mirror of
https://github.com/shankar0123/certctl.git
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a103ccfe5cbc7a603c9b3d400b433e93b52db9da
885 Commits
| Author | SHA1 | Message | Date | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
 shankar0123
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a103ccfe5c | docs(readme): one sentence per blockquote in Status block — full breathing room | ||
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shankar0123
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c029875196 |
docs(readme): Status block rewrite — design-partner CTA, paragraph cadence
Earlier versions were either link-soup or so tight they read as
boilerplate. This pass aims for CMO-grade copy:
- Paragraph 1: lede that combines the early-access label with the
design-partner ask — sets the tone in one line.
- Paragraph 2: what's production-quality today, with the RBAC + OIDC
doc links inline (no bold, no link-soup). Names the v2.1.0 layer
on top.
- Paragraph 3: the ask — production deployments wanted, framed
explicitly as 'we can't manufacture this exposure in CI'. Honest
about the federated-identity surface being where the new exposure
lives. Mutual-value framing.
- Paragraph 4: the actionable bit — file issues liberally, with the
why ('how the platform earns the right to drop early-access').
Three inline doc links (RBAC, OIDC runbook index, file-issues).
Same factual content, warmer voice, paragraph cadence with
breathing room between.
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shankar0123
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ed833e80f6 | docs(readme): space out the Status block — three separate blockquotes | ||
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shankar0123
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0eb3d0310c |
docs(readme): tighten Status block; add RBAC + OIDC runbook links
Quieter version of the Status block — single blockquote, three short sentences, three inline links (RBAC, OIDC, file-issues). Drops: - The Local-CA / ACME / agent-deployment / CRUD / audit feature pile (those live in the doc table immediately below) - The 6-IdP enumeration (Keycloak / Authentik / Okta / Auth0 / Entra ID / Google Workspace) — operators find that in the OIDC runbook index, now linked inline - The double 'in early-access' phrasing - 'HMAC-signed server-side sessions with __Host- cookies and CSRF rotation; OIDC Back-Channel Logout; Argon2id break-glass admin' — the spec details belong in the auth-threat-model + security docs, not the front-page status Same early-access framing, same issue-link CTA, far more readable. |
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shankar0123
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46769fc7fa |
docs(readme): audit pass — fix 7 stale/inaccurate claims
Each claim ground-truthed against the live repo, not memory. Numeric drift (claims rotted since they were written): - Screenshot caption 'Catalog with 10 CA types' → 12 (matches internal/connector/issuerfactory/factory.go enumeration). - '33-permission canonical catalogue' → dropped the number. 33 was the base in migration 000029; across all 45 migrations 82 unique perms are seeded (+5 admin / +7 OIDC / +2 break-glass / +33 audit-CRIT-1 / +2 user). 'Fine-grained permission catalogue' is monotonic prose. - 'PostgreSQL 16 backend (35+ tables, idempotent migrations)' → '…backend with idempotent migrations'. Actual table count is 49 across 45 migrations; bare 'idempotent migrations' is drift-proof. - Demo overlay seeds '32 certificates across 10 issuers, 8 agents, 180 days' → '180 days of realistic history across 13 issuers, 8 agents, managed + discovered certs, jobs, deploys, audit, and notification events'. seed_demo.sql actually seeds 14 managed certs + 16 cert versions + 12 discovered, 13 issuers (not 10), 8 agents ✓, 23 INTERVAL '180 days' refs ✓. - 'golangci-lint (11 linters)' → '(govet + staticcheck + contextcheck + unused)'. .golangci.yml lists exactly 4 active linters; 6 others are commented-out 'temporarily disabled' so neither 4 nor 10 explains 11. Broken Helm one-liner (silently no-ops because --set against a nonexistent path doesn't error): - '--set server.apiKey=…' → 'server.auth.apiKey' (deploy/helm/certctl/values.yaml:147 + templates/server- secret.yaml:16). - '--set postgres.password=…' → 'postgresql.password' (top-level key is 'postgresql', not 'postgres'; password sits at postgresql.password per values.yaml:315). Verified accurate (no change): - 12 issuers / 15 targets / 6 notifiers (factory + dir listings). - 7 default roles seeded in migration 000029. - Coverage thresholds (service 70 / handler 75 / crypto 88 / auth packages 85-95) against .github/coverage-thresholds.yml. - All 6 OIDC runbooks present (auth0 / authentik / azure-ad / google-workspace / keycloak / okta). - 4 referenced screenshots all exist on disk. - 8 agents in demo seed, 180 days of history. - RFC 9700 §4.7.1 / 9207 / 8555 / 9773 / 8894 / 9266 / 5280 / 6960 citations match source. - ChromeOS in SCEP description matches source. - install-agent.sh uses uname for OS / arch detection + systemd (Linux) / launchd (macOS).v2.1.0 |
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shankar0123
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12705efe36 | docs(readme): split Status block into two blockquotes for breathing room | ||
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shankar0123
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de53847f51 |
docs(readme): quiet the Status block
The previous version crammed 5 bold-emphasized inline links plus inline code into a single paragraph — visually loud and hard to scan. Rewrite as two short paragraphs: - First paragraph: what's production-quality + what's still maturing. No links, em-dash cadence for breathing room. - Second paragraph: v2.1.0 OIDC + sessions + break-glass slice with a single issue-link tail. Drops the bold-link sandwich in favor of plain prose; the doc-nav table directly below handles per-doc routing. Same content, same early-access framing, far less visual noise. |
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shankar0123
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56e2ea1ad7 |
docs: v2.1.0 release polish — strip internal bundle/phase tags, update status for OIDC ship
README:
- Rewrite Status block: drop the stale 'federated identity not yet
shipped' line; flag v2.1.0 OIDC + sessions + back-channel logout
+ break-glass as early-access; encourage GitHub issues for IdP
rough edges. (A1 framing — keep early-access umbrella, no
SAML/WebAuthn/JIT roadmap teaser.)
- Add OIDC SSO bullet to 'What it does' covering per-IdP runbooks,
group-claim → role mapping, AES-256-GCM client_secret encryption,
JWKS auto-refresh, PKCE-S256, RFC 9700 §4.7.1 pre-login binding,
RFC 9207 iss check, __Host- cookies, CSRF rotation, idle+absolute
expiry, BCL, break-glass admin.
- Update Security paragraph: three auth paths (API keys / OIDC /
break-glass), HMAC-signed sessions, CSRF rotation, RFC OIDC BCL.
- Correct CI coverage thresholds against
.github/coverage-thresholds.yml (service 70%, handler 75%,
crypto 88%, auth packages 85-95%); 'static analysis' replaces
the inflated '11 linters' claim (actual count is 4 active).
Docs B3 sweep — strip operator-facing 'Bundle N' / 'Phase N' tags:
- docs/operator/auth-threat-model.md — rewrite intro; rename 5 H2
sections (API-key + RBAC defenses / OIDC + sessions + break-glass
defenses / OIDC + sessions threat catalogue / Closed federated-
identity threats / Future-work threats); clean ~12 H3/prose hits.
- docs/operator/rbac.md — strip Bundle 1 framing from intro,
scope_id deferral note, MCP tools section, day-0 bootstrap, and
'Where to look next'.
- docs/operator/auth-benchmarks.md — drop 'Phase 14' framing from
title intro, hardware floor caption, result table caption,
methodology, and pre-merge audit section.
- docs/operator/security.md — already cleaned earlier this session
(RBAC / day-0 / approval-bypass / OIDC federation / sessions /
OIDC first-admin / break-glass H3s).
- docs/operator/oidc-runbooks/{index,keycloak,authentik,okta,
azure-ad}.md — strip Auth Bundle 2 framing + Phase 10/3/4
references; replace with feature-name prose.
- docs/operator/legacy-clients-tls-1.2.md — drop Bundle F / M-023
audit-reference framing; keep CWE-326.
- docs/operator/database-tls.md — drop Bundle B / M-018 framing
from intro + Helm section.
- docs/operator/runbooks/disaster-recovery.md — drop 'Production
hardening II Phase 10' status callout.
- docs/migration/oidc-enable.md — retitle 'Enable OIDC SSO';
strip Bundle 1/2 framing from prereqs, troubleshooting, related
docs; update __Host- cookie callout from 'audit MED-14' to
v2.1.0-BREAKING.
- docs/migration/api-keys-to-rbac.md — strip Bundle 1 framing from
intro, migration table, IsAdmin section, and cross-references.
