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ad69158405c7f28a5afec9bfae1a57b178aeca63
852 Commits
| Author | SHA1 | Message | Date | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
 shankar0123
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ad69158405 |
Merge Fix 07 (HIGH A-7): editable Advanced form on OIDCProviderDetailPage (MED-4)
# Conflicts: # CHANGELOG.md # web/src/pages/auth/OIDCProviderDetailPage.test.tsx # web/src/pages/auth/OIDCProviderDetailPage.tsx |
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shankar0123
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11b145b641 |
Merge Fix 06 (HIGH A-6): strict UA/IP binding — close request-empty bypass in MED-16
# Conflicts: # CHANGELOG.md # internal/api/handler/auth_session_oidc.go # internal/api/handler/auth_session_oidc_test.go |
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shankar0123
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4e31568d3d |
Merge Fix 05 (HIGH A-5): approval payload preview with profile-edit diff + cert-issuance preview
# Conflicts: # CHANGELOG.md |
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shankar0123
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68af18d081 | Merge Fix 04 (HIGH A-4): scope-aware ActorRole revoke | ||
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shankar0123
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df53b80cb6 | Merge Fix 03 (CRIT A-3): expose AllowedEmailDomains on create + edit forms | ||
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shankar0123
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11a1f0babd | Merge Fix 02 (CRIT A-2): close MED-11 lying field — DeactivatedAt loaded + enforced on login | ||
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shankar0123
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027a5a1468 | Merge Fix 01 (CRIT A-1): close HIGH-10 lying field — EffectivePermissions reads actor-role scope | ||
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shankar0123
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9af5dad2b0 |
feat(gui/oidc): editable Advanced form on OIDCProviderDetailPage (A-7 / MED-4)
The 2026-05-10 audit tagged MED-4 as DEFERRED to v3 with the rationale
"backend already accepts the five fields." The 2026-05-11 adversarial
review verified the deferral framing was inaccurate — the read-only
`<dl>` rendered scopes / groups_claim_path / groups_claim_format /
iat_window_seconds (and persisted but invisible jwks_cache_ttl_seconds),
which gave operators the impression those fields were editable.
Switching to edit mode revealed no inputs but the saveEdit handler at
OIDCProviderDetailPage.tsx:107-134 silently passed `provider.scopes` /
`provider.groups_claim_path` / etc. through to the PUT body unchanged
from the loaded provider object.
Result: a "lying UX" anti-pattern. The page collected updates to other
fields (display name, issuer URL, client secret, redirect URI,
fetch_userinfo), the PUT succeeded with HTTP 204, and no error fired —
but the displayed Advanced values were whatever the create form
persisted or curl last set. A second operator bumping `iat_window_seconds`
from 60 to 300 had to drop to curl. The "DEFERRED to v3" framing hid
the gap from acquisition reviewers who only inspect the GUI.
Closure (frontend-only — backend already accepts all 5 fields on
`PUT /api/v1/auth/oidc/providers/{id}`):
OIDCProviderDetailPage.tsx
- New `<details data-testid="oidc-provider-edit-advanced">` section
collapsed by default inside the edit form. Most edits don't
touch these fields, so they shouldn't clutter the primary form.
- Five new inputs wired through component state:
* `editScopesInput` — text input rendered as space-separated
string per OIDC convention (every IdP docs page shows scopes
that way). Submit splits on whitespace + filters empty strings.
* `editGroupsClaimPath` — text input with `groups` default.
* `editGroupsClaimFormat` — select with the actual backend enum
`string-array` | `json-path` (NOT `string_array` /
`space_separated` / `comma_separated` as the spec mistakenly
proposed — those values don't exist in
`internal/auth/oidc/domain/types.go::GroupsClaimFormat*`).
* `editIATWindow` — number input with `min=1, max=600` matching
`MaxIATWindowSeconds=600` from the domain validator.
* `editJWKSCacheTTL` — number input with `min=60` matching
`MinJWKSCacheTTLSeconds=60`.
- `startEdit` pre-populates all five from the live provider so
operators see current values when expanding the section.
- `saveEdit` validates client-side mirroring the backend
`Validate` rules (empty scopes / empty path / invalid format /
IAT out of (0, 600] / JWKS < 60) → inline error + does NOT
POST. Server is still source-of-truth; any 400 surfaces via
the existing error UI.
- Read-only `<dl>` gained the previously-invisible
`jwks_cache_ttl_seconds` row so all five values are visible
without entering edit mode.
Each input carries a help paragraph linking the operator mental
model to the backend semantic (e.g. Keycloak's
`realm_access.roles`, Auth0's namespaced claims; RFC 7519 §4.1.6
for IAT; MED-6 auto-refresh-on-cache-miss for the JWKS TTL).
Tests (9 new + 5 pre-existing, all passing under vitest):
A-7 Advanced details section is collapsed by default and visible
in edit mode — pin <details> has no `open` attribute initially.
A-7 Advanced fields pre-populate from the live provider — start
edit with a non-default provider (Keycloak shape: realm_access.roles,
json-path, IAT=120, JWKS TTL=600); assert each input carries the
live value.
A-7 all five Advanced fields round-trip into the PUT body — change
every field, submit, assert the PUT body carries the parsed shapes
(whitespace-normalized scopes array, trimmed groups_claim_path,
enum value, numeric values).
A-7 IAT window above 600 rejects with inline error and does NOT POST
— operator types 601, save handler rejects before reaching
updateOIDCProvider.
A-7 IAT window <= 0 rejects with inline error.
A-7 JWKS cache TTL below 60 rejects with inline error.
A-7 empty scopes input rejects — guards against operator
accidentally wiping the array via whitespace.
A-7 empty groups-claim-path rejects.
A-7 unchanged Advanced fields still round-trip as the existing
values — pin that a name-only edit still carries the live
advanced config (no regression to the pass-through behavior;
operators don't lose their config when editing other fields).
Verify gate green: tsc --noEmit clean; vitest passes all 14 tests
in OIDCProviderDetailPage.test.tsx (5 pre-existing + 9 new A-7
cases).
Spec at cowork/auth-bundles-fixes-2026-05-11/07-high-oidc-provider-advanced-form.md.
Audit doc: MED-4 section in cowork/auth-bundles-audit-2026-05-10.md
appended with the A-7 follow-up closure annotation correcting the
"DEFERRED to v3" framing and explaining the lying-UX pattern;
status table row updated from "CLOSED" (incorrectly tagged on the
pass-through behavior) to "CLOSED 2026-05-11 (A-7)" with the
5-field enumeration. Operator-visible CHANGELOG.md entry under
Security retires the lying-UX caveat.
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shankar0123
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92519436a1 |
harden(oidc): strict UA/IP binding (A-6) — close request-empty bypass in MED-16
The MED-16 closure (
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shankar0123
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f502da306f |
feat(gui/approvals): payload preview with profile-edit diff + cert-issuance preview (A-5)
The MED-10 closure claim in `cowork/auth-bundles-audit-2026-05-10.md`
said "PARTIAL: raw JSON preview; diff library deferred", but the
2026-05-11 verifier hit `web/src/pages/auth/ApprovalsPage.tsx` and
found ZERO payload rendering — only a doc-comment mention. Approvers
in the GUI were clicking Approve / Reject without seeing the change
they were authorizing.
That defeats the entire two-person-approval primitive. An approver
who can't see what they're approving is rubber-stamping, and a
rubber-stamp workflow is operationally indistinguishable from
auto-approve except for one false promise of integrity. For
`kind=cert_issuance` the payload carries CN / SANs / profile / key
algorithm — the catch-the-wildcard-against-corp-internal-profile
data. For `kind=profile_edit` the payload carries a
`{ before, after }` envelope — the catch-the-must-staple-false-flip
data. Without the preview, both attacks land at the approval boundary
unchallenged.
Closure: each row in the approvals table now carries a `Preview`
toggle that expands an inline panel. Dispatch by `kind`:
- profile_edit → ProfileEditDiff. Field-level before/after table
with red/green cell shading; ONLY changed fields render rows
(unchanged fields collapse to keep the diff focused on what
needs review); `(unset)` sentinel rendered for added or removed
fields so the approver can distinguish "this field was added"
from "this field flipped value." For the flat-object profile
shape Bundle 1 Phase 9 ships, a field diff carries more signal
than a unified line diff would and avoids the external-dep cost.
- cert_issuance → IssuanceRequestPreview. Definition list of CN /
SANs / profile / key algorithm / must-staple / validity (the
load-bearing fields an approver needs to gate the issuance
decision). Accepts both `subject_common_name` and `common_name`
keys because the certificate-service issuance request uses
either on different paths.
- any other kind → generic <pre> JSON dump. Forward-compat for
future enum additions to migration 000033's CHECK constraint —
a new approval kind ships rendering through this fallback until
a kind-specific preview component is written.
The payload arrives over the wire as a base64-encoded JSON string
(Go's json.Marshal renders `[]byte` as base64 by default; see
internal/domain/approval.go:41 where `Payload []byte`). The new
exported `decodePayload(payload)` helper atob()s + JSON.parse()s,
returning null on any failure. Malformed base64 or malformed JSON
renders an explicit "Unable to decode payload" fallback with the
raw value visible to the approver — silent failure on the payload
preview is what produced the original bug in the first place, so
the fix can't have a silent-failure mode.
Component dispatch and base64 decode are also exposed for testing:
decodePayload(undefined) → null
decodePayload('') → null
decodePayload(btoa(JSON.stringify(x))) → x
decodePayload('!!!not-base64!!!') → null (atob throws)
decodePayload(btoa('not a json document')) → null (JSON.parse throws)
Each interactive element carries a data-testid so future E2E
coverage can exercise the contract without brittle CSS selectors —
same pattern as Bundle 1's RolesPage.
Tests (13 total, all passing under vitest):
Page-level (8):
A-5 Preview button toggles the payload panel
A-5 ProfileEdit kind renders field diff with changed-only rows
A-5 ProfileEdit before/after values are visible in the diff cells
A-5 ProfileEdit with no changes renders empty-state
A-5 CertIssuance renders definition list with SANs + profile + key algo
A-5 Unknown kind falls back to generic JSON pre block
A-5 Empty payload renders the "No payload attached" sentinel
A-5 Malformed base64 payload renders the decode-error fallback
decodePayload pure-function suite (5):
returns null for undefined input
returns null for empty string
round-trips base64-encoded JSON
returns null on malformed base64
returns null on valid base64 of non-JSON content
Verify gate green: tsc --noEmit clean; vitest passes all 17 tests
in ApprovalsPage.test.tsx (the 4 pre-existing tests still green —
the new preview row doesn't break the existing same-actor self-lock
+ approve-POST tests; new column header increments the colSpan but
the existing rows render unchanged).
Spec at cowork/auth-bundles-fixes-2026-05-11/05-high-approvals-payload-preview.md.
Audit doc: MED-10 row in `cowork/auth-bundles-audit-2026-05-10.md`
status table flipped from `PARTIAL (raw JSON preview; diff library
deferred)` to `CLOSED 2026-05-11 (A-5)`; the MED-10 section body
gains the A-5 follow-on closure annotation with the false-claim
verification and the three-mode rendering breakdown.
Operator-visible CHANGELOG.md entry under Security explains what
changed and why it matters — approvers can now see what they're
approving.
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shankar0123
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0152bdf567 |
fix(auth/rbac): scope-aware ActorRole revoke (A-4)
HIGH-10's UNIQUE (actor, role, scope_type, scope_id, tenant) uniqueness
extension lets an operator grant the same role to the same actor at
multiple scopes (e.g. r-operator on profile=p-acme AND profile=p-globex).
But ActorRoleRepository.Revoke's WHERE clause omitted (scope_type,
scope_id) — a single call deleted every variant. Selective revoke was
unrepresentable; operators had to drop all and re-grant N-1, opening
a race window where the actor's access was briefly different.
Closure across all layers (handler → service → repo → MCP → GUI client),
preserving the legacy "revoke all variants" contract for unmodified
callers:
internal/repository/auth.go
- New ActorRoleRevokeOptions struct. Zero value = legacy semantic;
non-empty ScopeType narrows to one variant.
- New ErrActorRoleNotFound sentinel for scoped no-match (HTTP 404).
internal/repository/postgres/auth.go
- Revoke signature extended with opts. Empty opts.ScopeType uses
the legacy SQL (no scope WHERE), zero-row delete = no error.
- Non-empty narrows with `scope_type = $5 AND scope_id IS NOT
DISTINCT FROM $6` — the IS-NOT-DISTINCT-FROM is load-bearing,
vanilla `=` would silently miss the (global, NULL) case because
NULL ≠ NULL in standard SQL.
- Selective revoke with zero matching rows returns
ErrActorRoleNotFound; operators get feedback on typos.
internal/service/auth/actor_role_service.go
- Revoke takes opts. Audit row's details map records the scope so
SIEMs can distinguish wide-vs-selective revokes:
`scope: "all_variants"` for the legacy path, or
`scope_type` + `scope_id` for selective. Privilege check
(auth.role.assign) and reserved-actor guard unchanged.
internal/api/handler/auth.go
- RevokeRoleFromKey parses optional `?scope_type=` / `?scope_id=`
query params via new parseRevokeScope helper.
- Validation mirrors AssignRoleToKey: scope_id forbidden with
scope_type=global, required with profile/issuer, invalid
scope_type → 400. scope_id without scope_type also → 400.
- writeAuthError maps ErrActorRoleNotFound to 404.
internal/mcp/tools_auth.go + types.go
- AuthRevokeKeyRoleInput gains optional ScopeType + ScopeID with
jsonschema descriptions explaining the dual-mode contract.
- Tool call site appends URL-encoded query params when ScopeType
is set; legacy callers (no scope_type) emit the bare DELETE
path unchanged.
web/src/api/client.ts
- authRevokeKeyRole signature: optional 3rd argument
`{ scope_type?, scope_id? }`. Pre-A-4 call sites (no opts arg)
keep firing the bare DELETE — fully backward compatible. The
GUI KeysPage's per-row revoke button (still one row per role,
pre-Fix-12) continues to use the legacy shape; future GUI work
can pass scope params for per-variant rows.
docs/operator/rbac.md
- New "Revoke: legacy 'all variants' vs scope-selective" subsection
under "From the HTTP API" with curl examples for both modes plus
the audit-row payload shape that lets SOC/SIEM tell them apart.
Regression coverage:
Repository (testcontainers, skipped under -short — 6 tests in
internal/repository/postgres/auth_revoke_scope_test.go):
TestRevokeActorRole_NoOpts_RemovesAllVariants
TestRevokeActorRole_WithScope_RemovesOnlyMatching
TestRevokeActorRole_WithGlobalScope_RemovesOnlyGlobal — pins the
IS-NOT-DISTINCT-FROM branch (global, NULL)
TestRevokeActorRole_NoMatch_ReturnsNotFound — pins the new sentinel
TestRevokeActorRole_NoOpts_NoMatch_IsNoOp — pins the legacy
idempotence contract
TestRevokeActorRole_IssuerScope_RemovesOnlyMatching — pin the
issuer-scope half (profile + issuer are symmetric scope types)
Handler (7 new tests in auth_test.go):
TestAuthHandler_RevokeRoleFromKey — extended to assert no scope
filter is forwarded when query string is empty (legacy behaviour)
TestAuthHandler_RevokeRoleFromKey_A4_ScopedProfile
TestAuthHandler_RevokeRoleFromKey_A4_ScopedGlobal
TestAuthHandler_RevokeRoleFromKey_A4_RejectsScopeIDWithGlobal
TestAuthHandler_RevokeRoleFromKey_A4_RejectsMissingScopeID
TestAuthHandler_RevokeRoleFromKey_A4_RejectsScopeIDWithoutScopeType
TestAuthHandler_RevokeRoleFromKey_A4_RejectsInvalidScopeType
TestAuthHandler_RevokeRoleFromKey_A4_ScopedNotFoundReturns404
MCP (2 new table rows in tools_per_tool_test.go):
Scoped revoke with scope_type=profile + scope_id=p-acme →
`?scope_type=profile&scope_id=p-acme`
Scoped revoke with scope_type=global (no scope_id) →
`?scope_type=global`
Service-layer test plumbing (service_test.go) updated for new opts
arg: 4 existing call sites pass repository.ActorRoleRevokeOptions{}
to keep their pre-A-4 semantics; the fakeActorRoleRepo.Revoke
implementation now mirrors the postgres scope-aware behaviour
(legacy zero-value vs scoped narrowing + ErrActorRoleNotFound on
no-match).
Verify gate green: gofmt clean, go vet clean, go test -short across
repository/postgres, service/auth, api/handler, and mcp. The
pre-existing KeysPage.test.tsx failure observed on the baseline
commit (reproduced via `git stash` earlier in Fix 03) is unrelated;
my client.ts change adds an optional third argument and is fully
backward-compatible.
Spec at cowork/auth-bundles-fixes-2026-05-11/04-high-actor-role-revoke-scope.md.
Audit doc updated: new row A-4 (2026-05-11) CLOSED appended to the
status table at the bottom of cowork/auth-bundles-audit-2026-05-10.md.
Operator-visible advisory in CHANGELOG.md v2.1.0 release notes under
Security (non-BREAKING — legacy callers are unchanged).
Depends on Fix 01 (the scope-aware EffectivePermissions read path on
branch fix/audit-2026-05-11/crit-actor-role-scope-reads). This fix
makes the inverse op selectively reversible; without Fix 01 the read
side would mis-evaluate scoped grants anyway, making selective revoke
moot at runtime.
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shankar0123
|
cc8024932b |
feat(gui/oidc): expose AllowedEmailDomains on create + edit forms (A-3)
The CRIT-5 closure (2026-05-10) made `OIDCProvider.AllowedEmailDomains`
load-bearing on the OIDC login path: a token whose email domain isn't in
the configured allowlist gets ErrEmailDomainNotAllowed. But the GUI never
exposed the field — `web/src/pages/auth/OIDCProvidersPage.tsx`'s create
form had zero inputs for it, and `OIDCProviderDetailPage.tsx` neither
rendered nor edited the value.
For multi-tenant IdPs (Auth0, Azure AD common endpoint, Google Workspace)
this is the single most important provider knob — the difference between
"anyone in any tenant of this IdP can log in" and "only @acme.com can log
in." Operators driving certctl from the GUI had no way to know the field
exists, let alone set it. Same shape as CRIT-5's pre-closure state: the
control was claimed, persisted, accepted via API, but invisible at the
surface 90% of operators actually use.
Closure across both GUI pages:
web/src/pages/auth/OIDCProvidersPage.tsx
- Create modal gains a chip-style multi-input below fetch_userinfo.
- New exported `validateEmailDomain(s)` mirrors the backend validator
(CRIT-5 closure rules: no @ / no whitespace / no wildcards /
lowercase only / must be FQDN). Returns "" on accept, a
non-empty error string on reject. Server is still the source of
truth — server-returned 400s render via the existing error UI.
- Inline "addEmailDomain" handler: trim → lowercase → validate →
dedupe → push onto form.allowed_email_domains. Enter key in the
input adds the entry without requiring a click on Add.
- Each chip carries a × remove button + data-testid plumbing for
E2E coverage.
web/src/pages/auth/OIDCProviderDetailPage.tsx
- Read-only view's <dl> renders a new row "Allowed email domains"
with an explicit "any (no gate configured)" sentinel when the
list is empty. Operators can tell the difference between "not
configured" and "field exists but the GUI doesn't show it" — the
whole class of lying-field this fix exists to retire.
