(backend) wip introduce a token exchange endpoint

Add a prototype setup that uses OrbStack as the local Kubernetes
provider on macOS, aiming to save a few GB of RAM compared to the
current stack.

The script has been tested locally but was mostly built through vibe
coding, so it has not been thoroughly reviewed yet.

Follow-ups to look into:

* Simplify the ingress and CoreDNS setup if possible.
* Wire up a way to run tests and lint against the Tilt stack.

CHANGELOG.md

@@ -10,10 +10,6 @@ and this project adheres to
 
 ### Added
 
-- ✨(backend) push recordings to the owner's Drive (POC)
-
-## Fixed
-
 - ✨(summary) report exception type in failure analytics
 - ✨(frontend) add configurable documentation menu item
 - ✨(frontend) allow promoting authenticated participants

Makefile

@@ -84,7 +84,6 @@ bootstrap: \
 	data/media \
 	data/static \
 	create-env-files \
-	create-docker-network \
 	build \
 	migrate \
 	demo \
@@ -118,16 +117,11 @@ down: ## stop and remove containers, networks, images, and volumes
 	@$(COMPOSE) down
 .PHONY: down
 
-create-docker-network: ## create the shared lasuite-network if it doesn't exist
-	@docker network create lasuite-network || true
-.PHONY: create-docker-network
-
 logs: ## display app-dev logs (follow mode)
 	@$(COMPOSE) logs -f app-dev
 .PHONY: logs
 
 run-backend: ## start only the backend application and all needed services
-	@$(MAKE) create-docker-network
 	@$(COMPOSE) up --force-recreate -d celery-dev --remove-orphans
 	@$(COMPOSE) up --force-recreate -d nginx
 	@echo "Wait for postgresql to be up..."
@@ -395,6 +389,12 @@ build-k8s-cluster: \
     ./bin/start-kind.sh
 .PHONY: build-k8s-cluster
 
+build-k8s-cluster-orbstack: ## setup the kubernetes environment on OrbStack's built-in cluster (macOS)
+build-k8s-cluster-orbstack: \
+    env.d/development/kube-secret
+	./bin/start-orbstack.sh
+.PHONY: build-k8s-cluster-orbstack
+
 start-tilt-keycloak: ## start the kubernetes cluster using kind, without Pro Connect for authentication, use keycloak
 	DEV_ENV=dev-keycloak tilt up --namespace=meet -f ./bin/Tiltfile
 .PHONY: build-k8s-cluster

bin/Tiltfile

@@ -1,5 +1,11 @@
 load('ext://uibutton', 'cmd_button', 'bool_input', 'location')
 load('ext://namespace', 'namespace_create', 'namespace_inject')
+
+# OrbStack's built-in cluster (macOS) is a supported alternative to kind.
+# Recent Tilt versions (>= 0.33) detect it as a local dev cluster; this is
+# a no-op for kind and a safety net for older Tilt versions.
+allow_k8s_contexts('orbstack')
+
 namespace_create('meet')
 
 DEV_ENV = os.getenv('DEV_ENV', 'dev-keycloak')

bin/start-orbstack.sh

@@ -0,0 +1,182 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env bash
+#
+# Bootstrap the local dev environment on OrbStack's built-in Kubernetes
+# cluster (macOS) instead of kind.
+#
+# This replicates what bin/start-kind.sh (numerique-gouv/tools
+# kind/create_cluster.sh) provides, minus what OrbStack makes unnecessary:
+#   - no kind cluster: OrbStack ships a lightweight single-node cluster
+#   - no local registry (kind-registry): OrbStack's cluster shares the
+#     Docker image store, so images built by Tilt are directly visible
+#     to pods. Tilt detects the "orbstack" context as a local cluster
+#     and skips pushing images entirely.
+#
+# Requirements: OrbStack (with Kubernetes enabled), kubectl, mkcert, curl.
+set -o errexit
+
+APPLICATION=${1:-meet}
+CONTEXT="orbstack"
+
+echo "0. Check OrbStack Kubernetes is available"
+if ! command -v mkcert >/dev/null 2>&1; then
+  echo "❌ mkcert is not installed. Install it first: brew install mkcert"
+  exit 1
+fi
+if ! kubectl config get-contexts -o name | grep -qx "${CONTEXT}"; then
+  echo "Context '${CONTEXT}' not found. Trying to start OrbStack Kubernetes..."
+  if command -v orb >/dev/null 2>&1; then
+    orb start k8s
+  else
+    echo "❌ Enable Kubernetes in OrbStack (Settings > Kubernetes) and retry."
+    exit 1
+  fi
+fi
+kubectl config use-context "${CONTEXT}"
+
+echo "0b. Check ports 80/443 are free on localhost"
+# OrbStack forwards LoadBalancer service ports to 127.0.0.1. If the kind
+# cluster is still running, its docker proxy already holds 80/443.
+# Skip the check if ingress-nginx is already installed here: in that case
+# the listener on 80/443 is our own LoadBalancer.
+if ! kubectl -n ingress-nginx get deployment ingress-nginx-controller >/dev/null 2>&1; then
+  for port in 80 443; do
+    if lsof -nP -iTCP:"${port}" -sTCP:LISTEN >/dev/null 2>&1; then
+      echo "❌ Port ${port} is already in use on the host."
+      echo "   If the kind cluster is running, delete it first:"
+      echo "     kind delete cluster --name suite"
+      exit 1
+    fi
+  done
+fi
+
+echo "1. Create ca"
+CURRENT_DIR=$(pwd)
+mkcert -install
+cd /tmp
+mkcert "127.0.0.1.nip.io" "*.127.0.0.1.nip.io"
+cd "${CURRENT_DIR}"
+
+echo "2. Install ingress-nginx (cloud provider: LoadBalancer service)"
+# OrbStack exposes LoadBalancer services on 127.0.0.1, so the cloud
+# manifest replaces kind's hostPort-based deploy. Every sub-step below is
+# guarded individually so the script is safe to re-run after a partial
+# failure (unlike the upstream kind script, which guards the whole block
+# on namespace existence).
+
+# Make sure no stale registry configmap tells Tilt to push to localhost:5001
+# (there is no registry on OrbStack).
+kubectl -n kube-public delete configmap local-registry-hosting --ignore-not-found
+
+if ! kubectl -n ingress-nginx get deployment ingress-nginx-controller >/dev/null 2>&1; then
+  kubectl apply -f https://raw.githubusercontent.com/kubernetes/ingress-nginx/main/deploy/static/provider/cloud/deploy.yaml
+fi
+if ! kubectl -n ingress-nginx get deployment nginx-errors >/dev/null 2>&1; then
+  kubectl apply -n ingress-nginx -f https://raw.githubusercontent.com/kubernetes/ingress-nginx/refs/heads/main/docs/examples/customization/custom-errors/custom-default-backend.yaml
+fi
+kubectl -n ingress-nginx create secret tls mkcert --key /tmp/127.0.0.1.nip.io+1-key.pem --cert /tmp/127.0.0.1.nip.io+1.pem || echo ok
+
+# The meet charts render Ingresses without ingressClassName. The kind
+# provider manifest handles this via --watch-ingress-without-class=true;
+# the cloud manifest does not, so add it here (otherwise: 404 everywhere).
+if ! kubectl -n ingress-nginx get deployment ingress-nginx-controller -o jsonpath='{.spec.template.spec.containers[0].args}' | grep -q 'watch-ingress-without-class'; then
+  kubectl -n ingress-nginx patch deployments.apps ingress-nginx-controller --type 'json' -p '[{"op": "add", "path": "/spec/template/spec/containers/0/args/-", "value":"--watch-ingress-without-class=true"},{"op": "add", "path": "/spec/template/spec/containers/0/args/-", "value":"--default-ssl-certificate=ingress-nginx/mkcert"},{"op": "add", "path": "/spec/template/spec/containers/0/args/-", "value":"--default-backend-service=ingress-nginx/nginx-errors"}
+]'
+fi
+if ! kubectl -n ingress-nginx get deployment nginx-errors -o jsonpath='{.spec.template.spec.containers[0].image}' | grep -q 'error-pages'; then
+  kubectl -n ingress-nginx patch deployment nginx-errors --type=json -p='[
+  {"op": "replace", "path": "/spec/template/spec/containers/0/image", "value": "ghcr.io/tarampampam/error-pages:3.3.0"},
+  {"op": "add", "path": "/spec/template/spec/containers/0/env", "value": [{"name": "TEMPLATE_NAME", "value": "ghost"}, {"name": "SHOW_DETAILS", "value": "false"}, {"name": "SEND_SAME_HTTP_CODE", "value": "true"}]}
+]'
+fi
+cat <<EOF | kubectl apply -n ingress-nginx -f -
+  apiVersion: v1
+  data:
+    allow-snippet-annotations: "true"
+    annotations-risk-level: Critical
+    custom-http-errors: 500,501,502,503,504
+  kind: ConfigMap
+  metadata:
+    name: ingress-nginx-controller
+    namespace: ingress-nginx
+EOF
+
+echo "2b. Wait for the ingress controller to be ready"
+kubectl -n ingress-nginx rollout status deployment/ingress-nginx-controller --timeout=180s
+
+echo "3. Patch CoreDNS so in-cluster pods resolve *.127.0.0.1.nip.io to the ingress"
+# nip.io resolves to 127.0.0.1, which inside a pod is the pod itself.
+# Rewrite these names to the ingress-nginx service, like the kind setup does.
+# Unlike kind, we amend OrbStack's existing Corefile instead of replacing it.
+if ! kubectl -n kube-system get configmap coredns -o jsonpath='{.data.Corefile}' | grep -q '127\.0\.0\.1\.nip\.io'; then
+  kubectl -n kube-system get configmap coredns -o jsonpath='{.data.Corefile}' \
+    | awk '/forward \./ && !done { print "    rewrite stop {"; print "      name regex (.*).127.0.0.1.nip.io ingress-nginx-controller.ingress-nginx.svc.cluster.local answer auto"; print "    }"; done=1 } { print }' \
+    >/tmp/Corefile.orbstack
+  kubectl -n kube-system create configmap coredns --from-file=Corefile=/tmp/Corefile.orbstack --dry-run=client -o yaml | kubectl apply -f -
+  kubectl -n kube-system rollout restart deployments/coredns
+fi
+
+if ! kubectl get ns "${APPLICATION}" >/dev/null 2>&1; then
+  echo "4. Setup namespace"
+  kubectl create ns "${APPLICATION}"
+fi
+kubectl config set-context --current --namespace="${APPLICATION}"
+kubectl -n "${APPLICATION}" create secret generic mkcert --from-file=rootCA.pem="$(mkcert -CAROOT)/rootCA.pem" || echo ok
+
+if ! kubectl get configmap certifi -n "${APPLICATION}" >/dev/null 2>&1; then
+  echo "5. Inject our custom CA in a configmap for certifi"
+  curl https://raw.githubusercontent.com/certifi/python-certifi/refs/heads/master/certifi/cacert.pem -o /tmp/cacert.pem
+  cat "$(mkcert -CAROOT)/rootCA.pem" >>/tmp/cacert.pem
+  kubectl -n "${APPLICATION}" create configmap certifi --from-file=cacert.pem=/tmp/cacert.pem
+  kubectl -n "${APPLICATION}" create secret generic certifi --from-file=/tmp/cacert.pem || echo ok
+fi
+
+echo "5b. Smoke test: the ingress chain answers on https://127.0.0.1"
+# Before Tilt deploys the app this returns the styled 404 from the default
+# backend — that still proves LB -> controller works. 000 means the
+# LoadBalancer is not bound to localhost.
+HTTP_CODE=$(curl -sk -o /dev/null -w '%{http_code}' --max-time 10 https://127.0.0.1/ || true)
+if [ "${HTTP_CODE}" = "000" ]; then
+  echo "⚠️  Nothing answered on https://127.0.0.1 — check the LoadBalancer:"
+  echo "    kubectl -n ingress-nginx get svc ingress-nginx-controller"
+else
+  echo "✅ Ingress reachable (HTTP ${HTTP_CODE})"
+fi
+
+echo "6. Check pod readiness across all namespaces..."
+
+sleep_interval=10
+
+echo "Initial wait time: $((sleep_interval * 2)) seconds…"
+sleep $((sleep_interval * 2))
+
+check_pods_ready() {
+    local max_attempts=60  # Maximum number of attempts (10 minutes with 10s intervals)
+    local attempt=1
+
+    while [ $attempt -le $max_attempts ]; do
+        echo "Attempt $attempt/$max_attempts - Checking pod status..."
+
+        not_ready_count=$( kubectl get po -A --no-headers | grep -v -E "Running|Completed"| wc -l | tr -d ' ')
+
+        if [ "$not_ready_count" -eq 0 ]; then
+            echo "✅ All pods are ready!"
+            return 0
+        else
+            echo "⏳ $not_ready_count pod(s) still not ready. Waiting $sleep_interval seconds…"
+            sleep $sleep_interval
+            ((attempt++))
+        fi
+    done
+
+    echo "❌ Timeout: Some pods are still not ready after 10 minutes"
+    echo "Final pod status:"
+    kubectl get po -A
+    return 1
+}
+
+if check_pods_ready; then
+    echo "🎉 Cluster is fully ready!"
+else
+    echo "⚠️  Some pods may need manual intervention"
+    exit 1
+fi

compose.yml

@@ -14,9 +14,6 @@ services:
     image: sj26/mailcatcher:latest
     ports:
       - "1081:1080"
-    networks:
-      - default
-      - lasuite
 
   minio:
     user: ${DOCKER_USER:-1000}
@@ -36,13 +33,6 @@ services:
     command: minio server --console-address :9001 /data
     volumes:
       - ./data/media:/data
-    networks:
-      default:
-        # The backend containers also sit on lasuite-network, where Drive's own
-        # minio answers to "minio" as well. They address this one by an alias no
-        # other stack uses, so the two can never race in DNS.
-        aliases:
-          - meet-minio
 
   createbuckets:
     image: minio/mc
@@ -103,7 +93,6 @@ services:
     networks:
       - resource-server
       - default
-      - lasuite
 
   celery-dev:
     user: ${DOCKER_USER:-1000}
@@ -120,9 +109,6 @@ services:
       - /app/.venv
     depends_on:
       - app-dev
-    networks:
-      - default
-      - lasuite
 
   app:
     build:
@@ -210,32 +196,32 @@ services:
       - env.d/development/kc_postgresql
 