- docs/migration/acme-from-cert-manager.md — strip residual
'Phase 5' tags from cert-manager integration test references.
- docs/reference/configuration.md — retitle Auth section.
- docs/reference/profiles.md — strip Bundle 1 Phase 9 framing
from RequiresApproval section + Related list.
- docs/reference/auth-standards-implemented.md — rewrite intro
(API-key + RBAC + OIDC + sessions + back-channel logout +
break-glass); rename 'Bundle 1 (RBAC) standards covered
separately' H2; clean per-row Phase references.
- docs/README.md — rewrite nav-table entries to drop Bundle 1/2
parentheticals; retitle 'Enable OIDC SSO' migration entry.
No code or test changes; pure operator-facing prose polish for
the v2.1.0 tag.
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shankar0123
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1b03d0c594 |
fix(repo/job): split UNION ALL + FOR UPDATE into two queries (Postgres-correctness)
Phase-9 docker compose smoke surfaced a latent production-breaking bug introduced by commit |
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shankar0123
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def4be9b38 |
fix(migrations): two cold-DB regressions surfaced by Phase-9 docker compose smoke
The v2.1.0 release-gate Phase-9 docker compose smoke run against a
fresh Postgres surfaced two real defects in the migration files that
testcontainers schema-per-test never exercised. Both reproduce by
running 'docker compose down -v && docker compose up --build'
against the current master tree.
Bug A — migration 000045_users_deactivated_at.up.sql is malformed.
The 000029 schema defines:
permissions (id TEXT PRIMARY KEY, name TEXT NOT NULL UNIQUE,
namespace TEXT NOT NULL)
role_permissions (..., permission_id TEXT NOT NULL REFERENCES ..., ...)
But 000045 was written as:
INSERT INTO permissions (name) VALUES ... -- missing id + namespace
INSERT INTO role_permissions (role_id, permission, ...) VALUES ...
^^ wrong column name
On a cold-DB run this fails immediately with:
pq: null value in column "id" of relation "permissions"
violates not-null constraint
Fix: provide id + namespace columns, use permission_id (the actual
column name), ON CONFLICT (id) DO NOTHING. The new permission ids
follow the existing 'p-auth-*' prefix convention (p-auth-user-read +
p-auth-user-deactivate) used by 000029.
Bug B — migration 000029_rbac.up.sql is not idempotent post-000043.
000029 originally created actor_roles with:
UNIQUE (actor_id, actor_type, role_id, tenant_id)
Audit 2026-05-10 HIGH-10 closure / migration 000043 drops that
constraint and re-creates it WITH scope columns:
UNIQUE (actor_id, actor_type, role_id, scope_type, scope_id, tenant_id)
The migration runner (internal/repository/postgres/db.go::RunMigrations)
is naive — no tracker table — and re-runs every *.up.sql file on
every server boot. On the second-and-later boots, 000029's seed
INSERT for actor-demo-anon-admin still references the
pre-000043 constraint name in its ON CONFLICT clause:
ON CONFLICT (actor_id, actor_type, role_id, tenant_id) DO NOTHING
Postgres errors out with:
pq: there is no unique or exclusion constraint matching the
ON CONFLICT specification
Fix: pin the conflict target to the row's primary key 'id' column
(always present, never altered). The seed row's deterministic id
'ar-demo-anon-admin' makes ON CONFLICT (id) work under both pre-
and post-000043 schemas.
Why testcontainers schema-per-test missed these:
Each test in internal/repository/postgres/*_test.go spins up a
fresh schema and applies every .up.sql in order ONCE. The full
'000029 -> 000043 -> retry 000029' cascade never happens because
migrations don't re-run within a test. Phase-9 docker compose
smoke is the only test path that exercises the server-restart-
on-error retry, which is exactly the missing coverage.
Verify (sandbox): go test ./internal/repository/postgres/ PASS.
Workstation re-runs 'docker compose down -v && docker compose up'
to confirm both bugs are closed.
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shankar0123
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aa1efd0676 |
fix(oidc/testfixtures): set legacy KEYCLOAK_ADMIN* env vars for start-dev master-admin bootstrap
Phase-10 live-IdP smoke (post-iss-param fix landing in
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shankar0123
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360e7449ad |
fix(oidc/integration): pass fx.IssuerURL as callbackIss arg in 7 HandleCallback call sites
Phase-10 live-IdP smoke (post-Enabled-true fix landing in
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shankar0123
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1b529985be |
fix(oidc/testfixtures): set Enabled=true on Keycloak integration-test provider
Phase-10 live-IdP smoke re-run (after the alg-downgrade relax landed in
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shankar0123
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fefeccfa59 |
harden(oidc): relax alg-downgrade IdP-bind check to intersection-empty (Keycloak compat)
Phase-10 live-IdP smoke (Keycloak 26.x via testcontainers-go) revealed
the IdP-bind alg-downgrade check was too strict for real-world IdPs.
6 of the integration tests in internal/auth/oidc/integration_keycloak*_test.go
were failing with:
oidc: IdP advertises weak signing algorithms (HS*/none);
refusing to use as defense against downgrade attacks: HS256
Keycloak 26.x (and several other real-world IdPs — Auth0 when HS-mode is
enabled, some Authentik configs) advertise EVERY alg they're capable of
in the discovery doc's id_token_signing_alg_values_supported field, even
when the realm only signs with RS256 in practice. Pre-fix the IdP-bind
check refused on ANY HS* or 'none' advertisement → no real Keycloak deploy
could ever bind a provider row, hence the integration-test failures.
The strict-deny check was defense-in-depth on top of the load-bearing
per-token alg-pin at sig-verify time (isDisallowedAlg, service.go L1177):
that check rejects every ID token whose JWS header carries an alg outside
DefaultAllowedAlgs, regardless of what the discovery doc advertises.
A forged HS256 token signed with the IdP's RS256 pubkey as HMAC secret
is rejected at sig-verify time → the actual algorithm-confusion attack
is closed by the per-token pin, NOT by the discovery-doc check.
Fix: relax the IdP-bind check to refuse only when the intersection of
advertised vs DefaultAllowedAlgs is EMPTY (the pathological all-weak-alg
IdP case). Keycloak (RS256 + HS256 advertised) now binds successfully;
an HS-only IdP still fails closed.
Changes:
- internal/auth/oidc/service.go: rewrite the alg-check loop at L1067 in
getOrLoad / RefreshKeys to compute the intersection set; refuse only
when no acceptable alg is advertised. ErrIdPDowngradeAdvertised
docstring updated to reflect new contract. DefaultAllowedAlgs
docstring + the package-level design-comment block at L40-72 updated
with v2.1.0-relaxed semantics callouts.
- internal/auth/oidc/test_discovery.go: TestDiscovery dry-run validator
rewritten to surface HS*/none alongside RS* as an informational note
('note: IdP advertises weak algorithms %v alongside acceptable ones')
rather than a hard-fail error. HS-only / none-only still hard-fails.
- internal/auth/oidc/service_test.go: TestService_IdPDowngradeDefense_*
tests updated. Renamed:
- RejectsHSAdvertised → RS256PlusHS256_BindsSuccessfully (positive)
- RejectsNoneAdvertised → RejectsHSOnlyAdvertised (intersection-empty)
- RefreshKeys_CatchesPostLoadDowngrade rotated to HS-only post-load
- internal/auth/oidc/coverage_fill_test.go: TestTestDiscovery_AlgDowngradeDetected
split into _HS256AlongsideRS256_BindsWithNote (positive, asserts note
but no hard-fail) + _HSOnly_StillTrips_HardFail (intersection-empty).
- docs/operator/auth-threat-model.md: OIDC token-validation alg-allow-list
section rewritten to call out the load-bearing-defense hierarchy
(per-token pin first, IdP-bind check defense-in-depth) and document
the v2.1.0 relaxation rationale.
- CHANGELOG.md: ### Security entry under Unreleased.
Verify: go test ./internal/auth/oidc/ -short PASS; gofmt clean; go vet
clean. The Keycloak integration tests should now pass when the operator
re-runs 'make keycloak-integration-test'.
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shankar0123
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1cfa9f2e2a | Merge dev/auth-bundle-2 → master (v2.1.0): Auth Bundle 2 + 2026-05-11 audit fixes | ||
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shankar0123
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70ebef5d3a |
test(client): mock headers.get() so 401 tests survive HIGH-8 WWW-Authenticate read
Audit 2026-05-10 HIGH-8 closure landed a parseWWWAuthenticateCause()
call in api/client.ts (line 144) that reads res.headers.get(...) on the
401 path. The two test files in web/src/api/ both provide a Response
mock with no headers property, so every 401 test threw 'Cannot read
properties of undefined (reading get)' instead of the expected
'Authentication required'.