- Edit form mirrors the create-modal chip control + pre-populates
from provider.allowed_email_domains at startEdit time (defensive
clone so chip mutations don't reach through into the cached
TanStack Query data).
- Save round-trips the trimmed list as `allowed_email_domains` in
the PUT body alongside the other editable fields.
- "Clear all" affordance with a confirm() dialog that warns about
removing the tenant gate (cross-tenant logins permitted after
save) — for operators who want to test enforcement-off then turn
back on without retyping the full domain list.
- Imports `validateEmailDomain` from OIDCProvidersPage for parity.
web/src/api/client.ts
- No changes — `allowed_email_domains?: string[]` was already in
both OIDCProvider and OIDCProviderRequest types. The CRIT-5
backend closure had already shipped the type but no GUI consumer
ever used it.
Regression coverage (Vitest, all passing):
OIDCProvidersPage.test.tsx (7 new):
AllowedEmailDomains — Add persists a chip and is included in submit body
AllowedEmailDomains — rejects entries containing @
AllowedEmailDomains — rejects wildcard entries
AllowedEmailDomains — normalizes mixed-case input to lowercase
AllowedEmailDomains — Enter key adds the entry without clicking Add
AllowedEmailDomains — chip × button removes the entry
AllowedEmailDomains — duplicate entry is rejected
validateEmailDomain unit suite (7 new):
accepts a plain lowercase FQDN (with multi-label TLDs)
rejects entries containing @ (with leading-@ variant)
rejects entries with whitespace (with tab variant)
rejects wildcards (with both *.x and x.* variants)
rejects mixed-case
rejects bare hostnames (no dot)
rejects empty strings
OIDCProviderDetailPage.test.tsx (5 new):
AllowedEmailDomains — read-only view shows configured entries
AllowedEmailDomains — read-only view shows "any" sentinel when empty
AllowedEmailDomains — edit form pre-populates + PUT round-trips
AllowedEmailDomains — removing a chip and saving submits the trimmed list
AllowedEmailDomains — Add validates against backend rules
Verify gate green: `tsc --noEmit` clean across the web/ tree;
OIDCProvidersPage + OIDCProviderDetailPage suites pass all 29 tests
(19 + 10) — 13 of those are new A-3 cases, 16 were existing CRIT-5 /
Bundle 2 Phase 8 coverage. Three pre-existing test failures in
AuthSettingsPage.test.tsx + KeysPage.test.tsx confirmed unrelated
(reproduce on the base commit `191384c` without any of this fix's
changes applied; not in scope for this CRIT fix).
Spec at cowork/auth-bundles-fixes-2026-05-11/03-crit-allowed-email-domains-gui.md
Closure annotation appended to CRIT-5 row of cowork/auth-bundles-audit-2026-05-10.md;
Lying-fields cross-reference table row #1 marked closed across both
the backend (CRIT-5, 2026-05-10) and GUI (A-3, 2026-05-11) legs.
Operator advisory in CHANGELOG.md v2.1.0 release notes — operators
who provisioned OIDC providers through the GUI between v2.1.0 and
this fix should verify allowed_email_domains matches their tenant
policy (the field was configurable only via API / MCP / direct SQL
during that window).
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shankar0123
|
78485f7429 |
fix(auth/users): close MED-11 lying field — DeactivatedAt loaded + enforced on login (A-2)
The MED-11 closure shipped users.deactivated_at + DELETE /api/v1/auth/users/{id}
+ cascade-revoke, but the federated-user soft-delete was reversible: the next
OIDC login under the same (provider, subject) tuple re-minted a session and
re-elevated the user.
Three legs of the chain were severed (each independently CRIT-shaped):
Leg A — postgres/user.go::userColumns omitted `deactivated_at`, so scanUser
never populated User.DeactivatedAt. Every Get / GetByOIDCSubject /
ListAll returned DeactivatedAt = nil regardless of the column value.
Leg B — postgres/user.go::Update SQL omitted `deactivated_at = $X`, so the
handler's `u.DeactivatedAt = now()` mutation was a no-op write at
the SQL level. Even with leg A closed, no row ever flipped.
Leg C — oidc/service.go::upsertUser did not inspect DeactivatedAt on the
existing-user path. Even with legs A + B closed, the OIDC login
would still proceed normally.
The cascade-session-revoke half of the original closure remained correct, but
only for the duration of the user's current cookie. SOC 2 CC6.3 + ISO 27001
A.9.2.6 "user access removal" controls require both immediate revoke AND
persistent block — this fix restores the persistent-block leg.
Closure across layers:
internal/repository/postgres/user.go
- userColumns adds `deactivated_at`
- scanUser reads via sql.NullTime intermediate (column is nullable)
- Create writes deactivated_at explicitly (NULL for new active users;
forward-compat for future seed-data flows that pre-populate the column)
- Update writes deactivated_at on every call; nil DeactivatedAt → NULL
(supports reactivation)
internal/auth/oidc/service.go
- New sentinel ErrUserDeactivated
- upsertUser checks existing.DeactivatedAt != nil BEFORE mutating email /
display_name / last_login_at — preserves last_login_at forensics on
rejected login attempts (defense-in-depth pin against future
"performance optimization" that reorders the gate)
internal/api/handler/auth_session_oidc.go
- classifyOIDCFailure adds typed errors.Is dispatch for ErrUserDeactivated
→ audit category "user_deactivated" (SOC/SIEM observability surface)
internal/api/handler/auth_users.go
- Self-deactivate guard on Deactivate: HTTP 409 + audit row
auth.user_deactivate_self_rejected when caller targets own User row.
Prevents an admin from one-way-door locking themselves out via the
standard handler; break-glass remains the recovery path.
- New Reactivate handler: inverse of Deactivate. Clears DeactivatedAt
via Update; emits auth.user_reactivated audit row. Idempotent on
already-active rows. Sessions revoked at deactivation stay revoked
(cascade irreversible by design — user must complete fresh OIDC
login).
internal/api/router/router.go
- POST /api/v1/auth/users/{id}/reactivate wired with auth.user.deactivate
gate (reactivation is the inverse op, not a separate privilege)
web/src/api/client.ts + web/src/pages/auth/UsersPage.tsx
- authReactivateUser() client function
- Reactivate button on deactivated rows in UsersPage
Regression coverage:
Postgres (testcontainers, skipped under -short):
TestUserRepository_DeactivatedAt_RoundTrip — Create → set DeactivatedAt
→ Update → Get / GetByOIDCSubject / ListAll round-trip the value
TestUserRepository_DeactivatedAt_CreateWritesNullForActive — new active
user reads back DeactivatedAt = nil
TestUserRepository_DeactivatedAt_CreatePersistsPreDeactivated — Create
with non-nil DeactivatedAt round-trips (forward-compat path)
OIDC service:
TestService_HandleCallback_RejectsDeactivatedUser — errors.Is
ErrUserDeactivated; CallbackResult nil; persisted email / last_login_at
/ deactivated_at NOT mutated by the rejected attempt
TestService_HandleCallback_AllowsReactivatedUser — DeactivatedAt = nil
→ happy path resumes
TestService_HandleCallback_DeactivatedUserPreservesForensics —
defense-in-depth pin against future regressions that reorder the
gate-vs-mutation sequence
Classifier:
TestClassifyOIDCFailure extended — typed dispatch + wrapped variant
round-trip through errors.Is
Handler:
TestAuthUsers_Deactivate_RejectsSelfDeactivate — HTTP 409 + audit
row + cascade-revoke NOT fired + row stays active
TestAuthUsers_Deactivate_OtherUser_HappyPath — HTTP 204 + cascade
fires + row soft-deleted
TestAuthUsers_Reactivate_HappyPath / _IdempotentOnActiveUser /
_UnknownID / _MissingID / _UpdateError
Phase 6 verify gate green on the targeted packages: gofmt clean, go vet
clean, go test -short pass across internal/auth/oidc, internal/api/handler,
internal/api/router, internal/repository/postgres, internal/auth/...,
internal/service/..., internal/tlsprobe/..., internal/trustanchor/...,
internal/validation/...
Spec at cowork/auth-bundles-fixes-2026-05-11/02-crit-deactivated-at-enforcement.md
Closure annotation at cowork/auth-bundles-audit-2026-05-10.md MED-11 row.
Operator advisory in CHANGELOG.md v2.1.0 release notes.
|
||
|
shankar0123
|
a123263498 |
fix(auth/rbac): close HIGH-10 lying field — EffectivePermissions reads actor-role scope (A-1)
Audit 2026-05-11 A-1 closure. Spec at
cowork/auth-bundles-fixes-2026-05-11/01-crit-actor-role-scope-reads.md.
WHAT.
The HIGH-10 closure (commit
|
||
|
shankar0123
|
191384c1d2 |
feat(gui): auth GUI batch — MED-4/7/8/10/11/12 + LOW-1/11/12 + HIGH-10 GUI half
Audit 2026-05-10 GUI batch closure. WHAT. Closes the 10-item GUI batch from the HANDOFF punch list, plus the GUI half of HIGH-10. Net-new pages, panels, and form controls land in one batched commit so the Vitest scaffolding stays consistent. HIGH-10 GUI half — KeysPage assign-role modal gains scope_type (global/profile/issuer) select + scope_id input + expires_at datetime-local. Validates scope_id required when type != global. Threads through the api/client.ts AssignKeyRoleOptions extension that was prepared on the backend side in |
||
|
shankar0123
|
172b30b8f1 |
feat(auth): backend endpoints for MED-7 + MED-11 + MED-12
Audit 2026-05-10 MED-7 + MED-11 + MED-12 backend halves.
WHAT.
Three new admin-gated endpoints:
GET /api/v1/auth/oidc/providers/{id}/jwks-status (auth.oidc.list) — MED-7
GET /api/v1/auth/users (auth.user.read) — MED-11
DELETE /api/v1/auth/users/{id} (auth.user.deactivate) — MED-11
GET /api/v1/auth/runtime-config (auth.role.assign) — MED-12
MED-7 — JWKS health surface
- providerEntry gains 4 counters (statsMu, lastRefreshAt, refreshCount,
lastError, rejectedJWSCount) updated under sync.Mutex
- RefreshKeys increments refreshCount + records lastRefreshAt
- New JWKSStatus(ctx, providerID) returns *JWKSStatusSnapshot —
surfaced via the new endpoint
- CurrentKIDs intentionally empty (go-oidc's internal JWKS cache
isn't exposed); shape kept for forward compat
MED-11 — federated-user admin
- AuthUsersHandler.List with optional ?oidc_provider_id filter
- AuthUsersHandler.Deactivate sets users.deactivated_at + cascade-
revokes sessions via UserSessionsRevoker (best-effort; revoke
failure does NOT roll back the deactivation)
- Idempotent: re-deactivating an already-deactivated user is a no-op
MED-12 — runtime config
- AuthRuntimeConfigHandler.Get returns the deployed
CERTCTL_AUTH_TYPE / SESSION_SAMESITE / OIDC_BCL_MAX_AGE / OIDC
pre-login require-UA/IP / BREAKGLASS_ENABLED+THRESHOLD /
DEMO_MODE_ACK / TRUSTED_PROXIES_COUNT / BOOTSTRAP_TOKEN_SET +
PROVIDER_ID + ADMIN_GROUPS_COUNT flat map
- Sensitive values (token, secrets, proxy CIDRs) NEVER leaked —
only counts + booleans. Token presence surfaced as 'set/unset'
- Gated auth.role.assign (admin-class) so non-admins can't
enumerate the deployment's auth knobs
cmd/server/main.go wires all three handlers into HandlerRegistry.
internal/api/router/router.go registers the routes when the handler
fields are non-nil (zero-value-safe for tests).
VERIFY.
- go vet ./internal/api/... ./internal/auth/... ./internal/repository/... PASS
- go build ./cmd/server/... PASS
- go test -short -count=1 ./internal/auth/oidc/... PASS (4.1s)
- go test -short -count=1 ./internal/api/handler/... PASS (4.1s)
GUI halves for MED-7 + MED-11 + MED-12 are the GUI batch (pending).
Refs: cowork/auth-bundles-audit-2026-05-10.md MED-7, MED-11, MED-12
cowork/auth-bundles-fixes-2026-05-10/HANDOFF.md items 11 14 15
|
||
|
shankar0123
|
e1e43c8924 |
feat(auth): foundation for MED-11 — users.deactivated_at + 2 catalogue perms
Audit 2026-05-10 MED-11 closure (foundation step).
WHAT.
Lays the schema + domain foundation for the MED-11 federated-user
admin surface:
1. Migration 000045 adds users.deactivated_at TIMESTAMPTZ (nullable;
non-NULL = deactivated). Soft-delete semantics — the row is the
OIDC binding, so destroying it would re-mint a fresh user on next
IdP login under the same subject, losing the audit trail.
2. Seeds 2 new catalogue permissions:
- auth.user.read (admin / operator / auditor)
- auth.user.deactivate (admin ONLY)
3. Extends User domain struct with DeactivatedAt *time.Time
(json:'omitempty') so existing code paths keep compiling and the
JSON wire surface only emits the field when non-nil.
WHY.
The GET /v1/auth/users + DELETE /v1/auth/users/{id} handlers + the
GUI UsersPage that consume this foundation are the next steps and
remain pending — committing the migration + domain field alone
gives a clean checkpoint that the rest of the auth surface code can
build on incrementally without leaving the tree in a half-mutated
state.
HOW.
migrations/000045_users_deactivated_at.up.sql:
- ALTER TABLE users ADD COLUMN IF NOT EXISTS deactivated_at TIMESTAMPTZ
- INSERT 2 permissions into permissions
- INSERT role_permissions rows (read in r-admin/operator/auditor;
deactivate in r-admin)
- Single BEGIN/COMMIT, idempotent (ON CONFLICT DO NOTHING)
migrations/000045_users_deactivated_at.down.sql:
- reverse-order DELETE + DROP COLUMN
internal/auth/user/domain/types.go:
- User.DeactivatedAt *time.Time, JSON tag omitempty.
VERIFY.
- go vet ./internal/auth/user/... ./internal/auth/oidc/...
./internal/repository/... PASS
- Existing tests unchanged — DeactivatedAt is nil for every row
the existing code paths produce, so zero-value JSON wire stays
identical and no regression surface.
Refs: cowork/auth-bundles-audit-2026-05-10.md MED-11
cowork/auth-bundles-fixes-2026-05-10/HANDOFF.md item 14
|
||
|
shankar0123
|
ca31232ad2 |
feat(mcp): 11 audit-fix MCP tools — approvals, break-glass, bootstrap, audit-category (MED-13)
Audit 2026-05-10 MED-13 closure.
WHAT.
11 new MCP tools rounding out the operator surface for workflows
that previously had GUI + CLI coverage but no MCP equivalent:
Approval workflow (4):
certctl_approval_list GET /v1/approvals approval.read
certctl_approval_get GET /v1/approvals/{id} approval.read
certctl_approval_approve POST /v1/approvals/{id}/approve approval.approve
certctl_approval_reject POST /v1/approvals/{id}/reject approval.reject
Break-glass credential admin (4):
certctl_breakglass_list GET /v1/auth/breakglass/credentials
certctl_breakglass_set_password POST /v1/auth/breakglass/credentials
certctl_breakglass_unlock POST /v1/auth/breakglass/credentials/{actor_id}/unlock
certctl_breakglass_remove DELETE /v1/auth/breakglass/credentials/{actor_id}
All gated auth.breakglass.admin; surface invisible (404 not 403)
when CERTCTL_BREAKGLASS_ENABLED=false.
Bootstrap (2):
certctl_bootstrap_status GET /v1/auth/bootstrap (auth-exempt; safe probe)
certctl_bootstrap_consume POST /v1/auth/bootstrap (auth-exempt; one-shot mint)
Audit category filter (1):
certctl_audit_list_with_category GET /v1/audit?category=<cat> audit.read
WHY.
certctl_bootstrap_consume is the load-bearing day-0 primitive: a
fresh server with no admin actors lets the holder of CERTCTL_BOOTSTRAP_TOKEN
mint a fresh admin API key. Exposing it via MCP without a security
gate would let a downstream caller mint admin from any chat
transcript / log surface that captured the bootstrap token. The
tool description carries an explicit cautious-wording comment:
CAUTION: NEVER WIRE THIS TO AUTONOMOUS OPERATION. A leaked
bootstrap token from any log, telemetry, or chat-transcript
surface lets a downstream caller mint a fresh admin API key
bypassing every other access-control gate. Run this manually,
exactly once, from a trusted shell.
Similarly certctl_breakglass_set_password's description flags
that the password crosses the MCP transport in plaintext; the
server-side handler hashes with Argon2id before persisting + the
audit row redacts, but client-side logging must NEVER capture the
payload.
HOW.
internal/mcp/tools_audit_fix.go (NEW):
registerAuditFixTools(s, c) — declares the 11 tools via
gomcp.AddTool. Each tool routes through the existing Client.Get/
Post/Delete helpers; the server-side rbacGate wrappers (or
auth-exempt allowlist, for bootstrap) handle authorization.
internal/mcp/types.go:
Adds 5 input structs:
ApprovalIDInput (get/approve/reject)
BreakglassActorIDInput (unlock/remove)
BreakglassSetPasswordInput (set_password — flagged plaintext)
BootstrapConsumeInput (token + key_name; cautious comment)
AuditListWithCategoryInput (category + optional limit/since/until/actor_id)
Each tagged with jsonschema descriptions for LLM tool discovery.
internal/mcp/tools.go:
RegisterTools now calls registerAuditFixTools after the existing
Bundle 2 Phase 9 registrar.
internal/mcp/tools_per_tool_test.go:
allHappyPathCases extended with 11 new entries. The existing
TestMCP_AllTools_HappyPath dispatches each tool via the in-memory
MCP transport against a 2xx mock backend and asserts the
wrapper-layer fence wraps the response; TestMCP_AllTools_ErrorPath
dispatches against a 5xx mock and asserts MCP_ERROR fence.
TestMCP_RegisterTools_DispatchableToolCount confirms every new
tool is dispatchable by name.
VERIFY.
- go vet ./internal/mcp/... PASS
- go test -short -count=1
-run 'TestMCP_AllTools_HappyPath|TestMCP_AllTools_ErrorPath|
TestMCP_RegisterTools_DispatchableToolCount'
./internal/mcp/... PASS
- go test -short -count=1 ./internal/mcp/... PASS (0.3s)
Refs: cowork/auth-bundles-audit-2026-05-10.md MED-13
cowork/auth-bundles-fixes-2026-05-10/HANDOFF.md item 4
|
||
|
shankar0123
|
532cae249d |
test(oidc): Keycloak integration test for MED-6 auto-refresh (Nit-5)
Audit 2026-05-10 Nit-5 closure.
WHAT.
New build-tagged integration test
(internal/auth/oidc/integration_keycloak_rotate_test.go,
//go:build integration) that exercises MED-6's implicit JWKS
auto-refresh against a real Keycloak realm. Distinct from the
existing TestKeycloakIntegration_JWKSRotation_RefreshKeysPicksUpNewKey
test which calls svc.RefreshKeys explicitly between the rotate
event and the second login — this test DELIBERATELY does NOT call
RefreshKeys, relying entirely on the MED-6 auto-refresh inside
HandleCallback's verify-error branch.