   keycloak:
-    image: quay.io/keycloak/keycloak:26.3.2
+    image: quay.io/keycloak/keycloak:20.0.1
     volumes:
       - ./docker/auth/realm.json:/opt/keycloak/data/import/realm.json
     command:
       - start-dev
       - --features=preview
       - --import-realm
-      - --proxy-headers=xforwarded
-      - --hostname=http://localhost:8083
+      - --proxy=edge
+      - --hostname-url=http://localhost:8083
+      - --hostname-admin-url=http://localhost:8083/
       - --hostname-strict=false
+      - --hostname-strict-https=false
     environment:
-      KC_BOOTSTRAP_ADMIN_USERNAME: admin
-      KC_BOOTSTRAP_ADMIN_PASSWORD: admin
+      KEYCLOAK_ADMIN: admin
+      KEYCLOAK_ADMIN_PASSWORD: admin
       KC_DB: postgres
       KC_DB_URL_HOST: kc_postgresql
       KC_DB_URL_DATABASE: keycloak
       KC_DB_PASSWORD: pass
       KC_DB_USERNAME: meet
       KC_DB_SCHEMA: public
+      PROXY_ADDRESS_FORWARDING: 'true'
     ports:
       - "8080:8080"
     depends_on:
       - kc_postgresql
-    networks:
-      - default
-      - lasuite
 
   livekit:
     image: livekit/livekit-server
@@ -352,6 +338,3 @@ services:
 networks:
   default:
   resource-server:
-  lasuite:
-    name: lasuite-network
-    external: true

docker/auth/realm.json

@@ -56,9 +56,7 @@
           "value": "meet"
         }
       ],
-      "realmRoles": [
-        "user"
-      ]
+      "realmRoles": ["user"]
     },
     {
       "username": "user-e2e-chromium",
@@ -72,9 +70,7 @@
           "value": "password-e2e-chromium"
         }
       ],
-      "realmRoles": [
-        "user"
-      ]
+      "realmRoles": ["user"]
     },
     {
       "username": "user-e2e-webkit",
@@ -88,9 +84,7 @@
           "value": "password-e2e-webkit"
         }
       ],
-      "realmRoles": [
-        "user"
-      ]
+      "realmRoles": ["user"]
     },
     {
       "username": "user-e2e-firefox",
@@ -104,9 +98,7 @@
           "value": "password-e2e-firefox"
         }
       ],
-      "realmRoles": [
-        "user"
-      ]
+      "realmRoles": ["user"]
     }
   ],
   "roles": {
@@ -126,15 +118,9 @@
         "description": "${role_default-roles}",
         "composite": "true",
         "composites": {
-          "realm": [
-            "offline_access",
-            "uma_authorization"
-          ],
+          "realm": ["offline_access", "uma_authorization"],
           "client": {
-            "account": [
-              "view-profile",
-              "manage-account"
-            ]
+            "account": ["view-profile", "manage-account"]
           }
         },
         "clientRole": "false",
@@ -283,9 +269,7 @@
           "composite": "true",
           "composites": {
             "client": {
-              "realm-management": [
-                "query-clients"
-              ]
+              "realm-management": ["query-clients"]
             }
           },
           "clientRole": "true",
@@ -308,10 +292,7 @@
           "composite": "true",
           "composites": {
             "client": {
-              "realm-management": [
-                "query-users",
-                "query-groups"
-              ]
+              "realm-management": ["query-users", "query-groups"]
             }
           },
           "clientRole": "true",
@@ -387,9 +368,7 @@
           "composite": "true",
           "composites": {
             "client": {
-              "account": [
-                "view-consent"
-              ]
+              "account": ["view-consent"]
             }
           },
           "clientRole": "true",
@@ -421,9 +400,7 @@
           "composite": "true",
           "composites": {
             "client": {
-              "account": [
-                "manage-account-links"
-              ]
+              "account": ["manage-account-links"]
             }
           },
           "clientRole": "true",
@@ -478,9 +455,7 @@
     "clientRole": "false",
     "containerId": "ccf4fd40-4286-474d-854a-4714282a8bec"
   },
-  "requiredCredentials": [
-    "password"
-  ],
+  "requiredCredentials": ["password"],
   "otpPolicyType": "totp",
   "otpPolicyAlgorithm": "HmacSHA1",
   "otpPolicyInitialCounter": 0,
@@ -488,14 +463,9 @@
   "otpPolicyLookAheadWindow": 1,
   "otpPolicyPeriod": 30,
   "otpPolicyCodeReusable": "false",
-  "otpSupportedApplications": [
-    "totpAppGoogleName",
-    "totpAppFreeOTPName"
-  ],
+  "otpSupportedApplications": ["totpAppGoogleName", "totpAppFreeOTPName"],
   "webAuthnPolicyRpEntityName": "keycloak",
-  "webAuthnPolicySignatureAlgorithms": [
-    "ES256"
-  ],
+  "webAuthnPolicySignatureAlgorithms": ["ES256"],
   "webAuthnPolicyRpId": "",
   "webAuthnPolicyAttestationConveyancePreference": "not specified",
   "webAuthnPolicyAuthenticatorAttachment": "not specified",
@@ -505,9 +475,7 @@
   "webAuthnPolicyAvoidSameAuthenticatorRegister": "false",
   "webAuthnPolicyAcceptableAaguids": [],
   "webAuthnPolicyPasswordlessRpEntityName": "keycloak",
-  "webAuthnPolicyPasswordlessSignatureAlgorithms": [
-    "ES256"
-  ],
+  "webAuthnPolicyPasswordlessSignatureAlgorithms": ["ES256"],
   "webAuthnPolicyPasswordlessRpId": "",
   "webAuthnPolicyPasswordlessAttestationConveyancePreference": "not specified",
   "webAuthnPolicyPasswordlessAuthenticatorAttachment": "not specified",
@@ -519,19 +487,14 @@
   "scopeMappings": [
     {
       "clientScope": "offline_access",
-      "roles": [
-        "offline_access"
-      ]
+      "roles": ["offline_access"]
     }
   ],
   "clientScopeMappings": {
     "account": [
       {
         "client": "account-console",
-        "roles": [
-          "manage-account",
-          "view-groups"
-        ]
+        "roles": ["manage-account", "view-groups"]
       }
     ]
   },
@@ -546,9 +509,7 @@
       "enabled": "true",
       "alwaysDisplayInConsole": "false",
       "clientAuthenticatorType": "client-secret",
-      "redirectUris": [
-        "/realms/meet/account/*"
-      ],
+      "redirectUris": ["/realms/meet/account/*"],
       "webOrigins": [],
       "notBefore": 0,
       "bearerOnly": "false",
@@ -590,9 +551,7 @@
       "enabled": "true",
       "alwaysDisplayInConsole": "false",
       "clientAuthenticatorType": "client-secret",
-      "redirectUris": [
-        "/realms/meet/account/*"
-      ],
+      "redirectUris": ["/realms/meet/account/*"],
       "webOrigins": [],
       "notBefore": 0,
       "bearerOnly": "false",
@@ -837,12 +796,8 @@
       "enabled": "true",
       "alwaysDisplayInConsole": "false",
       "clientAuthenticatorType": "client-secret",
-      "redirectUris": [
-        "/admin/meet/console/*"
-      ],
-      "webOrigins": [
-        "+"
-      ],
+      "redirectUris": ["/admin/meet/console/*"],
+      "webOrigins": ["+"],
       "notBefore": 0,
       "bearerOnly": "false",
       "consentRequired": "false",
@@ -890,142 +845,6 @@
         "offline_access",
         "microprofile-jwt"
       ]
-    },
-    {
-      "clientId": "drive",
-      "name": "",
-      "description": "",
-      "rootUrl": "",
-      "adminUrl": "",
-      "baseUrl": "",
-      "surrogateAuthRequired": false,
-      "enabled": true,
-      "alwaysDisplayInConsole": false,
-      "clientAuthenticatorType": "client-secret",
-      "secret": "ThisIsAnExampleKeyForDevPurposeOnly",
-      "redirectUris": [
-        "http://localhost:3100/*",
-        "http://localhost:8171/*",
-        "http://localhost:8085/*"
-      ],
-      "webOrigins": [
-        "http://localhost:3100",
-        "http://localhost:8171",
-        "http://localhost:8085"
-      ],
-      "notBefore": 0,
-      "bearerOnly": false,
-      "consentRequired": false,
-      "standardFlowEnabled": true,
-      "implicitFlowEnabled": false,
-      "directAccessGrantsEnabled": false,
-      "serviceAccountsEnabled": false,
-      "publicClient": false,
-      "frontchannelLogout": true,
-      "protocol": "openid-connect",
-      "attributes": {
-        "access.token.lifespan": "-1",
-        "client.secret.creation.time": "1707820779",
-        "user.info.response.signature.alg": "RS256",
-        "post.logout.redirect.uris": "http://localhost:3100/*##http://localhost:8171/*##http://localhost:8085/*",
-        "oauth2.device.authorization.grant.enabled": "false",
-        "use.jwks.url": "false",
-        "backchannel.logout.revoke.offline.tokens": "false",
-        "use.refresh.tokens": "true",
-        "tls-client-certificate-bound-access-tokens": "false",
-        "oidc.ciba.grant.enabled": "false",
-        "backchannel.logout.session.required": "true",
-        "client_credentials.use_refresh_token": "false",
-        "acr.loa.map": "{}",
-        "require.pushed.authorization.requests": "false",
-        "display.on.consent.screen": "false",
-        "client.session.idle.timeout": "-1",
-        "token.response.type.bearer.lower-case": "false"
-      },
-      "authenticationFlowBindingOverrides": {},
-      "fullScopeAllowed": true,
-      "nodeReRegistrationTimeout": -1,
-      "defaultClientScopes": [
-        "web-origins",
-        "acr",
-        "roles",
-        "profile",
-        "email"
-      ],
-      "optionalClientScopes": [
-        "address",
-        "phone",
-        "offline_access",
-        "microprofile-jwt"
-      ]
-    },
-    {
-      "clientId": "deploycenter",
-      "name": "",
-      "description": "",
-      "rootUrl": "",
-      "adminUrl": "",
-      "baseUrl": "",
-      "surrogateAuthRequired": false,
-      "enabled": true,
-      "alwaysDisplayInConsole": false,
-      "clientAuthenticatorType": "client-secret",
-      "secret": "ThisIsAnExampleKeyForDevPurposeOnly",
-      "redirectUris": [
-        "http://localhost:3100/*",
-        "http://localhost:8171/*",
-        "http://localhost:8085/*"
-      ],
-      "webOrigins": [
-        "http://localhost:3100",
-        "http://localhost:8171",
-        "http://localhost:8085"
-      ],
-      "notBefore": 0,
-      "bearerOnly": false,
-      "consentRequired": false,
-      "standardFlowEnabled": true,
-      "implicitFlowEnabled": false,
-      "directAccessGrantsEnabled": false,
-      "serviceAccountsEnabled": false,
-      "publicClient": false,
-      "frontchannelLogout": true,
-      "protocol": "openid-connect",
-      "attributes": {
-        "access.token.lifespan": "-1",
-        "client.secret.creation.time": "1707820779",
-        "user.info.response.signature.alg": "RS256",
-        "post.logout.redirect.uris": "http://localhost:3100/*##http://localhost:8171/*##http://localhost:8085/*",
-        "oauth2.device.authorization.grant.enabled": "false",
-        "use.jwks.url": "false",
-        "backchannel.logout.revoke.offline.tokens": "false",
-        "use.refresh.tokens": "true",
-        "tls-client-certificate-bound-access-tokens": "false",
-        "oidc.ciba.grant.enabled": "false",
-        "backchannel.logout.session.required": "true",
-        "client_credentials.use_refresh_token": "false",
-        "acr.loa.map": "{}",
-        "require.pushed.authorization.requests": "false",
-        "display.on.consent.screen": "false",
-        "client.session.idle.timeout": "-1",
-        "token.response.type.bearer.lower-case": "false"
-      },
-      "authenticationFlowBindingOverrides": {},
-      "fullScopeAllowed": true,
-      "nodeReRegistrationTimeout": -1,
-      "defaultClientScopes": [
-        "web-origins",
-        "acr",
-        "roles",
-        "profile",
-        "email"
-      ],
-      "optionalClientScopes": [
-        "address",
-        "phone",
-        "offline_access",
-        "microprofile-jwt"
-      ]
     }
   ],
   "clientScopes": [
@@ -1563,9 +1382,7 @@
   },
   "smtpServer": {},
   "eventsEnabled": "false",
-  "eventsListeners": [
-    "jboss-logging"
-  ],
+  "eventsListeners": ["jboss-logging"],
   "enabledEventTypes": [],
   "adminEventsEnabled": "false",
   "adminEventsDetailsEnabled": "false",
@@ -1588,9 +1405,7 @@
         "subType": "anonymous",
         "subComponents": {},
         "config": {
-          "allow-default-scopes": [
-            "true"
-          ]
+          "allow-default-scopes": ["true"]
         }
       },
       {
@@ -1600,9 +1415,7 @@
         "subType": "anonymous",
         "subComponents": {},
         "config": {
-          "max-clients": [
-            "200"
-          ]
+          "max-clients": ["200"]
         }
       },
       {
@@ -1612,9 +1425,7 @@
         "subType": "authenticated",
         "subComponents": {},
         "config": {
-          "allow-default-scopes": [
-            "true"
-          ]
+          "allow-default-scopes": ["true"]
         }
       },
       {
@@ -1670,12 +1481,8 @@
         "subType": "anonymous",
         "subComponents": {},
         "config": {
-          "host-sending-registration-request-must-match": [
-            "true"
-          ],
-          "client-uris-must-match": [
-            "true"
-          ]
+          "host-sending-registration-request-must-match": ["true"],
+          "client-uris-must-match": ["true"]
         }
       }
     ],
@@ -1694,9 +1501,7 @@
         "providerId": "aes-generated",
         "subComponents": {},
         "config": {
-          "priority": [
-            "100"
-          ]
+          "priority": ["100"]
         }
       },
       {
@@ -1705,12 +1510,8 @@
         "providerId": "hmac-generated",
         "subComponents": {},
         "config": {
-          "priority": [
-            "100"
-          ],
-          "algorithm": [
-            "HS256"
-          ]
+          "priority": ["100"],
+          "algorithm": ["HS256"]
         }
       },
       {
@@ -1719,12 +1520,8 @@
         "providerId": "rsa-enc-generated",
         "subComponents": {},
         "config": {
-          "priority": [
-            "100"
-          ],
-          "algorithm": [
-            "RSA-OAEP"
-          ]
+          "priority": ["100"],
+          "algorithm": ["RSA-OAEP"]
         }
       },
       {
@@ -1733,9 +1530,7 @@
         "providerId": "rsa-generated",
         "subComponents": {},
         "config": {
-          "priority": [
-            "100"
-          ]
+          "priority": ["100"]
         }
       }
     ]