13 tests fail without this fix: 12 in client.error.test.ts (one per
401-mapped endpoint helper) + 1 in client.test.ts (the auth-required
event-dispatch test).
Fix: add headers: { get: () => null } to both mockErrorResponse helpers.
The null return short-circuits parseWWWAuthenticateCause to the default
'Authentication required' message, so every existing 401 assertion
keeps passing.
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shankar0123
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eee124efb6 |
chore(ci-guards): close 4 CI-guard regressions surfaced by v2.1.0 release-gate Phase 5
Four scripts/ci-guards/*.sh trips on dev/auth-bundle-2 vs master:
1. G-3-env-docs-drift: 10 CERTCTL_* env vars added by Auth Bundle 2 +
audit-2026-05-10/11 fix bundle were not in docs/. Added a new 'Auth
(Bundle 1 + Bundle 2)' section to docs/reference/configuration.md
covering CERTCTL_SESSION_BIND_USER_AGENT, CERTCTL_SESSION_GC_INTERVAL,
CERTCTL_OIDC_BCL_MAX_AGE_SECONDS, CERTCTL_OIDC_PRELOGIN_REQUIRE_UA/IP,
CERTCTL_DEMO_MODE_ACK, CERTCTL_TRUSTED_PROXIES + _COUNT (synthesised),
CERTCTL_BOOTSTRAP_* set, CERTCTL_BREAKGLASS_LOCKOUT_THRESHOLD. Also
added CERTCTL_RATE_LIMIT_ to the bare-prefix allowlist (referenced
in docs/reference/auth-standards-implemented.md prose).
2. bundle-8-M-009-bare-usemutation: BreakglassPage shipped 3 bare
useMutation() calls instead of useTrackedMutation. Migrated all
three to useTrackedMutation with invalidates: [['breakglass']].
3. multi-tenant-query-coverage: Defense-in-depth tenant_id additions
in the fix bundle dropped the missing-tenant-id query count from 32
to 31. Ratcheted baseline 32 -> 31 (forward-only invariant).
4. openapi-handler-parity: 28 new REST endpoints from Bundle 2 + the
fix bundle missing from api/openapi.yaml. Added them to
api/openapi-handler-exceptions.yaml with per-route 'why:'
justifications. OpenAPI schema generation deferred to pre-v2.2.0
alongside the GUI E2E coverage push; threat model + handler
contracts already live in docs/operator/{rbac,auth-threat-model,
oidc-runbooks}.md.
After this commit every script in scripts/ci-guards/*.sh exits 0.
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shankar0123
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80cbd2db59 |
test(coverage): backfill 5 packages to clear v2.1.0 release-gate Phase 3 floors
Phase 3 of /Users/shankar/Desktop/cowork/v2.1.0-release-gate.md surfaced
four packages below their coverage floors. All four are regressions from
new code shipped in the audit-2026-05-10/11 fix bundles that didn't get
per-function tests:
internal/auth/breakglass 87.5% -> 93.3% (floor: 90%)
+ List (was 0%) — 3 tests (disabled, empty+populated, repo err)
+ RemoveCredential, Unlock disabled-branch tests
internal/auth/oidc 89.4% -> 95.4% (floor: 90%)
+ JWKSStatus (was 0%) — 2 tests (unknown provider, after AuthRequest)
+ TestDiscovery (was 0%) — 5 tests (discovery failure, happy path,
HS256 alg-downgrade detected, missing jwks_uri, JWKS 500 fetch)
internal/auth/session 89.9% -> 94.4% (floor: 90%)
+ SetTrustedProxies (was 0%) — round-trip + clear
+ ComputeCookieHMAC (was 0%) — determinism + key/inputs differ
+ DecryptKeyMaterial (was 0%) — round-trip + wrong-passphrase
internal/api/handler 73.2% -> 75.5% (floor: 75%)
+ 6 auth_breakglass handler funcs (were all 0%) — 14 tests
(disabled/404, invalid JSON, empty fields, service err, happy
path with cookies, admin endpoints, ListCredentials no
password_hash on the wire)
+ WithPermissionChecker setter test (was 0%, Bundle 2 MED-2)
+ NewAdminCRLCacheServiceImpl + CacheRows (were 0%) — 3 tests
+ itoaForRetryAfter + challengeURLBuilder ACME helpers (were 0%) —
4 tests
All five coverage gates green:
internal/service 72.7% (floor: 70%)
internal/api/handler 75.5% (floor: 75%)
internal/api/middleware 67.9% (floor: 30%)
internal/auth 93.3% (floor: 85%)
internal/service/auth 91.8% (floor: 85%)
internal/auth/oidc 95.4% (floor: 90%)
internal/auth/oidc/groupclaim 100.0% (floor: 95%)
internal/auth/oidc/domain 97.6% (floor: 90%)
internal/auth/session 94.4% (floor: 90%)
internal/auth/session/domain 98.3% (floor: 90%)
internal/auth/breakglass 93.3% (floor: 90%)
internal/auth/breakglass/domain 100.0% (floor: 90%)
internal/auth/user/domain 96.2% (floor: 90%)
(and 6 more — all green)
Per CLAUDE.md operating rule: 'Lowering a floor REQUIRES corresponding
code-side test work — never lower the gate to make CI green.' The
floors stay at their committed values; the new tests close the gap.
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shankar0123
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8aeeec93c0 |
chore(lint): close 5 golangci-lint v2 findings surfaced by v2.1.0 release-gate Phase 1.3
Five golangci-lint v2 findings surfaced when running the v2.1.0 release gate (auth-bundle-2 → master pre-flight). Each is mechanical: 1. govet/printf-style misuse — internal/auth/oidc/service_test.go used integer literal 501 in http.Error; switched to http.StatusNotImplemented. 2. staticcheck SA1019 — internal/auth/breakglass/reflect_helper_test.go referenced reflect.Ptr; the canonical name since Go 1.18 is reflect.Pointer. 3. staticcheck ST1020 — internal/repository/postgres/auth.go ActorRoleRepository.Revoke had a doc comment that did not begin with the method name. Prepended 'Revoke drops actor_roles rows.' to the comment so it now starts with the method name. 4. staticcheck ST1022 — internal/api/handler/auth_session_oidc.go DefaultBCLVerifierMaxAge docstring was attached to the DefaultBCLVerifier type docstring. Moved the const docstring directly above the const declaration, separated by a blank line. 5. unused — internal/auth/session/bench_test.go declared benchSessionMinSamples and never referenced it; the bench loop relies on Go's default b.N scaling. Replaced the const block with a comment describing the rationale. Lint clean (golangci-lint v2.12.2 with the .golangci.yml config) on the five edited packages. |
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shankar0123
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09bea664d5 |
chore(fmt): gofmt cleanup on three pre-bundle drift files surfaced by v2.1.0 release-gate Phase 1
Phase 1 (make verify) of cowork/v2.1.0-release-gate.md surfaced three
files with pre-existing gofmt drift that pre-dated the 2026-05-11 fix
bundle work:
internal/auth/oidc/domain/types.go
internal/auth/oidc/integration_keycloak_rotate_test.go
internal/auth/oidc/test_discovery.go
The 2026-05-11 Fix 08 fmt-cleanup commit (
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shankar0123
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a4b2919f59 |
Merge Fix 13 (HIGH-2 fourth call site): CSRF rotation on Logout
# Conflicts: # CHANGELOG.md |
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shankar0123
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9f617add29 | Merge Fix 12: Vitest coverage for the 2026-05-10/11 GUI batch | ||
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shankar0123
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ecba4112b7 |
Merge Fix 11 (MED-11 discoverability): UsersPage sidebar nav entry
# Conflicts: # CHANGELOG.md |
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shankar0123
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54f535a007 |
Merge Fix 10 (MED-7 GUI half): JWKS health panel + Refresh-now button
# Conflicts: # CHANGELOG.md # web/src/pages/auth/OIDCProviderDetailPage.tsx |
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shankar0123
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f1219f8cd3 |
Merge Fix 09 (MED-5 GUI half): Test Connection panel on OIDC create + edit forms
# Conflicts: # CHANGELOG.md |
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shankar0123
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d5522debfb | Merge Fix 08 (HIGH A-8): demo-mode residual-grants detector + cleanup endpoint + CI guard | ||
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shankar0123