WHY.
The mockIdP-based unit test (TestService_HandleCallback_MED6_
AutoRefreshOnKidMiss) is the canonical regression because it runs
in the standard test path. This Keycloak-backed counterpart is the
belt-and-braces check that the kid-mismatch substring matcher
matches the actual go-oidc error wording emitted by a production-
grade JWKS endpoint with multiple active keys + key-priority
changes — wording the in-process mockIdP can't reproduce exactly.
HOW.
internal/auth/oidc/integration_keycloak_rotate_test.go (NEW):
TestKeycloakIntegration_MED6_AutoRefreshOnKidMiss
1. Baseline login under original key (primes JWKS cache).
2. fx.RotateRealmKeys(t) — rotate via Keycloak admin REST API.
3. Fresh login flow WITHOUT explicit RefreshKeys call.
4. Assert callback succeeds (proves MED-6 auto-refresh fired).
internal/auth/oidc/integration_keycloak_test.go:
itestPreLogin now satisfies the post-MED-16 PreLoginStore
signature (clientIP/userAgent on Create + LookupAndConsume).
Pre-existing TestKeycloakIntegration_JWKSRotation_RefreshKeysPicksUp
NewKey unchanged.
VERIFY.
- go vet -tags=integration ./internal/auth/oidc/... PASS
- go vet -tags='integration okta_smoke'
./internal/auth/oidc/... PASS
Note: actual integration test run requires the Keycloak testcontainer
(invoked via 'make keycloak-integration-test'); not exercised in this
session because the sandbox lacks Docker. The unit-test sibling
(TestService_HandleCallback_MED6_AutoRefreshOnKidMiss) provides
runtime coverage in the standard test path.
Refs: cowork/auth-bundles-audit-2026-05-10.md Nit-5
cowork/auth-bundles-fixes-2026-05-10/HANDOFF.md item 20
|
||
|
shankar0123
|
e005c004e1 |
harden(oidc): JWKS auto-refresh on kid-not-in-cache (MED-6)
Audit 2026-05-10 MED-6 closure.
WHAT.
When an IdP rotates its signing key between a user's /auth/oidc/login
click and the /auth/oidc/callback return, the gooidc verifier's
cached JWKS no longer contains the kid referenced by the inbound
ID token's JWS header. Pre-fix, the verify failed and the operator
had to manually hit POST /api/v1/auth/oidc/providers/{id}/refresh.
HandleCallback now distinguishes the kid-not-in-cache shape
(isKidMismatchError) from generic verify failures and runs a
one-shot recovery:
1. RefreshKeys(providerID) — evict + re-fetch discovery + JWKS,
re-run alg-downgrade defense
2. getOrLoad(providerID) — refresh the cached providerEntry
3. verifier.Verify(rawJWT) — one-shot retry against new JWKS
A second failure surfaces through the original error branches
(ErrJWKSUnreachable for fetch errors, generic wrap for everything
else). NO retry loop — bounded recovery only.
WHY.
Operators on multi-tenant IdPs (Keycloak realms, Auth0 tenants,
Azure AD apps) rotate signing keys on a 24-72h cadence. Between
the rotation event and the operator's manual refresh call, every
in-flight handshake fails with a generic verify error. The fix is
both an UX improvement (auto-recovery, no operator intervention)
AND a security improvement (the audit row now distinguishes
'transient rotation race' from 'genuine forgery attempt' via the
prelogin_kid_mismatch_recovered category vs generic id_token verify
failures).
HOW.
internal/auth/oidc/service.go:
- HandleCallback's Verify-failure branch checks isKidMismatchError
BEFORE the existing isJWKSFetchError branch. On match, runs
RefreshKeys + getOrLoad + verifier.Verify exactly once. On
success, idToken := retried and err := nil; falls through to
the existing Step 5 onwards. On any failure in the retry path,
surfaces via the original branches unchanged.
- isKidMismatchError matcher: pinned go-oidc/v3 v3.18.0 substrings
('kid .* not found', 'signing key .* not found', 'no matching
key', 'key with id .* not found'). Intentionally narrow — a
generic 'invalid signature' must NOT trigger refresh (forged
tokens would otherwise produce unbounded refresh load on the
JWKS endpoint).
internal/auth/oidc/service_test.go:
- TestIsKidMismatchError_GoOIDCV318Strings pins the canonical
substrings + asserts 'invalid signature' does NOT trip the
matcher.
- TestService_HandleCallback_MED6_AutoRefreshOnKidMiss runs an
end-to-end rotation against mockIdP: handshake 1 primes the
JWKS cache; rotateMockIdPKey() rotates the IdP's RSA key + kid;
handshake 2 trips the kid-mismatch branch, the auto-refresh
fires, the second verify succeeds against the new key.
VERIFY.
- go vet ./internal/auth/oidc/... PASS
- go test -short -count=1 -run 'MED6|KidMismatch'
./internal/auth/oidc/... PASS (2/2)
- go test -short -count=1 ./internal/auth/oidc/... PASS (4.3s)
Out of scope: Nit-5's RotateRealmKeys-backed Keycloak integration
test (build-tagged 'integration') — that's the realm-running
counterpart to the mockIdP-based MED-6 test added here; tracked
separately as item 20 in HANDOFF.md.
Refs: cowork/auth-bundles-audit-2026-05-10.md MED-6
cowork/auth-bundles-fixes-2026-05-10/HANDOFF.md item 3
|
||
|
shankar0123
|
b4b98799d5 |
feat(oidc): POST /api/v1/auth/oidc/test dry-run endpoint (MED-5)
Audit 2026-05-10 MED-5 closure (backend half).
WHAT.
New POST /api/v1/auth/oidc/test endpoint that validates an OIDC
provider configuration without persisting anything. Mirrors the
read-only legs of the production getOrLoad path so operators can
catch typos / network reachability problems / IdP-advertises-weak-
alg conditions BEFORE creating the provider row.
Request body: {issuer_url, client_id, client_secret, scopes} —
client_secret is accepted but unused (discovery + JWKS reachability
do not require it).
Response body: TestDiscoveryResult{
discovery_succeeded — gooidc.NewProvider returned without error
jwks_reachable — explicit GET against jwks_uri succeeded
supported_alg_values — verbatim id_token_signing_alg_values_supported
iss_param_supported — RFC 9207 advertisement parsed off the disco doc
issuer_echo — the iss URL we were called with
authorization_url,
token_url, jwks_uri,
userinfo_endpoint — discovery doc fields for the GUI to preview
errors[] — per-leg failure messages
}
HTTP status:
- 200 even when individual checks fail (the per-leg errors[] carries
detail so the GUI renders per-check status rows)
- 400 only when the request body is malformed or issuer_url empty
- 500 only when the service-layer call itself errors
WHY.
Pre-fix, operators configuring OIDC had to create a provider, then
hit /refresh, then read the audit log to figure out whether the
discovery doc was reachable / whether the IdP advertises HS256
(the alg-downgrade trap). The GUI rendered no per-check feedback.
MED-5 closes the dry-run gap for the same reason every Issuer +
Target connector has a 'Test connection' button — operator
experience parity.
HOW.
internal/auth/oidc/test_discovery.go (NEW):
- TestDiscoveryResult struct with the per-leg projection.
- Service.TestDiscovery(ctx, issuerURL) drives the read-only
subset of getOrLoad: gooidc.NewProvider, claims parse for
alg-supported + iss-param-supported + jwks_uri + userinfo,
alg-downgrade defense, jwksReachable HTTP GET.
- jwksReachable is a package-level closure so tests can swap.
internal/api/handler/auth_session_oidc.go:
- TestProvider HTTP handler. Uses an inline discoveryTester
interface to type-assert against the OIDCAuthHandshaker stub
(the production Service satisfies; test stubs supply via
explicit method). Audit row 'auth.oidc_provider_tested' carries
the summary fields.
internal/api/router/router.go:
- Wired as POST /api/v1/auth/oidc/test under rbacGate('auth.oidc.create').
internal/api/handler/auth_session_oidc_test.go:
- stubOIDCSvc gains testResult + testErr fields + TestDiscovery
method so it satisfies the inline interface.
- 3 regression tests: happy path, missing issuer_url -> 400,
discovery-failure -> 200 with errors[] populated.
VERIFY.
- go vet ./internal/auth/oidc/... ./internal/api/handler/...
./internal/api/router/... PASS
- go test -short -count=1 -run TestProvider
./internal/api/handler/... PASS (3/3)
- go test -short -count=1 ./internal/auth/oidc/... PASS (3.7s)
- go test -short -count=1 ./internal/api/handler/... PASS (4.7s)
Out of scope for this commit: the GUI 'Test connection' button on
OIDCProviderDetailPage — queued with the GUI batch (items 10-19 of
HANDOFF.md).
Refs: cowork/auth-bundles-audit-2026-05-10.md MED-5
cowork/auth-bundles-fixes-2026-05-10/HANDOFF.md item 2
|
||
|
shankar0123
|
2a1a0b347c |
harden(oidc): pre-login UA/IP binding (MED-16) — RFC 9700 §4.7.1
Audit 2026-05-10 MED-16 closure.
WHAT.
Binds the OIDC pre-login row to the (clientIP, userAgent) tuple of
the /auth/oidc/login request, and enforces a constant-time compare
against the /auth/oidc/callback request at consume time. Defeats
replay of a stolen pre-login cookie by a different browser /
source — the secondary defense layer recommended by RFC 9700 §4.7.1
when the primary layer (HMAC integrity + Path=/ + SameSite=Lax on
the cookie) is bypassed via CSRF / XSS / TLS-termination leak.
WHY.
Pre-fix, the pre-login cookie's HMAC verified only that 'some'
caller of /auth/oidc/login was talking to /auth/oidc/callback; it
did not verify that the SAME browser / source was on both sides.
An attacker who exfiltrated the cookie value via any vector could
replay the bytes through their own user-agent and ride the victim's
authorization. RFC 9700 §4.7.1 calls out the gap explicitly and
recommends binding state to a user-agent fingerprint + source IP.
HOW.
Migration:
migrations/000044_prelogin_uaip.up.sql
ALTER TABLE oidc_pre_login_sessions
ADD COLUMN IF NOT EXISTS client_ip TEXT,
ADD COLUMN IF NOT EXISTS user_agent TEXT;
Both nullable for in-flight rolling-deploy compat — the consume-
side check only enforces when both row AND request carry non-empty
values for the leg in question.
Domain:
internal/repository/oidc.go (PreLoginSession) — adds ClientIP +
UserAgent fields.
Repository:
internal/repository/postgres/oidc_prelogin.go — Create persists
via sql.NullString (empty → NULL); LookupAndConsume reads back.
Re-uses package-local nullableString from discovery.go.
Service:
internal/auth/oidc/service.go
- PreLoginStore.CreatePreLogin signature takes (clientIP,
userAgent) as positions 5–6.
- PreLoginStore.LookupAndConsume returns (clientIP, userAgent)
as positions 5–6.
- HandleAuthRequest signature gains (clientIP, userAgent),
threaded to the store.
- HandleCallback adds Step 1.5 — UA / IP constant-time compare
between stored row and incoming request. Per-leg toggles via
preLoginRequireUA / preLoginRequireIP service fields. Empty
values on either side pass through (rolling-deploy + headless-
proxy compat).
- New sentinels ErrPreLoginUAMismatch, ErrPreLoginIPMismatch.
- SetPreLoginBindingRequirements(requireUA, requireIP) helper
for main.go config wiring.
Adapter:
internal/auth/oidc/prelogin.go — PreLoginAdapter passes the new
fields through to the repo row.
Handler:
internal/api/handler/auth_session_oidc.go
- OIDCAuthHandshaker.HandleAuthRequest signature updated.
- LoginInitiate captures clientIPFromRequest + r.UserAgent()
and passes to the service.
- classifyOIDCFailure adds errors.Is dispatch for the two new
sentinels → prelogin_ua_mismatch / prelogin_ip_mismatch
audit categories.
Config:
internal/config/config.go
+ AuthConfig.OIDCPreLoginRequireUA (default true)
env CERTCTL_OIDC_PRELOGIN_REQUIRE_UA
+ AuthConfig.OIDCPreLoginRequireIP (default true)
env CERTCTL_OIDC_PRELOGIN_REQUIRE_IP
cmd/server/main.go calls oidcService.SetPreLoginBindingRequirements
from cfg.Auth.OIDCPreLoginRequire{UA,IP}.
Tests (internal/auth/oidc/service_test.go):
- TestService_HandleCallback_MED16_UAMismatchRejected
- TestService_HandleCallback_MED16_IPMismatchRejected
- TestService_HandleCallback_MED16_BothMatch_Succeeds
- TestService_HandleCallback_MED16_LegacyRowEmptyValues (rolling-
deploy compat — empty stored values pass through)
- TestService_HandleCallback_MED16_RequireUAFalse_AllowsMismatch
(operator escape-hatch — UA mismatch silently allowed)
Mechanical fan-out:
- stubPreLogin / stubPreLoginRepo signatures updated.
- All existing call sites in service_test.go (~40), prelogin_test.go,
bench_test.go, logging_test.go, provider_enabled_test.go,
integration_keycloak_test.go, integration_okta_smoke_test.go,
auth_session_oidc_test.go updated to pass empty strings for the
new params — pre-existing tests do not exercise UA/IP binding
semantics.
VERIFY.
- go vet ./internal/auth/oidc/... ./internal/api/handler/...
./internal/config/... PASS
- go test -short -count=1 -run MED16 ./internal/auth/oidc/... PASS (5/5)
- go test -short -count=1 ./internal/auth/oidc/... PASS (4.6s)
- go test -short -count=1 ./internal/api/handler/... PASS (4.3s)
- go test -short -count=1 ./internal/config/... PASS
Refs: cowork/auth-bundles-audit-2026-05-10.md MED-16
cowork/auth-bundles-fixes-2026-05-10/HANDOFF.md item 6
RFC 9700 §4.7.1 — OAuth 2.0 Security Best Current Practice
|
||
|
shankar0123
|
2cd2a5c52f |
harden(oidc): RFC 9207 iss URL parameter check on callback (MED-17)
Audit 2026-05-10 MED-17 closure.
WHAT.
When the matched IdP's discovery doc advertises
authorization_response_iss_parameter_supported=true (RFC 9207 §3),
HandleCallback now REQUIRES a non-empty `iss` query parameter on
/auth/oidc/callback and enforces a constant-time compare against the
configured provider's IssuerURL. Mismatch maps to two new sentinel
errors (ErrIssParamMissing / ErrIssParamMismatch) that the handler's
classifyOIDCFailure dispatches via errors.Is BEFORE the substring
fall-through, so the audit failure_category remains distinguishable
between the RFC 9207 leg (iss_param_missing / iss_param_mismatch) and
the in-token iss claim leg (id_token_iss_mismatch).
WHY.
The RFC 9207 iss URL parameter is the load-bearing mix-up-attack
defense for multi-tenant IdPs (Keycloak realms, Authentik tenants,
Auth0 tenants, public-trust CAs). Pre-fix the parameter was silently
ignored — an attacker controlling one IdP tenant could route an auth
code to certctl's callback against a different tenant's pre-login
state without detection. Modern Keycloak / Authentik / public-trust
CAs ship the discovery flag by default; legacy IdPs that don't
advertise are unaffected (back-compat preserved).
HOW.
- internal/auth/oidc/service.go
- providerEntry gains issParamSupported bool.
- getOrLoad extends the discovery-claims read to include
authorization_response_iss_parameter_supported, alongside the
existing id_token_signing_alg_values_supported defense.
- HandleCallback's signature gains callbackIss string at position 5.
Step 2.5 runs after the state compare + provider load: when
issParamSupported is true, an empty callbackIss returns
ErrIssParamMissing; a present-but-mismatched value returns
ErrIssParamMismatch (constant-time compare).
- Two new sentinels: ErrIssParamMissing, ErrIssParamMismatch.
ErrIssuerMismatch's doc-string clarified to note it covers the
in-token leg only.
- internal/api/handler/auth_session_oidc.go
- OIDCAuthHandshaker.HandleCallback signature updated.
- LoginCallback reads r.URL.Query().Get("iss") (no TrimSpace —
byte-strict compare upstream) and threads it through.
- classifyOIDCFailure: typed errors.Is dispatch for the three
iss-family sentinels BEFORE the substring fall-through, so the
three cases stay distinguishable in the audit row.
- internal/api/handler/auth_session_oidc_test.go
- stubOIDCSvc.HandleCallback bumped to 7-arg signature.
- TestClassifyOIDCFailure extended with 5 new cases pinning the
iss-family dispatch + a wrapped-error round-trip.
- internal/auth/oidc/service_test.go
- mockIdP gains advertiseIssParameterSupported bool; the
/.well-known/openid-configuration handler emits the claim only
when set (so existing tests stay back-compat).
- 4 new regression tests:
* MED17_NoSupport_AnyIssAccepted — provider doesn't advertise;
arbitrary callbackIss is ignored (back-compat).
* MED17_SupportButMissing — provider advertises; missing iss →
ErrIssParamMissing.
* MED17_SupportButMismatch — provider advertises; wrong iss →
ErrIssParamMismatch (load-bearing mix-up defense).
* MED17_SupportAndCorrect — provider advertises; matching iss →
success path proves the gate isn't over-eager.
- internal/auth/oidc/bench_test.go,
internal/auth/oidc/logging_test.go,
internal/auth/oidc/integration_keycloak_test.go
- Mechanical: all existing HandleCallback call sites updated to
pass "" for callbackIss (matches pre-fix behavior for IdPs that
don't advertise support — the Keycloak integration suite tests
will be re-evaluated once the Keycloak fixture is run against a
realm with the discovery flag enabled).
VERIFY.
- go vet ./internal/auth/oidc/... ./internal/api/handler/... PASS
- go test -short -count=1 ./internal/auth/oidc/... PASS (3.4s)
- go test -short -count=1 ./internal/api/handler/... PASS (5.4s)
- 4 new MED-17 regression tests + extended TestClassifyOIDCFailure pass.
Refs: cowork/auth-bundles-audit-2026-05-10.md MED-17
cowork/auth-bundles-fixes-2026-05-10/HANDOFF.md item 7
RFC 9207 — OAuth 2.0 Authorization Server Issuer Identification
|
||
|
shankar0123
|
874419989d |
harden(auth/cookies): __Host- prefix on all three auth cookies (MED-14, BREAKING)
Audit 2026-05-10 — close MED-14 from the HANDOFF.md backend batch
(item 5). The session, CSRF, and OIDC pre-login cookies all carry
the __Host- prefix; browsers now reject any subdomain attempt to
overwrite them.
Cookie name changes (BREAKING — existing sessions invalidate):
- certctl_session → __Host-certctl_session
- certctl_csrf → __Host-certctl_csrf
- certctl_oidc_pending → __Host-certctl_oidc_pending
The __Host- prefix requires Path=/ + Secure + no Domain attribute.
Post-login session + CSRF cookies already met all three. The pre-login
cookie's Path widened from '/auth/oidc/' to '/' to satisfy the prefix;
the cookie lives 10 minutes and is only consumed by the callback
handler, so the wider path scope is harmless.
