WIP: M-1 handler sentinel error mapping (checkpoint before branch cleanup)

Uncommitted migration work at the time of branch cleanup. Tagged as
checkpoint/m1-migration-wip so the commit survives git gc --prune=now.

Session context: Phase 3 Part B+C of the M-1 sentinel error migration
was in progress. 38 modified files, 4 new files (errors.go + errors_test.go
in internal/service/ and internal/api/handler/). Resume from this commit
via 'git checkout checkpoint/m1-migration-wip'.

internal/api/handler/agent_groups.go

@@ -3,12 +3,14 @@ package handler
 import (
 	"context"
 	"encoding/json"
+	"errors"
 	"net/http"
 	"strconv"
 	"strings"
 
 	"github.com/shankar0123/certctl/internal/api/middleware"
 	"github.com/shankar0123/certctl/internal/domain"
+	"github.com/shankar0123/certctl/internal/service"
 )
 
 // AgentGroupService defines the service interface for agent group operations.
@@ -22,6 +24,19 @@ type AgentGroupService interface {
 }
 
 // AgentGroupHandler handles HTTP requests for agent group operations.
+//
+// Error dispatch (post-M-1): every service error routes through the [errToStatus]
+// choke point via `errors.Is` walking the wrap chain, with one explicit
+// [service.ErrValidation] arm on the write paths (Create, Update) so the
+// composed "validation: <field-specific reason>" message the service layer
+// attaches via `fmt.Errorf("%w: ...", ErrValidation)` can be passed through to
+// the 400 response body. Before M-1, the Create handler branched on
+// `strings.Contains(err.Error(), "invalid"|"required")` — fragile because a
+// single reword in [service.validateAgentGroup] would demote the 400 to 500
+// with no compile-time signal — and the Update/Delete handlers branched on
+// `strings.Contains(err.Error(), "not found")`, coupling HTTP classification
+// to repository human-readable strings. Both now ride the typed
+// [repository.ErrNotFound] wrap through errToStatus. Mirrors ProfileHandler.
 type AgentGroupHandler struct {
 	svc AgentGroupService
 }
@@ -89,7 +104,18 @@ func (h AgentGroupHandler) GetAgentGroup(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request)
 
 	group, err := h.svc.GetAgentGroup(r.Context(), id)
 	if err != nil {
-		ErrorWithRequestID(w, http.StatusNotFound, "Agent group not found", requestID)
+		// M-1: route through errToStatus so a repo-level `sql.ErrNoRows`
+		// (wrapped as repository.ErrNotFound) becomes 404, but a transient DB
+		// failure no longer masquerades as 404 — it correctly surfaces 500. The
+		// pre-M-1 "any error → 404" shortcut was plausible when Get's only
+		// expected failure was "not found", but the choke point now gives us
+		// correct dispatch for free. Mirrors GetProfile.
+		status := errToStatus(err)
+		msg := "Failed to get agent group"
+		if status == http.StatusNotFound {
+			msg = "Agent group not found"
+		}
+		ErrorWithRequestID(w, status, msg, requestID)
 		return
 	}
 
@@ -123,7 +149,15 @@ func (h AgentGroupHandler) CreateAgentGroup(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Reque
 
 	created, err := h.svc.CreateAgentGroup(r.Context(), group)
 	if err != nil {
-		if strings.Contains(err.Error(), "invalid") || strings.Contains(err.Error(), "required") {
+		// M-1: replace the 2-term substring net (`"invalid"|"required"`) with a
+		// single `errors.Is(err, service.ErrValidation)` arm. validateAgentGroup
+		// wraps every field-specific failure via `fmt.Errorf("%w: <reason>",
+		// ErrValidation)`, so `err.Error()` still contains the human-readable
+		// reason (e.g., "agent group name is required") and can be safely passed
+		// to the 400 body — but the status decision no longer depends on the
+		// exact wording. Other errors redact to a generic 500. Mirrors
+		// CreateProfile.
+		if errors.Is(err, service.ErrValidation) {
 			ErrorWithRequestID(w, http.StatusBadRequest, err.Error(), requestID)
 			return
 		}
@@ -160,11 +194,22 @@ func (h AgentGroupHandler) UpdateAgentGroup(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Reque
 