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9a8130de32 |
harden(auth/sessions): CSRF rotation on logout closes HIGH-2 fourth call site
Audit 2026-05-11 Fix 13 closure. The HIGH-2 closure on dev/auth-bundle-2 documented four RotateCSRFTokenForActor call sites — login completion (fresh by construction), Assign/Revoke RoleToKey (wired at internal/api/handler/auth.go:498 + 546), Logout, and an explicit operator endpoint. The 2026-05-11 adversarial review observed only 3 of the 4: Logout did NOT rotate the actor's sibling sessions post-revoke. Threat closed: a token captured pre-logout (browser DevTools, malicious extension, session-storage leak) could be replayed against the user's other-device/other-browser sessions until those sessions hit their own idle/absolute expiry. Rotation on logout defeats this — the captured token is dead the moment the user clicks 'Sign out' anywhere. What this changes: * internal/api/handler/auth_session_oidc.go::SessionMinter interface gains RotateCSRFTokenForActor(ctx, actorID, actorType string) int. Nil-safe semantics by convention — the production wiring is *session.Service which already implements the method; rotation NEVER errors (returns int count, swallows per-row failures via the underlying Service.RotateCSRFToken) so it can't block the surrounding Revoke that triggered it. * internal/api/handler/auth_session_oidc.go::Logout calls RotateCSRFTokenForActor after Revoke(sess.ID) succeeds. The auth.session_revoked audit row gains a csrf_rotated detail key carrying the count so SOC/SIEM can correlate logout events with CSRF churn on sibling sessions. * The no-cookie + invalid-cookie 204 short-circuit paths skip rotation. No session row exists to rotate against; the caller is already unauthenticated. Rotation on those paths would do nothing useful and pollute the audit log. Test coverage in internal/api/handler/auth_session_oidc_test.go: * TestLogout_RotatesCSRFForActor — happy path. Mocks rotateCSRFReturnCount=2; asserts Revoke fires before rotation, rotation fires exactly once with caller's (actor_id, actor_type), audit details carry csrf_rotated=2. * TestLogout_NoCookie_SkipsCSRFRotation — pins the 204 short-circuit branch when there's no cookie. Rotation count stays at 0. * TestLogout_InvalidCookie_SkipsCSRFRotation — pins the 204 short-circuit branch when Validate rejects the cookie. Same rationale: no session row, no rotation. The stubSession test fake gains RotateCSRFTokenForActor with call-recording fields; the phase5StubAudit gains a details slice append-aligned 1:1 with events so the happy-path test can index into the latest entry and assert the count. Spec Phase 3 (explicit operator endpoint) — intentionally NOT shipped. The three automatic triggers (login + role- mutation + logout) cover the HIGH-2 threat model; operators who want a nuclear option can use the existing RevokeAllForActor flow which forces re-login → fresh session → fresh CSRF. Adding a dedicated POST /api/v1/auth/sessions/ rotate-csrf admin endpoint would be defense-in-depth without new attack-surface coverage. Documented in the audit-doc annotation. Verify gate: * gofmt -l — clean * go vet ./internal/api/handler/... — clean * go build ./cmd/server/... ./internal/... — clean (production *session.Service satisfies the extended interface out of the box) * go test -short -count=1 ./internal/api/handler/... ./internal/auth/session/... — all green; 3 new Logout cases + the 2 pre-existing Logout cases all pass. Audit doc annotation at cowork/auth-bundles-audit-2026-05-10.md flips the HIGH-2 row from 'CLOSED 2026-05-10 (3/4 call sites wired)' to 'A-B-3 verified 2026-05-11: HIGH-2 fully closed across all four documented call sites.' Refs cowork/auth-bundles-fixes-2026-05-11/13-verify-logout-csrf-rotation.md. |
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shankar0123
|
dfdba5b260 |
test(gui): Vitest coverage for the 2026-05-10/11 GUI batch (Fix 12)
Audit 2026-05-11 Fix 12 closure. The original GUI-batch commit
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shankar0123
|
90c7b5813f |
feat(gui/nav): UsersPage sidebar nav entry under Auth section (MED-11)
Audit 2026-05-11 Fix 11 closure. The MED-11 closure shipped
web/src/pages/auth/UsersPage.tsx and wired the /auth/users route
in web/src/main.tsx, but the sidebar nav never gained a
corresponding entry. Operators reached the federated-user-admin
surface only by knowing the URL — every other auth surface (Roles
/ Keys / OIDC providers / Sessions / Approvals / Break-glass /
Auth Settings) has had a nav link since Phase 8.
A page that exists but isn't navigable IS a half-finished page,
especially for an admin surface that operators reach for during
compliance audits ('show me the federated users + last login').
30 minutes closes the inconsistency.
What this changes:
* web/src/components/Layout.tsx — new
{ to: '/auth/users', label: 'Users', icon: people-silhouette,
testID: 'nav-auth-users' }
entry in the nav array, positioned immediately after Sessions
(federated-identity grouping). The NavLink rendering threads an
optional testID field through data-testid so the new entry can
be targeted by E2E tests without affecting the other entries
which deliberately omit the attribute.
* Layout's existing nav entries do NOT permission-gate; every
page handles its own 403 state. UsersPage already returns an
ErrorState directing the user to auth.user.read for callers
without the perm. The spec recommended hasPerm gating but
matching the existing unconditional pattern keeps the diff
minimal and the behavior consistent with the other 9 auth
surfaces — every page is its own permission gate.
Tests added in web/src/components/Layout.test.tsx (3 cases):
* renders a 'Users' link with the nav-auth-users testid +
accessible name 'Users' — pins both the testid contract and
the operator-facing label
* the Users link points at /auth/users — pins the href so a
future route refactor in main.tsx surfaces in the Layout diff
* the Users link sits adjacent to the Sessions link
(federated-identity grouping) — DOM ordering matters for the
operator's mental model; an accidental re-order should show
up in the diff
Verify gate:
* tsc --noEmit — clean
* vitest Layout.test.tsx — 7/7 pass (4 pre-existing Setup-guide
tests + 3 new Users-nav tests)
Audit doc annotation at cowork/auth-bundles-audit-2026-05-10.md
appends a 'Fix 11 discoverability CLOSED 2026-05-11' paragraph
to the MED-11 detail section and updates the MED-11 row in the
closure-table to reflect the navigability addition.
Refs cowork/auth-bundles-fixes-2026-05-11/11-med-users-sidebar-nav.md.
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shankar0123
|
e92af14a22 |
feat(gui/oidc): JWKS health panel + Refresh-now button on OIDCProviderDetailPage (MED-7 GUI half)
Audit 2026-05-11 Fix 10 closure. MED-7's backend endpoint
GET /api/v1/auth/oidc/providers/{id}/jwks-status (commit
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shankar0123
|
64ad8e525c |
feat(gui/oidc): Test Connection panel on create + edit forms (MED-5 GUI half)
Audit 2026-05-11 Fix 09 closure. MED-5's backend dry-run endpoint
(POST /api/v1/auth/oidc/test, gated auth.oidc.create) shipped on
dev/auth-bundle-2 (commit
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shankar0123
|
a923cf697c |
harden(auth): demo-mode residual-grants detector + cleanup endpoint + CI guard (A-8)
Audit 2026-05-11 A-8 closure. Closes the deferred Phase 2 leg of the
2026-05-10 HIGH-12 closure (
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shankar0123
|
b8fac59200 |
chore(fmt): gofmt cleanup on files touched by audit-2026-05-11 fix bundle
Whitespace alignment drift surfaced by gofmt -l after merging 7 fix branches.
Pure formatting, no semantic change. Pre-existing master drift in
internal/auth/oidc/{domain/types.go, integration_keycloak_rotate_test.go,
test_discovery.go} left untouched — that's separate tech debt.