docs/developping_locally.md

@@ -143,3 +143,24 @@ $ make start-tilt-keycloak
 ```
 
 Monitor Tilt’s progress at [http://localhost:10350/](http://localhost:10350/). After Tilt actions finish, you can access the app at [https://meet.127.0.0.1.nip.io/](https://meet.127.0.0.1.nip.io/).
+
+### Alternative: OrbStack's built-in Kubernetes (macOS)
+
+If you use [OrbStack](https://orbstack.dev/) on macOS, you can run the stack on its built-in Kubernetes cluster instead of kind. It uses noticeably less RAM (no nested kubeadm node container) and no local registry is needed: OrbStack's cluster shares the Docker image store, so Tilt uses images directly without pushing.
+
+Enable Kubernetes in OrbStack (Settings > Kubernetes), then:
+
+```shellscript
+$ make build-k8s-cluster-orbstack
+```
+
+This installs ingress-nginx (exposed by OrbStack on `127.0.0.1:80/443`), the mkcert TLS certificates, and the CoreDNS rewrite for `*.127.0.0.1.nip.io`, then you start Tilt as usual:
+
+```shellscript
+$ make start-tilt-keycloak
+```
+
+Notes:
+- Ports 80/443 must be free: delete the kind cluster first if you used it (`kind delete cluster --name suite`).
+- If you "Reset Kubernetes" in OrbStack, re-run `make build-k8s-cluster-orbstack`.
+- kind remains the reference setup (matches CI and lets you pin the Kubernetes version).

docs/features/recording.md

@@ -126,90 +126,6 @@ RECORDING_STORAGE_EVENT_TOKEN = <token>
 > Questions? Open an issue on [GitHub](https://github.com/suitenumerique/meet/issues/new?assignees=&labels=bug&template=Bug_report.md) or join our [Matrix community](https://matrix.to/#/#meet-official:matrix.org).
 
 
-## Push recordings to Drive
-
-Once a recording is over, it can be pushed to the main workspace of the user who
-started it in [Drive](https://github.com/suitenumerique/drive), on top of staying
-in the object storage. The file is streamed from the object storage to Drive: it
-is never fully held in the worker's memory nor written to its disk.
-
-Drive is called as an OIDC resource server, following its
-[resource server documentation](https://github.com/suitenumerique/drive/blob/main/docs/resource_server.md):
-
-```mermaid
-sequenceDiagram
-    participant User
-    participant Backend as Django Backend
-    participant Worker as Celery Worker
-    participant Storage as Object Storage
-    participant Drive
-
-    User->>Backend: POST /api/v1.0/rooms/{id}/start-recording/
-    Backend->>Backend: Park the user's OIDC access token (encrypted)
-
-    Note over Backend: Recording in progress...
-
-    Storage->>Backend: Storage event notification
-    Backend->>Worker: Schedule push_recording
-
-    Worker->>Drive: GET /items/ (as the user)
-    Drive-->>Worker: Main workspace
-    Worker->>Drive: POST /items/{workspace}/children/
-    Drive-->>Worker: Item + presigned upload URL
-    Worker->>Storage: GET recording (streamed)
-    Worker->>Drive: PUT presigned URL (relayed chunk by chunk)
-    Worker->>Drive: POST /items/{item}/upload-ended/
-    Worker->>Backend: Drop the parked access token
-```
-
-### Special requirements
-
-- Drive configured as an OIDC resource server, accepting Meet's audience
-  (`OIDC_RS_ALLOWED_AUDIENCES` must contain Meet's client id), with the `items`
-  endpoint allowing the `list`, `children` and `upload_ended` actions.
-- `OIDC_STORE_ACCESS_TOKEN` enabled on Meet, along with
-  `OIDC_STORE_REFRESH_TOKEN_KEY`, the Fernet key encrypting the parked token.
-
-> [!CAUTION]
-> This is a proof of concept: the access token is captured when the recording
-> starts and assumed to still be valid when the recording ends. Long recordings
-> may therefore fail to be pushed. Exchanging it for a long-lived, narrowly
-> scoped token ([RFC 8693](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc8693)) is the
-> intended follow-up.
-
-### Configuration options
-
-| Option                                                | Type        | Default | Description                                                                                                                                        |
-| ----------------------------------------------------- | ----------- | ------- | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
-| **RECORDING_PUSH_TO_DRIVE_ENABLED**                   | Boolean     | `False` | Enable pushing recordings to the owner's Drive.                                                                                                     |
-| **DRIVE_API_BASE_URL**                                | String      | `None`  | Base URL of Drive's external API, e.g. `https://drive.example.com/external_api/v1.0`.                                                                |
-| **RECORDING_PUSH_TO_DRIVE_SIGNED_URL_EXPIRY_SECONDS** | Integer     | `3600`  | Lifetime of the signed URL the worker downloads the recording from.                                                                                 |
-| **OIDC_STORE_ACCESS_TOKEN**                           | Boolean     | `False` | Keep the user's access token in the session, required to call Drive on their behalf.                                                                 |
-| **OIDC_STORE_REFRESH_TOKEN_KEY**                      | Secret/File | `None`  | Fernet key encrypting OIDC tokens at rest. Generate one with `Fernet.generate_key()`.                                                                |
-| **DRIVE_UPLOAD_STORAGE_NETLOC**                       | String      | `None`  | Development only: `host:port` to reach Drive's object storage at, when the domain Drive signs its upload URLs with only resolves from a browser.     |
-
-### Local development
-
-Meet and Drive run as two separate compose projects, joined by the external
-`lasuite-network` (`make create-docker-network`). Meet's backend containers reach
-Drive's nginx at `drive-nginx:8083` and its object storage at `drive-minio:9000`.
-
-On the Drive side:
-
-```bash
-OIDC_RESOURCE_SERVER_ENABLED=True
-OIDC_RS_CLIENT_ID=drive
-OIDC_RS_CLIENT_SECRET=ThisIsAnExampleKeyForDevPurposeOnly
-OIDC_RS_AUDIENCE_CLAIM=client_id
-OIDC_RS_ALLOWED_AUDIENCES=meet
-```
-
-`DRIVE_UPLOAD_STORAGE_NETLOC` is needed there because Drive signs its upload URLs
-with `localhost:9100`, which does not resolve from Meet's containers. The
-presigned signature covers the `Host` header, so the backend keeps announcing the
-signed host and only swaps the address it connects to.
-
-
 ## LiveKit Egress
 
 La Suite Meet uses LiveKit Egress to record room sessions. For reference, see the [LiveKit Egress repository](https://github.com/livekit/egress) and the [official documentation](https://docs.livekit.io/home/egress/overview/).

src/backend/core/api/feature_flag.py

@@ -16,6 +16,7 @@ class FeatureFlag:
         "file_upload": "FILE_UPLOAD_ENABLED",
         "addons": "ADDONS_ENABLED",
         "application": "APPLICATION_ENABLED",
+        "user_access_token": "USER_ACCESS_TOKEN_ENABLED",
     }
 
     @classmethod

src/backend/core/api/serializers.py

@@ -580,3 +580,25 @@ class ExternalProcessEventSerializer(BaseValidationOnlySerializer):
     # useless bad requests
     type = serializers.CharField(required=False, allow_null=True, allow_blank=True)
     status = serializers.CharField(required=False, allow_null=True, allow_blank=True)
+
+
+class TransitCodeSerializer(BaseValidationOnlySerializer):
+    """Validate the single-use transit code sent to the exchange endpoint."""
+
+    # todo if I can pass the max length directly to the char field
+    code = serializers.CharField(max_length=255, trim_whitespace=True)
+
+    def validate_code(self, value):
+        """Reject codes whose length cannot match a generated one.
+
+        `secrets.token_urlsafe(nbytes)` produces (4 * nbytes + 2) // 3
+        url-safe characters. Checking the length against the configured
+        TRANSIT_CODE_NBYTES makes malformed codes fail fast with a 400,
+        before any cache lookup.
+        """
+        expected_length = (4 * settings.TRANSIT_CODE_NBYTES + 2) // 3
+
+        if len(value) != expected_length:
+            raise serializers.ValidationError("Invalid transit code format.")
+
+        return value

src/backend/core/api/throttling.py

@@ -73,3 +73,14 @@ class CreationCallbackAnonRateThrottle(MonitoredAnonRateThrottle):
     """Throttle Anonymous user requesting room generation callback"""
 
     scope = "creation_callback"
+
+
+class ExchangeAccessTokenAnonRateThrottle(MonitoredAnonRateThrottle):
+    """Throttle anonymous transit code exchange attempts.
+
+    Abuse mitigation only, not a security boundary: DRF throttling is
+    best-effort. The security of the exchange rests on the codes'
+    entropy and single use.
+    """
+
+    scope = "exchange_access_token"

src/backend/core/api/viewsets.py

@@ -69,6 +69,7 @@ from core.recording.worker.mediator import (
     WorkerServiceMediator,
 )
 from core.services.invitation import InvitationService
+from core.services.jwt_token import JwtTokenService
 from core.services.livekit_events import (
     LiveKitEventsService,
     LiveKitWebhookError,
@@ -93,6 +94,7 @@ from core.services.room_roles import (
     RoomRoleService,
 )
 from core.services.subtitle import SubtitleException, SubtitleService
+from core.services.transit_code import TransitCodeService
 from core.tasks.file import process_file_deletion
 
 from ..authentication.livekit import LiveKitTokenAuthentication
@@ -229,6 +231,76 @@ class UserViewSet(
             self.serializer_class(request.user, context=context).data
         )
 
+    @decorators.action(
+        detail=False,
+        methods=["post"],
+        url_path="exchange-access-token",
+        permission_classes=[],
+        throttle_classes=[throttling.ExchangeAccessTokenAnonRateThrottle],
+    )
+    @FeatureFlag.require("user_access_token")
+    def exchange_access_token(self, request):
+        """Exchange a single-use transit code for a user access token.
+
+        The endpoint is unauthenticated: the transit code itself, an opaque
+        random string obtained through the external API and delivered to
+        the embedded frontend via a URL fragment, is the credential. Each
+        code can be exchanged exactly once (consuming it deletes it from
+        the cache); replaying a consumed code is denied and logged.
+
+        The issued JWT authenticates the user the code was minted for on
+        the whole core API, exactly like a session cookie would (similar
+        to lib-jitsi-meet's token authentication), and never appears in
+        any URL. Role-based permissions apply unchanged.
+        """
+        serializer = serializers.TransitCodeSerializer(data=request.data)
+        serializer.is_valid(raise_exception=True)
+
+        code_data = TransitCodeService().consume_code(serializer.validated_data["code"])
+
+        if code_data is None:
+            logger.warning("Invalid, expired or already used transit code")
+            raise drf_exceptions.PermissionDenied(
+                "Invalid, expired or already used transit code."
+            )
+
+        # Re-check the user at exchange time so that a deactivation after
+        # the transit code was minted is taken into account.
+        try:
+            user = models.User.objects.get(id=code_data["user_id"], is_active=True)
+        except models.User.DoesNotExist as excpt:
+            raise drf_exceptions.PermissionDenied(
+                "This account can no longer access the application."
+            ) from excpt
+
+        token_service = JwtTokenService(
+            secret_key=settings.USER_ACCESS_TOKEN_SECRET_KEY,
+            algorithm=settings.USER_ACCESS_TOKEN_ALG,
+            issuer=settings.USER_ACCESS_TOKEN_ISSUER,
+            audience=settings.USER_ACCESS_TOKEN_AUDIENCE,
+            expiration_seconds=settings.USER_ACCESS_TOKEN_TTL,
+            token_type=settings.USER_ACCESS_TOKEN_TYPE,
+        )
+
+        # todo - discuss wether it's the relevant scope
+        data = token_service.generate_jwt(
+            user,
+            "user:access",
+            {
+                "token_type": "user_access",
+                "client_id": code_data.get("client_id", "unknown"),
+            },
+        )
+
+        # Log for auditing
+        logger.info(
+            "User access token issued from transit code: user_id=%s, client_id=%s",
+            user.id,
+            code_data.get("client_id", "unknown"),
+        )
+
+        return drf_response.Response(data)
+
 
 class RoomViewSet(
     mixins.CreateModelMixin,
@@ -364,33 +436,6 @@ class RoomViewSet(
                 room.id,
             )
 
-    @staticmethod
-    def _park_drive_credentials(request, recording):
-        """Keep the OIDC access token needed to push the recording to Drive later.
-
-        Pushing happens long after this request, when the egress is over and the
-        user is gone, so the token has to be parked now.
-
-        POC limitation: we assume the token is still valid by then. The target
-        design is a token exchange (RFC 8693) performed here, to get a long-lived
-        token narrowly scoped to that upload.
-        """
-
-        if not settings.RECORDING_PUSH_TO_DRIVE_ENABLED:
-            return
-
-        access_token = request.session.get("oidc_access_token")
-
-        if not access_token:
-            logger.warning(
-                "No OIDC access token in session, recording %s will not be pushed "
-                "to Drive. Is OIDC_STORE_ACCESS_TOKEN enabled?",
-                recording.id,
-            )
-            return
-
-        recording.set_owner_access_token(access_token)
-
     @decorators.action(
         detail=True,
         methods=["post"],
@@ -426,7 +471,6 @@ class RoomViewSet(
                     role=models.RoleChoices.OWNER,
                     recording=recording,
                 )
-                self._park_drive_credentials(request, recording)
 
         except (DjangoValidationError, IntegrityError):
             # DjangoValidationError covers the Python-level check (full_clean);

src/backend/core/authentication/user_token.py

@@ -0,0 +1,71 @@
+"""User access JWT authentication for the Meet core API.
+
+Allows an embedded frontend (e.g. rendered in an iframe, where third-party
+session cookies are blocked) to authenticate requests on the core API with
+a JWT, obtained by exchanging a single-use transit code (see
+core.services.transit_code and the users exchange-access-token endpoint)
+and passed as a Bearer header. The JWT itself never appears in any URL.
+
+Similar to lib-jitsi-meet's token authentication, the token is bound to a
+user, not to a resource: once authenticated, the request is treated
+exactly like a session-authenticated one, and the existing role-based
+permissions apply unchanged.
+"""
+
+import logging
+
+from django.conf import settings
+
+from rest_framework import exceptions
+
+from core.external_api.authentication import BaseJWTAuthentication
+
+logger = logging.getLogger(__name__)
+
+USER_ACCESS_TOKEN_TYPE_CLAIM = "user_access"  # noqa: S105
+
+
+class UserAccessJWTAuthentication(BaseJWTAuthentication):