 	updated, err := h.svc.UpdateAgentGroup(r.Context(), id, group)
 	if err != nil {
-		if strings.Contains(err.Error(), "not found") {
-			ErrorWithRequestID(w, http.StatusNotFound, "Agent group not found", requestID)
+		// M-1: explicit ErrValidation arm preserves the user-facing reason in
+		// the 400 body (validateAgentGroup wraps every failure via
+		// `fmt.Errorf("%w: ...", ErrValidation)`); every other error — including
+		// repo-layer ErrNotFound on a missing row — routes through errToStatus
+		// so the 404/500 decision no longer depends on substring matching.
+		// Mirrors UpdateProfile.
+		if errors.Is(err, service.ErrValidation) {
+			ErrorWithRequestID(w, http.StatusBadRequest, err.Error(), requestID)
 			return
 		}
-		ErrorWithRequestID(w, http.StatusInternalServerError, "Failed to update agent group", requestID)
+		status := errToStatus(err)
+		msg := "Failed to update agent group"
+		if status == http.StatusNotFound {
+			msg = "Agent group not found"
+		}
+		ErrorWithRequestID(w, status, msg, requestID)
 		return
 	}
 
@@ -188,11 +233,15 @@ func (h AgentGroupHandler) DeleteAgentGroup(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Reque
 	}
 
 	if err := h.svc.DeleteAgentGroup(r.Context(), id); err != nil {
-		if strings.Contains(err.Error(), "not found") {
-			ErrorWithRequestID(w, http.StatusNotFound, "Agent group not found", requestID)
-			return
+		// M-1: sentinel dispatch replaces the substring 404 check — see the
+		// parallel comment block in UpdateAgentGroup for the rationale. Mirrors
+		// DeleteProfile.
+		status := errToStatus(err)
+		msg := "Failed to delete agent group"
+		if status == http.StatusNotFound {
+			msg = "Agent group not found"
 		}
-		ErrorWithRequestID(w, http.StatusInternalServerError, "Failed to delete agent group", requestID)
+		ErrorWithRequestID(w, status, msg, requestID)
 		return
 	}
 

internal/api/handler/agents.go

@@ -108,7 +108,19 @@ func (h AgentHandler) GetAgent(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
 
 	agent, err := h.svc.GetAgent(r.Context(), id)
 	if err != nil {
-		ErrorWithRequestID(w, http.StatusNotFound, "Agent not found", requestID)
+		// M-1 (P2): route through errToStatus so a repo-level
+		// sql.ErrNoRows (wrapped as repository.ErrNotFound) becomes 404,
+		// but a transient DB failure no longer masquerades as 404 — it
+		// correctly surfaces 500. The pre-M-1 "any error → 404" shortcut
+		// was plausible when Get's only expected failure was "not found",
+		// but the choke point now gives us correct dispatch for free.
+		// Mirrors GetAgentGroup / GetProfile.
+		status := errToStatus(err)
+		msg := "Failed to get agent"
+		if status == http.StatusNotFound {
+			msg = "Agent not found"
+		}
+		ErrorWithRequestID(w, status, msg, requestID)
 		return
 	}
 
@@ -147,11 +159,20 @@ func (h AgentHandler) RegisterAgent(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
 