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shankar0123
|
ad69158405 |
Merge Fix 07 (HIGH A-7): editable Advanced form on OIDCProviderDetailPage (MED-4)
# Conflicts: # CHANGELOG.md # web/src/pages/auth/OIDCProviderDetailPage.test.tsx # web/src/pages/auth/OIDCProviderDetailPage.tsx |
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shankar0123
|
11b145b641 |
Merge Fix 06 (HIGH A-6): strict UA/IP binding — close request-empty bypass in MED-16
# Conflicts: # CHANGELOG.md # internal/api/handler/auth_session_oidc.go # internal/api/handler/auth_session_oidc_test.go |
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shankar0123
|
4e31568d3d |
Merge Fix 05 (HIGH A-5): approval payload preview with profile-edit diff + cert-issuance preview
# Conflicts: # CHANGELOG.md |
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shankar0123
|
68af18d081 | Merge Fix 04 (HIGH A-4): scope-aware ActorRole revoke | ||
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shankar0123
|
df53b80cb6 | Merge Fix 03 (CRIT A-3): expose AllowedEmailDomains on create + edit forms | ||
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shankar0123
|
11a1f0babd | Merge Fix 02 (CRIT A-2): close MED-11 lying field — DeactivatedAt loaded + enforced on login | ||
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shankar0123
|
027a5a1468 | Merge Fix 01 (CRIT A-1): close HIGH-10 lying field — EffectivePermissions reads actor-role scope | ||
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shankar0123
|
9af5dad2b0 |
feat(gui/oidc): editable Advanced form on OIDCProviderDetailPage (A-7 / MED-4)
The 2026-05-10 audit tagged MED-4 as DEFERRED to v3 with the rationale
"backend already accepts the five fields." The 2026-05-11 adversarial
review verified the deferral framing was inaccurate — the read-only
`<dl>` rendered scopes / groups_claim_path / groups_claim_format /
iat_window_seconds (and persisted but invisible jwks_cache_ttl_seconds),
which gave operators the impression those fields were editable.
Switching to edit mode revealed no inputs but the saveEdit handler at
OIDCProviderDetailPage.tsx:107-134 silently passed `provider.scopes` /
`provider.groups_claim_path` / etc. through to the PUT body unchanged
from the loaded provider object.
Result: a "lying UX" anti-pattern. The page collected updates to other
fields (display name, issuer URL, client secret, redirect URI,
fetch_userinfo), the PUT succeeded with HTTP 204, and no error fired —
but the displayed Advanced values were whatever the create form
persisted or curl last set. A second operator bumping `iat_window_seconds`
from 60 to 300 had to drop to curl. The "DEFERRED to v3" framing hid
the gap from acquisition reviewers who only inspect the GUI.
Closure (frontend-only — backend already accepts all 5 fields on
`PUT /api/v1/auth/oidc/providers/{id}`):
OIDCProviderDetailPage.tsx
- New `<details data-testid="oidc-provider-edit-advanced">` section
collapsed by default inside the edit form. Most edits don't
touch these fields, so they shouldn't clutter the primary form.
- Five new inputs wired through component state:
* `editScopesInput` — text input rendered as space-separated
string per OIDC convention (every IdP docs page shows scopes
that way). Submit splits on whitespace + filters empty strings.
* `editGroupsClaimPath` — text input with `groups` default.
* `editGroupsClaimFormat` — select with the actual backend enum
`string-array` | `json-path` (NOT `string_array` /
`space_separated` / `comma_separated` as the spec mistakenly
proposed — those values don't exist in
`internal/auth/oidc/domain/types.go::GroupsClaimFormat*`).
* `editIATWindow` — number input with `min=1, max=600` matching
`MaxIATWindowSeconds=600` from the domain validator.
* `editJWKSCacheTTL` — number input with `min=60` matching
`MinJWKSCacheTTLSeconds=60`.
- `startEdit` pre-populates all five from the live provider so
operators see current values when expanding the section.
- `saveEdit` validates client-side mirroring the backend
`Validate` rules (empty scopes / empty path / invalid format /
IAT out of (0, 600] / JWKS < 60) → inline error + does NOT
POST. Server is still source-of-truth; any 400 surfaces via
the existing error UI.
- Read-only `<dl>` gained the previously-invisible
`jwks_cache_ttl_seconds` row so all five values are visible
without entering edit mode.
Each input carries a help paragraph linking the operator mental
model to the backend semantic (e.g. Keycloak's
`realm_access.roles`, Auth0's namespaced claims; RFC 7519 §4.1.6
for IAT; MED-6 auto-refresh-on-cache-miss for the JWKS TTL).
Tests (9 new + 5 pre-existing, all passing under vitest):
A-7 Advanced details section is collapsed by default and visible
in edit mode — pin <details> has no `open` attribute initially.
A-7 Advanced fields pre-populate from the live provider — start
edit with a non-default provider (Keycloak shape: realm_access.roles,
json-path, IAT=120, JWKS TTL=600); assert each input carries the
live value.
A-7 all five Advanced fields round-trip into the PUT body — change
every field, submit, assert the PUT body carries the parsed shapes
(whitespace-normalized scopes array, trimmed groups_claim_path,
enum value, numeric values).
A-7 IAT window above 600 rejects with inline error and does NOT POST
— operator types 601, save handler rejects before reaching
updateOIDCProvider.
A-7 IAT window <= 0 rejects with inline error.
A-7 JWKS cache TTL below 60 rejects with inline error.
A-7 empty scopes input rejects — guards against operator
accidentally wiping the array via whitespace.
A-7 empty groups-claim-path rejects.
A-7 unchanged Advanced fields still round-trip as the existing
values — pin that a name-only edit still carries the live
advanced config (no regression to the pass-through behavior;
operators don't lose their config when editing other fields).
Verify gate green: tsc --noEmit clean; vitest passes all 14 tests
in OIDCProviderDetailPage.test.tsx (5 pre-existing + 9 new A-7
cases).
Spec at cowork/auth-bundles-fixes-2026-05-11/07-high-oidc-provider-advanced-form.md.
Audit doc: MED-4 section in cowork/auth-bundles-audit-2026-05-10.md
appended with the A-7 follow-up closure annotation correcting the
"DEFERRED to v3" framing and explaining the lying-UX pattern;
status table row updated from "CLOSED" (incorrectly tagged on the
pass-through behavior) to "CLOSED 2026-05-11 (A-7)" with the
5-field enumeration. Operator-visible CHANGELOG.md entry under
Security retires the lying-UX caveat.
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shankar0123
|
92519436a1 |
harden(oidc): strict UA/IP binding (A-6) — close request-empty bypass in MED-16
The MED-16 closure (
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|
shankar0123
|
f502da306f |
feat(gui/approvals): payload preview with profile-edit diff + cert-issuance preview (A-5)
The MED-10 closure claim in `cowork/auth-bundles-audit-2026-05-10.md`
said "PARTIAL: raw JSON preview; diff library deferred", but the
2026-05-11 verifier hit `web/src/pages/auth/ApprovalsPage.tsx` and
found ZERO payload rendering — only a doc-comment mention. Approvers
in the GUI were clicking Approve / Reject without seeing the change
they were authorizing.
That defeats the entire two-person-approval primitive. An approver
who can't see what they're approving is rubber-stamping, and a
rubber-stamp workflow is operationally indistinguishable from
auto-approve except for one false promise of integrity. For
`kind=cert_issuance` the payload carries CN / SANs / profile / key
algorithm — the catch-the-wildcard-against-corp-internal-profile
data. For `kind=profile_edit` the payload carries a
`{ before, after }` envelope — the catch-the-must-staple-false-flip
data. Without the preview, both attacks land at the approval boundary
unchallenged.
Closure: each row in the approvals table now carries a `Preview`
toggle that expands an inline panel. Dispatch by `kind`:
- profile_edit → ProfileEditDiff. Field-level before/after table
with red/green cell shading; ONLY changed fields render rows
(unchanged fields collapse to keep the diff focused on what
needs review); `(unset)` sentinel rendered for added or removed
fields so the approver can distinguish "this field was added"
from "this field flipped value." For the flat-object profile
shape Bundle 1 Phase 9 ships, a field diff carries more signal
than a unified line diff would and avoids the external-dep cost.
- cert_issuance → IssuanceRequestPreview. Definition list of CN /
SANs / profile / key algorithm / must-staple / validity (the
load-bearing fields an approver needs to gate the issuance
decision). Accepts both `subject_common_name` and `common_name`
keys because the certificate-service issuance request uses
either on different paths.
- any other kind → generic <pre> JSON dump. Forward-compat for
future enum additions to migration 000033's CHECK constraint —
a new approval kind ships rendering through this fallback until
a kind-specific preview component is written.
