Merge Fix 01 (CRIT A-1): close HIGH-10 lying field — EffectivePermissions reads actor-role scope

2026-06-07 19:21:29 +00:00 · 2026-05-11 11:16:00 +00:00
parent 191384c1d2 a123263498
commit 027a5a1468
4 changed files with 444 additions and 12 deletions
@@ -2,6 +2,26 @@

 ## Unreleased

+### Security (BREAKING — silent-elevation closure)
+
+- **HIGH-10 actor-role scope is now enforced (Audit 2026-05-11 A-1).**
+  Pre-fix, `actor_roles.scope_type` / `scope_id` (added in migration 000043
+  by the HIGH-10 closure) were persisted by Grant + accepted on the handler
+  body + surfaced through the GUI/MCP — but the load-bearing
+  `EffectivePermissions` SQL never read them. A profile-scoped grant
+  silently elevated to global at authorization time. Canonical CRIT-5
+  lying-field shape, replicated. **The post-fix authorization narrows
+  correctly**: every existing `actor_roles` row with `scope_type != 'global'`
+  now takes effect.
+
+  > **Operator advisory:** if you used the HIGH-10 scope-bound role-grant
+  > API between commit `551812b` and the v2.1.0 tag (the column was
+  > populated but ignored), the grants were silently global. After
+  > upgrading, audit `SELECT actor_id, role_id, scope_type, scope_id FROM
+  > actor_roles WHERE scope_type != 'global'` and confirm the narrowing
+  > reflects intent. If an actor was granted a scoped role but expected
+  > global behavior, re-grant with `scope_type=global`.
+
 ### Security (BREAKING)

 - **`__Host-` cookie prefix on all three auth cookies (Audit 2026-05-10 MED-14).**
@@ -335,8 +335,13 @@ func NewActorRoleRepository(db *sql.DB) *ActorRoleRepository {
 }

 func (r *ActorRoleRepository) ListByActor(ctx context.Context, actorID string, actorType authdomain.ActorTypeValue, tenantID string) ([]*authdomain.ActorRole, error) {
+	// Audit 2026-05-11 A-1 — include scope_type + scope_id in the
+	// SELECT so the GUI / MCP surface can render which scope an
+	// actor's grant is bound to. Pre-fix, these columns were
+	// persisted by Grant (HIGH-10 closure) but never surfaced on
+	// read — operators couldn't see what they configured.
 	rows, err := r.db.QueryContext(ctx, `
-		SELECT id, actor_id, actor_type, role_id, granted_at, expires_at, granted_by, tenant_id
+		SELECT id, actor_id, actor_type, role_id, granted_at, expires_at, granted_by, tenant_id, scope_type, scope_id
 		FROM actor_roles
 		WHERE actor_id = $1 AND actor_type = $2 AND tenant_id = $3
 		ORDER BY granted_at
@@ -349,7 +354,7 @@ func (r *ActorRoleRepository) ListByActor(ctx context.Context, actorID string, a

 func (r *ActorRoleRepository) ListByRole(ctx context.Context, roleID string) ([]*authdomain.ActorRole, error) {
 	rows, err := r.db.QueryContext(ctx, `
-		SELECT id, actor_id, actor_type, role_id, granted_at, expires_at, granted_by, tenant_id
+		SELECT id, actor_id, actor_type, role_id, granted_at, expires_at, granted_by, tenant_id, scope_type, scope_id
 		FROM actor_roles
 		WHERE role_id = $1
 		ORDER BY granted_at
@@ -468,15 +473,55 @@ func (r *ActorRoleRepository) AdminExists(ctx context.Context, tenantID string)
 }

 func (r *ActorRoleRepository) EffectivePermissions(ctx context.Context, actorID string, actorType authdomain.ActorTypeValue, tenantID string) ([]repository.EffectivePermission, error) {
+	// Audit 2026-05-11 A-1 — effective scope is the intersection of
+	// the actor-role's scope (ar.scope_*) AND the role-permission's
+	// scope (rp.scope_*). Pre-fix, only rp.scope_* was read; an
+	// actor granted r-operator scoped to profile=p-prod silently
+	// got every r-operator permission at every scope rp emitted
+	// (typically global), defeating HIGH-10's per-actor scope knob.