 	created, err := h.svc.RegisterAgent(r.Context(), agent)
 	if err != nil {
-		errMsg := err.Error()
-		if strings.Contains(errMsg, "unique") || strings.Contains(errMsg, "duplicate") || strings.Contains(errMsg, "already exists") {
+		// M-1 (P2): replace the 3-term substring net
+		// (`"unique"|"duplicate"|"already exists"`) with a typed
+		// errors.Is(err, service.ErrConflict) arm. The service layer now
+		// wraps pg SQLSTATE 23505 duplicate-name violations via
+		// fmt.Errorf("%w: agent name already exists", ErrConflict), so
+		// classification no longer depends on the exact driver wording.
+		// Other errors redact to a generic 500 with slog.Error server-
+		// side diagnostic capture (F-002). Mirrors CreateProfile's
+		// ErrValidation arm pattern, adapted for the conflict case.
+		if errors.Is(err, service.ErrConflict) {
 			ErrorWithRequestID(w, http.StatusConflict, "Agent with this name already exists", requestID)
 			return
 		}
+		slog.Error("RegisterAgent failed", "name", agent.Name, "error", err.Error())
 		ErrorWithRequestID(w, http.StatusInternalServerError, "Failed to register agent", requestID)
 		return
 	}
@@ -211,7 +232,15 @@ func (h AgentHandler) Heartbeat(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
 			ErrorWithRequestID(w, http.StatusGone, "Agent has been retired", requestID)
 			return
 		}
-		if strings.Contains(err.Error(), "not found") {
+		// M-1 (P2): the pre-M-1 `strings.Contains(err.Error(), "not
+		// found")` branch now rides the errToStatus choke point, which
+		// recognizes repository.ErrNotFound via errors.Is. The retired-
+		// agent sentinel is still checked FIRST above so the 410 Gone
+		// short-circuit is never masked by the 404 arm. Any other error
+		// redacts to a generic 500 with slog.Error server-side diagnostic
+		// capture (F-002). Mirrors GetAgentGroup.
+		status := errToStatus(err)
+		if status == http.StatusNotFound {
 			ErrorWithRequestID(w, http.StatusNotFound, "Agent not found", requestID)
 			return
 		}
@@ -308,7 +337,16 @@ func (h AgentHandler) AgentCertificatePickup(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Requ
 
 	certPEM, err := h.svc.CertificatePickup(r.Context(), agentID, certID)
 	if err != nil {
-		ErrorWithRequestID(w, http.StatusNotFound, "Certificate not found or not ready", requestID)
+		// M-1 (P2): route through errToStatus so a repo-level
+		// sql.ErrNoRows (wrapped as repository.ErrNotFound) becomes 404,
+		// but a transient DB failure no longer masquerades as 404 — it
+		// correctly surfaces 500. Mirrors GetAgent.
+		status := errToStatus(err)
+		msg := "Failed to retrieve certificate"
+		if status == http.StatusNotFound {
+			msg = "Certificate not found or not ready"
+		}
+		ErrorWithRequestID(w, status, msg, requestID)
 		return
 	}
 
@@ -491,7 +529,16 @@ func (h AgentHandler) RetireAgent(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
 			JSON(w, http.StatusConflict, body)
 			return
 		}
-		if strings.Contains(err.Error(), "not found") {
+		// M-1 (P2): the pre-M-1 `strings.Contains(err.Error(), "not
+		// found")` branch now rides the errToStatus choke point, which
+		// recognizes repository.ErrNotFound via errors.Is. The sentinel
+		// (ErrAgentIsSentinel, ErrForceReasonRequired) and typed
+		// (*BlockedByDependenciesError) checks above still run FIRST so
+		// the 403/400/409 structural refusals are never masked by the
+		// 404 arm. Any other error redacts to a generic 500 with
+		// slog.Error server-side diagnostic capture (F-002).
+		status := errToStatus(err)
+		if status == http.StatusNotFound {
 			ErrorWithRequestID(w, http.StatusNotFound, "Agent not found", requestID)
 			return
 		}

internal/api/handler/audit.go

@@ -2,6 +2,7 @@ package handler
 
 import (
 	"context"
+	"log/slog"
 	"net/http"
 	"strconv"
 	"strings"
@@ -86,7 +87,24 @@ func (h AuditHandler) GetAuditEvent(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
 
 	event, err := h.svc.GetAuditEvent(r.Context(), id)
 	if err != nil {
-		ErrorWithRequestID(w, http.StatusNotFound, "Audit event not found", requestID)
+		// M-1 (P2): dispatch routes through errToStatus. Pre-M-1 this branch was
+		// a blanket `any error → 404 Audit event not found` shortcut — which
+		// silently demoted transient DB failures from the service's auditRepo.List
+		// wrap to 404 Not Found with no observable external signal. Post-M-1:
+		// service/audit.go GetAuditEvent only wraps the genuine zero-events path
+		// with service.ErrNotFound via %w, and the repo.List wrap surfaces without
+		// that sentinel — so errors.Is(err, service.ErrNotFound) picks up the real
+		// 404s and everything else correctly surfaces as 500 with server-side
+		// slog.Error capture (F-002 redacted-500 pattern preserved).
+		status := errToStatus(err)
+		if status == http.StatusInternalServerError {
+			slog.Error("GetAuditEvent failed", "audit_event_id", id, "error", err.Error())
+		}
+		msg := "Failed to get audit event"
+		if status == http.StatusNotFound {
+			msg = "Audit event not found"
+		}
+		ErrorWithRequestID(w, status, msg, requestID)
 		return
 	}
 