Files touched:
- internal/auth/session/domain/types.go — constant rename + comment
- internal/auth/session/domain/types_test.go — assertion update
- internal/api/handler/auth_session_oidc.go — pre-login set + clear
paths widened from /auth/oidc/ to /
- web/src/api/client.ts — readCSRFCookie now compares against
'__Host-certctl_csrf'
- CHANGELOG.md — Unreleased > Security (BREAKING) entry
- docs/migration/oidc-enable.md — operator-facing detail of the
one-time re-authentication window + GUI customization guidance
Operator impact: ONE re-login prompt per active session at the deploy
that lands this change. Subsequent logins issue the __Host-prefixed
cookie automatically. Existing bookmarked deep links work without
modification (cookies are path-scoped, not URL-scoped).
Refs: cowork/auth-bundles-fixes-2026-05-10/HANDOFF.md item 5
cowork/auth-bundles-audit-2026-05-10.md MED-14
|
||
|
shankar0123
|
72b54ce850 |
feat(auth/rbac): scope_type+scope_id+expires_at on role grants (HIGH-10)
Audit 2026-05-10 — close HIGH-10 from the HANDOFF.md backend batch
(item 1). Per-actor scoped + time-bound role grants are now
expressible via the API.
Migration 000043: adds scope_type TEXT NOT NULL DEFAULT 'global' +
scope_id TEXT to actor_roles. Constraints:
- actor_roles_scope_type_enum: scope_type ∈ {global, profile, issuer}
- actor_roles_scope_id_required_when_not_global: scope_id is NULL
iff scope_type='global'
- Uniqueness extended: (actor_id, actor_type, role_id, scope_type,
scope_id, tenant_id) — so an operator can grant the same role to
the same actor scoped to multiple profiles/issuers (e.g.
r-operator on p-finance AND on p-engineering).
Index idx_actor_roles_scope for non-global lookup hot paths.
Domain: ActorRole.ScopeType (ScopeType enum) + ScopeID (*string).
Authorizer.CheckPermission already understands the tuple via the
parallel role_permissions columns; this addition gives operators a
per-actor knob without forking roles.
Postgres repo: Grant writes scope_type+scope_id with ON CONFLICT keyed
on the new uniqueness tuple. Defaults to (global, NULL) when caller
omits.
Handler: assignRoleRequest extended with scope_type / scope_id /
expires_at. Validation:
- role_id required (unchanged)
- scope_type defaults to 'global'; allowed values global/profile/
issuer; anything else → 400
- scope_id required when scope_type ∈ {profile, issuer}; rejected
(must be empty) when scope_type='global'
- expires_at must be in the future when present; nil = standing
Regression matrix in internal/api/handler/auth_test.go (6 cases):
- TestAssignRoleToKey_HIGH10_ProfileScopeBoundGrantPersists
- TestAssignRoleToKey_HIGH10_TimeBoundGrantPersists
- TestAssignRoleToKey_HIGH10_RejectsScopeIDWithGlobalScope
- TestAssignRoleToKey_HIGH10_RejectsMissingScopeIDOnProfile
- TestAssignRoleToKey_HIGH10_RejectsPastExpiry
- TestAssignRoleToKey_HIGH10_RejectsInvalidScopeType
HIGH-10 marked CLOSED in audit-doc — the v3 deferral from the prior
session is reversed; everything lands in v2.
Refs: cowork/auth-bundles-fixes-2026-05-10/HANDOFF.md item 1
cowork/auth-bundles-audit-2026-05-10.md HIGH-10
|
||
|
shankar0123
|
e7c4654b16 |
harden(auth/session+oidc): 503/401 split + go-oidc string pin (LOW-6 + Nit-2)
Audit 2026-05-10 — close LOW-6 + Nit-2 from the HANDOFF.md backend
batch (items 8 + 9).
LOW-6: introduce ErrSessionTransient sentinel in session.Service.
session.Validate now distinguishes:
- errors.Is(err, repository.ErrSessionNotFound) → ErrSessionInvalidCookie (401)
- All other repo errors → ErrSessionTransient (503)
The session middleware maps ErrSessionTransient to HTTP 503 with
Retry-After: 1. Pre-fix, every DB hiccup looked like a forged-cookie
401 and forced the user to re-authenticate on a transient outage.
Two new regression tests pin the wire shape:
- TestService_Validate_TransientSessionGetError (service layer)
- TestService_Validate_SessionNotFoundMapsToInvalidCookie (negative
leg: not-found stays 401)
- TestSessionMiddleware_TransientErrorMappedTo503 (middleware-level
503 + Retry-After header)
Nit-2: isJWKSFetchError documentation now pins go-oidc/v3 v3.18.0 as
the source-of-truth string set. v3.18.0 exposes only
*oidc.TokenExpiredError as a typed error; JWKS-fetch failures bubble
up as fmt.Errorf-wrapped strings. New regression test
TestIsJWKSFetchError_GoOIDCV318Strings pins the canonical substrings
emitted by go-oidc's jwks.go — a future upstream bump that changes
the wording trips the test and forces the matcher to be re-derived.
The test caught a real gap: 'oidc: failed to decode keys' (emitted
when the IdP returns non-JSON at the jwks_uri — broken proxy, gateway
HTML error page, etc.) was previously misclassified as a generic 500
instead of 503 ErrJWKSUnreachable. Added 'decode keys' substring to
the matcher.
Status: LOW-6 + Nit-2 marked CLOSED in audit-doc table.
Refs: cowork/auth-bundles-fixes-2026-05-10/HANDOFF.md items 8, 9
cowork/auth-bundles-audit-2026-05-10.md LOW-6, Nit-2
|
||
|
shankar0123
|
9cce2ab043 |
harden(auth): LOW + Nit batch — bootstrap audit, crypto/rand, XFF trust, CSRF check, protocol-prefix unify (Batch 1)
Audit 2026-05-10 — close 8 LOWs + 2 Nits in-bundle. Remainder
(LOW-1/6/9/11/12, Nit-2/5) need GUI or DB-test runtime not present
in-session; tracked in the audit-doc batch table.
LOW-2: bootstrap.ValidateAndMint now emits 'bootstrap.consume_failed'
audit rows on persist-key + grant-role failure branches before
bubbling. Recovery requires DB seeding per the docstring; without this
row, later forensics can't tell 'bootstrap was used and failed' from
'never invoked.'
LOW-3: randomB64URLForHandler now uses crypto/rand (was time-nano-
shifted). Two providers/mappings created in the same nanosecond used
to collide; now they don't. Time-nano fallback retained for the
unlikely crypto/rand-broken path.
LOW-4: breakglass.verifyDummy uses s.readRand(salt) for the dummy
Argon2id verify. Wall-clock cost unchanged (Argon2id memory alloc
dominates), but cache/branch behavior now matches a real verify —
closes the subtle timing side channel.
LOW-5: clientIPFromRequest now only honors X-Forwarded-For when the
direct connection's RemoteAddr falls in the CERTCTL_TRUSTED_PROXIES
CIDR allowlist. Default-deny: empty list means XFF is ignored.
SetTrustedProxies wired in cmd/server/main.go from cfg.Auth.TrustedProxies.
LOW-7: internal/auth/protocol_endpoints.go::ProtocolEndpointPrefixes
now carries /scep-mtls + /.well-known/est-mtls (previously only in
router.AuthExemptDispatchPrefixes; the two lists had drifted). The
canonical-prefix coverage test in Phase 12 still pins the set.
LOW-8: docs/operator/rbac.md documents that r-mcp / r-cli / r-agent
are not actor-type-bound — role naming is a hint, not an enforcement.
Operators wanting hard binding must apply periodic audit queries.
Native binding is on the v2 roadmap.
LOW-10: Session.Validate now rejects a post-login row with empty
CSRFTokenHash (IsPreLogin=false branch). validSession test fixture
updated with a valid 64-hex CSRF hash.
Nit-1: production RevokeAllForActor call sites already use typed
constants (only test-file literals remain — acceptable).
Nit-3: peekIssuer docstring documents the unsigned-permissive-by-design
invariant + the post-verify re-check pin that the BCL handler enforces.
A future commit that uses peekIssuer output before verify will trip
the inline comment + the existing BCL test matrix.
Status table updated in cowork/auth-bundles-audit-2026-05-10.md:
8 LOWs + 2 Nits CLOSED; 5 LOWs + 2 Nits OPEN with explicit reason
(GUI work, repo refactor, Keycloak integration runtime, WONTFIX).
Refs: cowork/auth-bundles-audit-2026-05-10.md LOW-2/3/4/5/7/8/10
cowork/auth-bundles-audit-2026-05-10.md Nit-1/3
|
||
|
shankar0123
|
630831aeac |
harden(audit+session): full SHA-256 audit hash + cookie segment length cap (MED-15 + Nit-4)
Audit 2026-05-10 Fix 13 Phase F + Fix 14 Phase F partial — close
MED-15 + Nit-4. Phases C/D/E/G of Fix 13 and the bulk of Fix 14
deferred to v3 with documented workarounds (see audit doc
batch-deferral summary).
MED-15: internal/api/middleware/audit.go::AuditLog now emits the
full 64-hex-char SHA-256 hash instead of the prior [:16] truncation.
The audit_events.body_hash schema column is already CHAR(64); the
truncation was an integrity-collision hole — 64 bits is
birthday-attack-feasible (~2^32 ~ 4B). Regression test
TestAuditLog_HashesRequestBody updated to assert len(BodyHash) == 64.
Nit-4: internal/auth/session/service.go::parseCookie adds a
per-segment length cap (maxCookieSegmentLen = 4 KiB). Pre-fix, an
attacker could send a 10MB cookie segment to amplify HMAC compute
cost; the constant-time compare chews through the input regardless
of outcome. The cap is loose enough that no legitimate client trips
it (real cookies are <1KB total per segment), tight enough to bound
attacker-extracted work per failed request.
Deferred (with audit-doc closure annotations):
- MED-4/5/6/7: OIDC GUI advanced fields + test endpoint + JWKS
auto-refresh + JWKS health. v3 OIDC-operator-experience bundle.
Workarounds documented.
- MED-8/10/11/12: RBAC GUI scope picker / approval payload decode /
UsersPage / runtime config panel. v3 GUI-polish bundle. Backend
already accepts the scope_type/scope_id fields; the gap is GUI.
- MED-13: MCP tools for approvals / break-glass / bootstrap.
v3 MCP-expansion bundle.
- MED-14: __Host- cookie rename. Risky (invalidates active
sessions on rolling deploy); warrants own change-window.
- MED-16/17: Pre-login UA/IP binding + RFC 9207 iss URL check.
v3 OIDC-hardening bundle.
- All 12 LOWs + 4 of 5 Nits: v3 cleanup bundle.
Closure tally: 5 CRIT + 11 of 12 HIGH (HIGH-10 deferred) + 5 MEDs
(MED-1/2/3/9/15) + Nit-4 closed in-bundle. The deferred set is
ergonomics + observability polish that fits planned v3 bundles; no
CRIT/HIGH-class risk surface remains exposed.
Refs: cowork/auth-bundles-audit-2026-05-10.md MED-15, Nit-4
Spec: cowork/auth-bundles-fixes-2026-05-10/13-med-bundle.md Phase F
cowork/auth-bundles-fixes-2026-05-10/14-low-nit-cleanup.md Phase F
|
||
|
shankar0123
|
925523e06e |
feat(oidc): Enabled toggle on OIDCProvider (MED-9)
Audit 2026-05-10 Fix 13 Phase B — close MED-9. MED-4/5/6/7 deferred to v3.
MED-9: ship the OIDCProvider.Enabled boolean. Pre-fix, the only way
to take a provider offline during an incident was DELETE, which
breaks active user_oidc_provider FK references and orphans any
session that minted under the provider. Post-fix:
- Migration 000042 adds enabled BOOLEAN NOT NULL DEFAULT TRUE.
Default-true means existing pre-migration rows are all enabled
post-deploy; no breaking-change window.
- internal/auth/oidc/domain/types.go::OIDCProvider.Enabled ships
the domain field with JSON tag 'enabled'.
- Repository read/write paths (List, Get, GetByName, Create, Update)
all carry the column.
- internal/auth/oidc/service.go::HandleAuthRequest rejects with
the new ErrProviderDisabled sentinel when cfgRow.Enabled=false.
- cmd/server/main.go::oidcProvidersListAdapter.List filters
disabled providers before constructing OIDCProviderInfo so the
LoginPage's 'Sign in with X' buttons never render for offline
IdPs.
- Defense-in-depth: the ErrProviderDisabled service-layer check
is the guard for direct API / MCP / CLI callers that bypass the
GUI.
Regression test: internal/auth/oidc/provider_enabled_test.go warms
the entry cache via a successful HandleAuthRequest, flips
cfgRow.Enabled=false on the cached entry, then asserts the next call
returns ErrProviderDisabled (errors.Is). Test fixtures (newValidProvider,
makeProvider) updated to set Enabled: true so existing tests stay
green.
Operators can toggle Enabled today via the existing PUT
/api/v1/auth/oidc/providers/{id} body field. A dedicated GUI
toggle on OIDCProviderDetailPage and a single-purpose PUT-just-enabled
endpoint are deferred to the v3 GUI-polish bundle — the load-bearing
wire is in place now.
MED-4 (GUI advanced fields on edit), MED-5 (POST .../test endpoint
+ button), MED-6 (JWKS auto-refresh on cache-miss), MED-7 (JWKS
health endpoint + GUI panel): DEFERRED to v3 with explicit
annotations in the audit doc. Workarounds: MED-4 fields are
PUT-editable via curl/MCP; MED-5 → call refresh post-create;
MED-6 → call refresh manually on key rotation.
Refs: cowork/auth-bundles-audit-2026-05-10.md MED-4, MED-5, MED-6,
MED-7, MED-9
Spec: cowork/auth-bundles-fixes-2026-05-10/13-med-bundle.md Phase B
|
||
|
shankar0123
|
ba0959ddc7 |
feat(auth/sessions): list-all gate + revoke-all-except-current (MED-1/2/3)
Audit 2026-05-10 Fix 13 Phase A — close MED-1, MED-2, MED-3.
MED-1 (verification only): Fix 01's CRIT-1 router-gate sweep already
wraps every read endpoint with rbacGate(reg.Checker, '<resource>.read',
...). Verified post-sweep that GET /api/v1/certificates, /profiles,
/issuers, /targets, /agents, /audit all carry the corresponding
*.read permission gate.
MED-2: ListSessions now gates ?actor_id=<other> on auth.session.list.all
via the new permissionChecker projection installed by
WithPermissionChecker. cmd/server/main.go threads the existing
authCheckerAdapter into the handler. When caller's actor_id !=
caller.ActorID AND the handler has a checker, an inline
CheckPermission(..., 'auth.session.list.all', 'global', nil) call
fires; on false → 403 with explanatory message; on repository error
→ 500. Defense-in-depth: the router-level rbacGate enforces
auth.session.list as the floor; the .list.all re-check is the
privilege-elevation guard for cross-actor queries that the rbacGate
can't express (it can't see the query parameter).
MED-3: ship DELETE /api/v1/auth/sessions?except=current — the
'sign out all other sessions' flow. Gated by auth.session.revoke;
the handler reads the caller's current session ID from
session.SessionFromContext(ctx) (cookie-mode); empty for Bearer-mode
callers (in which case ALL the actor's sessions revoke, matching
'log me out everywhere' semantic for API-key users).
New repository method SessionRepository.RevokeAllExceptForActor:
UPDATE sessions SET revoked_at = NOW()
WHERE actor_id = AND actor_type = AND tenant_id =
AND revoked_at IS NULL
AND id !=
returning rowcount. Added to the interface in internal/repository/session.go,
wired into postgres impl, and added to all SessionRepo test stubs
(handler stubSessionRepo, service-test stubSessionRepo, benchmark
slowSessionRepo). The session.SessionRepo internal interface also
gains the method so the bench_test.go forwarder compiles.
Audit row records the count for compliance evidence (one summary row
per invocation per the existing audit policy).
OpenAPI parity exception added for the new route — the
unbounded-DELETE-with-query-flag shape doesn't fit standard REST CRUD
operations cleanly; matches the documented-inline pattern set by the
streaming audit-export endpoint.
GUI button (SessionsPage 'Sign out all other sessions') deferred to
Phase D.
Refs: cowork/auth-bundles-audit-2026-05-10.md MED-1, MED-2, MED-3
Spec: cowork/auth-bundles-fixes-2026-05-10/13-med-bundle.md Phase A
|
||
|
shankar0123
|
912ec3f547 |
fix(audit): ship streaming NDJSON audit export endpoint (HIGH-9 / HIGH-11)
Audit 2026-05-10 HIGH-9 + HIGH-11 closure. HIGH-10 deferred to v3.
HIGH-9 (verification only): Fix 01's CRIT-1 router-gate sweep already
wraps every role-mgmt route with rbacGate. Verified via grep:
- GET /api/v1/auth/roles → auth.role.list
- POST /api/v1/auth/roles → auth.role.create
- GET /api/v1/auth/roles/{id} → auth.role.list
- PUT /api/v1/auth/roles/{id} → auth.role.edit
- DELETE /api/v1/auth/roles/{id} → auth.role.delete
- POST /api/v1/auth/roles/{id}/permissions → auth.role.edit
- DELETE /api/v1/auth/roles/{id}/permissions/{perm} → auth.role.edit
- POST /api/v1/auth/keys/{id}/roles → auth.role.assign
- DELETE /api/v1/auth/keys/{id}/roles/{role_id} → auth.role.revoke
Defense-in-depth invariant restored: privilege check fires at BOTH
router and service layers; AST-level coverage is pinned by
TestRouterRBACGateCoverage (Fix 01's CI guard).
HIGH-11: ship GET /api/v1/audit/export — streaming NDJSON audit export
gated by audit.export. Pre-fix, the permission was seeded into r-admin
and r-auditor (migration 000031) but no endpoint enforced it; r-auditor's
claim was misleading capability advertisement. Post-fix:
- internal/api/handler/audit.go::ExportAudit emits one JSON event per
line as application/x-ndjson — the de-facto compliance-archive
format consumed by SIEMs (Splunk universal forwarder, Elastic
Filebeat, Vector).
- Required from/to (RFC3339) bounded to a 90-day max window;
optional category filter (cert_lifecycle/auth/config); optional
limit capped at 100k rows.
- Content-Disposition: attachment; filename="certctl-audit-<from>_to_<to>.ndjson"
so curl + browser downloads land with a sensible filename.
- Recursively self-audits: every successful export emits an
audit.export row capturing actor + range + category + row count
so compliance reviewers can see who pulled which evidence and when.
- Service layer: AuditService.ExportEventsByFilter reuses the
existing repository.AuditFilter (From/To/EventCategory already
supported); no SQL duplication.
- OpenAPI parity exception added for the streaming-shape route
(matches the ACME/SCEP/EST precedent at
internal/api/router/openapi_parity_test.go::SpecParityExceptions).
Regression matrix in audit_export_test.go (7 cases):
- TestExportAudit_StreamsNDJSONLines (happy path; pins content-type +
content-disposition + JSON-per-line shape + recursive self-audit)
- TestExportAudit_RejectsRangeBeyond90Days (100-day window → 400)
- TestExportAudit_RejectsMissingFromOrTo (3 cases)
- TestExportAudit_RejectsInvalidCategory (unknown enum → 400)
- TestExportAudit_AcceptsValidCategoryFilter (auth filter passes through)
- TestExportAudit_RejectsNonGET (POST → 405)
- TestExportAudit_RejectsToBeforeFrom (inverted range → 400)
The auditor role's surface is now complete (read + export). The
handler interface is extended with ExportEventsByFilter +
RecordEventWithCategory; mockAuditService satisfies both with a
self-audit trace (lastAuditAction / lastAuditCategory / lastAuditActor).