+	//
+	// Matching rules (the inner CASE encodes them):
+	//
+	//   ar.scope    rp.scope    effective_scope
+	//   ─────────   ─────────   ──────────────────────
+	//   global      global      global / NULL
+	//   global      profile=X   profile=X      (rp narrows)
+	//   profile=X   global      profile=X      (ar narrows)
+	//   profile=X   profile=X   profile=X      (both agree)
+	//   profile=X   profile=Y   ROW DROPPED    (disjoint scopes — no permission flows)
+	//   profile=X   issuer=*    ROW DROPPED    (scope-type mismatch)
+	//
+	// The HAVING-style filter is implemented via a subquery — Postgres
+	// doesn't allow referencing a CASE alias from HAVING in a SELECT
+	// DISTINCT context without a wrapping CTE.
 	rows, err := r.db.QueryContext(ctx, `
-		SELECT DISTINCT p.name, rp.scope_type, rp.scope_id
-		FROM actor_roles ar
-		JOIN role_permissions rp ON rp.role_id = ar.role_id
-		JOIN permissions p ON p.id = rp.permission_id
-		WHERE ar.actor_id = $1
-		  AND ar.actor_type = $2
-		  AND ar.tenant_id = $3
-		  AND (ar.expires_at IS NULL OR ar.expires_at > NOW())
+		SELECT DISTINCT permission_name, effective_scope_type, effective_scope_id
+		FROM (
+			SELECT
+				p.name AS permission_name,
+				CASE
+					WHEN ar.scope_type = 'global' AND rp.scope_type = 'global' THEN 'global'
+					WHEN ar.scope_type = 'global' THEN rp.scope_type
+					WHEN rp.scope_type = 'global' THEN ar.scope_type
+					WHEN ar.scope_type = rp.scope_type AND ar.scope_id IS NOT DISTINCT FROM rp.scope_id THEN ar.scope_type
+					ELSE NULL
+				END AS effective_scope_type,
+				CASE
+					WHEN ar.scope_type = 'global' AND rp.scope_type = 'global' THEN NULL
+					WHEN ar.scope_type = 'global' THEN rp.scope_id
+					WHEN rp.scope_type = 'global' THEN ar.scope_id
+					WHEN ar.scope_type = rp.scope_type AND ar.scope_id IS NOT DISTINCT FROM rp.scope_id THEN ar.scope_id
+					ELSE NULL
+				END AS effective_scope_id
+			FROM actor_roles ar
+			JOIN role_permissions rp ON rp.role_id = ar.role_id
+			JOIN permissions p ON p.id = rp.permission_id
+			WHERE ar.actor_id = $1
+			  AND ar.actor_type = $2
+			  AND ar.tenant_id = $3
+			  AND (ar.expires_at IS NULL OR ar.expires_at > NOW())
+		) AS intersected
+		WHERE effective_scope_type IS NOT NULL
 	`, actorID, string(actorType), tenantID)
 	if err != nil {
 		return nil, fmt.Errorf("actorRole.effective: %w", err)
@@ -505,9 +550,16 @@ func scanActorRoles(rows *sql.Rows) ([]*authdomain.ActorRole, error) {
 	var out []*authdomain.ActorRole
 	for rows.Next() {
 		var ar authdomain.ActorRole
-		var actorType string
+		var actorType, scopeType string
 		var expires sql.NullTime
-		if err := rows.Scan(&ar.ID, &ar.ActorID, &actorType, &ar.RoleID, &ar.GrantedAt, &expires, &ar.GrantedBy, &ar.TenantID); err != nil {
+		var scopeID sql.NullString
+		// Audit 2026-05-11 A-1 — scope_type + scope_id are persisted
+		// by Grant (HIGH-10 closure, migration 000043). Pre-fix they
+		// were never scanned, so callers received ActorRole with
+		// zero-value scope fields regardless of what the row held.
+		// EffectivePermissions narrowing depends on these being
+		// populated correctly.