internal/api/handler/certificates.go

@@ -298,12 +298,13 @@ func (h CertificateHandler) UpdateCertificate(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Req
 
 	updated, err := h.svc.UpdateCertificate(r.Context(), id, cert)
 	if err != nil {
-		if strings.Contains(err.Error(), "not found") {
-			ErrorWithRequestID(w, http.StatusNotFound, "Certificate not found", requestID)
-			return
+		status := errToStatus(err)
+		msg := err.Error()
+		if status == http.StatusInternalServerError {
+			slog.Error("UpdateCertificate failed", "cert_id", id, "error", err)
+			msg = "internal error"
 		}
-		slog.Error("UpdateCertificate failed", "cert_id", id, "error", err.Error())
-		ErrorWithRequestID(w, http.StatusInternalServerError, "Failed to update certificate", requestID)
+		ErrorWithRequestID(w, status, msg, requestID)
 		return
 	}
 
@@ -327,11 +328,13 @@ func (h CertificateHandler) ArchiveCertificate(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Re
 	}
 
 	if err := h.svc.ArchiveCertificate(r.Context(), id); err != nil {
-		if strings.Contains(err.Error(), "not found") {
-			ErrorWithRequestID(w, http.StatusNotFound, "Certificate not found", requestID)
-			return
+		status := errToStatus(err)
+		msg := err.Error()
+		if status == http.StatusInternalServerError {
+			slog.Error("ArchiveCertificate failed", "cert_id", id, "error", err)
+			msg = "internal error"
 		}
-		ErrorWithRequestID(w, http.StatusInternalServerError, "Failed to archive certificate", requestID)
+		ErrorWithRequestID(w, status, msg, requestID)
 		return
 	}
 
@@ -373,12 +376,13 @@ func (h CertificateHandler) GetCertificateVersions(w http.ResponseWriter, r *htt
 
 	versions, total, err := h.svc.GetCertificateVersions(r.Context(), certID, page, perPage)
 	if err != nil {
-		if strings.Contains(err.Error(), "not found") {
-			ErrorWithRequestID(w, http.StatusNotFound, "Certificate not found", requestID)
-			return
+		status := errToStatus(err)
+		msg := err.Error()
+		if status == http.StatusInternalServerError {
+			slog.Error("GetCertificateVersions failed", "cert_id", certID, "error", err)
+			msg = "internal error"
 		}
-		slog.Error("GetCertificateVersions failed", "cert_id", certID, "error", err.Error())
-		ErrorWithRequestID(w, http.StatusInternalServerError, "Failed to get certificate versions", requestID)
+		ErrorWithRequestID(w, status, msg, requestID)
 		return
 	}
 
@@ -414,20 +418,13 @@ func (h CertificateHandler) TriggerRenewal(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Reques
 	actor := resolveActor(r.Context())
 
 	if err := h.svc.TriggerRenewal(r.Context(), certID, actor); err != nil {
-		errMsg := err.Error()
-		if strings.Contains(errMsg, "not found") {
-			ErrorWithRequestID(w, http.StatusNotFound, "Certificate not found", requestID)
-			return
+		status := errToStatus(err)
+		msg := err.Error()
+		if status == http.StatusInternalServerError {
+			slog.Error("TriggerRenewal failed", "cert_id", certID, "error", err)
+			msg = "internal error"
 		}
-		if strings.Contains(errMsg, "cannot renew") {
-			ErrorWithRequestID(w, http.StatusBadRequest, errMsg, requestID)
-			return
-		}
-		if strings.Contains(errMsg, "already in progress") {
-			ErrorWithRequestID(w, http.StatusConflict, errMsg, requestID)
-			return
-		}
-		ErrorWithRequestID(w, http.StatusInternalServerError, "Failed to trigger renewal", requestID)
+		ErrorWithRequestID(w, status, msg, requestID)
 		return
 	}
 