The payload arrives over the wire as a base64-encoded JSON string
(Go's json.Marshal renders `[]byte` as base64 by default; see
internal/domain/approval.go:41 where `Payload []byte`). The new
exported `decodePayload(payload)` helper atob()s + JSON.parse()s,
returning null on any failure. Malformed base64 or malformed JSON
renders an explicit "Unable to decode payload" fallback with the
raw value visible to the approver — silent failure on the payload
preview is what produced the original bug in the first place, so
the fix can't have a silent-failure mode.
Component dispatch and base64 decode are also exposed for testing:
decodePayload(undefined) → null
decodePayload('') → null
decodePayload(btoa(JSON.stringify(x))) → x
decodePayload('!!!not-base64!!!') → null (atob throws)
decodePayload(btoa('not a json document')) → null (JSON.parse throws)
Each interactive element carries a data-testid so future E2E
coverage can exercise the contract without brittle CSS selectors —
same pattern as Bundle 1's RolesPage.
Tests (13 total, all passing under vitest):
Page-level (8):
A-5 Preview button toggles the payload panel
A-5 ProfileEdit kind renders field diff with changed-only rows
A-5 ProfileEdit before/after values are visible in the diff cells
A-5 ProfileEdit with no changes renders empty-state
A-5 CertIssuance renders definition list with SANs + profile + key algo
A-5 Unknown kind falls back to generic JSON pre block
A-5 Empty payload renders the "No payload attached" sentinel
A-5 Malformed base64 payload renders the decode-error fallback
decodePayload pure-function suite (5):
returns null for undefined input
returns null for empty string
round-trips base64-encoded JSON
returns null on malformed base64
returns null on valid base64 of non-JSON content
Verify gate green: tsc --noEmit clean; vitest passes all 17 tests
in ApprovalsPage.test.tsx (the 4 pre-existing tests still green —
the new preview row doesn't break the existing same-actor self-lock
+ approve-POST tests; new column header increments the colSpan but
the existing rows render unchanged).
Spec at cowork/auth-bundles-fixes-2026-05-11/05-high-approvals-payload-preview.md.
Audit doc: MED-10 row in `cowork/auth-bundles-audit-2026-05-10.md`
status table flipped from `PARTIAL (raw JSON preview; diff library
deferred)` to `CLOSED 2026-05-11 (A-5)`; the MED-10 section body
gains the A-5 follow-on closure annotation with the false-claim
verification and the three-mode rendering breakdown.
Operator-visible CHANGELOG.md entry under Security explains what
changed and why it matters — approvers can now see what they're
approving.
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shankar0123
|
0152bdf567 |
fix(auth/rbac): scope-aware ActorRole revoke (A-4)
HIGH-10's UNIQUE (actor, role, scope_type, scope_id, tenant) uniqueness
extension lets an operator grant the same role to the same actor at
multiple scopes (e.g. r-operator on profile=p-acme AND profile=p-globex).
But ActorRoleRepository.Revoke's WHERE clause omitted (scope_type,
scope_id) — a single call deleted every variant. Selective revoke was
unrepresentable; operators had to drop all and re-grant N-1, opening
a race window where the actor's access was briefly different.
Closure across all layers (handler → service → repo → MCP → GUI client),
preserving the legacy "revoke all variants" contract for unmodified
callers:
internal/repository/auth.go
- New ActorRoleRevokeOptions struct. Zero value = legacy semantic;
non-empty ScopeType narrows to one variant.
- New ErrActorRoleNotFound sentinel for scoped no-match (HTTP 404).
internal/repository/postgres/auth.go
- Revoke signature extended with opts. Empty opts.ScopeType uses
the legacy SQL (no scope WHERE), zero-row delete = no error.
- Non-empty narrows with `scope_type = $5 AND scope_id IS NOT
DISTINCT FROM $6` — the IS-NOT-DISTINCT-FROM is load-bearing,
vanilla `=` would silently miss the (global, NULL) case because
NULL ≠ NULL in standard SQL.
- Selective revoke with zero matching rows returns
ErrActorRoleNotFound; operators get feedback on typos.
internal/service/auth/actor_role_service.go
- Revoke takes opts. Audit row's details map records the scope so
SIEMs can distinguish wide-vs-selective revokes:
`scope: "all_variants"` for the legacy path, or
`scope_type` + `scope_id` for selective. Privilege check
(auth.role.assign) and reserved-actor guard unchanged.
internal/api/handler/auth.go
- RevokeRoleFromKey parses optional `?scope_type=` / `?scope_id=`
query params via new parseRevokeScope helper.
- Validation mirrors AssignRoleToKey: scope_id forbidden with
scope_type=global, required with profile/issuer, invalid
scope_type → 400. scope_id without scope_type also → 400.
- writeAuthError maps ErrActorRoleNotFound to 404.
internal/mcp/tools_auth.go + types.go
- AuthRevokeKeyRoleInput gains optional ScopeType + ScopeID with
jsonschema descriptions explaining the dual-mode contract.
- Tool call site appends URL-encoded query params when ScopeType
is set; legacy callers (no scope_type) emit the bare DELETE
path unchanged.
web/src/api/client.ts
- authRevokeKeyRole signature: optional 3rd argument
`{ scope_type?, scope_id? }`. Pre-A-4 call sites (no opts arg)
keep firing the bare DELETE — fully backward compatible. The
GUI KeysPage's per-row revoke button (still one row per role,
pre-Fix-12) continues to use the legacy shape; future GUI work
can pass scope params for per-variant rows.
docs/operator/rbac.md
- New "Revoke: legacy 'all variants' vs scope-selective" subsection
under "From the HTTP API" with curl examples for both modes plus
the audit-row payload shape that lets SOC/SIEM tell them apart.
Regression coverage:
Repository (testcontainers, skipped under -short — 6 tests in
internal/repository/postgres/auth_revoke_scope_test.go):
TestRevokeActorRole_NoOpts_RemovesAllVariants
TestRevokeActorRole_WithScope_RemovesOnlyMatching
TestRevokeActorRole_WithGlobalScope_RemovesOnlyGlobal — pins the
IS-NOT-DISTINCT-FROM branch (global, NULL)
TestRevokeActorRole_NoMatch_ReturnsNotFound — pins the new sentinel
TestRevokeActorRole_NoOpts_NoMatch_IsNoOp — pins the legacy
idempotence contract
TestRevokeActorRole_IssuerScope_RemovesOnlyMatching — pin the
issuer-scope half (profile + issuer are symmetric scope types)
Handler (7 new tests in auth_test.go):
TestAuthHandler_RevokeRoleFromKey — extended to assert no scope
filter is forwarded when query string is empty (legacy behaviour)
TestAuthHandler_RevokeRoleFromKey_A4_ScopedProfile
TestAuthHandler_RevokeRoleFromKey_A4_ScopedGlobal
TestAuthHandler_RevokeRoleFromKey_A4_RejectsScopeIDWithGlobal
TestAuthHandler_RevokeRoleFromKey_A4_RejectsMissingScopeID
TestAuthHandler_RevokeRoleFromKey_A4_RejectsScopeIDWithoutScopeType
TestAuthHandler_RevokeRoleFromKey_A4_RejectsInvalidScopeType
TestAuthHandler_RevokeRoleFromKey_A4_ScopedNotFoundReturns404
MCP (2 new table rows in tools_per_tool_test.go):
Scoped revoke with scope_type=profile + scope_id=p-acme →
`?scope_type=profile&scope_id=p-acme`
Scoped revoke with scope_type=global (no scope_id) →
`?scope_type=global`
Service-layer test plumbing (service_test.go) updated for new opts
arg: 4 existing call sites pass repository.ActorRoleRevokeOptions{}
to keep their pre-A-4 semantics; the fakeActorRoleRepo.Revoke
implementation now mirrors the postgres scope-aware behaviour
(legacy zero-value vs scoped narrowing + ErrActorRoleNotFound on
no-match).
Verify gate green: gofmt clean, go vet clean, go test -short across
repository/postgres, service/auth, api/handler, and mcp. The
pre-existing KeysPage.test.tsx failure observed on the baseline
commit (reproduced via `git stash` earlier in Fix 03) is unrelated;
my client.ts change adds an optional third argument and is fully
backward-compatible.
Spec at cowork/auth-bundles-fixes-2026-05-11/04-high-actor-role-revoke-scope.md.
Audit doc updated: new row A-4 (2026-05-11) CLOSED appended to the
status table at the bottom of cowork/auth-bundles-audit-2026-05-10.md.
Operator-visible advisory in CHANGELOG.md v2.1.0 release notes under
Security (non-BREAKING — legacy callers are unchanged).
