restored.

Reads are strict and never contact Vault on failure: the file must be
non-empty after trimming, and on Unix group/other permission bits are a
hard error (mirroring the SFTP host-key rule). Rotation detection uses
a content digest; the token itself is never stored on the source and
the crate-owned copy is zeroized.

Configuring the token file together with AppRole or an explicit static
token is rejected as a configuration error. All new config fields are
serde(default) and the strict admin-configure deserializer accepts the
new variant.

Covered by paused-clock tests (atomic replacement installs a new
generation next cycle, deletion fails closed and recovers, prompt task
recycling) plus negatives for missing/empty/over-permissive files and a
Debug leak regression.

* docs(kms): add Vault authentication and credential lifecycle runbook

Cover choosing between static token, AppRole, and Vault Agent token
file auth; AppRole role setup with SecretID delivery and rotation;
Agent sink deployment with the permission requirements; and the
fail-closed window semantics with a troubleshooting table keyed on the
renewal task's log lines.
2026-07-30 22:29:49 +00:00
Zhengchao An 342ee1df78 feat(kms): add backend capability discovery (#5485) 2026-07-31 06:09:43 +08:00
Zhengchao An 40ef0db9cc test(kms): pin rotation contracts across backends and document retention (#5486)
* feat(kms): retain historical master key versions for Vault KV2 rotation

Rotation previously had to be rejected outright because replacing the
stored material would orphan every DEK wrapped by earlier versions.
Vault KV2 now keeps each version's material in an immutable, create-only
record at {prefix}/{key_id}/versions/{N} and treats the top-level record
as the current-version pointer plus fast-path material copy:

- decrypt resolves the envelope's master_key_version to its version
  record; a missing version fails closed with KeyVersionNotFound and
  never falls back to the current material
- envelopes without a version (pre-versioning writers) resolve to the
  baseline_version frozen at the key's first rotation, so never-rotated
  keys behave exactly as before
- generate_data_key stamps the wrapping version from the same key record
  snapshot that supplied the material
- rotate_key commits in check-and-set order: freeze baseline, persist
  the next version's material, then switch the current pointer; any
  failure leaves the current pointer untouched, and concurrent rotations
  serialize on the CAS writes with monotonically unique versions
- key listings drop the versions/ directory entries and physical key
  deletion purges version records before the key record

Refs rustfs/backlog#1565

* test(kms): pin rotation contracts across backends and document retention

Completes the backlog#1565 series with the cross-backend regression net
and operator documentation:

- Vault Transit: ignored integration test proving version-prefixed
  historical ciphertext still decrypts after rotation, with no
  RustFS-side version bookkeeping in the envelope
- Local: offline mixed-format test interleaving pre-versioning and
  versioned envelopes through a rejected rotation; the existing
  rotation-rejection pinning test already covers material immutability
- docs: kms-backend-security.md gains the KV2 versioned retention
  model, version record retention/destruction preconditions, and the
  upgrade-before-first-rotation cluster constraint

Refs rustfs/backlog#1565
2026-07-31 01:49:55 +08:00
Zhengchao An b457c6abcc feat(kms): add backup manifest and responsibility contract types (#5483)
Contract-only module for KMS backup/restore (no handler or backend
wiring): versioned manifest schema with completeness marker and sealed
digest, the (backend, at-rest protection) responsibility matrix, typed
fail-closed errors, and the zero-write restore dry-run report. Fields
whose shape depends on in-flight contracts are reserved and reject data
in format version 1.
2026-07-31 01:49:21 +08:00
houseme 7051a5ce41 feat: add opt-in hotpath profiling (#5488)
* feat: add opt-in hotpath profiling

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>

* test: fix vault kms client construction

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
2026-07-31 01:49:19 +08:00
Zhengchao An 1d3ba1eb8b feat(kms): retain historical master key versions for Vault KV2 rotation (#5484)
Rotation previously had to be rejected outright because replacing the
stored material would orphan every DEK wrapped by earlier versions.
Vault KV2 now keeps each version's material in an immutable, create-only
record at {prefix}/{key_id}/versions/{N} and treats the top-level record
as the current-version pointer plus fast-path material copy:

- decrypt resolves the envelope's master_key_version to its version
  record; a missing version fails closed with KeyVersionNotFound and
  never falls back to the current material
- envelopes without a version (pre-versioning writers) resolve to the
  baseline_version frozen at the key's first rotation, so never-rotated
  keys behave exactly as before
- generate_data_key stamps the wrapping version from the same key record
  snapshot that supplied the material
- rotate_key commits in check-and-set order: freeze baseline, persist
  the next version's material, then switch the current pointer; any
  failure leaves the current pointer untouched, and concurrent rotations
  serialize on the CAS writes with monotonically unique versions
- key listings drop the versions/ directory entries and physical key
  deletion purges version records before the key record

Refs rustfs/backlog#1565
2026-07-31 01:48:10 +08:00
Zhengchao An 8368017fb2 refactor(kms): route Vault clients through a rotatable credential provider (#5481)
* fix(kms): repair vault test call sites missed by the timeout refactor

Three offline tests still constructed VaultKmsClient with the pre-#5472
single-argument signature, leaving cargo test -p rustfs-kms unable to
compile. Pass the same 30s attempt timeout the neighbouring tests use.

* refactor(kms): route Vault clients through a rotatable credential provider

Both Vault backends previously built a VaultClient in their constructor
and held it for the lifetime of the backend, which leaves no seam for
re-authentication: rotating credentials would require tearing down the
whole backend.

Introduce backends/vault_credentials with a TokenSource trait (only
StaticToken for now; AppRole login and agent token files land in
follow-ups) and a VaultCredentialProvider that owns the authenticated
client behind an ArcSwap. Request paths take a per-call snapshot via
current(), so a future rotation swaps in a new client generation without
interrupting calls already in flight. Tokens held by this crate are
zeroized on drop, and Debug output of every credential-carrying type is
redacted (covered by a leak regression test).

Behavior is unchanged: static token, namespace, and per-attempt timeout
feed the same VaultClientSettings as before, and AppRole configurations
are still rejected at construction with the same message.
2026-07-30 16:48:24 +00:00
Zhengchao An 699ef14ddd fix(kms): pass attempt timeout in vault kv2 tests (#5482)
PR #5472 added a required attempt_timeout parameter to
VaultKmsClient::new, while PR #5474 (developed in parallel) added
three tests calling it with the old single-argument signature,
breaking compilation of cargo test -p rustfs-kms. Pass the same
30-second timeout the neighboring tests use.
2026-07-30 16:47:06 +00:00
Zhengchao An 704ea43da5 fix(kms): pass attempt timeout to Vault test clients (#5479)
PR #5472 added an attempt_timeout parameter to VaultKmsClient::new while
PR #5474 was developed in parallel and added three tests using the old
single-argument signature. Both merged cleanly at the text level, leaving
main unable to compile the rustfs-kms test target. Align the three call
sites with the current constructor signature.
2026-07-30 16:44:21 +00:00
Zhengchao An 35a20622f1 feat(kms): add master key version to data key envelope contract (#5480)
* fix(kms): restore vault backend test compilation after timeout parameter

PR #5472 added an attempt_timeout parameter to VaultKmsClient::new while
PR #5474 landed tests still using the one-argument form, leaving
'cargo test -p rustfs-kms' unable to compile on main. Pass the same
30-second timeout the surrounding integration tests already use.

* feat(kms): add master key version to data key envelope contract

DataKeyEnvelope gains an optional master_key_version field recording
which KEK version wrapped the DEK, so rotation-aware backends can load
the matching historical material on decrypt. The field is skipped when
None, keeping envelopes from non-rotating backends byte-identical to
the historical seven-field JSON shape, and legacy envelopes without the
field deserialize to None. The envelope discriminator marker is
untouched, so mixed-format routing is unchanged in both directions.

Adds the KeyVersionNotFound typed error for version-addressed material
lookups that must fail closed instead of falling back to the current
version.

Refs rustfs/backlog#1565
2026-07-30 16:43:10 +00:00
Zhengchao An 7662b2436a docs(kms): document local backend durability and deployment support matrix (#5478)
* docs(kms): document local backend durability and deployment support matrix

* docs(kms): reflow backend security doc to one line per paragraph
2026-07-31 00:14:45 +08:00
Zhengchao An d4f2efa2ad fix(kms): report accurate Vault KV2 security contract and disable unsafe rotation (#5474) 2026-07-30 22:56:43 +08:00
Zhengchao An 19cdd806a2 fix(kms): fail closed on missing or corrupt key material (#5475) 2026-07-30 22:56:30 +08:00
Zhengchao An 6e5f330ff5 feat(kms): add operation timeout and typed retry policy engine (#5472) 2026-07-30 11:20:17 +00:00
Zhengchao An e86d4cb579 fix(kms): make local backend persistence crash-durable (#5471) 2026-07-30 11:13:37 +00:00
houseme e08847d2b6 docs(obs): add Grafana server-label dashboard (#5468)
Co-authored-by: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
2026-07-30 17:51:34 +08:00
Zhengchao An 145d38133b fix(ci): generate release notes with the correct baseline (#5467)
fix(ci): generate release notes with correct baseline
2026-07-30 14:09:13 +08:00
houseme 30dc04c94b fix(obs): label node-local metrics by server (#5465)
Add stable server labels to node-local Prometheus metrics and OTLP resource attributes so dashboards can distinguish per-node CPU, memory, host network, and internode traffic series.

Co-authored-by: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
2026-07-30 04:57:22 +00:00
唐小鸭 ad7663afd1 refactor(sse): decouple ecstore and harden KMS lifecycle (#5435)
* refactor(sse): decouple encryption from ecstore

* feat(kms): enhance KMS service manager with runtime state and persistence support

* feat(kms): add local key export functionality for SSE-S3 migration tests

* fix(kms): keep local key export narrowly scoped

* fix(sse): validate copy source customer algorithm

---------

Co-authored-by: Zhengchao An <anzhengchao@gmail.com>
2026-07-30 12:39:25 +08:00
houseme 6e6b38ad8e test(e2e): accept backpressure unknown terminal status (#5464)
Co-authored-by: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
2026-07-30 04:38:30 +00:00
cxymds 8601179c39 fix(ecstore): quarantine rejected format members (#5463) 2026-07-30 04:09:08 +00:00
Zhengchao An b83c9c4663 ci(release): isolate preview releases from latest channels (#5462) 2026-07-30 11:28:48 +08:00
cxymds 67904a6c18 fix(ecstore): start with unresolved Kubernetes peers (#5460)
* fix(ecstore): start with unresolved Kubernetes peers