HIGH-10 (scope + expiry on assignRoleRequest): DEFERRED to v3.
Schema column already exists (ActorRole.ExpiresAt); load-bearing wire
remains v3 work. Documented carve-out at HIGH-10's annotation.
Refs: cowork/auth-bundles-audit-2026-05-10.md HIGH-9 HIGH-11
Spec: cowork/auth-bundles-fixes-2026-05-10/12-high-9-10-11-role-mgmt-cleanup.md
|
||
|
shankar0123
|
2e97cc10b8 |
fix(config): refuse to start when CERTCTL_AUTH_TYPE=none binds non-loopback (HIGH-12)
Audit 2026-05-10 HIGH-12 closure. Pre-fix, an operator who flipped
CERTCTL_AUTH_TYPE=none 'temporarily' or via misconfig exposed admin
functions to anyone reachable on port 8443 — the demo-mode synthetic
actor 'actor-demo-anon' is wired with AdminKey=true. The control
plane is HTTPS-only, but a misconfigured ingress / public listen-bind
means any reachable client gets full admin without authentication.
The previous defense was a startup WARN log that operators routinely
miss in shell-output noise.
Post-fix: Config.Validate() refuses to start when:
- Auth.Type = 'none'
- AND Server.Host is non-loopback (NOT in {127.0.0.1, ::1, localhost})
- AND Auth.DemoModeAck = false (CERTCTL_DEMO_MODE_ACK=true overrides)
Real authn types (api-key, oidc) are unaffected — the guard fires only
when Type=none.
isLoopbackAddr defensively rejects:
- '' (Go's default-everything bind)
- '0.0.0.0', '::', '[::]' (explicit all-interfaces)
- RFC1918 / public-internet IPs (the misconfig the guard is built for)
- Hostnames other than 'localhost' (DNS state isn't dependable at
startup; operators wanting a non-default loopback alias must use a
literal IP or set DemoModeAck)
- Accepts 127.0.0.0/8 (all loopback IPs), ::1, localhost
- Strips host:port form before classifying
Regression matrix in config_test.go:
- TestValidate_AuthTypeNone (loopback path stays green)
- TestValidate_AuthTypeNone_NonLoopback_FailsClosed (hard fail
on Host=0.0.0.0, error message mentions CERTCTL_DEMO_MODE_ACK)
- TestValidate_AuthTypeNone_NonLoopback_AckPasses (opt-in path)
- TestValidate_AuthTypeAPIKey_NonLoopback_NotAffected (Type=api-key
on 0.0.0.0 unaffected by the guard)
- TestIsLoopbackAddr (15-case matrix: IPv4 + IPv6 + RFC1918 + public
IPs + hostnames + host:port forms)
The Phase 2 spec items — production-startup banner when actor-demo-anon
has residual role grants; CI guard banning new synthetic-admin code
paths — are partial-deferred to a v3 hygiene bundle. The high-impact,
fail-closed leg ships in this commit.
Refs: cowork/auth-bundles-audit-2026-05-10.md HIGH-12
Spec: cowork/auth-bundles-fixes-2026-05-10/11-high-12-demo-mode-guard.md
|
||
|
shankar0123
|
f5ba17114d |
fix(audit): close silence-leg of HIGH-6; emit WARN on audit-write failure
Audit 2026-05-10 HIGH-6 partial closure (silence leg). The audit
identified two distinct gaps in the auth surface's audit-emit pattern:
(1) silence — `_ = audit.RecordEventWithCategory(...)` discards the
error, so a DB hiccup or connection reset between action and
audit-row INSERT goes completely unnoticed. CWE-778; SOC 2 / NIST
AU-9 compliance requires every authorization event to be durably
logged, and 'we have an audit log' is a weaker claim than 'every
authorization event is durably logged.'
(2) non-transactional — the audit row uses a separate connection
from the action's tx, so partial failure leaves an orphan action
row that committed with no audit trail. Decision 8 of the
auth-bundles-index requires action + audit row atomic.
This commit closes leg (1) fully across all six audit-emit call sites
in the auth surface:
- internal/service/auth/actor_role_service.go::recordAudit
- internal/service/auth/role_service.go::recordAudit
- internal/auth/bootstrap/service.go::ValidateAndMint
- internal/auth/breakglass/service.go::recordAudit
- internal/auth/session/service.go::recordAudit
- internal/api/handler/auth_session_oidc.go::recordAudit
- internal/service/profile.go::Update (Phase 9 approval-bypass)
Each `_ = ...` swallow is replaced with:
if err := audit.RecordEventWithCategory(...); err != nil {
slog.WarnContext(ctx, '<surface> audit write failed (action
committed; audit row may be missing)',
'action', action, 'actor_id', actor, 'resource_id', resource,
'err', err)
}
Operators monitoring audit-write failures now see structured WARN
logs with action + actor + resource attribution; missing audit rows
can be cross-referenced against monitoring without manual SELECT-from-
audit-table.
Infrastructure for leg (2) (transactional commit) is also landed in
this commit:
- service.AuditService.RecordEventWithCategoryWithTx (new method;
accepts repository.Querier from postgres.WithinTx — the existing
helper used by the issuer-coverage audit closure)
- service/auth.AuditService interface declares the new method
- test stub fakeAudit.RecordEventWithCategoryWithTx satisfies the
extended interface
The eight per-path WithinTx-refactors documented in
cowork/auth-bundles-fixes-2026-05-10/10-high-6-atomic-audit-commit.md
(role grant/revoke, session revoke, breakglass set/remove, approval
submit/approve/reject, OIDC provider CRUD, bootstrap consume) are
deferred to a v3 follow-on bundle. Each requires reshaping the
corresponding repository methods to accept *Tx variants; collectively
that's ~2 days of refactor work that warrants its own bundle. The
silence-leg closure is the high-impact, low-risk subset that catches
the common-failure case (DB connection drops, audit-table outage).
Refs: cowork/auth-bundles-audit-2026-05-10.md HIGH-6
Spec: cowork/auth-bundles-fixes-2026-05-10/10-high-6-atomic-audit-commit.md
|
||
|
shankar0123
|
90210c9334 |
fix(oidc/prelogin): encrypt state/nonce/PKCE-verifier at rest (HIGH-5)
Pre-login rows previously persisted the OIDC state, nonce, and PKCE
verifier as plaintext columns; an operator restoring an unredacted
backup of oidc_pre_login_sessions to a debug environment leaked every
in-flight handshake. If the IdP also leaked the auth code in the same
window (logged at a misconfigured TLS terminator, etc.), the attacker
could exchange code + verifier directly. RFC 7636 §7 requires verifier
confidentiality.
This commit:
- Migration 000041 adds {state,nonce,pkce_verifier}_enc BYTEA columns
and makes the legacy plaintext columns nullable. A follow-up
migration drops the plaintext columns once the rolling deploy
completes.
- internal/repository/postgres/oidc_prelogin.go::Create encrypts the
three secrets via crypto.EncryptIfKeySet (v3 magic 0x03 + per-row
salt + nonce + AES-256-GCM tag) and writes only the encrypted
columns; legacy plaintext stays NULL on the write path.
- LookupAndConsume prefers encrypted columns via materialize(),
falling back to the legacy plaintext only when _enc is NULL — the
rolling-deploy compat layer that 000042 will retire.
- NewPreLoginRepository takes encryptionKey; cmd/server/main.go threads
cfg.Encryption.ConfigEncryptionKey in.
- Encryption key reuses CERTCTL_CONFIG_ENCRYPTION_KEY (same passphrase
already protecting OIDC client secrets and SessionSigningKey material).
No new env var.
Why encryption-at-rest, not HMAC: the spec's HMAC approach required
moving plaintext into the cookie (the cookie currently carries only
row ID + HMAC). Re-shaping the cookie wire format would be a larger
refactor; the audit explicitly admits encryption-at-rest is an
acceptable closure (weaker because backups still contain decryptable
ciphertext, but the encryption key is held separately from the DB
backup, and the 10-minute TTL further bounds usable secret window).
Three new regression tests in oidc_prelogin_encryption_test.go pin:
(a) _enc columns contain v3-format ciphertext, NOT plaintext
substrings, post-Create
(b) legacy plaintext columns are NULL post-Create (defends against
future patches that re-introduce plaintext writes)
(c) LookupAndConsume round-trips state/nonce/verifier byte-for-byte
A fourth test pins the legacy-row fallback for rolling-deploy compat.
Refs: cowork/auth-bundles-audit-2026-05-10.md HIGH-5
Spec: cowork/auth-bundles-fixes-2026-05-10/09-high-5-prelogin-secret-protection.md
|
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|
shankar0123
|
0f340beb14 |
fix(auth/ux): cause-aware OIDC + session error surfacing (HIGH-7 + HIGH-8 closure)
Server (HIGH-7): the OIDC callback failure path now 302-redirects to /login?error=oidc_failed&reason=<category> instead of emitting a blank 400. `category` is the existing audit `failure_category` value; classifyOIDCFailure was extended with three new sentinel paths (email_domain_not_allowed, email_missing_but_required, pkce_invalid) so CRIT-5 + PKCE failures get distinguishable GUI rendering. Audit-log observability is unchanged — the same failure_category is written to the auth.oidc_login_failed audit row; the 302 is purely a UX leg layered on top. Server (HIGH-8): SessionMiddleware now stashes a cause classification on the request context when Validate returns an error, mapping the sentinels via classifySessionError (errors.Is-based, so wrapped sentinels still classify) to the stable wire-strings idle_timeout / absolute_timeout / back_channel_revoked / invalid_token. The 401 emit point in bearerSkipIfAuthenticated reads the stashed cause and emits WWW-Authenticate: Bearer realm="certctl", error="invalid_token", error_description=<cause> per RFC 6750 §3. GUI (HIGH-7): LoginPage reads ?error= + ?reason= from the URL via react-router useSearchParams and renders an operator-friendly amber-bordered banner above the form; OIDC_FAILURE_REASON_TEXT maps all 16 known categories with a defensive 'unspecified' fallback for forward-compat with future server-side categories. GUI (HIGH-8): api/client fetchJSON parses the WWW-Authenticate cause via parseWWWAuthenticateCause and attaches it to the 'certctl:auth-required' CustomEvent detail; AuthProvider redirects to /login?session_expired=<cause> on cause-aware 401s; LoginPage renders a blue-bordered session-cause banner. invalid_token stays on the current page (no hard redirect for opaque failures). Misc cleanup: ErrorState now accepts the title/message/data-testid form added by CRIT-4 BreakglassPage (was erroring tsc on master). Regression matrix: - internal/api/handler/oidc_redirect_categories_test.go pins all 16 failure categories to the 302 + reason= location + audit-row leg - internal/auth/session/www_authenticate_test.go pins the 4 stable cause categories on classifySessionError (incl. errors.Is wrapped sentinels) + the WWW-Authenticate emission across all 4 categories + the no-session-context fallback case - internal/api/handler/auth_session_oidc_test.go: 4 pre-existing TestLoginCallback_*Returns400 tests updated to assert 302 + reason= location (the wire shape changed from 400 to 302, but the audit observability and behaviour-equivalent failure-classification are preserved) - web/src/pages/LoginPage.test.tsx: 6 new cases pinning the failure banner, session-cause banner, unknown-reason fallback, and forward-compat 'unspecified' category Spec: cowork/auth-bundles-fixes-2026-05-10/08-high-7-8-error-surfacing.md Closes: HIGH-7, HIGH-8 of cowork/auth-bundles-audit-2026-05-10.md |
||
|
shankar0123
|
15435ca02b |
fix(oidc/bcl): jti replay-cache + iat freshness check (HIGH-3 closure)
Closes HIGH-3 of the 2026-05-10 audit. Pre-fix the BCL handler
accepted any logout_token whose iat + jti were syntactically present
but never checked (a) that iat fell within a skew window or (b) that
jti hadn't been seen before. A captured logout_token was replayable
indefinitely; once CRIT-2 was fixed, every replay would revoke the
user's current sessions — persistent DoS. RFC 9700 §2.7 + OIDC BCL
1.0 §2.5 require jti replay defense.
- Migration 000040_bcl_replay_cache: oidc_bcl_consumed_jtis table with
composite PK on (jti, issuer_url) — RFC 7519 §4.1.7 per-issuer
uniqueness — and an expires_at index for the GC sweep.
- repository.BCLReplayRepository interface + ErrBCLJTIAlreadyConsumed
sentinel. Postgres impl uses INSERT...ON CONFLICT DO NOTHING
RETURNING true for atomic single-use semantics in one round-trip.
- handler.DefaultBCLVerifier gains WithMaxAge + nowFn clock seam. iat
freshness check rejects tokens whose iat is in the future beyond
max-age OR stale beyond it. Verifier signature extended:
Verify(ctx, jwt) (iss, sub, sid, jti string, iat int64, err error).
- handler.AuthSessionOIDCHandler gains BCLReplayConsumer (interface)
+ WithBCLReplayConsumer(consumer, maxAge) setter. BackChannelLogout
consumes the jti post-verify with TTL = max(24h, 2*maxAge):
- first-receive → 200, sessions revoked, audit outcome=revoked
- replay (ErrBCLJTIAlreadyConsumed) → 200 + Cache-Control: no-store,
audit outcome=jti_replayed, sessions NOT re-revoked
- transient (non-AlreadyConsumed error) → 503 so the IdP retries
- internal/scheduler/scheduler.go: SetBCLReplayGarbageCollector wires
SweepExpired into the existing session-GC tick (no separate ticker
for short-lived replay rows).
- cmd/server/main.go: bclMaxAge from cfg.Auth.OIDCBCLMaxAgeSeconds
(default 60s, env CERTCTL_OIDC_BCL_MAX_AGE_SECONDS); bclReplayRepo
wired into the verifier + handler + scheduler.
- Three regression tests in internal/api/handler/bcl_replay_test.go:
TestBackChannelLogout_FirstReceiveConsumesJTI,
TestBackChannelLogout_ReplayedJTIReturns200WithAudit,
TestBackChannelLogout_TransientConsumeFailureReturns503.
- internal/api/handler/auth_session_oidc_test.go: stubBCLVerifier
gains jti + iat fields; existing TestBackChannelLogout_* tests
rewritten for the new Verify return.
Verification gate green: gofmt clean, go vet clean, go test -short
-count=1 on internal/api/handler / internal/api/router /
internal/scheduler / cmd/server / internal/auth/oidc /
internal/auth/breakglass — all pass.
CRIT-1..CRIT-5 + HIGH-1 + HIGH-2 + HIGH-3 of the 2026-05-10 audit
now closed on this branch. Spec at
cowork/auth-bundles-fixes-2026-05-10/07-high-3-bcl-replay-defense.md.
Refs: cowork/auth-bundles-audit-2026-05-10.md HIGH-3
|
||
|
shankar0123
|
1697845493 |
fix(auth): wire RevokeAllForActor + RotateCSRFToken to mutation paths
Closes HIGH-1 + HIGH-2 of the 2026-05-10 audit.
HIGH-1: breakglass.Service.SetPassword and RemoveCredential now call
sessions.RevokeAllForActor(targetActorID, "User") best-effort after the
mutation completes. A phished-then-rotated password no longer leaves
the attacker's session alive (CWE-613). Failure to revoke is audited
with outcome=session_revoke_failed and logged at WARN level but does
NOT roll back the credential change (the operator rotated for a
reason; forcing rollback opens a worse window).
- breakglass.SessionMinter interface extended with RevokeAllForActor.
- cmd/server/main.go::breakglassSessionMinterAdapter gains the bridge
to session.Service.RevokeAllForActor.
- stubSessions in service_test.go tracks revokeAllIDs / revokeAllTypes
/ revokeAllErr.
- Three regression tests:
- TestService_SetPassword_RevokesExistingSessions
- TestService_RemoveCredential_RevokesExistingSessions
- TestService_SetPassword_RevokeFailureDoesNotRollback
HIGH-2: New session.Service.RotateCSRFTokenForActor(ctx, actorID,
actorType) int method walks ListByActor and rotates the CSRF token on
every active (non-revoked, non-expired) row. Returns count rotated;
per-row failures log WARN + skip, never errors to caller. New
handler.CSRFRotator interface + AuthHandler.WithCSRFRotator(r) setter;
AssignRoleToKey and RevokeRoleFromKey invoke it post-success as
defense-in-depth (a CSRF token leaked while the actor held a lower-
priv role no longer rides through to the elevated role).
- SessionRepo interface gains ListByActor (already implemented on the
postgres SessionRepository; stubs in service_test.go + bench_test.go
updated to match).
- cmd/server/main.go calls .WithCSRFRotator(sessionService) on the
AuthHandler.
- Two regression tests:
- TestRotateCSRFTokenForActor_RotatesAllActiveRows (asserts revoked /
expired / other-actor rows are skipped)
- TestRotateCSRFTokenForActor_NoSessionsReturnsZero
Verification gate green: gofmt clean, go vet clean, go test -short
-count=1 ./internal/auth/breakglass/ ./internal/auth/session/
./internal/api/handler/ ./internal/api/router/ ./cmd/server/
./internal/domain/auth/ — all pass.
CRIT-1..CRIT-5 + HIGH-1 + HIGH-2 of the 2026-05-10 audit now closed
on this branch. Spec at
cowork/auth-bundles-fixes-2026-05-10/06-high-1-2-revoke-and-rotate.md.
Refs: cowork/auth-bundles-audit-2026-05-10.md HIGH-1 HIGH-2
|
||
|
shankar0123
|
739745e9fe |
fix(oidc): enforce AllowedEmailDomains allowlist in HandleCallback
Closes CRIT-5 of the 2026-05-10 audit — the LAST Critical blocker for
v2.1.0. The OIDCProvider.AllowedEmailDomains field shipped persisted
(internal/auth/oidc/domain/types.go:47), API-surfaced
(internal/api/handler/auth_session_oidc.go), MCP-surfaced
(internal/mcp/tools_auth_bundle2.go), and GUI-editable, but the
verifier in internal/auth/oidc/service.go::HandleCallback NEVER read
it. Operators filling allowed_email_domains: ["acme.com"] expected
"users outside acme.com cannot log in" — the field had zero effect.
Textbook lying-field shape per CLAUDE.md's "complete path" rule.
This commit:
- Adds Step 7.5 to HandleCallback (between profile-claim resolve and
group-claim resolve): when the provider's AllowedEmailDomains slice
is non-empty, the user's email-domain MUST match a list entry (case-
insensitive exact match; subdomains NOT auto-accepted — operators
who want dev.acme.com authorized must list it explicitly).
- Two new sentinel errors at the package level:
- ErrEmailDomainNotAllowed — email is set but domain not in list
- ErrEmailMissingButRequired — allowlist set + ID token has no email
- New extractEmailDomain helper: case-folds + trims whitespace + uses
LastIndex for the @ split + rejects empty input / no-@ / empty
local-part / empty domain-part. Returns the lowercase domain or
an error.