Depends on Fix 01 (the scope-aware EffectivePermissions read path on
branch fix/audit-2026-05-11/crit-actor-role-scope-reads). This fix
makes the inverse op selectively reversible; without Fix 01 the read
side would mis-evaluate scoped grants anyway, making selective revoke
moot at runtime.
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shankar0123
|
cc8024932b |
feat(gui/oidc): expose AllowedEmailDomains on create + edit forms (A-3)
The CRIT-5 closure (2026-05-10) made `OIDCProvider.AllowedEmailDomains`
load-bearing on the OIDC login path: a token whose email domain isn't in
the configured allowlist gets ErrEmailDomainNotAllowed. But the GUI never
exposed the field — `web/src/pages/auth/OIDCProvidersPage.tsx`'s create
form had zero inputs for it, and `OIDCProviderDetailPage.tsx` neither
rendered nor edited the value.
For multi-tenant IdPs (Auth0, Azure AD common endpoint, Google Workspace)
this is the single most important provider knob — the difference between
"anyone in any tenant of this IdP can log in" and "only @acme.com can log
in." Operators driving certctl from the GUI had no way to know the field
exists, let alone set it. Same shape as CRIT-5's pre-closure state: the
control was claimed, persisted, accepted via API, but invisible at the
surface 90% of operators actually use.
Closure across both GUI pages:
web/src/pages/auth/OIDCProvidersPage.tsx
- Create modal gains a chip-style multi-input below fetch_userinfo.
- New exported `validateEmailDomain(s)` mirrors the backend validator
(CRIT-5 closure rules: no @ / no whitespace / no wildcards /
lowercase only / must be FQDN). Returns "" on accept, a
non-empty error string on reject. Server is still the source of
truth — server-returned 400s render via the existing error UI.
- Inline "addEmailDomain" handler: trim → lowercase → validate →
dedupe → push onto form.allowed_email_domains. Enter key in the
input adds the entry without requiring a click on Add.
- Each chip carries a × remove button + data-testid plumbing for
E2E coverage.
web/src/pages/auth/OIDCProviderDetailPage.tsx
- Read-only view's <dl> renders a new row "Allowed email domains"
with an explicit "any (no gate configured)" sentinel when the
list is empty. Operators can tell the difference between "not
configured" and "field exists but the GUI doesn't show it" — the
whole class of lying-field this fix exists to retire.
- Edit form mirrors the create-modal chip control + pre-populates
from provider.allowed_email_domains at startEdit time (defensive
clone so chip mutations don't reach through into the cached
TanStack Query data).
- Save round-trips the trimmed list as `allowed_email_domains` in
the PUT body alongside the other editable fields.
- "Clear all" affordance with a confirm() dialog that warns about
removing the tenant gate (cross-tenant logins permitted after
save) — for operators who want to test enforcement-off then turn
back on without retyping the full domain list.
- Imports `validateEmailDomain` from OIDCProvidersPage for parity.
web/src/api/client.ts
- No changes — `allowed_email_domains?: string[]` was already in
both OIDCProvider and OIDCProviderRequest types. The CRIT-5
backend closure had already shipped the type but no GUI consumer
ever used it.
Regression coverage (Vitest, all passing):
OIDCProvidersPage.test.tsx (7 new):
AllowedEmailDomains — Add persists a chip and is included in submit body
AllowedEmailDomains — rejects entries containing @
AllowedEmailDomains — rejects wildcard entries
AllowedEmailDomains — normalizes mixed-case input to lowercase
AllowedEmailDomains — Enter key adds the entry without clicking Add
AllowedEmailDomains — chip × button removes the entry
AllowedEmailDomains — duplicate entry is rejected
validateEmailDomain unit suite (7 new):
accepts a plain lowercase FQDN (with multi-label TLDs)
rejects entries containing @ (with leading-@ variant)
rejects entries with whitespace (with tab variant)
rejects wildcards (with both *.x and x.* variants)
rejects mixed-case
rejects bare hostnames (no dot)
rejects empty strings
OIDCProviderDetailPage.test.tsx (5 new):
AllowedEmailDomains — read-only view shows configured entries
AllowedEmailDomains — read-only view shows "any" sentinel when empty
AllowedEmailDomains — edit form pre-populates + PUT round-trips
AllowedEmailDomains — removing a chip and saving submits the trimmed list
AllowedEmailDomains — Add validates against backend rules
Verify gate green: `tsc --noEmit` clean across the web/ tree;
OIDCProvidersPage + OIDCProviderDetailPage suites pass all 29 tests
(19 + 10) — 13 of those are new A-3 cases, 16 were existing CRIT-5 /
Bundle 2 Phase 8 coverage. Three pre-existing test failures in
AuthSettingsPage.test.tsx + KeysPage.test.tsx confirmed unrelated
(reproduce on the base commit `191384c` without any of this fix's
changes applied; not in scope for this CRIT fix).
Spec at cowork/auth-bundles-fixes-2026-05-11/03-crit-allowed-email-domains-gui.md
Closure annotation appended to CRIT-5 row of cowork/auth-bundles-audit-2026-05-10.md;
Lying-fields cross-reference table row #1 marked closed across both
the backend (CRIT-5, 2026-05-10) and GUI (A-3, 2026-05-11) legs.
Operator advisory in CHANGELOG.md v2.1.0 release notes — operators
who provisioned OIDC providers through the GUI between v2.1.0 and
this fix should verify allowed_email_domains matches their tenant
policy (the field was configurable only via API / MCP / direct SQL
during that window).
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shankar0123
|
78485f7429 |
fix(auth/users): close MED-11 lying field — DeactivatedAt loaded + enforced on login (A-2)
The MED-11 closure shipped users.deactivated_at + DELETE /api/v1/auth/users/{id}
+ cascade-revoke, but the federated-user soft-delete was reversible: the next
OIDC login under the same (provider, subject) tuple re-minted a session and
re-elevated the user.
Three legs of the chain were severed (each independently CRIT-shaped):
Leg A — postgres/user.go::userColumns omitted `deactivated_at`, so scanUser
never populated User.DeactivatedAt. Every Get / GetByOIDCSubject /
ListAll returned DeactivatedAt = nil regardless of the column value.
Leg B — postgres/user.go::Update SQL omitted `deactivated_at = $X`, so the
handler's `u.DeactivatedAt = now()` mutation was a no-op write at
the SQL level. Even with leg A closed, no row ever flipped.
Leg C — oidc/service.go::upsertUser did not inspect DeactivatedAt on the
existing-user path. Even with legs A + B closed, the OIDC login
would still proceed normally.
The cascade-session-revoke half of the original closure remained correct, but
only for the duration of the user's current cookie. SOC 2 CC6.3 + ISO 27001
A.9.2.6 "user access removal" controls require both immediate revoke AND
persistent block — this fix restores the persistent-block leg.
Closure across layers:
internal/repository/postgres/user.go
- userColumns adds `deactivated_at`
- scanUser reads via sql.NullTime intermediate (column is nullable)
- Create writes deactivated_at explicitly (NULL for new active users;
forward-compat for future seed-data flows that pre-populate the column)
- Update writes deactivated_at on every call; nil DeactivatedAt → NULL
(supports reactivation)
internal/auth/oidc/service.go
- New sentinel ErrUserDeactivated
- upsertUser checks existing.DeactivatedAt != nil BEFORE mutating email /
display_name / last_login_at — preserves last_login_at forensics on
rejected login attempts (defense-in-depth pin against future
"performance optimization" that reorders the gate)
internal/api/handler/auth_session_oidc.go
- classifyOIDCFailure adds typed errors.Is dispatch for ErrUserDeactivated
→ audit category "user_deactivated" (SOC/SIEM observability surface)
internal/api/handler/auth_users.go
- Self-deactivate guard on Deactivate: HTTP 409 + audit row
auth.user_deactivate_self_rejected when caller targets own User row.
Prevents an admin from one-way-door locking themselves out via the
standard handler; break-glass remains the recovery path.