+		if err := rows.Scan(&ar.ID, &ar.ActorID, &actorType, &ar.RoleID, &ar.GrantedAt, &expires, &ar.GrantedBy, &ar.TenantID, &scopeType, &scopeID); err != nil {
 			return nil, fmt.Errorf("actorRole scan: %w", err)
 		}
 		ar.ActorType = authdomain.ActorTypeValue(actorType)
@@ -515,6 +567,11 @@ func scanActorRoles(rows *sql.Rows) ([]*authdomain.ActorRole, error) {
 			t := expires.Time
 			ar.ExpiresAt = &t
 		}
+		ar.ScopeType = authdomain.ScopeType(scopeType)
+		if scopeID.Valid {
+			s := scopeID.String
+			ar.ScopeID = &s
+		}
 		out = append(out, &ar)
 	}
 	return out, rows.Err()
@@ -0,0 +1,305 @@
+package postgres_test
+
+// Audit 2026-05-11 A-1 closure — EffectivePermissions scope-intersection
+// regression matrix. Pre-fix, the SQL only narrowed by role-permission
+// scope (rp.scope_*); actor-role scope (ar.scope_*) was ignored. An
+// operator who scope-granted Alice `r-operator` to `profile=p-prod`
+// silently elevated Alice to `r-operator` globally. Same shape as the
+// original CRIT-5 lying field, replicated in the load-bearing auth
+// check path.
+//
+// These tests exercise the SQL change in isolation against a real
+// Postgres container. They cover the six effective-scope cases the
+// fix encodes (see the EffectivePermissions SQL comment block):
+//
+//   ar.scope    rp.scope    expected_effective
+//   ─────────   ─────────   ──────────────────────────
+//   global      global      global / NULL
+//   global      profile=X   profile=X      (rp narrows)
+//   profile=X   global      profile=X      (ar narrows)
+//   profile=X   profile=X   profile=X      (both agree)
+//   profile=X   profile=Y   ROW DROPPED    (disjoint)
+//   profile=X   issuer=*    ROW DROPPED    (scope-type mismatch)
+
+import (
+	"context"
+	"testing"
+
+	authdomain "github.com/certctl-io/certctl/internal/domain/auth"
+	"github.com/certctl-io/certctl/internal/repository/postgres"
+)
+
+// seedRoleWithPerm creates a role with one permission grant at the
+// supplied scope and returns the role ID. Helper for the test matrix.
+func seedRoleWithPerm(t *testing.T, ctx context.Context, roleRepo *postgres.RoleRepository, permRepo *postgres.PermissionRepository, roleSuffix, permName string, rpScopeType authdomain.ScopeType, rpScopeID *string) string {
+	t.Helper()
+	roleID := "r-" + roleSuffix
+	role := &authdomain.Role{
+		ID: roleID, Name: "Test " + roleSuffix, Description: "scope-test role", TenantID: authdomain.DefaultTenantID,
+	}
+	if err := roleRepo.Create(ctx, role); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("seed role %s: %v", roleSuffix, err)
+	}
+	// Look up the permission ID (the catalogue is seeded by migrations,
+	// but for net-new test perms we'd need to Create — for this test
+	// we use a perm name from the existing default catalogue).
+	perm, err := permRepo.GetByName(ctx, permName)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("seed perm GetByName %s: %v", permName, err)
+	}
+	rp := &authdomain.RolePermission{
+		RoleID: roleID, PermissionID: perm.ID, ScopeType: rpScopeType, ScopeID: rpScopeID,
+	}
+	if err := roleRepo.AddPermission(ctx, rp); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("seed AddPermission %s/%s: %v", roleSuffix, permName, err)
+	}
+	return roleID
+}
+
+// grantActorRoleAtScope inserts an actor_roles row at the supplied
+// scope. ScopeID nil = global.
+func grantActorRoleAtScope(t *testing.T, ctx context.Context, repo *postgres.ActorRoleRepository, actorID, roleID string, scopeType authdomain.ScopeType, scopeID *string) {
+	t.Helper()
+	ar := &authdomain.ActorRole{
+		ActorID: actorID, ActorType: authdomain.ActorTypeValue("APIKey"), RoleID: roleID,
+		TenantID: authdomain.DefaultTenantID, ScopeType: scopeType, ScopeID: scopeID,
+	}
+	if err := repo.Grant(ctx, ar); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("Grant %s -> %s@%s: %v", actorID, roleID, scopeType, err)
+	}
+}
+
+func ptrStr(s string) *string { return &s }
+
+// effectivePermFor returns the single EffectivePermission for
+// (actor, perm) or nil. Asserts at most one row matches the perm name —
+// the SQL DISTINCT should fold duplicates.