@@ -516,19 +513,13 @@ func (h CertificateHandler) RevokeCertificate(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Req
 	actor := resolveActor(r.Context())
 
 	if err := h.svc.RevokeCertificate(r.Context(), certID, req.Reason, actor); err != nil {
-		// Distinguish between client errors and server errors
-		errMsg := err.Error()
-		if strings.Contains(errMsg, "already revoked") ||
-			strings.Contains(errMsg, "cannot revoke") ||
-			strings.Contains(errMsg, "invalid revocation reason") {
-			ErrorWithRequestID(w, http.StatusBadRequest, errMsg, requestID)
-			return
+		status := errToStatus(err)
+		msg := err.Error()
+		if status == http.StatusInternalServerError {
+			slog.Error("RevokeCertificate failed", "cert_id", certID, "error", err)
+			msg = "internal error"
 		}
-		if strings.Contains(errMsg, "not found") || strings.Contains(errMsg, "failed to fetch") || strings.Contains(errMsg, "failed to get") {
-			ErrorWithRequestID(w, http.StatusNotFound, "Certificate not found", requestID)
-			return
-		}
-		ErrorWithRequestID(w, http.StatusInternalServerError, "Failed to revoke certificate", requestID)
+		ErrorWithRequestID(w, status, msg, requestID)
 		return
 	}
 
@@ -557,16 +548,13 @@ func (h CertificateHandler) GetDERCRL(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
 
 	derBytes, err := h.svc.GenerateDERCRL(r.Context(), issuerID)
 	if err != nil {
-		errMsg := err.Error()
-		if strings.Contains(errMsg, "not found") {
-			ErrorWithRequestID(w, http.StatusNotFound, errMsg, requestID)
-			return
+		status := errToStatus(err)
+		msg := err.Error()
+		if status == http.StatusInternalServerError {
+			slog.Error("GenerateDERCRL failed", "issuer_id", issuerID, "error", err)
+			msg = "internal error"
 		}
-		if strings.Contains(errMsg, "do not support") || strings.Contains(errMsg, "does not support") {
-			ErrorWithRequestID(w, http.StatusNotImplemented, errMsg, requestID)
-			return
-		}
-		ErrorWithRequestID(w, http.StatusInternalServerError, "Failed to generate CRL", requestID)
+		ErrorWithRequestID(w, status, msg, requestID)
 		return
 	}
 
@@ -602,16 +590,13 @@ func (h CertificateHandler) HandleOCSP(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
 
 	derBytes, err := h.svc.GetOCSPResponse(r.Context(), issuerID, serialHex)
 	if err != nil {
-		errMsg := err.Error()
-		if strings.Contains(errMsg, "not found") {
-			ErrorWithRequestID(w, http.StatusNotFound, errMsg, requestID)
-			return
+		status := errToStatus(err)
+		msg := err.Error()
+		if status == http.StatusInternalServerError {
+			slog.Error("GetOCSPResponse failed", "issuer_id", issuerID, "serial", serialHex, "error", err)
+			msg = "internal error"
 		}
-		if strings.Contains(errMsg, "do not support") || strings.Contains(errMsg, "does not support") {
-			ErrorWithRequestID(w, http.StatusNotImplemented, errMsg, requestID)
-			return
-		}
-		ErrorWithRequestID(w, http.StatusInternalServerError, "Failed to generate OCSP response", requestID)
+		ErrorWithRequestID(w, status, msg, requestID)
 		return
 	}
 
@@ -642,12 +627,13 @@ func (h CertificateHandler) GetCertificateDeployments(w http.ResponseWriter, r *
 
 	deployments, err := h.svc.GetCertificateDeployments(r.Context(), certID)
 	if err != nil {
-		errMsg := err.Error()
-		if strings.Contains(errMsg, "not found") {
-			ErrorWithRequestID(w, http.StatusNotFound, "Certificate not found", requestID)
-			return
+		status := errToStatus(err)
+		msg := err.Error()
+		if status == http.StatusInternalServerError {
+			slog.Error("GetCertificateDeployments failed", "cert_id", certID, "error", err)
+			msg = "internal error"
 		}
-		ErrorWithRequestID(w, http.StatusInternalServerError, "Failed to get deployments", requestID)
+		ErrorWithRequestID(w, status, msg, requestID)
 		return
 	}
 