+    """JWT authentication for user access tokens.
+
+    Validates user access tokens issued by the users exchange-access-token
+    endpoint and authenticates the user they were issued for. A bearer
+    token that does not verify against the user access token secret is
+    deferred to the next authentication backend; a token that does verify
+    but carries wrong claims is rejected.
+
+    When the feature is disabled (USER_ACCESS_TOKEN_ENABLED=False), the
+    backend is entirely inert: `BaseJWTAuthentication.authenticate`
+    returns None before reading the Authorization header, deferring every
+    request to the next authentication backend.
+    """
+
+    def __init__(self):
+        """Initialize the backend with user access token settings."""
+        super().__init__(
+            secret_key=settings.USER_ACCESS_TOKEN_SECRET_KEY,
+            algorithm=settings.USER_ACCESS_TOKEN_ALG,
+            issuer=settings.USER_ACCESS_TOKEN_ISSUER,
+            audience=settings.USER_ACCESS_TOKEN_AUDIENCE,
+            expiration_seconds=settings.USER_ACCESS_TOKEN_TTL,
+            token_type=settings.USER_ACCESS_TOKEN_TYPE,
+            is_enabled=settings.USER_ACCESS_TOKEN_ENABLED,
+        )
+
+    def validate_payload(self, payload):
+        """Validate the token type and the issuance-audit claim.
+
+        Raises:
+            AuthenticationFailed: If the token verified against the user
+                access token secret but does not carry the expected claims.
+        """
+        if payload.get("token_type") != USER_ACCESS_TOKEN_TYPE_CLAIM:
+            logger.warning("Wrong 'token_type' in user access token payload")
+            raise exceptions.AuthenticationFailed("Invalid token type.")
+
+        # Every token we issue carries the client_id of the application the
+        # transit code was minted for: its absence means the token does not
+        # come from the exchange endpoint.
+        if not payload.get("client_id"):
+            logger.warning("Missing 'client_id' in user access token payload")
+            raise exceptions.AuthenticationFailed("Invalid token claims.")

src/backend/core/external_api/permissions.py

@@ -86,6 +86,14 @@ class HasRequiredRoomScope(BaseScopePermission):
     }
 
 
+class HasRequiredUserScope(BaseScopePermission):
+    """Scope-based permissions for the external user endpoints."""
+
+    scope_map = {
+        "generate_transit_code": models.ApplicationScope.USERS_SESSION,
+    }
+
+
 class RoomPermissions(permissions.BasePermission):
     """Permissions applying to the room API endpoint."""
 

src/backend/core/external_api/viewsets.py

@@ -22,6 +22,7 @@ from rest_framework import (
 from core import analytics, api, models
 from core.api.feature_flag import FeatureFlag
 from core.services.jwt_token import JwtTokenService
+from core.services.transit_code import TransitCodeService
 
 from ..services.provisional_user_service import (
     ProvisionalUserCreationDisabledError,
@@ -218,3 +219,62 @@ class RoomViewSet(
                 "$set": {"email": self.request.user.email},
             },
         )
+
+
+class UserViewSet(viewsets.GenericViewSet):
+    """Application-delegated API for user operations.
+
+    Provides JWT-authenticated access to user operations for external
+    applications acting on behalf of users. All operations are
+    scope-based. Meant to grow with the other user actions exposed to
+    third parties.
+
+    Supported operations:
+    - transit-code: Mint a single-use transit code for the delegated user
+      (requires 'users:session' scope)
+    """
+
+    authentication_classes = [
+        authentication.ApplicationJWTAuthentication,
+        ResourceServerAuthentication,
+    ]
+    permission_classes = [
+        api.permissions.IsAuthenticated & permissions.HasRequiredUserScope
+    ]
+
+    @decorators.action(
+        detail=False,
+        methods=["post"],
+        url_path="transit-code",
+        url_name="transit-code",
+    )
+    @FeatureFlag.require("user_access_token")
+    def generate_transit_code(self, request):
+        """Mint a transit code for the delegated user.
+
+        Returns a short-lived, single-use opaque code to pass to an embedded
+        frontend (e.g. via a URL fragment when cookies are unavailable). The
+        frontend exchanges it once on
+        POST /api/v1.0/users/exchange-access-token/ for a JWT access token,
+        equivalent to session-cookie authentication and never exposed in a URL.
+        """
+        auth_method = type(request.successful_authenticator).__name__
+        client_id = (request.auth or {}).get("client_id", "unknown")
+
+        code = TransitCodeService().create_code(request.user, client_id=client_id)
+
+        # Log for auditing
+        logger.info(
+            "Transit code issued: user_id=%s, client_id=%s, auth_method=%s",
+            request.user.id,
+            client_id,
+            auth_method,
+        )
+
+        return drf_response.Response(
+            {
+                "transit_code": code,
+                "expires_in": settings.TRANSIT_CODE_TTL,
+            },
+            status=drf_status.HTTP_200_OK,
+        )

src/backend/core/migrations/0022_alter_application_scopes.py

@@ -0,0 +1,19 @@
+# Generated by Django 5.2.14 on 2026-07-31 18:27
+
+import django.contrib.postgres.fields
+from django.db import migrations, models
+
+
+class Migration(migrations.Migration):
+
+    dependencies = [
+        ('core', '0021_recording_external_process_id_alter_recording_status'),
+    ]
+
+    operations = [
+        migrations.AlterField(
+            model_name='application',
+            name='scopes',
+            field=django.contrib.postgres.fields.ArrayField(base_field=models.CharField(choices=[('rooms:create', 'Create rooms'), ('rooms:list', 'List rooms'), ('rooms:retrieve', 'Retrieve room details'), ('rooms:update', 'Update rooms'), ('rooms:delete', 'Delete rooms'), ('users:session', 'Create user session tokens')], max_length=50), blank=True, default=list, size=None),
+        ),
+    ]

src/backend/core/migrations/0022_alter_recording_status.py

@@ -1,18 +0,0 @@
-# Generated by Django 5.2.14 on 2026-07-20 00:00
-
-from django.db import migrations, models
-
-
-class Migration(migrations.Migration):
-
-    dependencies = [
-        ('core', '0021_recording_external_process_id_alter_recording_status'),
-    ]
-
-    operations = [
-        migrations.AlterField(
-            model_name='recording',
-            name='status',
-            field=models.CharField(choices=[('initiated', 'Initiated'), ('active', 'Active'), ('stopped', 'Stopped'), ('saved', 'Saved'), ('aborted', 'Aborted'), ('failed', 'Failed'), ('failed_to_start', 'Failed to Start'), ('failed_to_stop', 'Failed to Stop'), ('notification_succeeded', 'Notification succeeded'), ('external_process_successful', 'External process successful'), ('external_process_failed', 'External process failed')], default='initiated', max_length=50),
-        ),
-    ]

src/backend/core/migrations/0023_recording_owner_access_token.py

@@ -1,24 +0,0 @@
-# Generated by Django 5.2.14 on 2026-07-29 00:00
-
-from django.db import migrations, models
-
-
-class Migration(migrations.Migration):
-
-    dependencies = [
-        ("core", "0022_alter_recording_status"),
-    ]
-
-    operations = [
-        migrations.AddField(
-            model_name="recording",
-            name="owner_access_token",
-            field=models.TextField(
-                blank=True,
-                editable=False,
-                help_text="Encrypted OIDC access token of the user who started the recording, used to push the recording to their Drive on their behalf. Dropped as soon as the push has been attempted.",
-                null=True,
-                verbose_name="Owner access token",
-            ),
-        ),
-    ]

src/backend/core/models.py

@@ -613,17 +613,6 @@ class Recording(BaseModel):
         verbose_name=_("External Process ID"),
         help_text=_("ID of the external process associated with the recording."),
     )
-    owner_access_token = models.TextField(
-        null=True,
-        blank=True,
-        editable=False,
-        verbose_name=_("Owner access token"),
-        help_text=_(
-            "Encrypted OIDC access token of the user who started the recording, "
-            "used to push the recording to their Drive on their behalf. "
-            "Dropped as soon as the push has been attempted."
-        ),
-    )
 
     class Meta:
         db_table = "meet_recording"
@@ -726,39 +715,6 @@ class Recording(BaseModel):
 
         return self.expired_at < timezone.now()
 
-    def set_owner_access_token(self, access_token: str) -> None:
-        """Park the OIDC access token of the user who started the recording.
-
-        It is stored encrypted, and only long enough for the worker to push the
-        recording to that user's Drive once the recording is over.
-        """
-
-        self.owner_access_token = utils.encrypt_secret(access_token)
-        self.save(update_fields=["owner_access_token", "updated_at"])
-
-    def get_owner_access_token(self) -> Optional[str]:
-        """Return the parked OIDC access token, or None if there is none left."""
-
-        if not self.owner_access_token:
-            return None
-
-        try:
-            return utils.decrypt_secret(self.owner_access_token)
-        except utils.SecretDecryptionError:
-            logger.exception(
-                "Could not decrypt the access token of recording %s", self.id
-            )
-            return None
-
-    def clear_owner_access_token(self) -> None:
-        """Drop the parked access token, it is a user credential."""
-
-        if self.owner_access_token is None:
-            return
-
-        self.owner_access_token = None
-        self.save(update_fields=["owner_access_token", "updated_at"])
-
 
 class RecordingAccess(BaseAccess):
     """Relation model to give access to a recording for a user or a team with a role."""
@@ -813,6 +769,7 @@ class ApplicationScope(models.TextChoices):
     ROOMS_RETRIEVE = "rooms:retrieve", _("Retrieve room details")
     ROOMS_UPDATE = "rooms:update", _("Update rooms")
     ROOMS_DELETE = "rooms:delete", _("Delete rooms")
+    USERS_SESSION = "users:session", _("Create user session tokens")
 
 
 class Application(BaseModel):

src/backend/core/recording/event/notification.py

@@ -19,7 +19,6 @@ from livekit import api as livekit_api
 
 from core import models, utils
 from core.analytics import UserFeatureFlag, is_user_feature_flag_enabled
-from core.tasks.push_recording import push_recording
 from core.utils import generate_download_s3_url
 
 logger = logging.getLogger(__name__)
@@ -46,17 +45,7 @@ class NotificationService:
     """Service for processing recordings and notifying external services."""
 
     def notify_external_services(self, recording):
-        """Process a recording, then push it to the owner's Drive."""
-
-        try:
-            return self._notify_by_mode(recording)
-        finally:
-            # Independent from the mode: the file itself is pushed to the owner's
-            # Drive, whether it is a screen recording or a transcript's audio.
-            self._push_recording_to_drive(recording)
-
-    def _notify_by_mode(self, recording):
-        """Route a recording to the services its mode calls for."""
+        """Process a recording based on its mode."""
 
         if recording.mode == models.RecordingModeChoices.TRANSCRIPT:
             return self._notify_summary_service(recording)
@@ -233,31 +222,6 @@ class NotificationService:
             f"Unknown summary service version: {settings.SUMMARY_SERVICE_VERSION}"
         )
 
-    @staticmethod
-    def _push_recording_to_drive(recording: models.Recording):
-        """Hand the recording over to the task pushing it to the owner's Drive.
-
-        Best effort: a failure here must not compromise the rest of the
-        notification flow, the recording itself is safe in object storage.
-        """
-
-        if not settings.RECORDING_PUSH_TO_DRIVE_ENABLED:
-            return
-
-        if not recording.owner_access_token:
-            logger.warning(
-                "No access token parked for recording %s, skipping the Drive push",
-                recording.id,
-            )
-            return
-
-        try:
-            push_recording.delay(str(recording.id))
-        except Exception:  # pylint: disable=broad-except
-            logger.exception(
-                "Could not schedule the Drive push of recording %s", recording.id
-            )
-
     @staticmethod
     def _notify_summary_service_v1(recording: models.Recording):
         """Notify summary service about a new recording."""

src/backend/core/services/drive.py

@@ -1,217 +0,0 @@
-"""Client for La Suite Drive's external API (OIDC resource server).
-
-Drive exposes `/external_api/v1.0/*` to applications holding an end user's OIDC
-access token. Uploading a file is a four step dance, documented in Drive's
-`docs/resource_server.md`:
-
-1. `GET  /items/` to locate the user's main workspace,
-2. `POST /items/{workspace_id}/children/` to create the file item, which returns
-   a presigned upload URL (the `policy`),
-3. `PUT  {policy}` to push the bytes to Drive's object storage,
-4. `POST /items/{item_id}/upload-ended/` to let Drive know the upload is over.
-
-Drive never fetches a URL on our behalf, so the bytes have to transit through
-whoever holds the user's token, i.e. us.
-"""
-
-import logging
-from urllib.parse import urlparse, urlunparse
-
-from django.conf import settings
-
-import requests
-
-logger = logging.getLogger(__name__)
-
-# (connect, read) timeouts, in seconds. The upload one is generous: it covers a
-# whole recording being relayed to Drive's object storage.
-API_TIMEOUT = (10, 30)
-UPLOAD_TIMEOUT = (10, 300)
-
-# Safety net when walking the paginated item list looking for the main workspace.
-MAX_WORKSPACE_PAGES = 10
-
-
-class DriveError(Exception):
-    """Raised when Drive's external API cannot fulfill a request."""
-
-
-class SizedStream:
-    """Read-only byte stream of a known size, suitable as a `requests` body.
-
-    `requests` falls back to a chunked transfer encoding when it cannot guess the
-    body size upfront, which presigned S3 uploads reject. Advertising the size
-    through `__len__` makes it send a plain `Content-Length` instead, while the
-    underlying stream is still consumed chunk by chunk.
-    """
-
-    def __init__(self, stream, length: int):
-        """Wrap `stream`, whose full content is `length` bytes long."""
-        self._stream = stream
-        self._length = length
-
-    def __len__(self) -> int:
-        """Return the total size of the stream, in bytes."""
-        return self._length
-
-    def __iter__(self):
-        """Iterate over the stream, required for `requests` to stream the body."""
-        return iter(self._stream)
-
-    def read(self, amt=None) -> bytes:
-        """Read up to `amt` bytes from the stream."""
-        return self._stream.read(amt)
-
-
-class DriveClient:
-    """Talk to Drive's external API on behalf of a user.
-
-    The client is bound to a single user access token: every call is performed
-    as that user, and Drive applies its own permissions accordingly.
-    """
-
-    def __init__(self, access_token: str, *, base_url: str | None = None):
-        """Prepare a session authenticated with the user's OIDC access token."""
-
-        self._base_url = (base_url or settings.DRIVE_API_BASE_URL or "").rstrip("/")
-
-        if not self._base_url:
-            raise DriveError(
-                "Drive API is not configured, set DRIVE_API_BASE_URL to enable it."
-            )
-
-        if not access_token:
-            raise DriveError("An access token is required to call Drive.")
-
-        self._session = requests.Session()
-        self._session.headers.update(
-            {
-                "Authorization": f"Bearer {access_token}",
-                "Content-Type": "application/json",
-            }
-        )
-
-    def __enter__(self):
-        """Allow use as a context manager, closing the session on exit."""
-        return self
-
-    def __exit__(self, *args):
-        """Close the underlying HTTP session."""
-        self.close()
-
-    def close(self):
-        """Release the underlying HTTP session."""
-        self._session.close()
-
-    def _request(self, method, path, **kwargs):
-        """Perform an authenticated call to the external API and return its body."""
-
-        url = f"{self._base_url}{path}"
-        kwargs.setdefault("timeout", API_TIMEOUT)
-
-        try:
-            response = self._session.request(method, url, **kwargs)
-            response.raise_for_status()
-        except requests.RequestException as exc:
-            raise DriveError(f"Drive call failed: {method} {url}") from exc
-
-        if not response.content:
-            return None
-
-        try:
-            return response.json()
-        except ValueError as exc:
-            raise DriveError(f"Drive returned a non-JSON body for {url}") from exc
-
-    def get_main_workspace(self) -> dict:
-        """Return the user's main workspace, the default destination for files."""
-
-        path = "/items/"
-
-        for _page in range(MAX_WORKSPACE_PAGES):
-            data = self._request("GET", path) or {}
-
-            for item in data.get("results") or []:
-                if item.get("main_workspace"):
-                    return item
-
-            next_url = data.get("next")
-            if not next_url:
-                break
-
-            # `next` is absolute; keep only what follows the API base URL.
-            path = next_url[len(self._base_url) :]
-
-        raise DriveError("No main workspace found for this user.")
-
-    def create_file(self, *, parent_id: str, filename: str) -> dict:
-        """Create a file item under `parent_id` and return it.
-
-        The returned item carries a `policy`: the presigned URL the content has
-        to be uploaded to.
-        """
-
-        item = self._request(
-            "POST",
-            f"/items/{parent_id}/children/",
-            json={"type": "file", "filename": filename},
-        )
-
-        if not item or not item.get("policy"):
-            raise DriveError(
-                f"Drive did not return an upload policy for file '{filename}'."
-            )
-
-        return item
-
-    @staticmethod
-    def _resolve_upload_target(policy_url: str) -> tuple[str, str | None]:
-        """Return the address to connect to, and the `Host` header to send.
-
-        Drive signs its upload URLs with the object storage domain meant for its
-        *browser* clients, which does not necessarily resolve from here — that is
-        the case in the split docker compose development setup. The presigned
-        signature covers the `Host` header, so we may only swap the address we
-        connect to and must keep announcing the original host.
-        """
-
-        override = settings.DRIVE_UPLOAD_STORAGE_NETLOC
-
-        if not override:
-            return policy_url, None
-
-        parsed = urlparse(policy_url)
-        return urlunparse(parsed._replace(netloc=override)), parsed.netloc
-
-    def upload_content(self, *, policy_url: str, stream, content_length, content_type):
-        """Push `stream` to the presigned URL, without buffering it as a whole."""
-
-        url, host_header = self._resolve_upload_target(policy_url)
-
-        headers = {
-            "Content-Type": content_type,
-            "Content-Length": str(content_length),
-            "x-amz-acl": "private",
-        }
-
-        if host_header:
-            headers["Host"] = host_header
-
-        try:
-            # A bare `requests.put`, not the authenticated session: the presigned
-            # URL carries its own credentials and the object storage rejects an
-            # extra `Authorization` header.
-            response = requests.put(
-                url,
-                data=SizedStream(stream, content_length),
-                headers=headers,
-                timeout=UPLOAD_TIMEOUT,
-            )
-            response.raise_for_status()
-        except requests.RequestException as exc:
-            raise DriveError("Upload to Drive's object storage failed.") from exc
-
-    def complete_upload(self, item_id: str) -> None:
-        """Tell Drive the upload is over, which makes the file available."""
-
-        self._request("POST", f"/items/{item_id}/upload-ended/", json={})

src/backend/core/services/transit_code.py

@@ -0,0 +1,74 @@
+"""Service handling the lifecycle of transit codes.
+
+A transit code is an opaque, cryptographically random, single-use code
+handed to an embedded frontend (through a URL fragment) so it can obtain a
+user access token on the core API without a session cookie. The code
+carries no information by itself: everything it references (user, client)
+is stored server-side in the cache, and consumed atomically on exchange.
+"""
+
+import hashlib
+import secrets
+
+from django.conf import settings
+from django.core.cache import cache
+
+
+class TransitCodeService:
+    """Create and consume single-use transit codes."""
+
+    @staticmethod
+    def _cache_key(code):
+        """Build the cache key for a code.
+
+        The code is hashed so that a dump of the cache never reveals
+        directly usable codes.
+        """
+        digest = hashlib.sha256(code.encode("utf-8")).hexdigest()
+        return f"{settings.TRANSIT_CODE_CACHE_PREFIX}:{digest}"
+
+    def create_code(self, user, client_id="unknown"):
+        """Generate a transit code for a user, and store it.
+
+        The code expires after TRANSIT_CODE_TTL seconds.
+
+        Returns:
+            str: The opaque code to hand to the client.
+        """
+        # Default 48 random bytes -> 64 url-safe characters, 384 bits of
+        # entropy: unguessable and safe to transit through a URL fragment.
+        code = secrets.token_urlsafe(settings.TRANSIT_CODE_NBYTES)
+
+        cache.set(
+            self._cache_key(code),
+            {
+                "user_id": str(user.id),
+                "client_id": client_id,
+            },
+            timeout=settings.TRANSIT_CODE_TTL,
+        )
+
+        return code
+
+    def consume_code(self, code):
+        """Consume a transit code, enforcing single use.
+
+        The code is deleted from the cache upon consumption. `cache.delete`
+        returns whether a key was actually deleted, so if two requests race
+        on the same code, only one of them wins.
+
+        Returns:
+            dict | None: The data stored at creation time ('user_id',
+                'client_id'), or None if the code is unknown, expired or
+                already consumed.
+        """
+        if not code:
+            return None
+
+        key = self._cache_key(code)
+        data = cache.get(key)
+
+        if data is None or not cache.delete(key):
+            return None
+
+        return data

src/backend/core/tasks/__init__.py

@@ -1,11 +0,0 @@
-"""Asynchronous tasks of the core application.
-
-Importing the task modules here is what makes Celery's `autodiscover_tasks`
-register them: it only imports the `core.tasks` package itself, never its
-submodules.
-"""
-
-from core.tasks.file import process_file_deletion
-from core.tasks.push_recording import push_recording
-
-__all__ = ["process_file_deletion", "push_recording"]

src/backend/core/tasks/_task.py

@@ -1,7 +1,4 @@
-"""Celery-optional task decorator."""
-
 # ruff: noqa: PLC0415
-# pylint: disable=import-outside-toplevel
 
 from django.conf import settings
 

src/backend/core/tasks/push_recording.py

@@ -1,112 +0,0 @@
-"""Task pushing a finished recording to its owner's Drive."""
-
-import logging
-
-from django.conf import settings
-
-import requests
-
-from core import models, utils
-from core.services.drive import API_TIMEOUT, DriveClient, DriveError
-from core.tasks._task import task
-
-logger = logging.getLogger(__name__)
-
-# (connect, read) timeouts for the download leg, in seconds. The read one has to
-# accommodate a whole recording being relayed.
-DOWNLOAD_TIMEOUT = (API_TIMEOUT[0], 300)
-
-
-def _build_filename(recording: models.Recording) -> str:
-    """Return a human-readable filename for the Drive item."""
-
-    return (
-        f"{recording.room.slug}-"
-        f"{recording.created_at:%Y-%m-%d-%H-%M}."
-        f"{recording.extension}"
-    )
-
-
-@task
-def push_recording(recording_id: str) -> bool:
-    """Push a recording to the main workspace of the user who started it.
-
-    The recording is streamed straight from object storage to Drive's presigned
-    URL: it is never fully downloaded to the worker's disk or memory.
-
-    The access token parked when the recording started is consumed here, and
-    dropped afterwards whatever the outcome — it is a user credential, and a
-    replay would need a fresh one anyway.
-
-    Mostly taken from: https://github.com/suitenumerique/drive/blob/main/docs/resource_server.md
-    """
-
-    try:
-        recording = models.Recording.objects.select_related("room").get(pk=recording_id)
-    except models.Recording.DoesNotExist:
-        logger.error(
-            "Recording %s does not exist, cannot push it to Drive", recording_id
-        )
-        return False
-
-    access_token = recording.get_owner_access_token()
-
-    if not access_token:
-        logger.error(
-            "No access token stored for recording %s, cannot push it to Drive. "
-            "Was OIDC_STORE_ACCESS_TOKEN enabled when the recording started?",
-            recording_id,
-        )
-        return False
-
-    download_url = utils.generate_download_s3_url(
-        recording.key,
-        expires_in=settings.RECORDING_PUSH_TO_DRIVE_SIGNED_URL_EXPIRY_SECONDS,
-        override_domain=False,
-    )
-    filename = _build_filename(recording)
-
-    try:
-        with DriveClient(access_token) as drive:
-            workspace = drive.get_main_workspace()
-            item = drive.create_file(parent_id=workspace["id"], filename=filename)
-
-            # The bytes are relayed chunk by chunk: the recording is never held
-            # in memory as a whole.
-            with requests.get(
-                download_url, stream=True, timeout=DOWNLOAD_TIMEOUT
-            ) as download:
-                download.raise_for_status()
-
-                content_length = download.headers.get("Content-Length")
-                if content_length is None:
-                    raise DriveError(
-                        "Object storage did not return the recording size, "
-                        "cannot stream it to Drive."
-                    )
-
-                drive.upload_content(
-                    policy_url=item["policy"],
-                    stream=download.raw,
-                    content_length=int(content_length),
-                    content_type=download.headers.get(
-                        "Content-Type", "application/octet-stream"
-                    ),
-                )
-
-            drive.complete_upload(item["id"])
-
-    except (DriveError, requests.RequestException):
-        logger.exception("Failed to push recording %s to Drive", recording_id)
-        return False
-
-    finally:
-        recording.clear_owner_access_token()
-
-    logger.info(
-        "Recording %s pushed to Drive as '%s' (item %s)",
-        recording_id,
-        filename,
-        item["id"],
-    )
-    return True

src/backend/core/tests/files/test_api_files_create.py

@@ -117,7 +117,7 @@ def test_api_files_create_file_authenticated_success():
     policy_parsed = urlparse(policy)
 
     assert policy_parsed.scheme == "http"
-    assert policy_parsed.netloc in ["meet-minio:9000", "minio:9000", "localhost:9000"]
+    assert policy_parsed.netloc in ["minio:9000", "localhost:9000"]
     assert policy_parsed.path == f"/meet-media-storage/tmp/files/{file.id!s}.png"
 
     query_params = parse_qs(policy_parsed.query)

src/backend/core/tests/recording/test_push_recording.py

@@ -1,324 +0,0 @@
-"""
-Test pushing a recording to the owner's Drive.
-"""
-
-# pylint: disable=redefined-outer-name,unused-argument
-
-from unittest import mock
-
-from django.test import override_settings
-
-import pytest
-import responses
-
-from core import factories, models
-from core.recording.event.notification import NotificationService
-from core.tasks.push_recording import push_recording
-
-pytestmark = pytest.mark.django_db
-
-DRIVE_API = "https://drive.test/external_api/v1.0"
-DOWNLOAD_URL = "https://storage.test/recordings/recording.mp4"
-# Signed by Drive with the object storage domain meant for its browser clients.
-UPLOAD_URL = "http://drive-storage.test:9100/drive-media/item?X-Amz-Signature=deadbeef"
-INTERNAL_UPLOAD_URL = "http://drive-minio:9000/drive-media/item"
-
-WORKSPACE_ID = "11111111-1111-4111-8111-111111111111"
-ITEM_ID = "22222222-2222-4222-8222-222222222222"
-
-RECORDING_CONTENT = b"fake-recording-bytes"
-
-
-@pytest.fixture
-def recording_with_token():
-    """Return a recording carrying a parked access token."""
-
-    recording = factories.RecordingFactory(
-        mode=models.RecordingModeChoices.SCREEN_RECORDING
-    )
-    recording.set_owner_access_token("user-access-token")
-    return recording
-
-
-@pytest.fixture
-def mocked_download_url():
-    """Avoid signing a real S3 URL, the object storage is not the point here."""
-
-    with mock.patch(
-        "core.utils.generate_download_s3_url", return_value=DOWNLOAD_URL
-    ) as patched:
-        yield patched
-
-
-@pytest.fixture
-def upload():
-    """Capture what gets PUT to the presigned URL.
-
-    The upload sends a stream, but "responses" drains file-like bodies before
-    handing the request over, so what lands here is already the bytes.
-    """
-
-    captured = {}
-
-    def callback(request):
-        captured["url"] = request.url
-        captured["headers"] = request.headers
-        captured["body"] = request.body
-        return 200, {}, ""
-
-    captured["callback"] = callback
-    return captured
-
-
-def register_download(with_content_length=True):