+func effectivePermFor(t *testing.T, ctx context.Context, repo *postgres.ActorRoleRepository, actorID, permName string) (authdomain.ScopeType, *string, bool) {
+	t.Helper()
+	rows, err := repo.EffectivePermissions(ctx, actorID, authdomain.ActorTypeValue("APIKey"), authdomain.DefaultTenantID)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("EffectivePermissions for %s: %v", actorID, err)
+	}
+	for _, r := range rows {
+		if r.PermissionName == permName {
+			return r.ScopeType, r.ScopeID, true
+		}
+	}
+	return "", nil, false
+}
+
+// TestEffectivePermissions_ActorRoleGlobal_RolePermGlobal pins the
+// trivial happy path — both global → effective global.
+func TestEffectivePermissions_ActorRoleGlobal_RolePermGlobal(t *testing.T) {
+	if testing.Short() {
+		t.Skip("integration test in short mode")
+	}
+	db := getTestDB(t).freshSchema(t)
+	ctx := context.Background()
+	roleRepo := postgres.NewRoleRepository(db)
+	permRepo := postgres.NewPermissionRepository(db)
+	actorRepo := postgres.NewActorRoleRepository(db)
+
+	rid := seedRoleWithPerm(t, ctx, roleRepo, permRepo, "ar-a1-globglob", "cert.read", authdomain.ScopeTypeGlobal, nil)
+	grantActorRoleAtScope(t, ctx, actorRepo, "alice-a1-globglob", rid, authdomain.ScopeTypeGlobal, nil)
+
+	st, sid, ok := effectivePermFor(t, ctx, actorRepo, "alice-a1-globglob", "cert.read")
+	if !ok {
+		t.Fatal("expected cert.read in effective permissions")
+	}
+	if st != authdomain.ScopeTypeGlobal {
+		t.Errorf("effective scope_type = %q; want global", st)
+	}
+	if sid != nil {
+		t.Errorf("effective scope_id = %v; want nil", sid)
+	}
+}
+
+// TestEffectivePermissions_ActorRoleGlobal_RolePermProfile pins that
+// rp.scope narrows when ar is global — the permission flows through
+// at the rp scope.
+func TestEffectivePermissions_ActorRoleGlobal_RolePermProfile(t *testing.T) {
+	if testing.Short() {
+		t.Skip("integration test in short mode")
+	}
+	db := getTestDB(t).freshSchema(t)
+	ctx := context.Background()
+	roleRepo := postgres.NewRoleRepository(db)
+	permRepo := postgres.NewPermissionRepository(db)
+	actorRepo := postgres.NewActorRoleRepository(db)
+
+	rid := seedRoleWithPerm(t, ctx, roleRepo, permRepo, "ar-a1-globprof", "cert.read", authdomain.ScopeTypeProfile, ptrStr("p-prod"))
+	grantActorRoleAtScope(t, ctx, actorRepo, "alice-a1-globprof", rid, authdomain.ScopeTypeGlobal, nil)
+
+	st, sid, ok := effectivePermFor(t, ctx, actorRepo, "alice-a1-globprof", "cert.read")
+	if !ok {
+		t.Fatal("expected cert.read in effective permissions")
+	}
+	if st != authdomain.ScopeTypeProfile {
+		t.Errorf("effective scope_type = %q; want profile", st)
+	}
+	if sid == nil || *sid != "p-prod" {
+		t.Errorf("effective scope_id = %v; want p-prod", sid)
+	}
+}
+
+// TestEffectivePermissions_ActorRoleProfile_RolePermGlobal is the
+// load-bearing case the A-1 fix closes: pre-fix, ar.scope was ignored
+// and Alice scoped to profile=p-prod silently got the rp global
+// permission AT GLOBAL SCOPE (i.e. on profile=p-acme too). Post-fix,
+// the effective scope must narrow to ar.scope (profile=p-prod).