* fix(ecstore): infer Kubernetes endpoint identity safely

* fix(ecstore): fail closed on unsafe format migration

* fix(ecstore): reject poisoned format heal candidates

* fix(ecstore): reject unsafe legacy migration outliers

* fix(ecstore): resume interrupted format migrations

* fix(ecstore): preserve Kubernetes startup compatibility
2026-07-30 11:14:38 +08:00
205 changed files with 20871 additions and 3628 deletions
+80 -16
View File
@@ -1,19 +1,21 @@
---
name: rustfs-release-publish
description: "End-to-end RustFS release pipeline: bump version files on main directly to the final target version, cut a preview tag on that commit, verify the CI build and release artifacts, run the downloaded binary locally and exercise the console, validate the server with the latest rc client, then publish the final tag on the SAME validated commit — never a new bump commit, never latest main. Use whenever the user wants to release/publish a RustFS version (发版/发布)."
description: "End-to-end RustFS release pipeline: first publish any merged-but-unreleased rustfs/console changes and wait for its latest Release asset, then bump RustFS version files on main directly to the final target, publish a visible GitHub prerelease from a preview tag without updating latest channels, validate it, and publish the final tag on the SAME commit. Use whenever the user wants to release/publish a RustFS version (发版/发布)."
---
# RustFS Release Publish (preview-validated pipeline)
This skill orchestrates a full release. It wraps `rustfs-release-version-bump` (which only edits version files and opens the PR) with a mandatory preview-tag validation loop before the final tag is published.
Core design: **version files never carry a `-preview.N` suffix**. The preview suffix exists only in tag names. This works because the binary self-reports the git tag it was built from (`build::TAG` via shadow_rs, see `rustfs/src/config/cli.rs` `SHORT_VERSION`), and `build.yml` derives artifact names and prerelease classification from the tag name — Cargo.toml's version is only a no-tag fallback. Therefore the preview tag and the final tag can (and MUST) point at the exact same commit: what you validated is byte-for-byte the source that ships.
Core design: **version files never carry a `-preview.N` suffix**. The preview suffix exists only in tag names. A preview tag creates a visible GitHub Release marked Prerelease and uploads versioned assets, but it never becomes GitHub Latest and never updates `*-latest`, `latest.json`, R2, Docker, or Helm channels. This works because the binary self-reports the git tag it was built from (`build::TAG` via shadow_rs, see `rustfs/src/config/cli.rs` `SHORT_VERSION`), and `build.yml` derives artifact names and preview classification from the tag name — Cargo.toml's version is only a no-tag fallback. Therefore the preview tag and the final tag can (and MUST) point at the exact same commit: what you validated is byte-for-byte the source that ships.
Pipeline shape:
```
bump version files to <target> (final version, ONE commit) -> merge
check console main against its latest Release
-> if ahead: publish console -> wait for Release asset + latest API
-> bump RustFS version files to <target> (final version, ONE commit) -> merge
-> tag <preview-tag> at that commit -> CI green
-> verify release artifacts -> run binary locally + console checks
-> verify preview Release assets -> run binary locally + console checks
-> validate with latest rc client
-> tag <target> at the SAME commit (zero delta) -> re-verify CI/release
```
@@ -23,7 +25,7 @@ On validation failure: fix lands on main via normal PR (version files are alread
## Required inputs
- Final target version, for example `1.0.0-beta.10`.
- Preview iteration `N` (default: next unused preview tag for that target; check with `git tag -l '<target>-preview.*'` — and for stable targets `git tag -l '<target>-rc.*'` after `git fetch --tags`).
- Preview iteration `N` (default: next unused preview tag for that target; check with `git tag -l '<target>-preview.*'` after `git fetch --tags`).
If the target version is missing or ambiguous, stop and ask before doing anything (see the semver gate below).
@@ -45,14 +47,18 @@ Rules:
## Preview tag naming
- Prerelease target (contains `alpha`/`beta`/`rc`): preview tag is `<target>-preview.N`, e.g. `1.0.0-beta.10-preview.3`. It contains `beta`, so `build.yml`'s substring-based classification marks it prerelease — safe.
- **Stable** target (e.g. `1.1.0`): NEVER tag `1.1.0-preview.N``build.yml` marks a tag prerelease only if its name contains `alpha`, `beta`, or `rc`, so `1.1.0-preview.N` would be treated as a stable release and overwrite `latest.json` as stable. Use `1.1.0-rc.N` as the preview tag instead.
- Use `<target>-preview.N` for every target, e.g. `1.0.0-beta.10-preview.3` or `1.1.0-preview.1`.
- The canonical suffix is exactly `-preview.<digits>`. `build.yml` recognizes it before alpha/beta/rc classification and routes it to the preview-only path; any other tag containing `-preview` fails closed instead of being treated as a release.
- A preview Release MUST be published with `isPrerelease=true` and `isLatest=false`. Any `*-latest` preview asset or preview-triggered `latest.json`, R2, Docker, or Helm publication is a pipeline failure.
## Hard rules
- Version files (Cargo.toml, Cargo.lock, README, flake.nix, Chart.yaml, rustfs.spec) are bumped ONCE, directly to `<target>`. Never write a `-preview.N` suffix into any version file. If `rustfs-release-version-bump` is ever asked for a `-preview` version, that is a pipeline bug — stop.
- Preview Release assets are versioned and intentionally visible on the Releases page. Do not label them Latest or use them to update any latest distribution channel.
- Tags have no `v` prefix. Always annotated: `git tag -a <tag> -m "Release <tag>"`.
- The final tag MUST point at exactly `PREVIEW_HASH` — the commit the validated preview tag points at. Never tag current `main` HEAD (commits merged after validation are unvalidated), and never create an extra version-bump commit between preview and final.
- When a previous deliverable exists, GitHub Release notes for the preview and final tags MUST use it as their shared comparison baseline: the most recently published non-preview Release before the target. Internal `-preview.N` Releases are explicitly excluded from that selection, even when they point at the same commit as the final tag. If no previous deliverable exists, omit `previous_tag_name` and record that GitHub's default baseline fallback was used.
- Generated Release notes carry a workflow-management marker so retries can repair them. Before manually curating a generated body, remove that marker; unmarked non-placeholder notes are preserved by later workflow runs.
- Phases run in order; a failure in any phase blocks everything after it. After the fix lands on main, restart from Phase 2 with the next preview iteration against the new `origin/main` hash — do not resume mid-pipeline against a stale hash.
- If the release is abandoned after Phase 1 merged, main's version files claim a version that was never tagged. Either revert the bump PR or leave it to be overwritten by the next release — but tell the user explicitly and record the decision.
- User-facing status updates in Chinese; commits, PR titles/bodies, and tag messages in English. No hard-wrapping in commit messages, PR bodies, or documentation prose — one logical line per sentence/paragraph, let soft wrap handle display.
@@ -63,6 +69,61 @@ Rules:
- `gh auth status` works; confirm you can view `gh release list -L 3`.
- Confirm the exact final target version with the user if not explicit.
### Console release gate
Complete this gate before changing any RustFS version file or creating any RustFS tag. RustFS `build.yml` downloads the asset returned by `repos/rustfs/console/releases/latest`, so a successful Console build alone is insufficient.
1. Read the latest published Console tag and compare it with Console `main`:
```bash
CONSOLE_REPO="rustfs/console"
CONSOLE_LATEST=$(gh api "repos/${CONSOLE_REPO}/releases/latest" --jq .tag_name)
gh api "repos/${CONSOLE_REPO}/compare/${CONSOLE_LATEST}...main" \
--jq '{status, ahead_by, behind_by, commits: [.commits[] | {sha, message: .commit.message}]}'
```
- `ahead_by == 0`: no merged Console change is waiting for release. Still verify the current latest asset using step 4, then continue to Phase 1.
- `ahead_by > 0` and `behind_by == 0`: publish Console before continuing. Report the merged commits and select the next unused `vX.Y.Z` tag. Default to the next patch version when the changes are fixes or backward-compatible UI work; stop for confirmation if a minor/major bump is plausible.
- Any diverged history or `behind_by > 0`: stop and resolve the Console release baseline explicitly. Do not guess a range or publish RustFS.
2. Clone/fetch `rustfs/console` into a scratch directory and record its exact `main` commit. Before creating a tag, check for a `v*` tag or Release workflow already associated with that hash. If one is in progress, wait for it instead of creating another version:
```bash
CONSOLE_SCRATCH=$(mktemp -d)
gh repo clone "$CONSOLE_REPO" "$CONSOLE_SCRATCH/console"
git -C "$CONSOLE_SCRATCH/console" fetch origin main --tags
CONSOLE_HASH=$(git -C "$CONSOLE_SCRATCH/console" rev-parse origin/main)
git -C "$CONSOLE_SCRATCH/console" tag --points-at "$CONSOLE_HASH" 'v*'
gh run list -R "$CONSOLE_REPO" --workflow release.yml --commit "$CONSOLE_HASH" --limit 5
```
If no release exists or is running for `CONSOLE_HASH`, create the selected annotated tag at that exact hash and push it:
```bash
git -C "$CONSOLE_SCRATCH/console" tag -a "<console-tag>" -m "Release <console-tag>" "$CONSOLE_HASH"
git -C "$CONSOLE_SCRATCH/console" push origin "<console-tag>"
```
Console tags include the `v` prefix. Pushing the tag triggers `.github/workflows/release.yml` (`🚀 Release`). Remove `CONSOLE_SCRATCH` after the gate completes.
3. Find the exact tag run and wait for completion:
```bash
gh run list -R "$CONSOLE_REPO" --workflow release.yml --branch "<console-tag>" --limit 1
gh run watch -R "$CONSOLE_REPO" "<console-run-id>" --exit-status
```
4. Block until the published Release is non-draft, the latest endpoint returns the expected tag, and `rustfs-console-<console-tag>.zip` is uploaded, non-empty, and carries a `sha256:` digest:
```bash
gh release view -R "$CONSOLE_REPO" "<console-tag>" --json isDraft,isPrerelease,assets,url
test "$(gh api "repos/${CONSOLE_REPO}/releases/latest" --jq .tag_name)" = "<console-tag>"
test "$(gh api "repos/${CONSOLE_REPO}/releases/tags/<console-tag>" \
--jq '[.assets[] | select(.name == "rustfs-console-<console-tag>.zip" and .state == "uploaded" and .size > 0 and (.digest | startswith("sha256:")))] | length')" -eq 1
```
Treat a missing/mismatched asset, digest, latest tag, or failed/cancelled workflow as BLOCKED. Do not start Phase 1 until the Console gate passes. Record `CONSOLE_TAG`, `CONSOLE_HASH`, Console run URL, and Release URL for the final report.
## Phase 1 — Version bump to the final target (once)
- If main's version files already read `<target>` (e.g. this is a restart after a failed preview), verify with `rg -n "<target>" Cargo.toml rustfs.spec helm/rustfs/Chart.yaml` and skip to Phase 2.
@@ -85,16 +146,17 @@ git push origin "<preview-tag>"
Pushing the tag triggers `.github/workflows/build.yml` ("Build and Release"); `docker.yml` chains off it via `workflow_run`.
The preview run builds versioned artifacts and publishes them in a GitHub prerelease. Its latest-channel, R2, Docker, and Helm jobs must be skipped. Those publication paths run only after the final tag is pushed.
On a restart (N+1), refresh `PREVIEW_HASH=$(git rev-parse origin/main)` first — it must contain the fix — and re-report it.
## Phase 3 — CI and artifact verification
## Phase 3 — CI and preview Release verification
- Watch the tag build: `gh run list --workflow build.yml --limit 5` then `gh run watch <run-id>`. Every matrix target must succeed (linux x86_64/aarch64 × musl/gnu, macos-aarch64, windows-x86_64) plus the release and latest.json jobs.
- Verify the GitHub release: `gh release view "<preview-tag>" --json isPrerelease,assets`
- `isPrerelease` must be `true`.
- Assets must include all 6 platform zips in both versioned (`rustfs-<platform>-v<tag>.zip`) and `-latest` forms, plus `SHA256SUMS`, `SHA512SUMS`, `rustfs-<tag>.sbom.cdx.json`, `rustfs-<tag>.provenance.json`.
- Verify the chained Docker run succeeded: `gh run list --workflow docker.yml --limit 3`.
- Checksum spot-check for the platform you will run locally: download the zip and `SHA256SUMS`, verify with `shasum -a 256 -c` (grep to one line).
- Find and watch the tag build: `gh run list --workflow build.yml --branch "<preview-tag>" --limit 1` then `gh run watch <run-id>`. Every build matrix target must succeed (linux x86_64/aarch64 × musl/gnu, macos-aarch64, windows-x86_64).
- Confirm the Release publication jobs (`create-release`, `upload-release-assets`, and `publish-release`) succeed while `update-latest-version` is skipped.
- Verify `gh release view "<preview-tag>" --json isPrerelease,assets,url`: `isPrerelease` must be `true`, and the Release must contain all 6 versioned platform zips, checksums, SBOM, and provenance with no `-latest` assets. Confirm `gh api repos/{owner}/{repo}/releases/latest --jq .tag_name` does not return `<preview-tag>`.
- Record `PREVIOUS_DELIVERABLE`, selected from published Releases by `publishedAt` after excluding the current tag and every `-preview.N` tag. Verify `gh release view "<preview-tag>" --json body --jq .body` contains `## What's Changed` and, when `PREVIOUS_DELIVERABLE` exists, `**Full Changelog**: https://github.com/rustfs/rustfs/compare/<PREVIOUS_DELIVERABLE>...<preview-tag>`. For a repository with no previous deliverable, verify a Full Changelog link exists and record the GitHub baseline fallback.
- Confirm preview-triggered Docker and Helm jobs are skipped. Preview validation covers the built RustFS binaries, embedded console, and rc compatibility; Docker image construction and Helm publication are deferred to the final tag because the Dockerfiles consume GitHub Release assets.
## Phase 4 — Run the artifact locally, verify the console
@@ -157,13 +219,15 @@ git push origin "<target>"
```
- CI rebuilds from the same source; the only changed input is the tag name, so the binary now self-reports `<target>`.
- Re-run the Phase 3 verification against the final tag: all matrix jobs green; `gh release view "<target>"` shows the full asset set; for a prerelease target `isPrerelease` is `true`, for a stable target it must be `false` and `latest.json` must be updated.
- Verify the final tag's complete publication path: all matrix and release jobs green; `gh release view "<target>"` shows the full versioned and `-latest` asset set plus checksums, SBOM, and provenance; Docker and Helm workflows succeed; `latest.json` points to `<target>`. A stable target must have `isPrerelease=false` and `isLatest=true`. An alpha/beta/rc target must have `isPrerelease=true`; GitHub does not permit prereleases to be Latest, but the project `latest.json` still advances to the final non-preview target.
- Verify the final Release body contains `## What's Changed` and a Full Changelog link. When `PREVIOUS_DELIVERABLE` exists, the link MUST be `https://github.com/rustfs/rustfs/compare/<PREVIOUS_DELIVERABLE>...<target>` and the baseline MUST equal the preview Release baseline; for example, both `1.0.0-beta.12-preview.1` and `1.0.0-beta.12` compare from `1.0.0-beta.11`.
- Optionally spot-check `./rustfs --version` from a final-tag artifact — it must report `<target>`.
## Output contract
Always report:
- Console gate result: previous/latest Console tags, whether merged changes required a release, `CONSOLE_HASH`, and Console run/Release URLs when a release was published.
- Target version, preview tag(s) used, `PREVIEW_HASH` (which both tags point at).
- Per-phase result (PASS/FAIL/BLOCKED) with key evidence: CI run URLs, release URLs, console check results, the rc command matrix.
- Per-phase result (PASS/FAIL/BLOCKED) with key evidence: preview and final Release URLs, preview `isPrerelease`/`isLatest` state, final latest-channel state, console check results, and the rc command matrix.
- Any deviation from this pipeline and why the user approved it.
@@ -18,7 +18,7 @@ Validated baseline: release pattern used in PR `#2957`.
If target version is missing or ambiguous, stop and ask before editing.
Reject any target version containing a `-preview.` suffix: preview identifiers are tag-only (see `rustfs-release-publish`) and must never be written into version files. If asked for one, stop and point to the release pipeline instead of editing.
Reject any target version containing `-preview`: preview identifiers are tag-only (see `rustfs-release-publish`) and must never be written into version files. If asked for one, stop and point to the release pipeline instead of editing.
## Read before editing
+7
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@@ -23,6 +23,8 @@ on:
- 'deny.toml'
- '.github/actions/**'
- '.github/workflows/**'
- 'scripts/release/create_or_update_release.sh'
- 'scripts/security/check_preview_release_workflow.sh'
- 'scripts/security/check_workflow_pins.sh'
pull_request:
types: [ opened, synchronize, reopened, closed ]
@@ -33,6 +35,8 @@ on:
- 'deny.toml'
- '.github/actions/**'
- '.github/workflows/**'
- 'scripts/release/create_or_update_release.sh'
- 'scripts/security/check_preview_release_workflow.sh'
- 'scripts/security/check_workflow_pins.sh'
schedule:
- cron: '0 3 * * 0' # Weekly on Sunday 03:00 UTC (staggered after the midnight ci/build crons)
@@ -96,6 +100,9 @@ jobs:
- name: Report unpinned GitHub Actions
run: ./scripts/security/check_workflow_pins.sh --enforce
- name: Check preview release workflow policy
run: ./scripts/security/check_preview_release_workflow.sh
dependency-review:
name: Dependency Review
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
+50 -81
View File
@@ -107,13 +107,21 @@ jobs:
# Determine build type based on trigger
if [[ "${{ startsWith(github.ref, 'refs/tags/') }}" == "true" ]]; then
# Tag push - release or prerelease
# Tag push - preview, release, or prerelease
should_build=true
tag_name="${GITHUB_REF#refs/tags/}"
version="${tag_name}"
# Check if this is a prerelease
if [[ "$tag_name" == *"alpha"* ]] || [[ "$tag_name" == *"beta"* ]] || [[ "$tag_name" == *"rc"* ]]; then
# Preview tags publish a GitHub prerelease for validation, but
# must not update any latest channel.
if [[ "$tag_name" =~ -preview\.[0-9]+$ ]]; then
build_type="preview"
is_prerelease=true
echo "🔍 Preview build detected: $tag_name"
elif [[ "$tag_name" == *"-preview"* ]]; then
echo "❌ Invalid preview tag: $tag_name (expected suffix: -preview.<number>)" >&2
exit 1
elif [[ "$tag_name" == *"alpha"* ]] || [[ "$tag_name" == *"beta"* ]] || [[ "$tag_name" == *"rc"* ]]; then
build_type="prerelease"
is_prerelease=true
echo "🚀 Prerelease build detected: $tag_name"
@@ -714,6 +722,10 @@ jobs:
echo ""
case "$BUILD_TYPE" in
"preview")
echo "🔍 Preview artifacts are published in a GitHub prerelease"
echo "⏭️ Preview releases do not update latest channels"
;;
"development")
echo "🛠️ Development build artifacts have been uploaded to OSS dev directory"
echo "⚠️ This is a development build - not suitable for production use"
@@ -732,7 +744,9 @@ jobs:
echo ""
echo "🐳 Docker Images:"
if [[ "${{ github.event.inputs.build_docker }}" == "false" ]]; then
if [[ "$BUILD_TYPE" == "preview" ]]; then
echo "⏭️ Preview tags do not publish Docker images"
elif [[ "${{ github.event.inputs.build_docker }}" == "false" ]]; then
echo "⏭️ Docker image build was skipped (binary only build)"
elif [[ "$BUILD_STATUS" == "success" ]]; then
echo "🔄 Docker images will be built and pushed automatically via workflow_run event"
@@ -740,11 +754,11 @@ jobs:
echo "❌ Docker image build will be skipped due to build failure"
fi
# Create GitHub Release (only for tag pushes)
# Create GitHub Release for every valid release tag, including previews
create-release:
name: Create GitHub Release
needs: [ build-check, build-rustfs ]
if: startsWith(github.ref, 'refs/tags/') && needs.build-check.outputs.build_type != 'development'
if: startsWith(github.ref, 'refs/tags/') && (needs.build-check.outputs.build_type == 'preview' || needs.build-check.outputs.build_type == 'release' || needs.build-check.outputs.build_type == 'prerelease')
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
permissions:
contents: write
@@ -767,9 +781,12 @@ jobs:
VERSION="${{ needs.build-check.outputs.version }}"
IS_PRERELEASE="${{ needs.build-check.outputs.is_prerelease }}"
BUILD_TYPE="${{ needs.build-check.outputs.build_type }}"
TARGET_COMMITISH=$(git rev-parse --verify "refs/tags/${TAG}^{commit}")
# Determine release type for title
if [[ "$BUILD_TYPE" == "prerelease" ]]; then
if [[ "$BUILD_TYPE" == "preview" ]]; then
RELEASE_TYPE="preview"
elif [[ "$BUILD_TYPE" == "prerelease" ]]; then
if [[ "$TAG" == *"alpha"* ]]; then
RELEASE_TYPE="alpha"
elif [[ "$TAG" == *"beta"* ]]; then
@@ -783,54 +800,24 @@ jobs:
RELEASE_TYPE="release"
fi
# Check if release already exists
if gh release view "$TAG" >/dev/null 2>&1; then
echo "Release $TAG already exists"
RELEASE_ID=$(gh release view "$TAG" --json databaseId --jq '.databaseId')
RELEASE_URL=$(gh release view "$TAG" --json url --jq '.url')
# Create release title
if [[ "$IS_PRERELEASE" == "true" ]]; then
TITLE="RustFS $VERSION (${RELEASE_TYPE})"
else
# Get release notes from tag message
RELEASE_NOTES=$(git tag -l --format='%(contents)' "${TAG}")
if [[ -z "$RELEASE_NOTES" || "$RELEASE_NOTES" =~ ^[[:space:]]*$ ]]; then
if [[ "$IS_PRERELEASE" == "true" ]]; then
RELEASE_NOTES="Pre-release ${VERSION} (${RELEASE_TYPE})"
else
RELEASE_NOTES="Release ${VERSION}"
fi
fi
# Create release title
if [[ "$IS_PRERELEASE" == "true" ]]; then
TITLE="RustFS $VERSION (${RELEASE_TYPE})"
else
TITLE="RustFS $VERSION"
fi
# Create the release
PRERELEASE_FLAG=""
if [[ "$IS_PRERELEASE" == "true" ]]; then
PRERELEASE_FLAG="--prerelease"
fi
gh release create "$TAG" \
--title "$TITLE" \
--notes "$RELEASE_NOTES" \
$PRERELEASE_FLAG \
--draft
RELEASE_ID=$(gh release view "$TAG" --json databaseId --jq '.databaseId')
RELEASE_URL=$(gh release view "$TAG" --json url --jq '.url')
TITLE="RustFS $VERSION"
fi
echo "release_id=$RELEASE_ID" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"
echo "release_url=$RELEASE_URL" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"
echo "Created release: $RELEASE_URL"
./scripts/release/create_or_update_release.sh \
"$TAG" \
"$TARGET_COMMITISH" \
"$TITLE" \
"$IS_PRERELEASE"
# Prepare and upload release assets
upload-release-assets:
name: Upload Release Assets
needs: [ build-check, build-rustfs, create-release ]
if: startsWith(github.ref, 'refs/tags/') && needs.build-check.outputs.build_type != 'development'
if: startsWith(github.ref, 'refs/tags/') && (needs.build-check.outputs.build_type == 'preview' || needs.build-check.outputs.build_type == 'release' || needs.build-check.outputs.build_type == 'prerelease')
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
permissions:
contents: write
@@ -920,8 +907,8 @@ jobs:
# the pointed-to version is a prerelease.
update-latest-version:
name: Update Latest Version
needs: [ build-check, upload-release-assets ]
if: startsWith(github.ref, 'refs/tags/')
needs: [ build-check, publish-release ]
if: startsWith(github.ref, 'refs/tags/') && (needs.build-check.outputs.build_type == 'release' || needs.build-check.outputs.build_type == 'prerelease')
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
steps:
- name: Update latest.json
@@ -980,51 +967,33 @@ jobs:
publish-release:
name: Publish Release
needs: [ build-check, create-release, upload-release-assets ]
if: startsWith(github.ref, 'refs/tags/') && needs.build-check.outputs.build_type != 'development'
if: startsWith(github.ref, 'refs/tags/') && (needs.build-check.outputs.build_type == 'preview' || needs.build-check.outputs.build_type == 'release' || needs.build-check.outputs.build_type == 'prerelease')
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
permissions:
contents: write
steps:
- name: Checkout repository
uses: actions/checkout@9c091bb21b7c1c1d1991bb908d89e4e9dddfe3e0 # v7
- name: Update release notes and publish
- name: Publish release
env:
GH_TOKEN: ${{ github.token }}
shell: bash
run: |
TAG="${{ needs.build-check.outputs.version }}"
VERSION="${{ needs.build-check.outputs.version }}"
IS_PRERELEASE="${{ needs.build-check.outputs.is_prerelease }}"
BUILD_TYPE="${{ needs.build-check.outputs.build_type }}"
RELEASE_ID="${{ needs.create-release.outputs.release_id }}"
# Determine release type
if [[ "$BUILD_TYPE" == "prerelease" ]]; then
if [[ "$TAG" == *"alpha"* ]]; then
RELEASE_TYPE="alpha"
elif [[ "$TAG" == *"beta"* ]]; then
RELEASE_TYPE="beta"
elif [[ "$TAG" == *"rc"* ]]; then
RELEASE_TYPE="rc"
else
RELEASE_TYPE="prerelease"
fi
# Publish the release and correct its channel state on retries.
# Only a stable final release may become GitHub Latest.
if [[ "$BUILD_TYPE" == "release" ]]; then
gh api --method PATCH "repos/${GITHUB_REPOSITORY}/releases/${RELEASE_ID}" \
-F draft=false \
-F prerelease=false \
-f make_latest=true >/dev/null
else
RELEASE_TYPE="release"
gh api --method PATCH "repos/${GITHUB_REPOSITORY}/releases/${RELEASE_ID}" \
-F draft=false \
-F prerelease=true \
-f make_latest=false >/dev/null
fi
# Get original release notes from tag
ORIGINAL_NOTES=$(git tag -l --format='%(contents)' "${TAG}")
if [[ -z "$ORIGINAL_NOTES" || "$ORIGINAL_NOTES" =~ ^[[:space:]]*$ ]]; then
if [[ "$IS_PRERELEASE" == "true" ]]; then
ORIGINAL_NOTES="Pre-release ${VERSION} (${RELEASE_TYPE})"
else
ORIGINAL_NOTES="Release ${VERSION}"
fi
fi
# Publish the release (remove draft status)
gh release edit "$TAG" --draft=false
echo "🎉 Released $TAG successfully!"
echo "📄 Release URL: ${{ needs.create-release.outputs.release_url }}"
+9 -1
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@@ -82,7 +82,8 @@ jobs:
github.event_name == 'workflow_dispatch' ||
(github.event.workflow_run.conclusion == 'success' &&
github.event.workflow_run.event == 'push' &&
github.event.workflow_run.head_branch != 'main')
github.event.workflow_run.head_branch != 'main' &&
!contains(github.event.workflow_run.head_branch, '-preview'))
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
outputs:
should_build: ${{ steps.check.outputs.should_build }}
@@ -220,6 +221,13 @@ jobs:
create_latest=true
echo "🚀 Building with latest stable release version"
;;
*-preview*)
build_type="preview"
is_prerelease=true
should_build=false
should_push=false
echo "⏭️ Preview tags do not publish Docker images"
;;
# Prerelease versions (must match first, more specific)
v*alpha*|v*beta*|v*rc*|*alpha*|*beta*|*rc*)
build_type="prerelease"
+3 -2
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@@ -33,11 +33,12 @@ jobs:
build-helm-package:
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
if: |
github.event_name == 'workflow_dispatch' ||
(github.event_name == 'workflow_dispatch' && !contains(github.event.inputs.version, '-preview')) ||
(
github.event.workflow_run.conclusion == 'success' &&
github.event.workflow_run.event == 'push' &&
contains(github.event.workflow_run.head_branch, '.')
contains(github.event.workflow_run.head_branch, '.') &&
!contains(github.event.workflow_run.head_branch, '-preview')
)
outputs:
Generated
+134 -35
View File
@@ -1528,7 +1528,7 @@ version = "0.10.4"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
checksum = "3078c7629b62d3f0439517fa394996acacc5cbc91c5a20d8c658e77abd503a71"
dependencies = [
"generic-array 0.14.9",
"generic-array 0.14.7",
]
[[package]]
@@ -1547,7 +1547,7 @@ version = "0.3.3"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
checksum = "a8894febbff9f758034a5b8e12d87918f56dfc64a8e1fe757d65e29041538d93"
dependencies = [
"generic-array 0.14.9",
"generic-array 0.14.7",
]
[[package]]
@@ -1598,7 +1598,7 @@ version = "3.9.3"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
checksum = "6dee98b0db6a962de883bf5d20362dee4d7ca0d12fe39a7c6c73c844e1cd7c1f"
dependencies = [
"darling 0.23.0",
"darling 0.20.11",
"ident_case",
"prettyplease",
"proc-macro2",
@@ -1870,7 +1870,7 @@ version = "0.4.4"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
checksum = "773f3b9af64447d2ce9850330c473515014aa235e6a783b02db81ff39e4a3dad"
dependencies = [
"crypto-common 0.1.6",
"crypto-common 0.1.7",
"inout 0.1.4",
]
@@ -2328,7 +2328,7 @@ version = "0.5.5"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
checksum = "0dc92fb57ca44df6db8059111ab3af99a63d5d0f8375d9972e319a379c6bab76"
dependencies = [
"generic-array 0.14.9",
"generic-array 0.14.7",
"rand_core 0.6.4",
"subtle",
"zeroize",
@@ -2353,11 +2353,11 @@ dependencies = [
[[package]]
name = "crypto-common"
version = "0.1.6"
version = "0.1.7"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
checksum = "1bfb12502f3fc46cca1bb51ac28df9d618d813cdc3d2f25b9fe775a34af26bb3"
checksum = "78c8292055d1c1df0cce5d180393dc8cce0abec0a7102adb6c7b1eef6016d60a"
dependencies = [
"generic-array 0.14.9",
"generic-array 0.14.7",
"typenum",
]
@@ -3554,7 +3554,7 @@ checksum = "9ed9a281f7bc9b7576e61468ba615a66a5c8cfdff42420a70aa82701a3b1e292"
dependencies = [
"block-buffer 0.10.4",
"const-oid 0.9.6",
"crypto-common 0.1.6",
"crypto-common 0.1.7",
"subtle",
]
@@ -3672,6 +3672,7 @@ dependencies = [
"flate2",
"futures",
"hex",
"hotpath",
"http 1.5.0",
"http-body-util",
"hyper",
@@ -3813,7 +3814,7 @@ dependencies = [
"crypto-bigint 0.5.5",
"digest 0.10.7",
"ff 0.13.1",
"generic-array 0.14.9",
"generic-array 0.14.7",
"group 0.13.0",
"hkdf 0.12.4",
"pem-rfc7468 0.7.0",
@@ -4258,9 +4259,9 @@ dependencies = [
[[package]]
name = "generic-array"
version = "0.14.9"
version = "0.14.7"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
checksum = "4bb6743198531e02858aeaea5398fcc883e71851fcbcb5a2f773e2fb6cb1edf2"
checksum = "85649ca51fd72272d7821adaf274ad91c288277713d9c18820d8499a7ff69e9a"
dependencies = [
"typenum",
"version_check",
@@ -4273,7 +4274,7 @@ version = "1.4.4"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
checksum = "ab4e5aa225bc56696909483320f0ff9b600f1a971b52e07a17d70f3d9b43254b"
dependencies = [
"generic-array 0.14.9",
"generic-array 0.14.7",
"rustversion",
"typenum",
]
@@ -4372,9 +4373,9 @@ dependencies = [
[[package]]
name = "google-cloud-auth"
version = "1.14.0"
version = "1.15.0"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
checksum = "a3494870d06f3cbbb3561ada6f234982549e3a2fb31e719ef258e6eadb9ae09a"
checksum = "f54aab44c16b8463ae11b165a87c3d484780231f157bb1ed65843d591beb5abd"
dependencies = [
"async-trait",
"aws-lc-rs",
@@ -4401,9 +4402,9 @@ dependencies = [
[[package]]
name = "google-cloud-gax"
version = "1.12.0"
version = "1.13.0"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
checksum = "3103a4a9013f1aed573ca56e19a9680b0211643a99ea85caf524b397d6be8be3"
checksum = "b9a46dd0fd026bbc4a5d84e6ab0c941cee6e3b057976a0bb107fdb5238ce598f"
dependencies = [
"bytes",
"futures",
@@ -4420,9 +4421,9 @@ dependencies = [
[[package]]
name = "google-cloud-gax-internal"
version = "0.7.15"
version = "0.7.16"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
checksum = "c0df265fba091ed7e00ecd0755009423310163f8b52820f007b6b4d97f4c6617"
checksum = "fb04c54317ace06d489213f761797240b3046142a9b7ce6b9a82a9d134e193d1"
dependencies = [
"bytes",
"futures",
@@ -4524,9 +4525,9 @@ dependencies = [
[[package]]
name = "google-cloud-storage"
version = "1.16.0"
version = "1.17.0"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
checksum = "dc4b1d78c88db5c2530b12461e373a7d0d3a6caa3f6c1fc14e5d824cf2aeb307"
checksum = "9227f65175fa91a6e41f246797917697efdadfe09dd8ea84ad8b737a71efbd28"
dependencies = [
"async-trait",
"base64 0.22.1",
@@ -4577,9 +4578,9 @@ dependencies = [
[[package]]
name = "google-cloud-wkt"
version = "1.6.0"
version = "1.7.0"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
checksum = "46df1fcc3ab69164af3f4199ed21f45b5dbc56d9f03211eb4fa20116d442364b"
checksum = "7fccf98cfd5481a5f5a285181ab0c62123d7d47cd2bb7299448440649349e4e7"
dependencies = [
"base64 0.22.1",
"bytes",
@@ -4916,19 +4917,31 @@ source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
checksum = "66750a77f4f6b408a148be5102ef1f3ba7172def7ee92b1cfc75d9f7a3870453"
dependencies = [
"arc-swap",
"async-channel",
"async-trait",
"cfg-if",
"crossbeam-channel",
"flate2",
"futures-channel",
"futures-util",
"hdrhistogram",
"hotpath-macros",
"hotpath-meta",
"http 1.5.0",
"libc",
"object 0.36.7",
"parking_lot",
"pin-project-lite",
"prettytable-rs",
"quanta",
"regex",
"reqwest",
"reqwest-middleware",
"rustc-demangle",
"serde",
"serde_json",
"tiny_http",
"tokio",
]
[[package]]
@@ -4942,6 +4955,21 @@ dependencies = [
"syn 2.0.119",
]
[[package]]
name = "hotpath-macros-meta"
version = "0.22.0"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
checksum = "21f2f70b29b6f42311acd2fb0b2f91a34d9a573c76fb8a7f51970670a1673a49"
[[package]]
name = "hotpath-meta"
version = "0.22.0"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
checksum = "8b771f77b2f409086bb40ff029f850ce99d17118d4e207df0f28cb32bd7568c7"
dependencies = [
"hotpath-macros-meta",
]
[[package]]
name = "htmlescape"
version = "0.3.1"
@@ -5023,9 +5051,9 @@ checksum = "15cdd26707701c53297e2fa6afb323d55fbc1d0810c3aec078ae3ef0424c3c15"
[[package]]
name = "hybrid-array"
version = "0.4.13"
version = "0.4.14"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
checksum = "818356c5132c1fede50f837ca96afbe78ff42413047f4abb886217845e1b6c8c"
checksum = "707114b52a152fa7bdb290cd7cd5912d9467273b6d74e21b8d81aca1f8533f6b"
dependencies = [
"ctutils",
"subtle",
@@ -5273,7 +5301,7 @@ source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
checksum = "879f10e63c20629ecabbb64a8010319738c66a5cd0c29b02d63d272b03751d01"
dependencies = [
"block-padding 0.3.3",
"generic-array 0.14.9",
"generic-array 0.14.7",
]
[[package]]
@@ -6783,6 +6811,15 @@ dependencies = [
"objc2-core-foundation",
]
[[package]]
name = "object"
version = "0.36.7"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
checksum = "62948e14d923ea95ea2c7c86c71013138b66525b86bdc08d2dcc262bdb497b87"
dependencies = [
"memchr",
]
[[package]]
name = "object"
version = "0.37.3"
@@ -7820,7 +7857,7 @@ source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
checksum = "be769465445e8c1474e9c5dac2018218498557af32d9ed057325ec9a41ae81bf"
dependencies = [
"heck",
"itertools 0.10.5",
"itertools 0.13.0",
"log",
"multimap",
"once_cell",
@@ -7840,7 +7877,7 @@ source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
checksum = "03da047801ff44bb6a4d407d4860c05fd70bb81714e6b2f3812603d5b145b042"
dependencies = [
"heck",
"itertools 0.10.5",
"itertools 0.13.0",
"log",
"multimap",
"petgraph 0.8.3",
@@ -7861,7 +7898,7 @@ source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
checksum = "8a56d757972c98b346a9b766e3f02746cde6dd1cd1d1d563472929fdd74bec4d"
dependencies = [
"anyhow",
"itertools 0.10.5",
"itertools 0.13.0",
"proc-macro2",
"quote",
"syn 2.0.119",
@@ -7874,7 +7911,7 @@ source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
checksum = "b570b25f7617e43d59005d0990ccb79e950a423952cea19671b7a876da390adf"
dependencies = [
"anyhow",
"itertools 0.10.5",
"itertools 0.13.0",
"proc-macro2",
"quote",
"syn 2.0.119",
@@ -8514,6 +8551,21 @@ dependencies = [
"web-sys",
]
[[package]]
name = "reqwest-middleware"
version = "0.5.2"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
checksum = "07bc3f1384cffa4f274dad2d4ddd73aed32fed8f786d96c6be8aa4e5fd3c3b58"
dependencies = [
"anyhow",
"async-trait",
"http 1.5.0",
"reqwest",
"serde",
"thiserror 2.0.19",
"tower-service",
]
[[package]]
name = "resolv-conf"
version = "0.7.6"
@@ -8988,6 +9040,7 @@ dependencies = [
"const-str",
"futures",
"hashbrown 0.17.1",
"hotpath",
"metrics",
"rustfs-config",
"rustfs-s3-types",
@@ -9008,6 +9061,7 @@ dependencies = [
"base64-simd",
"bytes",
"crc-fast",
"hotpath",
"http 1.5.0",
"md-5 0.11.0",
"pretty_assertions",
@@ -9021,6 +9075,7 @@ name = "rustfs-common"
version = "1.0.0-beta.12"
dependencies = [
"chrono",
"hotpath",
"metrics",
"rmp-serde",
"s3s",
@@ -9035,6 +9090,7 @@ dependencies = [
name = "rustfs-concurrency"
version = "1.0.0-beta.12"
dependencies = [
"hotpath",
"insta",
"rustfs-io-core",
"serde",
@@ -9048,6 +9104,7 @@ name = "rustfs-config"
version = "1.0.0-beta.12"
dependencies = [
"const-str",
"hotpath",
"serde",
"serde_json",
]
@@ -9058,6 +9115,7 @@ version = "1.0.0-beta.12"
dependencies = [
"base64-simd",
"hmac 0.13.0",
"hotpath",
"rand 0.10.2",
"serde",
"serde_json",
@@ -9073,6 +9131,7 @@ dependencies = [
"argon2",
"base64-simd",
"chacha20poly1305",
"hotpath",
"jsonwebtoken 11.0.0",
"pbkdf2 0.13.0",
"rand 0.10.2",
@@ -9090,6 +9149,7 @@ name = "rustfs-data-usage"
version = "1.0.0-beta.12"
dependencies = [
"async-trait",
"hotpath",
"rmp-serde",
"rustfs-filemeta",
"serde",
@@ -9099,7 +9159,6 @@ dependencies = [
name = "rustfs-ecstore"
version = "1.0.0-beta.12"
dependencies = [
"aes-gcm",
"arc-swap",
"async-channel",
"async-recursion",
@@ -9115,7 +9174,6 @@ dependencies = [
"byteorder",
"bytes",
"bytesize",
"chacha20poly1305",
"chrono",
"criterion",
"enumset",
@@ -9128,6 +9186,7 @@ dependencies = [
"google-cloud-storage",
"hex-simd",
"hmac 0.13.0",
"hostname",
"hotpath",
"http 1.5.0",
"http-body 1.1.0",
@@ -9168,7 +9227,6 @@ dependencies = [
"rustfs-erasure-codec",
"rustfs-filemeta",
"rustfs-io-metrics",
"rustfs-kms",
"rustfs-lifecycle",
"rustfs-lock",
"rustfs-madmin",
@@ -9237,6 +9295,7 @@ dependencies = [
name = "rustfs-extension-schema"
version = "1.0.0-beta.12"
dependencies = [
"hotpath",
"serde",
"serde_json",
"thiserror 2.0.19",
@@ -9275,6 +9334,7 @@ dependencies = [
"async-trait",
"base64 0.23.0",
"futures",
"hotpath",
"http 1.5.0",
"metrics",
"rustfs-common",
@@ -9306,6 +9366,7 @@ dependencies = [
"async-trait",
"base64-simd",
"futures",
"hotpath",
"http 1.5.0",
"jsonwebtoken 11.0.0",
"moka",
@@ -9340,6 +9401,7 @@ name = "rustfs-io-core"
version = "1.0.0-beta.12"
dependencies = [
"bytes",
"hotpath",
"memmap2",
"rustfs-io-metrics",
"thiserror 2.0.19",
@@ -9352,10 +9414,13 @@ name = "rustfs-io-metrics"
version = "1.0.0-beta.12"
dependencies = [
"criterion",
"hotpath",
"metrics",
"metrics-util",
"num_cpus",
"rustfs-common",
"rustfs-s3-ops",
"rustfs-utils",
"sysinfo",
"thiserror 2.0.19",
"tokio",
@@ -9416,6 +9481,7 @@ version = "1.0.0-beta.12"
dependencies = [
"bytes",
"futures",
"hotpath",
"http 1.5.0",
"http-body 1.1.0",
"http-body-util",
@@ -9441,20 +9507,25 @@ name = "rustfs-kms"
version = "1.0.0-beta.12"
dependencies = [
"aes-gcm",
"anyhow",
"arc-swap",
"argon2",
"async-trait",
"base64 0.23.0",
"chacha20poly1305",
"hex",
"hotpath",
"insta",
"jiff",
"md-5 0.11.0",
"metrics",
"metrics-util",
"moka",
"rand 0.10.2",
"reqwest",
"rustfs-security-governance",
"rustfs-utils",
"rustify",
"serde",
"serde_json",
"sha2 0.11.0",
@@ -9463,6 +9534,7 @@ dependencies = [
"tempfile",
"thiserror 2.0.19",
"tokio",
"tokio-util",
"tracing",
"url",
"uuid",
@@ -9475,6 +9547,7 @@ name = "rustfs-lifecycle"
version = "1.0.0-beta.12"
dependencies = [
"async-trait",
"hotpath",
"metrics",
"metrics-util",
"proptest",
@@ -9499,6 +9572,7 @@ dependencies = [
"async-trait",
"crossbeam-queue",
"futures",
"hotpath",
"parking_lot",
"rand 0.10.2",
"rustfs-io-metrics",
@@ -9520,6 +9594,7 @@ version = "1.0.0-beta.12"
dependencies = [
"chrono",
"flate2",
"hotpath",
"regex",
"serde",
"serde_json",
@@ -9537,6 +9612,7 @@ name = "rustfs-madmin"
version = "1.0.0-beta.12"
dependencies = [
"chrono",
"hotpath",
"humantime",
"hyper",
"rmp-serde",
@@ -9557,6 +9633,7 @@ dependencies = [
"criterion",
"form_urlencoded",
"hashbrown 0.17.1",
"hotpath",
"metrics",
"percent-encoding",
"quick-xml",
@@ -9586,6 +9663,7 @@ version = "1.0.0-beta.12"
dependencies = [
"criterion",
"futures",
"hotpath",
"rustfs-config",
"rustfs-io-metrics",
"rustfs-utils",
@@ -9604,6 +9682,7 @@ version = "1.0.0-beta.12"
dependencies = [
"bytes",
"criterion",
"hotpath",
"metrics",
"metrics-util",
"moka",
@@ -9626,6 +9705,7 @@ dependencies = [
"flate2",
"futures-util",
"glob",
"hotpath",
"jiff",
"libc",
"metrics",
@@ -9674,6 +9754,7 @@ dependencies = [
"base64-simd",
"chrono",
"futures",
"hotpath",
"ipnetwork",
"jsonwebtoken 11.0.0",
"moka",
@@ -9710,6 +9791,7 @@ dependencies = [
"futures-util",
"hex",
"hmac 0.13.0",
"hotpath",
"http 1.5.0",
"http-body-util",
"hyper",
@@ -9762,6 +9844,7 @@ name = "rustfs-protos"
version = "1.0.0-beta.12"
dependencies = [
"flatbuffers",
"hotpath",
"prost 0.14.4",
"rmp-serde",
"rustfs-common",
@@ -9786,6 +9869,7 @@ version = "1.0.0-beta.12"
dependencies = [
"byteorder",
"bytes",
"hotpath",
"regex",
"rmp",
"rmp-serde",
@@ -9844,6 +9928,7 @@ dependencies = [
"chacha20poly1305",
"hex",
"hmac 0.13.0",
"hotpath",
"minlz",
"pin-project-lite",
"rand 0.10.2",
@@ -9861,6 +9946,7 @@ dependencies = [
name = "rustfs-s3-ops"
version = "1.0.0-beta.12"
dependencies = [
"hotpath",
"rustfs-s3-types",
]
@@ -9868,6 +9954,7 @@ dependencies = [
name = "rustfs-s3-types"
version = "1.0.0-beta.12"
dependencies = [
"hotpath",
"serde",
"serde_json",
]
@@ -9882,6 +9969,7 @@ dependencies = [
"datafusion",
"futures",
"futures-core",
"hotpath",
"http 1.5.0",
"metrics",
"parking_lot",
@@ -9910,6 +9998,7 @@ dependencies = [
"datafusion",
"derive_builder",
"futures",
"hotpath",
"parking_lot",
"rustfs-s3select-api",
"s3s",
@@ -9927,6 +10016,7 @@ dependencies = [
"futures",
"hex-simd",
"hmac 0.13.0",
"hotpath",
"http 1.5.0",
"metrics",
"rand 0.10.2",
@@ -9959,6 +10049,7 @@ dependencies = [
name = "rustfs-security-governance"
version = "1.0.0-beta.12"
dependencies = [
"hotpath",
"thiserror 2.0.19",
]
@@ -9968,6 +10059,7 @@ version = "1.0.0-beta.12"
dependencies = [
"base64-simd",
"bytes",
"hotpath",
"http 1.5.0",
"hyper",
"rustfs-utils",
@@ -9984,6 +10076,7 @@ name = "rustfs-storage-api"
version = "1.0.0-beta.12"
dependencies = [
"async-trait",
"hotpath",
"insta",
"rustfs-filemeta",
"serde",
@@ -10005,6 +10098,7 @@ dependencies = [
"deadpool-postgres",
"futures-util",
"hashbrown 0.17.1",
"hotpath",
"hyper",
"hyper-rustls",
"lapin",
@@ -10050,6 +10144,7 @@ dependencies = [
name = "rustfs-test-utils"
version = "1.0.0-beta.12"
dependencies = [
"hotpath",
"rustfs-data-usage",
"rustfs-ecstore",
"rustfs-storage-api",
@@ -10066,6 +10161,7 @@ name = "rustfs-tls-runtime"
version = "1.0.0-beta.12"
dependencies = [
"arc-swap",
"hotpath",
"metrics",
"rcgen",
"rustfs-common",
@@ -10087,6 +10183,7 @@ version = "1.0.0-beta.12"
dependencies = [
"async-trait",
"axum",
"hotpath",
"http 1.5.0",
"ipnetwork",
"metrics",
@@ -10133,6 +10230,7 @@ dependencies = [
"hex-simd",
"highway",
"hmac 0.13.0",
"hotpath",
"http 1.5.0",
"hyper",
"local-ip-address",
@@ -10165,6 +10263,7 @@ dependencies = [
"astral-tokio-tar",
"async-compression",
"criterion",
"hotpath",
"tempfile",
"thiserror 2.0.19",
"tokio",
@@ -10508,7 +10607,7 @@ checksum = "d3e97a565f76233a6003f9f5c54be1d9c5bdfa3eccfb189469f11ec4901c47dc"
dependencies = [
"base16ct 0.2.0",
"der 0.7.10",
"generic-array 0.14.9",
"generic-array 0.14.7",
"pkcs8 0.10.2",
"subtle",
"zeroize",
@@ -11498,7 +11597,7 @@ source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
checksum = "32497e9a4c7b38532efcdebeef879707aa9f794296a4f0244f6f69e9bc8574bd"
dependencies = [
"fastrand",
"getrandom 0.3.4",
"getrandom 0.4.3",
"once_cell",
"rustix",
"windows-sys 0.61.2",
+5 -3
View File
@@ -250,12 +250,13 @@ enumset = "1.1.14"
faster-hex = "0.10.0"
flate2 = "1.1.9"
glob = "0.3.4"
google-cloud-storage = "1.16.0"
google-cloud-auth = "1.14.0"
google-cloud-storage = "1.17.0"
google-cloud-auth = "1.15.0"
hashbrown = { version = "0.17.1" }
hex = "0.4.3"
hex-simd = "0.8.0"
highway = { version = "1.3.0" }
hostname = "0.4.2"
ipnetwork = { version = "0.21.1" }
lazy_static = "1.5.0"
libc = "0.2.189"
@@ -284,6 +285,7 @@ reed-solomon-simd = "3.1.0"
regex = { version = "1.13.1" }
rumqttc = { package = "rumqttc-next", version = "0.33.3" }
redis = { version = "1.5.0" }
rustify = { version = "0.7", default-features = false }
rustix = { version = "1.1.4" }
rust-embed = { version = "8.12.0" }
rustc-hash = { version = "2.1.3" }
@@ -346,7 +348,7 @@ dav-server = "0.11.0"
# Performance Analysis and Memory Profiling
mimalloc = "0.1.52"
hotpath = "0.22.0"
hotpath = { version = "0.22.0", default-features = false }
# Snapshot testing for output format regression detection
insta = { version = "1.48" }
+26
View File
@@ -25,7 +25,33 @@ documentation = "https://docs.rs/rustfs-audit/latest/rustfs_audit/"
keywords = ["audit", "target", "management", "fan-out", "RustFS"]
categories = ["web-programming", "development-tools", "asynchronous", "api-bindings"]
[features]
default = []
hotpath = [
"hotpath/hotpath",
"hotpath/tokio",
"hotpath/futures",
"rustfs-config/hotpath",
"rustfs-s3-types/hotpath",
"rustfs-targets/hotpath",
]
hotpath-alloc = [
"hotpath",
"hotpath/hotpath-alloc",
"rustfs-config/hotpath-alloc",
"rustfs-s3-types/hotpath-alloc",
"rustfs-targets/hotpath-alloc",
]
hotpath-cpu = [
"hotpath",
"hotpath/hotpath-cpu",
"rustfs-config/hotpath-cpu",
"rustfs-s3-types/hotpath-cpu",
"rustfs-targets/hotpath-cpu",
]
[dependencies]
hotpath.workspace = true
rustfs-targets = { workspace = true }
rustfs-config = { workspace = true, features = ["audit", "server-config-model"] }
rustfs-s3-types = { workspace = true }
+7
View File
@@ -28,7 +28,14 @@ documentation = "https://docs.rs/rustfs-checksums/latest/rustfs_checksum/"
[lints]
workspace = true
[features]
default = []
hotpath = ["hotpath/hotpath"]
hotpath-alloc = ["hotpath", "hotpath/hotpath-alloc"]
hotpath-cpu = ["hotpath", "hotpath/hotpath-cpu"]
[dependencies]
hotpath.workspace = true
bytes = { workspace = true, features = ["serde"] }
crc-fast = { workspace = true }
http = { workspace = true }
+7
View File
@@ -27,7 +27,14 @@ categories = ["web-programming", "development-tools", "data-structures"]
[lints]
workspace = true
[features]
default = []
hotpath = ["hotpath/hotpath", "hotpath/tokio"]
hotpath-alloc = ["hotpath", "hotpath/hotpath-alloc"]
hotpath-cpu = ["hotpath", "hotpath/hotpath-cpu"]
[dependencies]
hotpath.workspace = true
tokio = { workspace = true, features = ["fs", "rt-multi-thread"] }
tonic = { workspace = true, features = ["gzip", "deflate"] }
uuid = { workspace = true, features = ["v4", "fast-rng", "macro-diagnostics"] }
+7
View File
@@ -13,7 +13,14 @@ categories = ["concurrency", "filesystem"]
[lints]
workspace = true
[features]
default = []
hotpath = ["hotpath/hotpath", "hotpath/tokio", "rustfs-io-core/hotpath"]
hotpath-alloc = ["hotpath", "hotpath/hotpath-alloc", "rustfs-io-core/hotpath-alloc"]
hotpath-cpu = ["hotpath", "hotpath/hotpath-cpu", "rustfs-io-core/hotpath-cpu"]
[dependencies]
hotpath.workspace = true
# Internal crates
rustfs-io-core = { workspace = true }
serde = { workspace = true, features = ["derive"] }
+4
View File
@@ -25,6 +25,7 @@ keywords = ["configuration", "settings", "management", "rustfs", "Minio"]
categories = ["web-programming", "development-tools", "config"]
[dependencies]
hotpath.workspace = true
const-str = { workspace = true, optional = true, features = ["std", "proc"] }
serde = { workspace = true, optional = true, features = ["derive"] }
serde_json = { workspace = true, optional = true, features = ["raw_value"] }
@@ -34,6 +35,9 @@ workspace = true
[features]
default = ["constants"]
hotpath = ["hotpath/hotpath"]
hotpath-alloc = ["hotpath", "hotpath/hotpath-alloc"]
hotpath-cpu = ["hotpath", "hotpath/hotpath-cpu"]
audit = ["dep:const-str", "constants"]
constants = ["dep:const-str"]
notify = ["dep:const-str", "constants"]
+4
View File
@@ -66,6 +66,10 @@ Current guidance:
- `RUSTFS_BROWSER_REDIRECT_URL` sets the externally reachable browser origin used for OIDC callback, console success redirect, and logout fallback URLs. Configure it to the public scheme and authority without a path, for example `https://console.example.com`. In load-balancer deployments, keep OIDC authorize and callback requests on the same backend node because the in-flight OIDC `state` is local to the RustFS node.