-    """Register the object storage response holding the recording bytes."""
-
-    headers = (
-        {"Content-Length": str(len(RECORDING_CONTENT))} if with_content_length else None
-    )
-    responses.add(
-        responses.GET,
-        DOWNLOAD_URL,
-        body=RECORDING_CONTENT,
-        status=200,
-        headers=headers,
-        content_type="video/mp4",
-    )
-
-
-def register_drive(upload=None, workspaces=None):
-    """Register the Drive API calls of a successful upload."""
-
-    responses.add(
-        responses.GET,
-        f"{DRIVE_API}/items/",
-        json={
-            "results": workspaces
-            if workspaces is not None
-            else [
-                {"id": "shared-workspace", "main_workspace": False},
-                {"id": WORKSPACE_ID, "main_workspace": True},
-            ],
-            "next": None,
-        },
-        status=200,
-    )
-    responses.add(
-        responses.POST,
-        f"{DRIVE_API}/items/{WORKSPACE_ID}/children/",
-        json={"id": ITEM_ID, "policy": UPLOAD_URL},
-        status=201,
-    )
-    if upload is not None:
-        responses.add_callback(responses.PUT, UPLOAD_URL, callback=upload["callback"])
-        responses.add_callback(
-            responses.PUT, INTERNAL_UPLOAD_URL, callback=upload["callback"]
-        )
-    responses.add(
-        responses.POST,
-        f"{DRIVE_API}/items/{ITEM_ID}/upload-ended/",
-        json={},
-        status=200,
-    )
-
-
-@override_settings(DRIVE_API_BASE_URL=DRIVE_API, DRIVE_UPLOAD_STORAGE_NETLOC=None)
-@responses.activate
-def test_push_recording_uploads_to_the_main_workspace(
-    recording_with_token, mocked_download_url, upload
-):
-    """The recording is created in the main workspace, uploaded, then confirmed."""
-
-    register_download()
-    register_drive(upload=upload)
-
-    assert push_recording(str(recording_with_token.id)) is True
-
-    workspaces_call, create_call, ended_call = (
-        responses.calls[0].request,
-        responses.calls[1].request,
-        responses.calls[4].request,
-    )
-
-    assert workspaces_call.url == f"{DRIVE_API}/items/"
-    assert workspaces_call.headers["Authorization"] == "Bearer user-access-token"
-
-    room = recording_with_token.room
-    expected_filename = (
-        f"{room.slug}-{recording_with_token.created_at:%Y-%m-%d-%H-%M}.mp4"
-    )
-    assert expected_filename in create_call.body.decode()
-
-    assert upload["url"] == UPLOAD_URL
-    assert upload["body"] == RECORDING_CONTENT
-    assert upload["headers"]["Content-Length"] == str(len(RECORDING_CONTENT))
-    assert upload["headers"]["Content-Type"] == "video/mp4"
-    assert upload["headers"]["x-amz-acl"] == "private"
-    # The presigned URL carries its own credentials, an extra Authorization
-    # header would make the object storage reject the upload.
-    assert "Authorization" not in upload["headers"]
-
-    assert ended_call.url == f"{DRIVE_API}/items/{ITEM_ID}/upload-ended/"
-
-
-@override_settings(DRIVE_API_BASE_URL=DRIVE_API, DRIVE_UPLOAD_STORAGE_NETLOC=None)
-@responses.activate
-def test_push_recording_drops_the_access_token(
-    recording_with_token, mocked_download_url, upload
-):
-    """The parked credential does not outlive the push."""
-
-    register_download()
-    register_drive(upload=upload)
-
-    push_recording(str(recording_with_token.id))
-
-    recording_with_token.refresh_from_db()
-    assert recording_with_token.owner_access_token is None
-
-
-@override_settings(DRIVE_API_BASE_URL=DRIVE_API, DRIVE_UPLOAD_STORAGE_NETLOC=None)
-@responses.activate
-def test_push_recording_drops_the_access_token_on_failure(
-    recording_with_token, mocked_download_url, upload
-):
-    """A failed push does not leave the credential behind either."""
-
-    register_download()
-    register_drive(
-        upload=upload, workspaces=[{"id": "shared", "main_workspace": False}]
-    )
-
-    assert push_recording(str(recording_with_token.id)) is False
-
-    recording_with_token.refresh_from_db()
-    assert recording_with_token.owner_access_token is None
-
-
-@override_settings(DRIVE_API_BASE_URL=DRIVE_API)
-@responses.activate
-def test_push_recording_without_parked_token():
-    """Without a token there is nobody to push on behalf of, so nothing happens."""
-
-    recording = factories.RecordingFactory()
-
-    assert push_recording(str(recording.id)) is False
-    assert not responses.calls
-
-
-@override_settings(DRIVE_API_BASE_URL=DRIVE_API)
-@responses.activate
-def test_push_recording_unknown_recording():
-    """An unknown recording is reported, not raised."""
-
-    assert push_recording("33333333-3333-4333-8333-333333333333") is False
-    assert not responses.calls
-
-
-@override_settings(
-    DRIVE_API_BASE_URL=DRIVE_API, DRIVE_UPLOAD_STORAGE_NETLOC="drive-minio:9000"
-)
-@responses.activate
-def test_push_recording_rewrites_the_upload_host(
-    recording_with_token, mocked_download_url, upload
-):
-    """The upload reaches the internal address while announcing the signed host.
-
-    The presigned signature covers the Host header, so it has to stay untouched
-    even when the address we connect to does not.
-    """
-
-    register_download()
-    register_drive(upload=upload)
-
-    assert push_recording(str(recording_with_token.id)) is True
-
-    assert upload["url"].startswith(INTERNAL_UPLOAD_URL)
-    assert upload["headers"]["Host"] == "drive-storage.test:9100"
-    assert upload["body"] == RECORDING_CONTENT
-
-
-@override_settings(DRIVE_API_BASE_URL=DRIVE_API, DRIVE_UPLOAD_STORAGE_NETLOC=None)
-@responses.activate
-def test_push_recording_without_content_length(
-    recording_with_token, mocked_download_url, upload
-):
-    """A size-less download cannot be relayed, and is reported as a failure."""
-
-    register_download(with_content_length=False)
-    register_drive(upload=upload)
-
-    assert push_recording(str(recording_with_token.id)) is False
-    assert "body" not in upload
-
-
-@override_settings(DRIVE_API_BASE_URL=None)
-def test_push_recording_without_drive_configured(
-    recording_with_token, mocked_download_url
-):
-    """An unconfigured Drive is reported, not raised."""
-
-    assert push_recording(str(recording_with_token.id)) is False
-
-
-def test_recording_access_token_roundtrip():
-    """The parked token is encrypted at rest and read back as-is."""
-
-    recording = factories.RecordingFactory()
-    recording.set_owner_access_token("user-access-token")
-
-    recording.refresh_from_db()
-    assert recording.owner_access_token != "user-access-token"
-    assert recording.get_owner_access_token() == "user-access-token"
-
-    recording.clear_owner_access_token()
-    recording.refresh_from_db()
-    assert recording.get_owner_access_token() is None
-
-
-def test_recording_access_token_undecryptable():
-    """A token encrypted with another key is reported as missing, not raised."""
-
-    recording = factories.RecordingFactory(owner_access_token="not-a-fernet-token")
-
-    assert recording.get_owner_access_token() is None
-
-
-@pytest.mark.parametrize("enabled", [True, False])
-def test_notify_external_services_schedules_the_push(enabled):
-    """The push is scheduled from the notification flow, when enabled."""
-
-    recording = factories.RecordingFactory(
-        mode=models.RecordingModeChoices.SCREEN_RECORDING
-    )
-    recording.set_owner_access_token("user-access-token")
-
-    with (
-        override_settings(RECORDING_PUSH_TO_DRIVE_ENABLED=enabled),
-        mock.patch("core.recording.event.notification.push_recording") as mocked_push,
-        mock.patch.object(
-            NotificationService, "_notify_user_by_email", return_value=True
-        ),
-    ):
-        NotificationService().notify_external_services(recording)
-
-    assert mocked_push.delay.called is enabled
-
-
-def test_notify_external_services_without_parked_token():
-    """No token means nothing to push with, so no task is scheduled."""
-
-    recording = factories.RecordingFactory(
-        mode=models.RecordingModeChoices.SCREEN_RECORDING
-    )
-
-    with (
-        override_settings(RECORDING_PUSH_TO_DRIVE_ENABLED=True),
-        mock.patch("core.recording.event.notification.push_recording") as mocked_push,
-        mock.patch.object(
-            NotificationService, "_notify_user_by_email", return_value=True
-        ),
-    ):
-        NotificationService().notify_external_services(recording)
-
-    assert not mocked_push.delay.called

src/backend/core/tests/rooms/test_api_rooms_create.py

@@ -2,9 +2,14 @@
 Test rooms API endpoints in the Meet core app: create.
 """
 
+from datetime import datetime, timedelta, timezone
+
+from django.conf import settings as django_settings
+
 # pylint: disable=redefined-outer-name,unused-argument
 from django.core.cache import cache
 
+import jwt
 import pytest
 from rest_framework.test import APIClient
 
@@ -109,3 +114,38 @@ def test_api_rooms_create_authenticated_existing_slug():
 
     assert response.status_code == 400
     assert response.json() == {"slug": ["Room with this Slug already exists."]}
+
+
+def generate_user_access_token(user):
+    """Generate a valid user access JWT signed with the token secret."""
+    now = datetime.now(timezone.utc)
+
+    payload = {
+        "iss": django_settings.USER_ACCESS_TOKEN_ISSUER,
+        "aud": django_settings.USER_ACCESS_TOKEN_AUDIENCE,
+        "iat": now,
+        "exp": now + timedelta(seconds=django_settings.USER_ACCESS_TOKEN_TTL),
+        "user_id": str(user.id),
+        "token_type": "user_access",
+        "client_id": "test-app",
+        "scope": "user:access",
+    }
+
+    return jwt.encode(
+        payload,
+        django_settings.USER_ACCESS_TOKEN_SECRET_KEY,
+        algorithm=django_settings.USER_ACCESS_TOKEN_ALG,
+    )
+
+
+def test_api_rooms_create_authenticated_with_user_access_token():
+    """A user access token should create a room exactly like a session would."""
+    user = UserFactory()
+
+    client = APIClient()
+    client.credentials(HTTP_AUTHORIZATION=f"Bearer {generate_user_access_token(user)}")
+    response = client.post("/api/v1.0/rooms/", {"name": "my room"})
+
+    assert response.status_code == 201
+    room = Room.objects.get()
+    assert room.accesses.filter(role="owner", user=user).exists()

src/backend/core/tests/rooms/test_api_rooms_list.py

@@ -2,8 +2,12 @@
 Test rooms API endpoints in the Meet core app: list.
 """
 
+from datetime import datetime, timedelta, timezone
 from unittest import mock
 
+from django.conf import settings as django_settings
+
+import jwt
 import pytest
 from rest_framework.pagination import PageNumberPagination
 from rest_framework.test import APIClient
@@ -156,3 +160,40 @@ def test_api_rooms_list_pagination_page_size():
     assert len(content["results"]) == 3
     assert content["next"] == "http://testserver/api/v1.0/rooms/?page=2&page_size=3"
     assert content["previous"] is None
+
+
+def generate_user_access_token(user):
+    """Generate a valid user access JWT signed with the token secret."""
+    now = datetime.now(timezone.utc)
+
+    payload = {
+        "iss": django_settings.USER_ACCESS_TOKEN_ISSUER,
+        "aud": django_settings.USER_ACCESS_TOKEN_AUDIENCE,
+        "iat": now,
+        "exp": now + timedelta(seconds=django_settings.USER_ACCESS_TOKEN_TTL),
+        "user_id": str(user.id),
+        "token_type": "user_access",
+        "client_id": "test-app",
+        "scope": "user:access",
+    }
+
+    return jwt.encode(
+        payload,
+        django_settings.USER_ACCESS_TOKEN_SECRET_KEY,
+        algorithm=django_settings.USER_ACCESS_TOKEN_ALG,
+    )
+
+
+def test_api_rooms_list_authenticated_with_user_access_token():
+    """A user access token should list rooms exactly like a session would."""
+    user = UserFactory()
+    room = RoomFactory(users=[(user, "owner")])
+    RoomFactory()  # another user's room, not listed
+
+    client = APIClient()
+    client.credentials(HTTP_AUTHORIZATION=f"Bearer {generate_user_access_token(user)}")
+    response = client.get("/api/v1.0/rooms/")
+
+    assert response.status_code == 200
+    assert response.data["count"] == 1
+    assert response.data["results"][0]["id"] == str(room.id)

src/backend/core/tests/rooms/test_api_rooms_retrieve.py

@@ -3,11 +3,14 @@ Test rooms API endpoints in the Meet core app: retrieve.
 """
 
 import random
+from datetime import datetime, timedelta, timezone
 from unittest import mock
 
+from django.conf import settings as django_settings
 from django.contrib.auth.models import AnonymousUser
 from django.test.utils import override_settings
 
+import jwt
 import pytest
 from rest_framework.test import APIClient
 
@@ -503,3 +506,40 @@ def test_api_rooms_retrieve_administrators(
         role=str(user_access.role),
         participant_id=None,
     )
+
+
+def generate_user_access_token(user):
+    """Generate a valid user access JWT signed with the token secret."""
+    now = datetime.now(timezone.utc)
+
+    payload = {
+        "iss": django_settings.USER_ACCESS_TOKEN_ISSUER,
+        "aud": django_settings.USER_ACCESS_TOKEN_AUDIENCE,
+        "iat": now,
+        "exp": now + timedelta(seconds=django_settings.USER_ACCESS_TOKEN_TTL),
+        "user_id": str(user.id),
+        "token_type": "user_access",
+        "client_id": "test-app",
+        "scope": "user:access",
+    }
+
+    return jwt.encode(
+        payload,
+        django_settings.USER_ACCESS_TOKEN_SECRET_KEY,
+        algorithm=django_settings.USER_ACCESS_TOKEN_ALG,
+    )
+
+
+def test_api_rooms_retrieve_authenticated_with_user_access_token():
+    """A user access token should retrieve a room exactly like a session would."""
+    user = UserFactory()
+    room = RoomFactory(users=[(user, "owner")])
+
+    client = APIClient()
+    client.credentials(HTTP_AUTHORIZATION=f"Bearer {generate_user_access_token(user)}")
+    response = client.get(f"/api/v1.0/rooms/{room.id!s}/")
+
+    assert response.status_code == 200
+    assert response.data["id"] == str(room.id)
+    # Authenticated as the owner: privileged fields are included
+    assert response.data["pin_code"] == room.pin_code

src/backend/core/tests/rooms/test_api_rooms_update.py

@@ -3,8 +3,12 @@ Test rooms API endpoints in the Meet core app: update.
 """
 
 import random
+from datetime import datetime, timedelta, timezone
 from unittest.mock import patch
 
+from django.conf import settings as django_settings
+
+import jwt
 import pytest
 from rest_framework.test import APIClient
 
@@ -437,3 +441,45 @@ def test_api_rooms_update_livekit_sync_failure(mock_update_metadata):
             "configuration": {"can_publish_sources": ["camera"]},
         },
     )
+
+
+def generate_user_access_token(user):
+    """Generate a valid user access JWT signed with the token secret."""
+    now = datetime.now(timezone.utc)
+
+    payload = {
+        "iss": django_settings.USER_ACCESS_TOKEN_ISSUER,
+        "aud": django_settings.USER_ACCESS_TOKEN_AUDIENCE,
+        "iat": now,
+        "exp": now + timedelta(seconds=django_settings.USER_ACCESS_TOKEN_TTL),
+        "user_id": str(user.id),