+func TestEffectivePermissions_ActorRoleProfile_RolePermGlobal_A1Closure(t *testing.T) {
+	if testing.Short() {
+		t.Skip("integration test in short mode")
+	}
+	db := getTestDB(t).freshSchema(t)
+	ctx := context.Background()
+	roleRepo := postgres.NewRoleRepository(db)
+	permRepo := postgres.NewPermissionRepository(db)
+	actorRepo := postgres.NewActorRoleRepository(db)
+
+	rid := seedRoleWithPerm(t, ctx, roleRepo, permRepo, "ar-a1-profglob", "cert.read", authdomain.ScopeTypeGlobal, nil)
+	grantActorRoleAtScope(t, ctx, actorRepo, "alice-a1-profglob", rid, authdomain.ScopeTypeProfile, ptrStr("p-prod"))
+
+	st, sid, ok := effectivePermFor(t, ctx, actorRepo, "alice-a1-profglob", "cert.read")
+	if !ok {
+		t.Fatal("expected cert.read in effective permissions")
+	}
+	if st != authdomain.ScopeTypeProfile {
+		t.Errorf("A-1 closure regression: effective scope_type = %q; want profile (narrowed to ar.scope)", st)
+	}
+	if sid == nil || *sid != "p-prod" {
+		t.Errorf("A-1 closure regression: effective scope_id = %v; want p-prod (narrowed to ar.scope_id)", sid)
+	}
+}
+
+// TestEffectivePermissions_BothScopedSameTuple_Matches pins that
+// (ar=profile=p-prod, rp=profile=p-prod) collapses to a single
+// matching effective row at profile=p-prod.
+func TestEffectivePermissions_BothScopedSameTuple_Matches(t *testing.T) {
+	if testing.Short() {
+		t.Skip("integration test in short mode")
+	}
+	db := getTestDB(t).freshSchema(t)
+	ctx := context.Background()
+	roleRepo := postgres.NewRoleRepository(db)
+	permRepo := postgres.NewPermissionRepository(db)
+	actorRepo := postgres.NewActorRoleRepository(db)
+
+	rid := seedRoleWithPerm(t, ctx, roleRepo, permRepo, "ar-a1-bothsame", "cert.read", authdomain.ScopeTypeProfile, ptrStr("p-prod"))
+	grantActorRoleAtScope(t, ctx, actorRepo, "alice-a1-bothsame", rid, authdomain.ScopeTypeProfile, ptrStr("p-prod"))
+
+	st, sid, ok := effectivePermFor(t, ctx, actorRepo, "alice-a1-bothsame", "cert.read")
+	if !ok {
+		t.Fatal("expected cert.read in effective permissions")
+	}
+	if st != authdomain.ScopeTypeProfile || sid == nil || *sid != "p-prod" {
+		t.Errorf("matching tuple did not produce profile=p-prod effective row; got (%q, %v)", st, sid)
+	}
+}
+
+// TestEffectivePermissions_BothScopedDifferentIDs_RowDropped pins the
+// disjoint-scope case: ar.profile=p-prod, rp.profile=p-acme → no
+// permission row should appear in the effective set. Pre-A1 fix, the
+// permission flowed through at rp.scope (p-acme) silently.
+func TestEffectivePermissions_BothScopedDifferentIDs_RowDropped(t *testing.T) {
+	if testing.Short() {
+		t.Skip("integration test in short mode")
+	}
+	db := getTestDB(t).freshSchema(t)
+	ctx := context.Background()
+	roleRepo := postgres.NewRoleRepository(db)
+	permRepo := postgres.NewPermissionRepository(db)
+	actorRepo := postgres.NewActorRoleRepository(db)
+
+	rid := seedRoleWithPerm(t, ctx, roleRepo, permRepo, "ar-a1-bothdiff", "cert.read", authdomain.ScopeTypeProfile, ptrStr("p-acme"))
+	grantActorRoleAtScope(t, ctx, actorRepo, "alice-a1-bothdiff", rid, authdomain.ScopeTypeProfile, ptrStr("p-prod"))
+
+	_, _, ok := effectivePermFor(t, ctx, actorRepo, "alice-a1-bothdiff", "cert.read")
+	if ok {
+		t.Error("A-1 closure regression: disjoint scopes (ar=p-prod, rp=p-acme) should NOT produce an effective permission row")
+	}
+}
+
+// TestEffectivePermissions_ScopeTypeMismatch_RowDropped pins the
+// scope-type-disagreement case: ar.profile=p-prod, rp.issuer=iss-x →
+// no permission. Cross-type narrowing is undefined.