internal/api/handler/errors.go

@@ -0,0 +1,117 @@
+package handler
+
+import (
+	"errors"
+	"net/http"
+
+	"github.com/lib/pq"
+
+	"github.com/shankar0123/certctl/internal/repository"
+	"github.com/shankar0123/certctl/internal/service"
+)
+
+// errToStatus is the single choke point that maps a service-layer or
+// repository-layer error to its HTTP status code. Before M-1 (P2), 42 switch
+// branches across 11 handler files classified errors via
+// `strings.Contains(err.Error(), ...)` substring matching — a pattern that
+// made every HTTP status mapping one sentinel-message reword away from silent
+// regression (see M-003 self-approval privilege boundary: a reword of
+// ErrSelfApproval.Error() would have demoted 403 Forbidden to 500 Internal
+// Server Error with no compile-time error, no test failure, and no observable
+// external signal).
+//
+// All handler branches now route through this function via errors.Is and
+// errors.As, which walks the wrap chain built by fmt.Errorf("%w: ...", ...).
+// The generic sentinels live in internal/service/errors.go; domain-specific
+// sentinels (ErrSelfApproval, ErrAgentIsSentinel, ErrBlockedByDependencies,
+// ErrForceReasonRequired, ErrAgentNotFound) wrap those generics via %w so both
+// errors.Is(err, ErrSelfApproval) and errors.Is(err, ErrForbidden) succeed on
+// the same wrapped error.
+//
+// # Dispatch order
+//
+//  1. ErrAgentRetired → 410 Gone. Tested FIRST. It is deliberately NOT wrapped
+//     under any generic sentinel — 410 Gone is semantically distinct from
+//     403/404/409 (permanently-terminated resource identity that drives
+//     deterministic agent-binary shutdown at cmd/agent/main.go:1291). Must
+//     short-circuit before any generic check so wrapping can never demote it.
+//  2. ErrNotFound → 404 Not Found. Both service.ErrNotFound and
+//     repository.ErrNotFound route here — repositories wrap sql.ErrNoRows with
+//     repository.ErrNotFound so a "row not found" escapes the repo layer as a
+//     typed sentinel rather than an untyped fmt.Errorf string. Tested BEFORE
+//     ErrForbidden so RFC 7235's preference for hiding resource existence from
+//     unauthorized callers is preserved (a caller who cannot see a resource
+//     should get 404, not 403).
+//  3. ErrUnauthenticated → 401 Unauthorized. SCEP challenge-password mismatch
+//     and similar credential failures.
+//  4. ErrForbidden → 403 Forbidden. M-003 gate. Tested BEFORE ErrValidation so
+//     double-wrapping (e.g., a future fmt.Errorf("%w: ctx", ErrSelfApproval)
+//     in a wrapping call site) cannot demote 403 to 400.
+//  5. ErrConflict / repository.ErrRenewalPolicyDuplicateName /
+//     repository.ErrRenewalPolicyInUse → 409 Conflict. The repo-layer sentinels
+//     are routed here explicitly so handlers do not need their own dispatch
+//     tree for G-1's renewal-policy FK + unique-name violations.
+//  6. ErrValidation → 400 Bad Request. Generic input validation / malformed
+//     request bodies / invalid state transitions that the caller could correct
+//     by changing their request.
+//  7. ErrUnprocessable → 422 Unprocessable Entity. Distinct from
+//     ErrValidation: ErrValidation is "caller sent bad input" (400), while
+//     ErrUnprocessable is "caller's input was fine but our stored data can't
+//     satisfy the operation" — e.g., an X.509 PEM in the inventory that fails
+//     to decode. The pre-M-1 ExportPKCS12 handler pinned 422 on
+//     strings.Contains(err.Error(), "cannot be parsed"); the sentinel makes
+//     that dispatch survive message rewording.
+//  8. ErrNotImplemented → 501 Not Implemented. Reserved for feature-flag-gated
+//     code paths.
+//  9. *pq.Error fallback on SQLSTATE 23503 (FK violation) / 23505 (unique
+//     violation) → 409 Conflict. Final branch before the default 500. Anything
+//     that reaches here is technically a code smell (the repository layer
+//     should normally wrap driver errors into a typed sentinel) but the status
+//     mapping is still correct.
+//
+// # Why a function, not a middleware
+//
+// Handlers must continue to call [Error] / [ErrorWithRequestID] with a
+// caller-chosen human-readable message (sometimes the wrapped err.Error(),
+// sometimes a redacted "internal error" for 500s per F-002). This function
+// gives handlers the status code; the handler keeps control of the body.
+func errToStatus(err error) int {
+	if err == nil {
+		return http.StatusOK
+	}
+
+	switch {
+	case errors.Is(err, service.ErrAgentRetired):
+		return http.StatusGone // 410 — must short-circuit before generic dispatch
+	case errors.Is(err, service.ErrNotFound),
+		errors.Is(err, repository.ErrNotFound):
+		return http.StatusNotFound // 404 — before ErrForbidden (RFC 7235 existence hiding)
+	case errors.Is(err, service.ErrUnauthenticated):
+		return http.StatusUnauthorized // 401
+	case errors.Is(err, service.ErrForbidden):
+		return http.StatusForbidden // 403 — before ErrValidation (preserves M-003 gate under double-wrap)
+	case errors.Is(err, service.ErrConflict),
+		errors.Is(err, repository.ErrRenewalPolicyDuplicateName),
+		errors.Is(err, repository.ErrRenewalPolicyInUse):
+		return http.StatusConflict // 409
+	case errors.Is(err, service.ErrValidation):
+		return http.StatusBadRequest // 400
+	case errors.Is(err, service.ErrUnprocessable):
+		return http.StatusUnprocessableEntity // 422 — stored-data-unparseable, not caller-input-bad
+	case errors.Is(err, service.ErrNotImplemented):
+		return http.StatusNotImplemented // 501
+	}
+
+	// Driver-level fallback. Raw *pq.Error escaping the repository layer is a
+	// code smell but a real escape hatch today — we still want a correct 409
+	// instead of a generic 500 for FK/unique violations.
+	var pgErr *pq.Error
+	if errors.As(err, &pgErr) {
+		switch pgErr.Code {
+		case "23503", "23505":
+			return http.StatusConflict
+		}
+	}
+
+	return http.StatusInternalServerError
+}