+        "token_type": "user_access",
+        "client_id": "test-app",
+        "scope": "user:access",
+    }
+
+    return jwt.encode(
+        payload,
+        django_settings.USER_ACCESS_TOKEN_SECRET_KEY,
+        algorithm=django_settings.USER_ACCESS_TOKEN_ALG,
+    )
+
+
+def test_api_rooms_update_authenticated_with_user_access_token():
+    """Role-based permissions apply unchanged with a user access token."""
+    user = UserFactory()
+    room = RoomFactory(users=[(user, "member")])
+
+    client = APIClient()
+    client.credentials(HTTP_AUTHORIZATION=f"Bearer {generate_user_access_token(user)}")
+
+    # A simple member cannot update the room
+    response = client.patch(f"/api/v1.0/rooms/{room.id!s}/", {"name": "new name"})
+    assert response.status_code == 403
+
+    # An administrator can
+    room.accesses.filter(user=user).update(role="administrator")
+    response = client.patch(f"/api/v1.0/rooms/{room.id!s}/", {"name": "new name"})
+    assert response.status_code == 200
+    room.refresh_from_db()
+    assert room.name == "new name"

src/backend/core/tests/services/test_livekit_events.py

@@ -6,8 +6,6 @@ Test LiveKitEvents service.
 import uuid
 from unittest import mock
 
-from django.test import override_settings
-
 import pytest
 from livekit.api import EgressStatus
 
@@ -74,8 +72,6 @@ def test_initialization(
 )
 @mock.patch("core.utils.notify_participants")
 @mock.patch("core.services.room_management.RoomManagement.update_metadata")
-# Without storage events, completion falls back to the egress event itself.
-@override_settings(RECORDING_STORAGE_EVENT_ENABLE=False)
 def test_handle_egress_ended_success(
     mock_update_metadata, mock_notify, mode, notification_type, service
 ):
@@ -159,8 +155,6 @@ def test_handle_egress_updated_non_handled(
 )
 @mock.patch("core.utils.notify_participants")
 @mock.patch("core.services.room_management.RoomManagement.update_metadata")
-# Without storage events, completion falls back to the egress event itself.
-@override_settings(RECORDING_STORAGE_EVENT_ENABLE=False)
 def test_handle_egress_ended_metadata_update_fails(
     mock_update_metadata, mock_notify, mode, notification_type, service
 ):

src/backend/core/tests/services/test_transit_code.py

@@ -0,0 +1,46 @@
+"""
+Unit tests for the TransitCodeService.
+"""
+
+import pytest
+
+from core.factories import UserFactory
+from core.services.transit_code import TransitCodeService
+
+pytestmark = pytest.mark.django_db
+
+
+def test_create_code_returns_unique_opaque_codes():
+    """Each created code should be a distinct high-entropy string."""
+    user = UserFactory()
+    service = TransitCodeService()
+
+    codes = {service.create_code(user) for _ in range(5)}
+
+    assert len(codes) == 5
+    for code in codes:
+        assert len(code) >= 43
+
+
+def test_consume_code_returns_stored_data_once():
+    """Consuming a code should return its data exactly once."""
+    user = UserFactory()
+    service = TransitCodeService()
+
+    code = service.create_code(user, client_id="my-app")
+
+    assert service.consume_code(code) == {
+        "user_id": str(user.id),
+        "client_id": "my-app",
+    }
+    # Single use: a second consumption fails
+    assert service.consume_code(code) is None
+
+
+def test_consume_code_unknown_or_empty():
+    """Unknown or empty codes should not be consumable."""
+    service = TransitCodeService()
+
+    assert service.consume_code("unknown-code") is None
+    assert service.consume_code("") is None
+    assert service.consume_code(None) is None

src/backend/core/tests/test_api_user_access_token_authentication.py

@@ -0,0 +1,200 @@
+"""
+Tests for user access JWT authentication on the core API.
+
+The token authenticates the user on the whole API, exactly like a session
+cookie would (similar to lib-jitsi-meet's token authentication): the
+existing role-based permissions apply unchanged. Room endpoint coverage
+with a user access token lives in the room test files.
+"""
+
+from datetime import datetime, timedelta, timezone
+
+from django.conf import settings as django_settings
+
+import jwt
+import pytest
+from rest_framework.test import APIClient
+
+from core.factories import RoomFactory, UserFactory
+from core.models import RoleChoices
+
+pytestmark = pytest.mark.django_db
+
+
+def generate_user_access_token(user, **overrides):
+    """Generate a valid user access JWT signed with the token secret."""
+    now = datetime.now(timezone.utc)
+
+    payload = {
+        "iss": django_settings.USER_ACCESS_TOKEN_ISSUER,
+        "aud": django_settings.USER_ACCESS_TOKEN_AUDIENCE,
+        "iat": now,
+        "exp": now + timedelta(seconds=django_settings.USER_ACCESS_TOKEN_TTL),
+        "user_id": str(user.id),
+        "token_type": "user_access",
+        "client_id": "test-app",
+        "scope": "user:access",
+    }
+    payload.update(overrides)
+    payload = {key: value for key, value in payload.items() if value is not None}
+
+    return jwt.encode(
+        payload,
+        django_settings.USER_ACCESS_TOKEN_SECRET_KEY,
+        algorithm=django_settings.USER_ACCESS_TOKEN_ALG,
+    )
+
+
+def test_user_access_token_users_me():
+    """A user access token should authenticate the user on /users/me/."""
+    user = UserFactory()
+
+    client = APIClient()
+    client.credentials(HTTP_AUTHORIZATION=f"Bearer {generate_user_access_token(user)}")
+
+    response = client.get("/api/v1.0/users/me/")
+
+    assert response.status_code == 200
+    assert response.data["email"] == user.email
+
+
+def test_user_access_token_expired():
+    """An expired user access token should be rejected."""
+    user = UserFactory()
+
+    now = datetime.now(timezone.utc)
+    token = generate_user_access_token(
+        user,
+        iat=now - timedelta(hours=3),
+        exp=now - timedelta(hours=1),
+    )
+    client = APIClient()
+    client.credentials(HTTP_AUTHORIZATION=f"Bearer {token}")
+
+    response = client.get("/api/v1.0/users/me/")
+
+    assert response.status_code == 401
+    assert "token expired" in str(response.data).lower()
+
+
+def test_user_access_token_invalid_signature():
+    """A token signed with the wrong key should defer and end unauthenticated."""
+    user = UserFactory()
+
+    now = datetime.now(timezone.utc)
+    token = jwt.encode(
+        {
+            "iss": django_settings.USER_ACCESS_TOKEN_ISSUER,
+            "aud": django_settings.USER_ACCESS_TOKEN_AUDIENCE,
+            "iat": now,
+            "exp": now + timedelta(seconds=600),
+            "user_id": str(user.id),
+            "token_type": "user_access",
+            "client_id": "test-app",
+        },
+        "wrong-secret-key-padded-for-minimum-len!",
+        algorithm=django_settings.USER_ACCESS_TOKEN_ALG,
+    )
+    client = APIClient()
+    client.credentials(HTTP_AUTHORIZATION=f"Bearer {token}")
+
+    # UserAccessJWTAuthentication defers, session auth finds no session
+    response = client.get("/api/v1.0/users/me/")
+
+    assert response.status_code == 401
+
+
+def test_user_access_token_wrong_token_type():
+    """A verified token with the wrong 'token_type' claim should be rejected."""
+    user = UserFactory()
+
+    token = generate_user_access_token(user, token_type="addons")
+    client = APIClient()
+    client.credentials(HTTP_AUTHORIZATION=f"Bearer {token}")
+
+    response = client.get("/api/v1.0/users/me/")
+
+    assert response.status_code == 401
+    assert "invalid token type" in str(response.data).lower()
+
+
+def test_user_access_token_missing_client_id_claim():
+    """A token without the issuance-audit claim should be rejected."""
+    user = UserFactory()
+
+    token = generate_user_access_token(user, client_id=None)
+    client = APIClient()
+    client.credentials(HTTP_AUTHORIZATION=f"Bearer {token}")
+
+    response = client.get("/api/v1.0/users/me/")
+
+    assert response.status_code == 401
+    assert "invalid token claims" in str(response.data).lower()
+
+
+def test_user_access_token_inactive_user():
+    """A user access token for an inactive user should be rejected."""
+    user = UserFactory(is_active=False)
+
+    client = APIClient()
+    client.credentials(HTTP_AUTHORIZATION=f"Bearer {generate_user_access_token(user)}")
+
+    response = client.get("/api/v1.0/users/me/")
+
+    assert response.status_code == 401
+
+
+def test_user_access_token_feature_disabled(settings):
+    """When the feature is disabled, user access tokens should be ignored."""
+    settings.USER_ACCESS_TOKEN_ENABLED = False
+
+    user = UserFactory()
+
+    client = APIClient()
+    client.credentials(HTTP_AUTHORIZATION=f"Bearer {generate_user_access_token(user)}")
+
+    response = client.get("/api/v1.0/users/me/")
+
+    assert response.status_code == 401
+
+
+def test_user_access_token_does_not_break_session_authentication():
+    """A session-authenticated user should keep full access to the API."""
+    user = UserFactory()
+    RoomFactory(users=[(user, RoleChoices.OWNER)])
+
+    client = APIClient()
+    client.force_login(user)
+    response = client.get("/api/v1.0/rooms/")
+
+    assert response.status_code == 200
+    assert response.data["count"] == 1
+
+
+def test_user_access_token_application_jwt_not_accepted_on_core_api():
+    """An application-delegation JWT must not authenticate on the core API."""
+    user = UserFactory()
+
+    now = datetime.now(timezone.utc)
+    token = jwt.encode(
+        {
+            "iss": django_settings.APPLICATION_JWT_ISSUER,
+            "aud": django_settings.APPLICATION_JWT_AUDIENCE,
+            "iat": now,
+            "exp": now + timedelta(seconds=600),
+            "user_id": str(user.id),
+            "client_id": "some-client",
+            "delegated": True,
+            "scope": "rooms:retrieve",
+        },
+        django_settings.APPLICATION_JWT_SECRET_KEY,
+        algorithm=django_settings.APPLICATION_JWT_ALG,
+    )
+    client = APIClient()
+    client.credentials(HTTP_AUTHORIZATION=f"Bearer {token}")
+
+    # The user token backend must defer (wrong signature) and the request
+    # must end up unauthenticated.
+    response = client.get("/api/v1.0/users/me/")
+
+    assert response.status_code == 401

src/backend/core/tests/test_api_users_exchange_access_token.py

@@ -0,0 +1,165 @@
+"""
+Test users API endpoints in the Meet core app: exchange transit code.
+"""
+
+# pylint: disable=W0621
+
+import secrets
+
+import jwt
+import pytest
+from rest_framework.test import APIClient
+
+from core.factories import UserFactory
+from core.services.transit_code import TransitCodeService
+
+pytestmark = pytest.mark.django_db
+
+
+def decode_user_access_token(token, settings):
+    """Decode a user access token with the token secret."""
+    return jwt.decode(
+        token,
+        settings.USER_ACCESS_TOKEN_SECRET_KEY,
+        algorithms=[settings.USER_ACCESS_TOKEN_ALG],
+        issuer=settings.USER_ACCESS_TOKEN_ISSUER,
+        audience=settings.USER_ACCESS_TOKEN_AUDIENCE,
+    )
+
+
+def generate_unknown_code(settings):
+    """Generate a well-formed code that was never stored."""
+    return secrets.token_urlsafe(settings.TRANSIT_CODE_NBYTES)
+
+
+@pytest.fixture
+def client():
+    """Return an anonymous API client with a random source IP.
+
+    A fresh IP per test isolates the anonymous throttle history, both
+    between the tests of this module and between test runs.
+    """
+    # `secrets` rather than `random`: the global random module is seeded
+    # deterministically by the factories, its sequence repeats across runs.
+    remote_addr = (
+        f"10.{secrets.randbelow(256)}.{secrets.randbelow(256)}"
+        f".{secrets.randbelow(254) + 1}"
+    )
+    return APIClient(REMOTE_ADDR=remote_addr)
+
+
+def test_exchange_access_token_missing_code(client):
+    """The exchange endpoint should validate its input."""
+    response = client.post("/api/v1.0/users/exchange-access-token/")
+
+    assert response.status_code == 400
+    assert "code" in response.data
+
+
+def test_exchange_access_token_malformed_code(client):
+    """A code whose length cannot match a generated one should be a 400."""
+    response = client.post(
+        "/api/v1.0/users/exchange-access-token/",
+        {"code": "not-a-valid-code"},
+    )
+
+    assert response.status_code == 400
+    assert "invalid transit code format" in str(response.data).lower()
+
+
+def test_exchange_access_token_unknown_code(client, settings):
+    """A well-formed but unknown code should be denied."""
+    response = client.post(
+        "/api/v1.0/users/exchange-access-token/",
+        {"code": generate_unknown_code(settings)},
+    )
+
+    assert response.status_code == 403
+    assert "invalid, expired or already used" in str(response.data).lower()
+
+
+def test_exchange_access_token_success(client, settings):
+    """A valid transit code should be exchangeable for an access token."""
+    user = UserFactory()
+
+    code = TransitCodeService().create_code(user, client_id="my-app")
+
+    response = client.post("/api/v1.0/users/exchange-access-token/", {"code": code})
+
+    assert response.status_code == 200
+    assert response.data["token_type"] == settings.USER_ACCESS_TOKEN_TYPE
+    assert response.data["expires_in"] == settings.USER_ACCESS_TOKEN_TTL
+    assert response.data["scope"] == "user:access"
+
+    payload = decode_user_access_token(response.data["access_token"], settings)
+    assert payload["token_type"] == "user_access"
+    assert payload["user_id"] == str(user.id)
+    assert payload["client_id"] == "my-app"
+    assert payload["exp"] - payload["iat"] == settings.USER_ACCESS_TOKEN_TTL
+
+
+def test_exchange_access_token_single_use(client):
+    """A transit code should be exchangeable exactly once."""
+    user = UserFactory()
+
+    code = TransitCodeService().create_code(user)
+
+    response = client.post("/api/v1.0/users/exchange-access-token/", {"code": code})
+    assert response.status_code == 200
+
+    # Replaying the same code must be denied
+    response = client.post("/api/v1.0/users/exchange-access-token/", {"code": code})
+    assert response.status_code == 403
+    assert "invalid, expired or already used" in str(response.data).lower()
+
+
+def test_exchange_access_token_inactive_user(client):
+    """A code minted for a now-inactive user should be denied."""
+    user = UserFactory()
+
+    code = TransitCodeService().create_code(user)
+
+    user.is_active = False
+    user.save()
+
+    response = client.post("/api/v1.0/users/exchange-access-token/", {"code": code})
+
+    assert response.status_code == 403
+    assert "no longer access" in str(response.data).lower()
+
+
+def test_exchange_access_token_feature_disabled(client, settings):
+    """The exchange endpoint should return 404 when the feature is disabled."""
+    settings.USER_ACCESS_TOKEN_ENABLED = False
+
+    user = UserFactory()
+    code = TransitCodeService().create_code(user)
+
+    response = client.post("/api/v1.0/users/exchange-access-token/", {"code": code})
+
+    assert response.status_code == 404
+
+
+def test_exchange_access_token_throttled(client, settings):