## Distributed endpoint locality
- `RUSTFS_LOCAL_ENDPOINT_HOST` identifies this server's host in a distributed `RUSTFS_VOLUMES` topology without resolving every peer during startup. Set it to exactly one host, without a scheme, port, or path. It is accepted only for orchestrated URL topologies and must match at least one endpoint on the RustFS server port; invalid or unmatched values fail startup. Leave it unset to retain DNS-based locality discovery.
## Scanner environment aliases
- `RUSTFS_SCANNER_SPEED` (canonical, also accepts `MINIO_SCANNER_SPEED`)
+4
View File
@@ -131,6 +131,10 @@ pub const ENV_RUSTFS_ADDRESS: &str = "RUSTFS_ADDRESS";
/// Environment variable for server volumes.
pub const ENV_RUSTFS_VOLUMES: &str = "RUSTFS_VOLUMES";
/// Environment variable identifying this server's host in distributed endpoint
/// lists without relying on DNS locality discovery.
pub const ENV_LOCAL_ENDPOINT_HOST: &str = "RUSTFS_LOCAL_ENDPOINT_HOST";
/// Environment variable to explicitly bypass local physical disk independence checks.
pub const ENV_UNSAFE_BYPASS_DISK_CHECK: &str = "RUSTFS_UNSAFE_BYPASS_DISK_CHECK";
+7
View File
@@ -24,7 +24,14 @@ description = "Credentials management utilities for RustFS, enabling secure hand
keywords = ["rustfs", "Minio", "credentials", "authentication", "authorization"]
categories = ["web-programming", "development-tools", "data-structures", "security"]
[features]
default = []
hotpath = ["hotpath/hotpath"]
hotpath-alloc = ["hotpath", "hotpath/hotpath-alloc"]
hotpath-cpu = ["hotpath", "hotpath/hotpath-cpu"]
[dependencies]
hotpath.workspace = true
base64-simd = { workspace = true }
hmac = { workspace = true }
rand = { workspace = true, features = ["serde"] }
+4
View File
@@ -29,6 +29,7 @@ documentation = "https://docs.rs/rustfs-crypto/latest/rustfs_crypto/"
workspace = true
[dependencies]
hotpath.workspace = true
aes-gcm = { workspace = true, optional = true, features = ["rand_core"] }
argon2 = { workspace = true, optional = true }
chacha20poly1305 = { workspace = true, optional = true }
@@ -49,6 +50,9 @@ time = { workspace = true, features = ["parsing", "formatting", "macros", "serde
[features]
default = ["crypto", "fips"]
hotpath = ["hotpath/hotpath"]
hotpath-alloc = ["hotpath", "hotpath/hotpath-alloc"]
hotpath-cpu = ["hotpath", "hotpath/hotpath-cpu"]
fips = []
crypto = [
"dep:aes-gcm",
+7
View File
@@ -27,7 +27,14 @@ categories = ["data-structures", "filesystem"]
[lints]
workspace = true
[features]
default = []
hotpath = ["hotpath/hotpath", "rustfs-filemeta/hotpath"]
hotpath-alloc = ["hotpath", "hotpath/hotpath-alloc", "rustfs-filemeta/hotpath-alloc"]
hotpath-cpu = ["hotpath", "hotpath/hotpath-cpu", "rustfs-filemeta/hotpath-cpu"]
[dependencies]
hotpath.workspace = true
serde = { workspace = true, features = ["derive"] }
rmp-serde = { workspace = true }
async-trait = { workspace = true }
+48
View File
@@ -25,10 +25,58 @@ workspace = true
[features]
default = []
hotpath = [
"hotpath/hotpath",
"hotpath/tokio",
"hotpath/futures",
"hotpath/reqwest-0-13",
"rustfs-config/hotpath",
"rustfs-credentials/hotpath",
"rustfs-data-usage/hotpath",
"rustfs-ecstore/hotpath",
"rustfs-filemeta/hotpath",
"rustfs-lock/hotpath",
"rustfs-madmin/hotpath",
"rustfs-protos/hotpath",
"rustfs-rio/hotpath",
"rustfs-signer/hotpath",
"rustfs-utils/hotpath",
]
hotpath-alloc = [
"hotpath",
"hotpath/hotpath-alloc",
"rustfs-config/hotpath-alloc",
"rustfs-credentials/hotpath-alloc",
"rustfs-data-usage/hotpath-alloc",
"rustfs-ecstore/hotpath-alloc",
"rustfs-filemeta/hotpath-alloc",
"rustfs-lock/hotpath-alloc",
"rustfs-madmin/hotpath-alloc",
"rustfs-protos/hotpath-alloc",
"rustfs-rio/hotpath-alloc",
"rustfs-signer/hotpath-alloc",
"rustfs-utils/hotpath-alloc",
]
hotpath-cpu = [
"hotpath",
"hotpath/hotpath-cpu",
"rustfs-config/hotpath-cpu",
"rustfs-credentials/hotpath-cpu",
"rustfs-data-usage/hotpath-cpu",
"rustfs-ecstore/hotpath-cpu",
"rustfs-filemeta/hotpath-cpu",
"rustfs-lock/hotpath-cpu",
"rustfs-madmin/hotpath-cpu",
"rustfs-protos/hotpath-cpu",
"rustfs-rio/hotpath-cpu",
"rustfs-signer/hotpath-cpu",
"rustfs-utils/hotpath-cpu",
]
ftps = []
sftp = []
[dependencies]
hotpath.workspace = true
rustfs-config = { workspace = true, features = ["constants"] }
rustfs-credentials.workspace = true
rustfs-ecstore.workspace = true
@@ -2136,11 +2136,20 @@ async fn four_node_manual_transition_distributed_admission_conflict_reports_stat
assert_eq!(terminal["bucket"].as_str(), Some(bucket.as_str()));
assert_eq!(terminal["prefix"].as_str(), Some(prefix));
assert_eq!(terminal["dry_run"].as_bool(), Some(false));
assert_eq!(
terminal["status"].as_str(),
Some("partial"),
let terminal_status = terminal["status"].as_str();
assert!(
matches!(terminal_status, Some("partial" | "unknown")),
"small transition queue should surface terminal backpressure: {terminal}"
);
if terminal_status == Some("unknown") {
let failure_reason = terminal["failure_reason"]
.as_str()
.ok_or_else(|| format!("unknown terminal status omitted failure_reason: {terminal}"))?;
assert!(
failure_reason.contains("worker result was not persisted before the transition queue drained"),
"unknown terminal status should identify lost worker-result persistence: {terminal}"
);
}
let skipped_queue_full = terminal["report"]["skipped_queue_full"]
.as_u64()
.ok_or_else(|| format!("terminal status omitted report.skipped_queue_full: {terminal}"))?;
+87 -5
View File
@@ -33,14 +33,98 @@ workspace = true
[features]
default = []
rio-v2 = ["dep:rustfs-rio-v2"]
hotpath = ["dep:hotpath", "hotpath/hotpath", "rustfs-filemeta/hotpath", "rustfs-rio/hotpath"]
hotpath = [
"hotpath/hotpath",
"hotpath/tokio",
"hotpath/futures",
"hotpath/async-channel",
"hotpath/parking_lot",
"hotpath/reqwest-0-13",
"rustfs-checksums/hotpath",
"rustfs-common/hotpath",
"rustfs-concurrency/hotpath",
"rustfs-config/hotpath",
"rustfs-credentials/hotpath",
"rustfs-data-usage/hotpath",
"rustfs-filemeta/hotpath",
"rustfs-io-metrics/hotpath",
"rustfs-lifecycle/hotpath",
"rustfs-lock/hotpath",
"rustfs-madmin/hotpath",
"rustfs-object-capacity/hotpath",
"rustfs-policy/hotpath",
"rustfs-protos/hotpath",
"rustfs-replication/hotpath",
"rustfs-rio/hotpath",
"rustfs-rio-v2?/hotpath",
"rustfs-s3-types/hotpath",
"rustfs-signer/hotpath",
"rustfs-storage-api/hotpath",
"rustfs-tls-runtime/hotpath",
"rustfs-utils/hotpath",
"rustfs-crypto/hotpath",
]
hotpath-alloc = [
"hotpath",
"hotpath/hotpath-alloc",
"rustfs-checksums/hotpath-alloc",
"rustfs-common/hotpath-alloc",
"rustfs-concurrency/hotpath-alloc",
"rustfs-config/hotpath-alloc",
"rustfs-credentials/hotpath-alloc",
"rustfs-data-usage/hotpath-alloc",
"rustfs-filemeta/hotpath-alloc",
"rustfs-io-metrics/hotpath-alloc",
"rustfs-lifecycle/hotpath-alloc",
"rustfs-lock/hotpath-alloc",
"rustfs-madmin/hotpath-alloc",
"rustfs-object-capacity/hotpath-alloc",
"rustfs-policy/hotpath-alloc",
"rustfs-protos/hotpath-alloc",
"rustfs-replication/hotpath-alloc",
"rustfs-rio/hotpath-alloc",
"rustfs-rio-v2?/hotpath-alloc",
"rustfs-s3-types/hotpath-alloc",
"rustfs-signer/hotpath-alloc",
"rustfs-storage-api/hotpath-alloc",
"rustfs-tls-runtime/hotpath-alloc",
"rustfs-utils/hotpath-alloc",
"rustfs-crypto/hotpath-alloc",
]
hotpath-cpu = [
"hotpath",
"hotpath/hotpath-cpu",
"rustfs-checksums/hotpath-cpu",
"rustfs-common/hotpath-cpu",
"rustfs-concurrency/hotpath-cpu",
"rustfs-config/hotpath-cpu",
"rustfs-credentials/hotpath-cpu",
"rustfs-data-usage/hotpath-cpu",
"rustfs-filemeta/hotpath-cpu",
"rustfs-io-metrics/hotpath-cpu",
"rustfs-lifecycle/hotpath-cpu",
"rustfs-lock/hotpath-cpu",
"rustfs-madmin/hotpath-cpu",
"rustfs-object-capacity/hotpath-cpu",
"rustfs-policy/hotpath-cpu",
"rustfs-protos/hotpath-cpu",
"rustfs-replication/hotpath-cpu",
"rustfs-rio/hotpath-cpu",
"rustfs-rio-v2?/hotpath-cpu",
"rustfs-s3-types/hotpath-cpu",
"rustfs-signer/hotpath-cpu",
"rustfs-storage-api/hotpath-cpu",
"rustfs-tls-runtime/hotpath-cpu",
"rustfs-utils/hotpath-cpu",
"rustfs-crypto/hotpath-cpu",
]
# Exposes shared lifecycle/tier test utilities (MockWarmBackend, fault
# injection, xl.meta transition assertions) via `api::tier::test_util`.
# Enable only from `[dev-dependencies]` (rustfs/backlog#1148 ilm-6).
test-util = []
[dependencies]
hotpath = { workspace = true, optional = true }
hotpath.workspace = true
rustfs-filemeta.workspace = true
rustfs-utils = { workspace = true, features = ["full"] }
rustfs-rio.workspace = true
@@ -57,7 +141,6 @@ rustfs-policy.workspace = true
rustfs-protos.workspace = true
rustfs-replication.workspace = true
rustfs-lifecycle.workspace = true
rustfs-kms.workspace = true
rustfs-s3-types = { workspace = true }
rustfs-data-usage.workspace = true
rustfs-object-capacity.workspace = true
@@ -105,6 +188,7 @@ tempfile.workspace = true
hyper = { workspace = true, features = ["http2", "http1", "server"] }
hyper-util = { workspace = true, features = ["tokio", "server-auto", "server-graceful", "tracing"] }
hyper-rustls = { workspace = true, default-features = false, features = ["native-tokio", "http1", "tls12", "logging", "http2", "aws-lc-rs"] }
hostname.workspace = true
rustls = { workspace = true, default-features = false, features = ["aws-lc-rs", "logging", "tls12", "prefer-post-quantum", "std"] }
rustls-pki-types.workspace = true
tokio = { workspace = true, features = ["io-util", "sync", "signal", "fs", "rt-multi-thread"] }
@@ -124,8 +208,6 @@ libc.workspace = true
rustix = { workspace = true, features = ["process", "fs"] }
rustfs-madmin.workspace = true
reqwest = { workspace = true }
aes-gcm = { workspace = true, features = ["rand_core"] }
chacha20poly1305.workspace = true
aws-sdk-s3 = { workspace = true, default-features = false, features = ["sigv4a", "default-https-client", "rt-tokio"] }
urlencoding = { workspace = true }
smallvec = { workspace = true, features = ["serde"] }
+6 -4
View File
@@ -391,10 +391,12 @@ pub mod notification {
pub mod object {
pub use crate::object_api::{
BLOCK_SIZE_V2, ERASURE_ALGORITHM, GetObjectBodyCacheHook, GetObjectBodyCacheHookLookup, GetObjectBodySource,
GetObjectReader, ObjectInfo, ObjectMutationHook, ObjectOptions, PutObjReader, RangedDecompressReader, StreamConsumer,
get_object_body_cache_plaintext_len, lookup_get_object_body_cache_hook, register_get_object_body_cache_hook,
register_object_mutation_hook, unregister_get_object_body_cache_hook, unregister_object_mutation_hook,
BLOCK_SIZE_V2, ERASURE_ALGORITHM, EncryptionResolutionError, EncryptionResolutionErrorKind, GetObjectBodyCacheHook,
GetObjectBodyCacheHookLookup, GetObjectBodySource, GetObjectReader, ObjectEncryptionResolver, ObjectInfo,
ObjectMutationHook, ObjectOptions, PutObjReader, RangedDecompressReader, ReadEncryptionMaterial, ReadEncryptionMode,
ReadEncryptionRequest, StreamConsumer, get_object_body_cache_plaintext_len, lookup_get_object_body_cache_hook,
register_get_object_body_cache_hook, register_object_mutation_hook, unregister_get_object_body_cache_hook,
unregister_object_mutation_hook,
};
pub use crate::store::PreparedGetObjectReader;
}
+93 -6
View File
@@ -579,8 +579,26 @@ pub struct BucketMetadataSys {
/// Serializes metadata-map commits and their derived cache updates for one
/// bucket. Namespace locks, when present, are acquired before this lock.
metadata_publish_locks: Arc<MetadataPublishLockRegistry>,
/// Deduplicates concurrent lazy loads of one bucket's metadata, so N
/// simultaneous cache misses issue a single disk read instead of N.
///
/// This is the `singleflight` that upstream applies to its own lazy
/// `GetConfig`. Without it the namespace *read* lock the load holds is no
/// help: read locks are shared, so it excludes concurrent config writers
/// but not concurrent readers, and every caller still pays a full
/// erasure-set metadata fanout. A separate registry from
/// `metadata_publish_locks`, reusing the same per-bucket lock machinery.
///
/// Lock order: this lock, then the namespace lock, then the publish lock,
/// then the metadata map. It is only ever taken as the first of those, so
/// it cannot invert against a path that already holds one of the others.
lazy_load_locks: Arc<MetadataPublishLockRegistry>,
#[cfg(test)]
lazy_load_lock_probe: std::sync::atomic::AtomicBool,
/// Counts disk loads taken by the lazy `get_config` path, so a test can
/// prove concurrent misses collapse into one.
#[cfg(test)]
lazy_disk_loads: std::sync::atomic::AtomicUsize,
/// Buckets recently observed to have no persisted metadata. Serving the
/// fabricated default from here (instead of re-reading disk) keeps the
/// per-request cost of repeated lookups for such names bounded — without
@@ -599,8 +617,13 @@ impl BucketMetadataSys {
metadata_publish_locks: Arc::new(MetadataPublishLockRegistry {
locks: StdMutex::new(HashMap::new()),
}),
lazy_load_locks: Arc::new(MetadataPublishLockRegistry {
locks: StdMutex::new(HashMap::new()),
}),
#[cfg(test)]
lazy_load_lock_probe: std::sync::atomic::AtomicBool::new(false),
#[cfg(test)]
lazy_disk_loads: std::sync::atomic::AtomicUsize::new(0),
absent_metadata: moka::future::Cache::builder()
.max_capacity(ABSENT_BUCKET_METADATA_MAX_ENTRIES)
.time_to_live(ABSENT_BUCKET_METADATA_TTL)
@@ -615,16 +638,22 @@ impl BucketMetadataSys {
}
fn metadata_publish_lock(&self, bucket: &str) -> Arc<Mutex<MetadataPublishLockState>> {
let mut locks = self
.metadata_publish_locks
.locks
.lock()
.unwrap_or_else(|poisoned| poisoned.into_inner());
Self::bucket_lock_in(&self.metadata_publish_locks, bucket)
}
/// Per-bucket gate for the lazy `get_config` disk load. See
/// [`Self::lazy_load_locks`].
fn lazy_load_lock(&self, bucket: &str) -> Arc<Mutex<MetadataPublishLockState>> {
Self::bucket_lock_in(&self.lazy_load_locks, bucket)
}
fn bucket_lock_in(registry: &Arc<MetadataPublishLockRegistry>, bucket: &str) -> Arc<Mutex<MetadataPublishLockState>> {
let mut locks = registry.locks.lock().unwrap_or_else(|poisoned| poisoned.into_inner());
locks.get(bucket).and_then(Weak::upgrade).unwrap_or_else(|| {
let lock = Arc::new_cyclic(|lock| {
Mutex::new(MetadataPublishLockState {
bucket: bucket.to_string(),
registry: Arc::downgrade(&self.metadata_publish_locks),
registry: Arc::downgrade(registry),
lock: lock.clone(),
})
});
@@ -1079,6 +1108,27 @@ impl BucketMetadataSys {
return Ok((Arc::new(bm), true));
}
// Collapse concurrent misses for this bucket into one disk load.
// Taken before the namespace lock — see `lazy_load_locks` for the
// ordering rule.
let load_lock = self.lazy_load_lock(bucket);
let _load_guard = load_lock.lock_owned().await;
// Re-check both caches: whoever held the gate before us may have
// already answered this exact question, and repeating the fanout
// is the whole cost this gate exists to avoid.
if let Some(bm) = self.metadata_map.read().await.get(bucket).cloned() {
return Ok((bm, true));
}
if self.absent_metadata.get(bucket).await.is_some() {
let mut bm = BucketMetadata::new(bucket);
bm.default_timestamps();
return Ok((Arc::new(bm), true));
}
#[cfg(test)]
self.lazy_disk_loads.fetch_add(1, std::sync::atomic::Ordering::Relaxed);
let lock = self.api.new_ns_lock(bucket, bucket).await?;
let guard = lock.get_read_lock(crate::set_disk::get_lock_acquire_timeout()).await?;
#[cfg(test)]
@@ -1431,6 +1481,43 @@ mod tests {
use serial_test::serial;
use tokio::time::timeout;
/// Concurrent cache misses for one bucket must collapse into a single disk
/// load.
///
/// The namespace read lock the lazy path already holds does not provide
/// this: read locks are shared, so it excludes concurrent config writers
/// but not concurrent readers. Without the dedup gate every caller pays its
/// own namespace-lock acquisition plus a full erasure-set metadata fanout —
/// and the paths that reach `get_config` are per-request, so the multiplier
/// is request concurrency.
#[tokio::test]
async fn concurrent_lazy_loads_of_one_bucket_issue_a_single_disk_read() {
use std::sync::atomic::Ordering;
let (_dirs, ecstore) = isolated_store_over_temp_disks().await;
let sys = Arc::new(BucketMetadataSys::new(ecstore));
// A name with no persisted metadata: every caller misses the map, and
// the absent-cache entry does not exist until the first load records it.
let bucket = "singleflight-bucket";
let waiters = 8;
let results = futures::future::join_all((0..waiters).map(|_| {
let sys = Arc::clone(&sys);
async move { sys.get_config(bucket).await.map(|(bm, _)| bm.name.clone()) }
}))
.await;
for result in results {
assert_eq!(result.expect("every caller must get an answer"), bucket);
}
assert_eq!(
sys.lazy_disk_loads.load(Ordering::Relaxed),
1,
"concurrent misses for one bucket must share a single disk load"
);
}
/// Pins the fail-closed caching contract of the lazy `get_config` path
/// and the refresh no-replace rule: fabricated defaults are returned but
/// never served by the map-only `get()`, persisted metadata is cached on
+1 -15
View File
@@ -46,16 +46,6 @@ lazy_static! {
m.insert("x-amz-replication-status".to_string(), true);
m
};
static ref SSE_HEADERS: HashMap<String, bool> = {
let mut m = HashMap::new();
m.insert("x-amz-server-side-encryption".to_string(), true);
m.insert("x-amz-server-side-encryption-aws-kms-key-id".to_string(), true);
m.insert("x-amz-server-side-encryption-context".to_string(), true);
m.insert("x-amz-server-side-encryption-customer-algorithm".to_string(), true);
m.insert("x-amz-server-side-encryption-customer-key".to_string(), true);
m.insert("x-amz-server-side-encryption-customer-key-md5".to_string(), true);
m
};
}
pub fn is_standard_query_value(qs_key: &str) -> bool {
@@ -70,16 +60,12 @@ pub fn is_standard_header(header_key: &str) -> bool {
*SUPPORTED_HEADERS.get(&header_key.to_lowercase()).unwrap_or(&false)
}
pub fn is_sse_header(header_key: &str) -> bool {
*SSE_HEADERS.get(&header_key.to_lowercase()).unwrap_or(&false)
}
pub fn is_amz_header(header_key: &str) -> bool {
let key = header_key.to_lowercase();
key.starts_with("x-amz-meta-")
|| key.starts_with("x-amz-grant-")
|| key == "x-amz-acl"
|| is_sse_header(header_key)
|| rustfs_utils::http::is_sse_header(header_key)
|| key.starts_with("x-amz-checksum-")
}
@@ -58,7 +58,7 @@ use std::{
collections::HashMap,
io::Cursor,
sync::{
Arc,
Arc, Weak,
atomic::{AtomicBool, Ordering},
},
time::SystemTime,
@@ -350,6 +350,44 @@ impl PeerRestClient {
}
}
fn parse_topology_host(peer_host_port: &str, grid_host: &str) -> Result<XHost> {
let url = url::Url::parse(grid_host).map_err(|_| Error::other("peer grid host is not a valid URL"))?;
if !matches!(url.scheme(), "http" | "https")
|| !url.username().is_empty()
|| url.password().is_some()
|| url.query().is_some()
|| url.fragment().is_some()
|| url.path() != "/"
{
return Err(Error::other("peer grid host has an invalid URL shape"));
}
let url_host = url.host().ok_or_else(|| Error::other("peer grid host is missing a host"))?;
let topology_host = match url.port() {
Some(port) => format!("{url_host}:{port}"),
None => url_host.to_string(),
};
let explicit_port = url.port();
let name = match url_host {
url::Host::Domain(domain) => domain.to_string(),
url::Host::Ipv4(address) => address.to_string(),
url::Host::Ipv6(address) if explicit_port.is_none() => format!("[{address}]"),
url::Host::Ipv6(address) => address.to_string(),
};
let port = url
.port_or_known_default()
.filter(|port| *port > 0)
.ok_or_else(|| Error::other("peer grid host is missing a valid port"))?;
let host = XHost {
name,
port,
is_port_set: explicit_port.is_some(),
};
if topology_host != peer_host_port {
return Err(Error::other("peer topology host does not match its grid URL"));
}
Ok(host)
}
fn build_clients_from_slots(
slots: Vec<(String, Option<String>, bool)>,
) -> (Vec<Option<Self>>, Vec<Option<Self>>, Vec<String>) {
@@ -363,14 +401,14 @@ impl PeerRestClient {
}
let client = match grid_host {
Some(grid_host) => match XHost::try_from(peer_host_port.clone()) {
Some(grid_host) => match Self::parse_topology_host(&peer_host_port, &grid_host) {
Ok(host) => {
let mut client = PeerRestClient::new(host, grid_host);
client.topology_member = peer_host_port.clone();
Some(client)
}
Err(err) => {
warn!(peer = %peer_host_port, "Xhost parse failed while constructing peer client: {err:?}");
warn!(peer = %peer_host_port, "peer topology host parse failed while constructing peer client: {err:?}");
None
}
},
@@ -519,9 +557,8 @@ impl PeerRestClient {
}
let grid_host = self.grid_host.clone();
let offline = Arc::clone(&self.offline);
let recovery_running = Arc::clone(&self.recovery_running);
let span = Self::recovery_monitor_span(&grid_host);
let offline = Arc::downgrade(&self.offline);
let recovery_running = Arc::downgrade(&self.recovery_running);
// The offline flag and its recovery are the silent half of
// rustfs/backlog#888: log the monitor's start and its success so an
// "offline then back" episode leaves a trace on the observing node.
@@ -530,13 +567,34 @@ impl PeerRestClient {
grid_host = %self.grid_host,
"peer RPC connection marked offline after a network-like failure; starting background recovery monitor"
);
drop(Self::spawn_recovery_monitor(grid_host, offline, recovery_running));
}
fn spawn_recovery_monitor(
grid_host: String,
offline: Weak<AtomicBool>,
recovery_running: Weak<AtomicBool>,
) -> tokio::task::JoinHandle<()> {
let span = Self::recovery_monitor_span(&grid_host);
super::spawn_background_monitor(span, async move {
let mut delay = get_drive_active_check_interval();
let connect_timeout = get_drive_active_check_timeout();
for attempt in 1..=PEER_REST_RECOVERY_MAX_ATTEMPTS {
if offline.strong_count() == 0 || recovery_running.strong_count() == 0 {
return;
}
tokio::time::sleep(delay).await;
if offline.strong_count() == 0 || recovery_running.strong_count() == 0 {
return;
}
if Self::perform_connectivity_check(&grid_host, connect_timeout).await.is_ok() {
let Some(offline) = offline.upgrade() else {
return;
};
let Some(recovery_running) = recovery_running.upgrade() else {
return;
};
offline.store(false, Ordering::Release);
recovery_running.store(false, Ordering::Release);
info!(
@@ -556,8 +614,10 @@ impl PeerRestClient {
attempts = PEER_REST_RECOVERY_MAX_ATTEMPTS,
"peer recovery monitor reached max attempts; will retry on next request"
);
recovery_running.store(false, Ordering::Release);
});
if let Some(recovery_running) = recovery_running.upgrade() {
recovery_running.store(false, Ordering::Release);
}
})
}
#[cfg(test)]
@@ -1807,9 +1867,13 @@ fn tier_config_reload_status_outcome(status: tonic::Status) -> TierConfigReloadO
mod tests {
use super::*;
use crate::config::com::STORAGE_CLASS_SUB_SYS;
use crate::layout::{disks_layout::DisksLayout, endpoints::SetupType};
use rustfs_config::{ENV_KUBERNETES_SERVICE_HOST, ENV_LOCAL_ENDPOINT_HOST, ENV_STARTUP_TOPOLOGY_WAIT_MODE};
use serde_json::Value;
use serial_test::serial;
use std::io::{self, Write};
use std::sync::{Arc, Mutex};
use temp_env::async_with_vars;
use tracing_subscriber::{Registry, fmt::MakeWriter, layer::SubscriberExt};
#[test]
@@ -1927,30 +1991,115 @@ mod tests {
fn build_clients_from_slots_preserves_missing_remote_topology_slots() {
let slots = vec![
("127.0.0.1:9000".to_string(), None, true),
("127.0.0.1:9001".to_string(), Some("http://127.0.0.1:9001".to_string()), false),
(
"rustfs-1.invalid:9001".to_string(),
Some("http://rustfs-1.invalid:9001".to_string()),
false,
),
("rustfs-2.invalid".to_string(), Some("http://rustfs-2.invalid".to_string()), false),
("127.0.0.1:notaport".to_string(), Some("http://127.0.0.1:notaport".to_string()), false),
("127.0.0.1:9003".to_string(), None, false),
];
let (remote, all, remote_topology_hosts) = PeerRestClient::build_clients_from_slots(slots);
assert_eq!(remote.len(), 3, "local node is excluded but remote slots are not compacted away");
assert_eq!(all.len(), 4, "all slots preserve the sorted cluster topology shape");
assert_eq!(remote.len(), 4, "local node is excluded but remote slots are not compacted away");
assert_eq!(all.len(), 5, "all slots preserve the sorted cluster topology shape");
assert_eq!(
remote_topology_hosts,
vec![
"127.0.0.1:9001".to_string(),
"rustfs-1.invalid:9001".to_string(),
"rustfs-2.invalid".to_string(),
"127.0.0.1:notaport".to_string(),
"127.0.0.1:9003".to_string()
]
);
assert!(remote[0].is_some(), "valid remote peer should get a client");
assert!(remote[1].is_none(), "unparseable remote peer should remain observable as a missing slot");
assert!(remote[2].is_none(), "missing grid host should remain observable as a missing slot");
let unresolved = remote[0]
.as_ref()
.expect("temporarily unresolved remote peer should retain a client");
assert_eq!(unresolved.host.to_string(), "rustfs-1.invalid:9001");
let default_port = remote[1]
.as_ref()
.expect("temporarily unresolved scheme-default remote peer should retain a client");
assert_eq!(default_port.host.to_string(), "rustfs-2.invalid");
assert_eq!(default_port.host.port, 80);
assert!(!default_port.host.is_port_set);
assert!(remote[2].is_none(), "unparseable remote peer should remain observable as a missing slot");
assert!(remote[3].is_none(), "missing grid host should remain observable as a missing slot");
assert!(all[0].is_none(), "local node is represented by the local server_info row");
assert!(all[1].is_some());
assert!(all[2].is_none());
assert!(all[2].is_some());
assert!(all[3].is_none());
assert!(all[4].is_none());
}
#[test]
fn topology_host_parser_preserves_names_and_bracketed_ipv6() {
let domain = PeerRestClient::parse_topology_host("rustfs-1.invalid", "https://rustfs-1.invalid")
.expect("unresolved HTTPS topology host should parse without DNS");
assert_eq!(domain.to_string(), "rustfs-1.invalid");
assert_eq!(domain.port, 443);
assert!(!domain.is_port_set);
let ipv6 = PeerRestClient::parse_topology_host("[2001:db8::1]:9000", "http://[2001:db8::1]:9000")
.expect("bracketed IPv6 topology host should parse without changing its identity");
assert_eq!(ipv6.to_string(), "[2001:db8::1]:9000");
let default_port_ipv6 = PeerRestClient::parse_topology_host("[2001:db8::2]", "http://[2001:db8::2]")
.expect("scheme-default IPv6 topology host should parse without DNS");
assert_eq!(default_port_ipv6.to_string(), "[2001:db8::2]");
assert_eq!(default_port_ipv6.port, 80);
assert!(!default_port_ipv6.is_port_set);
assert!(PeerRestClient::parse_topology_host("peer.invalid:0", "http://peer.invalid:0").is_err());
assert!(PeerRestClient::parse_topology_host("peer-a.invalid:9000", "http://peer-b.invalid:9000").is_err());
assert!(PeerRestClient::parse_topology_host("peer.invalid:9000", "http://peer.invalid:9000/unexpected").is_err());
}
#[tokio::test]
#[serial]
async fn unresolved_default_port_endpoint_topology_retains_all_peer_clients() {
let volumes = (0..4)
.map(|index| format!("http://rustfs-{index}.invalid:80/data{index}"))
.collect::<Vec<_>>();
let layout = DisksLayout::from_volumes(&volumes).expect("distributed default-port topology should parse");
async_with_vars(
[
(ENV_STARTUP_TOPOLOGY_WAIT_MODE, Some("orchestrated")),
(ENV_LOCAL_ENDPOINT_HOST, Some("rustfs-0.invalid")),
(ENV_KUBERNETES_SERVICE_HOST, None),
],
async {
let (server_pools, setup_type) = EndpointServerPools::create_server_endpoints("0.0.0.0:80", &layout)
.await
.expect("explicit local identity should avoid peer DNS during endpoint construction");
assert_eq!(setup_type, SetupType::DistErasure);
let (remote, all, remote_topology_hosts) =
PeerRestClient::build_clients_from_slots(server_pools.peer_grid_host_slots_sorted());
assert_eq!(remote.len(), 3);
assert!(
remote.iter().all(Option::is_some),
"unresolved remote peers must retain reconnectable clients"
);
assert_eq!(all.len(), 4);
assert_eq!(all.iter().filter(|client| client.is_none()).count(), 1);
assert_eq!(remote_topology_hosts.len(), 3);
assert!(
remote_topology_hosts.iter().all(|host| !host.contains(':')),
"scheme-default ports must preserve the legacy topology identity"
);
assert!(
remote
.iter()
.flatten()
.all(|client| client.host.port == 80 && !client.host.is_port_set),
"scheme-default peers must retain the effective dial port"
);
},
)
.await;
}
#[test]
@@ -2740,6 +2889,31 @@ mod tests {
assert!(!client.offline.load(Ordering::Acquire));
}
#[tokio::test(start_paused = true)]
async fn dropped_peer_client_releases_and_stops_its_recovery_monitor() {
let client = test_peer_client();
client.offline.store(true, Ordering::Release);
client.recovery_running.store(true, Ordering::Release);
let offline = Arc::downgrade(&client.offline);
let recovery_running = Arc::downgrade(&client.recovery_running);
let handle = PeerRestClient::spawn_recovery_monitor(client.grid_host.clone(), offline.clone(), recovery_running.clone());
let started = tokio::time::Instant::now();
drop(client);
assert!(offline.upgrade().is_none(), "detached recovery must not retain offline state");
assert!(
recovery_running.upgrade().is_none(),
"detached recovery must not retain its running state"
);
handle.await.expect("recovery monitor should not panic");
assert_eq!(
tokio::time::Instant::now(),
started,
"recovery monitor should stop before advancing to its first delayed probe"
);
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn peer_rest_client_finalize_result_keeps_online_for_app_errors_mentioning_unavailable() {
// Regression: application error text containing "unavailable" (a
@@ -4814,9 +4814,11 @@ mod tests {
async fn test_remote_disk_endpoints_with_different_schemes() {
let test_cases = vec![
("http://server:9000", "server:9000"),
("https://secure-server:443", "secure-server"), // Default HTTPS port is omitted
("http://plain-server:80", "plain-server"),
("http://plain-server", "plain-server"),
("https://secure-server:443", "secure-server"),
("http://192.168.1.100:8080", "192.168.1.100:8080"),
("https://secure-server", "secure-server"), // No port specified
("https://secure-server", "secure-server"),
];
for (url_str, expected_hostname) in test_cases {
+199 -20
View File
@@ -37,7 +37,9 @@ use crate::{
runtime::instance::{InstanceContext, bootstrap_ctx},
runtime::sources as runtime_sources,
set_disk::{PreparedGetObjectMetadata, SetDisks},
store::init_format::{check_format_erasure_values, get_format_erasure_in_quorum, load_format_erasure_all, save_format_file},
store::init_format::{
check_format_erasure_values, load_format_erasure_all, save_format_file, select_format_erasure_in_quorum,
},
};
use futures::{
future::join_all,
@@ -947,7 +949,7 @@ impl crate::storage_api_contracts::heal::HealOperations for Sets {
#[tracing::instrument(skip(self))]
async fn heal_format(&self, dry_run: bool) -> Result<(HealResultItem, Option<Error>)> {
let (disks, _) = init_storage_disks_with_errors(
let (disks, init_errs) = init_storage_disks_with_errors(
&self.endpoints.endpoints,
&DiskOption {
cleanup: false,
@@ -955,15 +957,36 @@ impl crate::storage_api_contracts::heal::HealOperations for Sets {
},
)
.await;
let (formats, errs) = load_format_erasure_all(&disks, true).await;
let (formats, mut errs) = load_format_erasure_all(&disks, true).await;
for (err, init_err) in errs.iter_mut().zip(init_errs) {
if init_err.is_some() {
*err = init_err;
}
}
if errs.iter().any(|err| {
matches!(
err,
Some(DiskError::InconsistentDisk | DiskError::CorruptedFormat | DiskError::CorruptedBackend)
)
}) {
return Ok((HealResultItem::default(), Some(StorageError::CorruptedFormat)));
}
if let Err(err) = check_format_erasure_values(&formats, self.set_drive_count) {
info!("failed to check formats erasure values: {}", err);
return Ok((HealResultItem::default(), Some(err)));
}
let ref_format = match get_format_erasure_in_quorum(&formats) {
Ok(format) => format,
let (ref_format, quorum_members) = match select_format_erasure_in_quorum(&formats, 0) {
Ok((format, members)) if format.shared_identity() == self.format.shared_identity() => (format, members),
Ok(_) => return Ok((HealResultItem::default(), Some(StorageError::CorruptedFormat))),
Err(err) => return Ok((HealResultItem::default(), Some(err))),
};
if formats
.iter()
.zip(quorum_members)
.any(|(format, member)| format.is_some() && !member)
{
return Ok((HealResultItem::default(), Some(StorageError::CorruptedFormat)));
}
let mut res = HealResultItem {
heal_item_type: HealItemType::Metadata.to_string(),
detail: "disk-format".to_string(),
@@ -985,11 +1008,6 @@ impl crate::storage_api_contracts::heal::HealOperations for Sets {
return Ok((res, Some(StorageError::NoHealRequired)));
}
// if !self.format.eq(&ref_format) {
// info!("format ({:?}) not eq ref_format ({:?})", self.format, ref_format);
// return Ok((res, Some(Error::new(DiskError::CorruptedFormat))));
// }
let (new_format_sets, _) = new_heal_format_sets(&ref_format, self.set_count, self.set_drive_count, &formats, &errs);
if !dry_run {
let mut tmp_new_formats = vec![None; self.set_count * self.set_drive_count];
@@ -1298,7 +1316,7 @@ mod tests {
assert_eq!(result, (Some(3), Some(1), Some(0)));
}
async fn multipart_listing_test_sets() -> (Vec<tempfile::TempDir>, Arc<Sets>) {
async fn two_set_test_sets() -> (Vec<tempfile::TempDir>, Arc<Sets>) {
let format = FormatV3::new(2, 2);
let mut temp_dirs = Vec::new();
let mut all_endpoints = Vec::new();
@@ -1339,8 +1357,8 @@ mod tests {
Arc::new(RwLock::new(disks)),
2,
1,
0,
set_index,
0,
endpoints,
format.clone(),
vec![Arc::new(LocalClient::new()), Arc::new(LocalClient::new())],
@@ -1373,11 +1391,114 @@ mod tests {
(temp_dirs, sets)
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn set_format_heal_accepts_quorum_from_a_nonzero_set() {
let (_temp_dirs, sets) = two_set_test_sets().await;
let (result, err) = sets.disk_set[1]
.heal_format(false)
.await
.expect("the second erasure set should load its own format quorum");
assert!(matches!(err, Some(StorageError::NoHealRequired)), "unexpected heal result: {err:?}");
assert_eq!(result.disk_count, 2);
assert_eq!(result.set_count, 1);
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn format_heal_rejects_foreign_majorities_at_set_and_pool_scopes() {
let (_temp_dirs, _canonical_format, sets) = setup_heal_format_sets(2, true).await;
let set_disks = set_level_heal_view(&sets).await;
let (_, set_err) = set_disks
.heal_format(false)
.await
.expect("set format heal should report a typed mismatch");
assert!(
matches!(set_err, Some(StorageError::CorruptedFormat)),
"foreign set majority must not replace the cached format: {set_err:?}"
);
let (_, pool_err) = sets
.heal_format(false)
.await
.expect("pool format heal should report a typed mismatch");
assert!(
matches!(pool_err, Some(StorageError::CorruptedFormat)),
"foreign pool majority must not replace the cached format: {pool_err:?}"
);
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn pool_format_heal_rejects_a_wrong_slot_minority() {
let (_temp_dirs, canonical_format, sets) = setup_heal_format_sets(3, false).await;
let mut poisoned_format = canonical_format.clone();
poisoned_format.erasure.this = canonical_format.erasure.sets[0][0];
replace_heal_test_format(&sets, 2, &poisoned_format).await;
let probe_err = new_disk(
&sets.endpoints.endpoints.as_ref()[2],
&DiskOption {
cleanup: false,
health_check: false,
},
)
.await
.expect_err("a wrong-slot local format must fail disk initialization");
assert_eq!(probe_err, DiskError::InconsistentDisk);
let (_, pool_err) = sets
.heal_format(false)
.await
.expect("pool format heal should report a typed slot mismatch");
assert!(
matches!(pool_err, Some(StorageError::CorruptedFormat)),
"a wrong-slot minority must not be reported as no-heal-required: {pool_err:?}"
);
assert_eq!(
read_heal_test_format(&sets, 2).await,
poisoned_format,
"format heal must not overwrite a wrong-slot disk"
);
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn format_heal_rejects_a_foreign_minority_at_set_and_pool_scopes() {
let (_temp_dirs, canonical_format, sets) = setup_heal_format_sets(3, false).await;
let mut poisoned_format = canonical_format.clone();
poisoned_format.id = Uuid::new_v4();
poisoned_format.erasure.this = poisoned_format.erasure.sets[0][2];
replace_heal_test_format(&sets, 2, &poisoned_format).await;
let set_disks = set_level_heal_view(&sets).await;
let (_, set_err) = set_disks
.heal_format(false)
.await
.expect("set format heal should report a typed identity mismatch");
assert!(
matches!(set_err, Some(StorageError::CorruptedFormat)),
"a foreign minority must not be reported as no-heal-required: {set_err:?}"
);
let (_, pool_err) = sets
.heal_format(false)
.await
.expect("pool format heal should report a typed identity mismatch");
assert!(
matches!(pool_err, Some(StorageError::CorruptedFormat)),
"a foreign minority must not be reported as no-heal-required: {pool_err:?}"
);
assert_eq!(
read_heal_test_format(&sets, 2).await,
poisoned_format,
"format heal must not overwrite a foreign disk"
);
}
#[tokio::test(flavor = "multi_thread")]
#[serial]
async fn list_multipart_uploads_merges_all_sets_without_pagination_loss() {
let _setup_type_guard = SetupTypeGuard::switch_to(SetupType::Erasure).await;
let (_temp_dirs, sets) = multipart_listing_test_sets().await;
let (_temp_dirs, sets) = two_set_test_sets().await;
let bucket = format!("multipart-list-{}", Uuid::new_v4().simple());
sets.make_bucket(&bucket, &MakeBucketOptions::default())
.await
@@ -1616,11 +1737,15 @@ mod tests {
// formatting the first `num_formatted` of them against a shared reference
// format and leaving the rest unformatted. Returns the live TempDir handles
// (must be kept alive), the reference format, and the assembled `Sets`.
// `disk_set` is intentionally empty: these tests only drive `heal_format`
// with `dry_run == true`, which never touches `disk_set`.
async fn setup_heal_format_sets(num_formatted: usize) -> (Vec<tempfile::TempDir>, FormatV3, Sets) {
// `disk_set` is intentionally empty: these tests only exercise paths that
// return before pool-level healing delegates into a set.
async fn setup_heal_format_sets(num_formatted: usize, foreign_identity: bool) -> (Vec<tempfile::TempDir>, FormatV3, Sets) {
const SET_DRIVE_COUNT: usize = 3;
let ref_format = FormatV3::new(1, SET_DRIVE_COUNT);
let mut stored_format = ref_format.clone();
if foreign_identity {
stored_format.id = Uuid::new_v4();
}
let mut dirs = Vec::with_capacity(SET_DRIVE_COUNT);
let mut endpoints = Vec::with_capacity(SET_DRIVE_COUNT);
@@ -1645,8 +1770,8 @@ mod tests {
)
.await
.expect("disk should be created");
let mut disk_format = ref_format.clone();
disk_format.erasure.this = ref_format.erasure.sets[0][i];
let mut disk_format = stored_format.clone();
disk_format.erasure.this = stored_format.erasure.sets[0][i];
save_format_file(&Some(disk), &Some(disk_format))
.await
.expect("format should be saved");
@@ -1677,6 +1802,60 @@ mod tests {
(dirs, ref_format, sets)
}
async fn set_level_heal_view(sets: &Sets) -> Arc<SetDisks> {
let endpoints = sets.endpoints.endpoints.as_ref().clone();
let mut disks = Vec::with_capacity(endpoints.len());
for endpoint in &endpoints {
disks.push(Some(
new_disk(
endpoint,
&DiskOption {
cleanup: false,
health_check: false,
},
)
.await
.expect("fresh set-level disk handle should open"),
));
}
SetDisks::new(
"test-owner".to_string(),
Arc::new(RwLock::new(disks)),
endpoints.len(),
1,
0,
0,
endpoints,
sets.format.clone(),
Vec::new(),
)
.await
}
async fn replace_heal_test_format(sets: &Sets, disk_index: usize, format: &FormatV3) {
let disk = new_disk(
&sets.endpoints.endpoints.as_ref()[disk_index],
&DiskOption {
cleanup: false,
health_check: false,
},
)
.await
.expect("heal test disk should open");
save_format_file(&Some(disk.clone()), &Some(format.clone()))
.await
.expect("poisoned test format should be written");
}
async fn read_heal_test_format(sets: &Sets, disk_index: usize) -> FormatV3 {
let path = std::path::Path::new(&sets.endpoints.endpoints.as_ref()[disk_index].get_file_path())
.join(crate::disk::RUSTFS_META_BUCKET)
.join(crate::disk::FORMAT_CONFIG_FILE);
let data = tokio::fs::read(path).await.expect("test format should be readable");
FormatV3::try_from(data.as_slice()).expect("test format should parse")
}
// Regression for #956 (NoHealRequired path): with every disk already
// formatted, `heal_format` reports exactly one drive record per disk
// (N = set_count * set_drive_count), each carrying a real endpoint. Before
@@ -1685,7 +1864,7 @@ mod tests {
#[tokio::test]
#[serial]
async fn heal_format_no_heal_required_reports_one_record_per_disk() {
let (_dirs, _ref_format, sets) = setup_heal_format_sets(3).await;
let (_dirs, _ref_format, sets) = setup_heal_format_sets(3, false).await;
let (res, err) = sets.heal_format(true).await.expect("heal_format should succeed");
// All disks formatted -> NoHealRequired early return, still returns `res`.
@@ -1715,7 +1894,7 @@ mod tests {
#[serial]
async fn heal_format_heal_path_reports_one_record_per_disk_aligned() {
// Disks 0 and 1 formatted (quorum), disk 2 unformatted.
let (_dirs, _ref_format, sets) = setup_heal_format_sets(2).await;
let (_dirs, _ref_format, sets) = setup_heal_format_sets(2, false).await;
let (res, err) = sets.heal_format(true).await.expect("heal_format should succeed");
// Unformatted disk present -> heal path, not NoHealRequired.
+4
View File
@@ -1049,6 +1049,10 @@ impl LocalDiskWrapper {
Ok(())
}
pub(crate) async fn set_disk_id_state(&self, id: Option<Uuid>) {
*self.disk_id.write().await = id;
}
/// Get the current disk ID
pub async fn get_current_disk_id(&self) -> Option<Uuid> {
*self.disk_id.read().await
+2 -2
View File
@@ -5078,7 +5078,7 @@ impl LocalDisk {
Ok((buf, mtime))
}
#[cfg_attr(feature = "hotpath", hotpath::measure)]
#[hotpath::measure]
async fn read_metadata_with_dmtime(&self, file_path: impl AsRef<Path>) -> Result<(Vec<u8>, Option<OffsetDateTime>)> {
check_path_length(file_path.as_ref().to_string_lossy().as_ref())?;
@@ -5121,7 +5121,7 @@ impl LocalDisk {
Ok((data, modtime))
}
#[cfg_attr(feature = "hotpath", hotpath::measure)]
#[hotpath::measure]
async fn read_all_data(&self, volume: &str, volume_dir: impl AsRef<Path>, file_path: impl AsRef<Path>) -> Result<Vec<u8>> {
// TODO: timeout support
let (data, _) = self.read_all_data_with_dmtime(volume, volume_dir, file_path).await?;
+78
View File
@@ -132,6 +132,18 @@ pub enum Disk {
Remote(Box<RemoteDisk>),
}
impl Disk {
pub(crate) async fn set_disk_id_state(&self, id: Option<Uuid>) -> Result<()> {
match self {
Disk::Local(local_disk) => {
local_disk.set_disk_id_state(id).await;
Ok(())
}
Disk::Remote(remote_disk) => remote_disk.set_disk_id(id).await,
}
}
}
#[async_trait::async_trait]
impl DiskAPI for Disk {
fn to_string(&self) -> String {
@@ -1552,6 +1564,72 @@ mod tests {
let _ = fs::remove_dir_all(&test_dir).await;
}
#[tokio::test]
#[serial_test::serial]
async fn local_disk_id_state_does_not_publish_to_the_process_registry() {
let local_dir = tempfile::tempdir().expect("local disk tempdir should be created");
let mut endpoint =
Endpoint::try_from(local_dir.path().to_str().expect("tempdir path should be utf8")).expect("endpoint should parse");
endpoint.set_pool_index(0);
endpoint.set_set_index(0);
endpoint.set_disk_index(0);
let local_disk = LocalDisk::new(&endpoint, false).await.expect("local disk should initialize");
let disk = Disk::Local(Box::new(LocalDiskWrapper::new(Arc::new(local_disk), false)));
let disk_id = Uuid::new_v4();
disk.set_disk_id_state(Some(disk_id))
.await
.expect("local wrapper state should accept a disk ID");
let Disk::Local(local_disk) = &disk else {
panic!("test disk should remain local");
};
assert_eq!(local_disk.get_current_disk_id().await, Some(disk_id));
assert!(
!crate::runtime::global::current_ctx()
.local_disk_id_map()
.read()
.await
.contains_key(&disk_id),
"state-only startup publication must not update the process disk-ID registry"
);
disk.set_disk_id_state(None)
.await
.expect("local wrapper state should clear a disk ID");
assert_eq!(local_disk.get_current_disk_id().await, None);
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn remote_disk_id_state_delegates_some_and_none() {
let mut endpoint = Endpoint::try_from("http://remote-server:9000/data").expect("remote endpoint should parse");
endpoint.set_pool_index(0);
endpoint.set_set_index(0);
endpoint.set_disk_index(0);
let remote_disk = RemoteDisk::new(
&endpoint,
&DiskOption {
cleanup: false,
health_check: false,
},
Arc::new(crate::cluster::rpc::TcpHttpInternodeDataTransport),
)
.await
.expect("remote disk should initialize");
let disk = Disk::Remote(Box::new(remote_disk));
let disk_id = Uuid::new_v4();
disk.set_disk_id_state(Some(disk_id))
.await
.expect("remote state should accept a disk ID");
assert_eq!(disk.get_disk_id().await.expect("remote disk ID should be readable"), Some(disk_id));
disk.set_disk_id_state(None)
.await
.expect("remote state should clear a disk ID");
assert_eq!(disk.get_disk_id().await.expect("remote disk ID should be readable"), None);
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn reset_health_for_store_init_retry_delegates_to_disk_variants() {
let local_dir = tempfile::tempdir().unwrap();
+3 -3
View File
@@ -103,7 +103,7 @@ where
/// or `out` is larger than one shard. On error `out`'s contents are
/// unspecified but never contain bytes that failed the hash check — the copy
/// happens only after verification.
#[cfg_attr(feature = "hotpath", hotpath::measure)]
#[hotpath::measure]
pub async fn read(&mut self, out: &mut [u8]) -> std::io::Result<usize> {
let want = out.len();
self.begin_read(want)?;
@@ -303,7 +303,7 @@ where
/// Write a (hash+data) block. Returns the number of data bytes written.
/// Returns an error if called after a short write or if data exceeds shard_size.
#[cfg_attr(feature = "hotpath", hotpath::measure(label = "BitrotWriter::write"))]
#[hotpath::measure(label = "BitrotWriter::write")]
pub async fn write(&mut self, buf: &[u8]) -> std::io::Result<usize> {
if buf.is_empty() {
return Ok(0);
@@ -455,7 +455,7 @@ pub fn bitrot_shard_file_size(size: usize, shard_size: usize, algo: HashAlgorith
/// stores those as whole-file bitrot with no interleaved hash, so the size guard
/// on the next line would reject a genuinely healthy part. Reading legacy V1
/// whole-file-bitrot objects would need a separate verification path.
#[cfg_attr(feature = "hotpath", hotpath::measure)]
#[hotpath::measure]
pub async fn bitrot_verify<R: AsyncRead + Unpin + Send>(
mut r: R,
want_size: usize,
+2 -2
View File
@@ -691,7 +691,7 @@ impl<R> ParallelReader<R>
where
R: crate::erasure::coding::ShardSource,
{
#[cfg_attr(feature = "hotpath", hotpath::measure)]
#[hotpath::measure]
pub async fn read(&mut self) -> (Vec<Option<Vec<u8>>>, Vec<Option<Error>>) {
// On the reconstruction-verifying GET path, read every live shard reader
// in lockstep so all readers advance one block per stripe and stay
@@ -1505,7 +1505,7 @@ where
}
impl Erasure {
#[cfg_attr(feature = "hotpath", hotpath::measure)]
#[hotpath::measure]
pub async fn decode<W, R>(
&self,
writer: &mut W,
+4 -4
View File
@@ -504,7 +504,7 @@ impl Erasure {
Ok((reader, total))
}
#[cfg_attr(feature = "hotpath", hotpath::measure)]
#[hotpath::measure]
pub async fn encode<R>(
self: Arc<Self>,
reader: R,
@@ -670,7 +670,7 @@ impl Erasure {
Ok((reader, total))
}
#[cfg_attr(feature = "hotpath", hotpath::measure)]
#[hotpath::measure]
pub async fn encode_batched<R>(
self: Arc<Self>,
mut reader: R,
@@ -798,7 +798,7 @@ impl Erasure {
/// Fast path for small inline objects: skip tokio::spawn + mpsc channel.
/// Reads all data, encodes directly, writes shards sequentially.
#[cfg_attr(feature = "hotpath", hotpath::measure)]
#[hotpath::measure]
pub async fn encode_inline_small<R>(
self: Arc<Self>,
reader: R,
@@ -813,7 +813,7 @@ impl Erasure {
/// Fast path for single-block non-inline objects: avoids the producer/consumer
/// pipeline in `encode()` while keeping the same writer/quorum/shutdown semantics.
#[cfg_attr(feature = "hotpath", hotpath::measure)]
#[hotpath::measure]
pub async fn encode_single_block_non_inline<R>(
self: Arc<Self>,
reader: R,
+5 -5
View File
@@ -640,7 +640,7 @@ impl Erasure {
/// # Returns
/// A vector of encoded shards as `Bytes`.