internal/api/handler/errors_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,120 @@
+package handler
+
+import (
+	"errors"
+	"fmt"
+	"net/http"
+	"testing"
+
+	"github.com/lib/pq"
+
+	"github.com/shankar0123/certctl/internal/repository"
+	"github.com/shankar0123/certctl/internal/service"
+)
+
+// TestErrToStatus_DispatchMatrix pins the handler's single error → HTTP
+// status choke point. Each row covers one branch of the dispatch switch and
+// the dispatch order invariants documented in errors.go:
+//
+//   - ErrAgentRetired FIRST (410 short-circuits before generic checks)
+//   - ErrNotFound before ErrForbidden (RFC 7235 existence hiding)
+//   - ErrForbidden before ErrValidation (preserves M-003 gate under double-wrap)
+//   - Repo sentinels route to 409 alongside ErrConflict
+//   - *pq.Error on 23503 / 23505 routes to 409 as the driver-level fallback
+//   - Default path is 500
+func TestErrToStatus_DispatchMatrix(t *testing.T) {
+	cases := []struct {
+		name string
+		err  error
+		want int
+	}{
+		{"nil → 200", nil, http.StatusOK},
+
+		// Each generic sentinel resolves to its documented status code.
+		{"ErrNotFound → 404", service.ErrNotFound, http.StatusNotFound},
+		{"ErrValidation → 400", service.ErrValidation, http.StatusBadRequest},
+		{"ErrConflict → 409", service.ErrConflict, http.StatusConflict},
+		{"ErrForbidden → 403", service.ErrForbidden, http.StatusForbidden},
+		{"ErrUnauthenticated → 401", service.ErrUnauthenticated, http.StatusUnauthorized},
+		{"ErrNotImplemented → 501", service.ErrNotImplemented, http.StatusNotImplemented},
+
+		// Wrapped domain sentinels route through their generic wrap.
+		{"ErrSelfApproval → 403 (via ErrForbidden)", service.ErrSelfApproval, http.StatusForbidden},
+		{"ErrAgentIsSentinel → 403 (via ErrForbidden)", service.ErrAgentIsSentinel, http.StatusForbidden},
+		{"ErrBlockedByDependencies → 409 (via ErrConflict)", service.ErrBlockedByDependencies, http.StatusConflict},
+		{"ErrForceReasonRequired → 400 (via ErrValidation)", service.ErrForceReasonRequired, http.StatusBadRequest},
+		{"ErrAgentNotFound → 400 (via ErrValidation)", service.ErrAgentNotFound, http.StatusBadRequest},
+
+		// ErrAgentRetired is standalone — 410 Gone must fire before any
+		// generic dispatch. This locks in the semantic-distinct short-circuit.
+		{"ErrAgentRetired → 410", service.ErrAgentRetired, http.StatusGone},
+
+		// Repository-layer sentinels (G-1 + M-1).
+		{"repo.ErrNotFound → 404", repository.ErrNotFound, http.StatusNotFound},
+		{"wrapped repo.ErrNotFound → 404",
+			fmt.Errorf("%w: renewal policy rp-foo", repository.ErrNotFound),
+			http.StatusNotFound},