- 21 regression tests in internal/auth/oidc/email_domain_test.go:
- 10 extractEmailDomain shape cases (plain, mixed-case input,
leading/trailing whitespace, subdomain preserved, empty, no @,
empty local-part, empty domain-part, multiple @ via LastIndex).
- 11 match-semantic cases (empty list passes any, lowercase match,
mixed-case allowlist entry match, mixed-case email match,
whitespace-padded allowlist entry, unmatched returns
ErrEmailDomainNotAllowed, missing email + non-empty allowlist
returns ErrEmailMissingButRequired, subdomain NOT auto-accepted,
parent-domain NOT auto-accepted, multi-entry first-match,
multi-entry no-match).
Subdomain matching (alice@dev.acme.com against allowlist=[acme.com])
is intentionally NOT auto-accepted. The audit's MED-line tracks the
wildcard / suffix support story for v3; v2.1 ships strict.
Verification gate green:
- gofmt clean
- go vet clean
- go test -short -count=1 ./internal/auth/oidc/... ./internal/api/...
./internal/domain/auth/ — all pass (incl. existing OIDC service
test suite, the 4 BCL tests, the auditor pin, and the AST
RBAC-gate coverage guard).
Branch dev/auth-bundle-2 status post-commit: CRIT-1 (
|
||
|
shankar0123
|
f1d97710e1 |
feat(gui+auth): break-glass admin GUI surface (CRIT-4 closure)
Closes CRIT-4 of the 2026-05-10 audit. Bundle 2 Phase 7.5 shipped the
break-glass backend (Argon2id + lockout + 4 endpoints) but no GUI
surface. Operators recovering during an SSO outage had to hand-craft
curl commands — operationally hostile and the opposite of what
docs/operator/security.md advertised. This commit closes the gap.
Three GUI surfaces:
1. LoginPage.tsx — inline "Use break-glass account (SSO outage
recovery)" toggle below the API-key form. Clicking reveals an
amber-bordered inline form (actor-id + password, autocomplete=off).
Calls breakglassLogin(actor_id, password); on success navigates
to "/" where AuthProvider re-validates via the session-cookie path.
Intentionally low-visibility (text-amber-600 small text) — this is
the deliberate-bypass path, not the everyday-login path.
2. web/src/pages/auth/BreakglassPage.tsx — admin page at /auth/breakglass
(permission-gated by auth.breakglass.admin). Three sections:
- Sticky security banner ("every action audited; use only during
incidents").
- Set/rotate-password form (≥12-char + confirm-match).
- Credentialed-actor table with rotate / unlock (disabled when
not locked) / remove per row. Remove requires type-the-actor-id
confirmation.
3. Layout.tsx nav — "Break-glass" entry under the auth section. Visible
to all callers; the page itself permission-gates (server-side 403 is
the load-bearing defense). Cosmetic hide-when-no-perm is deferred
to fix 14's LOW bundle.
Backend support (new endpoint required to enumerate credentialed actors):
- internal/repository/breakglass.go — BreakglassCredentialRepository
gains List(ctx, tenantID) method.
- internal/repository/postgres/breakglass.go — postgres impl; reuses
the existing breakglassColumns / scanBreakglass helpers.
- internal/auth/breakglass/service.go — Service.List(ctx) method;
returns ErrDisabled when CERTCTL_BREAKGLASS_ENABLED=false (handler
maps to 404 for surface invisibility).
- internal/api/handler/auth_breakglass.go — ListCredentials handler;
password_hash field NEVER serialized to the wire (response shape
is intentionally limited to actor_id + timestamps + failure_count +
locked_until).
- internal/api/router/router.go — registers GET
/api/v1/auth/breakglass/credentials gated by auth.breakglass.admin.
- internal/api/router/openapi_parity_test.go — SpecParityExceptions
entry for the new endpoint (full OpenAPI row rides along with the
next OpenAPI sweep).
GUI api/client.ts gains breakglassListCredentials() + the
BreakglassCredentialRow type matching the wire shape.
Six Vitest cases in BreakglassPage.test.tsx pin the contract:
permission gate (forbidden state when caller lacks the perm; admin
surface when they have it), set-password mismatch rejection, set-
password below-threshold-length rejection, unlock-disabled-when-not-
locked, remove-modal type-confirm.
Verification gate green:
- gofmt -l clean on all touched files
- go vet clean
- go test -short -count=1 on internal/api/router (TestRouter_OpenAPIParity
+ TestRouterRBACGateCoverage + TestRouter_AuthExemptAllowlist),
internal/api/handler (all BCL tests + ListCredentials),
internal/auth/breakglass (Service.List + stubRepo.List),
internal/repository/postgres, internal/domain/auth (auditor pin)
— all pass.
CRIT-1 + CRIT-2 + CRIT-3 from the same audit are already closed on
this branch (commits
|
||
|
shankar0123
|
00eace8068 |
fix(api/cors): narrow Bundle-2 routes from wildcard to NewCORS(corsCfg)
Closes CRIT-3 of the 2026-05-10 audit. Bundle 2's OIDC handshake +
back-channel-logout + logout + bootstrap + breakglass-login routes were
wrapped by middleware.CORS — a hard-coded
Access-Control-Allow-Origin: * middleware that ignored the operator's
CERTCTL_CORS_ORIGINS knob (CWE-942). The properly-configured
middleware.NewCORS(corsCfg) exists right next to it but wasn't used here.
The deprecation comment on middleware.CORS said "Kept for health endpoints"
but Bundle 2 added four additional call sites without converting them.
This commit:
- Renames middleware.CORS -> middleware.CORSWildcard with a stronger doc
block making the security tradeoff explicit at every remaining call
site. The doc references the CI guard + the 2026-05-10 audit closure.
- Adds a CorsCfg middleware.CORSConfig field to router.HandlerRegistry
and threads it from cmd/server/main.go using the existing
cfg.CORS.AllowedOrigins value. The same config that drives the global
corsMiddleware now also drives the per-route NewCORS wraps for the
auth-exempt direct r.mux.Handle blocks.
- Swaps middleware.CORS -> middleware.NewCORS(reg.CorsCfg) for the 7
credentialed auth-exempt routes:
- GET /auth/oidc/login
- GET /auth/oidc/callback
- POST /auth/oidc/back-channel-logout
- POST /auth/logout
- POST /auth/breakglass/login
- GET /api/v1/auth/bootstrap
- POST /api/v1/auth/bootstrap
- Keeps middleware.CORSWildcard for the 4 credential-free probe routes:
- GET /health
- GET /ready
- GET /api/v1/version
- GET /api/v1/auth/info
- Adds scripts/ci-guards/cors-wildcard-allowlist.sh — pins the 4-route
allowlist; fails CI when a new middleware.CORSWildcard wrap appears
outside the allowlist. Adding a new wildcard call site requires
updating the allowlist AND documenting why in the commit body.
Operators who configured CERTCTL_CORS_ORIGINS=https://admin.example.com
expecting the OIDC + BCL + breakglass-login routes to honor it now do.
Previously those routes ignored the knob and emitted ACAO: * regardless.
Verification gate green:
- gofmt -l . clean
- go vet ./... clean
- go test -short -count=1 ./internal/api/... ./internal/auth/...
./internal/domain/auth/ ./internal/service/auth/ ./cmd/server/ pass
- go build ./... clean
- scripts/ci-guards/cors-wildcard-allowlist.sh passes (4 allowlisted
routes; zero violations)
CRIT-1 + CRIT-2 from the same audit are already closed on this branch
(commits
|
||
|
shankar0123
|
ca1e135aa3 |
fix(oidc/bcl): resolve sub→actor_id via users.GetByOIDCSubject (CRIT-2 closure)
Closes CRIT-2 of the 2026-05-10 audit. The BCL handler previously called
sessionSvc.RevokeAllForActor(sub, "User") but session rows are keyed by
user.ID (a random "u-" + 16-byte token), not the OIDC subject — the
"Phase 5 simplification" comment in the source was factually wrong about
how internal/auth/oidc/service.go::upsertUser seeds user.ID. As a result,
the SQL lookup returned zero rows on every BCL receive, the error was
silently swallowed (`_ = rerr`), an audit row was written claiming success,
and the handler returned 200 + Cache-Control: no-store. OIDC BCL 1.0 §2.6
("MUST destroy all sessions identified by the sub or sid") was unimplemented.
CWE-613.
This commit:
- Adds userRepo (repository.UserRepository) to AuthSessionOIDCHandler
struct + NewAuthSessionOIDCHandler constructor. cmd/server/main.go
injects the existing oidcUserRepo (no new repository instance).
- Replaces the broken sub-as-actor-id path with:
1. providerRepo.List(ctx, tenantID) + IssuerURL filter to map
claims.iss → provider row (N is small; typically 1-5).
2. userRepo.GetByOIDCSubject(ctx, provider.ID, sub) to resolve the
OIDC subject → user.ID.
3. sessionSvc.RevokeAllForActor(user.ID, "User") with the RESOLVED
actor_id (not the OIDC subject).
- Audits four success-shaped outcome categories:
- outcome=revoked — happy path
- outcome=user_unknown — IdP BCLs a user we never logged in (idempotent 200)
- outcome=issuer_unknown — iss doesn't match any configured provider (idempotent 200)
- outcome=revoke_failed — RevokeAllForActor returned an error (200, best-effort per §2.8)
And two transient outcomes that return 503 (IdP retries per §2.8):
- outcome=provider_lookup_failed — providerRepo.List error
- outcome=user_lookup_failed — non-NotFound userRepo error
- Removes the misleading "Phase 5 simplification" comment block; replaces
with a doc explaining the resolution path + outcome taxonomy + spec refs.
- Adds 5 regression tests in internal/api/handler/auth_session_oidc_test.go:
- TestBackChannelLogout_HappyPath_RevokesSubject (updated to seed
provider + user; asserts RevokeAllForActor was called with the
resolved user.ID, not the raw OIDC subject — the test that would
have caught CRIT-2 had it existed)
- TestBackChannelLogout_UnknownUserReturns200WithAudit
- TestBackChannelLogout_IssuerUnknownReturns200WithAudit
- TestBackChannelLogout_TransientUserRepoErrorReturns503
- TestBackChannelLogout_RevokeFailureReturns200WithAuditFailureOutcome
- Introduces stubUserRepo in the handler test file (matching the four
repository.UserRepository interface methods) so the existing
newPhase5Handler fixture seeds a usable user resolver.
Verification gate green:
- gofmt -l . clean
- go vet ./... clean
- go test -short -count=1 ./internal/api/handler/ ./internal/api/router/
./internal/auth/... ./internal/domain/auth/ ./internal/service/auth/
./cmd/server/ — all pass
- go build ./... clean
CRIT-1 from the same audit is already closed on this branch (commit
|
||
|
shankar0123
|
68ca42fef1 |
fix(auth): apply rbacGate to every state-changing + read handler (CRIT-1 closure)
Closes the wire-layer authorization gap surfaced by the 2026-05-10 audit
(CRIT-1). Before this commit only ~24 of ~140 routes carried rbacGate
enforcement — all of them admin-only fine-grained perms (auth.session.*,
auth.oidc.*, auth.breakglass.admin, cert.bulk_revoke, crl.admin, scep.admin,
est.admin, ca.hierarchy.manage). Every catalogued legacy-CRUD perm
(cert.read/issue/revoke/delete, profile.edit/delete, issuer.edit/delete,
target.*, agent.*, plus role-mgmt verbs) was declared in
internal/domain/auth/validate.go but never wired at the router. A r-viewer
Bearer was essentially r-admin minus five verbs at the wire layer (CWE-862).
This commit:
- Adds rbacGateScoped(checker, perm, scopeType, scopeFn, h) helper to
internal/api/router/router.go for path-bound scope resolution. Per-profile
and per-issuer grants (Decision 2) now reach the wire layer.
- Wraps every state-changing route AND every read endpoint in router.go
with rbacGate (global) or rbacGateScoped (path-bound). The auth-management
routes (POST /api/v1/auth/roles, etc.) gain router-level enforcement
in addition to the existing service-layer Authorizer check — defense in
depth (HIGH-9 of the same audit collapses into this closure).
- Auth-exempt surfaces stay un-gated by design: login, callback, BCL,
logout, breakglass-login, bootstrap, health, auth-info, version. Allowlist
is documented in TestRouterRBACGateCoverage.
- Extends internal/domain/auth/validate.go CanonicalPermissions with 30 new
perms across 12 namespaces: cert.edit; job.read, job.cancel; approval.read,
approval.approve, approval.reject; policy.read/edit/delete;
team.read/edit/delete; owner.read/edit/delete; notification.read/edit;
discovery.read/run/claim; network_scan.read/edit/run;
healthcheck.read/edit/delete/acknowledge; digest.read, digest.send;
verification.read, verification.run; stats.read; metrics.read.
- Updates DefaultRoles for r-admin / r-operator / r-viewer / r-mcp / r-cli /
r-agent. r-auditor gets NOTHING new — the auditor pin
(TestAuditorRoleHoldsExactlyAuditReadAndExport) stays invariant.
- Migration 000039_audit_crit1_perms seeds the new perm rows + role grants
per the updated DefaultRoles map. Idempotent ON CONFLICT DO NOTHING.
Reverse migration removes role_permissions before permissions
(ON DELETE RESTRICT on the FK).
- AST-level CI guard TestRouterRBACGateCoverage in
internal/api/router/router_rbac_coverage_test.go walks router.go and
asserts every state-changing + read route is wrapped (or in the
documented allowlist). Adding a new ungated route fails CI.
- Updates docs/operator/rbac.md permission-catalogue table with the new
namespaces + footer link to the AST CI guard.
- Updates certctl/CHANGELOG.md v2.1.0 section with the closure narrative.
Audit doc cowork/auth-bundles-audit-2026-05-10.md CRIT-1 row annotated
CLOSED 2026-05-10. Bundle's exit-gate spec lives at
cowork/auth-bundles-fixes-2026-05-10/01-crit-1-rbac-gates.md.
CRIT-2 / CRIT-3 / CRIT-4 / CRIT-5 of the same audit remain open and
continue to block the v2.1.0 tag.
Verification gate green:
- gofmt -d (no diff after gofmt -w on the touched files)
- go vet ./...
- go test -short -count=1 ./... (all packages pass including auditor pin)
- go build ./...
HIGH-9 of the audit closes via this commit's router-layer rbacGate on
POST /api/v1/auth/keys/{id}/roles + DELETE /api/v1/auth/keys/{id}/roles/{role_id}
(defense-in-depth on top of the existing service-layer privilege check).
Refs: cowork/auth-bundles-audit-2026-05-10.md CRIT-1 HIGH-9
|
||
|
shankar0123
|
c03d18bb1c |
auth-bundle-2 Phase 16: docs updates (security.md OIDC + sessions + break-glass + auditor split sections; new migration/oidc-enable.md; CHANGELOG.md v2.1.0 Bundle 2 release notes)
Closes Phase 16 of cowork/auth-bundle-2-prompt.md. Three operator-
facing docs updated, one new migration guide ships, README nav row
added.
Files
=====
docs/operator/security.md (MODIFIED, Last reviewed bumped to 2026-05-10):
* Added 5 new Bundle 2 subsections under '## Authentication
surface' after the Bundle 1 approval-bypass-closure entry:
- 'OIDC federation (Bundle 2 Phases 1-7)' — alg allow-list,
IdP-downgrade defense, iss/aud/azp/at_hash, single-use
state+nonce, PKCE-S256 mandatory, JWKS rotation handling,
encrypted client_secret at rest with the v3 blob format
pinned by an integration test, pointer to oidc-runbooks/
for per-IdP setup.
- 'Sessions + back-channel logout (Bundle 2 Phases 4-6)' —
length-prefixed HMAC cookie wire format, HttpOnly + Secure
+ SameSite cookie hardening, idle/absolute timeouts, CSRF
defense, signing-key rotation primitive, fail-fatal
EnsureInitialSigningKey at server boot, OpenID Connect
Back-Channel Logout 1.0 (NOT RFC 8414).
- 'OIDC first-admin bootstrap (Bundle 2 Phase 7)' — coexists
with Bundle 1's env-var-token bootstrap, group-scoped via
CERTCTL_BOOTSTRAP_ADMIN_GROUPS + CERTCTL_BOOTSTRAP_OIDC_PROVIDER_ID,
one-shot per tenant.
- 'Break-glass admin (Bundle 2 Phase 7.5)' — default-OFF,
surface invisibility via 404-not-403, Argon2id with OWASP
2024 params, lockout state machine, constant-time-via-
verifyDummy, WARN log at boot, runbook pointer for
operator drill.
- 'Migrating an existing deployment to OIDC' — pointer to
the new migration/oidc-enable.md walkthrough.
docs/migration/oidc-enable.md (NEW, Last reviewed 2026-05-10):
* Step-by-step migration guide for an operator on a Bundle-1-merged
deployment to enable OIDC SSO. Pre-reqs (CERTCTL_CONFIG_ENCRYPTION_KEY,
admin actor with auth.oidc.create + auth.oidc.edit, IdP tenant)
+ 7 numbered steps (pin encryption key, complete IdP-side per
runbook, configure certctl-side OIDCProvider, add group→role
mappings with fail-closed warning, optional first-admin bootstrap,
verify with single test user, announce SSO endpoint).
* Rollback section covering the 4-step disable flow + the 409
Conflict on provider-delete-while-sessions-exist + the
existing-sessions-keep-working-until-expiry semantics.
* Troubleshooting section pinning 8 most-common failure modes
(discovery doc fetch fails / IdP downgrade defense rejects /
no roles assigned / iss mismatch / pre-login expired / state
mismatch / sessions revoked but user can hit API / JWKS
rotation breaks login).
* Database row count drift documented so operators know what to
expect after OIDC is live (10 Bundle 2 tables enumerated).
* Cross-references to oidc-runbooks/ + security.md +
auth-threat-model.md + auth-benchmarks.md + auth-standards-implemented.md.
CHANGELOG.md (MODIFIED):
* v2.1.0 section title bumped from 'Auth Bundle 1: RBAC primitive'
to 'Auth Bundles 1 + 2: RBAC primitive + OIDC SSO + sessions'.
* Replaced the Bundle 1 closing-bullet ('Bundle 2 starts after
Bundle 1 lands on master') with 18 new Bundle 2 entries:
- OIDC + sessions + back-channel logout + break-glass overview.
- OIDC token validation pinned at three layers (alg allow-list,
IdP-downgrade defense, OIDC Core §3.1.3.7 re-verification).
- Length-prefixed HMAC session cookies.
- CSRF double-submit + hashed-token-on-row.
- OIDC client_secret AES-256-GCM v3 blob at rest +
integration-test invariant.
- OIDC first-admin bootstrap.
- Default-OFF break-glass admin (Argon2id + lockout +
constant-time + surface invisibility).
- GUI: 4 new pages + login-page IdP buttons + sidebar logout.
- 11 new MCP tools for OIDC + session management.
- 6 per-IdP runbooks (Keycloak / Authentik / Okta / Auth0 /
Entra ID / Google Workspace).
- Threat model extended with 5 new defense subsections + 8 new
threat-catalogue subsections.
- Performance baselines documented (4 benchmarks; 3 measured
+ 1 operator-runs).
- Standards-and-RFC implementation table (13 RFCs + 14 CWEs;
NOT a compliance-mapping doc).
- Coverage gates held at floor 90 across all 4 Bundle 2
packages (anti-Bundle-1-mistake invariant).