+func TestEffectivePermissions_ScopeTypeMismatch_RowDropped(t *testing.T) {
+	if testing.Short() {
+		t.Skip("integration test in short mode")
+	}
+	db := getTestDB(t).freshSchema(t)
+	ctx := context.Background()
+	roleRepo := postgres.NewRoleRepository(db)
+	permRepo := postgres.NewPermissionRepository(db)
+	actorRepo := postgres.NewActorRoleRepository(db)
+
+	rid := seedRoleWithPerm(t, ctx, roleRepo, permRepo, "ar-a1-typemis", "cert.read", authdomain.ScopeTypeIssuer, ptrStr("iss-x"))
+	grantActorRoleAtScope(t, ctx, actorRepo, "alice-a1-typemis", rid, authdomain.ScopeTypeProfile, ptrStr("p-prod"))
+
+	_, _, ok := effectivePermFor(t, ctx, actorRepo, "alice-a1-typemis", "cert.read")
+	if ok {
+		t.Error("A-1 closure regression: scope-type mismatch (ar=profile, rp=issuer) should NOT produce an effective permission row")
+	}
+}
+
+// TestEffectivePermissions_ExpiredGrant_Excluded pins that
+// ar.expires_at < NOW() excludes the grant from the effective set.
+// This worked pre-A1; the test pins it stays correct under the new
+// subquery shape.
+func TestEffectivePermissions_ExpiredGrant_Excluded(t *testing.T) {
+	if testing.Short() {
+		t.Skip("integration test in short mode")
+	}
+	db := getTestDB(t).freshSchema(t)
+	ctx := context.Background()
+	roleRepo := postgres.NewRoleRepository(db)
+	permRepo := postgres.NewPermissionRepository(db)
+	actorRepo := postgres.NewActorRoleRepository(db)
+
+	rid := seedRoleWithPerm(t, ctx, roleRepo, permRepo, "ar-a1-expired", "cert.read", authdomain.ScopeTypeGlobal, nil)
+	// Set an expired grant by post-hoc UPDATE since Grant doesn't accept
+	// past expires_at via the API — we mimic the "grant was made,
+	// expired since" steady state.
+	grantActorRoleAtScope(t, ctx, actorRepo, "alice-a1-expired", rid, authdomain.ScopeTypeGlobal, nil)
+	if _, err := db.ExecContext(ctx, `UPDATE actor_roles SET expires_at = NOW() - INTERVAL '1 hour' WHERE actor_id = $1`, "alice-a1-expired"); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("expire grant: %v", err)
+	}
+
+	_, _, ok := effectivePermFor(t, ctx, actorRepo, "alice-a1-expired", "cert.read")
+	if ok {
+		t.Error("expired grant should not contribute to effective permissions")
+	}
+}
+
+// TestListByActor_ReturnsScopeColumns pins that ar.scope_type / scope_id
+// surface on the read-side ListByActor path. Pre-A1 fix, scanActorRoles
+// didn't read these columns even when the row carried non-default
+// values — operators couldn't see what they configured.