#[tracing::instrument(level = "debug", skip_all, fields(data_len=data.len()))]
#[cfg_attr(feature = "hotpath", hotpath::measure)]
#[hotpath::measure]
pub fn encode_data(&self, data: &[u8]) -> io::Result<Vec<Bytes>> {
let shard_size_fn = if self.uses_legacy {
calc_shard_size_legacy
@@ -688,7 +688,7 @@ impl Erasure {
/// Encode owned data, avoiding a copy when the caller already has a heap buffer.
/// Falls back to copying into a new buffer if zero-copy conversion fails.
#[cfg_attr(feature = "hotpath", hotpath::measure)]
#[hotpath::measure]
pub fn encode_data_owned(&self, data: Vec<u8>) -> io::Result<Vec<Bytes>> {
let shard_size_fn = if self.uses_legacy {
calc_shard_size_legacy
@@ -752,7 +752,7 @@ impl Erasure {
/// block), the `resize(need_total_size)` below stays within capacity for every
/// `data_len <= block_size` — both shard-size formulas are monotone in
/// `data_len` — so this function never reallocates the buffer.
#[cfg_attr(feature = "hotpath", hotpath::measure)]
#[hotpath::measure]
pub fn encode_data_bytes_mut(&self, mut data_buffer: BytesMut, data_len: usize) -> io::Result<Vec<Bytes>> {
let shard_size_fn = if self.uses_legacy {
calc_shard_size_legacy
@@ -805,7 +805,7 @@ impl Erasure {
///
/// # Returns
/// Ok if reconstruction succeeds, error otherwise.
#[cfg_attr(feature = "hotpath", hotpath::measure)]
#[hotpath::measure]
pub fn decode_data(&self, shards: &mut [Option<Vec<u8>>]) -> io::Result<()> {
if self.parity_shards > 0 {
if self.uses_legacy {
@@ -825,7 +825,7 @@ impl Erasure {
}
/// Decode and reconstruct missing data shards, then regenerate parity shards.
#[cfg_attr(feature = "hotpath", hotpath::measure)]
#[hotpath::measure]
pub fn decode_data_and_parity(&self, shards: &mut [Option<Vec<u8>>]) -> io::Result<()> {
if self.parity_shards > 0 {
if self.uses_legacy {
+12 -1
View File
@@ -203,7 +203,7 @@ fn get_all_sets<T: AsRef<str>>(set_drive_count: usize, is_ellipses: bool, args:
for args in set_args.iter() {
for arg in args {
if unique_args.contains(arg) {
return Err(Error::other(format!("Input args {arg} has duplicate ellipses")));
return Err(Error::other("input arguments contain a duplicate endpoint after ellipsis expansion"));
}
unique_args.insert(arg);
}
@@ -924,4 +924,15 @@ mod test {
}
}
}
#[test]
fn layout_errors_do_not_echo_url_credentials() {
for volumes in [
vec!["http://:duplicate-secret@server/path", "http://:duplicate-secret@server/path"],
vec!["http://:ellipsis...secret@server/path"],
] {
let err = DisksLayout::from_volumes(&volumes).unwrap_err();
assert!(!err.to_string().contains("secret"), "layout error leaked endpoint credentials: {err}");
}
}
}
+19 -2
View File
@@ -88,6 +88,7 @@ impl TryFrom<&str> for Endpoint {
// - All field should be empty except Host and Path.
if !((url.scheme() == "http" || url.scheme() == "https")
&& url.username().is_empty()
&& url.password().is_none()
&& url.fragment().is_none()
&& url.query().is_none())
{
@@ -366,6 +367,12 @@ mod test {
expected_type: None,
expected_err: Some(Error::other("invalid URL endpoint format")),
},
TestCase {
arg: "http://:topsecret@server/path",
expected_endpoint: None,
expected_type: None,
expected_err: Some(Error::other("invalid URL endpoint format")),
},
TestCase {
arg: "http://:/path",
expected_endpoint: None,
@@ -505,8 +512,18 @@ mod test {
let endpoint = Endpoint::try_from("http://example.com:9000/path").unwrap();
assert_eq!(endpoint.host_port(), "example.com:9000");
let endpoint_no_port = Endpoint::try_from("https://example.com/path").unwrap();
assert_eq!(endpoint_no_port.host_port(), "example.com");
for endpoint in [
Endpoint::try_from("http://example.com/path").unwrap(),
Endpoint::try_from("http://example.com:80/path").unwrap(),
] {
assert_eq!(endpoint.host_port(), "example.com");
}
for endpoint in [
Endpoint::try_from("https://example.com/path").unwrap(),
Endpoint::try_from("https://example.com:443/path").unwrap(),
] {
assert_eq!(endpoint.host_port(), "example.com");
}
let file_endpoint = Endpoint::try_from("/tmp/data").unwrap();
assert_eq!(file_endpoint.host_port(), "");
File diff suppressed because it is too large Load Diff
+52 -47
View File
@@ -18,7 +18,7 @@ use serde::{Deserialize, Serialize};
use serde_json::Error as JsonError;
use uuid::Uuid;
#[derive(Debug, Serialize, Deserialize, Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
#[derive(Debug, Serialize, Deserialize, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Hash)]
pub enum FormatMetaVersion {
#[serde(rename = "1")]
V1,
@@ -27,7 +27,7 @@ pub enum FormatMetaVersion {
Unknown,
}
#[derive(Debug, Serialize, Deserialize, Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
#[derive(Debug, Serialize, Deserialize, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Hash)]
pub enum FormatBackend {
#[serde(rename = "xl")]
Erasure,
@@ -64,7 +64,7 @@ pub struct FormatErasureV3 {
pub distribution_algo: DistributionAlgoVersion,
}
#[derive(Debug, Serialize, Deserialize, Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
#[derive(Debug, Serialize, Deserialize, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Hash)]
pub enum FormatErasureVersion {
#[serde(rename = "1")]
V1,
@@ -77,7 +77,7 @@ pub enum FormatErasureVersion {
Unknown,
}
#[derive(Debug, Serialize, Deserialize, Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
#[derive(Debug, Serialize, Deserialize, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Hash)]
pub enum DistributionAlgoVersion {
#[serde(rename = "CRCMOD")]
V1,
@@ -121,6 +121,15 @@ pub struct FormatV3 {
pub disk_info: Option<DiskInfo>,
}
pub(crate) type SharedFormatIdentity<'a> = (
&'a FormatMetaVersion,
&'a FormatBackend,
&'a Uuid,
&'a FormatErasureVersion,
&'a [Vec<Uuid>],
&'a DistributionAlgoVersion,
);
impl TryFrom<&[u8]> for FormatV3 {
type Error = JsonError;
@@ -198,52 +207,24 @@ impl FormatV3 {
}
pub fn check_other(&self, other: &FormatV3) -> Result<()> {
let mut tmp = other.clone();
let this = tmp.erasure.this;
tmp.erasure.this = Uuid::nil();
if self.erasure.sets.len() != other.erasure.sets.len() {
return Err(Error::other(format!(
"Expected number of sets {}, got {}",
self.erasure.sets.len(),
other.erasure.sets.len()
)));
if self.shared_identity() != other.shared_identity() {
return Err(Error::other("storage formats do not match"));
}
for i in 0..self.erasure.sets.len() {
if self.erasure.sets[i].len() != other.erasure.sets[i].len() {
return Err(Error::other(format!(
"Each set should be of same size, expected {}, got {}",
self.erasure.sets[i].len(),
other.erasure.sets[i].len()
)));
}
self.find_disk_index_by_disk_id(other.erasure.this).map(|_| ())
}
for j in 0..self.erasure.sets[i].len() {
if self.erasure.sets[i][j] != other.erasure.sets[i][j] {
return Err(Error::other(format!(
"UUID on positions {}:{} do not match with, expected {:?} got {:?}: (%w)",
i,
j,
self.erasure.sets[i][j].to_string(),
other.erasure.sets[i][j].to_string(),
)));
}
}
}
for i in 0..tmp.erasure.sets.len() {
for j in 0..tmp.erasure.sets[i].len() {
if this == tmp.erasure.sets[i][j] {
return Ok(());
}
}
}
Err(Error::other(format!(
"DriveID {:?} not found in any drive sets {:?}",
this, other.erasure.sets
)))
/// Fields that must agree across every disk in one erasure format,
/// excluding the disk-specific `this` UUID and runtime-only `disk_info`.
pub(crate) fn shared_identity(&self) -> SharedFormatIdentity<'_> {
(
&self.version,
&self.format,
&self.id,
&self.erasure.version,
&self.erasure.sets,
&self.erasure.distribution_algo,
)
}
}
@@ -437,6 +418,30 @@ mod test {
assert!(result.is_ok());
}
#[test]
fn test_check_other_rejects_shared_identity_mismatches() {
type FormatMutation = (&'static str, fn(&mut FormatV3));
let format = FormatV3::new(1, 2);
let mutations: [FormatMutation; 5] = [
("meta version", |other| other.version = FormatMetaVersion::Unknown),
("backend", |other| other.format = FormatBackend::ErasureSingle),
("deployment id", |other| other.id = Uuid::new_v4()),
("erasure version", |other| other.erasure.version = FormatErasureVersion::V2),
("distribution algorithm", |other| {
other.erasure.distribution_algo = DistributionAlgoVersion::V2
}),
];
for (field, mutate) in mutations {
let mut other = format.clone();
other.erasure.this = format.erasure.sets[0][0];
mutate(&mut other);
assert!(format.check_other(&other).is_err(), "{field} mismatch must be rejected");
}
}
#[test]
fn test_check_other_different_set_count() {
let format1 = FormatV3::new(2, 4);
+3 -1
View File
@@ -12,8 +12,10 @@
// See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
// limitations under the License.
#![recursion_limit = "256"]
/// Scope-based hotpath measurement for `#[async_trait]` methods, where
/// `#[cfg_attr(feature = "hotpath", hotpath::measure)]` would only time the boxed-future construction.
/// `#[hotpath::measure]` would only time the boxed-future construction.
/// The guard records wall time from this statement until the enclosing
/// (desugared) async block completes, including early returns via `?`.
#[cfg(feature = "hotpath")]
@@ -0,0 +1,80 @@
// Copyright 2024 RustFS Team
//
// Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
// you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
// You may obtain a copy of the License at
//
// http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
//
// Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
// distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
// WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
// See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
// limitations under the License.
use async_trait::async_trait;
use http::{HeaderMap, HeaderValue};
use std::collections::HashMap;
use std::error::Error;
use std::fmt::{Display, Formatter};
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub enum ReadEncryptionMode {
Direct { base_nonce: [u8; 12] },
Object,
}
pub struct ReadEncryptionMaterial {
pub key_bytes: [u8; 32],
pub mode: ReadEncryptionMode,
}
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub enum EncryptionResolutionErrorKind {
InvalidRequest,
InvalidMetadata,
ServiceUnavailable,
DecryptionFailed,
}
#[derive(Debug)]
pub struct EncryptionResolutionError {
kind: EncryptionResolutionErrorKind,
message: String,
}
impl EncryptionResolutionError {
pub fn new(kind: EncryptionResolutionErrorKind, message: impl Into<String>) -> Self {
Self {
kind,
message: message.into(),
}
}
pub fn kind(&self) -> EncryptionResolutionErrorKind {
self.kind
}
}
impl Display for EncryptionResolutionError {
fn fmt(&self, formatter: &mut Formatter<'_>) -> std::fmt::Result {
formatter.write_str(&self.message)
}
}
impl Error for EncryptionResolutionError {}
pub struct ReadEncryptionRequest<'a> {
pub bucket: &'a str,
pub object: &'a str,
pub metadata: &'a HashMap<String, String>,
pub headers: &'a HeaderMap<HeaderValue>,
}
#[async_trait]
pub trait ObjectEncryptionResolver: Send + Sync {
async fn resolve_read_material(
&self,
request: ReadEncryptionRequest<'_>,
) -> Result<Option<ReadEncryptionMaterial>, EncryptionResolutionError>;
}
+5
View File
@@ -84,6 +84,7 @@ pub(crate) fn legacy_encrypted_range_seek_enabled() -> bool {
}
mod body_cache_hook;
mod encryption;
mod hook_slot;
mod object_mutation_hook;
mod readers;
@@ -98,6 +99,10 @@ pub use body_cache_hook::{
pub(crate) use body_cache_hook::{
get_object_body_cache_hook, get_object_body_cache_hook_suppressed, without_get_object_body_cache_hook,
};
pub use encryption::{
EncryptionResolutionError, EncryptionResolutionErrorKind, ObjectEncryptionResolver, ReadEncryptionMaterial,
ReadEncryptionMode, ReadEncryptionRequest,
};
pub(crate) use object_mutation_hook::notify_object_mutation;
pub use object_mutation_hook::{ObjectMutationHook, register_object_mutation_hook, unregister_object_mutation_hook};
pub use readers::*;
File diff suppressed because it is too large Load Diff
+17 -46
View File
@@ -273,29 +273,9 @@ impl ObjectInfo {
}
pub fn is_encrypted(&self) -> bool {
// Corresponding to the logic in rustfs/src/sse.rs/encryption_material_to_metadata function
use rustfs_utils::http::{SSEC_ALGORITHM_HEADER, SSEC_KEY_HEADER, SSEC_KEY_MD5_HEADER};
self.user_defined.keys().any(|key| {
let lower = key.to_ascii_lowercase();
lower.starts_with("x-minio-encryption-")
|| lower.starts_with("x-minio-internal-server-side-encryption-")
|| matches!(
lower.as_str(),
"x-minio-internal-encrypted-multipart"
| "x-rustfs-encryption-key"
| "x-rustfs-encryption-algorithm"
| "x-rustfs-encryption-iv"
| "x-rustfs-encryption-key-id"
| "x-rustfs-encryption-context"
| "x-rustfs-encryption-tag"
| "x-amz-server-side-encryption-aws-kms-key-id"
| SSEC_ALGORITHM_HEADER
| SSEC_KEY_HEADER
| SSEC_KEY_MD5_HEADER
| "x-amz-server-side-encryption"
)
})
self.user_defined
.keys()
.any(|key| rustfs_utils::http::is_object_encryption_marker(key))
}
/// Maximum inline size for non-versioned objects (128 KiB).
@@ -339,26 +319,7 @@ impl ObjectInfo {
}
pub fn encryption_original_size(&self) -> std::io::Result<Option<i64>> {
let actual_size = rustfs_utils::http::get_str(&self.user_defined, rustfs_utils::http::SUFFIX_ACTUAL_SIZE);
if let Some(size_str) = self
.user_defined
.get("x-rustfs-encryption-original-size")
.map(String::as_str)
.or_else(|| {
self.user_defined
.get("x-amz-server-side-encryption-customer-original-size")
.map(String::as_str)
})
.or(actual_size.as_deref())
&& !size_str.is_empty()
{
let size = size_str
.parse::<i64>()
.map_err(|e| std::io::Error::other(format!("Failed to parse encryption original size: {e}")))?;
return Ok(Some(size));
}
Ok(None)
rustfs_utils::http::get_object_encryption_original_size(&self.user_defined)
}
pub fn decrypted_size(&self) -> std::io::Result<i64> {
@@ -388,9 +349,6 @@ impl ObjectInfo {
return Ok(actual_size);
}
// Check if object is encrypted
// Managed SSE stores original size in x-rustfs-encryption-original-size metadata
// SSE-C stores original size in x-amz-server-side-encryption-customer-original-size
if let Some(size) = self.encryption_original_size()? {
return Ok(size);
}
@@ -881,6 +839,19 @@ mod tests {
assert!(!object.is_inline_fast_path_eligible(), "transitioned objects must fall back");
}
#[test]
fn minio_internal_encryption_metadata_is_not_treated_as_plaintext() {
let object = ObjectInfo {
user_defined: Arc::new(HashMap::from([(
"X-Minio-Internal-Server-Side-Encryption-Sealed-Key".to_string(),
"sealed".to_string(),
)])),
..Default::default()
};
assert!(object.is_encrypted());
}
#[test]
fn versions_after_marker_handles_null_version_marker() {
let first_version = Uuid::parse_str("11111111-2222-3333-4444-555555555555").unwrap();
+17
View File
@@ -46,6 +46,7 @@ use crate::bucket::metadata_sys::BucketMetadataSys;
use crate::bucket::replication::{DynReplicationPool, ReplicationStats};
use crate::disk::DiskStore;
use crate::layout::endpoints::{EndpointServerPools, SetupType};
use crate::object_api::ObjectEncryptionResolver;
use crate::services::event_notification::EventNotifier;
use crate::services::tier::tier::TierConfigMgr;
use rustfs_lock::{GlobalLockManager, get_global_lock_manager};
@@ -159,6 +160,8 @@ pub struct InstanceContext {
/// workers (scanner/heal/tier/lifecycle) without touching another instance.
/// Replaces the process-global cancel-token static.
background_cancel_token: OnceLock<CancellationToken>,
/// Resolves object-encryption material at the application boundary.
object_encryption_resolver: OnceLock<Arc<dyn ObjectEncryptionResolver>>,
tier_delete_journal_recovery_stores: std::sync::Mutex<HashSet<Uuid>>,
transition_transaction_recovery_stores: std::sync::Mutex<HashSet<Uuid>>,
#[cfg(test)]
@@ -197,6 +200,7 @@ impl InstanceContext {
local_disk_set_drives: Arc::new(RwLock::new(Vec::new())),
bucket_metadata_sys: std::sync::Mutex::new(None),
background_cancel_token: OnceLock::new(),
object_encryption_resolver: OnceLock::new(),
tier_delete_journal_recovery_stores: std::sync::Mutex::new(HashSet::new()),
transition_transaction_recovery_stores: std::sync::Mutex::new(HashSet::new()),
#[cfg(test)]
@@ -209,6 +213,19 @@ impl InstanceContext {
self.lock_manager.clone()
}
/// Install the application-owned object-encryption resolver once.
pub fn set_object_encryption_resolver(
&self,
resolver: Arc<dyn ObjectEncryptionResolver>,
) -> Result<(), Arc<dyn ObjectEncryptionResolver>> {
self.object_encryption_resolver.set(resolver)
}
/// Return the configured object-encryption resolver, if startup installed one.
pub fn object_encryption_resolver(&self) -> Option<&dyn ObjectEncryptionResolver> {
self.object_encryption_resolver.get().map(Arc::as_ref)
}
/// Set this instance's S3 region.
///
/// Write-once: panics on a second write, preserving the startup fail-fast
+132 -12
View File
@@ -27,7 +27,7 @@ use crate::{
bucket::replication::{DynReplicationPool, ReplicationStats},
config::{get_global_storage_class, get_global_storage_class_snapshot, set_global_storage_class, storageclass},
disk::{DiskAPI, DiskOption, DiskStore, new_disk},
error::Result,
error::{Error, Result},
layout::endpoints::{EndpointServerPools, SetupType},
runtime::global::{
GLOBAL_BOOT_TIME, GLOBAL_LIFECYCLE_SYS, GLOBAL_LOCAL_NODE_NAME_FALLBACK, GLOBAL_ROOT_DISK_THRESHOLD,
@@ -46,7 +46,6 @@ use crate::{
use rustfs_concurrency::WorkloadAdmissionSnapshotProvider;
use rustfs_config::server_config::{Config, get_global_server_config, set_global_server_config};
use rustfs_io_metrics::internode_metrics::global_internode_metrics;
use rustfs_kms::{ObjectEncryptionService, get_global_encryption_service};
use rustfs_lock::client::LockClient;
use s3s::dto::BucketLifecycleConfiguration;
use s3s::region::Region;
@@ -105,10 +104,6 @@ pub(crate) fn record_erasure_write_quorum_failure(stage: &'static str, dominant_
global_internode_metrics().record_erasure_write_quorum_failure(stage, dominant_error);
}
pub(crate) async fn object_encryption_service() -> Option<Arc<ObjectEncryptionService>> {
get_global_encryption_service().await
}
pub fn object_store_handle() -> Option<Arc<ECStore>> {
resolve_object_store_handle()
}
@@ -417,14 +412,14 @@ pub(crate) async fn clear_local_disk_id_map_for_test() {
local_disk_id_map_handle().write().await.clear();
}
pub(crate) async fn record_local_disk_id(instance_ctx: &Arc<InstanceContext>, disk_id: Uuid, endpoint: String) {
instance_ctx.local_disk_id_map().write().await.insert(disk_id, endpoint);
}
pub(crate) async fn replace_local_disk_id(previous: Option<Uuid>, current: Option<Uuid>, endpoint: String) {
let id_map = local_disk_id_map_handle();
let mut disk_id_map = id_map.write().await;
if let Some(previous_id) = previous {
if let Some(previous_id) = previous
&& disk_id_map
.get(&previous_id)
.is_some_and(|registered_endpoint| registered_endpoint == &endpoint)
{
disk_id_map.remove(&previous_id);
}
if let Some(current_id) = current {
@@ -432,6 +427,53 @@ pub(crate) async fn replace_local_disk_id(previous: Option<Uuid>, current: Optio
}
}
pub(crate) async fn reconcile_local_disk_ids(
instance_ctx: &InstanceContext,
pool_endpoints: &[String],
selected: &[(Uuid, String)],
) {
let pool_endpoints = pool_endpoints.iter().map(String::as_str).collect::<HashSet<_>>();
let disk_id_map = instance_ctx.local_disk_id_map();
let mut disk_ids = disk_id_map.write().await;
disk_ids.retain(|_, registered_endpoint| !pool_endpoints.contains(registered_endpoint.as_str()));
disk_ids.extend(selected.iter().cloned());
}
pub(crate) async fn quarantine_local_disks(instance_ctx: &InstanceContext, endpoints: &[Endpoint]) -> Result<()> {
let slots = endpoints
.iter()
.map(|endpoint| {
Ok((
usize::try_from(endpoint.pool_idx).map_err(|_| Error::CorruptedFormat)?,
usize::try_from(endpoint.set_idx).map_err(|_| Error::CorruptedFormat)?,
usize::try_from(endpoint.disk_idx).map_err(|_| Error::CorruptedFormat)?,
))
})
.collect::<Result<Vec<_>>>()?;
let local_disk_map = instance_ctx.local_disk_map();
let mut local_disks = local_disk_map.write().await;
for endpoint in endpoints {
local_disks.insert(endpoint.to_string(), None);
}
drop(local_disks);
let set_drives = instance_ctx.local_disk_set_drives();
let mut local_set_drives = set_drives.write().await;
if local_set_drives.is_empty() {
return Ok(());
}
for (pool_idx, set_idx, disk_idx) in slots {
let disk = local_set_drives
.get_mut(pool_idx)
.and_then(|sets| sets.get_mut(set_idx))
.and_then(|disks| disks.get_mut(disk_idx))
.ok_or(Error::CorruptedFormat)?;
*disk = None;
}
Ok(())
}
pub(crate) async fn record_local_disks(instance_ctx: &Arc<InstanceContext>, disks: Vec<DiskStore>) {
let map = instance_ctx.local_disk_map();
let mut global_local_disk_map = map.write().await;
@@ -558,10 +600,14 @@ pub(crate) async fn init_tier_config_mgr(store: Arc<ECStore>) -> Result<()> {
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
use super::{LockRegistry, local_node_name, set_local_node_name};
use super::{
LockRegistry, clear_local_disk_id_map_for_test, local_disk_path_by_id, local_node_name, reconcile_local_disk_ids,
replace_local_disk_id, set_local_node_name,
};
use crate::disk::endpoint::Endpoint;
use rustfs_lock::{LocalClient, LockClient};
use std::{collections::HashMap, sync::Arc};
use uuid::Uuid;
fn url_endpoint(raw: &str) -> Endpoint {
Endpoint {
@@ -607,4 +653,78 @@ mod tests {
assert_eq!(observed, next);
}
#[tokio::test]
#[serial_test::serial]
async fn clearing_a_stale_disk_id_does_not_remove_another_endpoint() {
clear_local_disk_id_map_for_test().await;
let disk_id = Uuid::new_v4();
replace_local_disk_id(None, Some(disk_id), "endpoint-a".to_string()).await;
replace_local_disk_id(Some(disk_id), None, "endpoint-b".to_string()).await;
assert_eq!(local_disk_path_by_id(&disk_id).await, Some("endpoint-a".to_string()));
clear_local_disk_id_map_for_test().await;
}
#[tokio::test]
#[serial_test::serial]
async fn reconciling_pool_disk_ids_preserves_other_endpoints() {
let instance_ctx = Arc::new(crate::runtime::instance::InstanceContext::new());
let process_ctx = crate::runtime::global::current_ctx();
let bootstrap_ctx = crate::runtime::instance::bootstrap_ctx();
let retained_id = Uuid::new_v4();
let removed_id = Uuid::new_v4();
let selected_id = Uuid::new_v4();
let process_sentinel = Uuid::new_v4();
let bootstrap_sentinel = Uuid::new_v4();
instance_ctx.local_disk_id_map().write().await.extend([
(retained_id, "endpoint-a".to_string()),
(removed_id, "endpoint-b".to_string()),
]);
process_ctx
.local_disk_id_map()
.write()
.await
.insert(process_sentinel, "endpoint-b".to_string());
bootstrap_ctx
.local_disk_id_map()
.write()
.await
.insert(bootstrap_sentinel, "endpoint-b".to_string());
reconcile_local_disk_ids(
&instance_ctx,
&["endpoint-b".to_string(), "endpoint-c".to_string()],
&[(selected_id, "endpoint-c".to_string())],
)
.await;
let disk_ids = instance_ctx.local_disk_id_map();
let disk_ids = disk_ids.read().await;
assert_eq!(disk_ids.get(&retained_id).map(String::as_str), Some("endpoint-a"));
assert_eq!(disk_ids.get(&removed_id), None);
assert_eq!(disk_ids.get(&selected_id).map(String::as_str), Some("endpoint-c"));
drop(disk_ids);
assert_eq!(
process_ctx
.local_disk_id_map()
.read()
.await
.get(&process_sentinel)
.map(String::as_str),
Some("endpoint-b")
);
assert_eq!(
bootstrap_ctx
.local_disk_id_map()
.read()
.await
.get(&bootstrap_sentinel)
.map(String::as_str),
Some("endpoint-b")
);
process_ctx.local_disk_id_map().write().await.remove(&process_sentinel);
bootstrap_ctx.local_disk_id_map().write().await.remove(&bootstrap_sentinel);
}
}
@@ -2044,15 +2044,10 @@ fn synthesized_disks(host: &str, endpoints: &EndpointServerPools, state: ItemSta
/// Whether `peer_host` refers to the same node as an endpoint whose
/// `host_port()` is `ep_host_port`.
///
/// `PeerRestClient::host` is an `XHost`, which resolves names to an address on
/// construction (`hosts_sorted` -> `XHost::try_from` -> `to_socket_addrs`), so
/// `peer_host` is the resolved `IP:port`. An endpoint's `host_port()`, however,
/// is `url.host():port` — still the raw `hostname:port` on hostname-based
/// deployments. A plain string compare therefore misses on hostname clusters,
/// leaving the synthesized/degraded drive list empty and `unknownDisks` at 0
/// (rustfs/rustfs#4607 follow-up). Compare directly first (fast path / IP
/// deployments), then canonicalize the endpoint side through the same `XHost`
/// resolution and compare again.
/// Current topology clients preserve the endpoint `hostname:port`, so the
/// direct comparison is the normal path. The resolution fallback keeps
/// compatibility with older or manually constructed clients whose `XHost`
/// contains a resolved `IP:port` (rustfs/rustfs#4607 follow-up).
fn endpoint_host_matches(peer_host: &str, ep_host_port: &str) -> bool {
if peer_host == ep_host_port {
return true;
+71 -3
View File
@@ -72,6 +72,7 @@ use crate::{
cluster::rpc::peer_rest_client::{PeerRestClient, PeerTierMutationState},
config::com::{CONFIG_PREFIX, read_config, read_config_with_metadata},
disk::{MIGRATING_META_BUCKET, RUSTFS_META_BUCKET},
layout::endpoints::EndpointServerPools,
object_api::{GetObjectReader, ObjectInfo, ObjectOptions, PutObjReader},
runtime::sources as runtime_sources,
set_disk::get_lock_acquire_timeout,
@@ -904,14 +905,17 @@ async fn remote_tier_mutation_peers() -> io::Result<Vec<Arc<dyn TierMutationPeer
let Some(endpoints) = runtime_sources::endpoint_pools() else {
return Err(tier_mutation_replay_error("cluster endpoint topology is not initialized"));
};
let remote_host_count = endpoints.hosts_sorted().iter().flatten().count();
let (peers, _) = PeerRestClient::new_clients(endpoints).await;
remote_tier_mutation_peers_from_topology(endpoints).await
}
async fn remote_tier_mutation_peers_from_topology(endpoints: EndpointServerPools) -> io::Result<Vec<Arc<dyn TierMutationPeer>>> {
let (peers, _, remote_topology_hosts) = PeerRestClient::new_clients_with_topology(endpoints).await;
let peers = peers
.into_iter()
.flatten()
.map(|peer| Arc::new(peer) as Arc<dyn TierMutationPeer>)
.collect::<Vec<_>>();
ensure_complete_tier_mutation_commit_peer_set(peers.len(), remote_host_count)?;
ensure_complete_tier_mutation_commit_peer_set(peers.len(), remote_topology_hosts.len())?;
Ok(peers)
}
@@ -4307,6 +4311,34 @@ fn tier_config_not_initialized_error(operation: &str) -> std::io::Error {
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
use super::*;
use crate::layout::{
endpoint::Endpoint,
endpoints::{Endpoints, PoolEndpoints, SetupType},
};
struct SetupTypeGuard {
previous: SetupType,
}
impl SetupTypeGuard {
async fn switch_to(next: SetupType) -> Self {
let previous = runtime_sources::current_setup_type().await;
runtime_sources::set_setup_type(next).await;
Self { previous }
}
}
impl Drop for SetupTypeGuard {
fn drop(&mut self) {
let previous = self.previous.clone();
let handle = tokio::runtime::Handle::current();
tokio::task::block_in_place(|| {
handle.block_on(async move {
runtime_sources::set_setup_type(previous).await;
});
});
}
}
fn build_s3_tier(name: &str) -> TierConfig {
TierConfig {
@@ -6354,6 +6386,42 @@ mod tests {
assert!(err.to_string().contains("without peer commit clients"), "{err}");
}
#[tokio::test(flavor = "multi_thread")]
#[serial_test::serial]
async fn tier_mutation_peer_composition_preserves_unresolved_topology_slots() {
let mut endpoints = Vec::new();
for disk_index in 0..4 {
let mut endpoint = Endpoint::try_from(format!("http://rustfs-{disk_index}.invalid:9000/data{disk_index}").as_str())
.expect("unresolved topology endpoint should parse without DNS");
endpoint.is_local = disk_index == 0;
endpoint.set_pool_index(0);
endpoint.set_set_index(0);
endpoint.set_disk_index(disk_index);
endpoints.push(endpoint);
}
let topology = EndpointServerPools::from(vec![PoolEndpoints {
legacy: false,
set_count: 1,
drives_per_set: 4,
endpoints: Endpoints::from(endpoints),
cmd_line: "unresolved-tier-mutation-topology".to_string(),
platform: "test".to_string(),
}]);
let _setup_type_guard = SetupTypeGuard::switch_to(SetupType::DistErasure).await;
let peers = remote_tier_mutation_peers_from_topology(topology)
.await
.expect("every unresolved remote topology slot should retain a tier mutation client");
assert_eq!(
peers.iter().map(|peer| peer.peer_label()).collect::<Vec<_>>(),
vec![
"http://rustfs-1.invalid:9000".to_string(),
"http://rustfs-2.invalid:9000".to_string(),
"http://rustfs-3.invalid:9000".to_string(),
]
);
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn coordinator_fanout_prepare_failure_aborts_prepared_peers_without_cas() {
let manager = TierConfigMgr::new();
+1 -3
View File
@@ -505,9 +505,7 @@ impl SetDisks {
}
fn file_info_has_encryption_metadata(meta: &FileInfo) -> bool {
meta.metadata
.keys()
.any(|name| http::is_encryption_metadata_key(name) || http::is_sse_header(name))
meta.metadata.keys().any(|name| http::is_object_encryption_marker(name))
}
fn starts_with_ignore_ascii_case(value: &str, prefix: &str) -> bool {
+10 -8
View File
@@ -110,7 +110,10 @@ use crate::{
object_api::{GetObjectReader, ObjectInfo, PutObjReader},
// event::name::EventName,
services::event_notification::{EventArgs, send_event},
store::init_format::{get_format_erasure_in_quorum, load_format_erasure, load_format_erasure_all, save_format_file},
store::init_format::{
formats_match_reference_slots, get_format_erasure_in_quorum, load_format_erasure, load_format_erasure_all,
save_format_file,
},
};
use bytes::Bytes;
use bytesize::ByteSize;
@@ -144,15 +147,17 @@ use rustfs_object_capacity::capacity_scope::{
CapacityScope, CapacityScopeDisk, current_dirty_generation, record_capacity_scope, record_global_dirty_scope,
};
use rustfs_s3_types::EventName;
#[cfg(test)]
use rustfs_utils::http::SSEC_ALGORITHM_HEADER;
use rustfs_utils::http::headers::AMZ_OBJECT_TAGGING;
use rustfs_utils::http::headers::AMZ_STORAGE_CLASS;
use rustfs_utils::http::headers::{
CACHE_CONTROL, CONTENT_DISPOSITION, CONTENT_ENCODING, CONTENT_LANGUAGE, CONTENT_TYPE, EXPIRES, HeaderExt as _,
};
use rustfs_utils::http::{
SSEC_ALGORITHM_HEADER, SSEC_KEY_HEADER, SSEC_KEY_MD5_HEADER, SUFFIX_ACTUAL_OBJECT_SIZE_CAP, SUFFIX_ACTUAL_SIZE,
SUFFIX_COMPRESSION, SUFFIX_COMPRESSION_SIZE, SUFFIX_REPLICATION_SSEC_CRC, SUFFIX_RESTORE_OPERATION_ID, contains_key_str,
get_header_map, get_str, insert_str, is_encryption_metadata_key, remove_header_map,
SUFFIX_ACTUAL_OBJECT_SIZE_CAP, SUFFIX_ACTUAL_SIZE, SUFFIX_COMPRESSION, SUFFIX_COMPRESSION_SIZE, SUFFIX_REPLICATION_SSEC_CRC,
SUFFIX_RESTORE_OPERATION_ID, contains_key_str, get_header_map, get_str, insert_str, is_object_encryption_marker,
remove_header_map,
};
use rustfs_utils::{
HashAlgorithm,
@@ -667,10 +672,7 @@ pub(crate) fn strip_internal_multipart_metadata(metadata: &mut HashMap<String, S
}
fn should_persist_encryption_original_size(metadata: &HashMap<String, String>) -> bool {
metadata.keys().any(|key| is_encryption_metadata_key(key))
|| metadata.contains_key(SSEC_ALGORITHM_HEADER)
|| metadata.contains_key(SSEC_KEY_HEADER)
|| metadata.contains_key(SSEC_KEY_MD5_HEADER)
metadata.keys().any(|key| is_object_encryption_marker(key))
}
/// Per-set memoized capacity dirty scope.
+63 -4
View File
@@ -1373,11 +1373,24 @@ impl crate::storage_api_contracts::heal::HealOperations for SetDisks {
async fn heal_format(&self, dry_run: bool) -> Result<(HealResultItem, Option<Error>)> {
let disks = self.disks.read().await.clone();
let (formats, errs) = load_format_erasure_all(&disks, true).await;
let ref_format = match get_format_erasure_in_quorum(&formats) {
Ok(format) => format,
if errs.iter().any(|err| {
matches!(
err,
Some(DiskError::InconsistentDisk | DiskError::CorruptedFormat | DiskError::CorruptedBackend)
)
}) {
return Ok((HealResultItem::default(), Some(StorageError::CorruptedFormat)));
}
let slot_offset = self
.set_index
.checked_mul(self.set_drive_count)
.ok_or_else(|| Error::other("erasure set slot offset overflow"))?;
let ref_format = match get_format_erasure_in_quorum(&formats, slot_offset) {
Ok(format) if format.shared_identity() == self.format.shared_identity() => format,
Ok(_) => return Ok((HealResultItem::default(), Some(StorageError::CorruptedFormat))),
Err(err) => {
let can_use_cached_layout = count_errs(&errs, &DiskError::UnformattedDisk) > 0
&& formats.iter().flatten().all(|format| self.format.check_other(format).is_ok())
&& formats_match_reference_slots(&formats, &self.format, slot_offset)
&& errs
.iter()
.all(|err| err.is_none() || matches!(err, Some(DiskError::UnformattedDisk)));
@@ -1388,6 +1401,9 @@ impl crate::storage_api_contracts::heal::HealOperations for SetDisks {
}
}
};
if !formats_match_reference_slots(&formats, &ref_format, slot_offset) {
return Ok((HealResultItem::default(), Some(StorageError::CorruptedFormat)));
}
let endpoints = crate::layout::endpoints::Endpoints::from(self.set_endpoints.clone());
let before_drives = crate::layout::set_heal::formats_to_drives_info(&endpoints, &formats, &errs);
@@ -1543,11 +1559,16 @@ mod heal_result_report_tests {
use crate::disk::error::DiskError;
use crate::disk::format::FormatV3;
use crate::disk::{DiskAPI as _, DiskOption, DiskStore, RUSTFS_META_TMP_BUCKET, ReadOptions, new_disk};
use crate::error::Error;
use crate::object_api::{ObjectOptions, PutObjReader};
use crate::set_disk::ops::object::hermetic_set_disks_support::hermetic_set_disks_isolated;
use crate::storage_api_contracts::bucket::{BucketOperations as _, MakeBucketOptions};
use crate::storage_api_contracts::heal::HealOperations as _;
use crate::storage_api_contracts::object::{ObjectIO as _, ObjectOperations as _};
use crate::{config::storageclass, store::init_format::save_format_file};
use crate::{
config::storageclass,
store::init_format::{load_format_erasure, save_format_file},
};
use rustfs_common::heal_channel::{DriveState, HealOpts, HealScanMode};
use rustfs_filemeta::{BLOCK_SIZE_V2, FileInfo, ObjectPartInfo, TRANSITION_COMPLETE};
use std::sync::Arc;
@@ -1863,6 +1884,44 @@ mod heal_result_report_tests {
}
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn format_heal_cached_layout_rejects_a_disk_from_another_slot() {
let mut _temp_dirs = Vec::new();
let mut endpoints = Vec::new();
let mut disks = Vec::new();
for disk_index in 0..3 {
let (temp_dir, mut endpoint, disk) = real_disk().await;
endpoint.set_pool_index(0);
endpoint.set_set_index(0);
endpoint.set_disk_index(disk_index);
_temp_dirs.push(temp_dir);
endpoints.push(endpoint);
disks.push(Some(disk));
}
let set = set_disks_with(disks.clone(), endpoints, 1).await;
let mut wrong_slot = set.format.clone();
wrong_slot.erasure.this = set.format.erasure.sets[0][1];
save_format_file(&disks[0], &Some(wrong_slot))
.await
.expect("wrong-slot format fixture should be saved");
let mut correct_slot = set.format.clone();
correct_slot.erasure.this = set.format.erasure.sets[0][2];
save_format_file(&disks[2], &Some(correct_slot))
.await
.expect("correct format fixture should be saved");
let (_, heal_err) = set
.heal_format(false)
.await
.expect("format heal should report the quorum failure in its result");
assert!(matches!(heal_err, Some(Error::CorruptedFormat)));
let unformatted = load_format_erasure(disks[1].as_ref().expect("second disk should be online"), true)
.await
.expect_err("a rejected fallback must not format the missing slot");
assert_eq!(unformatted, DiskError::UnformattedDisk);
}
// Regression for #955: an offline disk must contribute exactly one drive
// record. Before the fix the offline branch fell through and pushed a second
// (Corrupt) record for the same disk, so `before/after.drives` grew to
+114 -9
View File
@@ -343,20 +343,23 @@ impl SetDisks {
}
};
// The drive's format may place it in a different erasure set than this
// one. Claiming a misplaced drive into `self.disks` would let two sets
// manage the same drive and degrade together, so reject it here
// (backlog#799 B19).
if set_idx != self.set_index {
// Claiming a misplaced drive into `self.disks` would let two slots or
// sets manage the same drive and degrade together (backlog#799 B19).
if set_idx != self.set_index || self.set_endpoints.get(disk_idx) != Some(ep) {
warn!(
"renew_disk: drive {:?} belongs to set {} but is being renewed on set {}; skipping",
ep, set_idx, self.set_index
endpoint = %ep,
format_set_index = set_idx,
format_disk_index = disk_idx,
endpoint_pool_index = ep.pool_idx,
endpoint_set_index = ep.set_idx,
endpoint_disk_index = ep.disk_idx,
expected_pool_index = self.pool_index,
expected_set_index = self.set_index,
"renew_disk rejected a drive whose endpoint and format do not identify the same topology slot"
);
return;
}
// Check that the endpoint matches
let _ = new_disk.set_disk_id(Some(fm.erasure.this)).await;
new_disk.enable_health_check();
@@ -715,6 +718,108 @@ mod tests {
drop(temp_dirs);
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn renew_disk_rejects_a_format_from_another_slot_or_cluster() {
let disk_count = 3;
let format = FormatV3::new(1, disk_count);
let mut temp_dirs = Vec::with_capacity(disk_count);
let mut endpoints = Vec::with_capacity(disk_count);
let mut fixture_disks = Vec::with_capacity(disk_count);
for disk_idx in 0..disk_count {
let (temp_dir, endpoint, disk) = make_formatted_local_disk(disk_idx, &format).await;
temp_dirs.push(temp_dir);
endpoints.push(endpoint);
fixture_disks.push(disk);
}
let set_disks = SetDisks::new(
"test-owner".to_string(),
Arc::new(RwLock::new(vec![Some(fixture_disks[0].clone()), None, None])),
disk_count,
disk_count / 2,
0,
0,
endpoints.clone(),
format.clone(),
Vec::new(),
)
.await;
let mut other_cluster_format = format.clone();
other_cluster_format.id = Uuid::new_v4();
other_cluster_format.erasure.this = format.erasure.sets[0][2];
save_format_file(&Some(fixture_disks[2].clone()), &Some(other_cluster_format))
.await
.expect("other-cluster format should be written for the rejection test");
set_disks.renew_disk(&endpoints[2]).await;
let disks = set_disks.get_disks_internal().await;
assert_eq!(
disks[0]
.as_ref()
.expect("the canonical first slot must remain attached")
.endpoint(),
endpoints[0]
);
assert!(
disks[2].is_none(),
"a disk from another deployment must remain detached even when its slot UUID matches"
);
let mut correct_format = format.clone();
correct_format.erasure.this = format.erasure.sets[0][2];
let replacement_disk = new_disk(
&endpoints[2],
&DiskOption {
cleanup: false,
health_check: false,
},
)
.await
.expect("third endpoint should reopen after other-cluster rejection");
save_format_file(&Some(replacement_disk), &Some(correct_format))
.await
.expect("correct slot format should be restored");
set_disks.renew_disk(&endpoints[2]).await;
let disks = set_disks.get_disks_internal().await;
assert_eq!(
disks[0]
.as_ref()
.expect("the canonical first slot must remain attached")
.endpoint(),
endpoints[0]
);
assert_eq!(disks[2].as_ref().expect("the restored third slot should attach").endpoint(), endpoints[2]);
let third_disk = disks[2].clone();
let mut wrong_slot_format = format.clone();
wrong_slot_format.erasure.this = format.erasure.sets[0][0];
save_format_file(&third_disk, &Some(wrong_slot_format))
.await
.expect("wrong-slot format should be written for the rejection test");
set_disks.disks.write().await[2] = None;
let mut misplaced_endpoint = endpoints[2].clone();
misplaced_endpoint.set_disk_index(0);
set_disks.renew_disk(&misplaced_endpoint).await;
let disks = set_disks.get_disks_internal().await;
assert_eq!(
disks[0]
.as_ref()
.expect("the canonical first slot must remain attached")
.endpoint(),
endpoints[0]
);
assert!(disks[2].is_none(), "a disk claiming another endpoint's slot must remain detached");
drop(temp_dirs);
}
// SetDisks split P0 (#816): the borrow handle must mirror the core state and
// the List operation family must run identically through it.
#[tokio::test]
+71 -2
View File
@@ -42,6 +42,7 @@ use crate::object_api::{GetObjectBodySource, get_object_body_cache_hook_suppress
use crate::services::tier::tier::{TierConfigMgr, TierOperationLease};
use crate::store::ECStore;
use futures::FutureExt as _;
use http::HeaderValue;
use std::future::Future;
fn erasure_from_file_info(fi: &FileInfo, uses_legacy: bool) -> Result<coding::Erasure> {
@@ -49,6 +50,17 @@ fn erasure_from_file_info(fi: &FileInfo, uses_legacy: bool) -> Result<coding::Er
.map_err(Error::from)
}
async fn get_object_reader_with_context(
ctx: &InstanceContext,
reader: Box<dyn AsyncRead + Unpin + Send + Sync>,
range: Option<HTTPRangeSpec>,
object_info: &ObjectInfo,
opts: &ObjectOptions,
headers: &HeaderMap<HeaderValue>,
) -> Result<(GetObjectReader, usize, i64)> {
GetObjectReader::new_with_resolver(reader, range, object_info, opts, headers, ctx.object_encryption_resolver()).await
}
/// Length of the full plaintext body when — and only when — this read's output
/// is exactly the object's complete plaintext, so the app-layer body cache may
/// serve it in place of the erasure read.
@@ -713,7 +725,8 @@ impl crate::storage_api_contracts::object::ObjectIO for SetDisks {
size_bucket,
);
record_get_object_reader_path_observation(GET_OBJECT_PATH_CODEC_STREAMING, object_class, size_bucket);
let (mut reader, _offset, _length) = GetObjectReader::new(stream, range, &object_info, opts, &h).await?;
let (mut reader, _offset, _length) =
get_object_reader_with_context(&self.ctx, stream, range, &object_info, opts, &h).await?;
// Carry the hook probe result so the app layer skips its
// now-redundant lookup on the streaming miss path (ODC-16).
reader.body_source = body_source;
@@ -745,7 +758,8 @@ impl crate::storage_api_contracts::object::ObjectIO for SetDisks {
let (rd, wd) = tokio::io::duplex(duplex_buffer_size);
debug!(bucket, object, duplex_buffer_size, "Created duplex pipe for object data transfer");
let (mut reader, offset, length) = GetObjectReader::new(Box::new(rd), range, &object_info, opts, &h).await?;
let (mut reader, offset, length) =
get_object_reader_with_context(&self.ctx, Box::new(rd), range, &object_info, opts, &h).await?;
// Carry the hook probe result so the app layer skips its now-redundant
// lookup on the streaming miss path (ODC-16).
reader.body_source = body_source;
@@ -4536,6 +4550,61 @@ mod erasure_construction_tests {
}
}
#[cfg(test)]
mod object_encryption_resolver_wiring_tests {
use super::*;
use crate::object_api::{EncryptionResolutionError, ObjectEncryptionResolver, ReadEncryptionMaterial, ReadEncryptionRequest};
use std::io::Cursor;
use std::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, Ordering};
struct CountingResolver {
calls: AtomicUsize,
}
#[async_trait::async_trait]
impl ObjectEncryptionResolver for CountingResolver {
async fn resolve_read_material(
&self,
_request: ReadEncryptionRequest<'_>,
) -> std::result::Result<Option<ReadEncryptionMaterial>, EncryptionResolutionError> {
self.calls.fetch_add(1, Ordering::Relaxed);
Ok(None)
}
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn get_object_reader_forwards_instance_resolver() {
let resolver = Arc::new(CountingResolver {
calls: AtomicUsize::new(0),
});
let ctx = InstanceContext::new();
assert!(
ctx.set_object_encryption_resolver(resolver.clone()).is_ok(),
"fresh context should accept resolver"
);
let object_info = ObjectInfo {
bucket: "bucket".to_string(),
name: "object".to_string(),
size: 1,
user_defined: Arc::new(HashMap::from([("x-amz-server-side-encryption".to_string(), "AES256".to_string())])),
..Default::default()
};
let result = get_object_reader_with_context(
&ctx,
Box::new(Cursor::new(Vec::<u8>::new())),
None,
&object_info,
&ObjectOptions::default(),
&HeaderMap::new(),
)
.await;
assert!(result.is_err(), "resolver returning no material must fail closed");
assert_eq!(resolver.calls.load(Ordering::Relaxed), 1);
}
}
#[cfg(test)]
pub(in crate::set_disk::ops) mod hermetic_set_disks_support {
//! Shared hermetic `SetDisks` construction for the ops tests below: the
+7 -7
View File
@@ -199,7 +199,7 @@ impl SetDisks {
);
}
#[cfg_attr(feature = "hotpath", hotpath::measure)]
#[hotpath::measure]
pub async fn read_version_optimized(
&self,
bucket: &str,
@@ -238,7 +238,7 @@ impl SetDisks {
}
#[tracing::instrument(level = "debug", skip(self))]
#[cfg_attr(feature = "hotpath", hotpath::measure)]
#[hotpath::measure]
pub(super) async fn get_object_fileinfo(
&self,
bucket: &str,
@@ -410,7 +410,7 @@ impl SetDisks {
Ok((fi, parts_metadata, op_online_disks))
}
#[cfg_attr(feature = "hotpath", hotpath::measure)]
#[hotpath::measure]
pub(super) async fn get_object_info_and_quorum(
&self,
bucket: &str,
@@ -605,7 +605,7 @@ impl SetDisks {
}
#[allow(clippy::too_many_arguments)]
#[cfg_attr(feature = "hotpath", hotpath::measure)]
#[hotpath::measure]
pub(super) async fn get_object_with_fileinfo<W>(
// &self,
bucket: &str,
@@ -1140,7 +1140,7 @@ impl SetDisks {
}
#[allow(clippy::too_many_arguments)]
#[cfg_attr(feature = "hotpath", hotpath::measure)]
#[hotpath::measure]
pub(super) async fn get_object_decode_reader_with_fileinfo(
bucket: &str,
object: &str,
@@ -1296,7 +1296,7 @@ impl SetDisks {
}
#[allow(clippy::too_many_arguments)]
#[cfg_attr(feature = "hotpath", hotpath::measure)]
#[hotpath::measure]
async fn build_codec_streaming_part_reader(
bucket: &str,
object: &str,
@@ -1469,7 +1469,7 @@ fn multipart_part_checksum_algo(fi: &FileInfo, part_number: usize) -> HashAlgori
/// `get_object_with_fileinfo` (backlog#870) so both report the same
/// stage-duration semantics.
#[allow(clippy::too_many_arguments)]
#[cfg_attr(feature = "hotpath", hotpath::measure)]
#[hotpath::measure]
async fn setup_multipart_part_readers(
files: &[FileInfo],
disks: &[Option<DiskStore>],
+137 -2
View File
@@ -30,6 +30,7 @@ impl ECStore {
};
let mut count_no_heal = 0;
let mut first_error = None;
for pool in self.pools.iter() {
let (mut result, err) = pool.heal_format(dry_run).await?;
if let Some(err) = err {
@@ -37,8 +38,8 @@ impl ECStore {
StorageError::NoHealRequired => {
count_no_heal += 1;
}
_ => {
continue;
err => {
first_error.get_or_insert(err);
}
}
}
@@ -47,6 +48,9 @@ impl ECStore {
r.before.drives.append(&mut result.before.drives);
r.after.drives.append(&mut result.after.drives);
}
if let Some(err) = first_error {
return Ok((r, Some(err)));
}
if count_no_heal == self.pools.len() {
info!(
event = EVENT_HEAL_FORMAT_COMPLETED,
@@ -165,3 +169,134 @@ impl ECStore {
Err(StorageError::NotImplemented)
}
}
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
use super::*;
use crate::disk::{DiskOption, format::FormatV3, new_disk};
use crate::layout::endpoints::{Endpoints, PoolEndpoints};
use crate::store::init_format::{load_format_erasure, save_format_file};
#[tokio::test]
async fn handle_heal_format_continues_after_a_pool_error() {
let canonical_format = FormatV3::new(1, 3);
let mut foreign_format = canonical_format.clone();
foreign_format.id = Uuid::new_v4();
let mut temp_dirs = Vec::new();
let mut endpoints = Vec::new();
let mut disks = Vec::new();
for disk_index in 0..3 {
let temp_dir = tempfile::tempdir().expect("temporary disk root should be created");
let mut endpoint = Endpoint::try_from(temp_dir.path().to_str().expect("temporary path should be UTF-8"))
.expect("temporary endpoint should parse");
endpoint.set_pool_index(0);
endpoint.set_set_index(0);
endpoint.set_disk_index(disk_index);
let disk = new_disk(
&endpoint,
&DiskOption {
cleanup: false,
health_check: false,
},
)
.await
.expect("temporary disk should open");
let mut disk_format = foreign_format.clone();
disk_format.erasure.this = foreign_format.erasure.sets[0][disk_index];
save_format_file(&Some(disk.clone()), &Some(disk_format))
.await
.expect("foreign format should be written");
temp_dirs.push(temp_dir);
endpoints.push(endpoint);
disks.push(Some(disk));
}
let pool_endpoints = PoolEndpoints {
legacy: false,
set_count: 1,
drives_per_set: 3,
endpoints: Endpoints::from(endpoints),
cmd_line: "foreign-format-majority-test".to_string(),
platform: "test".to_string(),
};
let pool = Sets::new(disks, &pool_endpoints, &canonical_format, 0, 1)
.await
.expect("test pool should build around the cached canonical format");
let mut recoverable_format = FormatV3::new(1, 3);
recoverable_format.id = canonical_format.id;
let mut recoverable_temp_dirs = Vec::new();
let mut recoverable_endpoints = Vec::new();
let mut recoverable_disks = Vec::new();
let mut unformatted_disk = None;
for disk_index in 0..3 {