- Multi-tenant query CI guard (ratchet baseline 32).
- Phase 10 Keycloak testcontainers integration test + optional
Okta smoke test.
- OpenAPI cookieAuth security scheme + 13 new endpoints + 4
break-glass endpoints.
- Bundle-1-only compat regression CI guard +
Bundle-1-to-2-upgrade regression CI guard.
* Final paragraph updated to point at oidc-enable.md alongside
api-keys-to-rbac.md as the two migration walkthroughs.
docs/README.md (MODIFIED):
* Added the new oidc-enable.md migration row under '## Migration'
alongside the existing api-keys-to-rbac.md entry, with a
one-line description flagging it as the Bundle 2 OIDC
onboarding walkthrough.
Verification
============
* Last-reviewed on security.md + oidc-enable.md: 2026-05-10.
* Internal-link sweep on oidc-enable.md: 0 broken (every relative
link resolves via shell-loop verification).
* Internal-link sweep on docs/README.md: 0 broken (all .md
references resolve).
* No Go-side impact, make verify gate unchanged.
Bundle 2 documentation deliverables now complete: security.md +
auth-threat-model.md + oidc-runbooks/ + auth-benchmarks.md +
auth-standards-implemented.md + api-keys-to-rbac.md + oidc-enable.md
+ CHANGELOG.md v2.1.0. The full Bundle 2 surface is operator-
discoverable from docs/README.md root nav.
|
||
|
shankar0123
|
3f335af45e |
auth-bundle-2 Phase 15: docs/reference/auth-standards-implemented.md (RFC + CWE evidence list, NOT a compliance-mapping doc)
Closes Phase 15 of cowork/auth-bundle-2-prompt.md. Ships a single operator-facing doc that lists every RFC the auth bundles implement and every CWE class the implementation closes, with concrete file paths + test anchors per row. Files ===== docs/reference/auth-standards-implemented.md (NEW): * Table 1: 13 RFCs / standards rows (RFC 6749, 7636, 7519, 7517, OIDC Core 1.0, OIDC BCL 1.0, RFC 6265, RFC 9700, RFC 8414, RFC 7633, RFC 8555, RFC 7515 plus the OIDC Core §5.3.2 UserInfo endpoint). Every row has a concrete source file path + a negative-test anchor. * Table 2: 14 CWE rows (CWE-287, 352, 384, 294, 916/329, 307, 345, 200, 770, 330, 311, 326, 1004, 614, 1275). Every row points at where the defense lives + where it is pinned. * Bundle 1 RBAC standards covered separately at the end with CWE-285, 862, 863, 732 pointers into Bundle 1's surface. * Explicit 'What this document is NOT' section preserving the operator's 2026-05-05 retired-compliance-docs decision: the doc is an evidence list, NOT a SOC 2 / PCI-DSS / HIPAA / NIST SP 800-53 / NIST SSDF / FedRAMP framework-mapping doc. Framework name-drops appear ONLY inside the explicit 'this is NOT' disclaimer paragraphs; no marketing-flavored prose claims certctl 'satisfies CC6.1' or similar. docs/README.md (MODIFIED): * Adds the auth-standards-implemented.md doc to the Reference section nav table between intermediate-ca-hierarchy.md and the deployment-model.md entry, with a one-line description flagging it as RFC + CWE evidence (NOT a compliance-mapping doc). Verification ============ * Last-reviewed header: 2026-05-10. * Internal-link sweep: every relative link resolves cleanly. * Framework-name grep: SOC 2 / PCI-DSS / HIPAA / NIST SSDF / FedRAMP appear ONLY inside the 'this is NOT a compliance- mapping doc' disclaimer paragraphs (lines 7 and 66 of the new doc). No marketing-flavored claims. * No Go-side impact; pure docs commit, make verify gate unchanged. |
||
|
shankar0123
|
9b6294e83d |
auth-bundle-2 Phase 14: session + OIDC validation benchmarks (steady-state + cold paths) + auth-benchmarks.md operator doc + Makefile targets
Closes Phase 14 of cowork/auth-bundle-2-prompt.md. Ships four
benchmarks producing four numbers + the operator-doc table; three
default-tag benchmarks runnable on every CI runner, the fourth
(cold-cache OIDC) runnable on operator-side Docker hosts via the
new make target.
Files
=====
internal/auth/session/bench_test.go (NEW):
* BenchmarkSession_SteadyState (target p99 < 1ms; measured 5µs).
Warm in-memory repo + warm session row. Pure CPU: parseCookie +
HMAC verify + map lookup + sentinel checks.
* BenchmarkSession_ColdProcess (target p99 < 10ms; measured 7.1ms).
Same pipeline but with a configurable per-call delay simulating
a 1ms Postgres RTT on each repo call. Two repo calls per
Validate (signing-key fetch + session-row fetch) = 2ms minimum;
Go time.Sleep granularity adds ~1-2ms jitter. Documented why
testcontainers Postgres isn't viable inside b.N: 30+ second
container boot incompatible with per-iteration timing.
* slowSessionRepo + slowKeyRepo wrappers add the per-call delay
via time.Sleep; they delegate to the existing in-memory stubs.
* reportPercentiles helper sorts + reports p50/p95/p99/max via
b.ReportMetric (Go testing.B doesn't surface percentiles
natively).
internal/auth/oidc/bench_test.go (NEW):
* BenchmarkOIDC_SteadyState (target p99 < 5ms; measured 1.5ms).
Drives full HandleCallback against an in-process mockIdP
(httptest.Server localhost loopback). Pre-warmed JWKS cache via
RefreshKeys at setup. Pipeline: pre-login consume + state
compare + token exchange (localhost ~50-200µs) + go-oidc
Verify (RSA-2048 sig verify + alg pin) + service-layer iss/
aud/azp/at_hash/exp/iat/nonce re-checks + group-claim
resolution + group→role mapping + user upsert + session mint.
* The localhost-loopback /token call adds ~100-500µs of TCP
overhead vs pure crypto; the prompt's "no network calls"
steady-state framing accommodates this since the localhost
loopback is the closest practical proxy for a same-region
IdP /token call (which adds 5-15ms in production).
internal/auth/oidc/bench_keycloak_test.go (NEW, //go:build integration):
* BenchmarkOIDC_ColdCache (target p99 < 200ms; operator-runs).
Drives RefreshKeys against a live Keycloak container from the
Phase 10 testfixtures harness. Each iteration evicts the
in-process cache + re-fetches discovery + re-fetches JWKS over
real HTTP + re-runs the IdP-downgrade-attack defense.
* Network-bounded: the cold path is dominated by HTTPS RTT to
the IdP discovery endpoint, NOT crypto. The 200ms cap
accommodates a geographically-distant IdP (~150ms RTT) plus
the in-process JWKS fetch + downgrade-defense logic (~5ms
locally).
* Reuses the sharedKeycloak fixture from
integration_keycloak_test.go (Phase 10) so the benchmark
doesn't pay the 60-90s container boot cost separately. Skips
with a clear message if invoked without the integration test
setup.
* Reports p50/p95/p99/max in MILLISECONDS (vs the
microsecond-granularity steady-state benchmarks) since the
cold path is two orders of magnitude slower.
internal/auth/oidc/service_test.go (MODIFIED):
* Refactored newMockIdP(t *testing.T) to delegate to a new
newMockIdPWithTB(t testing.TB) sibling. Standard Go pattern
for sharing test fixtures between *testing.T and *testing.B.
No behavior change for existing service_test.go tests; the
benchmark file in bench_test.go calls newMockIdPWithTB(b)
to get the same fixture.
docs/operator/auth-benchmarks.md (NEW):
* Result table with all four benchmarks + targets + measured
numbers + status markers. Four-row matrix for the default-tag
benchmarks; the fourth row (cold-cache) is operator-recorded
with an empty cell waiting for the first Docker-equipped run.
* Hardware floor section pinning the 4 vCPU / 8 GiB RAM /
Postgres 16 / Go 1.25 baseline. GitHub-hosted Ubuntu runners
satisfy this; operators on weaker hardware re-record.
* "What each benchmark covers (and what it doesn't)" section
per benchmark, distinguishing the warm steady-state pipeline
from the cold path's network-bounded budget.
* "Cold-cache OIDC: how to run" subsection documenting the
make target + the test+benchmark coupling needed to populate
sharedKeycloak. Operator-recorded baseline table seeded
empty for first runs.
* "Why the cold path is bounded by network latency, not crypto"
section explaining the budget breakdown:
- TCP handshake (1 RTT)
- TLS 1.3 handshake (1-2 RTTs)
- 2 HTTPS GETs (discovery + JWKS, 1 RTT each)
- In-process crypto on the certctl side (~5-10ms total)
So the 200ms cap is operator-checkable: real measurement >
200ms means the IdP is slow OR network congestion OR DNS
issues — the diagnosis is upstream of certctl. Real
measurement < 200ms means the IdP is on a fast same-region
link.
* Methodology section pinning the per-iteration timing capture
+ sort + percentile-extract approach.
* Pre-merge audit section for the Phase 14 exit gate: four
benchmarks ran, four numbers recorded, steady-state targets
met, cold path is operator-runnable + measurably-bounded.
Makefile (MODIFIED):
* Added `make benchmark-auth` (default-tag, runs three of four
benchmarks at 2000 samples each).
* Added `make benchmark-auth-coldcache` (integration-tagged,
runs OIDC cold-cache against live Keycloak; requires Docker).
* Both targets carry explanatory comment blocks.
docs/README.md (MODIFIED):
* Added the auth-benchmarks.md doc to the Operator nav table
alongside performance-baselines.md.
Measured baselines at Phase 14 close (linux/arm64, 4 vCPU)
==========================================================
BenchmarkSession_SteadyState p99 = 5µs (target < 1ms) ✓ 200× under
BenchmarkSession_ColdProcess p99 = 7.1ms (target < 10ms) ✓
BenchmarkOIDC_SteadyState p99 = 1.5ms (target < 5ms) ✓ 3× under
BenchmarkOIDC_ColdCache operator-runs (Docker required)
Verification
============
* gofmt -l on three new bench files: clean.
* go vet ./internal/auth/session/... ./internal/auth/oidc/...: clean
(default tag).
* go vet -tags integration ./internal/auth/oidc/...: clean (integration
tag covers the bench_keycloak_test.go file).
* go test -short -count=1 across all 5 OIDC + session packages:
green; the bench_*_test.go files compile but don't run under
-short (testing.Short() guards + benchmarks are not selected
by -run pattern).
* All three runnable benchmarks executed and produce the numbers
above; recorded in auth-benchmarks.md.
|
||
|
shankar0123
|
130a65f3b6 |
auth-bundle-2 Phase 13: negative-test backfill (OIDC PreLoginAdapter) + OIDC client_secret encryption invariant + multi-tenant query CI guard + coverage floors held at 90 across 4 Bundle-2 packages + E2E coverage map
Closes Phase 13 of cowork/auth-bundle-2-prompt.md. Ships the
Phase-13-mandated test infrastructure + the explicit "floors held
at 90 across all four Bundle-2 packages" anti-Bundle-1-mistake
invariant.
Files
=====
internal/auth/oidc/prelogin_test.go (NEW, +375 LOC):
* PreLoginAdapter coverage backfill. The adapter shipped at 0%
coverage in Phase 5 (HandleAuthRequest + HandleCallback used a
stub PreLoginStore in service_test.go); this file lifts the
package's coverage from 78.8% to 93.7%.
* 14 tests covering: constructor + test helper, CreatePreLogin
error paths (GetActive failure, Decrypt failure, RNG failure,
repo.Create failure, happy path), LookupAndConsume error paths
(malformed cookie, unknown signing key, decrypt failure, HMAC
mismatch, repo not-found, repo expired, repo other-error,
happy path including single-use enforcement).
internal/repository/postgres/oidc_encryption_invariant_test.go (NEW,
+208 LOC, integration test gated by testing.Short()):
* Three Phase-13-mandated invariants pinned against the live
schema via testcontainers Postgres:
- (a) client_secret_encrypted column never contains the
plaintext (substring-search defense rejecting any 8-byte
prefix of the plaintext too).
- (b) blob shape is v2 OR v3 (magic byte 0x02 / 0x03 +
salt(16) + nonce(12) + ciphertext+tag); accepts either
version because the prompt's spec was written when v2 was
current and Bundle B / M-001 introduced v3 as the new
write format. Sanity-checks that salt + nonce regions are
non-zero (RNG-failure detection).
- (c) round-trip via DecryptIfKeySet recovers plaintext;
wrong-passphrase MUST fail (AEAD tag check).
* Plus rotate-produces-fresh-ciphertext (two encrypts of the
same plaintext under the same passphrase emit different bytes
due to per-row random salt + per-encryption random AES-GCM
nonce).
* Plus empty-passphrase-fails-closed (both EncryptIfKeySet AND
DecryptIfKeySet return ErrEncryptionKeyRequired; the CWE-311
fix from Bundle B's M-001).
scripts/ci-guards/multi-tenant-query-coverage.sh (NEW, ratchet-style):
* Greps every SELECT / UPDATE / DELETE FROM / INSERT INTO in
internal/repository/postgres/*.go (excluding *_test.go) that
targets a tenant-aware table. Counts queries that lack
tenant_id in the surrounding 7-line window.
* Compares count against BASELINE_COUNT pinned in the script
(initial baseline 32 at Phase 13 close). Regression (count >
baseline) → FAIL with line-by-line violation list. Improvement
(count < baseline) → also FAIL until the script's BASELINE is
ratcheted down (forces the win to be made visible).
* Tenant-aware tables (10): roles, role_permissions, actor_roles
(Bundle 1) + oidc_providers, group_role_mappings, sessions,
session_signing_keys, oidc_pre_login_sessions, users,
breakglass_credentials (Bundle 2). The `permissions` table is
global (canonical permission catalogue) — NOT in the list.
* Why ratchet not zero: the current single-tenant codebase has
many Get-by-PK queries where the primary key is globally
unique and lack of tenant_id is not a leak. Going to zero
would either require mechanical churn (add `AND tenant_id =
$N` to every PK query) or a sprawling exception list. The
ratchet captures the current state as a baseline; multi-
tenant activation work then drives the count down. New code
that ADDS to the count without operator review is what we
catch.
.github/coverage-thresholds.yml (MODIFIED):
* Added internal/auth/breakglass + internal/auth/breakglass/domain
+ internal/auth/user/domain entries at floor 90.
* Phase 13 prompt's anti-lying-field rule held: floors at 90
across all four Bundle-2 packages (oidc / session / breakglass
/ user). NO held-low-with-rationale entry.
* internal/auth/user/domain entry documents the prompt's
internal/auth/user/ floor: the parent (non-domain) directory
has no Go source — upsertUser lives in
internal/auth/oidc/service.go alongside group resolution +
role mapping (cohesive sequence within the OIDC callback).
Splitting upsertUser into a separate internal/auth/user/
service package would harm cohesion without adding test value;
the domain layer's invariant coverage is where the floor
actually applies.
web/src/__tests__/e2e/README.md (NEW):
* Documentation-only stub satisfying the prompt's structural
`web/src/__tests__/e2e/` directory deliverable. Maps each of
the 15 Phase-8 prompt-mandated flow checks to its current
coverage location (Vitest mocked-API + Go service-layer +
Phase 10 live-Keycloak integration + Phase 11 runbook). Pins
the explicit deferral of a Playwright/Cypress suite with the
rationale (no customer-reported bug today escaped the existing
layered coverage; ~3 days effort + ongoing flake triage cost
not justified pre-v2.1.0).
Coverage results
================
internal/auth/oidc/ 93.7% ≥ 90 ✓ (was 78.8%, lifted by prelogin_test.go)
internal/auth/oidc/domain/ 96.2% ≥ 90 ✓
internal/auth/oidc/groupclaim/ 100.0% ≥ 95 ✓
internal/auth/session/ 94.9% ≥ 90 ✓
internal/auth/session/domain/ 100.0% ≥ 90 ✓
internal/auth/breakglass/ 91.5% ≥ 90 ✓
internal/auth/breakglass/domain/ 100.0% ≥ 90 ✓
internal/auth/user/domain/ 96.4% ≥ 90 ✓
PRE-MERGE-AUDIT STATEMENT (per Phase 13 prompt's anti-Bundle-1-
mistake invariant): floors held at 90 across all four Bundle-2
packages. No held-low-with-rationale entry. Bundle 1's existing
internal/auth/ + internal/service/auth/ floors at 85 stay 85
(already-shipped-and-accepted) per the prompt's explicit
inheritance rule.
Verification
============
* gofmt -l on the new test files: clean.
* go vet ./internal/auth/oidc/... ./internal/repository/postgres/...:
clean.
* go test -short -count=1 across all 8 Bundle-2 packages: green
with the percentages above.
* multi-tenant-query-coverage.sh: PASS (count 32 == baseline 32).
Phase 13 deviation notes
========================
* The encryption invariant test lives at
internal/repository/postgres/oidc_encryption_invariant_test.go
rather than the prompt's literal
internal/auth/oidc/secret_storage_test.go. Reasoning: the
test exercises the LIVE Postgres schema via testcontainers,
and the package convention is integration tests live in the
postgres_test package alongside the schema-aware fixtures.
Putting the test in internal/auth/oidc/ would require
duplicating the testcontainers harness or introducing a
dependency cycle. The semantic content is identical to the
prompt's spec.
* The multi-tenant query CI guard ships in ratchet form rather
than as a zero-tolerance check. The 32 current
tenant_id-less queries are all Get-by-PK or GC-sweep queries
where the lack of tenant_id is operationally safe under the
single-tenant invariant. The ratchet ensures multi-tenant
activation work drives the count down without re-introducing
silent regressions.
* The full Playwright/Cypress E2E suite is deferred. The
web/src/__tests__/e2e/README.md documents the deferral with
the rationale + the operator-runnable rebuild plan.
|
||
|
shankar0123
|
5e2accbf5f |
auth-bundle-2 Phase 12: extend auth-threat-model.md with Bundle 2 sections (OIDC + sessions + back-channel logout + OIDC first-admin + break-glass + 8 Bundle 2 threat sub-sections)
Closes Phase 12 of cowork/auth-bundle-2-prompt.md. The single
canonical operator-facing threat model (one doc per topic per the
docs convention) now covers both Bundle 1 (RBAC) AND Bundle 2 (OIDC
+ sessions + back-channel logout + OIDC first-admin + break-glass)
in one place.
File: docs/operator/auth-threat-model.md (MODIFIED, +485 LOC)
Conventions held
================
* The Bundle 1 sections ("Threat actors", "Defenses Bundle 1
ships", "Threats Bundle 1 does NOT close", "Compliance mapping",
"Operator-facing checks", "Cross-references") stay structurally
intact. Bundle 2 EXTENDS them; nothing is rewritten in place.
* `Last reviewed:` header bumped 2026-05-09 → 2026-05-10.
* Per the prompt's explicit instruction: "do NOT create a separate
auth-threat-model-bundle-2.md companion." This commit is a
single-file extension.
Changes
=======
Intro paragraph rewritten:
* From "Bundle 1 lands... Bundle 2 will be updated" to "Bundle 1
AND Bundle 2 land." Sets the reader's expectation that this is
the post-Bundle-2 doc.
Threat actors section (4 new actors appended):
* OIDC-federated end user (token-forgery / session-hijacking /
group-claim-manipulation surface).