+    """Anonymous exchange attempts should be rate limited."""
+    throttle_rates = settings.REST_FRAMEWORK["DEFAULT_THROTTLE_RATES"]
+    initial_rate = throttle_rates["exchange_access_token"]
+    # The rates dict is mutated in place: restore it explicitly, the
+    # `settings` fixture only rolls back attribute assignments.
+    throttle_rates["exchange_access_token"] = "2/minute"
+
+    try:
+        for _ in range(2):
+            response = client.post(
+                "/api/v1.0/users/exchange-access-token/",
+                {"code": generate_unknown_code(settings)},
+            )
+            assert response.status_code == 403
+
+        response = client.post(
+            "/api/v1.0/users/exchange-access-token/",
+            {"code": generate_unknown_code(settings)},
+        )
+        assert response.status_code == 429
+    finally:
+        throttle_rates["exchange_access_token"] = initial_rate

src/backend/core/tests/test_external_api_users.py

@@ -0,0 +1,166 @@
+"""
+Tests for external API /users endpoints (transit codes)
+"""
+
+# pylint: disable=W0621
+
+from datetime import datetime, timedelta, timezone
+from unittest import mock
+
+from django.conf import settings as django_settings
+
+import jwt
+import pytest
+from lasuite.oidc_resource_server.authentication import ResourceServerAuthentication
+from rest_framework.test import APIClient
+
+from core.factories import ApplicationFactory, UserFactory
+from core.models import ApplicationScope
+from core.services.transit_code import TransitCodeService
+
+pytestmark = pytest.mark.django_db
+
+
+def generate_test_token(user, scopes):
+    """Generate a valid application JWT token for testing."""
+    now = datetime.now(timezone.utc)
+    scope_string = " ".join(scopes)
+
+    application = ApplicationFactory()
+
+    payload = {
+        "iss": django_settings.APPLICATION_JWT_ISSUER,
+        "aud": django_settings.APPLICATION_JWT_AUDIENCE,
+        "iat": now,
+        "exp": now
+        + timedelta(seconds=django_settings.APPLICATION_JWT_EXPIRATION_SECONDS),
+        "client_id": str(application.client_id),
+        "scope": scope_string,
+        "user_id": str(user.id),
+        "delegated": True,
+    }
+
+    return jwt.encode(
+        payload,
+        django_settings.APPLICATION_JWT_SECRET_KEY,
+        algorithm=django_settings.APPLICATION_JWT_ALG,
+    )
+
+
+def test_api_users_transit_code_requires_authentication():
+    """Minting a transit code without authentication should return 401."""
+    client = APIClient()
+    response = client.post("/external-api/v1.0/users/transit-code/")
+
+    assert response.status_code == 401
+
+
+def test_api_users_transit_code_missing_scope():
+    """A token without the 'users:session' scope should be rejected."""
+    user = UserFactory()
+
+    token = generate_test_token(user, [ApplicationScope.ROOMS_RETRIEVE])
+
+    client = APIClient()
+    client.credentials(HTTP_AUTHORIZATION=f"Bearer {token}")
+    response = client.post("/external-api/v1.0/users/transit-code/")
+
+    assert response.status_code == 403
+    assert "users:session" in str(response.data)
+
+
+def test_api_users_transit_code_success(settings):
+    """A delegated user with the scope should be able to mint a transit code."""
+    user = UserFactory()
+
+    token = generate_test_token(user, [ApplicationScope.USERS_SESSION])
+
+    client = APIClient()
+    client.credentials(HTTP_AUTHORIZATION=f"Bearer {token}")
+    response = client.post("/external-api/v1.0/users/transit-code/")
+
+    assert response.status_code == 200
+    assert response.data["expires_in"] == settings.TRANSIT_CODE_TTL
+
+    code = response.data["transit_code"]
+    # Opaque, high-entropy random string
+    assert len(code) == (4 * settings.TRANSIT_CODE_NBYTES + 2) // 3
+
+    # The code is stored server-side and references the delegated user
+    code_data = TransitCodeService().consume_code(code)
+    assert code_data == {
+        "user_id": str(user.id),
+        "client_id": mock.ANY,
+    }
+
+
+def test_api_users_transit_code_with_rs_token():
+    """A resource-server-authenticated user should be able to mint a code."""
+    user = UserFactory()
+
+    # todo - add a decorator instead
+    with mock.patch.object(
+        ResourceServerAuthentication,
+        "authenticate",
+        return_value=(user, {"scope": "users:session", "client_id": "rs-client"}),
+    ) as mock_rs_authenticate:
+        client = APIClient()
+        client.credentials(HTTP_AUTHORIZATION="Bearer some-opaque-rs-token")
+        response = client.post("/external-api/v1.0/users/transit-code/")
+
+    mock_rs_authenticate.assert_called_once()
+    assert response.status_code == 200
+
+    code_data = TransitCodeService().consume_code(response.data["transit_code"])
+    assert code_data == {
+        "user_id": str(user.id),
+        "client_id": "rs-client",
+    }
+
+
+def test_api_users_transit_code_with_rs_token_missing_scope():
+    """A resource server token without the scope should be rejected."""
+    user = UserFactory()
+
+    # todo - add a decorator instead
+    with mock.patch.object(
+        ResourceServerAuthentication,
+        "authenticate",
+        return_value=(user, {"scope": "rooms:list", "client_id": "rs-client"}),
+    ):
+        client = APIClient()
+        client.credentials(HTTP_AUTHORIZATION="Bearer some-opaque-rs-token")
+        response = client.post("/external-api/v1.0/users/transit-code/")
+
+    assert response.status_code == 403
+    assert "users:session" in str(response.data)
+
+
+def test_api_users_transit_code_feature_disabled(settings):
+    """Minting a transit code should return 404 when the feature is disabled."""
+    settings.USER_ACCESS_TOKEN_ENABLED = False
+
+    user = UserFactory()
+    token = generate_test_token(user, [ApplicationScope.USERS_SESSION])
+
+    client = APIClient()
+    client.credentials(HTTP_AUTHORIZATION=f"Bearer {token}")
+    response = client.post("/external-api/v1.0/users/transit-code/")
+
+    assert response.status_code == 404
+
+
+def test_api_users_transit_code_inactive_user():
+    """An inactive user should not be able to mint a transit code."""
+    user = UserFactory(is_active=False)
+
+    token = generate_test_token(user, [ApplicationScope.USERS_SESSION])
+
+    client = APIClient()
+    client.credentials(HTTP_AUTHORIZATION=f"Bearer {token}")
+    response = client.post("/external-api/v1.0/users/transit-code/")
+
+    assert response.status_code == 401
+
+
+# todo - add a test to make sure the addon authentification doesn't allow to mint a transit token

src/backend/core/urls.py

@@ -37,6 +37,11 @@ external_router.register(
     external_viewsets.RoomViewSet,
     basename="external_room",
 )
+external_router.register(
+    "users",
+    external_viewsets.UserViewSet,
+    basename="external_user",
+)
 
 urlpatterns = [
     path(

src/backend/core/utils.py

@@ -17,7 +17,6 @@ from typing import List, Optional
 from uuid import uuid4
 
 from django.conf import settings
-from django.core.exceptions import ImproperlyConfigured
 from django.core.files.storage import default_storage
 
 import aiohttp
@@ -26,7 +25,6 @@ import botocore
 import magic
 import phonenumbers
 from asgiref.sync import async_to_sync
-from cryptography.fernet import Fernet, InvalidToken
 from livekit.api import (  # pylint: disable=E0611
     AccessToken,
     ListRoomsRequest,
@@ -419,43 +417,6 @@ def generate_upload_policy(file):
     return policy
 
 
-class SecretDecryptionError(Exception):
-    """Raised when a stored secret cannot be decrypted."""
-
-
-@lru_cache(maxsize=1)
-def get_cipher_suite():
-    """Return the Fernet cipher suite used to encrypt secrets at rest.
-
-    Deliberately the same key as django-lasuite's OIDC token storage, so a
-    deployment only has one key to provision for user credentials.
-    """
-
-    key = settings.OIDC_STORE_REFRESH_TOKEN_KEY
-
-    if not key:
-        raise ImproperlyConfigured("OIDC_STORE_REFRESH_TOKEN_KEY setting is required.")
-
-    return Fernet(key)
-
-
-def encrypt_secret(value: str) -> str:
-    """Encrypt a secret meant to be stored at rest."""
-
-    return get_cipher_suite().encrypt(value.encode()).decode()
-
-
-def decrypt_secret(value: str) -> str:
-    """Decrypt a secret stored by `encrypt_secret`."""
-
-    try:
-        return get_cipher_suite().decrypt(value.encode()).decode()
-    except InvalidToken as exc:
-        raise SecretDecryptionError(
-            "The stored secret could not be decrypted, was the key rotated?"
-        ) from exc
-
-
 def generate_download_s3_url(
     key: str, *, expires_in: int, override_domain: bool = True
 ):

src/backend/meet/settings.py

@@ -324,6 +324,7 @@ class Base(Configuration):
 
     REST_FRAMEWORK = {
         "DEFAULT_AUTHENTICATION_CLASSES": (
+            "core.authentication.user_token.UserAccessJWTAuthentication",
             "core.authentication.backends.SessionAuthenticationWith401",
         ),
         "DEFAULT_PARSER_CLASSES": [
@@ -344,6 +345,11 @@ class Base(Configuration):
                 environ_name="REQUEST_ENTRY_THROTTLE_RATES",
                 environ_prefix=None,
             ),
+            "exchange_access_token": values.Value(
+                default="30/minute",
+                environ_name="EXCHANGE_ACCESS_TOKEN_THROTTLE_RATES",
+                environ_prefix=None,
+            ),
             "creation_callback": values.Value(
                 default="600/minute",
                 environ_name="CREATION_CALLBACK_THROTTLE_RATES",
@@ -568,20 +574,6 @@ class Base(Configuration):
     OIDC_STORE_ID_TOKEN = values.BooleanValue(
         default=True, environ_name="OIDC_STORE_ID_TOKEN", environ_prefix=None
     )
-    # Required to call other La Suite applications on behalf of the user, e.g.
-    # to push a recording to their Drive.
-    OIDC_STORE_ACCESS_TOKEN = values.BooleanValue(
-        default=False, environ_name="OIDC_STORE_ACCESS_TOKEN", environ_prefix=None
-    )
-    OIDC_STORE_REFRESH_TOKEN = values.BooleanValue(
-        default=False, environ_name="OIDC_STORE_REFRESH_TOKEN", environ_prefix=None
-    )
-    # Fernet key used to encrypt OIDC tokens at rest, both the refresh token
-    # django-lasuite stores in the session and the access token parked on a
-    # recording. Generate one with `Fernet.generate_key()`.
-    OIDC_STORE_REFRESH_TOKEN_KEY = SecretFileValue(
-        None, environ_name="OIDC_STORE_REFRESH_TOKEN_KEY", environ_prefix=None
-    )
     ALLOW_LOGOUT_GET_METHOD = values.BooleanValue(
         default=True, environ_name="ALLOW_LOGOUT_GET_METHOD", environ_prefix=None
     )
@@ -734,29 +726,6 @@ class Base(Configuration):
         None, environ_name="RECORDING_MAX_DURATION", environ_prefix=None
     )
 
-    # Push recordings to Drive
-    # Once a recording is over, it is pushed to the main workspace of the user who
-    # started it, using their OIDC access token. It requires OIDC_STORE_ACCESS_TOKEN,
-    # and Drive to be configured as an OIDC resource server accepting Meet's audience.
-    RECORDING_PUSH_TO_DRIVE_ENABLED = values.BooleanValue(
-        False, environ_name="RECORDING_PUSH_TO_DRIVE_ENABLED", environ_prefix=None
-    )
-    # Base URL of Drive's external API, e.g. https://drive.example.com/external_api/v1.0
-    DRIVE_API_BASE_URL = values.Value(
-        None, environ_name="DRIVE_API_BASE_URL", environ_prefix=None
-    )
-    # Lifetime of the signed URL the worker downloads the recording from.
-    RECORDING_PUSH_TO_DRIVE_SIGNED_URL_EXPIRY_SECONDS = values.PositiveIntegerValue(
-        60 * 60,
-        environ_name="RECORDING_PUSH_TO_DRIVE_SIGNED_URL_EXPIRY_SECONDS",
-        environ_prefix=None,
-    )
-    # Development only: host:port to reach Drive's object storage at, when the
-    # domain Drive signs its upload URLs with is only resolvable from a browser.
-    DRIVE_UPLOAD_STORAGE_NETLOC = values.Value(
-        None, environ_name="DRIVE_UPLOAD_STORAGE_NETLOC", environ_prefix=None
-    )
-
     # Recording encoding options for LiveKit Egress (video composite egress only).
     # These settings affect screen recordings handled by VideoCompositeEgressService;
     # they are silently ignored by AudioCompositeEgressService (audio-only transcript
@@ -990,6 +959,61 @@ class Base(Configuration):
         environ_name="APPLICATION_BASE_URL",
         environ_prefix=None,
     )
+
+    # User access tokens (embedded frontend / iframe support)
+    USER_ACCESS_TOKEN_ENABLED = values.BooleanValue(
+        False, environ_name="USER_ACCESS_TOKEN_ENABLED", environ_prefix=None
+    )
+    USER_ACCESS_TOKEN_SECRET_KEY = SecretFileValue(
+        None, environ_name="USER_ACCESS_TOKEN_SECRET_KEY", environ_prefix=None
+    )
+    USER_ACCESS_TOKEN_ALG = values.Value(
+        "HS256",
+        environ_name="USER_ACCESS_TOKEN_ALG",
+        environ_prefix=None,
+    )
+    USER_ACCESS_TOKEN_ISSUER = values.Value(
+        "lasuite-meet",
+        environ_name="USER_ACCESS_TOKEN_ISSUER",
+        environ_prefix=None,
+    )
+    USER_ACCESS_TOKEN_AUDIENCE = values.Value(
+        None,
+        environ_name="USER_ACCESS_TOKEN_AUDIENCE",
+        environ_prefix=None,
+    )
+    # Lifetime of the user access token obtained through the exchange
+    # endpoint. It never transits through a URL, so it can cover a full
+    # meeting (default: 2 hours).
+    USER_ACCESS_TOKEN_TTL = values.PositiveIntegerValue(
+        7200,
+        environ_name="USER_ACCESS_TOKEN_TTL",
+        environ_prefix=None,
+    )
+    # Lifetime of the single-use transit code handed to the frontend
+    # through a URL fragment. Kept very short by design: it must only
+    # survive the redirect and the exchange call.
+    TRANSIT_CODE_TTL = values.PositiveIntegerValue(
+        60,
+        environ_name="TRANSIT_CODE_TTL",
+        environ_prefix=None,
+    )
+    TRANSIT_CODE_CACHE_PREFIX = values.Value(
+        "transit-code",
+        environ_name="TRANSIT_CODE_CACHE_PREFIX",
+        environ_prefix=None,
+    )
+    # Number of random bytes per code (48 bytes -> 64 url-safe characters)
+    TRANSIT_CODE_NBYTES = values.PositiveIntegerValue(
+        48,
+        environ_name="TRANSIT_CODE_NBYTES",
+        environ_prefix=None,
+    )
+    USER_ACCESS_TOKEN_TYPE = values.Value(
+        "Bearer",
+        environ_name="USER_ACCESS_TOKEN_TYPE",
+        environ_prefix=None,
+    )
     # Warning: EXTERNAL_API_ALLOW_PUBLIC_ACCESS is ignored when
     # EXTERNAL_API_DEFAULT_ACCESS_LEVEL=public.
     EXTERNAL_API_ALLOW_PUBLIC_ACCESS = values.BooleanValue(
@@ -1287,6 +1311,10 @@ class Test(Base):
     ADDONS_CSRF_SECRET = "secret-key-padded-for-minimum-len!-addons"  # noqa:S105
     ADDONS_TOKEN_SECRET_KEY = "secret-key-padded-for-minimum-len!-addons"  # noqa:S105
 
+    USER_ACCESS_TOKEN_ENABLED = True
+    USER_ACCESS_TOKEN_SECRET_KEY = "secret-key-padded-for-minimum-len!-room"  # noqa:S105
+    USER_ACCESS_TOKEN_AUDIENCE = "Test inc."  # noqa:S105
+
     def __init__(self):
         # pylint: disable=invalid-name
         self.INSTALLED_APPS += ["drf_spectacular_sidecar"]