let temp_dir = tempfile::tempdir().expect("temporary disk root should be created");
let mut endpoint = Endpoint::try_from(temp_dir.path().to_str().expect("temporary path should be UTF-8"))
.expect("temporary endpoint should parse");
endpoint.set_pool_index(1);
endpoint.set_set_index(0);
endpoint.set_disk_index(disk_index);
let disk = new_disk(
&endpoint,
&DiskOption {
cleanup: false,
health_check: false,
},
)
.await
.expect("temporary disk should open");
if disk_index < 2 {
let mut disk_format = recoverable_format.clone();
disk_format.erasure.this = recoverable_format.erasure.sets[0][disk_index];
save_format_file(&Some(disk.clone()), &Some(disk_format))
.await
.expect("recoverable format should be written");
} else {
unformatted_disk = Some(disk.clone());
}
recoverable_temp_dirs.push(temp_dir);
recoverable_endpoints.push(endpoint);
recoverable_disks.push(Some(disk));
}
let recoverable_pool_endpoints = PoolEndpoints {
legacy: false,
set_count: 1,
drives_per_set: 3,
endpoints: Endpoints::from(recoverable_endpoints),
cmd_line: "recoverable-format-test".to_string(),
platform: "test".to_string(),
};
let recoverable_pool = Sets::new(recoverable_disks, &recoverable_pool_endpoints, &recoverable_format, 1, 1)
.await
.expect("recoverable test pool should build");
let endpoint_pools = EndpointServerPools::from(vec![pool_endpoints.clone(), recoverable_pool_endpoints.clone()]);
let store = ECStore {
id: canonical_format.id,
disk_map: HashMap::new(),
pools: vec![pool, recoverable_pool],
peer_sys: S3PeerSys::new(&endpoint_pools),
pool_meta: RwLock::new(PoolMeta::default()),
rebalance_meta: RwLock::new(None),
decommission_cancelers: RwLock::new(Vec::new()),
start_gate: Mutex::new(()),
pool_meta_save_gate: Mutex::new(()),
ctx: crate::runtime::instance::bootstrap_ctx(),
};
let (result, err) = store
.handle_heal_format(false)
.await
.expect("format heal should return the typed pool error");
assert!(
matches!(err, Some(StorageError::CorruptedFormat)),
"foreign format majority must not be downgraded to a successful heal: {err:?}"
);
assert_eq!(result.disk_count, 3, "the recoverable pool should still be inspected");
let healed = load_format_erasure(&unformatted_disk.expect("the unformatted disk handle should be retained"), true)
.await
.expect("the later pool should be healed despite the first pool error");
assert_eq!(healed.erasure.this, recoverable_format.erasure.sets[0][2]);
}
}
+36 -4
View File
@@ -101,6 +101,10 @@ fn should_retry_local_decommission_resume(err: &Error, attempt: usize) -> bool {
matches!(err, Error::ConfigNotFound) && attempt < LOCAL_DECOMMISSION_RESUME_MAX_CONFIG_RETRIES
}
fn should_retry_format_load(err: &Error) -> bool {
!matches!(err, Error::CorruptedFormat)
}
fn should_auto_start_rebalance_after_init(decommission_running: bool, rebalance_meta_loaded: bool) -> bool {
rebalance_meta_loaded && !decommission_running
}
@@ -294,7 +298,7 @@ impl ECStore {
// periodic monitoring until format loading succeeds. Startup RPC
// failures can still spawn recovery probes for peers that come up
// after this node.
let (disks, errs) = init_format::init_disks(
let (mut disks, errs) = init_format::init_disks(
&pool_eps.endpoints,
&DiskOption {
cleanup: true,
@@ -309,9 +313,10 @@ impl ECStore {
let mut times = 0;
let mut interval = 1;
loop {
match init_format::connect_load_init_formats(
match init_format::connect_load_init_formats_with_instance_ctx(
&instance_ctx,
pool_first_is_local,
&disks,
&mut disks,
pool_eps.set_count,
pool_eps.drives_per_set,
deployment_id,
@@ -319,6 +324,7 @@ impl ECStore {
.await
{
Ok(fm) => break Ok(fm),
Err(e) if !should_retry_format_load(&e) => break Err(e),
// Wrap the final error if we are giving up
Err(e) if times >= 10 => {
break Err(Error::other(format!("store init failed to load formats after {times} retries: {e}")));
@@ -551,7 +557,7 @@ mod tests {
LOCAL_DECOMMISSION_RESUME_MAX_CONFIG_RETRIES, load_pool_meta_for_startup, pool_first_endpoint_is_local,
pool_meta_has_active_decommission, preflight_startup_rpc_secret_with, resolve_startup_pool_defaults_with,
resolve_store_init_stage_result, save_validated_pool_meta_for_startup, should_auto_start_rebalance_after_init,
should_retry_local_decommission_resume, wait_for_local_decommission_resume_delay,
should_retry_format_load, should_retry_local_decommission_resume, wait_for_local_decommission_resume_delay,
};
#[cfg(feature = "test-util")]
use crate::{
@@ -773,6 +779,13 @@ mod tests {
assert!(!should_retry_local_decommission_resume(&StorageError::SlowDown, 0));
}
#[test]
fn test_should_retry_format_load_rejects_permanent_corruption() {
assert!(!should_retry_format_load(&StorageError::CorruptedFormat));
assert!(should_retry_format_load(&StorageError::ErasureReadQuorum));
assert!(should_retry_format_load(&StorageError::FirstDiskWait));
}
#[test]
fn test_should_auto_start_rebalance_after_init_allows_loaded_rebalance_without_decommission() {
assert!(should_auto_start_rebalance_after_init(false, true));
@@ -1247,6 +1260,16 @@ mod tests {
let registered: Vec<String> = instance_ctx.local_disk_map().read().await.keys().cloned().collect();
assert_eq!(registered.len(), 4, "the passed context must register all four local disks");
let registered_disk_ids = instance_ctx.local_disk_id_map();
let registered_disk_ids = registered_disk_ids.read().await;
assert_eq!(registered_disk_ids.len(), 4, "the passed context must publish all four disk IDs");
for endpoint in registered_disk_ids.values() {
assert!(
registered.contains(endpoint),
"every disk ID in the passed context must resolve to one of its registered endpoints"
);
}
drop(registered_disk_ids);
let bootstrap = crate::runtime::instance::bootstrap_ctx();
assert_ne!(
bootstrap.deployment_id(),
@@ -1261,6 +1284,15 @@ mod tests {
"the bootstrap context must not absorb the fresh store's disks"
);
}
drop(bootstrap_map);
let bootstrap_disk_ids = bootstrap.local_disk_id_map();
let bootstrap_disk_ids = bootstrap_disk_ids.read().await;
for endpoint in bootstrap_disk_ids.values() {
assert!(
!registered.contains(endpoint),
"the bootstrap context must not absorb the fresh store's disk IDs"
);
}
}
#[tokio::test]
File diff suppressed because it is too large Load Diff
+2 -2
View File
@@ -989,7 +989,7 @@ mod tests {
init_local_disks(endpoint_pools.clone()).await.expect("init local disks");
let (disks, errs) = init_disks(
let (mut disks, errs) = init_disks(
&endpoint_pools.as_ref().first().expect("pool endpoints").endpoints,
&DiskOption {
cleanup: true,
@@ -999,7 +999,7 @@ mod tests {
.await;
assert!(errs.iter().all(|err| err.is_none()), "disk init should succeed: {errs:?}");
connect_load_init_formats(true, &disks, 1, 4, None)
connect_load_init_formats(true, &mut disks, 1, 4, None)
.await
.expect("initialize format metadata");
+1 -1
View File
@@ -238,7 +238,7 @@ impl ECStore {
}
#[instrument(skip(self, data))]
#[cfg_attr(feature = "hotpath", hotpath::measure)]
#[hotpath::measure]
pub(super) async fn handle_put_object_part(
&self,
bucket: &str,
+2 -2
View File
@@ -815,7 +815,7 @@ impl ECStore {
}
#[instrument(level = "debug", skip(self))]
#[cfg_attr(feature = "hotpath", hotpath::measure)]
#[hotpath::measure]
pub(super) async fn handle_get_object_reader(
&self,
bucket: &str,
@@ -849,7 +849,7 @@ impl ECStore {
}
#[instrument(level = "debug", skip(self, data))]
#[cfg_attr(feature = "hotpath", hotpath::measure)]
#[hotpath::measure]
pub(super) async fn handle_put_object(
&self,
bucket: &str,
+73 -2
View File
@@ -28,8 +28,26 @@ async fn remember_local_disk_id(disk: &DiskStore) -> Option<Uuid> {
async fn remember_local_disk_id_with_instance_ctx(instance_ctx: &Arc<InstanceContext>, disk: &DiskStore) -> Option<Uuid> {
let disk_id = disk.get_disk_id().await.ok().flatten()?;
runtime_sources::record_local_disk_id(instance_ctx, disk_id, disk.endpoint().to_string()).await;
Some(disk_id)
record_local_disk_id_if_active(instance_ctx, disk, disk_id)
.await
.then_some(disk_id)
}
async fn record_local_disk_id_if_active(instance_ctx: &Arc<InstanceContext>, disk: &DiskStore, disk_id: Uuid) -> bool {
let endpoint = disk.endpoint().to_string();
let local_disk_map = instance_ctx.local_disk_map();
let local_disks = local_disk_map.read().await;
let Some(active_disk) = local_disks.get(&endpoint).and_then(Option::as_ref) else {
return false;
};
if !Arc::ptr_eq(active_disk, disk) {
return false;
}
// Lock order is local_disk_map -> local_disk_id_map so quarantine is the
// linearization point for rejecting an in-flight stale disk snapshot.
instance_ctx.local_disk_id_map().write().await.insert(disk_id, endpoint);
true
}
pub async fn find_local_disk(disk_path: &str) -> Option<DiskStore> {
@@ -228,6 +246,7 @@ pub async fn get_disk_infos(disks: &[Option<DiskStore>]) -> Vec<Option<DiskInfo>
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
use super::*;
use crate::disk::new_disk;
use crate::layout::endpoints::{Endpoints, PoolEndpoints};
fn single_local_disk_pools(dir: &std::path::Path) -> EndpointServerPools {
@@ -314,4 +333,56 @@ mod tests {
);
}
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn stale_local_disk_snapshot_cannot_repopulate_the_id_registry() {
let temp_dir = tempfile::tempdir().expect("create temp disk dir");
let endpoint_pools = single_local_disk_pools(temp_dir.path());
let instance_ctx = Arc::new(InstanceContext::new());
init_local_disks_with_instance_ctx(&instance_ctx, endpoint_pools)
.await
.expect("local disk should be registered");
let disk = instance_ctx
.local_disk_map()
.read()
.await
.values()
.find_map(|disk| disk.clone())
.expect("registered local disk");
let endpoint = disk.endpoint().to_string();
let disk_id = Uuid::new_v4();
let local_disk_map = instance_ctx.local_disk_map();
let mut quarantine = local_disk_map.write().await;
let replacement = new_disk(
&disk.endpoint(),
&DiskOption {
cleanup: false,
health_check: false,
},
)
.await
.expect("replacement disk should initialize");
assert!(!Arc::ptr_eq(&disk, &replacement));
let task_ctx = instance_ctx.clone();
let task_disk = disk.clone();
let remember = tokio::spawn(async move { record_local_disk_id_if_active(&task_ctx, &task_disk, disk_id).await });
tokio::task::yield_now().await;
quarantine.insert(endpoint.clone(), Some(replacement.clone()));
drop(quarantine);
assert!(!remember.await.expect("stale lookup task should complete"));
assert!(!instance_ctx.local_disk_id_map().read().await.contains_key(&disk_id));
let active = instance_ctx
.local_disk_map()
.read()
.await
.get(&endpoint)
.cloned()
.flatten()
.expect("replacement disk should remain registered");
assert!(Arc::ptr_eq(&active, &replacement));
assert!(record_local_disk_id_if_active(&instance_ctx, &replacement, disk_id).await);
assert_eq!(instance_ctx.local_disk_id_map().read().await.get(&disk_id), Some(&endpoint));
}
}
+2 -2
View File
@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
## MinIO-generated encrypted fixtures
`minio_generated_read_test.rs` validates the `bitrot -> GetObjectReader` path against raw MinIO backend data captured by
`rustfs/src/storage/minio_generated_read_test.rs` validates the `bitrot -> GetObjectReader` path against raw MinIO backend data captured by
`.\rustfs\scripts\minio_fixture_lab\lab.py`.
It currently covers multipart fixtures for:
@@ -20,5 +20,5 @@ Example:
```powershell
$env:RUSTFS_MINIO_FIXTURE_ROOT = '.\rustfs\tmp\minio-fixture-lab-local-key'
$env:RUSTFS_MINIO_STATIC_KMS_KEY_B64 = '<base64-32-byte-local-minio-kms-key>'
cargo +1.97.1 test -p rustfs-ecstore --features rio-v2 --test minio_generated_read_test -- --ignored
cargo +1.97.1 test -p rustfs --features rio-v2 storage::minio_generated_read_test --lib -- --ignored
```
+7
View File
@@ -27,7 +27,14 @@ categories = ["web-programming", "development-tools"]
[lib]
doctest = false
[features]
default = []
hotpath = ["hotpath/hotpath"]
hotpath-alloc = ["hotpath", "hotpath/hotpath-alloc"]
hotpath-cpu = ["hotpath", "hotpath/hotpath-cpu"]
[dependencies]
hotpath.workspace = true
serde = { workspace = true, features = ["derive"] }
thiserror.workspace = true
+4 -2
View File
@@ -27,10 +27,12 @@ documentation = "https://docs.rs/rustfs-filemeta/latest/rustfs_filemeta/"
[features]
default = []
hotpath = ["dep:hotpath", "hotpath/hotpath"]
hotpath = ["hotpath/hotpath", "hotpath/tokio", "rustfs-utils/hotpath"]
hotpath-alloc = ["hotpath", "hotpath/hotpath-alloc", "rustfs-utils/hotpath-alloc"]
hotpath-cpu = ["hotpath", "hotpath/hotpath-cpu", "rustfs-utils/hotpath-cpu"]
[dependencies]
hotpath = { workspace = true, optional = true }
hotpath.workspace = true
crc-fast = { workspace = true }
rmp.workspace = true
rmp-serde.workspace = true
+3 -3
View File
@@ -19,7 +19,7 @@ impl FileMeta {
!matches!(Self::check_xl2_v1(buf), Err(_e))
}
#[cfg_attr(feature = "hotpath", hotpath::measure(impl_type = "FileMeta"))]
#[hotpath::measure(impl_type = "FileMeta")]
pub fn load(buf: &[u8]) -> Result<FileMeta> {
let mut xl = FileMeta::default();
xl.unmarshal_msg(buf)?;
@@ -112,7 +112,7 @@ impl FileMeta {
Ok((bin_len, remaining))
}
#[cfg_attr(feature = "hotpath", hotpath::measure(impl_type = "FileMeta"))]
#[hotpath::measure(impl_type = "FileMeta")]
pub fn unmarshal_msg(&mut self, buf: &[u8]) -> Result<u64> {
let i = buf.len() as u64;
@@ -326,7 +326,7 @@ impl FileMeta {
}
}
#[cfg_attr(feature = "hotpath", hotpath::measure(impl_type = "FileMeta"))]
#[hotpath::measure(impl_type = "FileMeta")]
pub fn marshal_msg(&self) -> Result<Vec<u8>> {
let mut wr = Vec::new();
+41
View File
@@ -29,7 +29,48 @@ categories = ["web-programming", "development-tools", "filesystem"]
[lints]
workspace = true
[features]
default = []
hotpath = [
"hotpath/hotpath",
"hotpath/tokio",
"hotpath/futures",
"rustfs-common/hotpath",
"rustfs-concurrency/hotpath",
"rustfs-config/hotpath",
"rustfs-ecstore/hotpath",
"rustfs-madmin/hotpath",
"rustfs-storage-api/hotpath",
"rustfs-utils/hotpath",
"rustfs-test-utils/hotpath",
]
hotpath-alloc = [
"hotpath",
"hotpath/hotpath-alloc",
"rustfs-common/hotpath-alloc",
"rustfs-concurrency/hotpath-alloc",
"rustfs-config/hotpath-alloc",
"rustfs-ecstore/hotpath-alloc",
"rustfs-madmin/hotpath-alloc",
"rustfs-storage-api/hotpath-alloc",
"rustfs-utils/hotpath-alloc",
"rustfs-test-utils/hotpath-alloc",
]
hotpath-cpu = [
"hotpath",
"hotpath/hotpath-cpu",
"rustfs-common/hotpath-cpu",
"rustfs-concurrency/hotpath-cpu",
"rustfs-config/hotpath-cpu",
"rustfs-ecstore/hotpath-cpu",
"rustfs-madmin/hotpath-cpu",
"rustfs-storage-api/hotpath-cpu",
"rustfs-utils/hotpath-cpu",
"rustfs-test-utils/hotpath-cpu",
]
[dependencies]
hotpath.workspace = true
rustfs-config = { workspace = true }
rustfs-concurrency = { workspace = true }
rustfs-ecstore = { workspace = true }
+1
View File
@@ -159,6 +159,7 @@ impl ErasureSetHealer {
/// execute erasure set heal with resume
#[tracing::instrument(skip(self, buckets), fields(set_disk_id = %set_disk_id, bucket_count = buckets.len()))]
#[hotpath::measure]
pub async fn heal_erasure_set(&self, buckets: &[String], set_disk_id: &str) -> Result<()> {
debug!(
target: "rustfs::heal::erasure_healer",
+3
View File
@@ -584,6 +584,7 @@ impl HealTask {
}
#[tracing::instrument(skip(self), fields(task_id = %self.id, heal_type = ?self.heal_type))]
#[hotpath::measure]
pub async fn execute(&self) -> Result<()> {
// update status and timestamps atomically to avoid race conditions
let now = SystemTime::now();
@@ -759,6 +760,7 @@ impl HealTask {
// specific heal implementation method
#[tracing::instrument(skip(self), fields(bucket = %bucket, object = %object, version_id = ?version_id))]
#[hotpath::measure]
async fn heal_object(&self, bucket: &str, object: &str, version_id: Option<&str>) -> Result<()> {
debug!(
target: "rustfs::heal::task",
@@ -1404,6 +1406,7 @@ impl HealTask {
self.heal_bucket_objects(bucket, prefix).await
}
#[hotpath::measure]
async fn heal_bucket_objects(&self, bucket: &str, prefix: &str) -> Result<()> {
let mut continuation_token: Option<String> = None;
let mut scanned = 0u64;
+48
View File
@@ -28,7 +28,55 @@ documentation = "https://docs.rs/rustfs-iam/latest/rustfs_iam/"
[lints]
workspace = true
[features]
default = []
hotpath = [
"hotpath/hotpath",
"hotpath/tokio",
"hotpath/futures",
"hotpath/reqwest-0-13",
"rustfs-config/hotpath",
"rustfs-credentials/hotpath",
"rustfs-crypto/hotpath",
"rustfs-ecstore/hotpath",
"rustfs-io-metrics/hotpath",
"rustfs-madmin/hotpath",
"rustfs-policy/hotpath",
"rustfs-storage-api/hotpath",
"rustfs-utils/hotpath",
"rustfs-test-utils/hotpath",
]
hotpath-alloc = [
"hotpath",
"hotpath/hotpath-alloc",
"rustfs-config/hotpath-alloc",
"rustfs-credentials/hotpath-alloc",
"rustfs-crypto/hotpath-alloc",
"rustfs-ecstore/hotpath-alloc",
"rustfs-io-metrics/hotpath-alloc",
"rustfs-madmin/hotpath-alloc",
"rustfs-policy/hotpath-alloc",
"rustfs-storage-api/hotpath-alloc",
"rustfs-utils/hotpath-alloc",
"rustfs-test-utils/hotpath-alloc",
]
hotpath-cpu = [
"hotpath",
"hotpath/hotpath-cpu",
"rustfs-config/hotpath-cpu",
"rustfs-credentials/hotpath-cpu",
"rustfs-crypto/hotpath-cpu",
"rustfs-ecstore/hotpath-cpu",
"rustfs-io-metrics/hotpath-cpu",
"rustfs-madmin/hotpath-cpu",
"rustfs-policy/hotpath-cpu",
"rustfs-storage-api/hotpath-cpu",
"rustfs-utils/hotpath-cpu",
"rustfs-test-utils/hotpath-cpu",
]
[dependencies]
hotpath.workspace = true
rustfs-credentials = { workspace = true }
rustfs-config = { workspace = true, features = ["server-config-model"] }
tokio = { workspace = true, features = ["fs", "rt-multi-thread"] }
+58 -27
View File
@@ -1139,8 +1139,11 @@ impl OidcSys {
let mut policies = Vec::new();
let mut groups = Vec::new();
// Add default role policy if configured
if !config.role_policy.is_empty() {
// Role-policy and claim-based authorization are separate OIDC modes. When a
// role policy is configured, group claims still provide group context but
// must not also become policy names.
let has_role_policy = !config.role_policy.trim().is_empty();
if has_role_policy {
for policy in config.role_policy.split(',') {
let policy = policy.trim();
if !policy.is_empty() {
@@ -1149,21 +1152,20 @@ impl OidcSys {
}
}
// Map groups claim to policies
for group in &claims.groups {
groups.push(group.clone());
let policy_name = if config.claim_prefix.is_empty() {
group.clone()
} else {
format!("{}{}", config.claim_prefix, group)
};
policies.push(policy_name);
if !has_role_policy {
let policy_name = if config.claim_prefix.is_empty() {
group.clone()
} else {
format!("{}{}", config.claim_prefix, group)
};
policies.push(policy_name);
}
}
// Map primary claim (if different from groups)
if config.claim_name != config.groups_claim {
let claim_values = extract_groups_claim(&claims.raw, &config.claim_name);
for val in claim_values {
if !has_role_policy && config.claim_name != config.groups_claim {
for val in extract_groups_claim(&claims.raw, &config.claim_name) {
let policy_name = if config.claim_prefix.is_empty() {
val
} else {
@@ -3201,26 +3203,22 @@ mod tests {
}
#[test]
fn test_map_claims_to_policies_with_provider() {
let mut config = test_config("okta");
config.role_policy = "readwrite".to_string();
config.display_name = "Okta".to_string();
fn role_policy_does_not_map_groups_as_policies() {
let mut config = test_config("authentik");
config.role_policy = "consoleAdmin".to_string();
config.claim_name = "policy".to_string();
let sys = make_test_sys(vec![config]);
let claims = OidcClaims {
sub: "user123".to_string(),
email: "user@example.com".to_string(),
username: "user".to_string(),
groups: vec!["admin".to_string(), "devs".to_string()],
raw: HashMap::new(),
groups: vec!["authentik Admins".to_string(), "users".to_string()],
raw: HashMap::from([("policy".to_string(), serde_json::json!(["readonly"]))]),
..Default::default()
};
let (policies, groups) = sys.map_claims_to_policies("okta", &claims);
assert_eq!(groups, vec!["admin", "devs"]);
assert!(policies.contains(&"readwrite".to_string()));
assert!(policies.contains(&"admin".to_string()));
assert!(policies.contains(&"devs".to_string()));
let (policies, groups) = sys.map_claims_to_policies("authentik", &claims);
assert_eq!(groups, vec!["authentik Admins", "users"]);
assert_eq!(policies, vec!["consoleAdmin"]);
}
#[test]
@@ -3245,6 +3243,39 @@ mod tests {
assert_eq!(policies.len(), 1);
}
#[test]
fn blank_role_policy_uses_claim_mapping() {
let mut config = test_config("keycloak");
config.role_policy = " ".to_string();
let sys = make_test_sys(vec![config]);
let claims = OidcClaims {
groups: vec!["readonly".to_string()],
..Default::default()
};
let (policies, groups) = sys.map_claims_to_policies("keycloak", &claims);
assert_eq!(groups, vec!["readonly"]);
assert_eq!(policies, vec!["readonly"]);
}
#[test]
fn claim_mapping_keeps_groups_with_distinct_primary_claim() {
let mut config = test_config("keycloak");
config.claim_name = "policy".to_string();
let sys = make_test_sys(vec![config]);
let claims = OidcClaims {
groups: vec!["developers".to_string()],
raw: HashMap::from([("policy".to_string(), serde_json::json!(["readonly"]))]),
..Default::default()
};
let (policies, groups) = sys.map_claims_to_policies("keycloak", &claims);
assert_eq!(groups, vec!["developers"]);
assert_eq!(policies, vec!["developers", "readonly"]);
}
#[test]
fn test_list_providers() {
let mut config = test_config("keycloak");
+2
View File
@@ -469,6 +469,7 @@ impl ObjectStore {
});
}
#[hotpath::measure]
async fn list_all_iamconfig_items(&self) -> Result<HashMap<String, Vec<String>>> {
let (tx, mut rx) = mpsc::channel::<StringOrErr>(100);
@@ -508,6 +509,7 @@ impl ObjectStore {
Ok(res)
}
#[hotpath::measure]
async fn load_policy_doc_concurrent(&self, names: &[String], mode: LoadMode) -> Result<Vec<PolicyDoc>> {
let mut futures = Vec::with_capacity(names.len());
+7
View File
@@ -27,7 +27,14 @@ categories = ["development-tools", "filesystem"]
[lints]
workspace = true
[features]
default = []
hotpath = ["hotpath/hotpath", "hotpath/tokio", "rustfs-io-metrics/hotpath"]
hotpath-alloc = ["hotpath", "hotpath/hotpath-alloc", "rustfs-io-metrics/hotpath-alloc"]
hotpath-cpu = ["hotpath", "hotpath/hotpath-cpu", "rustfs-io-metrics/hotpath-cpu"]
[dependencies]
hotpath.workspace = true
bytes = { workspace = true, features = ["serde"] }
thiserror = { workspace = true }
tokio = { workspace = true, features = ["io-util", "fs", "sync", "rt-multi-thread"] }
+27
View File
@@ -28,9 +28,36 @@ categories = ["development-tools", "filesystem"]
name = "metrics_pipeline"
harness = false
[features]
default = []
hotpath = [
"hotpath/hotpath",
"hotpath/tokio",
"rustfs-common/hotpath",
"rustfs-s3-ops/hotpath",
"rustfs-utils/hotpath",
]
hotpath-alloc = [
"hotpath",
"hotpath/hotpath-alloc",
"rustfs-common/hotpath-alloc",
"rustfs-s3-ops/hotpath-alloc",
"rustfs-utils/hotpath-alloc",
]
hotpath-cpu = [
"hotpath",
"hotpath/hotpath-cpu",
"rustfs-common/hotpath-cpu",
"rustfs-s3-ops/hotpath-cpu",
"rustfs-utils/hotpath-cpu",
]
[dependencies]
hotpath.workspace = true
metrics = { workspace = true }
rustfs-common = { workspace = true }
rustfs-s3-ops = { workspace = true }
rustfs-utils = { workspace = true, features = ["ip"] }
num_cpus = { workspace = true }
thiserror = { workspace = true }
tokio = { workspace = true, features = ["sync", "fs", "rt-multi-thread"] }
+199 -54
View File
@@ -15,7 +15,7 @@
use metrics::{counter, gauge};
use std::collections::HashMap;
use std::sync::{
Arc, LazyLock, RwLock,
Arc, LazyLock, OnceLock, RwLock,
atomic::{AtomicU64, Ordering},
};
use std::time::{Duration, Instant, SystemTime, UNIX_EPOCH};
@@ -40,6 +40,7 @@ pub const INTERNODE_MSGPACK_CODEC_JSON: &str = "json";
const OPERATION_LABEL: &str = "operation";
const BACKEND_LABEL: &str = "backend";
const SERVER_LABEL: &str = "server";
const CLASSIFICATION_LABEL: &str = "classification";
const STAGE_LABEL: &str = "stage";
const DOMINANT_ERROR_LABEL: &str = "dominant_error";
@@ -77,74 +78,93 @@ pub struct InternodeOperationMetricDescriptor {
pub labels: &'static [&'static str],
}
const OPERATION_BACKEND_LABELS: &[&str] = &[OPERATION_LABEL, BACKEND_LABEL];
const OPERATION_BACKEND_CLASSIFICATION_LABELS: &[&str] = &[OPERATION_LABEL, BACKEND_LABEL, CLASSIFICATION_LABEL];
const OPERATION_BACKEND_HTTP_VERSION_LABELS: &[&str] = &[OPERATION_LABEL, BACKEND_LABEL, HTTP_VERSION_LABEL];
const QUORUM_FAILURE_LABELS: &[&str] = &[STAGE_LABEL, DOMINANT_ERROR_LABEL];
const SERVER_OPERATION_BACKEND_LABELS: &[&str] = &[SERVER_LABEL, OPERATION_LABEL, BACKEND_LABEL];
const SERVER_OPERATION_BACKEND_CLASSIFICATION_LABELS: &[&str] =
&[SERVER_LABEL, OPERATION_LABEL, BACKEND_LABEL, CLASSIFICATION_LABEL];
const SERVER_OPERATION_BACKEND_HTTP_VERSION_LABELS: &[&str] = &[SERVER_LABEL, OPERATION_LABEL, BACKEND_LABEL, HTTP_VERSION_LABEL];
const SERVER_QUORUM_FAILURE_LABELS: &[&str] = &[SERVER_LABEL, STAGE_LABEL, DOMINANT_ERROR_LABEL];
pub const INTERNODE_OPERATION_METRICS: &[InternodeOperationMetricDescriptor] = &[
InternodeOperationMetricDescriptor {
name: INTERNODE_OPERATION_SENT_BYTES_TOTAL,
labels: OPERATION_BACKEND_LABELS,
labels: SERVER_OPERATION_BACKEND_LABELS,
},
InternodeOperationMetricDescriptor {
name: INTERNODE_OPERATION_RECV_BYTES_TOTAL,
labels: OPERATION_BACKEND_LABELS,
labels: SERVER_OPERATION_BACKEND_LABELS,
},
InternodeOperationMetricDescriptor {
name: INTERNODE_OPERATION_REQUESTS_OUTGOING_TOTAL,
labels: OPERATION_BACKEND_LABELS,
labels: SERVER_OPERATION_BACKEND_LABELS,
},
InternodeOperationMetricDescriptor {
name: INTERNODE_OPERATION_REQUESTS_INCOMING_TOTAL,
labels: OPERATION_BACKEND_LABELS,
labels: SERVER_OPERATION_BACKEND_LABELS,
},
InternodeOperationMetricDescriptor {
name: INTERNODE_OPERATION_ERRORS_TOTAL,
labels: OPERATION_BACKEND_LABELS,
labels: SERVER_OPERATION_BACKEND_LABELS,
},
InternodeOperationMetricDescriptor {
name: INTERNODE_OPERATION_DURATION_MS,
labels: OPERATION_BACKEND_LABELS,
labels: SERVER_OPERATION_BACKEND_LABELS,
},
InternodeOperationMetricDescriptor {
name: INTERNODE_OPERATION_CLASSIFIED_ERRORS_TOTAL,
labels: OPERATION_BACKEND_CLASSIFICATION_LABELS,
labels: SERVER_OPERATION_BACKEND_CLASSIFICATION_LABELS,
},
InternodeOperationMetricDescriptor {
name: INTERNODE_OPERATION_RETRIES_TOTAL,
labels: OPERATION_BACKEND_CLASSIFICATION_LABELS,
labels: SERVER_OPERATION_BACKEND_CLASSIFICATION_LABELS,
},
InternodeOperationMetricDescriptor {
name: INTERNODE_OPERATION_RETRY_SUCCESSES_TOTAL,
labels: OPERATION_BACKEND_CLASSIFICATION_LABELS,
labels: SERVER_OPERATION_BACKEND_CLASSIFICATION_LABELS,
},
InternodeOperationMetricDescriptor {
name: INTERNODE_OPERATION_HTTP_VERSIONS_TOTAL,
labels: OPERATION_BACKEND_HTTP_VERSION_LABELS,
labels: SERVER_OPERATION_BACKEND_HTTP_VERSION_LABELS,
},
InternodeOperationMetricDescriptor {
name: INTERNODE_OPERATION_STALL_TIMEOUTS_TOTAL,
labels: OPERATION_BACKEND_LABELS,
labels: SERVER_OPERATION_BACKEND_LABELS,
},
InternodeOperationMetricDescriptor {
name: INTERNODE_OPERATION_WRITE_SHUTDOWN_ERRORS_TOTAL,
labels: OPERATION_BACKEND_LABELS,
labels: SERVER_OPERATION_BACKEND_LABELS,
},
InternodeOperationMetricDescriptor {
name: ERASURE_WRITE_QUORUM_FAILURES_TOTAL,
labels: QUORUM_FAILURE_LABELS,
labels: SERVER_QUORUM_FAILURE_LABELS,
},
InternodeOperationMetricDescriptor {
name: INTERNODE_OPERATION_PAYLOAD_BYTES,
labels: OPERATION_BACKEND_LABELS,
labels: SERVER_OPERATION_BACKEND_LABELS,
},
InternodeOperationMetricDescriptor {
name: INTERNODE_OPERATION_LARGE_PAYLOADS_TOTAL,
labels: OPERATION_BACKEND_LABELS,
labels: SERVER_OPERATION_BACKEND_LABELS,
},
];
fn current_server_label() -> &'static str {
static STABLE_SERVER_LABEL: OnceLock<String> = OnceLock::new();
static FALLBACK_SERVER_LABEL: LazyLock<String> = LazyLock::new(rustfs_utils::get_local_ip_with_default);
if let Some(server) = STABLE_SERVER_LABEL.get() {
return server.as_str();
}
if let Some(server) = rustfs_common::try_get_global_local_node_name() {
let _ = STABLE_SERVER_LABEL.set(server);
if let Some(server) = STABLE_SERVER_LABEL.get() {
return server.as_str();
}
}
FALLBACK_SERVER_LABEL.as_str()
}
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, Default, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub struct InternodeMetricsSnapshot {
pub sent_bytes_total: u64,
@@ -193,7 +213,7 @@ impl InternodeMetrics {
return;
}
self.sent_bytes_total.fetch_add(bytes, Ordering::Relaxed);
counter!("rustfs_system_network_internode_sent_bytes_total").increment(bytes);
counter!("rustfs_system_network_internode_sent_bytes_total", SERVER_LABEL => current_server_label()).increment(bytes);
}
pub fn record_sent_bytes_for_operation(&self, operation: &'static str, bytes: usize) {
@@ -207,7 +227,13 @@ impl InternodeMetrics {
if bytes == 0 {
return;
}
counter!(INTERNODE_OPERATION_SENT_BYTES_TOTAL, OPERATION_LABEL => operation, BACKEND_LABEL => backend).increment(bytes);
counter!(
INTERNODE_OPERATION_SENT_BYTES_TOTAL,
SERVER_LABEL => current_server_label(),
OPERATION_LABEL => operation,
BACKEND_LABEL => backend
)
.increment(bytes);
}
pub fn record_recv_bytes(&self, bytes: usize) {
@@ -216,7 +242,7 @@ impl InternodeMetrics {
return;
}
self.recv_bytes_total.fetch_add(bytes, Ordering::Relaxed);
counter!("rustfs_system_network_internode_recv_bytes_total").increment(bytes);
counter!("rustfs_system_network_internode_recv_bytes_total", SERVER_LABEL => current_server_label()).increment(bytes);
}
pub fn record_recv_bytes_for_operation(&self, operation: &'static str, bytes: usize) {
@@ -230,12 +256,18 @@ impl InternodeMetrics {
if bytes == 0 {
return;
}
counter!(INTERNODE_OPERATION_RECV_BYTES_TOTAL, OPERATION_LABEL => operation, BACKEND_LABEL => backend).increment(bytes);
counter!(
INTERNODE_OPERATION_RECV_BYTES_TOTAL,
SERVER_LABEL => current_server_label(),
OPERATION_LABEL => operation,
BACKEND_LABEL => backend
)
.increment(bytes);
}
pub fn record_outgoing_request(&self) {
self.outgoing_requests_total.fetch_add(1, Ordering::Relaxed);
counter!("rustfs_system_network_internode_requests_outgoing_total").increment(1);
counter!("rustfs_system_network_internode_requests_outgoing_total", SERVER_LABEL => current_server_label()).increment(1);
}
pub fn record_outgoing_request_for_operation(&self, operation: &'static str) {
@@ -244,13 +276,18 @@ impl InternodeMetrics {
pub fn record_outgoing_request_for_operation_and_backend(&self, operation: &'static str, backend: &'static str) {
self.record_outgoing_request();
counter!(INTERNODE_OPERATION_REQUESTS_OUTGOING_TOTAL, OPERATION_LABEL => operation, BACKEND_LABEL => backend)
.increment(1);
counter!(
INTERNODE_OPERATION_REQUESTS_OUTGOING_TOTAL,
SERVER_LABEL => current_server_label(),
OPERATION_LABEL => operation,
BACKEND_LABEL => backend
)
.increment(1);
}
pub fn record_incoming_request(&self) {
self.incoming_requests_total.fetch_add(1, Ordering::Relaxed);
counter!("rustfs_system_network_internode_requests_incoming_total").increment(1);
counter!("rustfs_system_network_internode_requests_incoming_total", SERVER_LABEL => current_server_label()).increment(1);
}
pub fn record_incoming_request_for_operation(&self, operation: &'static str) {
@@ -259,13 +296,18 @@ impl InternodeMetrics {
pub fn record_incoming_request_for_operation_and_backend(&self, operation: &'static str, backend: &'static str) {
self.record_incoming_request();
counter!(INTERNODE_OPERATION_REQUESTS_INCOMING_TOTAL, OPERATION_LABEL => operation, BACKEND_LABEL => backend)
.increment(1);
counter!(
INTERNODE_OPERATION_REQUESTS_INCOMING_TOTAL,
SERVER_LABEL => current_server_label(),
OPERATION_LABEL => operation,
BACKEND_LABEL => backend
)
.increment(1);
}
pub fn record_error(&self) {
self.errors_total.fetch_add(1, Ordering::Relaxed);
counter!("rustfs_system_network_internode_errors_total").increment(1);
counter!("rustfs_system_network_internode_errors_total", SERVER_LABEL => current_server_label()).increment(1);
}
pub fn record_error_for_operation(&self, operation: &'static str) {
@@ -274,13 +316,24 @@ impl InternodeMetrics {
pub fn record_error_for_operation_and_backend(&self, operation: &'static str, backend: &'static str) {
self.record_error();
counter!(INTERNODE_OPERATION_ERRORS_TOTAL, OPERATION_LABEL => operation, BACKEND_LABEL => backend).increment(1);
counter!(
INTERNODE_OPERATION_ERRORS_TOTAL,
SERVER_LABEL => current_server_label(),
OPERATION_LABEL => operation,
BACKEND_LABEL => backend
)
.increment(1);
}
pub fn record_duration_for_operation_and_backend(&self, operation: &'static str, backend: &'static str, duration: Duration) {
let duration_ms = duration.as_secs_f64() * 1000.0;
metrics::histogram!(INTERNODE_OPERATION_DURATION_MS, OPERATION_LABEL => operation, BACKEND_LABEL => backend)
.record(duration_ms);
metrics::histogram!(
INTERNODE_OPERATION_DURATION_MS,
SERVER_LABEL => current_server_label(),
OPERATION_LABEL => operation,
BACKEND_LABEL => backend
)
.record(duration_ms);
}
pub fn record_classified_error_for_operation_and_backend(
@@ -291,6 +344,7 @@ impl InternodeMetrics {
) {
counter!(
INTERNODE_OPERATION_CLASSIFIED_ERRORS_TOTAL,
SERVER_LABEL => current_server_label(),
OPERATION_LABEL => operation,
BACKEND_LABEL => backend,
CLASSIFICATION_LABEL => classification
@@ -306,6 +360,7 @@ impl InternodeMetrics {
) {
counter!(
INTERNODE_OPERATION_RETRIES_TOTAL,
SERVER_LABEL => current_server_label(),
OPERATION_LABEL => operation,
BACKEND_LABEL => backend,
CLASSIFICATION_LABEL => classification
@@ -321,6 +376,7 @@ impl InternodeMetrics {
) {
counter!(
INTERNODE_OPERATION_RETRY_SUCCESSES_TOTAL,
SERVER_LABEL => current_server_label(),
OPERATION_LABEL => operation,
BACKEND_LABEL => backend,
CLASSIFICATION_LABEL => classification
@@ -337,6 +393,7 @@ impl InternodeMetrics {
self.operation_http_versions_total.fetch_add(1, Ordering::Relaxed);
counter!(
INTERNODE_OPERATION_HTTP_VERSIONS_TOTAL,
SERVER_LABEL => current_server_label(),
OPERATION_LABEL => operation,
BACKEND_LABEL => backend,
HTTP_VERSION_LABEL => http_version
@@ -346,13 +403,24 @@ impl InternodeMetrics {
pub fn record_stall_timeout_for_operation_and_backend(&self, operation: &'static str, backend: &'static str) {
self.operation_stall_timeouts_total.fetch_add(1, Ordering::Relaxed);
counter!(INTERNODE_OPERATION_STALL_TIMEOUTS_TOTAL, OPERATION_LABEL => operation, BACKEND_LABEL => backend).increment(1);
counter!(
INTERNODE_OPERATION_STALL_TIMEOUTS_TOTAL,
SERVER_LABEL => current_server_label(),
OPERATION_LABEL => operation,
BACKEND_LABEL => backend
)
.increment(1);
}
pub fn record_write_shutdown_error_for_operation_and_backend(&self, operation: &'static str, backend: &'static str) {
self.operation_write_shutdown_errors_total.fetch_add(1, Ordering::Relaxed);
counter!(INTERNODE_OPERATION_WRITE_SHUTDOWN_ERRORS_TOTAL, OPERATION_LABEL => operation, BACKEND_LABEL => backend)
.increment(1);
counter!(
INTERNODE_OPERATION_WRITE_SHUTDOWN_ERRORS_TOTAL,
SERVER_LABEL => current_server_label(),
OPERATION_LABEL => operation,
BACKEND_LABEL => backend
)
.increment(1);
}
/// Record the payload size (bytes) of a completed internode operation into a histogram
@@ -360,15 +428,26 @@ impl InternodeMetrics {
/// (`ReadAll`/`ReadMultiple`/`WriteAll`) would benefit from being moved off the shared
/// control-plane channel (see docs/grpc-optimization P1).
pub fn record_operation_payload_bytes(&self, operation: &'static str, backend: &'static str, bytes: usize) {
metrics::histogram!(INTERNODE_OPERATION_PAYLOAD_BYTES, OPERATION_LABEL => operation, BACKEND_LABEL => backend)
.record(bytes as f64);
metrics::histogram!(
INTERNODE_OPERATION_PAYLOAD_BYTES,
SERVER_LABEL => current_server_label(),
OPERATION_LABEL => operation,
BACKEND_LABEL => backend
)
.record(bytes as f64);
}
/// Increment the large-payload counter for an operation+backend whose payload exceeded the
/// caller-configured warning threshold. Feeds alerting on large unary RPCs that contend with
/// latency-sensitive control-plane traffic on the shared connection.
pub fn record_large_operation_payload(&self, operation: &'static str, backend: &'static str) {
counter!(INTERNODE_OPERATION_LARGE_PAYLOADS_TOTAL, OPERATION_LABEL => operation, BACKEND_LABEL => backend).increment(1);
counter!(
INTERNODE_OPERATION_LARGE_PAYLOADS_TOTAL,
SERVER_LABEL => current_server_label(),
OPERATION_LABEL => operation,
BACKEND_LABEL => backend
)
.increment(1);
}
/// Count a decode that fell back to the JSON compatibility field because the msgpack `_bin`
@@ -377,13 +456,20 @@ impl InternodeMetrics {
/// dropped (grpc-optimization P2). `direction` is [`INTERNODE_MSGPACK_DIRECTION_REQUEST`] or
/// [`INTERNODE_MSGPACK_DIRECTION_RESPONSE`]; `message` is the low-cardinality value name.
pub fn record_msgpack_json_fallback(&self, direction: &'static str, message: &'static str) {
counter!(INTERNODE_MSGPACK_JSON_FALLBACK_TOTAL, DIRECTION_LABEL => direction, MESSAGE_LABEL => message).increment(1);
counter!(
INTERNODE_MSGPACK_JSON_FALLBACK_TOTAL,
SERVER_LABEL => current_server_label(),
DIRECTION_LABEL => direction,
MESSAGE_LABEL => message
)
.increment(1);
}
pub fn record_msgpack_json_decode(&self, direction: &'static str, message: &'static str, codec: &'static str) {
self.msgpack_json_decode_total.fetch_add(1, Ordering::Relaxed);
counter!(
INTERNODE_MSGPACK_JSON_DECODE_TOTAL,
SERVER_LABEL => current_server_label(),
DIRECTION_LABEL => direction,
MESSAGE_LABEL => message,
CODEC_LABEL => codec
@@ -395,6 +481,7 @@ impl InternodeMetrics {
self.msgpack_json_decode_error_total.fetch_add(1, Ordering::Relaxed);
counter!(
INTERNODE_MSGPACK_JSON_DECODE_ERROR_TOTAL,
SERVER_LABEL => current_server_label(),
DIRECTION_LABEL => direction,
MESSAGE_LABEL => message,
CODEC_LABEL => codec
@@ -420,7 +507,7 @@ impl InternodeMetrics {
/// enabled; after the strict flip the legacy fallback path is closed and the counter stays flat.
pub fn record_signature_v1_fallback(&self) {
self.signature_v1_fallback_total.fetch_add(1, Ordering::Relaxed);
counter!(INTERNODE_SIGNATURE_V1_FALLBACK_TOTAL).increment(1);
counter!(INTERNODE_SIGNATURE_V1_FALLBACK_TOTAL, SERVER_LABEL => current_server_label()).increment(1);
}
/// Count a mutating internode disk RPC that was accepted without a signature-bound canonical
@@ -431,14 +518,14 @@ impl InternodeMetrics {
/// mutations are rejected and the counter stays flat.
pub fn record_body_digest_fallback(&self) {
self.body_digest_fallback_total.fetch_add(1, Ordering::Relaxed);
counter!(INTERNODE_BODY_DIGEST_FALLBACK_TOTAL).increment(1);
counter!(INTERNODE_BODY_DIGEST_FALLBACK_TOTAL, SERVER_LABEL => current_server_label()).increment(1);
}
/// Count an accepted v1/v2 request that does not carry the replay-scoped signature. This is
/// the convergence signal for `RUSTFS_INTERNODE_RPC_REPLAY_SCOPE_STRICT`.
pub fn record_replay_scope_fallback(&self) {
self.replay_scope_fallback_total.fetch_add(1, Ordering::Relaxed);
counter!(INTERNODE_REPLAY_SCOPE_FALLBACK_TOTAL).increment(1);
counter!(INTERNODE_REPLAY_SCOPE_FALLBACK_TOTAL, SERVER_LABEL => current_server_label()).increment(1);
}
/// Count a body-bound internode RPC rejected because the replay-protection nonce cache was
@@ -447,12 +534,13 @@ impl InternodeMetrics {
/// mutation rate and writes are being refused — alert on this counter.
pub fn record_replay_cache_overflow(&self) {
self.replay_cache_overflow_total.fetch_add(1, Ordering::Relaxed);
counter!(INTERNODE_REPLAY_CACHE_OVERFLOW_TOTAL).increment(1);
counter!(INTERNODE_REPLAY_CACHE_OVERFLOW_TOTAL, SERVER_LABEL => current_server_label()).increment(1);
}
pub fn record_erasure_write_quorum_failure(&self, stage: &'static str, dominant_error: &'static str) {
counter!(
ERASURE_WRITE_QUORUM_FAILURES_TOTAL,
SERVER_LABEL => current_server_label(),
STAGE_LABEL => stage,
DOMINANT_ERROR_LABEL => dominant_error
)
@@ -464,11 +552,12 @@ impl InternodeMetrics {
self.dial_total_time_nanos.fetch_add(elapsed_nanos, Ordering::Relaxed);
let samples = self.dial_samples_total.fetch_add(1, Ordering::Relaxed) + 1;
let total = self.dial_total_time_nanos.load(Ordering::Relaxed);
gauge!("rustfs_system_network_internode_dial_avg_time_nanos").set(total as f64 / samples as f64);
gauge!("rustfs_system_network_internode_dial_avg_time_nanos", SERVER_LABEL => current_server_label())
.set(total as f64 / samples as f64);
if !success {
self.dial_errors_total.fetch_add(1, Ordering::Relaxed);
counter!("rustfs_system_network_internode_dial_errors_total").increment(1);
counter!("rustfs_system_network_internode_dial_errors_total", SERVER_LABEL => current_server_label()).increment(1);
}
let now_ms = SystemTime::now()
@@ -687,6 +776,9 @@ fn cluster_peer_health_keys() -> Vec<String> {
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
use super::*;
use metrics::with_local_recorder;
use metrics_util::debugging::DebuggingRecorder;
use std::collections::HashSet;
#[test]
fn snapshot_reports_recorded_values() {
@@ -750,22 +842,22 @@ mod tests {
fn operation_metric_descriptors_include_backend_and_operation_labels() {
assert_eq!(INTERNODE_OPERATION_METRICS.len(), 15);
for metric in &INTERNODE_OPERATION_METRICS[..6] {
assert_eq!(metric.labels, &[OPERATION_LABEL, BACKEND_LABEL]);
assert_eq!(metric.labels, &[SERVER_LABEL, OPERATION_LABEL, BACKEND_LABEL]);
}
for metric in &INTERNODE_OPERATION_METRICS[6..9] {
assert_eq!(metric.labels, &[OPERATION_LABEL, BACKEND_LABEL, CLASSIFICATION_LABEL]);
assert_eq!(metric.labels, &[SERVER_LABEL, OPERATION_LABEL, BACKEND_LABEL, CLASSIFICATION_LABEL]);
}
assert_eq!(
INTERNODE_OPERATION_METRICS[9].labels,
&[OPERATION_LABEL, BACKEND_LABEL, HTTP_VERSION_LABEL]
&[SERVER_LABEL, OPERATION_LABEL, BACKEND_LABEL, HTTP_VERSION_LABEL]
);
for metric in &INTERNODE_OPERATION_METRICS[10..12] {
assert_eq!(metric.labels, &[OPERATION_LABEL, BACKEND_LABEL]);
assert_eq!(metric.labels, &[SERVER_LABEL, OPERATION_LABEL, BACKEND_LABEL]);
}
assert_eq!(INTERNODE_OPERATION_METRICS[12].labels, &[STAGE_LABEL, DOMINANT_ERROR_LABEL]);
assert_eq!(INTERNODE_OPERATION_METRICS[12].labels, &[SERVER_LABEL, STAGE_LABEL, DOMINANT_ERROR_LABEL]);
// Payload histogram + large-payload counter carry operation+backend labels.
assert_eq!(INTERNODE_OPERATION_METRICS[13].labels, &[OPERATION_LABEL, BACKEND_LABEL]);
assert_eq!(INTERNODE_OPERATION_METRICS[14].labels, &[OPERATION_LABEL, BACKEND_LABEL]);
assert_eq!(INTERNODE_OPERATION_METRICS[13].labels, &[SERVER_LABEL, OPERATION_LABEL, BACKEND_LABEL]);
assert_eq!(INTERNODE_OPERATION_METRICS[14].labels, &[SERVER_LABEL, OPERATION_LABEL, BACKEND_LABEL]);
}
#[test]
@@ -843,6 +935,59 @@ mod tests {
);
}
#[test]
fn direct_internode_metrics_emit_stable_server_label() {
let recorder = DebuggingRecorder::new();
let snapshotter = recorder.snapshotter();
let metrics = InternodeMetrics::default();
with_local_recorder(&recorder, || {
metrics.record_sent_bytes_for_operation_and_backend(
INTERNODE_OPERATION_READ_FILE_STREAM,
INTERNODE_TRANSPORT_BACKEND_TCP_HTTP,
128,
);
metrics.record_recv_bytes_for_operation_and_backend(
INTERNODE_OPERATION_PUT_FILE_STREAM,
INTERNODE_TRANSPORT_BACKEND_TCP_HTTP,
256,
);
metrics.record_dial_result(Duration::from_millis(3), false);
});
let observed: Vec<(String, HashSet<String>, Option<String>)> = snapshotter
.snapshot()
.into_vec()
.into_iter()
.filter(|(composite, _, _, _)| {
matches!(
composite.key().name(),
"rustfs_system_network_internode_sent_bytes_total"
| "rustfs_system_network_internode_recv_bytes_total"
| INTERNODE_OPERATION_SENT_BYTES_TOTAL
| INTERNODE_OPERATION_RECV_BYTES_TOTAL
| "rustfs_system_network_internode_dial_avg_time_nanos"
| "rustfs_system_network_internode_dial_errors_total"
)
})
.map(|(composite, _, _, _)| {
let labels = composite.key().labels();
let keys = labels.clone().map(|label| label.key().to_string()).collect();
let server = labels
.filter(|label| label.key() == SERVER_LABEL)
.map(|label| label.value().to_string())
.next();
(composite.key().name().to_string(), keys, server)
})
.collect();
assert_eq!(observed.len(), 6);
for (name, keys, server) in observed {
assert!(keys.contains(SERVER_LABEL), "{name} must carry the server label");
assert!(server.is_some_and(|value| !value.is_empty()), "{name} server label must not be empty");
}
}
#[test]
fn msgpack_json_fallback_counter_records_without_panicking() {
// Smoke test: the counter accepts both directions and a static message label.
+27
View File
@@ -28,7 +28,34 @@ authors.workspace = true
[lints]
workspace = true
[features]
default = []
hotpath = [
"hotpath/hotpath",
"hotpath/tokio",
"hotpath/futures",
"hotpath/reqwest-0-13",
"rustfs-credentials/hotpath",
"rustfs-policy/hotpath",
"rustfs-utils/hotpath",
]
hotpath-alloc = [
"hotpath",
"hotpath/hotpath-alloc",
"rustfs-credentials/hotpath-alloc",
"rustfs-policy/hotpath-alloc",
"rustfs-utils/hotpath-alloc",
]
hotpath-cpu = [
"hotpath",
"hotpath/hotpath-cpu",
"rustfs-credentials/hotpath-cpu",
"rustfs-policy/hotpath-cpu",
"rustfs-utils/hotpath-cpu",
]
[dependencies]
hotpath.workspace = true
tokio = { workspace = true, features = ["rt", "sync"] }
reqwest = { workspace = true, features = ["json"] }
serde = { workspace = true, features = ["derive"] }
+2
View File
@@ -95,6 +95,7 @@ impl KeystoneClient {
}
/// Validate a Keystone token
#[hotpath::measure]
pub async fn validate_token(&self, token: &str) -> Result<KeystoneToken> {
match self.version {
KeystoneVersion::V3 => self.validate_token_v3(token).await,
@@ -238,6 +239,7 @@ impl KeystoneClient {
}
/// Get EC2 credentials for a user
#[hotpath::measure]
pub async fn get_ec2_credentials(&self, user_id: &str, project_id: Option<&str>) -> Result<Vec<EC2Credential>> {
let admin_token = self.get_admin_token().await?;
+22
View File
@@ -25,3 +25,25 @@ For local KMS end-to-end tests, keep proxy bypass settings:
NO_PROXY=127.0.0.1,localhost HTTP_PROXY= HTTPS_PROXY= http_proxy= https_proxy= \
cargo test --package e2e_test test_local_kms_end_to_end -- --nocapture --test-threads=1
```
## Local Key Export for SSE-S3 Migration Tests
Use the read-only `local_kms_key_decrypt` example to export an AES-256 Local
KMS key as the base64 value expected by `RUSTFS_SSE_S3_MASTER_KEY`:
```bash
export RUSTFS_KMS_LOCAL_MASTER_KEY='<local-kms-at-rest-master-key>'
export RUSTFS_SSE_S3_MASTER_KEY="$(
cargo run -q -p rustfs-kms --example local_kms_key_decrypt -- \
/absolute/path/to/<key-id>.key
)"
```
For a `plaintext-dev-only` Local KMS key file,
`RUSTFS_KMS_LOCAL_MASTER_KEY` is not required.
The example writes only the base64-encoded 32-byte key to stdout. Diagnostics
go to stderr. Never paste its output into logs, shell history, issue comments,
or committed configuration. The export path must remain read-only and must
reuse `LocalKmsClient` decoding so current Argon2id and legacy key-file
compatibility stay aligned with the backend.
+26
View File
@@ -28,6 +28,7 @@ categories = ["cryptography", "web-programming", "authentication"]
workspace = true
[dependencies]
hotpath.workspace = true
# Core dependencies
async-trait = { workspace = true }
tokio = { workspace = true, features = ["fs", "io-util", "macros", "rt-multi-thread", "sync", "time"] }
@@ -37,6 +38,8 @@ serde = { workspace = true, features = ["derive"] }
serde_json = { workspace = true, features = ["raw_value"] }
tracing = { workspace = true }
thiserror = { workspace = true }
# Operation metrics emitted by the retry policy engine (crate::policy).
metrics = { workspace = true }
# Cryptography
aes-gcm = { workspace = true, features = ["rand_core"] }
@@ -65,11 +68,34 @@ rustfs-security-governance = { workspace = true }
# HTTP client for Vault
reqwest = { workspace = true }
vaultrs = { workspace = true }
# vaultrs surfaces transport-level failures as wrapped rustify errors; the
# operation policy needs the concrete type to classify them for retry decisions.
rustify = { workspace = true }
tokio-util = { workspace = true }
[dev-dependencies]
anyhow = { workspace = true }
# Debugging recorder for asserting emitted metrics in tests.
metrics-util = { version = "0.20", features = ["debugging"] }
insta = { workspace = true, features = ["yaml", "json"] }
tempfile = { workspace = true }
temp-env = { workspace = true }
# "net" backs the scripted loopback Vault used by the policy wiring tests.
tokio = { workspace = true, features = ["net", "test-util"] }
[features]
default = []
hotpath = [
"hotpath/hotpath",
"hotpath/tokio",
"hotpath/reqwest-0-13",
"rustfs-security-governance/hotpath",
"rustfs-utils/hotpath",
]
hotpath-alloc = [
"hotpath",
"hotpath/hotpath-alloc",