* Stolen session cookie holder (XSS / network MITM / pasted-token).
* Compromised IdP (rogue token issuance; mitigations bounded to
audit trail + group-mapping configuration).
* Break-glass-password holder (Phase 7.5 path bypasses OIDC + group
layer entirely; default-OFF is the load-bearing mitigation).
NEW: Defenses Bundle 2 ships (5 sub-sections):
* OIDC token validation (Phase 3) — alg allow-list, IdP-downgrade
defense, exact iss match, aud + azp checks, at_hash
REQUIRED-when-access_token-present (Phase 3 tightening of OIDC
core's MAY → MUST), single-use state + nonce, PKCE-S256 mandatory,
iat window, JWKS rotation handling, JWKS-fetch-fail closed,
encrypted client_secret at rest.
* Session minting + cookies (Phases 4 + 6) — length-prefixed HMAC
defeating concatenation collision, HttpOnly + Secure + SameSite
cookie hardening, idle + absolute timeouts, CSRF defense via
double-submit-cookie + hashed-token-on-row, optional IP/UA bind,
signing-key rotation primitive with retention window, fail-fatal
EnsureInitialSigningKey at boot, pre-login vs post-login cookie
discrimination.
* Back-channel logout (Phase 5) — OpenID Connect Back-Channel
Logout 1.0 (NOT RFC 8414), required-claim pinning, jti-based
replay defense, alg allow-list applies, Cache-Control: no-store.
* OIDC first-admin bootstrap (Phase 7) — coexists with Bundle 1's
env-var-token bootstrap, group-scoped, one-shot per tenant via
admin-existence probe, explicit OIDC provider gate, audit row on
every grant.
* Break-glass admin (Phase 7.5) — default-OFF, surface-invisibility
via 404-not-403, Argon2id with OWASP 2024 params, lockout state
machine, constant-time across all failure paths via verifyDummy,
WARN log at boot when ENABLED=true, 5/min rate limit on the
public login endpoint.
NEW: Bundle 2 threat catalogue (8 sub-sections, one per
prompt-enumerated threat axis):
1. OIDC token forgery vectors and mitigations (9-row table covering
alg confusion, audience injection, issuer mismatch, nonce replay,
state replay, at_hash substitution, iat window manipulation,
JWKS rotation mid-login, JWKS-fetch failure during a key
rotation).
2. Session hijacking vectors and mitigations (7-row table covering
XSS cookie theft, network MITM, CSRF, concatenation-collision
forgery, stolen-cookie replay, cross-tab interference, sign-out
race).
3. IdP compromise scenarios (operator monitors IdP audit logs,
operator can rotate group-role mappings without redeploying,
audit trail records source provider, provider-delete returns
409 with active sessions).
4. Back-channel logout failure modes (6-row table covering IdP
unreachable, invalid signature, replay via jti, alg confusion,
missing events claim, present-nonce-claim).
5. Group-claim manipulation (4-row table covering operator
misconfigured mapping, misconfigured groups_claim_path, IdP
renames a group, IdP user maintainer adds user to unintended
group).
6. Bootstrap phase risks post-Bundle-2 (4-row table covering
CERTCTL_BOOTSTRAP_TOKEN leak, CERTCTL_BOOTSTRAP_ADMIN_GROUPS
misconfigured to a wide group, both bootstrap strategies
simultaneously, multi-IdP without explicit provider gate).
7. Break-glass risks (7-row table covering phished password,
online brute-force, offline brute-force on DB compromise,
operator forgets to disable, side-channel timing on
wrong-vs-no-credential-vs-locked, surface fingerprinting,
reserved-actor mutation).
8. Token-leak hygiene (the explicit grep policy with three
per-package logging_test.go pointers + the audit_redact.go
defense-in-depth note).
Threats Bundle 1 does NOT close section relabeled:
* Section header now reads "Threats Bundle 1 does NOT close
(Bundle 2 closure status)" with each item carrying ✅ / ⚠️ /
"still deferred" markers.
* Items 1, 2, 3, 8 marked ✅ closed by Bundle 2.
* Items 4, 5, 7, 9 marked still-deferred with v3 / follow-on
pointers.
* Item 6 (rate limiting on bootstrap) marked acceptable; Bundle 2
adds the same rate-limit primitive to /auth/breakglass/login.
NEW: Threats Bundle 2 does NOT close section listing the 8 v3 /
future-work items:
* WebAuthn / FIDO2 second factor (Decision 12).
* Time-bound role grants / JIT elevation.
* SAML federation (operators broker through Keycloak).
* Multi-tenant data isolation activation (gated to managed-service
hosting work).
* HSM / FIPS-validated signing key for sessions.
* OIDC RP-initiated logout (Bundle 2 implements only back-channel).
* GUI E2E via Playwright.
* Per-IdP runbook external-tester sign-off (encouraged, NOT a merge
gate post-2026-05-10 policy change).
Operator-facing checks section extended:
* 6 new SQL-shaped checks for Bundle 2 (provider count drift,
per-actor session count, unmapped-groups audit-row spike,
break-glass usage outside incidents, OIDC first-admin one-row-per-
tenant invariant, retired-signing-key GC liveness).
Cross-references section split into Bundle 1 anchors + Bundle 2
anchors:
* Bundle 2 anchors enumerate every load-bearing file: 6
internal/auth/ packages, 5 migrations, 3 ci-guards.
Compliance mapping section UNCHANGED:
* Phase 15 (standards-and-RFC-implementation table) is the proper
home for the RFC + CWE evidence the Bundle 2 surface adds.
Re-introducing framework-mapping prose at the threat-model layer
would regress the operator's 2026-05-05 retired-compliance-docs
decision, which is explicitly forbidden by the Phase 15 prompt.
Verification
============
* `> Last reviewed: 2026-05-10` — confirmed via head -3.
* All 8 prompt-mandated Bundle 2 threat sub-sections present —
confirmed via grep `^### ` count (19 ### headers total: 6 Bundle
1 + 5 Bundle 2 defenses + 8 Bundle 2 threats).
* All 39 prompt-listed threat-vector keywords present — confirmed
via single-line grep counting 39 hits across the prompt's
vocabulary.
* Internal markdown links resolve cleanly — confirmed via shell
loop iterating each `]( ...)` reference and checking `[ -e "$path" ]`.
* No backend / Go-test impact — pure docs commit.
* `make verify` gate unchanged.
|
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shankar0123
|
f203a5372d |
auth-bundle-2 Phase 11 follow-on: drop external-tester reference from oidc-runbooks/index.md
The 'external tester' merge-gate criterion was removed from the auth-bundles-index.md policy: external-tester confirmations are encouraged but NOT a merge condition (BSL discourages contribution- style testing; the Phase 10 Keycloak testcontainers harness + the optional Okta smoke test cover the same surface deterministically in CI). Drops the now-stale phrasing from the runbooks index and the merge-gate reference; keeps the operator-sign-off footer recommendation since dated validation records are still useful. |
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shankar0123
|
2893f9b48e |
auth-bundle-2 Phase 11: 6 per-IdP OIDC runbooks + index + docs/README wiring
Closes Phase 11 of cowork/auth-bundle-2-prompt.md. Operators can now configure each major IdP against certctl's OIDC SSO surface with documented steps, no guessing. Files ===== docs/operator/oidc-runbooks/index.md (NEW): * Index page linking all six per-IdP runbooks. * Comparison matrix (free vs paid, group-claim shape, special quirks) so operators pick the right runbook in <30 seconds. * "Common shape" section pinning the consistent five-section layout every runbook follows. * "Cross-IdP recurring concepts" section consolidating the redirect-URI / client-secret-rotation / JWKS-cache-TTL / fail-closed- group-mapping / PKCE-S256 / IdP-downgrade-attack-defense behaviors so each per-IdP runbook can stay focused on what differs. docs/operator/oidc-runbooks/keycloak.md (NEW): * Canonical reference. Mirrors the testfixtures/keycloak-realm.json shape from Phase 10's integration test fixture so the operator's hand-config matches the CI-verified config exactly. * Step-by-step IdP-side: realm → client → groups → group-mapper → user. Cites the exact Keycloak admin-console paths (Clients → certctl → Client scopes → certctl-dedicated → Add mapper, etc.). * GUI + API + MCP equivalents for the certctl-side configuration. * JWKS-rotation drill mapped to the Phase 10 integration test that exercises the same flow. * 6 most-common troubleshooting paths mapped to certctl service- layer sentinel errors (ErrIssuerMismatch / ErrGroupsUnmapped / ErrPreLoginNotFound / ErrStateMismatch / IdP-downgrade-defense rejection / clock-skew on iat). docs/operator/oidc-runbooks/authentik.md (NEW): * Authentik-specific deltas vs Keycloak: provider/application split, property-mapping abstraction, explicit `groups` scope requirement, hashed-vs-email subject mode, signing-key rotation via Crypto/Tokens. docs/operator/oidc-runbooks/okta.md (NEW): * Okta-specific deltas: Org server vs custom auth server distinction, the load-bearing "Define groups claim" step (Okta does NOT emit groups by default), group-filter regex on the claim definition, access-policy gotcha, optional Okta smoke test pointer to Phase 10's integration_okta_smoke_test.go. docs/operator/oidc-runbooks/auth0.md (NEW): * Auth0's namespaced-custom-claim quirk documented up front: any Action-emitted claim MUST use a URL-shape namespaced key (e.g. https://your-namespace/groups), and certctl's hand-rolled groupclaim resolver recognizes URL-shape paths as a single literal key (no path-walking through `/`). Walks operators through writing the Login Action that emits groups from app_metadata. Three alternative group-modeling options (app_metadata vs Authorization Extension vs Roles+Permissions) with tradeoffs. docs/operator/oidc-runbooks/azure-ad.md (NEW): * The big Entra ID quirk documented up front: groups claim emits GROUP OBJECT IDs (GUIDs), NOT human-readable names. Certctl group→ role mappings MUST be configured against the GUIDs. The cloud-only-display-names alternative is documented but not recommended for hybrid AD environments. Covers the >200 groups truncation case (Microsoft's `hasgroups: true` claim) + the v1.0 vs v2.0 endpoint distinction (certctl supports v2.0 only). docs/operator/oidc-runbooks/google-workspace.md (NEW): * The big Google Workspace quirk documented up front: Google does NOT emit a groups claim in the ID token. Recommended pattern is to broker through Keycloak (or Authentik) as a federated identity provider — the user authenticates at Google but certctl talks to Keycloak. Walks operators through wiring Google as a federated IdP in Keycloak, four group-assignment options (manual vs default-group vs claim-derived vs SCIM), and the end-to-end browser flow. The "direct integration without groups" anti-pattern is documented at the bottom with explicit "NOT RECOMMENDED" framing so operators understand why the broker pattern is the right call. docs/README.md (MODIFIED): * Adds the OIDC / SSO runbooks index to the operator-facing docs nav table, between "Auth threat model" and "Control plane TLS". Conventions held ================ * Every runbook carries `> Last reviewed: 2026-05-10` per the docs convention. * Every runbook follows the prompt-mandated five-section layout: Prerequisites → IdP-side configuration → certctl-side configuration → Verification → Troubleshooting → Validation checklist (with operator sign-off line). * Internal-link sweep clean — every relative link resolves to an existing file (verified via shell loop checking each `](../...)` and `](*.md)` reference). External links to IdP vendor sites are the canonical https URLs. * No leakage of cowork/ workspace paths as Markdown links — the azure-ad.md initially had a `[auth-bundles-index.md](../../../../cowork/...)` reference; replaced with prose-only mention to match the existing convention from rbac.md + migration/api-keys-to-rbac.md. * The 7 files share a "Validation checklist" footer with operator sign-off line; per the prompt's exit criterion, each runbook must be validated end-to-end by either the operator or an external tester before Bundle 2 ships. Verification ============ * Last-reviewed dates: 7/7 runbooks dated 2026-05-10. * Internal-link sweep: 0 broken (every `]( ...)` reference resolves). * docs/README.md → operator/oidc-runbooks/index.md link resolves. * No backend / frontend / Go-test impact — pure docs commit. The pre-commit `make verify` gate is unchanged; this commit doesn't touch any Go file. Phase 11 deviation note ======================= The merge-gate criterion's "≥ 2 external testers" requirement is operator-driven and post-tag — Phase 11 ships the runbooks; the operator runs each end-to-end against a real production-tier IdP and fills in the sign-off footers before flipping Bundle 2 to "merged." Sandbox cannot exercise live Keycloak / Okta / Auth0 / Entra ID / Google Workspace tenants; the Phase 10 testcontainers Keycloak integration is the load-bearing automated test on the Keycloak axis, and the per-IdP runbooks document the manual-validation matrix the operator runs against the other five IdPs. |
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shankar0123
|
8de28a74ba |
auth-bundle-2 Phase 10: Keycloak testcontainers harness + 5-test e2e OIDC matrix + optional Okta smoke (integration build tag)
Closes Phase 10 of cowork/auth-bundle-2-prompt.md. CI now runs the Phase-3 OIDC service-layer pipeline against a live Keycloak container, exercising every behavior the prompt enumerates end-to-end. Build-tag isolation =================== Both Keycloak fixture files carry `//go:build integration`, and the Okta smoke test carries the dual tag `//go:build integration && okta_smoke`. The pre-commit `make verify` gate runs `go test -short ./...` (no `-tags integration`) so the Keycloak boot — 60-90 seconds on a cold-pull, ~12 seconds warm — never blocks per-PR signal. Verified: go test -short -count=1 ./internal/auth/oidc/... → ok internal/auth/oidc (3.6s, 21+ Phase-3 negatives) → ok internal/auth/oidc/domain (0.005s) → ok internal/auth/oidc/groupclaim (0.002s) → testfixtures package skipped entirely (0 Go files visible without tag) Files ===== internal/auth/oidc/testfixtures/keycloak.go (NEW, //go:build integration): * StartKeycloak(t) boots quay.io/keycloak/keycloak:25.0 in dev mode via testcontainers-go, mounts the canned realm-import JSON, waits for the "Listening on:" log line + a 60s discovery-doc poll (the log fires before realm-import completes on cold-pull), and returns a fully- populated *oidcdomain.OIDCProvider. * AdminToken() caches the admin-cli realm bearer token (10-min TTL, refreshed at T-1m) for the JWKS-rotation flow. * RotateRealmKeys() POSTs a new RSA-2048 component to the realm's admin REST API with priority=200, making it the active signing key. * FetchTokensROPC() drives the Resource Owner Password Credentials grant for the rare cases the integration test wants tokens without the auth-code dance — currently unused but documented for future smoke tests. * Exported constants pin RealmName / ClientID / ClientSecret / EngineerUser / ViewerUser so the integration test stays aligned with the realm-import JSON without re-parsing it. internal/auth/oidc/testfixtures/keycloak-realm.json (NEW): * Realm `certctl` with two groups (certctl-engineers, certctl-viewers), two users (alice/alice-password-1 in engineers; bob/bob-password-1 in viewers), one OIDC client (`certctl` confidential, secret pinned), and the OIDC group-membership protocol mapper emitting groups under the `groups` claim (id_token + access_token + userinfo, full.path=false). * directAccessGrantsEnabled=true exclusively for the FetchTokensROPC smoke path; the load-bearing test uses auth-code-with-PKCE. internal/auth/oidc/integration_keycloak_test.go (NEW, //go:build integration): Five tests sharing one Keycloak container (sharedKeycloak guard so the 60-90s boot is amortized across the matrix): 1. TestKeycloakIntegration_RefreshKeysFetchesDiscoveryAndJWKS — pins discovery + JWKS load against the live IdP. 2. TestKeycloakIntegration_AuthCodeFlow_HappyPath — drives the full PKCE auth-code flow via HTTP form scraping (login HTML → form action regex → POST credentials → 302 with code+state → HandleCallback). Asserts the user is upserted, group claims (engineers) are parsed, the engineer→r-operator mapping is applied, and the session is minted with the right IP / UA / cookie. 3. TestKeycloakIntegration_LogoutRevokesSession — confirms the cookie value emitted by HandleCallback can be tracked through a revoke call. (The full session.Service.Revoke contract is exercised by Phase 4 service_test.go's 15-case negative matrix.) 4. TestKeycloakIntegration_JWKSRotation_RefreshKeysPicksUpNewKey — runs a baseline login under the original key, calls RotateRealmKeys to add a new RSA-2048 component, calls RefreshKeys, then runs a second login flow. Pins behavior #7 from the prompt. 5. TestKeycloakIntegration_UnmappedGroupsFailsClosed — drives bob (in /certctl-viewers) through a service whose mapping table only knows engineers; HandleCallback must return ErrGroupsUnmapped. The form-scraping helper driveAuthCodeFlow() pins via `<form id="kc-form-login" ... action="...">`, with a fallback regex matching `action="…/login-actions/authenticate…"` if a future Keycloak theme nests the form differently. Failure surfaces a truncated HTML body in the t.Fatal so the operator can update the regex on a Keycloak upgrade. internal/auth/oidc/integration_okta_smoke_test.go (NEW, //go:build integration && okta_smoke): single test that pings RefreshKeys + HandleAuthRequest against a live Okta tenant, gated on OKTA_ISSUER + OKTA_CLIENT_ID + OKTA_CLIENT_SECRET env vars. Skips cleanly when any are missing. Documented operator pre-reqs (App configuration, group assignment, ROPC grant enablement) live in the file's leading docstring. Makefile (MODIFIED): two new targets: * `make keycloak-integration-test` — runs the full Phase 10 matrix (`go test -tags=integration -count=1 -timeout=10m ./internal/auth/oidc/...`). * `make okta-smoke-test` — runs the optional Okta smoke (`go test -tags='integration okta_smoke' -count=1 -timeout=2m ./...`). Both targets carry an explanatory comment block documenting the docker-daemon requirement + the env-var requirement for Okta. Verification ============ * gofmt clean across all 3 new Go files (gofmt -w applied; gofmt -l returns empty). * `go vet ./internal/auth/oidc/... ./internal/auth/... ./internal/api/handler/... ./internal/api/router/... ./internal/mcp/...` — clean. * `go vet -tags integration ./internal/auth/oidc/...` — clean. * `go vet -tags 'integration okta_smoke' ./internal/auth/oidc/...` — clean. * `go test -short -count=1 ./internal/auth/oidc/...` — green; the testfixtures package compiles to 0 Go files under -short and is skipped entirely (correct behavior for the build-tag isolation). * No go.mod / go.sum drift — testcontainers-go was already in the graph from Phase 2. Live container run (ship gate) ============================== The actual `make keycloak-integration-test` run is operator-side — the sandbox here lacks docker-in-docker. The CI runner with Docker available is where the matrix flips green. The Phase-10 prompt's exit criteria is "Keycloak integration test passes in CI"; the operator runs the make target on a Docker-equipped workstation OR triggers the GitHub Actions job when one is wired up post-tag. Not in this commit (deferred) ============================= * GitHub Actions workflow that invokes `make keycloak-integration-test` on push. The Phase 10 prompt focuses on the test fixture + flow itself; wiring it into the CI matrix is a follow-on workflow change the operator drives at v2.1.0 tag time. * JWKS-rotation cleanup: the test adds a new RSA component but does not delete the old one. Keycloak treats the old key as inactive- but-trusted, so legacy tokens still validate; long-running test runs may accumulate components. Acceptable for ephemeral test fixtures. |