+func TestListByActor_ReturnsScopeColumns(t *testing.T) {
+	if testing.Short() {
+		t.Skip("integration test in short mode")
+	}
+	db := getTestDB(t).freshSchema(t)
+	ctx := context.Background()
+	roleRepo := postgres.NewRoleRepository(db)
+	permRepo := postgres.NewPermissionRepository(db)
+	actorRepo := postgres.NewActorRoleRepository(db)
+
+	rid := seedRoleWithPerm(t, ctx, roleRepo, permRepo, "ar-a1-listscope", "cert.read", authdomain.ScopeTypeGlobal, nil)
+	grantActorRoleAtScope(t, ctx, actorRepo, "alice-a1-listscope", rid, authdomain.ScopeTypeProfile, ptrStr("p-staging"))
+
+	grants, err := actorRepo.ListByActor(ctx, "alice-a1-listscope", authdomain.ActorTypeValue("APIKey"), authdomain.DefaultTenantID)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("ListByActor: %v", err)
+	}
+	if len(grants) != 1 {
+		t.Fatalf("got %d grants; want 1", len(grants))
+	}
+	if grants[0].ScopeType != authdomain.ScopeTypeProfile {
+		t.Errorf("ListByActor scope_type = %q; want profile", grants[0].ScopeType)
+	}
+	if grants[0].ScopeID == nil || *grants[0].ScopeID != "p-staging" {
+		t.Errorf("ListByActor scope_id = %v; want p-staging", grants[0].ScopeID)
+	}
+}
@@ -282,6 +282,56 @@ func TestAuthorizer_SpecificScopeMatchesExactID(t *testing.T) {
 	}
 }

+// Audit 2026-05-11 A-1 — pin that when the SQL narrowed effective set
+// reflects an actor-role-scope-narrowed permission, CheckPermission
+// authorizes only the narrowed scope. This is the unit-level
+// counterpart to TestEffectivePermissions_ActorRoleProfile_RolePermGlobal_A1Closure
+// in internal/repository/postgres/auth_scope_test.go which exercises
+// the actual SQL.
+//
+// Pre-fix, the SQL ignored ar.scope_*, so a profile-scoped grant
+// produced a row with rp.scope (global), and CheckPermission would
+// pass for ANY profile. Post-fix, the SQL narrows the row to
+// (profile, p-prod), and CheckPermission only passes when the
+// request scope matches.
+func TestAuthorizer_ActorRoleProfileScope_OnlyNarrowedScopeAuthorizes_A1(t *testing.T) {
+	r := newFakeActorRoleRepo()
+	scope := "p-prod"
+	// Simulate the post-A-1 SQL emission: actor-role scoped to
+	// profile=p-prod + role-permission scoped global → narrowed
+	// effective row at profile=p-prod.
+	r.perms[actorKey("alice", authdomain.ActorTypeValue(domain.ActorTypeAPIKey))] = []repository.EffectivePermission{
+		{PermissionName: "cert.read", ScopeType: authdomain.ScopeTypeProfile, ScopeID: &scope},
+	}
+	az := NewAuthorizer(r)
+
+	// Request scope matches narrowed grant → authorize.
+	matchID := "p-prod"
+	ok, err := az.CheckPermission(context.Background(), "alice", authdomain.ActorTypeValue(domain.ActorTypeAPIKey), authdomain.DefaultTenantID, "cert.read", authdomain.ScopeTypeProfile, &matchID)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("CheckPermission (matching scope): %v", err)
+	}
+	if !ok {
+		t.Error("A-1: profile-scoped grant must authorize matching profile request")
+	}
+
+	// Different profile → reject (the load-bearing post-fix
+	// behavior). Pre-fix this would have returned true silently.
+	wrongID := "p-acme"
+	ok, _ = az.CheckPermission(context.Background(), "alice", authdomain.ActorTypeValue(domain.ActorTypeAPIKey), authdomain.DefaultTenantID, "cert.read", authdomain.ScopeTypeProfile, &wrongID)
+	if ok {
+		t.Error("A-1 regression: profile-scoped grant must NOT authorize a different profile (the canonical CRIT-5 shape)")
+	}
+
+	// Global request → also reject. A profile-scoped actor-role
+	// grant doesn't elevate to global; same shape as RFC 9700
+	// least-privilege.
+	ok, _ = az.CheckPermission(context.Background(), "alice", authdomain.ActorTypeValue(domain.ActorTypeAPIKey), authdomain.DefaultTenantID, "cert.read", authdomain.ScopeTypeGlobal, nil)
+	if ok {
+		t.Error("A-1: profile-scoped grant must NOT authorize a global request")
+	}
+}
+
 // =============================================================================
 // RoleService tests
 // =============================================================================