"rustfs-security-governance/hotpath-alloc",
"rustfs-utils/hotpath-alloc",
]
hotpath-cpu = ["hotpath", "hotpath/hotpath-cpu", "rustfs-security-governance/hotpath-cpu", "rustfs-utils/hotpath-cpu"]
@@ -0,0 +1,112 @@
// Copyright 2024 RustFS Team
//
// Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
// you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
// You may obtain a copy of the License at
//
// http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
//
// Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
// distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
// WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
// See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
// limitations under the License.
use base64::{Engine as _, engine::general_purpose::STANDARD as BASE64_STANDARD};
use rustfs_kms::{LocalConfig, backends::local::LocalKmsClient};
use std::io::{self, Write};
use std::path::{Path, PathBuf};
use zeroize::Zeroizing;
const LOCAL_KMS_MASTER_KEY_ENV: &str = "RUSTFS_KMS_LOCAL_MASTER_KEY";
fn usage(program: &str) -> String {
format!(
"Usage: {program} <local-kms-key-file>\n\
Reads {LOCAL_KMS_MASTER_KEY_ENV} when the key file is encrypted.\n\
Writes only the base64-encoded 32-byte key to stdout."
)
}
fn resolve_key_file(path: &Path) -> Result<(PathBuf, String), String> {
let canonical = std::fs::canonicalize(path).map_err(|error| format!("cannot open Local KMS key file: {error}"))?;
if canonical.extension().and_then(|extension| extension.to_str()) != Some("key") {
return Err("Local KMS key file must have a .key extension".to_string());
}
let key_dir = canonical
.parent()
.ok_or_else(|| "Local KMS key file must have a parent directory".to_string())?
.to_path_buf();
let key_id = canonical
.file_stem()
.and_then(|stem| stem.to_str())
.filter(|stem| !stem.is_empty())
.ok_or_else(|| "Local KMS key file name must contain a valid UTF-8 key ID".to_string())?
.to_string();
Ok((key_dir, key_id))
}
async fn run() -> Result<(), String> {
let mut args = std::env::args();
let program = args.next().unwrap_or_else(|| "local_kms_key_decrypt".to_string());
let Some(key_file) = args.next() else {
return Err(usage(&program));
};
if args.next().is_some() {
return Err(usage(&program));
}
let (key_dir, key_id) = resolve_key_file(Path::new(&key_file))?;
let master_key = std::env::var(LOCAL_KMS_MASTER_KEY_ENV).ok().filter(|value| !value.is_empty());
let client = LocalKmsClient::new_for_key_export(LocalConfig {
key_dir,
master_key,
file_permissions: Some(0o600),
})
.await
.map_err(|error| error.to_string())?;
let key_material = client
.decrypt_key_material_for_export(&key_id)
.await
.map_err(|error| error.to_string())?;
let encoded = Zeroizing::new(BASE64_STANDARD.encode(key_material.as_ref()));
let mut stdout = io::stdout().lock();
writeln!(stdout, "{}", encoded.as_str()).map_err(|error| format!("failed to write decrypted key: {error}"))
}
#[tokio::main]
async fn main() {
if let Err(error) = run().await {
let _ = writeln!(io::stderr().lock(), "local_kms_key_decrypt: {error}");
std::process::exit(1);
}
}
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
use super::*;
#[test]
fn resolve_key_file_extracts_directory_and_key_id() {
let directory = tempfile::tempdir().expect("create temporary directory");
let key_file = directory.path().join("migration-key.key");
std::fs::write(&key_file, b"{}").expect("create key file");
let (key_dir, key_id) = resolve_key_file(&key_file).expect("resolve key file");
assert_eq!(key_dir, directory.path().canonicalize().expect("canonical directory"));
assert_eq!(key_id, "migration-key");
}
#[test]
fn resolve_key_file_rejects_non_key_extension() {
let directory = tempfile::tempdir().expect("create temporary directory");
let key_file = directory.path().join("migration-key.json");
std::fs::write(&key_file, b"{}").expect("create key file");
let error = resolve_key_file(&key_file).expect_err("non-key file must be rejected");
assert!(error.contains(".key"));
}
}
+102 -12
View File
@@ -71,7 +71,10 @@ impl fmt::Debug for ConfigureLocalKmsRequest {
}
}
/// Request to configure KMS with Vault KV v2 + Transit backend
/// Request to configure KMS with the Vault KV v2 storage backend.
///
/// This backend stores master key material directly in KV v2; confidentiality relies on
/// Vault ACLs and KV v2 at-rest encryption, with no Transit wrapping involved.
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Serialize, Deserialize)]
#[serde(deny_unknown_fields)]
pub struct ConfigureVaultKmsRequest {
@@ -82,7 +85,8 @@ pub struct ConfigureVaultKmsRequest {
pub auth_method: VaultAuthMethod,
/// Vault namespace (Vault Enterprise, optional)
pub namespace: Option<String>,
/// Transit engine mount path
/// Deprecated: legacy Transit engine mount path. Still accepted so older clients keep
/// working, but the Vault KV2 backend never uses it.
pub mount_path: Option<String>,
/// KV engine mount path for storing keys
pub kv_mount: Option<String>,
@@ -192,7 +196,7 @@ pub enum ConfigureKmsRequest {
/// Configure with Local backend
#[serde(alias = "local", alias = "Local")]
Local(ConfigureLocalKmsRequest),
/// Configure with Vault KV v2 + Transit backend
/// Configure with the Vault KV v2 storage backend
#[serde(
rename = "VaultKV2",
alias = "Vault",
@@ -231,15 +235,55 @@ pub struct StartKmsRequest {
#[derive(Deserialize)]
#[serde(deny_unknown_fields)]
enum StrictVaultAuthMethod {
Token { token: String },
AppRole { role_id: String, secret_id: String },
Token {
token: String,
},
AppRole {
role_id: String,
#[serde(default)]
secret_id: String,
#[serde(default)]
secret_id_file: Option<std::path::PathBuf>,
#[serde(default)]
mount: Option<String>,
#[serde(default)]
refresh_safety_window_secs: Option<u64>,
},
TokenFile {
path: std::path::PathBuf,
#[serde(default)]
poll_interval_secs: Option<u64>,
#[serde(default)]
refresh_safety_window_secs: Option<u64>,
},
}
impl From<StrictVaultAuthMethod> for VaultAuthMethod {
fn from(value: StrictVaultAuthMethod) -> Self {
match value {
StrictVaultAuthMethod::Token { token } => Self::Token { token },
StrictVaultAuthMethod::AppRole { role_id, secret_id } => Self::AppRole { role_id, secret_id },
StrictVaultAuthMethod::AppRole {
role_id,
secret_id,
secret_id_file,
mount,
refresh_safety_window_secs,
} => Self::AppRole {
role_id,
secret_id,
secret_id_file,
mount: mount.unwrap_or_else(|| crate::config::DEFAULT_VAULT_APPROLE_MOUNT.to_string()),
refresh_safety_window_secs,
},
StrictVaultAuthMethod::TokenFile {
path,
poll_interval_secs,
refresh_safety_window_secs,
} => Self::TokenFile {
path,
poll_interval_secs,
refresh_safety_window_secs,
},
}
}
}
@@ -333,7 +377,7 @@ pub enum BackendSummary {
/// File permissions (octal)
file_permissions: Option<u32>,
},
/// Vault KV v2 + Transit backend summary
/// Vault KV v2 storage backend summary
#[serde(alias = "vault")]
VaultKv2 {
/// Vault server address
@@ -344,7 +388,8 @@ pub enum BackendSummary {
has_stored_credentials: bool,
/// Namespace (if configured)
namespace: Option<String>,
/// Transit engine mount path
/// Deprecated: legacy Transit mount path. Unused by the backend; kept only so the
/// serialized response shape stays stable for existing consumers.
mount_path: String,
/// KV engine mount path
kv_mount: String,
@@ -398,6 +443,7 @@ impl From<&KmsConfig> for KmsConfigSummary {
auth_method_type: match &vault_config.auth_method {
VaultAuthMethod::Token { .. } => "token".to_string(),
VaultAuthMethod::AppRole { .. } => "approle".to_string(),
VaultAuthMethod::TokenFile { .. } => "token_file".to_string(),
},
has_stored_credentials: true,
namespace: vault_config.namespace.clone(),
@@ -411,6 +457,7 @@ impl From<&KmsConfig> for KmsConfigSummary {
auth_method_type: match &vault_config.auth_method {
VaultAuthMethod::Token { .. } => "token".to_string(),
VaultAuthMethod::AppRole { .. } => "approle".to_string(),
VaultAuthMethod::TokenFile { .. } => "token_file".to_string(),
},
has_stored_credentials: true,
namespace: vault_config.namespace.clone(),
@@ -621,6 +668,52 @@ mod tests {
}
}
#[test]
fn test_deserialize_vault_kv2_configure_request_mount_path_optional_but_accepted() {
// deny_unknown_fields regression guard: mount_path is deprecated but must remain
// accepted so older clients that still send it do not get a 400.
let with_mount_path = serde_json::json!({
"backend_type": "VaultKV2",
"address": "http://127.0.0.1:8200",
"auth_method": { "Token": { "token": "dev-root-token" } },
"mount_path": "transit"
});
let request: ConfigureKmsRequest =
serde_json::from_value(with_mount_path).expect("request with deprecated mount_path should deserialize");
let config = request.to_kms_config();
assert_eq!(config.vault_config().expect("vault-kv2 config").mount_path, "transit");
let without_mount_path = serde_json::json!({
"backend_type": "VaultKV2",
"address": "http://127.0.0.1:8200",
"auth_method": { "Token": { "token": "dev-root-token" } }
});
let request: ConfigureKmsRequest =
serde_json::from_value(without_mount_path).expect("request without mount_path should deserialize");
let config = request.to_kms_config();
assert_eq!(config.vault_config().expect("vault-kv2 config").mount_path, "transit");
}
#[test]
fn test_vault_kv2_status_summary_does_not_mention_transit() {
let config = KmsConfig::vault(
url::Url::parse("https://vault.example.com:8200").expect("vault URL"),
"summary-token".to_string(),
);
let response = KmsStatusResponse {
status: KmsServiceStatus::Running,
backend_type: Some(config.backend.clone()),
healthy: Some(true),
config_summary: Some(KmsConfigSummary::from(&config)),
};
let json = serde_json::to_string(&response).expect("kms status response should serialize");
assert!(
!json.contains("Transit"),
"vault-kv2 status output must not describe the backend as Transit: {json}"
);
}
#[test]
fn test_deserialize_vault_transit_configure_request() {
let cases = ["VaultTransit", "vault-transit", "vault_transit"];
@@ -821,10 +914,7 @@ mod tests {
});
let approle = ConfigureKmsRequest::VaultKv2(ConfigureVaultKmsRequest {
address: "https://vault.example.com:8200".to_string(),
auth_method: VaultAuthMethod::AppRole {
role_id: "configure-role-id".to_string(),
secret_id: "configure-approle-secret-id".to_string(),
},
auth_method: VaultAuthMethod::approle("configure-role-id".to_string(), "configure-approle-secret-id".to_string()),
namespace: None,
mount_path: Some("transit".to_string()),
kv_mount: Some("secret".to_string()),
+345
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,345 @@
// Copyright 2024 RustFS Team
//
// Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
// you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
// You may obtain a copy of the License at
//
// http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
//
// Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
// distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
// WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
// See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
// limitations under the License.
//! Shared key state × operation contract tests for KMS backends.
//!
//! Every stateful backend must satisfy the same lifecycle matrix (see
//! `ensure_key_state_permits`): Enabled permits everything, Disabled permits
//! decryption and lifecycle recovery but rejects new cryptographic use, and
//! PendingDeletion rejects everything except decryption and cancellation.
//! Decryption staying available in Disabled/PendingDeletion is an explicit,
//! tested deviation from AWS KMS: disabling a key must not break reads of
//! objects already encrypted under it.
//!
//! The full matrix runs offline against the Local backend. The Vault KV2 and
//! Vault Transit runs exercise the same helper but need a live Vault dev
//! server, so they are `#[ignore]`d in CI. Static is covered by its own
//! stateless contract below.
use super::KmsBackend;
use super::local::LocalKmsBackend;
use super::static_kms::StaticKmsBackend;
use super::vault::VaultKmsBackend;
use super::vault_transit::VaultTransitKmsBackend;
use crate::config::KmsConfig;
use crate::error::{KmsError, Result};
use crate::manager::KmsManager;
use crate::service::ObjectEncryptionService;
use crate::types::{
CancelKeyDeletionRequest, CreateKeyRequest, DecryptRequest, DeleteKeyRequest, DescribeKeyRequest, EncryptRequest,
GenerateDataKeyRequest, KeySpec, KeyState, KeyUsage, ObjectEncryptionContext,
};
use base64::Engine as _;
use base64::engine::general_purpose::STANDARD as BASE64;
use rand::RngExt as _;
use std::collections::HashMap;
use std::sync::Arc;
fn expect_unsupported<T: std::fmt::Debug>(result: Result<T>) {
match result {
Err(KmsError::UnsupportedCapability { .. }) => {}
other => panic!("expected UnsupportedCapability, got {other:?}"),
}
}
/// Rotation while not Enabled: backends with rotation support must reject it
/// through the state machine; backends without it report the capability gap.
async fn expect_rotate_rejected(backend: &dyn KmsBackend, key_id: &str) {
let result = backend.rotate_key(key_id).await;
if backend.capabilities().rotate {
expect_invalid_key_state(result, "");
} else {
expect_unsupported(result);
}
}
fn expect_invalid_key_state<T: std::fmt::Debug>(result: Result<T>, expected_fragment: &str) {
match result {
Err(KmsError::InvalidOperation { message }) => assert!(
message.contains(expected_fragment),
"expected invalid-key-state message containing {expected_fragment:?}, got {message:?}"
),
other => panic!("expected InvalidOperation (invalid key state), got {other:?}"),
}
}
fn context() -> HashMap<String, String> {
HashMap::from([("bucket".to_string(), "contract".to_string())])
}
fn generate_request(key_id: &str) -> GenerateDataKeyRequest {
GenerateDataKeyRequest {
key_id: key_id.to_string(),
key_spec: KeySpec::Aes256,
encryption_context: context(),
}
}
fn encrypt_request(key_id: &str) -> EncryptRequest {
EncryptRequest {
key_id: key_id.to_string(),
plaintext: b"contract-plaintext".to_vec(),
encryption_context: context(),
grant_tokens: Vec::new(),
}
}
fn decrypt_request(ciphertext: Vec<u8>) -> DecryptRequest {
DecryptRequest {
ciphertext,
encryption_context: context(),
grant_tokens: Vec::new(),
}
}
fn schedule_request(key_id: &str) -> DeleteKeyRequest {
DeleteKeyRequest {
key_id: key_id.to_string(),
pending_window_in_days: Some(7),
force_immediate: None,
}
}
fn cancel_request(key_id: &str) -> CancelKeyDeletionRequest {
CancelKeyDeletionRequest {
key_id: key_id.to_string(),
}
}
fn create_request(key_name: String) -> CreateKeyRequest {
CreateKeyRequest {
key_name: Some(key_name),
key_usage: KeyUsage::EncryptDecrypt,
..Default::default()
}
}
async fn assert_key_state(backend: &dyn KmsBackend, key_id: &str, expected: KeyState) {
let described = backend
.describe_key(DescribeKeyRequest {
key_id: key_id.to_string(),
})
.await
.expect("describe_key must succeed for an existing key");
assert_eq!(described.key_metadata.key_state, expected, "unexpected state for key {key_id}");
}
/// Drives one freshly created (Enabled) key through the full state matrix,
/// entirely through the `KmsBackend` product surface.
async fn assert_state_machine_contract(backend: &dyn KmsBackend, key_id: &str) {
// Enabled: cryptographic use is allowed. Keep an envelope around to prove
// decryption keeps working in later states.
let data_key = backend
.generate_data_key(generate_request(key_id))
.await
.expect("Enabled key must generate data keys");
backend
.encrypt(encrypt_request(key_id))
.await
.expect("Enabled key must encrypt");
// Enabled -> Disabled.
backend.disable_key(key_id).await.expect("disable from Enabled must succeed");
assert_key_state(backend, key_id, KeyState::Disabled).await;
// Disabled: new cryptographic use and rotation are rejected...
expect_invalid_key_state(backend.encrypt(encrypt_request(key_id)).await, "disabled");
expect_invalid_key_state(backend.generate_data_key(generate_request(key_id)).await, "disabled");
expect_rotate_rejected(backend, key_id).await;
// ...but decryption of existing data keeps working (explicit AWS deviation)...
let decrypted = backend
.decrypt(decrypt_request(data_key.ciphertext_blob.clone()))
.await
.expect("decrypt with a disabled key must keep working");
assert_eq!(decrypted.plaintext, data_key.plaintext_key, "decrypt must recover the original data key");
// ...disable stays idempotent, cancel has nothing to cancel, and enable recovers.
backend.disable_key(key_id).await.expect("disable must be idempotent");
expect_invalid_key_state(backend.cancel_key_deletion(cancel_request(key_id)).await, "not pending deletion");
backend.enable_key(key_id).await.expect("enable from Disabled must succeed");
assert_key_state(backend, key_id, KeyState::Enabled).await;
// Disabled keys may still be scheduled for deletion.
backend
.disable_key(key_id)
.await
.expect("disable before scheduling must succeed");
backend
.delete_key(schedule_request(key_id))
.await
.expect("scheduling deletion of a disabled key must succeed");
assert_key_state(backend, key_id, KeyState::PendingDeletion).await;
// PendingDeletion: everything except decryption and cancellation is rejected.
expect_invalid_key_state(backend.encrypt(encrypt_request(key_id)).await, "pending deletion");
expect_invalid_key_state(backend.generate_data_key(generate_request(key_id)).await, "pending deletion");
expect_invalid_key_state(backend.enable_key(key_id).await, "pending deletion");
expect_invalid_key_state(backend.disable_key(key_id).await, "pending deletion");
expect_rotate_rejected(backend, key_id).await;
expect_invalid_key_state(backend.delete_key(schedule_request(key_id)).await, "pending deletion");
let decrypted = backend
.decrypt(decrypt_request(data_key.ciphertext_blob.clone()))
.await
.expect("decrypt with a pending-deletion key must keep working");
assert_eq!(decrypted.plaintext, data_key.plaintext_key);
// PendingDeletion -> Enabled through cancellation.
backend
.cancel_key_deletion(cancel_request(key_id))
.await
.expect("cancel from PendingDeletion must succeed");
assert_key_state(backend, key_id, KeyState::Enabled).await;
backend
.generate_data_key(generate_request(key_id))
.await
.expect("cancelled key must be usable again");
// Cancel without a pending deletion is an invalid state transition.
expect_invalid_key_state(backend.cancel_key_deletion(cancel_request(key_id)).await, "not pending deletion");
}
async fn local_fixture() -> (tempfile::TempDir, KmsConfig, LocalKmsBackend, String) {
let temp_dir = tempfile::tempdir().expect("temp dir should be created");
let config = KmsConfig::local(temp_dir.path().to_path_buf()).with_insecure_development_defaults();
let backend = LocalKmsBackend::new(config.clone())
.await
.expect("local backend should build");
let created = backend
.create_key(create_request("contract-key".to_string()))
.await
.expect("key should be created");
(temp_dir, config, backend, created.key_id)
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn local_backend_state_machine_contract() {
let (_temp_dir, _config, backend, key_id) = local_fixture().await;
assert_state_machine_contract(&backend, &key_id).await;
}
/// SSE-shaped regression: disabling a key must not break decryption of data
/// keys created while it was enabled, while new data key creation must fail.
#[tokio::test]
async fn local_disabled_key_keeps_decrypting_existing_envelopes() {
let (_temp_dir, config, backend, key_id) = local_fixture().await;
let backend = Arc::new(backend);
let service = ObjectEncryptionService::new(KmsManager::new(backend.clone(), config));
let object_context = ObjectEncryptionContext::new("sse-bucket".to_string(), "dir/object.bin".to_string());
let kms_key = Some(key_id.clone());
let (_data_key, encrypted_blob) = service
.create_data_key(&kms_key, &object_context)
.await
.expect("data key creation must succeed while the key is enabled");
backend
.lifecycle_client()
.disable_key(&key_id, None)
.await
.expect("disable must succeed");
service
.decrypt_data_key(&encrypted_blob, &object_context)
.await
.expect("existing objects must stay readable after their KMS key is disabled");
expect_invalid_key_state(service.create_data_key(&kms_key, &object_context).await, "disabled");
}
/// Static is a stateless read-only backend: cryptographic operations always
/// work against the single configured key and every lifecycle mutation is
/// rejected as an invalid operation.
#[tokio::test]
async fn static_backend_stateless_contract() {
let key_id = "static-contract-key";
let mut raw_key = [0u8; 32];
rand::rng().fill(&mut raw_key[..]);
let config = KmsConfig::static_kms(key_id.to_string(), BASE64.encode(raw_key));
let static_backend = StaticKmsBackend::new(config).await.expect("static backend should build");
let backend: &dyn KmsBackend = &static_backend;
let data_key = backend
.generate_data_key(generate_request(key_id))
.await
.expect("static backend must generate data keys");
let decrypted = backend
.decrypt(decrypt_request(data_key.ciphertext_blob.clone()))
.await
.expect("static backend must decrypt its own envelopes");
assert_eq!(decrypted.plaintext, data_key.plaintext_key);
assert_key_state(backend, key_id, KeyState::Enabled).await;
expect_invalid_key_state(backend.create_key(create_request("another-key".to_string())).await, "read-only");
expect_invalid_key_state(backend.delete_key(schedule_request(key_id)).await, "read-only");
expect_invalid_key_state(backend.cancel_key_deletion(cancel_request(key_id)).await, "read-only");
// Enable/disable and rotation are capability gaps at the product
// surface, not state-machine rejections.
expect_unsupported(backend.enable_key(key_id).await);
expect_unsupported(backend.disable_key(key_id).await);
expect_unsupported(backend.rotate_key(key_id).await);
}
fn vault_dev_config(constructor: fn(url::Url, String) -> KmsConfig) -> KmsConfig {
let address = std::env::var("RUSTFS_KMS_VAULT_ADDR").unwrap_or_else(|_| "http://127.0.0.1:8200".to_string());
let token = std::env::var("RUSTFS_KMS_VAULT_TOKEN").unwrap_or_else(|_| "dev-token".to_string());
let mut config = constructor(url::Url::parse(&address).expect("vault address should parse"), token);
config.allow_insecure_dev_defaults = true;
config
}
#[tokio::test]
#[ignore] // Requires a running Vault instance (dev mode) with a KV2 mount
async fn vault_kv2_backend_state_machine_contract() {
let config = vault_dev_config(KmsConfig::vault);
let backend = VaultKmsBackend::new(config).await.expect("vault kv2 backend should build");
let created = backend
.create_key(create_request(format!("contract-{}", uuid::Uuid::new_v4())))
.await
.expect("key should be created");
assert_state_machine_contract(&backend, &created.key_id).await;
// KV2 additionally supports version-retaining rotation, which must only
// work while the key is Enabled (the shared matrix covered the
// rejections).
backend
.rotate_key(&created.key_id)
.await
.expect("rotation of an Enabled KV2 key must succeed");
// Cleanup: leave the key pending deletion so repeated runs stay tidy.
let _ = backend.delete_key(schedule_request(&created.key_id)).await;
}
#[tokio::test]
#[ignore] // Requires a running Vault instance (dev mode) with the transit engine enabled
async fn vault_transit_backend_state_machine_contract() {
let config = vault_dev_config(KmsConfig::vault_transit);
let backend = VaultTransitKmsBackend::new(config)
.await
.expect("vault transit backend should build");
let created = backend
.create_key(create_request(format!("contract-{}", uuid::Uuid::new_v4())))
.await
.expect("key should be created");
assert_state_machine_contract(&backend, &created.key_id).await;
// Transit additionally supports rotation, which must only work while the
// key is Enabled (the shared matrix already covered the rejections).
backend
.rotate_key(&created.key_id)
.await
.expect("rotation of an Enabled transit key must succeed");
let _ = backend.delete_key(schedule_request(&created.key_id)).await;
}
File diff suppressed because it is too large Load Diff
+377 -169
View File
@@ -14,144 +14,88 @@
//! KMS backend implementations
use crate::error::Result;
use crate::error::{KmsError, Result};
use crate::types::*;
use async_trait::async_trait;
use std::collections::HashMap;
use jiff::Zoned;
use serde::{Deserialize, Serialize};
#[cfg(test)]
mod contract_tests;
pub mod local;
#[cfg(test)]
pub(crate) mod scripted_vault;
pub mod static_kms;
pub mod vault;
pub(crate) mod vault_credentials;
pub mod vault_transit;
/// Abstract KMS client interface that all backends must implement
#[async_trait]
pub trait KmsClient: Send + Sync {
/// Generate a new data encryption key (DEK)
///
/// Creates a new data key using the specified master key. The returned DataKey
/// contains both the plaintext and encrypted versions of the key.
///
/// # Arguments
/// * `request` - The key generation request
/// * `context` - Optional operation context for auditing
///
/// # Returns
/// Returns a DataKey containing both plaintext and encrypted key material
async fn generate_data_key(&self, request: &GenerateKeyRequest, context: Option<&OperationContext>) -> Result<DataKeyInfo>;
/// Operations whose availability depends on the key's lifecycle state.
///
/// Decryption is deliberately absent: RustFS allows decryption with
/// `Disabled` and `PendingDeletion` keys — an explicit deviation from AWS
/// KMS — because rejecting it would break reads of every object encrypted
/// under a key the moment it is disabled. Deletion cancellation is also
/// absent: it is valid exactly when the key is `PendingDeletion`, which call
/// sites enforce directly.
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub(crate) enum StateGatedOperation {
Encrypt,
GenerateDataKey,
Rotate,
Enable,
Disable,
ScheduleDeletion,
}
/// Encrypt data directly using a master key
///
/// Encrypts the provided plaintext using the specified master key.
/// This is different from generate_data_key as it encrypts user data directly.
///
/// # Arguments
/// * `request` - The encryption request containing plaintext and key ID
/// * `context` - Optional operation context for auditing
async fn encrypt(&self, request: &EncryptRequest, context: Option<&OperationContext>) -> Result<EncryptResponse>;
impl StateGatedOperation {
fn describe(self) -> &'static str {
match self {
Self::Encrypt => "encryption",
Self::GenerateDataKey => "data key generation",
Self::Rotate => "rotation",
Self::Enable => "enabling",
Self::Disable => "disabling",
Self::ScheduleDeletion => "deletion scheduling",
}
}
}
/// Decrypt data using a master key
///
/// Decrypts the provided ciphertext. The KMS automatically determines
/// which key was used for encryption based on the ciphertext metadata.
///
/// # Arguments
/// * `request` - The decryption request containing ciphertext
/// * `context` - Optional operation context for auditing
async fn decrypt(&self, request: &DecryptRequest, context: Option<&OperationContext>) -> Result<Vec<u8>>;
/// Enforce the shared key state × operation matrix.
///
/// - `Enabled`: every operation is allowed.
/// - `Disabled`: enabling, disabling (idempotent) and deletion scheduling are
/// allowed; encryption, data key generation and rotation are rejected.
/// - `PendingDeletion`: every state-gated operation is rejected, including a
/// repeated deletion schedule; only cancellation and decryption proceed.
/// - `PendingImport`/`Unavailable`: the key is not usable and is reported as
/// not found.
pub(crate) fn ensure_key_state_permits(key_id: &str, state: &KeyState, operation: StateGatedOperation) -> Result<()> {
match state {
KeyState::Enabled => Ok(()),
KeyState::Disabled => match operation {
StateGatedOperation::Enable | StateGatedOperation::Disable | StateGatedOperation::ScheduleDeletion => Ok(()),
StateGatedOperation::Encrypt | StateGatedOperation::GenerateDataKey | StateGatedOperation::Rotate => Err(
KmsError::invalid_key_state(format!("Key {key_id} is disabled: {} is not allowed", operation.describe())),
),
},
KeyState::PendingDeletion => Err(KmsError::invalid_key_state(format!(
"Key {key_id} is pending deletion: {} is not allowed",
operation.describe()
))),
KeyState::PendingImport | KeyState::Unavailable => Err(KmsError::key_not_found(key_id)),
}
}
/// Create a new master key
///
/// Creates a new master key in the KMS with the specified ID.
/// Returns an error if a key with the same ID already exists.
///
/// # Arguments
/// * `key_id` - Unique identifier for the new key
/// * `algorithm` - Key algorithm (e.g., "AES_256")
/// * `context` - Optional operation context for auditing
async fn create_key(&self, key_id: &str, algorithm: &str, context: Option<&OperationContext>) -> Result<MasterKeyInfo>;
/// Get information about a specific key
///
/// Returns metadata and information about the specified key.
///
/// # Arguments
/// * `key_id` - The key identifier
/// * `context` - Optional operation context for auditing
async fn describe_key(&self, key_id: &str, context: Option<&OperationContext>) -> Result<KeyInfo>;
/// List available keys
///
/// Returns a paginated list of keys available in the KMS.
///
/// # Arguments
/// * `request` - List request parameters (pagination, filters)
/// * `context` - Optional operation context for auditing
async fn list_keys(&self, request: &ListKeysRequest, context: Option<&OperationContext>) -> Result<ListKeysResponse>;
/// Enable a key
///
/// Enables a previously disabled key, allowing it to be used for cryptographic operations.
///
/// # Arguments
/// * `key_id` - The key identifier
/// * `context` - Optional operation context for auditing
async fn enable_key(&self, key_id: &str, context: Option<&OperationContext>) -> Result<()>;
/// Disable a key
///
/// Disables a key, preventing it from being used for new cryptographic operations.
/// Existing encrypted data can still be decrypted.
///
/// # Arguments
/// * `key_id` - The key identifier
/// * `context` - Optional operation context for auditing
async fn disable_key(&self, key_id: &str, context: Option<&OperationContext>) -> Result<()>;
/// Schedule key deletion
///
/// Schedules a key for deletion after a specified number of days.
/// This allows for a grace period to recover the key if needed.
///
/// # Arguments
/// * `key_id` - The key identifier
/// * `pending_window_days` - Number of days before actual deletion
/// * `context` - Optional operation context for auditing
async fn schedule_key_deletion(
&self,
key_id: &str,
pending_window_days: u32,
context: Option<&OperationContext>,
) -> Result<()>;
/// Cancel key deletion
///
/// Cancels a previously scheduled key deletion.
///
/// # Arguments
/// * `key_id` - The key identifier
/// * `context` - Optional operation context for auditing
async fn cancel_key_deletion(&self, key_id: &str, context: Option<&OperationContext>) -> Result<()>;
/// Rotate a key
///
/// Creates a new version of the specified key. Previous versions remain
/// available for decryption but new operations will use the new version.
///
/// # Arguments
/// * `key_id` - The key identifier
/// * `context` - Optional operation context for auditing
async fn rotate_key(&self, key_id: &str, context: Option<&OperationContext>) -> Result<MasterKeyInfo>;
/// Health check
///
/// Performs a health check on the KMS backend to ensure it's operational.
async fn health_check(&self) -> Result<()>;
/// Get backend information
///
/// Returns information about the KMS backend (type, version, etc.).
fn backend_info(&self) -> BackendInfo;
/// [`ensure_key_state_permits`] for backends that persist [`KeyStatus`].
pub(crate) fn ensure_key_status_permits(key_id: &str, status: &KeyStatus, operation: StateGatedOperation) -> Result<()> {
let state = match status {
KeyStatus::Active => KeyState::Enabled,
KeyStatus::Disabled => KeyState::Disabled,
KeyStatus::PendingDeletion => KeyState::PendingDeletion,
KeyStatus::Deleted => KeyState::Unavailable,
};
ensure_key_state_permits(key_id, &state, operation)
}
/// Simplified KMS backend interface for manager
@@ -181,58 +125,322 @@ pub trait KmsBackend: Send + Sync {
/// Cancel key deletion
async fn cancel_key_deletion(&self, request: CancelKeyDeletionRequest) -> Result<CancelKeyDeletionResponse>;
/// Enable a disabled key so it can be used for cryptographic operations
/// again.
///
/// Backends that advertise [`BackendCapabilities::enable_disable`] must
/// override this method; the default rejects the operation.
async fn enable_key(&self, _key_id: &str) -> Result<()> {
Err(KmsError::unsupported_capability("backend without enable/disable support", "enable_key"))
}
/// Disable a key, rejecting new cryptographic use while existing data
/// remains decryptable.
///
/// Backends that advertise [`BackendCapabilities::enable_disable`] must
/// override this method; the default rejects the operation.
async fn disable_key(&self, _key_id: &str) -> Result<()> {
Err(KmsError::unsupported_capability("backend without enable/disable support", "disable_key"))
}
/// Rotate a key to a new version while prior versions remain available
/// for decryption.
///
/// Only backends that advertise [`BackendCapabilities::rotate`] (that is,
/// backends with retained version history) may override this method; the
/// default rejects the operation.
async fn rotate_key(&self, _key_id: &str) -> Result<()> {
Err(KmsError::unsupported_capability("backend without rotation support", "rotate_key"))
}
/// Health check
async fn health_check(&self) -> Result<bool>;
/// Report which operations this backend actually supports.
///
/// The default is conservative: only the operations every backend is
/// required to implement by this trait are advertised. Optional lifecycle
/// operations (rotation, enable/disable, deletion scheduling, ...) must be
/// opted in by overriding this method.
fn capabilities(&self) -> BackendCapabilities {
BackendCapabilities::minimal()
}
/// Remove a key whose scheduled deletion deadline has passed.
///
/// Used by the background deletion worker. Implementations must re-check
/// state and deadline under their own write synchronization so that a
/// concurrent cancellation observed after the caller's inspection wins
/// ([`ExpiredKeyRemoval::StateChanged`]), must write a tombstone (a
/// `Deleted`/`Unavailable` record) before destroying material so a crashed
/// removal can simply be re-run, and must treat an already-removed key as
/// success so the operation stays idempotent across restarts and nodes.
///
/// The default rejects the operation for backends without deletion
/// support.
async fn remove_expired_key(&self, _key_id: &str, _now: &Zoned) -> Result<ExpiredKeyRemoval> {
Err(KmsError::unsupported_capability("backend without deletion support", "remove_expired_key"))
}
}
/// Information about a KMS backend
#[derive(Debug, Clone)]
pub struct BackendInfo {
/// Backend type name (e.g., "local", "vault")
pub backend_type: String,
/// Backend version
pub version: String,
/// Backend endpoint or location
pub endpoint: String,
/// Whether the backend is currently healthy
pub healthy: bool,
/// Additional metadata about the backend
pub metadata: HashMap<String, String>,
/// Outcome of [`KmsBackend::remove_expired_key`].
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub enum ExpiredKeyRemoval {
/// The key's record and material were removed, or were already gone.
Removed,
/// The key is no longer pending deletion (for example the deletion was
/// cancelled after the caller inspected it); nothing was removed.
StateChanged,
/// The key is pending deletion but its deadline has not passed, or it has
/// no persisted deadline (legacy record) and is never auto-removed.
NotExpired,
}
impl BackendInfo {
/// Create a new backend info
///
/// # Arguments
/// * `backend_type` - The type of the backend
/// * `version` - The version of the backend
/// * `endpoint` - The endpoint or location of the backend
/// * `healthy` - Whether the backend is healthy
///
/// # Returns
/// A new BackendInfo instance
///
pub fn new(backend_type: String, version: String, endpoint: String, healthy: bool) -> Self {
/// Set of operations a KMS backend supports.
///
/// Reported by [`KmsBackend::capabilities`] so callers (manager, admin API)
/// can discover what the active backend can do without probing individual
/// operations. Marked `#[non_exhaustive]` so new capability flags can be
/// added without breaking downstream code; construct values through
/// [`BackendCapabilities::minimal`] and the `with_*` builders.
#[non_exhaustive]
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq, Serialize, Deserialize)]
pub struct BackendCapabilities {
/// Direct encryption of caller-provided plaintext with a master key
pub encrypt: bool,
/// Decryption of previously produced ciphertext
pub decrypt: bool,
/// Data encryption key (DEK) generation
pub generate_data_key: bool,
/// Key rotation that retains prior versions for decryption
pub rotate: bool,
/// Enabling and disabling keys
pub enable_disable: bool,
/// Scheduling key deletion with a pending window
pub schedule_deletion: bool,
/// Multiple key versions addressable after rotation
pub versioning: bool,
/// Irreversible physical deletion of key material
pub physical_delete: bool,
}
impl BackendCapabilities {
/// Conservative baseline: only the operations that every [`KmsBackend`]
/// implementation is required to provide by the trait. All optional
/// lifecycle capabilities default to unsupported.
pub const fn minimal() -> Self {
Self {
backend_type,
version,
endpoint,
healthy,
metadata: HashMap::new(),
encrypt: true,
decrypt: true,
generate_data_key: true,
rotate: false,
enable_disable: false,
schedule_deletion: false,
versioning: false,
physical_delete: false,
}
}
/// Add metadata to the backend info
///
/// # Arguments
/// * `key` - Metadata key
/// * `value` - Metadata value
///
/// # Returns
/// Updated BackendInfo instance
///
pub fn with_metadata(mut self, key: String, value: String) -> Self {
self.metadata.insert(key, value);
/// Set whether direct encryption is supported
pub const fn with_encrypt(mut self, encrypt: bool) -> Self {
self.encrypt = encrypt;
self
}
/// Set whether decryption is supported
pub const fn with_decrypt(mut self, decrypt: bool) -> Self {
self.decrypt = decrypt;
self
}
/// Set whether data key generation is supported
pub const fn with_generate_data_key(mut self, generate_data_key: bool) -> Self {
self.generate_data_key = generate_data_key;
self
}
/// Set whether version-retaining key rotation is supported
pub const fn with_rotate(mut self, rotate: bool) -> Self {
self.rotate = rotate;
self
}
/// Set whether enabling/disabling keys is supported
pub const fn with_enable_disable(mut self, enable_disable: bool) -> Self {
self.enable_disable = enable_disable;
self
}
/// Set whether scheduled deletion with a pending window is supported
pub const fn with_schedule_deletion(mut self, schedule_deletion: bool) -> Self {
self.schedule_deletion = schedule_deletion;
self
}
/// Set whether multiple key versions are supported
pub const fn with_versioning(mut self, versioning: bool) -> Self {
self.versioning = versioning;
self
}
/// Set whether physical deletion of key material is supported
pub const fn with_physical_delete(mut self, physical_delete: bool) -> Self {
self.physical_delete = physical_delete;
self
}
}
impl Default for BackendCapabilities {
fn default() -> Self {
Self::minimal()
}
}
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
use super::*;
use crate::config::KmsConfig;
use base64::Engine as _;
use base64::engine::general_purpose::STANDARD as BASE64;
/// Backend that implements only the trait-mandated operations and relies
/// on the default `capabilities` implementation.
struct MinimalBackend;
#[async_trait]
impl KmsBackend for MinimalBackend {
async fn create_key(&self, _request: CreateKeyRequest) -> Result<CreateKeyResponse> {
unimplemented!("not exercised by capability tests")
}
async fn encrypt(&self, _request: EncryptRequest) -> Result<EncryptResponse> {
unimplemented!("not exercised by capability tests")
}
async fn decrypt(&self, _request: DecryptRequest) -> Result<DecryptResponse> {
unimplemented!("not exercised by capability tests")
}
async fn generate_data_key(&self, _request: GenerateDataKeyRequest) -> Result<GenerateDataKeyResponse> {
unimplemented!("not exercised by capability tests")
}
async fn describe_key(&self, _request: DescribeKeyRequest) -> Result<DescribeKeyResponse> {
unimplemented!("not exercised by capability tests")
}
async fn list_keys(&self, _request: ListKeysRequest) -> Result<ListKeysResponse> {
unimplemented!("not exercised by capability tests")
}
async fn delete_key(&self, _request: DeleteKeyRequest) -> Result<DeleteKeyResponse> {
unimplemented!("not exercised by capability tests")
}
async fn cancel_key_deletion(&self, _request: CancelKeyDeletionRequest) -> Result<CancelKeyDeletionResponse> {
unimplemented!("not exercised by capability tests")
}
async fn health_check(&self) -> Result<bool> {
Ok(true)
}
}
fn capabilities_snapshot(capabilities: BackendCapabilities) -> std::collections::BTreeMap<String, bool> {
serde_json::from_value(serde_json::to_value(capabilities).expect("capabilities should serialize"))
.expect("capabilities should deserialize into a flat bool map")
}
#[test]
fn default_capabilities_are_conservative() {
let capabilities = MinimalBackend.capabilities();
assert_eq!(capabilities, BackendCapabilities::minimal());
assert_eq!(capabilities, BackendCapabilities::default());
// The conservative baseline advertises only trait-mandated operations.
assert!(capabilities.encrypt);
assert!(capabilities.decrypt);
assert!(capabilities.generate_data_key);
assert!(!capabilities.rotate);
assert!(!capabilities.enable_disable);
assert!(!capabilities.schedule_deletion);
assert!(!capabilities.versioning);
assert!(!capabilities.physical_delete);
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn default_lifecycle_operations_are_unsupported() {
for (operation, result) in [
("enable_key", MinimalBackend.enable_key("any-key").await),
("disable_key", MinimalBackend.disable_key("any-key").await),
("rotate_key", MinimalBackend.rotate_key("any-key").await),
] {
let error = result.expect_err("backends must opt in to lifecycle operations by overriding them");
assert!(
matches!(error, KmsError::UnsupportedCapability { .. }),
"expected UnsupportedCapability for {operation}, got {error:?}"
);
}
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn default_remove_expired_key_is_unsupported() {
let error = MinimalBackend
.remove_expired_key("any-key", &jiff::Zoned::now())
.await
.expect_err("backends without deletion support must reject expired-key removal");
assert!(
matches!(error, KmsError::UnsupportedCapability { .. }),
"expected UnsupportedCapability, got {error:?}"
);
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn local_backend_capabilities_golden() {
let temp_dir = tempfile::tempdir().expect("temp dir should be created");
let config = KmsConfig::local(temp_dir.path().to_path_buf()).with_insecure_development_defaults();
let backend = local::LocalKmsBackend::new(config).await.expect("local backend should build");
insta::assert_json_snapshot!("local_backend_capabilities", capabilities_snapshot(backend.capabilities()));
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn vault_kv2_backend_capabilities_golden() {
let config = KmsConfig::vault(
url::Url::parse("http://127.0.0.1:8200").expect("vault URL should parse"),
"dev-token".to_string(),
)
.with_insecure_development_defaults();
// Constructing the client performs no network I/O with token auth.
let backend = vault::VaultKmsBackend::new(config)
.await
.expect("vault kv2 backend should build");
insta::assert_json_snapshot!("vault_kv2_backend_capabilities", capabilities_snapshot(backend.capabilities()));
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn vault_transit_backend_capabilities_golden() {
let config = KmsConfig::vault_transit(
url::Url::parse("http://127.0.0.1:8200").expect("vault URL should parse"),
"dev-token".to_string(),
)
.with_insecure_development_defaults();
// Constructing the client performs no network I/O with token auth.
let backend = vault_transit::VaultTransitKmsBackend::new(config)
.await
.expect("vault transit backend should build");
insta::assert_json_snapshot!("vault_transit_backend_capabilities", capabilities_snapshot(backend.capabilities()));
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn static_backend_capabilities_golden() {
let config = KmsConfig::static_kms("static-key".to_string(), BASE64.encode([0u8; 32]));
let backend = static_kms::StaticKmsBackend::new(config)
.await
.expect("static backend should build");
insta::assert_json_snapshot!("static_backend_capabilities", capabilities_snapshot(backend.capabilities()));
}
}
+159
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,159 @@
// Copyright 2024 RustFS Team
//
// Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
// you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
// You may obtain a copy of the License at
//
// http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
//
// Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
// distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
// WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
// See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
// limitations under the License.
//! Minimal scripted HTTP responder standing in for a Vault server.
//!
//! Wiring tests need to observe how many Vault requests a code path performs
//! (retries, read-confirm recovery) without a live Vault. The responder serves
//! one canned response per incoming request in order, closes the connection
//! after each response, and records the `METHOD /path` sequence for
//! assertions. It intentionally implements just enough HTTP/1.1 for the
//! `vaultrs` reqwest client: no keep-alive, no chunked bodies.
use std::sync::{Arc, Mutex};
use tokio::io::{AsyncReadExt, AsyncWriteExt};
use tokio::net::{TcpListener, TcpStream};
/// One canned HTTP response.
pub(crate) struct ScriptedResponse {
status: u16,
body: String,
}
impl ScriptedResponse {
/// A 200 response carrying `data` inside the standard Vault envelope.
pub(crate) fn ok(data: serde_json::Value) -> Self {
Self {
status: 200,
body: serde_json::json!({
"request_id": "scripted",
"lease_id": "",
"lease_duration": 0,
"renewable": false,
"data": data,
})
.to_string(),
}
}
/// An error response in Vault's `{"errors": [...]}` format.
pub(crate) fn error(status: u16, message: &str) -> Self {
Self {
status,
body: serde_json::json!({ "errors": [message] }).to_string(),
}
}
}
/// A scripted stand-in Vault listening on a loopback port.
pub(crate) struct ScriptedVault {
/// Base address (`http://127.0.0.1:port`) to point a Vault client at.
pub(crate) address: String,
requests: Arc<Mutex<Vec<String>>>,
}
impl ScriptedVault {
/// Bind a loopback listener and serve `responses` one per request.
///
/// Requests beyond the script get a 599 error so a test that under-scripts
/// fails loudly instead of hanging.
pub(crate) async fn serve(responses: Vec<ScriptedResponse>) -> Self {
let listener = TcpListener::bind("127.0.0.1:0").await.expect("bind scripted vault listener");
let address = format!("http://{}", listener.local_addr().expect("scripted vault local addr"));
let requests = Arc::new(Mutex::new(Vec::new()));
let recorded = Arc::clone(&requests);
tokio::spawn(async move {
let mut responses = responses.into_iter();
loop {
let Ok((mut stream, _)) = listener.accept().await else {
return;
};
let Some(request_line) = read_request(&mut stream).await else {
continue;
};
recorded
.lock()
.expect("scripted vault request log poisoned")
.push(request_line);
let response = responses
.next()
.unwrap_or_else(|| ScriptedResponse::error(599, "scripted vault: script exhausted"));
let payload = format!(
"HTTP/1.1 {} Scripted\r\ncontent-type: application/json\r\ncontent-length: {}\r\nconnection: close\r\n\r\n{}",
response.status,
response.body.len(),
response.body
);
let _ = stream.write_all(payload.as_bytes()).await;