- New Reactivate handler: inverse of Deactivate. Clears DeactivatedAt
via Update; emits auth.user_reactivated audit row. Idempotent on
already-active rows. Sessions revoked at deactivation stay revoked
(cascade irreversible by design — user must complete fresh OIDC
login).
internal/api/router/router.go
- POST /api/v1/auth/users/{id}/reactivate wired with auth.user.deactivate
gate (reactivation is the inverse op, not a separate privilege)
web/src/api/client.ts + web/src/pages/auth/UsersPage.tsx
- authReactivateUser() client function
- Reactivate button on deactivated rows in UsersPage
Regression coverage:
Postgres (testcontainers, skipped under -short):
TestUserRepository_DeactivatedAt_RoundTrip — Create → set DeactivatedAt
→ Update → Get / GetByOIDCSubject / ListAll round-trip the value
TestUserRepository_DeactivatedAt_CreateWritesNullForActive — new active
user reads back DeactivatedAt = nil
TestUserRepository_DeactivatedAt_CreatePersistsPreDeactivated — Create
with non-nil DeactivatedAt round-trips (forward-compat path)
OIDC service:
TestService_HandleCallback_RejectsDeactivatedUser — errors.Is
ErrUserDeactivated; CallbackResult nil; persisted email / last_login_at
/ deactivated_at NOT mutated by the rejected attempt
TestService_HandleCallback_AllowsReactivatedUser — DeactivatedAt = nil
→ happy path resumes
TestService_HandleCallback_DeactivatedUserPreservesForensics —
defense-in-depth pin against future regressions that reorder the
gate-vs-mutation sequence
Classifier:
TestClassifyOIDCFailure extended — typed dispatch + wrapped variant
round-trip through errors.Is
Handler:
TestAuthUsers_Deactivate_RejectsSelfDeactivate — HTTP 409 + audit
row + cascade-revoke NOT fired + row stays active
TestAuthUsers_Deactivate_OtherUser_HappyPath — HTTP 204 + cascade
fires + row soft-deleted
TestAuthUsers_Reactivate_HappyPath / _IdempotentOnActiveUser /
_UnknownID / _MissingID / _UpdateError
Phase 6 verify gate green on the targeted packages: gofmt clean, go vet
clean, go test -short pass across internal/auth/oidc, internal/api/handler,
internal/api/router, internal/repository/postgres, internal/auth/...,
internal/service/..., internal/tlsprobe/..., internal/trustanchor/...,
internal/validation/...
Spec at cowork/auth-bundles-fixes-2026-05-11/02-crit-deactivated-at-enforcement.md
Closure annotation at cowork/auth-bundles-audit-2026-05-10.md MED-11 row.
Operator advisory in CHANGELOG.md v2.1.0 release notes.
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|
shankar0123
|
a123263498 |
fix(auth/rbac): close HIGH-10 lying field — EffectivePermissions reads actor-role scope (A-1)
Audit 2026-05-11 A-1 closure. Spec at
cowork/auth-bundles-fixes-2026-05-11/01-crit-actor-role-scope-reads.md.
WHAT.
The HIGH-10 closure (commit
|
||
|
shankar0123
|
191384c1d2 |
feat(gui): auth GUI batch — MED-4/7/8/10/11/12 + LOW-1/11/12 + HIGH-10 GUI half
Audit 2026-05-10 GUI batch closure. WHAT. Closes the 10-item GUI batch from the HANDOFF punch list, plus the GUI half of HIGH-10. Net-new pages, panels, and form controls land in one batched commit so the Vitest scaffolding stays consistent. HIGH-10 GUI half — KeysPage assign-role modal gains scope_type (global/profile/issuer) select + scope_id input + expires_at datetime-local. Validates scope_id required when type != global. Threads through the api/client.ts AssignKeyRoleOptions extension that was prepared on the backend side in |
||
|
shankar0123
|
172b30b8f1 |
feat(auth): backend endpoints for MED-7 + MED-11 + MED-12
Audit 2026-05-10 MED-7 + MED-11 + MED-12 backend halves.
WHAT.
Three new admin-gated endpoints:
GET /api/v1/auth/oidc/providers/{id}/jwks-status (auth.oidc.list) — MED-7
GET /api/v1/auth/users (auth.user.read) — MED-11
DELETE /api/v1/auth/users/{id} (auth.user.deactivate) — MED-11
GET /api/v1/auth/runtime-config (auth.role.assign) — MED-12
MED-7 — JWKS health surface
- providerEntry gains 4 counters (statsMu, lastRefreshAt, refreshCount,
lastError, rejectedJWSCount) updated under sync.Mutex
- RefreshKeys increments refreshCount + records lastRefreshAt
- New JWKSStatus(ctx, providerID) returns *JWKSStatusSnapshot —
surfaced via the new endpoint
- CurrentKIDs intentionally empty (go-oidc's internal JWKS cache
isn't exposed); shape kept for forward compat
MED-11 — federated-user admin
- AuthUsersHandler.List with optional ?oidc_provider_id filter
- AuthUsersHandler.Deactivate sets users.deactivated_at + cascade-
revokes sessions via UserSessionsRevoker (best-effort; revoke
failure does NOT roll back the deactivation)
- Idempotent: re-deactivating an already-deactivated user is a no-op
MED-12 — runtime config
- AuthRuntimeConfigHandler.Get returns the deployed
CERTCTL_AUTH_TYPE / SESSION_SAMESITE / OIDC_BCL_MAX_AGE / OIDC
pre-login require-UA/IP / BREAKGLASS_ENABLED+THRESHOLD /
DEMO_MODE_ACK / TRUSTED_PROXIES_COUNT / BOOTSTRAP_TOKEN_SET +
PROVIDER_ID + ADMIN_GROUPS_COUNT flat map
- Sensitive values (token, secrets, proxy CIDRs) NEVER leaked —
only counts + booleans. Token presence surfaced as 'set/unset'
- Gated auth.role.assign (admin-class) so non-admins can't
enumerate the deployment's auth knobs
cmd/server/main.go wires all three handlers into HandlerRegistry.
internal/api/router/router.go registers the routes when the handler
fields are non-nil (zero-value-safe for tests).
VERIFY.
- go vet ./internal/api/... ./internal/auth/... ./internal/repository/... PASS
- go build ./cmd/server/... PASS
- go test -short -count=1 ./internal/auth/oidc/... PASS (4.1s)
- go test -short -count=1 ./internal/api/handler/... PASS (4.1s)
GUI halves for MED-7 + MED-11 + MED-12 are the GUI batch (pending).
Refs: cowork/auth-bundles-audit-2026-05-10.md MED-7, MED-11, MED-12
cowork/auth-bundles-fixes-2026-05-10/HANDOFF.md items 11 14 15
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|
shankar0123
|
e1e43c8924 |
feat(auth): foundation for MED-11 — users.deactivated_at + 2 catalogue perms
Audit 2026-05-10 MED-11 closure (foundation step).
WHAT.
Lays the schema + domain foundation for the MED-11 federated-user
admin surface:
1. Migration 000045 adds users.deactivated_at TIMESTAMPTZ (nullable;
non-NULL = deactivated). Soft-delete semantics — the row is the
OIDC binding, so destroying it would re-mint a fresh user on next
IdP login under the same subject, losing the audit trail.
2. Seeds 2 new catalogue permissions:
- auth.user.read (admin / operator / auditor)
- auth.user.deactivate (admin ONLY)
3. Extends User domain struct with DeactivatedAt *time.Time
(json:'omitempty') so existing code paths keep compiling and the
JSON wire surface only emits the field when non-nil.
WHY.
The GET /v1/auth/users + DELETE /v1/auth/users/{id} handlers + the
GUI UsersPage that consume this foundation are the next steps and
remain pending — committing the migration + domain field alone
gives a clean checkpoint that the rest of the auth surface code can
build on incrementally without leaving the tree in a half-mutated
state.
HOW.
migrations/000045_users_deactivated_at.up.sql:
- ALTER TABLE users ADD COLUMN IF NOT EXISTS deactivated_at TIMESTAMPTZ
- INSERT 2 permissions into permissions
- INSERT role_permissions rows (read in r-admin/operator/auditor;
deactivate in r-admin)
- Single BEGIN/COMMIT, idempotent (ON CONFLICT DO NOTHING)
migrations/000045_users_deactivated_at.down.sql:
- reverse-order DELETE + DROP COLUMN
internal/auth/user/domain/types.go:
- User.DeactivatedAt *time.Time, JSON tag omitempty.
VERIFY.
- go vet ./internal/auth/user/... ./internal/auth/oidc/...
./internal/repository/... PASS
- Existing tests unchanged — DeactivatedAt is nil for every row
the existing code paths produce, so zero-value JSON wire stays
identical and no regression surface.
Refs: cowork/auth-bundles-audit-2026-05-10.md MED-11
cowork/auth-bundles-fixes-2026-05-10/HANDOFF.md item 14
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