let _ = stream.shutdown().await;
}
});
Self { address, requests }
}
/// The `METHOD /path` lines of every request served so far, in order.
pub(crate) fn requests(&self) -> Vec<String> {
self.requests.lock().expect("scripted vault request log poisoned").clone()
}
}
/// Read one HTTP/1.1 request (head plus content-length body) and return its
/// `METHOD /path` line. Draining the body before responding keeps the client
/// from seeing a connection reset while it is still writing.
async fn read_request(stream: &mut TcpStream) -> Option<String> {
let mut buffer = Vec::new();
let mut chunk = [0u8; 4096];
let head_end = loop {
if let Some(position) = buffer.windows(4).position(|window| window == b"\r\n\r\n") {
break position + 4;
}
let read = stream.read(&mut chunk).await.ok()?;
if read == 0 {
return None;
}
buffer.extend_from_slice(&chunk[..read]);
};
let head = String::from_utf8_lossy(&buffer[..head_end]).into_owned();
let mut lines = head.lines();
let request_line = lines.next()?;
let mut parts = request_line.split_whitespace();
let method = parts.next()?;
let path = parts.next()?;
// rustify appends a lone "?" when an endpoint has no query parameters;
// strip it so assertions can use the plain path.
let path = path.strip_suffix('?').unwrap_or(path);
let content_length: usize = lines
.filter_map(|line| {
let (name, value) = line.split_once(':')?;
name.eq_ignore_ascii_case("content-length")
.then(|| value.trim().parse().ok())?
})
.next()
.unwrap_or(0);
let mut remaining = content_length.saturating_sub(buffer.len() - head_end);
while remaining > 0 {
let read = stream.read(&mut chunk).await.ok()?;
if read == 0 {
break;
}
remaining = remaining.saturating_sub(read);
}
Some(format!("{method} {path}"))
}
@@ -0,0 +1,14 @@
---
source: crates/kms/src/backends/mod.rs
expression: capabilities_snapshot(backend.capabilities())
---
{
"decrypt": true,
"enable_disable": true,
"encrypt": true,
"generate_data_key": true,
"physical_delete": true,
"rotate": false,
"schedule_deletion": true,
"versioning": false
}
@@ -0,0 +1,14 @@
---
source: crates/kms/src/backends/mod.rs
expression: capabilities_snapshot(backend.capabilities())
---
{
"decrypt": true,
"enable_disable": false,
"encrypt": true,
"generate_data_key": true,
"physical_delete": false,
"rotate": false,
"schedule_deletion": false,
"versioning": false
}
@@ -0,0 +1,14 @@
---
source: crates/kms/src/backends/mod.rs
expression: capabilities_snapshot(backend.capabilities())
---
{
"decrypt": true,
"enable_disable": true,
"encrypt": true,
"generate_data_key": true,
"physical_delete": true,
"rotate": true,
"schedule_deletion": true,
"versioning": true
}
@@ -0,0 +1,14 @@
---
source: crates/kms/src/backends/mod.rs
expression: capabilities_snapshot(backend.capabilities())
---
{
"decrypt": true,
"enable_disable": true,
"encrypt": true,
"generate_data_key": true,
"physical_delete": true,
"rotate": true,
"schedule_deletion": true,
"versioning": true
}
+87 -142
View File
@@ -21,7 +21,7 @@
//!
//! encrypted_data(plaintext_len+16) || nonce (12 bytes)
use crate::backends::{BackendInfo, KmsBackend, KmsClient};
use crate::backends::{BackendCapabilities, KmsBackend};
use crate::config::{BackendConfig, KmsConfig};
use crate::encryption::DataKeyEnvelope;
use crate::error::{KmsError, Result};
@@ -98,9 +98,10 @@ impl StaticKmsBackend {
}
}
#[async_trait]
impl KmsClient for StaticKmsBackend {
async fn generate_data_key(&self, request: &GenerateKeyRequest, _context: Option<&OperationContext>) -> Result<DataKeyInfo> {
impl StaticKmsBackend {
/// Generate a fresh data key and wrap it in the standard KMS envelope,
/// authenticated against the canonical encryption context.
pub(crate) fn generate_data_key_envelope(&self, request: &GenerateKeyRequest) -> Result<DataKeyInfo> {
if request.master_key_id != self.key_id {
return Err(KmsError::key_not_found(&request.master_key_id));
}
@@ -137,6 +138,8 @@ impl KmsClient for StaticKmsBackend {
nonce: nonce_bytes.to_vec(),
encryption_context: request.encryption_context.clone(),
created_at: Zoned::now(),
// The static backend has a single fixed key with no rotation.
master_key_version: None,
};
let ciphertext = serde_json::to_vec(&envelope)?;
@@ -149,7 +152,8 @@ impl KmsClient for StaticKmsBackend {
))
}
async fn encrypt(&self, request: &EncryptRequest, _context: Option<&OperationContext>) -> Result<EncryptResponse> {
/// Encrypt caller-provided plaintext into the standard KMS envelope.
pub(crate) fn encrypt_to_envelope(&self, request: &EncryptRequest) -> Result<EncryptResponse> {
if request.key_id != self.key_id {
return Err(KmsError::key_not_found(&request.key_id));
}
@@ -181,6 +185,8 @@ impl KmsClient for StaticKmsBackend {
nonce: nonce_bytes.to_vec(),
encryption_context: request.encryption_context.clone(),
created_at: Zoned::now(),
// The static backend has a single fixed key with no rotation.
master_key_version: None,
};
let ciphertext = serde_json::to_vec(&envelope)?;
@@ -192,7 +198,8 @@ impl KmsClient for StaticKmsBackend {
})
}
async fn decrypt(&self, request: &DecryptRequest, _context: Option<&OperationContext>) -> Result<Vec<u8>> {
/// Open a KMS envelope produced by this backend.
pub(crate) fn decrypt_envelope(&self, request: &DecryptRequest) -> Result<Vec<u8>> {
let envelope: DataKeyEnvelope = serde_json::from_slice(&request.ciphertext)
.map_err(|error| KmsError::cryptographic_error("parse", format!("Failed to parse data key envelope: {error}")))?;
if envelope.master_key_id != self.key_id {
@@ -231,14 +238,8 @@ impl KmsClient for StaticKmsBackend {
Ok(plaintext)
}
async fn create_key(&self, key_id: &str, _algorithm: &str, _context: Option<&OperationContext>) -> Result<MasterKeyInfo> {
if key_id == self.key_id {
return Err(KmsError::key_already_exists(key_id));
}
Err(KmsError::invalid_operation("Static KMS is read-only: cannot create new keys"))
}
async fn describe_key(&self, key_id: &str, _context: Option<&OperationContext>) -> Result<KeyInfo> {
/// Describe the single configured key.
pub(crate) fn configured_key_info(&self, key_id: &str) -> Result<KeyInfo> {
if key_id != self.key_id {
return Err(KmsError::key_not_found(key_id));
}
@@ -259,7 +260,8 @@ impl KmsClient for StaticKmsBackend {
})
}
async fn list_keys(&self, request: &ListKeysRequest, _context: Option<&OperationContext>) -> Result<ListKeysResponse> {
/// List the single configured key, honouring the pagination marker.
pub(crate) fn list_configured_key(&self, request: &ListKeysRequest) -> Result<ListKeysResponse> {
let key_info = KeyInfo {
key_id: self.key_id.clone(),
description: Some("Static single-key KMS backend".to_string()),
@@ -291,57 +293,6 @@ impl KmsClient for StaticKmsBackend {
truncated: false,
})
}
async fn enable_key(&self, key_id: &str, _context: Option<&OperationContext>) -> Result<()> {
if key_id != self.key_id {
return Err(KmsError::key_not_found(key_id));
}
// Static KMS key is always enabled
Ok(())
}
async fn disable_key(&self, key_id: &str, _context: Option<&OperationContext>) -> Result<()> {
if key_id != self.key_id {
return Err(KmsError::key_not_found(key_id));
}
Err(KmsError::invalid_operation("Static KMS is read-only: cannot disable keys"))
}
async fn schedule_key_deletion(
&self,
key_id: &str,
_pending_window_days: u32,
_context: Option<&OperationContext>,
) -> Result<()> {
if key_id != self.key_id {
return Err(KmsError::key_not_found(key_id));
}
Err(KmsError::invalid_operation("Static KMS is read-only: cannot schedule key deletion"))
}
async fn cancel_key_deletion(&self, key_id: &str, _context: Option<&OperationContext>) -> Result<()> {
if key_id != self.key_id {
return Err(KmsError::key_not_found(key_id));
}
Err(KmsError::invalid_operation("Static KMS is read-only: cannot cancel key deletion"))
}
async fn rotate_key(&self, key_id: &str, _context: Option<&OperationContext>) -> Result<MasterKeyInfo> {
if key_id != self.key_id {
return Err(KmsError::key_not_found(key_id));
}
Err(KmsError::invalid_operation("Static KMS is read-only: cannot rotate keys"))
}
async fn health_check(&self) -> Result<()> {
// Static KMS is always healthy if it was successfully initialized
Ok(())
}
fn backend_info(&self) -> BackendInfo {
BackendInfo::new("static".to_string(), env!("CARGO_PKG_VERSION").to_string(), "local".to_string(), true)
.with_metadata("key_id".to_string(), self.key_id.clone())
}
}
#[async_trait]
@@ -355,12 +306,12 @@ impl KmsBackend for StaticKmsBackend {
}
async fn encrypt(&self, request: EncryptRequest) -> Result<EncryptResponse> {
<Self as KmsClient>::encrypt(self, &request, None).await
self.encrypt_to_envelope(&request)
}
async fn decrypt(&self, request: DecryptRequest) -> Result<DecryptResponse> {
let key_id = self.key_id.clone();
let plaintext = <Self as KmsClient>::decrypt(self, &request, None).await?;
let plaintext = self.decrypt_envelope(&request)?;
Ok(DecryptResponse {
plaintext,
key_id,
@@ -376,7 +327,7 @@ impl KmsBackend for StaticKmsBackend {
encryption_context: request.encryption_context,
grant_tokens: Vec::new(),
};
let data_key = <Self as KmsClient>::generate_data_key(self, &gen_req, None).await?;
let data_key = self.generate_data_key_envelope(&gen_req)?;
let plaintext_key = data_key
.plaintext
@@ -391,7 +342,7 @@ impl KmsBackend for StaticKmsBackend {
}
async fn describe_key(&self, request: DescribeKeyRequest) -> Result<DescribeKeyResponse> {
let key_info = <Self as KmsClient>::describe_key(self, &request.key_id, None).await?;
let key_info = self.configured_key_info(&request.key_id)?;
let key_metadata = KeyMetadata {
key_id: key_info.key_id.clone(),
key_state: if key_info.status == KeyStatus::Active {
@@ -411,7 +362,7 @@ impl KmsBackend for StaticKmsBackend {
}
async fn list_keys(&self, request: ListKeysRequest) -> Result<ListKeysResponse> {
<Self as KmsClient>::list_keys(self, &request, None).await
self.list_configured_key(&request)
}
async fn delete_key(&self, request: DeleteKeyRequest) -> Result<DeleteKeyResponse> {
@@ -431,12 +382,18 @@ impl KmsBackend for StaticKmsBackend {
async fn health_check(&self) -> Result<bool> {
Ok(true)
}
fn capabilities(&self) -> BackendCapabilities {
// Static KMS is a read-only single-key backend: it only performs
// cryptographic operations and rejects every lifecycle mutation.
BackendCapabilities::minimal()
}
}
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
use super::*;
use crate::backends::{KmsBackend as KmsBackendTrait, KmsClient};
use crate::backends::KmsBackend as KmsBackendTrait;
use crate::config::{BackendConfig, KmsBackend, StaticConfig};
use crate::encryption::is_data_key_envelope;
use base64::Engine as _;
@@ -481,8 +438,8 @@ mod tests {
// Generate data key
let request = GenerateKeyRequest::new(key_id.clone(), "AES_256".to_string())
.with_context("bucket".to_string(), "test-bucket".to_string());
let data_key = KmsClient::generate_data_key(&backend, &request, None)
.await
let data_key = backend
.generate_data_key_envelope(&request)
.expect("Failed to generate data key");
assert_eq!(data_key.key_id, key_id);
@@ -499,9 +456,7 @@ mod tests {
// Decrypt the data key
let decrypt_request =
DecryptRequest::new(data_key.ciphertext.clone()).with_context("bucket".to_string(), "test-bucket".to_string());
let decrypted = KmsClient::decrypt(&backend, &decrypt_request, None)
.await
.expect("Failed to decrypt");
let decrypted = backend.decrypt_envelope(&decrypt_request).expect("Failed to decrypt");
assert_eq!(decrypted.as_slice(), data_key.plaintext.as_deref().expect("plaintext should exist"));
}
@@ -513,8 +468,8 @@ mod tests {
.with_context("bucket".to_string(), "source-bucket".to_string())
.with_context("object".to_string(), "source-object".to_string());
let data_key = KmsClient::generate_data_key(&backend, &request, None)
.await
let data_key = backend
.generate_data_key_envelope(&request)
.expect("generate static KMS data key");
assert!(
@@ -558,8 +513,8 @@ mod tests {
let (backend, key_id, _key) = create_test_backend().await;
let request = GenerateKeyRequest::new(key_id, "AES_256".to_string())
.with_context("bucket".to_string(), "source-bucket".to_string());
let generated = KmsClient::generate_data_key(&backend, &request, None)
.await
let generated = backend
.generate_data_key_envelope(&request)
.expect("generate context-bound data key");
let mut envelope: DataKeyEnvelope = serde_json::from_slice(&generated.ciphertext).expect("parse static KMS envelope");
envelope
@@ -568,8 +523,8 @@ mod tests {
let decrypt_request = DecryptRequest::new(serde_json::to_vec(&envelope).expect("serialize tampered envelope"))
.with_context("bucket".to_string(), "different-bucket".to_string());
let error = KmsClient::decrypt(&backend, &decrypt_request, None)
.await
let error = backend
.decrypt_envelope(&decrypt_request)
.expect_err("tampering with authenticated envelope context must fail");
assert!(matches!(error, KmsError::CryptographicError { .. }));
@@ -580,7 +535,7 @@ mod tests {
let (backend, _key_id, _key) = create_test_backend().await;
let request = GenerateKeyRequest::new("wrong-key-id".to_string(), "AES_256".to_string());
let result = KmsClient::generate_data_key(&backend, &request, None).await;
let result = backend.generate_data_key_envelope(&request);
assert!(result.is_err());
assert!(result.expect_err("should be Err").to_string().contains("wrong-key-id"));
}
@@ -592,7 +547,7 @@ mod tests {
// Ciphertext too short
let short = vec![0u8; 10];
let request = DecryptRequest::new(short);
let result = KmsClient::decrypt(&backend, &request, None).await;
let result = backend.decrypt_envelope(&request);
assert!(result.is_err());
}
@@ -602,9 +557,7 @@ mod tests {
// Generate a valid ciphertext first
let gen_request = GenerateKeyRequest::new(key_id, "AES_256".to_string());
let data_key = KmsClient::generate_data_key(&backend, &gen_request, None)
.await
.expect("generate");
let data_key = backend.generate_data_key_envelope(&gen_request).expect("generate");
// Tamper with the ciphertext (flip a bit in the encrypted portion)
let mut tampered = data_key.ciphertext.clone();
@@ -613,7 +566,7 @@ mod tests {
}
let request = DecryptRequest::new(tampered);
let result = KmsClient::decrypt(&backend, &request, None).await;
let result = backend.decrypt_envelope(&request);
assert!(result.is_err());
}
@@ -622,7 +575,14 @@ mod tests {
let (backend, key_id, _key) = create_test_backend().await;
// Creating the pre-configured key should return KeyAlreadyExists
let result = KmsClient::create_key(&backend, &key_id, "AES_256", None).await;
let result = KmsBackendTrait::create_key(
&backend,
CreateKeyRequest {
key_name: Some(key_id.clone()),
..Default::default()
},
)
.await;
assert!(result.is_err());
assert!(result.expect_err("should be Err").to_string().contains("already exists"));
}
@@ -632,7 +592,14 @@ mod tests {
let (backend, _key_id, _key) = create_test_backend().await;
// Creating any other key should return invalid operation (read-only)
let result = KmsClient::create_key(&backend, "other-key", "AES_256", None).await;
let result = KmsBackendTrait::create_key(
&backend,
CreateKeyRequest {
key_name: Some("other-key".to_string()),
..Default::default()
},
)
.await;
assert!(result.is_err());
let err_msg = result.expect_err("should be Err").to_string();
assert!(err_msg.contains("read-only") || err_msg.contains("cannot create"));
@@ -642,15 +609,13 @@ mod tests {
async fn test_describe_key() {
let (backend, key_id, _key) = create_test_backend().await;
let key_info = KmsClient::describe_key(&backend, &key_id, None)
.await
.expect("describe_key should succeed");
let key_info = backend.configured_key_info(&key_id).expect("describe_key should succeed");
assert_eq!(key_info.key_id, key_id);
assert_eq!(key_info.status, KeyStatus::Active);
assert_eq!(key_info.algorithm, "AES_256");
// Wrong key ID
let result = KmsClient::describe_key(&backend, "nonexistent", None).await;
let result = backend.configured_key_info("nonexistent");
assert!(result.is_err());
}
@@ -658,8 +623,8 @@ mod tests {
async fn test_list_keys() {
let (backend, key_id, _key) = create_test_backend().await;
let response = KmsClient::list_keys(&backend, &ListKeysRequest::default(), None)
.await
let response = backend
.list_configured_key(&ListKeysRequest::default())
.expect("list_keys should succeed");
assert_eq!(response.keys.len(), 1);
assert_eq!(response.keys[0].key_id, key_id);
@@ -667,61 +632,45 @@ mod tests {
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn test_disable_key_returns_error() {
async fn lifecycle_mutations_are_unsupported_at_the_product_surface() {
let (backend, key_id, _key) = create_test_backend().await;
let result = KmsClient::disable_key(&backend, &key_id, None).await;
assert!(result.is_err());
assert!(result.expect_err("should be Err").to_string().contains("read-only"));
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn test_enable_key_is_noop() {
let (backend, key_id, _key) = create_test_backend().await;
// Enable should succeed (no-op for static KMS)
KmsClient::enable_key(&backend, &key_id, None)
.await
.expect("enable_key should be no-op");
// Wrong key should still fail
let result = KmsClient::enable_key(&backend, "wrong", None).await;
assert!(result.is_err());
// The static backend advertises no enable/disable or rotation
// capability, so the shared KmsBackend defaults reject all three.
for result in [
KmsBackendTrait::enable_key(&backend, &key_id).await,
KmsBackendTrait::disable_key(&backend, &key_id).await,
KmsBackendTrait::rotate_key(&backend, &key_id).await,
] {
let error = result.expect_err("static lifecycle mutations must be rejected");
assert!(matches!(error, KmsError::UnsupportedCapability { .. }), "got {error:?}");
}
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn test_delete_key_returns_error() {
let (backend, key_id, _key) = create_test_backend().await;
let result = KmsClient::schedule_key_deletion(&backend, &key_id, 7, None).await;
let result = KmsBackendTrait::delete_key(
&backend,
DeleteKeyRequest {
key_id: key_id.clone(),
pending_window_in_days: Some(7),
force_immediate: None,
},
)
.await;
assert!(result.is_err());
assert!(result.expect_err("should be Err").to_string().contains("read-only"));
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn test_rotate_key_returns_error() {
let (backend, key_id, _key) = create_test_backend().await;
let result = KmsClient::rotate_key(&backend, &key_id, None).await;
assert!(result.is_err());
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn test_health_check() {
let (backend, _key_id, _key) = create_test_backend().await;
KmsClient::health_check(&backend).await.expect("health_check should succeed");
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn test_backend_info() {
let (backend, key_id, _key) = create_test_backend().await;
let info = KmsClient::backend_info(&backend);
assert_eq!(info.backend_type, "static");
assert_eq!(info.endpoint, "local");
assert!(info.healthy);
assert_eq!(info.metadata.get("key_id"), Some(&key_id));
KmsBackendTrait::health_check(&backend)
.await
.expect("health_check should succeed");
}
#[tokio::test]
@@ -730,17 +679,13 @@ mod tests {
let plaintext = b"Hello, static KMS world!";
let enc_request = EncryptRequest::new(key_id.clone(), plaintext.to_vec());
let enc_response = KmsClient::encrypt(&backend, &enc_request, None)
.await
.expect("encrypt should succeed");
let enc_response = backend.encrypt_to_envelope(&enc_request).expect("encrypt should succeed");
assert_eq!(enc_response.key_id, key_id);
assert!(!enc_response.ciphertext.is_empty());
let dec_request = DecryptRequest::new(enc_response.ciphertext);
let decrypted = KmsClient::decrypt(&backend, &dec_request, None)
.await
.expect("decrypt should succeed");
let decrypted = backend.decrypt_envelope(&dec_request).expect("decrypt should succeed");
assert_eq!(decrypted, plaintext);
}
File diff suppressed because it is too large Load Diff
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+233
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,233 @@
// Copyright 2024 RustFS Team
//
// Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
// you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
// You may obtain a copy of the License at
//
// http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
//
// Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
// distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
// WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
// See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
// limitations under the License.
//! Backup responsibility matrix: what a RustFS backup bundle owns per backend.
//!
//! The matrix is two-dimensional on purpose: responsibility is a function of
//! the backend *and* its at-rest protection state, not of the backend alone.
//! This keeps the schema stable when a backend changes protection direction —
//! switching Vault KV2 between storage-only and Transit-wrapped operation
//! selects a different existing row instead of changing the contract.
//!
//! These enums are backup-domain contract types. Once the backlog#1571
//! capability-discovery contract lands, the discovery surface is expected to
//! converge on (or map onto) the states defined here.
use serde::{Deserialize, Serialize};
/// Backend discriminant recorded in a backup manifest.
///
/// Wire names are aligned with [`crate::config::BackendConfig`] and
/// [`crate::config::KmsBackend`] (including the legacy `Vault` alias) so that
/// a manifest and a persisted KMS configuration never disagree about how the
/// same backend is spelled.
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq, Serialize, Deserialize)]
pub enum BackupBackendKind {
/// Local file-based backend.
Local,
/// Vault KV v2 storage backend.
#[serde(rename = "VaultKV2", alias = "Vault")]
VaultKv2,
/// Vault Transit backend.
VaultTransit,
/// Static single-key backend.
Static,
}
/// At-rest protection state of master key material, as observed at snapshot
/// time.
///
/// The first three states mirror the Local backend's on-disk protection
/// marker (`StoredKeyProtection` in `backends/local.rs`, kebab-case wire
/// names). The remaining states describe the non-local backends.
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq, Serialize, Deserialize)]
#[serde(rename_all = "kebab-case")]
pub enum AtRestProtection {
/// Local key files AEAD-encrypted under the Argon2id-derived master key.
EncryptedMasterKey,
/// Local development-only plaintext key files. Such files must never
/// enter a bundle as-is; bundle artifacts are always re-wrapped under the
/// backup KEK.
PlaintextDevOnly,
/// Pre-beta.9 local key files without a protection marker; the effective
/// mode is resolved at read time. Treated like [`Self::PlaintextDevOnly`]
/// for bundling purposes: re-wrap is mandatory.
LegacyUnspecified,
/// Vault KV2 as currently shipped: material confidentiality relies on
/// Vault ACLs, KV2 at-rest encryption, and TLS only (the backend reports
/// `at_rest_protection = "vault-kv2-acl"`); RustFS applies no
/// cryptographic wrapping of its own.
StorageOnly,
/// Vault KV2 with material wrapped by Vault Transit before storage. Not
/// produced by any current backend; the row exists so a future direction
/// change selects a state instead of changing the schema.
TransitWrapped,
/// Vault Transit: the cryptographic root lives in Vault and is not
/// exportable. RustFS can only ever own metadata and references.
ExternalNonExportable,
/// Static backend: the secret is delivered externally at startup and
/// RustFS persists no key material at all.
ExternalSecretDelivery,
}
/// What a RustFS backup bundle is responsible for, per (backend, protection)
/// combination.
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq, Serialize, Deserialize)]
#[serde(rename_all = "kebab-case")]
pub enum BackupResponsibility {
/// The bundle carries the complete recoverable state: encrypted key
/// material for every version, salt, metadata, and configuration.
///
/// Restore precondition for the Local backend: the operator re-supplies
/// the master key out of band. The master key itself is outside the
/// backup domain; the manifest stores at most an opaque verifier.
FullMaterial,
/// The bundle carries only non-sensitive references and verification
/// information. The source of truth is external secret delivery and the
/// operator re-provides the secret during restore. Embedding the secret
/// itself in a bundle is forbidden.
ReferenceOnly,
/// The bundle carries RustFS-side metadata, configuration references and
/// verification data, while the cryptographic root is protected by the
/// external system's native snapshot/disaster-recovery flow (Vault/HSM).
/// Restore must re-establish the external trust root first.
MetadataPlusExternalRoot,
}
impl BackupResponsibility {
/// Resolve the responsibility matrix for one (backend, protection) cell.
///
/// Returns `None` for combinations that no supported deployment can
/// produce; manifests declaring such a combination are rejected as
/// corrupted. This function is total and the unit tests anchor every
/// cell, so any change to the matrix is a deliberate contract change.
pub fn for_backend(backend: BackupBackendKind, protection: AtRestProtection) -> Option<Self> {
use AtRestProtection::*;
use BackupBackendKind::*;
match (backend, protection) {
(Local, EncryptedMasterKey | PlaintextDevOnly | LegacyUnspecified) => Some(Self::FullMaterial),
(Local, _) => None,
// Storage-only KV2 offers no external cryptographic root, so the
// bundle must own the material (re-wrapped under the backup KEK).
(VaultKv2, StorageOnly) => Some(Self::FullMaterial),
(VaultKv2, TransitWrapped) => Some(Self::MetadataPlusExternalRoot),
(VaultKv2, _) => None,
(VaultTransit, ExternalNonExportable) => Some(Self::MetadataPlusExternalRoot),
(VaultTransit, _) => None,
(Static, ExternalSecretDelivery) => Some(Self::ReferenceOnly),
(Static, _) => None,
}
}
}
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
use super::*;
use crate::config::KmsBackend;
fn json<T: Serialize>(value: &T) -> String {
serde_json::to_string(value).expect("serialization should succeed")
}
#[test]
fn backend_kind_wire_names_match_kms_backend() {
let pairs = [
(BackupBackendKind::Local, KmsBackend::Local),
(BackupBackendKind::VaultKv2, KmsBackend::VaultKv2),
(BackupBackendKind::VaultTransit, KmsBackend::VaultTransit),
(BackupBackendKind::Static, KmsBackend::Static),
];
for (backup_kind, config_kind) in pairs {
assert_eq!(json(&backup_kind), json(&config_kind), "wire name drifted for {backup_kind:?}");
}
}
#[test]
fn backend_kind_accepts_legacy_vault_alias() {
let decoded: BackupBackendKind = serde_json::from_str("\"Vault\"").expect("legacy alias should decode");
assert_eq!(decoded, BackupBackendKind::VaultKv2);
}
#[test]
fn responsibility_matrix_is_anchored_cell_by_cell() {
use AtRestProtection::*;
use BackupBackendKind::*;
use BackupResponsibility::*;
// Every (backend, protection) cell, exhaustively. Changing any row is
// a contract change and must be made here consciously.
let matrix = [
(Local, EncryptedMasterKey, Some(FullMaterial)),
(Local, PlaintextDevOnly, Some(FullMaterial)),
(Local, LegacyUnspecified, Some(FullMaterial)),
(Local, StorageOnly, None),
(Local, TransitWrapped, None),
(Local, ExternalNonExportable, None),
(Local, ExternalSecretDelivery, None),
(VaultKv2, EncryptedMasterKey, None),
(VaultKv2, PlaintextDevOnly, None),
(VaultKv2, LegacyUnspecified, None),
(VaultKv2, StorageOnly, Some(FullMaterial)),
(VaultKv2, TransitWrapped, Some(MetadataPlusExternalRoot)),
(VaultKv2, ExternalNonExportable, None),
(VaultKv2, ExternalSecretDelivery, None),
(VaultTransit, EncryptedMasterKey, None),
(VaultTransit, PlaintextDevOnly, None),
(VaultTransit, LegacyUnspecified, None),
(VaultTransit, StorageOnly, None),
(VaultTransit, TransitWrapped, None),
(VaultTransit, ExternalNonExportable, Some(MetadataPlusExternalRoot)),
(VaultTransit, ExternalSecretDelivery, None),
(Static, EncryptedMasterKey, None),
(Static, PlaintextDevOnly, None),
(Static, LegacyUnspecified, None),
(Static, StorageOnly, None),
(Static, TransitWrapped, None),
(Static, ExternalNonExportable, None),
(Static, ExternalSecretDelivery, Some(ReferenceOnly)),
];
assert_eq!(matrix.len(), 28, "matrix must stay exhaustive: 4 backends x 7 protection states");
for (backend, protection, expected) in matrix {
assert_eq!(
BackupResponsibility::for_backend(backend, protection),
expected,
"matrix cell drifted for ({backend:?}, {protection:?})"
);
}
}
#[test]
fn local_protection_wire_names_match_stored_key_protection() {
use crate::backends::local::StoredKeyProtection;
// The manifest must record exactly the marker values the Local
// backend writes to disk, or a restore could misread protection.
let pairs = [
(AtRestProtection::EncryptedMasterKey, StoredKeyProtection::EncryptedMasterKey),
(AtRestProtection::PlaintextDevOnly, StoredKeyProtection::PlaintextDevOnly),
(AtRestProtection::LegacyUnspecified, StoredKeyProtection::LegacyUnspecified),
];
for (backup_state, stored_state) in pairs {
assert_eq!(json(&backup_state), json(&stored_state), "wire name drifted for {backup_state:?}");
}
}
#[test]
fn responsibility_wire_names_are_frozen() {
assert_eq!(json(&BackupResponsibility::FullMaterial), "\"full-material\"");
assert_eq!(json(&BackupResponsibility::ReferenceOnly), "\"reference-only\"");
assert_eq!(json(&BackupResponsibility::MetadataPlusExternalRoot), "\"metadata-plus-external-root\"");
}
}
+280
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,280 @@
// Copyright 2024 RustFS Team
//
// Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
// you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
// You may obtain a copy of the License at
//
// http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
//
// Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
// distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
// WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
// See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
// limitations under the License.
//! Restore dry-run report contract.
//!
//! A restore dry-run is a zero-write preflight: it evaluates a bundle against
//! a target and reports every blocker, conflict, and external dependency
//! mismatch without modifying the target in any way. The report itself is
//! plain data — producing, serializing, or discarding it has no side effects,
//! and an implementation that writes anything during a dry-run violates this
//! contract. All values in a report are identifiers and references; secrets,
//! tokens, and key material never appear in it.
use crate::backup::error::BackupError;
use serde::{Deserialize, Serialize};
/// Machine-readable category of a restore blocker.
///
/// The first six codes mirror the [`BackupError`] variants; the remaining
/// codes cover preflight conditions that are not bundle defects.
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq, Serialize, Deserialize)]
#[serde(rename_all = "kebab-case")]
pub enum RestoreBlockerCode {
/// The bundle failed structural or integrity validation.
BundleCorrupted,
/// The manifest input ended prematurely.
BundleTruncated,
/// The manifest format version is unknown to this build.
UnknownFormatVersion,
/// The supplied backup KEK does not match the bundle's KEK.
WrongBackupKek,
/// A required artifact is absent from the bundle.
MissingArtifact,
/// The bundle has no completeness marker or is marked in-progress.
IncompleteBundle,
/// The target backend cannot satisfy the bundle's responsibility model.
UnsupportedBackend,
/// The bundle was produced by a different deployment than the target and
/// no explicit cross-deployment authorization applies.
DeploymentMismatch,
/// An external dependency (Vault cluster, mount, Transit key, ...) that
/// the bundle references is unreachable or missing.
ExternalDependencyUnavailable,
}
/// One condition that forbids the restore outright.
#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Serialize, Deserialize)]
#[serde(deny_unknown_fields)]
pub struct RestoreBlocker {
/// Machine-readable category.
pub code: RestoreBlockerCode,
/// Human-readable detail. Identifiers only; never secrets or material.
pub detail: String,
}
impl From<&BackupError> for RestoreBlocker {
fn from(error: &BackupError) -> Self {
let code = match error {
BackupError::Corrupted { .. } => RestoreBlockerCode::BundleCorrupted,
BackupError::Truncated { .. } => RestoreBlockerCode::BundleTruncated,
BackupError::UnknownVersion { .. } => RestoreBlockerCode::UnknownFormatVersion,
BackupError::WrongKek { .. } => RestoreBlockerCode::WrongBackupKek,
BackupError::MissingArtifact { .. } => RestoreBlockerCode::MissingArtifact,
BackupError::IncompleteBundle { .. } => RestoreBlockerCode::IncompleteBundle,
};
Self {
code,
detail: error.to_string(),
}
}
}
/// Kind of a conflict between bundle state and existing target state.
///
/// Restore is non-destructive by default: every conflict blocks the restore
/// unless an explicit, audited conflict policy resolves it. Silent overwrite
/// or merge is never an option.
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq, Serialize, Deserialize)]
#[serde(rename_all = "kebab-case")]
pub enum RestoreConflictKind {
/// The target already has a key with this stable id.
KeyAlreadyExists,
/// Restoring would lower a key version the target has already observed.
VersionRegression,
/// Restoring would lower the snapshot generation the target has already
/// observed.
GenerationRegression,
/// Restoring would revive a key the target has deleted or scheduled for
/// deletion.
StateRegression,
}
/// One conflict with existing target state.
#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Serialize, Deserialize)]
#[serde(deny_unknown_fields)]
pub struct RestoreConflict {
/// Stable key id the conflict concerns.
pub key_id: String,
/// Machine-readable category.
pub kind: RestoreConflictKind,
/// Human-readable detail. Identifiers only; never secrets or material.
pub detail: String,
}
/// A mismatch between an external dependency reference recorded in the bundle
/// and what the target environment observes.
#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Serialize, Deserialize)]
#[serde(deny_unknown_fields)]
pub struct ExternalDependencyMismatch {
/// Which dependency is affected (for example a Vault mount or Transit
/// key name). References only; never credentials.
pub dependency: String,
/// The value the bundle recorded.
pub expected: String,
/// The value the target environment reports.
pub observed: String,
}
/// Result of a restore dry-run preflight.
///
/// # Zero-write contract
///
/// A dry-run must not write to the target: no staging directories, no
/// repaired records, no metadata fixes triggered along the read path. The
/// report is pure data over values already known to the caller.
///
/// ```
/// use rustfs_kms::backup::{RestoreBlocker, RestoreBlockerCode, RestoreDryRunReport};
///
/// let clean = RestoreDryRunReport {
/// backup_id: "backup-0001".to_string(),
/// target_deployment_identity: "deployment-a".to_string(),
/// blockers: Vec::new(),
/// conflicts: Vec::new(),
/// external_mismatches: Vec::new(),
/// };
/// assert!(clean.restore_permitted());
///
/// let blocked = RestoreDryRunReport {
/// blockers: vec![RestoreBlocker {
/// code: RestoreBlockerCode::IncompleteBundle,
/// detail: "manifest has no completeness marker".to_string(),
/// }],
/// ..clean
/// };
/// assert!(!blocked.restore_permitted());
/// ```
#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Serialize, Deserialize)]
#[serde(deny_unknown_fields)]
pub struct RestoreDryRunReport {
/// Identifier of the evaluated bundle.
pub backup_id: String,
/// Identity of the restore target the bundle was evaluated against.
pub target_deployment_identity: String,
/// Conditions that forbid the restore outright.
pub blockers: Vec<RestoreBlocker>,
/// Conflicts with existing target state.
pub conflicts: Vec<RestoreConflict>,
/// External dependency mismatches.
pub external_mismatches: Vec<ExternalDependencyMismatch>,
}
impl RestoreDryRunReport {
/// Whether the restore may proceed: true only when the preflight found
/// no blockers, no conflicts, and no external dependency mismatches.
pub fn restore_permitted(&self) -> bool {
self.blockers.is_empty() && self.conflicts.is_empty() && self.external_mismatches.is_empty()
}
}
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
use super::*;
fn sample_report() -> RestoreDryRunReport {
RestoreDryRunReport {
backup_id: "backup-0001".to_string(),
target_deployment_identity: "deployment-b".to_string(),
blockers: vec![RestoreBlocker {
code: RestoreBlockerCode::DeploymentMismatch,
detail: "bundle was produced by deployment-a".to_string(),
}],
conflicts: vec![RestoreConflict {
key_id: "object-key".to_string(),
kind: RestoreConflictKind::VersionRegression,
detail: "target observed version 5, bundle carries version 3".to_string(),
}],
external_mismatches: vec![ExternalDependencyMismatch {
dependency: "vault transit key rustfs-master".to_string(),
expected: "min_version=2".to_string(),
observed: "min_version=4".to_string(),
}],
}
}
#[test]
fn report_round_trips_through_json() {
let report = sample_report();
let json = serde_json::to_string(&report).expect("serialization should succeed");
let decoded: RestoreDryRunReport = serde_json::from_str(&json).expect("deserialization should succeed");
assert_eq!(decoded, report);
}
#[test]
fn restore_permitted_requires_every_section_empty() {
assert!(!sample_report().restore_permitted());
let clean = RestoreDryRunReport {
blockers: Vec::new(),
conflicts: Vec::new(),
external_mismatches: Vec::new(),
..sample_report()
};
assert!(clean.restore_permitted());
for section in 0..3 {
let mut report = clean.clone();
match section {
0 => report.blockers = sample_report().blockers,
1 => report.conflicts = sample_report().conflicts,
_ => report.external_mismatches = sample_report().external_mismatches,
}
assert!(!report.restore_permitted(), "section {section} alone must block the restore");
}
}
#[test]
fn every_backup_error_maps_to_a_blocker_code() {
let cases = [
(BackupError::corrupted("x"), RestoreBlockerCode::BundleCorrupted),
(BackupError::truncated("x"), RestoreBlockerCode::BundleTruncated),
(
BackupError::UnknownVersion { found: 2, supported: 1 },
RestoreBlockerCode::UnknownFormatVersion,
),
(
BackupError::WrongKek {
required_kek_id: "a".to_string(),
required_kek_version: 1,
supplied_kek_id: "b".to_string(),
supplied_kek_version: 1,
},
RestoreBlockerCode::WrongBackupKek,
),
(BackupError::missing_artifact("key-material"), RestoreBlockerCode::MissingArtifact),
(BackupError::incomplete_bundle("x"), RestoreBlockerCode::IncompleteBundle),
];
for (error, expected_code) in cases {
let blocker = RestoreBlocker::from(&error);
assert_eq!(blocker.code, expected_code, "wrong code for {error:?}");
assert_eq!(blocker.detail, error.to_string());
}
}
/// The zero-write contract in practice: a report is plain serializable
/// data with no handles, no I/O, and no drop side effects.
#[test]
fn report_types_are_plain_data() {
fn assert_plain_data<T>()
where
T: serde::Serialize + serde::de::DeserializeOwned + Clone + PartialEq + std::fmt::Debug + Send + Sync + 'static,
{
}
assert_plain_data::<RestoreDryRunReport>();
assert_plain_data::<RestoreBlocker>();
assert_plain_data::<RestoreConflict>();
assert_plain_data::<ExternalDependencyMismatch>();
}
}
+133
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@@ -0,0 +1,133 @@
// Copyright 2024 RustFS Team
//
// Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
// you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
// You may obtain a copy of the License at
//
// http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
//
// Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
// distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
// WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
// See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
// limitations under the License.
//! Typed failures for the backup/restore bundle contract.
use thiserror::Error;
/// Typed failures raised while decoding or validating a backup bundle.
///
/// Every variant is a fail-closed condition: a restore surface observing any
/// of them must abort before touching target state. Messages carry only
/// identifiers (backup ids, KEK ids, artifact kinds and paths) — never key
/// material, bundle plaintext, or credentials.
#[derive(Error, Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub enum BackupError {
/// Manifest or bundle content fails structural, schema, or integrity
/// validation (unknown fields, duplicate fields, digest mismatch,
/// contradictory responsibility declarations, ...).
#[error("backup bundle corrupted: {reason}")]
Corrupted { reason: String },
/// Input ended before a complete manifest could be decoded.
#[error("backup manifest truncated: {reason}")]
Truncated { reason: String },
/// Manifest declares a format version this build does not understand.
/// Unknown versions are always rejected; there is no best-effort read.
#[error("unknown backup manifest format version {found} (this build supports version {supported})")]
UnknownVersion { found: u32, supported: u32 },
/// Bundle is protected by a different backup KEK than the one supplied.
#[error(
"backup bundle requires KEK '{required_kek_id}' version {required_kek_version}; \
supplied KEK '{supplied_kek_id}' version {supplied_kek_version} cannot open it"
)]
WrongKek {
required_kek_id: String,
required_kek_version: u32,
supplied_kek_id: String,
supplied_kek_version: u32,
},
/// Manifest requires an artifact that is not present in the bundle.
#[error("backup bundle is missing a required artifact: {artifact}")]
MissingArtifact { artifact: String },
/// Bundle has no completeness marker or records an in-progress state.
/// A bundle that never reached its completeness marker must never be
/// restored, regardless of how much of it is readable.
#[error("backup bundle is incomplete ({reason}); incomplete bundles must never be restored")]
IncompleteBundle { reason: String },
}
impl BackupError {
/// Create a corrupted-bundle error.
pub fn corrupted<S: Into<String>>(reason: S) -> Self {
Self::Corrupted { reason: reason.into() }
}
/// Create a truncated-manifest error.
pub fn truncated<S: Into<String>>(reason: S) -> Self {
Self::Truncated { reason: reason.into() }
}
/// Create an incomplete-bundle error.
pub fn incomplete_bundle<S: Into<String>>(reason: S) -> Self {
Self::IncompleteBundle { reason: reason.into() }
}
/// Create a missing-artifact error.
pub fn missing_artifact<S: Into<String>>(artifact: S) -> Self {
Self::MissingArtifact {
artifact: artifact.into(),
}
}
}
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
use super::*;
use crate::error::KmsError;
#[test]
fn backup_errors_convert_into_kms_error_transparently() {
let error = BackupError::corrupted("manifest digest mismatch");
let kms_error: KmsError = error.clone().into();
assert_eq!(kms_error.to_string(), error.to_string());
assert!(matches!(kms_error, KmsError::Backup(inner) if inner == error));
}
#[test]
fn error_messages_carry_identifiers_only() {
// The display strings must stay descriptive without ever embedding
// material or bundle plaintext; each variant only interpolates the
// identifiers below.
let wrong_kek = BackupError::WrongKek {
required_kek_id: "backup-kek-1".to_string(),
required_kek_version: 3,
supplied_kek_id: "backup-kek-2".to_string(),
supplied_kek_version: 1,
};
assert_eq!(
wrong_kek.to_string(),
"backup bundle requires KEK 'backup-kek-1' version 3; supplied KEK 'backup-kek-2' version 1 cannot open it"
);
let unknown = BackupError::UnknownVersion { found: 9, supported: 1 };
assert_eq!(
unknown.to_string(),
"unknown backup manifest format version 9 (this build supports version 1)"
);
assert_eq!(
BackupError::missing_artifact("key-material").to_string(),
"backup bundle is missing a required artifact: key-material"
);
assert_eq!(
BackupError::incomplete_bundle("manifest has no completeness marker").to_string(),
"backup bundle is incomplete (manifest has no completeness marker); incomplete bundles must never be restored"
);
}
}
File diff suppressed because it is too large Load Diff
+63
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,63 @@
// Copyright 2024 RustFS Team
//
// Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
// you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
// You may obtain a copy of the License at
//
// http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
//
// Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
// distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
// WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
// See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
// limitations under the License.
//! Backup/restore contract types for KMS state.
//!
//! This module is contract-only: it defines the versioned backup manifest,
//! the per-backend responsibility matrix, typed failure modes, and the
//! restore dry-run report. Nothing here is wired into handlers or backends;
//! backup export, restore orchestration, and the admin API build on these
//! types in follow-up changes.
//!
//! # Bundle model
//!
//! A backup bundle is a set of AEAD-encrypted artifacts described by a single
//! [`BackupManifest`]. All state in a bundle belongs to one snapshot
//! generation — there is no partially consistent bundle. The bundle is
//! protected by a backup KEK that is deliberately outside the business KMS
//! trust hierarchy, and the manifest is sealed with a completeness marker and
//! a final digest; a bundle that never reached its marker is permanently
//! non-restorable.
//!
//! # Restore ordering
//!
//! Restore implementations must follow this order: re-establish the external
//! trust root first (Vault/HSM native restore where one exists), then
//! material and version records into staging, then metadata and
//! configuration, then verification, and only then an explicit atomic
//! cutover. A dry-run ([`RestoreDryRunReport`]) performs zero writes.
//!
//! # Deliberately unfrozen
//!
//! Fields whose shape depends on contracts still in flight are reserved
//! rather than guessed (see [`ReservedSlot`]): the per-key version inventory
//! (backlog#1565) and capability discovery (backlog#1571). Alias and policy
//! artifacts are reserved names for features that do not exist yet. Reserved
//! slots reject data in format version 1 and become real types in a later
//! format version.
mod capability;
mod dry_run;
mod error;
mod manifest;
pub use capability::{AtRestProtection, BackupBackendKind, BackupResponsibility};
pub use dry_run::{
ExternalDependencyMismatch, RestoreBlocker, RestoreBlockerCode, RestoreConflict, RestoreConflictKind, RestoreDryRunReport,
};
pub use error::BackupError;
pub use manifest::{
AeadAlgorithm, ArtifactDescriptor, ArtifactKind, BackupKekDescriptor, BackupManifest, CompletenessState, ContentDigest,
DigestAlgorithm, LocalKdfDescriptor, LocalKeyDerivation, ReservedSlot,
};
+577 -20
View File
@@ -29,8 +29,23 @@ pub const ENV_KMS_VAULT_TRANSIT_METADATA_KV_MOUNT: &str = "RUSTFS_KMS_VAULT_TRAN
pub const ENV_KMS_VAULT_TRANSIT_METADATA_PREFIX: &str = "RUSTFS_KMS_VAULT_TRANSIT_METADATA_PREFIX";
pub const ENV_KMS_STATIC_SECRET_KEY: &str = "RUSTFS_KMS_STATIC_SECRET_KEY";
pub const ENV_KMS_STATIC_SECRET_KEY_FILE: &str = "RUSTFS_KMS_STATIC_SECRET_KEY_FILE";
pub const ENV_KMS_VAULT_APPROLE_ROLE_ID: &str = "RUSTFS_KMS_VAULT_APPROLE_ROLE_ID";
pub const ENV_KMS_VAULT_APPROLE_SECRET_ID: &str = "RUSTFS_KMS_VAULT_APPROLE_SECRET_ID";
pub const ENV_KMS_VAULT_APPROLE_SECRET_ID_FILE: &str = "RUSTFS_KMS_VAULT_APPROLE_SECRET_ID_FILE";
pub const ENV_KMS_VAULT_APPROLE_MOUNT: &str = "RUSTFS_KMS_VAULT_APPROLE_MOUNT";
pub const ENV_KMS_VAULT_TOKEN_FILE: &str = "RUSTFS_KMS_VAULT_TOKEN_FILE";
pub const DEFAULT_VAULT_TRANSIT_METADATA_KV_MOUNT: &str = "secret";
pub const DEFAULT_VAULT_TRANSIT_METADATA_KEY_PREFIX: &str = "rustfs/kms/transit-metadata";
pub const DEFAULT_VAULT_APPROLE_MOUNT: &str = "approle";
/// Upper bound applied to `KmsConfig::timeout` when deriving backend behavior.
///
/// Out-of-range values are clamped at use rather than rejected so existing
/// deployments with oversized settings keep starting after an upgrade.
pub(crate) const MAX_OPERATION_TIMEOUT: Duration = Duration::from_secs(300);
/// Upper bound applied to `KmsConfig::retry_attempts` when deriving backend behavior.
pub(crate) const MAX_RETRY_ATTEMPTS: u32 = 10;
fn default_vault_transit_metadata_kv_mount() -> String {
DEFAULT_VAULT_TRANSIT_METADATA_KV_MOUNT.to_string()
@@ -40,6 +55,14 @@ fn default_vault_transit_metadata_key_prefix() -> String {
DEFAULT_VAULT_TRANSIT_METADATA_KEY_PREFIX.to_string()
}
fn default_vault_kv2_mount_path() -> String {
"transit".to_string()
}
fn default_vault_approle_mount() -> String {
DEFAULT_VAULT_APPROLE_MOUNT.to_string()
}
pub const KMS_CONFIG_REDACTION_RULES: &[RedactionRule] = &[
RedactionRule::new("kms.local.master_key", RedactionLevel::Secret, "local backend key encryption material"),
RedactionRule::new("kms.vault.token", RedactionLevel::Secret, "vault authentication token"),
@@ -91,7 +114,9 @@ pub(crate) fn redacted_secret_option(value: Option<&str>) -> Option<&'static str
/// KMS backend types
#[derive(Debug, Default, Clone, Serialize, Deserialize, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub enum KmsBackend {
/// Vault KV v2 + Transit backend (key metadata in KV, wrapping via Transit)
/// Vault KV v2 storage backend: master key material is stored directly in KV v2.
/// Confidentiality relies on Vault ACLs, KV v2 at-rest encryption, and TLS; the
/// backend performs no Transit wrapping of key material.
#[serde(rename = "VaultKV2", alias = "Vault")]
VaultKv2,
/// Vault Transit backend using Vault as the cryptographic source of truth
@@ -117,9 +142,15 @@ pub struct KmsConfig {
/// Allow development-only insecure defaults such as plaintext local keys or HTTP Vault.
#[serde(default)]
pub allow_insecure_dev_defaults: bool,
/// Operation timeout
/// Timeout for a single backend attempt.
///
/// This bounds one outbound request, not the whole operation: the operation
/// policy owns the total deadline across retries. Values above 300 seconds
/// are clamped at use (see `KmsConfig::effective_timeout`).
pub timeout: Duration,
/// Number of retry attempts
/// Number of retry attempts.
///
/// Values above 10 are clamped at use (see `KmsConfig::effective_retry_attempts`).
pub retry_attempts: u32,
/// Enable caching
pub enable_cache: bool,
@@ -147,7 +178,7 @@ impl Default for KmsConfig {
pub enum BackendConfig {
/// Local backend configuration
Local(LocalConfig),
/// Vault KV v2 + Transit backend configuration
/// Vault KV v2 storage backend configuration
#[serde(rename = "VaultKV2", alias = "Vault")]
VaultKv2(Box<VaultConfig>),
/// Vault Transit backend configuration
@@ -255,7 +286,11 @@ impl StaticConfig {
}
}
/// Vault KV v2 + Transit backend configuration (metadata in KV, key wrapping via Transit)
/// Vault KV v2 backend configuration.
///
/// Key material and metadata are stored directly in KV v2; any identity with KV read
/// access to the key path can recover plaintext master key material. Use the Vault
/// Transit backend when cryptographic isolation of key material is required.
#[derive(Clone, Serialize, Deserialize)]
pub struct VaultConfig {
/// Vault server URL
@@ -264,7 +299,10 @@ pub struct VaultConfig {
pub auth_method: VaultAuthMethod,
/// Vault namespace (Vault Enterprise)
pub namespace: Option<String>,
/// Transit engine mount path
/// Deprecated: legacy Transit engine mount path. The Vault KV2 backend never calls
/// the Transit engine, so this value is unused; the field is retained (and
/// defaulted) only so previously persisted configurations keep deserializing.
#[serde(default = "default_vault_kv2_mount_path")]
pub mount_path: String,
/// KV engine mount path for storing keys
pub kv_mount: String,
@@ -360,18 +398,94 @@ impl Default for VaultTransitConfig {
pub enum VaultAuthMethod {
/// Token authentication
Token { token: String },
/// AppRole authentication
AppRole { role_id: String, secret_id: String },
/// AppRole authentication: login with `role_id` + `secret_id` for a
/// lease-bound token that is renewed in the background.
AppRole {
role_id: String,
/// Inline secret_id; used only when `secret_id_file` is unset.
secret_id: String,
/// Path to a file holding the secret_id. Re-read on every login so an
/// externally rotated secret_id is picked up; takes precedence over the
/// inline value.
#[serde(default)]
secret_id_file: Option<PathBuf>,
/// AppRole auth engine mount path.
#[serde(default = "default_vault_approle_mount")]
mount: String,
/// Fail-closed margin in seconds: once the current token is within this
/// window of expiry without a successful refresh, requests are refused
/// instead of sent with a token that may lapse mid-flight. Defaults to
/// the per-attempt timeout.
#[serde(default)]
refresh_safety_window_secs: Option<u64>,
},
/// Agent-managed token file (for example a Vault Agent auto-auth sink):
/// the token is read from `path` and re-read periodically so a token
/// rotated by the agent is picked up without a restart.
TokenFile {
path: PathBuf,
/// Seconds between token file re-reads. Each successful read also
/// extends the token's observed validity to twice this value, so a
/// file that stops being readable eventually trips the fail-closed
/// window. Defaults to 30 seconds.
#[serde(default)]
poll_interval_secs: Option<u64>,
/// Fail-closed margin in seconds, as on `AppRole`. Defaults to the
/// per-attempt timeout.
#[serde(default)]
refresh_safety_window_secs: Option<u64>,
},
}
impl VaultAuthMethod {
/// AppRole authentication with the default mount and no secret-id file.
pub fn approle(role_id: String, secret_id: String) -> Self {
Self::AppRole {
role_id,
secret_id,
secret_id_file: None,
mount: default_vault_approle_mount(),
refresh_safety_window_secs: None,
}
}
/// Agent-managed token file with the default poll interval.
pub fn token_file(path: PathBuf) -> Self {
Self::TokenFile {
path,
poll_interval_secs: None,
refresh_safety_window_secs: None,
}
}
}
impl fmt::Debug for VaultAuthMethod {
fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter<'_>) -> fmt::Result {
match self {
Self::Token { token } => f.debug_struct("Token").field("token", &redacted_secret(token)).finish(),
Self::AppRole { role_id, secret_id } => f
Self::AppRole {
role_id,
secret_id,
secret_id_file,
mount,
refresh_safety_window_secs,
} => f
.debug_struct("AppRole")
.field("role_id", role_id)
.field("secret_id", &redacted_secret(secret_id))
.field("secret_id_file", secret_id_file)
.field("mount", mount)
.field("refresh_safety_window_secs", refresh_safety_window_secs)
.finish(),
Self::TokenFile {
path,
poll_interval_secs,
refresh_safety_window_secs,
} => f
.debug_struct("TokenFile")
.field("path", path)
.field("poll_interval_secs", poll_interval_secs)
.field("refresh_safety_window_secs", refresh_safety_window_secs)
.finish(),
}
}
@@ -424,7 +538,12 @@ impl KmsConfig {
}
}
/// Create a new KMS configuration for Vault backend with token authentication (recommended for production)
/// Create a new KMS configuration for the Vault KV v2 backend with token authentication.
///
/// Master key material is stored directly in Vault KV v2: confidentiality relies on
/// Vault ACLs, KV v2 at-rest encryption, and TLS. KV read access to the key path is
/// equivalent to holding the plaintext master keys. Use [`KmsConfig::vault_transit`]
/// when key material must never be readable through Vault storage APIs.
pub fn vault(address: Url, token: String) -> Self {
Self {
backend: KmsBackend::VaultKv2,
@@ -437,13 +556,16 @@ impl KmsConfig {
}
}
/// Create a new KMS configuration for Vault backend with AppRole authentication (recommended for production)
/// Create a new KMS configuration for the Vault KV v2 backend with AppRole authentication.
///
/// Shares the security boundary described on [`KmsConfig::vault`]: key material lives
/// in KV v2 and is protected only by Vault ACLs and KV v2 at-rest encryption.
pub fn vault_approle(address: Url, role_id: String, secret_id: String) -> Self {
Self {
backend: KmsBackend::VaultKv2,
backend_config: BackendConfig::VaultKv2(Box::new(VaultConfig {
address: address.to_string(),
auth_method: VaultAuthMethod::AppRole { role_id, secret_id },
auth_method: VaultAuthMethod::approle(role_id, secret_id),
..Default::default()
})),
..Default::default()
@@ -536,6 +658,16 @@ impl KmsConfig {
self
}
/// Per-attempt timeout with the configured value clamped to the supported maximum.
pub(crate) fn effective_timeout(&self) -> Duration {
self.timeout.min(MAX_OPERATION_TIMEOUT)
}
/// Retry attempts with the configured value clamped to the supported maximum.
pub(crate) fn effective_retry_attempts(&self) -> u32 {
self.retry_attempts.min(MAX_RETRY_ATTEMPTS)
}
/// Validate the configuration
pub fn validate(&self) -> Result<()> {
// Validate timeout
@@ -548,6 +680,23 @@ impl KmsConfig {
return Err(KmsError::configuration_error("Retry attempts must be greater than 0"));
}
// Oversized values are clamped at use (not rejected) so pre-existing
// configurations cannot keep the service from starting after upgrade.
if self.timeout > MAX_OPERATION_TIMEOUT {
tracing::warn!(
configured_secs = self.timeout.as_secs(),
max_secs = MAX_OPERATION_TIMEOUT.as_secs(),
"KMS timeout exceeds the supported maximum; backend operations clamp it to the maximum"
);
}
if self.retry_attempts > MAX_RETRY_ATTEMPTS {
tracing::warn!(
configured = self.retry_attempts,
max = MAX_RETRY_ATTEMPTS,
"KMS retry_attempts exceeds the supported maximum; backend operations clamp it to the maximum"
);
}
// Validate backend-specific configuration
match &self.backend_config {
BackendConfig::Local(config) => {
@@ -574,13 +723,14 @@ impl KmsConfig {
return Err(KmsError::configuration_error("Vault KV2 address must use http or https scheme"));
}
validate_vault_auth_method("Vault KV2", &config.auth_method)?;
if !self.allow_insecure_dev_defaults {
validate_vault_development_defaults("Vault KV2", &config.address, &config.auth_method, config.tls.as_ref())?;
}
if config.mount_path.is_empty() {
return Err(KmsError::configuration_error("Vault KV2 mount path cannot be empty"));
}
// `mount_path` is deprecated and unused by this backend, so an empty value
// is deliberately not an error.
// Validate TLS configuration if using HTTPS
if config.address.starts_with("https://")
@@ -598,6 +748,8 @@ impl KmsConfig {
return Err(KmsError::configuration_error("Vault Transit address must use http or https scheme"));
}
validate_vault_auth_method("Vault Transit", &config.auth_method)?;
if !self.allow_insecure_dev_defaults {
validate_vault_development_defaults(
"Vault Transit",
@@ -702,14 +854,24 @@ impl KmsConfig {
}
KmsBackend::VaultKv2 => {
let address = get_env_str("RUSTFS_KMS_VAULT_ADDRESS", "http://localhost:8200");
let token = get_env_str("RUSTFS_KMS_VAULT_TOKEN", "dev-token");
let auth_method = vault_auth_method_from_env()?;
let skip_tls_verify = get_env_bool(ENV_KMS_VAULT_SKIP_TLS_VERIFY, false);
let mount_path = match get_env_opt_str("RUSTFS_KMS_VAULT_MOUNT_PATH") {
Some(path) => {
tracing::warn!(
"RUSTFS_KMS_VAULT_MOUNT_PATH is deprecated for the Vault KV2 backend: it never calls the Transit engine and the value is stored but unused"
);
path
}
None => default_vault_kv2_mount_path(),
};
config.backend_config = BackendConfig::VaultKv2(Box::new(VaultConfig {
address,
auth_method: VaultAuthMethod::Token { token },
auth_method,
namespace: get_env_opt_str("RUSTFS_KMS_VAULT_NAMESPACE"),
mount_path: get_env_str("RUSTFS_KMS_VAULT_MOUNT_PATH", "transit"),
mount_path,
kv_mount: get_env_str("RUSTFS_KMS_VAULT_KV_MOUNT", "secret"),
key_path_prefix: get_env_str("RUSTFS_KMS_VAULT_KEY_PREFIX", "rustfs/kms/keys"),
tls: vault_tls_config(skip_tls_verify),
@@ -717,12 +879,12 @@ impl KmsConfig {
}
KmsBackend::VaultTransit => {
let address = get_env_str("RUSTFS_KMS_VAULT_ADDRESS", "http://localhost:8200");
let token = get_env_str("RUSTFS_KMS_VAULT_TOKEN", "dev-token");
let auth_method = vault_auth_method_from_env()?;
let skip_tls_verify = get_env_bool(ENV_KMS_VAULT_SKIP_TLS_VERIFY, false);
config.backend_config = BackendConfig::VaultTransit(Box::new(VaultTransitConfig {
address,
auth_method: VaultAuthMethod::Token { token },
auth_method,
namespace: get_env_opt_str("RUSTFS_KMS_VAULT_NAMESPACE"),
mount_path: get_env_str("RUSTFS_KMS_VAULT_MOUNT_PATH", "transit"),
metadata_kv_mount: get_env_str(
@@ -801,6 +963,95 @@ fn is_under_temp_dir(path: &Path) -> bool {
path.starts_with(std::env::temp_dir())
}
/// Resolve the Vault auth method from environment variables.
///
/// Setting `RUSTFS_KMS_VAULT_APPROLE_ROLE_ID` selects AppRole authentication;
/// the secret_id then comes from `RUSTFS_KMS_VAULT_APPROLE_SECRET_ID_FILE`
/// (re-read on every login, mirroring the `RUSTFS_KMS_STATIC_SECRET_KEY_FILE`
/// precedent) or inline from `RUSTFS_KMS_VAULT_APPROLE_SECRET_ID`, with the
/// file taking precedence. Without a role id the legacy token flow applies.
fn vault_auth_method_from_env() -> Result<VaultAuthMethod> {
if let Some(token_file) = get_env_opt_str(ENV_KMS_VAULT_TOKEN_FILE) {
// A token file names one authoritative credential source; combining it
// with another one would leave the effective identity ambiguous, so
// that is a configuration error rather than a precedence rule.
if get_env_opt_str(ENV_KMS_VAULT_APPROLE_ROLE_ID).is_some() {
return Err(KmsError::configuration_error(format!(
"{ENV_KMS_VAULT_TOKEN_FILE} cannot be combined with {ENV_KMS_VAULT_APPROLE_ROLE_ID}; configure exactly one Vault auth method"
)));
}
if get_env_opt_str("RUSTFS_KMS_VAULT_TOKEN").is_some() {
return Err(KmsError::configuration_error(format!(
"{ENV_KMS_VAULT_TOKEN_FILE} cannot be combined with RUSTFS_KMS_VAULT_TOKEN; configure exactly one Vault auth method"
)));
}
return Ok(VaultAuthMethod::token_file(PathBuf::from(token_file)));
}
let Some(role_id) = get_env_opt_str(ENV_KMS_VAULT_APPROLE_ROLE_ID) else {
return Ok(VaultAuthMethod::Token {
token: get_env_str("RUSTFS_KMS_VAULT_TOKEN", "dev-token"),
});
};
let secret_id_file = get_env_opt_str(ENV_KMS_VAULT_APPROLE_SECRET_ID_FILE).map(PathBuf::from);
let secret_id = get_env_opt_str(ENV_KMS_VAULT_APPROLE_SECRET_ID).unwrap_or_default();
if secret_id.is_empty() && secret_id_file.is_none() {
return Err(KmsError::configuration_error(format!(
"Vault AppRole requires {ENV_KMS_VAULT_APPROLE_SECRET_ID} or {ENV_KMS_VAULT_APPROLE_SECRET_ID_FILE} to be set"
)));
}
Ok(VaultAuthMethod::AppRole {
role_id,
secret_id,
secret_id_file,
mount: get_env_str(ENV_KMS_VAULT_APPROLE_MOUNT, DEFAULT_VAULT_APPROLE_MOUNT),
refresh_safety_window_secs: None,
})
}
fn validate_vault_auth_method(backend_name: &str, auth_method: &VaultAuthMethod) -> Result<()> {
match auth_method {
VaultAuthMethod::Token { .. } => Ok(()),
VaultAuthMethod::AppRole {
role_id,
secret_id,
secret_id_file,
mount,
..
} => {
if role_id.is_empty() {
return Err(KmsError::configuration_error(format!("{backend_name} AppRole role_id cannot be empty")));
}
if secret_id.is_empty() && secret_id_file.is_none() {
return Err(KmsError::configuration_error(format!(
"{backend_name} AppRole requires a secret_id or a secret_id_file"
)));
}
if mount.is_empty() {
return Err(KmsError::configuration_error(format!("{backend_name} AppRole mount cannot be empty")));
}
Ok(())
}
VaultAuthMethod::TokenFile {
path,
poll_interval_secs,
..
} => {
if path.as_os_str().is_empty() {
return Err(KmsError::configuration_error(format!("{backend_name} token file path cannot be empty")));
}
if poll_interval_secs == &Some(0) {
return Err(KmsError::configuration_error(format!(
"{backend_name} token file poll interval must be greater than 0"
)));
}
Ok(())
}
}
}
fn validate_vault_development_defaults(
backend_name: &str,
address: &str,
@@ -855,6 +1106,31 @@ mod tests {
assert_eq!(local_config.key_dir, temp_dir.path());
}
#[test]
fn test_oversized_timeout_and_retries_clamped_not_rejected() {
let temp_dir = TempDir::new().expect("Failed to create temp dir");
let config = KmsConfig {
timeout: Duration::from_secs(3_600),
retry_attempts: 50,
..KmsConfig::local(temp_dir.path().to_path_buf()).with_insecure_development_defaults()
};
// Out-of-range values must not keep the service from starting.
assert!(config.validate().is_ok());
assert_eq!(config.effective_timeout(), MAX_OPERATION_TIMEOUT);
assert_eq!(config.effective_retry_attempts(), MAX_RETRY_ATTEMPTS);
// In-range values pass through unchanged.
let config = KmsConfig {
timeout: Duration::from_secs(45),
retry_attempts: 5,
..config
};
assert!(config.validate().is_ok());
assert_eq!(config.effective_timeout(), Duration::from_secs(45));
assert_eq!(config.effective_retry_attempts(), 5);
}
#[test]
fn test_local_development_defaults_require_opt_in() {
let temp_dir = TempDir::new().expect("Failed to create temp dir");
@@ -977,6 +1253,73 @@ mod tests {
assert!(config.vault_config().is_some());
}
#[test]
fn test_persisted_vault_kv2_config_without_mount_path_deserializes() {
// Configurations persisted after mount_path was deprecated may omit the field;
// it must default instead of failing deserialization.
let raw = r#"{
"backend": "VaultKV2",
"backend_config": {
"VaultKV2": {
"address": "http://127.0.0.1:8200",
"auth_method": { "Token": { "token": "t" } },
"namespace": null,
"kv_mount": "secret",
"key_path_prefix": "rustfs/kms/keys",
"tls": null
}
},
"default_key_id": null,
"timeout": {"secs": 30, "nanos": 0},
"retry_attempts": 3,
"enable_cache": true,
"cache_config": {
"max_keys": 1000,
"ttl": {"secs": 3600, "nanos": 0},
"enable_metrics": true
}
}"#;
let config: KmsConfig = serde_json::from_str(raw).expect("persisted kms config without mount_path");
assert_eq!(config.backend, KmsBackend::VaultKv2);
let vault = config.vault_config().expect("vault-kv2 config");
assert_eq!(vault.mount_path, "transit");
}
#[test]
fn test_vault_kv2_empty_mount_path_passes_validation() {
let address = Url::parse("https://vault.example.com:8200").expect("Valid URL");
let mut config = KmsConfig::vault(address, "test-token".to_string());
if let BackendConfig::VaultKv2(vault) = &mut config.backend_config {
vault.mount_path = String::new();
}
assert!(config.validate().is_ok(), "deprecated mount_path must not be required");
}
#[test]
fn test_vault_kv2_sources_do_not_claim_transit_wrapping() {
let sources = [
("config.rs", include_str!("config.rs")),
("api_types.rs", include_str!("api_types.rs")),
("backends/vault.rs", include_str!("backends/vault.rs")),
("lib.rs", include_str!("lib.rs")),
];
// Assemble the needles at runtime so this guard does not match its own source.
let needles = [
format!("wrapping via {}", "Transit"),
format!("KV v2 + {}", "Transit"),
format!("KV2+{}", "Transit"),
format!("you would use Vault's {} engine", "transit"),
];
for (name, source) in sources {
for needle in &needles {
assert!(
!source.contains(needle.as_str()),
"{name} still describes the Vault KV2 backend with `{needle}`"
);
}
}
}
#[test]
fn test_legacy_persisted_vault_transit_config_uses_metadata_defaults() {
let raw = r#"{
@@ -1133,6 +1476,220 @@ mod tests {
);
}
#[test]
fn test_from_env_selects_approle_when_role_id_is_set() {
with_vars(
vec![
("RUSTFS_KMS_BACKEND", Some("vault")),
("RUSTFS_KMS_VAULT_ADDRESS", Some("https://vault.example.com")),
(ENV_KMS_VAULT_APPROLE_ROLE_ID, Some("env-role-id")),
(ENV_KMS_VAULT_APPROLE_SECRET_ID, Some("env-approle-secret-id")),
(ENV_KMS_VAULT_APPROLE_MOUNT, Some("approle-alt")),
// A stale token env var must not override the AppRole selection.
("RUSTFS_KMS_VAULT_TOKEN", Some("vault-token")),
],
|| {
let config = KmsConfig::from_env().expect("kms config should load from env");
let vault = config.vault_config().expect("vault backend config");
let VaultAuthMethod::AppRole {
role_id,
secret_id,
secret_id_file,
mount,
refresh_safety_window_secs,
} = &vault.auth_method
else {
panic!("role id in the environment must select AppRole auth, got {:?}", vault.auth_method);
};
assert_eq!(role_id, "env-role-id");
assert_eq!(secret_id, "env-approle-secret-id");
assert_eq!(secret_id_file, &None);
assert_eq!(mount, "approle-alt");
assert_eq!(refresh_safety_window_secs, &None);
},
);
}
#[test]
fn test_from_env_approle_secret_id_file_is_stored_as_path() {
with_vars(
vec![
("RUSTFS_KMS_BACKEND", Some("vault-transit")),
("RUSTFS_KMS_VAULT_ADDRESS", Some("https://vault.example.com")),
(ENV_KMS_VAULT_APPROLE_ROLE_ID, Some("env-role-id")),
(ENV_KMS_VAULT_APPROLE_SECRET_ID_FILE, Some("/etc/rustfs/approle-secret-id")),
],
|| {
let config = KmsConfig::from_env().expect("kms config should load from env");
let vault = config.vault_transit_config().expect("vault transit backend config");
let VaultAuthMethod::AppRole {
secret_id,
secret_id_file,
mount,
..
} = &vault.auth_method
else {
panic!("role id in the environment must select AppRole auth");
};
// The path is stored, not read: the secret_id file is re-read on
// every login so external rotation is picked up.
assert_eq!(secret_id_file.as_deref(), Some(std::path::Path::new("/etc/rustfs/approle-secret-id")));
assert!(secret_id.is_empty());
assert_eq!(mount, DEFAULT_VAULT_APPROLE_MOUNT);
},
);
}
#[test]
fn test_from_env_approle_requires_secret_id_or_file() {
with_vars(
vec![
("RUSTFS_KMS_BACKEND", Some("vault")),
(ENV_KMS_VAULT_APPROLE_ROLE_ID, Some("env-role-id")),
(ENV_KMS_VAULT_APPROLE_SECRET_ID, None::<&str>),
(ENV_KMS_VAULT_APPROLE_SECRET_ID_FILE, None::<&str>),
],
|| {
let error = KmsConfig::from_env().expect_err("approle without a secret_id source must be rejected");
assert!(error.to_string().contains(ENV_KMS_VAULT_APPROLE_SECRET_ID));
},
);
}
#[test]
fn test_from_env_selects_token_file() {
with_vars(
vec![
("RUSTFS_KMS_BACKEND", Some("vault")),
("RUSTFS_KMS_VAULT_ADDRESS", Some("https://vault.example.com")),
(ENV_KMS_VAULT_TOKEN_FILE, Some("/run/vault-agent/token")),
],
|| {
let config = KmsConfig::from_env().expect("kms config should load from env");
let vault = config.vault_config().expect("vault backend config");
let VaultAuthMethod::TokenFile {
path,
poll_interval_secs,
refresh_safety_window_secs,
} = &vault.auth_method
else {
panic!("token file in the environment must select TokenFile auth, got {:?}", vault.auth_method);
};
assert_eq!(path, std::path::Path::new("/run/vault-agent/token"));
assert_eq!(poll_interval_secs, &None);
assert_eq!(refresh_safety_window_secs, &None);
},
);
}
#[test]
fn test_from_env_token_file_is_mutually_exclusive_with_other_auth() {
with_vars(
vec![
("RUSTFS_KMS_BACKEND", Some("vault")),
(ENV_KMS_VAULT_TOKEN_FILE, Some("/run/vault-agent/token")),
(ENV_KMS_VAULT_APPROLE_ROLE_ID, Some("env-role-id")),
],
|| {
let error = KmsConfig::from_env().expect_err("token file combined with approle must be rejected");
assert!(error.to_string().contains(ENV_KMS_VAULT_TOKEN_FILE));
assert!(error.to_string().contains(ENV_KMS_VAULT_APPROLE_ROLE_ID));
},
);
with_vars(
vec![
("RUSTFS_KMS_BACKEND", Some("vault-transit")),
(ENV_KMS_VAULT_TOKEN_FILE, Some("/run/vault-agent/token")),
("RUSTFS_KMS_VAULT_TOKEN", Some("vault-token")),
],
|| {
let error = KmsConfig::from_env().expect_err("token file combined with a static token must be rejected");
assert!(error.to_string().contains(ENV_KMS_VAULT_TOKEN_FILE));
assert!(error.to_string().contains("RUSTFS_KMS_VAULT_TOKEN"));
},
);
}
#[test]
fn test_validate_rejects_bad_token_file_settings() {
let vault_config = |auth_method: VaultAuthMethod| KmsConfig {
backend: KmsBackend::VaultKv2,
backend_config: BackendConfig::VaultKv2(Box::new(VaultConfig {
address: "https://vault.example.com:8200".to_string(),
auth_method,
..Default::default()
})),
..Default::default()
};
let error = vault_config(VaultAuthMethod::token_file(PathBuf::new()))
.validate()
.expect_err("empty token file path must be rejected");
assert!(error.to_string().contains("path"));
let error = vault_config(VaultAuthMethod::TokenFile {
path: PathBuf::from("/run/vault-agent/token"),
poll_interval_secs: Some(0),
refresh_safety_window_secs: None,
})
.validate()
.expect_err("zero poll interval must be rejected");
assert!(error.to_string().contains("poll interval"));
vault_config(VaultAuthMethod::token_file(PathBuf::from("/run/vault-agent/token")))
.validate()
.expect("well-formed token file auth must validate");
}
#[test]
fn test_approle_config_deserializes_legacy_shape_with_defaults() {
// Persisted configurations from before the AppRole implementation only
// carry role_id and secret_id; the new fields must fill with defaults.
let legacy = serde_json::json!({
"AppRole": {
"role_id": "legacy-role",
"secret_id": "legacy-secret-id",
}
});
let auth: VaultAuthMethod = serde_json::from_value(legacy).expect("legacy AppRole config must keep deserializing");
let VaultAuthMethod::AppRole {
role_id,
secret_id_file,
mount,
refresh_safety_window_secs,
..
} = auth
else {
panic!("expected AppRole");
};
assert_eq!(role_id, "legacy-role");
assert_eq!(secret_id_file, None);
assert_eq!(mount, DEFAULT_VAULT_APPROLE_MOUNT);
assert_eq!(refresh_safety_window_secs, None);
}
#[test]
fn test_validate_rejects_incomplete_approle() {
let mut config = KmsConfig::vault_approle(
Url::parse("https://vault.example.com:8200").expect("vault URL"),
String::new(),
"secret-id".to_string(),
);
let error = config.validate().expect_err("empty role_id must be rejected");
assert!(error.to_string().contains("role_id"));
config = KmsConfig::vault_approle(
Url::parse("https://vault.example.com:8200").expect("vault URL"),
"role-id".to_string(),
String::new(),
);
let error = config
.validate()
.expect_err("approle without secret_id or secret_id_file must be rejected");
assert!(error.to_string().contains("secret_id"));
}
#[test]
fn test_from_env_requires_vault_development_opt_in() {
with_vars(
+398
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,398 @@
// Copyright 2024 RustFS Team
//
// Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
// you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
// You may obtain a copy of the License at
//
// http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
//
// Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
// distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
// WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
// See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
// limitations under the License.
//! Background worker that completes scheduled key deletions.
//!
//! Every sweep lists keys, picks the ones whose persisted deletion deadline
//! has passed (plus tombstones left by a crashed removal) and hands each to
//! [`KmsBackend::remove_expired_key`], which re-checks state under the
//! backend's own synchronization. The sweep is idempotent and keeps no state
//! of its own, so it is safe to re-run after a restart and safe to run on
//! every node of a deployment concurrently — a key is only ever removed while
//! its (re-read) record is an expired pending deletion or a tombstone.
use crate::backends::{ExpiredKeyRemoval, KmsBackend};
use crate::types::{KeyStatus, ListKeysRequest};
use async_trait::async_trait;
use jiff::Zoned;
use std::sync::Arc;
use std::time::Duration;
use tokio_util::sync::CancellationToken;
use tracing::{debug, info, warn};
/// How often the worker looks for expired pending deletions.
pub const DEFAULT_SWEEP_INTERVAL: Duration = Duration::from_secs(60);
/// Reports configuration that still references a KMS key.
///
/// Consulted before any material is destroyed; a non-empty result blocks the
/// removal until the references disappear. Implementations live where the
/// referencing configuration lives (for example bucket encryption settings in
/// the server) and are injected via
/// [`crate::service_manager::KmsServiceManager::set_deletion_reference_checker`].
#[async_trait]
pub trait DeletionReferenceChecker: Send + Sync {
/// Identifiers of configuration still referencing `key_id` (bucket names,
/// settings paths, ...). Errors must be reported as a reference so that
/// an unavailable checker never unblocks a deletion.
async fn references(&self, key_id: &str) -> Vec<String>;
}
/// Outcome of one sweep, for logging and tests.
#[derive(Debug, Default, Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub struct SweepReport {
/// Keys whose record and material were removed this sweep.
pub removed: Vec<String>,
/// Keys left in place because configuration still references them.
pub blocked: Vec<String>,
/// Keys that were pending but not yet due, without a persisted deadline,
/// or whose state changed between inspection and removal.
pub skipped: usize,
/// Keys whose removal attempt failed; retried on the next sweep.
pub failed: usize,
}
pub(crate) struct DeletionWorker {
backend: Arc<dyn KmsBackend>,
default_key_id: Option<String>,
reference_checker: Option<Arc<dyn DeletionReferenceChecker>>,
interval: Duration,
}
impl DeletionWorker {
pub(crate) fn new(
backend: Arc<dyn KmsBackend>,
default_key_id: Option<String>,
reference_checker: Option<Arc<dyn DeletionReferenceChecker>>,
) -> Self {
Self {
backend,
default_key_id,
reference_checker,
interval: DEFAULT_SWEEP_INTERVAL,
}
}
pub(crate) fn spawn(self, cancel: CancellationToken) -> tokio::task::JoinHandle<()> {
tokio::spawn(async move { self.run(cancel).await })
}
async fn run(self, cancel: CancellationToken) {
let mut ticker = tokio::time::interval(self.interval);
ticker.set_missed_tick_behavior(tokio::time::MissedTickBehavior::Delay);
loop {
tokio::select! {
_ = cancel.cancelled() => {
debug!("KMS deletion worker stopped");
return;
}
_ = ticker.tick() => {}
}
let report = self.sweep(&Zoned::now()).await;
if !report.removed.is_empty() || !report.blocked.is_empty() || report.failed > 0 {
info!(
removed = ?report.removed,
blocked = ?report.blocked,
skipped = report.skipped,
failed = report.failed,
"KMS deletion sweep completed"
);
}
}
}
/// Run one sweep at the given time. Exposed separately so tests can drive
/// the expiry logic deterministically.
pub(crate) async fn sweep(&self, now: &Zoned) -> SweepReport {
let mut report = SweepReport::default();
let mut marker: Option<String> = None;
loop {
let request = ListKeysRequest {
limit: Some(100),
marker: marker.clone(),
usage_filter: None,
status_filter: None,
};
let response = match self.backend.list_keys(request).await {
Ok(response) => response,
Err(error) => {
warn!(%error, "KMS deletion sweep could not list keys");
report.failed += 1;
return report;
}
};
for key in &response.keys {
if matches!(key.status, KeyStatus::PendingDeletion | KeyStatus::Deleted) {
self.process_key(&key.key_id, now, &mut report).await;
}
}
if !response.truncated {
break;
}
match response.next_marker {
Some(next_marker) => marker = Some(next_marker),
None => break,
}
}
report
}
async fn process_key(&self, key_id: &str, now: &Zoned, report: &mut SweepReport) {
// Never remove a key that live configuration still points at. The
// default key check is built in; broader references (bucket
// encryption settings, ...) come from the injected checker.
if self.default_key_id.as_deref() == Some(key_id) {
warn!(key_id, "expired KMS key is still the default key; refusing removal");
report.blocked.push(key_id.to_string());
return;
}
if let Some(checker) = &self.reference_checker {
let references = checker.references(key_id).await;
if !references.is_empty() {
warn!(key_id, ?references, "expired KMS key is still referenced; refusing removal");
report.blocked.push(key_id.to_string());
return;
}
}
// The backend re-checks state and deadline under its own write
// synchronization, so a cancellation racing this sweep wins there.
match self.backend.remove_expired_key(key_id, now).await {
Ok(ExpiredKeyRemoval::Removed) => report.removed.push(key_id.to_string()),
Ok(ExpiredKeyRemoval::StateChanged | ExpiredKeyRemoval::NotExpired) => report.skipped += 1,
Err(error) => {
warn!(key_id, %error, "failed to remove expired KMS key; will retry next sweep");
report.failed += 1;
}
}
}
}
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
use super::*;
use crate::backends::local::LocalKmsBackend;
use crate::config::KmsConfig;
use crate::error::KmsError;
use crate::types::{CreateKeyRequest, DeleteKeyRequest, DescribeKeyRequest, KeyState, KeyUsage};
async fn local_backend(temp_dir: &tempfile::TempDir) -> Arc<LocalKmsBackend> {
let config = KmsConfig::local(temp_dir.path().to_path_buf()).with_insecure_development_defaults();
Arc::new(LocalKmsBackend::new(config).await.expect("local backend should build"))
}
async fn create_key(backend: &LocalKmsBackend, key_name: &str) -> String {
backend
.create_key(CreateKeyRequest {
key_name: Some(key_name.to_string()),
key_usage: KeyUsage::EncryptDecrypt,
..Default::default()
})
.await
.expect("key should be created")
.key_id
}
async fn schedule(backend: &LocalKmsBackend, key_id: &str) {
backend
.delete_key(DeleteKeyRequest {
key_id: key_id.to_string(),
pending_window_in_days: Some(7),
force_immediate: None,
})
.await
.expect("deletion should be scheduled");
}
fn worker(backend: Arc<LocalKmsBackend>) -> DeletionWorker {
DeletionWorker::new(backend, None, None)
}
fn after_window() -> Zoned {
Zoned::now() + Duration::from_secs(8 * 86400)
}
async fn assert_key_gone(backend: &LocalKmsBackend, key_id: &str) {
let error = backend
.describe_key(DescribeKeyRequest {
key_id: key_id.to_string(),
})
.await
.expect_err("removed key must not be describable");
assert!(matches!(error, KmsError::KeyNotFound { .. }), "expected KeyNotFound, got {error:?}");
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn sweep_removes_expired_pending_key_and_is_idempotent() {
let temp_dir = tempfile::tempdir().expect("temp dir");
let backend = local_backend(&temp_dir).await;
let key_id = create_key(&backend, "expired-key").await;
schedule(&backend, &key_id).await;
let worker = worker(backend.clone());
// Not yet due: nothing happens.
let report = worker.sweep(&Zoned::now()).await;
assert!(report.removed.is_empty());
assert_eq!(report.skipped, 1);
assert_eq!(report.failed, 0);
// Past the deadline: the key is removed.
let report = worker.sweep(&after_window()).await;
assert_eq!(report.removed, vec![key_id.clone()]);
assert_eq!(report.failed, 0);
assert_key_gone(&backend, &key_id).await;
// Re-running the sweep after the removal is a no-op.
let report = worker.sweep(&after_window()).await;
assert_eq!(report, SweepReport::default());
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn cancelled_deletion_always_beats_the_sweep() {
let temp_dir = tempfile::tempdir().expect("temp dir");
let backend = local_backend(&temp_dir).await;
let cancelled = create_key(&backend, "cancelled-key").await;
let doomed = create_key(&backend, "doomed-key").await;
schedule(&backend, &cancelled).await;
schedule(&backend, &doomed).await;
backend
.cancel_key_deletion(crate::types::CancelKeyDeletionRequest {
key_id: cancelled.clone(),
})
.await
.expect("cancel should succeed");
let report = worker(backend.clone()).sweep(&after_window()).await;
assert_eq!(report.removed, vec![doomed.clone()]);
assert_eq!(report.failed, 0);
// The cancelled key survives, enabled and usable.
let described = backend
.describe_key(DescribeKeyRequest {
key_id: cancelled.clone(),
})
.await
.expect("cancelled key must still exist");
assert_eq!(described.key_metadata.key_state, KeyState::Enabled);
assert_key_gone(&backend, &doomed).await;
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn default_key_and_external_references_block_removal() {
struct StaticReferences(Vec<String>);
#[async_trait]
impl DeletionReferenceChecker for StaticReferences {
async fn references(&self, _key_id: &str) -> Vec<String> {
self.0.clone()
}
}
let temp_dir = tempfile::tempdir().expect("temp dir");
let backend = local_backend(&temp_dir).await;
let key_id = create_key(&backend, "referenced-key").await;
schedule(&backend, &key_id).await;
// Blocked while it is the configured default key.
let as_default = DeletionWorker::new(backend.clone(), Some(key_id.clone()), None);
let report = as_default.sweep(&after_window()).await;
assert_eq!(report.blocked, vec![key_id.clone()]);
assert!(report.removed.is_empty());
// Blocked while external configuration still references it.
let with_references = DeletionWorker::new(
backend.clone(),
None,
Some(Arc::new(StaticReferences(vec!["bucket:sse-bucket".to_string()]))),
);
let report = with_references.sweep(&after_window()).await;
assert_eq!(report.blocked, vec![key_id.clone()]);
assert!(report.removed.is_empty());
backend
.describe_key(DescribeKeyRequest { key_id: key_id.clone() })
.await
.expect("blocked key must still exist");
// Removed once nothing references it anymore.
let unreferenced = DeletionWorker::new(backend.clone(), None, Some(Arc::new(StaticReferences(Vec::new()))));
let report = unreferenced.sweep(&after_window()).await;
assert_eq!(report.removed, vec![key_id.clone()]);
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn deadline_survives_backend_restart_and_sweep_completes_it() {
let temp_dir = tempfile::tempdir().expect("temp dir");
let key_id;
{
let backend = local_backend(&temp_dir).await;
key_id = create_key(&backend, "restart-key").await;
schedule(&backend, &key_id).await;
}
// "Restart": a fresh backend over the same directory must still see
// the persisted deadline...
let backend = local_backend(&temp_dir).await;
let described = backend
.describe_key(DescribeKeyRequest { key_id: key_id.clone() })
.await
.expect("key must survive the restart");
assert_eq!(described.key_metadata.key_state, KeyState::PendingDeletion);
assert!(
described.key_metadata.deletion_date.is_some(),
"deletion deadline must survive a backend restart"
);
// ...and the worker completes the deletion without any new schedule call.
let report = worker(backend.clone()).sweep(&after_window()).await;
assert_eq!(report.removed, vec![key_id.clone()]);
assert_key_gone(&backend, &key_id).await;
}
#[tokio::test(start_paused = true)]
async fn worker_loop_removes_due_keys_and_stops_on_cancel() {
let temp_dir = tempfile::tempdir().expect("temp dir");
let backend = local_backend(&temp_dir).await;
let key_id = create_key(&backend, "loop-key").await;
// A zero-day window through the lifecycle client produces a deadline
// that is already due for the worker's wall-clock sweep.
backend
.lifecycle_client()
.schedule_key_deletion(&key_id, 0, None)
.await
.expect("schedule with zero window");
let cancel = CancellationToken::new();
let task = worker(backend.clone()).spawn(cancel.clone());
// The paused clock auto-advances through the worker's interval ticks.
let mut removed = false;
for _ in 0..100 {
tokio::time::sleep(Duration::from_secs(1)).await;
if backend
.describe_key(DescribeKeyRequest { key_id: key_id.clone() })
.await
.is_err()
{
removed = true;
break;
}
}
assert!(removed, "worker loop must remove the due key");
cancel.cancel();
task.await.expect("worker task must stop after cancellation");
}
}
+68 -1
View File
@@ -32,7 +32,10 @@ use std::collections::HashMap;
///
/// This structure stores the encrypted DEK along with metadata needed for decryption.
/// The `master_key_version` field records which version of the KEK (Key Encryption Key)
/// was used to encrypt this DEK, enabling proper key rotation support.
/// wrapped this DEK so rotation-aware backends can load the matching historical
/// material. Envelopes written before versioning carry `None`; backends must resolve
/// `None` to a deterministic baseline version recorded in key metadata, never
/// implicitly to whatever version is current.
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Serialize, Deserialize)]
pub struct DataKeyEnvelope {
pub key_id: String,
@@ -43,6 +46,12 @@ pub struct DataKeyEnvelope {
pub encryption_context: HashMap<String, String>,
#[serde(with = "crate::time_serde::zoned")]
pub created_at: Zoned,
/// KEK version that wrapped `encrypted_key`; `None` on pre-versioning envelopes.
///
/// Optional and omitted when `None` so envelopes from non-rotating backends stay
/// byte-identical to the historical seven-field JSON shape.
#[serde(default, skip_serializing_if = "Option::is_none")]
pub master_key_version: Option<u32>,
}
#[derive(Deserialize)]
@@ -307,6 +316,7 @@ mod tests {
map
},
created_at: Zoned::now(),
master_key_version: None,
};
// Test serialization
@@ -336,6 +346,8 @@ mod tests {
let deserialized: DataKeyEnvelope = serde_json::from_str(envelope_json).expect("Should deserialize current format");
assert_eq!(deserialized.key_id, "test-key-id");
assert_eq!(deserialized.master_key_id, "master-key-id");
// Envelopes persisted before versioning must parse with no master key version.
assert_eq!(deserialized.master_key_version, None);
}
#[tokio::test]
@@ -353,6 +365,50 @@ mod tests {
let deserialized: DataKeyEnvelope = serde_json::from_str(envelope_json).expect("Should deserialize legacy format");
assert_eq!(deserialized.key_id, "test-key-id");
assert_eq!(deserialized.master_key_id, "master-key-id");
assert_eq!(deserialized.master_key_version, None);
}
#[test]
fn test_data_key_envelope_none_version_serializes_without_field() {
// A `None` version must keep the serialized envelope on the historical
// seven-field JSON shape so non-rotating backends emit byte-compatible
// envelopes that older readers accept unchanged.
let envelope = DataKeyEnvelope {
key_id: "test-key-id".to_string(),
master_key_id: "master-key-id".to_string(),
key_spec: "AES_256".to_string(),
encrypted_key: vec![1, 2, 3, 4],
nonce: vec![5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16],
encryption_context: HashMap::new(),
created_at: Zoned::now(),
master_key_version: None,
};
let value = serde_json::to_value(&envelope).expect("serialize envelope");
let object = value.as_object().expect("envelope serializes to an object");
assert!(!object.contains_key("master_key_version"));
assert_eq!(object.len(), 7, "None version must not change the seven-field JSON shape");
}
#[test]
fn test_data_key_envelope_version_round_trip() {
let envelope = DataKeyEnvelope {
key_id: "test-key-id".to_string(),
master_key_id: "master-key-id".to_string(),
key_spec: "AES_256".to_string(),
encrypted_key: vec![1, 2, 3, 4],
nonce: vec![5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16],
encryption_context: HashMap::new(),
created_at: Zoned::now(),
master_key_version: Some(7),
};
let serialized = serde_json::to_vec(&envelope).expect("serialize envelope");
let value: serde_json::Value = serde_json::from_slice(&serialized).expect("parse serialized envelope");
assert_eq!(value.get("master_key_version"), Some(&serde_json::json!(7)));
let deserialized: DataKeyEnvelope = serde_json::from_slice(&serialized).expect("deserialize envelope");
assert_eq!(deserialized.master_key_version, Some(7));
}
#[test]
@@ -368,8 +424,19 @@ mod tests {
}"#;
let minio_legacy = br#"{"aead":"AES-256-GCM-HMAC-SHA-256","iv":[1],"nonce":[2],"bytes":[3]}"#;
let duplicate_key_id = [b"{\"key_id\":\"duplicate\",".as_slice(), &kms_envelope[1..]].concat();
// Rotation-aware envelope: the optional master_key_version field must not
// change how mixed batches of old and new envelopes are routed.
let versioned_envelope = {
let mut value: serde_json::Value = serde_json::from_slice(kms_envelope).expect("parse KMS envelope fixture");
value
.as_object_mut()
.expect("KMS envelope fixture is an object")
.insert("master_key_version".to_string(), serde_json::json!(2));
serde_json::to_vec(&value).expect("serialize versioned envelope")
};
assert!(is_data_key_envelope(kms_envelope));
assert!(is_data_key_envelope(&versioned_envelope));
assert!(is_data_key_envelope(&[b" \n".as_slice(), kms_envelope].concat()));
assert!(!is_data_key_envelope(&duplicate_key_id));
assert!(!is_data_key_envelope(b"bm9uY2U=:Y2lwaGVydGV4dA=="));
+104
View File
@@ -90,6 +90,53 @@ pub enum KmsError {
/// Encryption context mismatch
#[error("Encryption context mismatch: {message}")]
ContextMismatch { message: String },
/// Backend operation exceeded its per-attempt timeout or total deadline
#[error("Operation timed out: {message}")]
OperationTimedOut { message: String },
/// Backend operation aborted by cancellation or shutdown
#[error("Operation cancelled: {message}")]
OperationCancelled { message: String },
// New variants must be appended below (never inserted above) so that
// concurrent additions rebase without conflicts.
/// Persisted key material is absent from an otherwise readable key record
#[error(
"Key material missing for key {key_id}: the stored record has no key material; restore it from backup or repair the key explicitly"
)]
MaterialMissing { key_id: String },
/// Persisted key material exists but cannot be decoded
#[error("Key material corrupt for key {key_id}: {message}")]
MaterialCorrupt { key_id: String, message: String },
/// Persisted key material failed authenticated decryption
#[error(
"Key material authentication failed for key {key_id}: the stored material cannot be decrypted with the configured master key"
)]
MaterialAuthenticationFailed { key_id: String },
/// Persisted key record uses a format version unknown to this build
#[error("Unsupported key format version {version:?} for key {key_id}")]
UnsupportedFormatVersion { key_id: String, version: String },
/// Requested master key version has no persisted material for the key
#[error("Key version {version} not found for key {key_id}")]
KeyVersionNotFound { key_id: String, version: u32 },
/// Backup/restore bundle contract violation; see [`crate::backup::BackupError`]
#[error(transparent)]
Backup(#[from] crate::backup::BackupError),
/// Operation is not supported by the active KMS backend
#[error("Operation '{operation}' is not supported by KMS backend '{backend}'")]
UnsupportedCapability { backend: String, operation: String },
/// Backend credentials expired or could not be refreshed in time; requests
/// fail closed instead of being sent with credentials that may lapse mid-flight
#[error("KMS credentials unavailable: {message}")]
CredentialsUnavailable { message: String },
}
impl KmsError {
@@ -187,6 +234,63 @@ impl KmsError {
pub fn context_mismatch<S: Into<String>>(message: S) -> Self {
Self::ContextMismatch { message: message.into() }
}
/// Create an operation timed out error
pub fn operation_timed_out<S: Into<String>>(message: S) -> Self {
Self::OperationTimedOut { message: message.into() }
}
/// Create an operation cancelled error
pub fn operation_cancelled<S: Into<String>>(message: S) -> Self {
Self::OperationCancelled { message: message.into() }
}
/// Create a material missing error
pub fn material_missing<S: Into<String>>(key_id: S) -> Self {
Self::MaterialMissing { key_id: key_id.into() }
}
/// Create a material corrupt error
pub fn material_corrupt<S1: Into<String>, S2: Into<String>>(key_id: S1, message: S2) -> Self {
Self::MaterialCorrupt {
key_id: key_id.into(),
message: message.into(),
}
}
/// Create a material authentication failed error
pub fn material_authentication_failed<S: Into<String>>(key_id: S) -> Self {
Self::MaterialAuthenticationFailed { key_id: key_id.into() }
}
/// Create an unsupported format version error
pub fn unsupported_format_version<S1: Into<String>, S2: Into<String>>(key_id: S1, version: S2) -> Self {
Self::UnsupportedFormatVersion {
key_id: key_id.into(),
version: version.into(),
}
}
/// Create a key version not found error
pub fn key_version_not_found<S: Into<String>>(key_id: S, version: u32) -> Self {
Self::KeyVersionNotFound {
key_id: key_id.into(),
version,
}
}
/// Create an unsupported capability error
pub fn unsupported_capability<S1: Into<String>, S2: Into<String>>(backend: S1, operation: S2) -> Self {
Self::UnsupportedCapability {
backend: backend.into(),
operation: operation.into(),
}
}
/// Create a credentials unavailable error
pub fn credentials_unavailable<S: Into<String>>(message: S) -> Self {
Self::CredentialsUnavailable { message: message.into() }
}
}
/// Convert from standard library errors

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