+		{"repo.ErrRenewalPolicyDuplicateName → 409", repository.ErrRenewalPolicyDuplicateName, http.StatusConflict},
+		{"repo.ErrRenewalPolicyInUse → 409", repository.ErrRenewalPolicyInUse, http.StatusConflict},
+
+		// Wrapped errors with additional context survive the dispatch.
+		{"wrapped ErrNotFound with context → 404",
+			fmt.Errorf("lookup failed: %w", service.ErrNotFound),
+			http.StatusNotFound},
+		{"wrapped ErrSelfApproval with context → 403",
+			fmt.Errorf("approval gate: %w", service.ErrSelfApproval),
+			http.StatusForbidden},
+
+		// Driver-level fallback: raw *pq.Error escaping repo layer.
+		{"*pq.Error 23503 → 409", &pq.Error{Code: "23503"}, http.StatusConflict},
+		{"*pq.Error 23505 → 409", &pq.Error{Code: "23505"}, http.StatusConflict},
+		{"*pq.Error 08006 → 500", &pq.Error{Code: "08006"}, http.StatusInternalServerError},
+
+		// Default path.
+		{"unknown error → 500", errors.New("something arbitrary"), http.StatusInternalServerError},
+	}
+	for _, c := range cases {
+		t.Run(c.name, func(t *testing.T) {
+			got := errToStatus(c.err)
+			if got != c.want {
+				t.Errorf("errToStatus(%v) = %d, want %d", c.err, got, c.want)
+			}
+		})
+	}
+}
+
+// TestErrToStatus_AgentRetiredShortCircuit is a dedicated regression guard
+// for the most fragile dispatch invariant: ErrAgentRetired's 410 Gone must
+// fire FIRST. If a future commit wraps it under ErrForbidden (e.g., to
+// include it in a generic "agent operations forbidden" bucket), this test
+// goes red and the agent-binary shutdown at cmd/agent/main.go:1291 would
+// silently stop triggering.
+func TestErrToStatus_AgentRetiredShortCircuit(t *testing.T) {
+	if got := errToStatus(service.ErrAgentRetired); got != http.StatusGone {
+		t.Fatalf("ErrAgentRetired → %d, want 410 Gone (short-circuit must fire before any generic dispatch)", got)
+	}
+}
+
+// TestErrToStatus_NotFoundBeforeForbidden locks the RFC 7235 existence-
+// hiding dispatch order. If someone were to reorder the switch arms to put
+// ErrForbidden first, an authorization failure on a nonexistent resource
+// would leak existence via a 403 instead of masking it with a 404.
+func TestErrToStatus_NotFoundBeforeForbidden(t *testing.T) {
+	// A hypothetical wrapping where both would match — contrived but the
+	// ordering guarantee is what we're testing.
+	both := fmt.Errorf("%w: layered with %w", service.ErrNotFound, service.ErrForbidden)
+	if got := errToStatus(both); got != http.StatusNotFound {
+		t.Errorf("dual-wrapped err → %d, want 404 (ErrNotFound must dispatch before ErrForbidden)", got)
+	}
+}
+
+// TestErrToStatus_ForbiddenBeforeValidation guards the M-003 self-approval
+// gate against a future call site that double-wraps ErrSelfApproval under
+// ErrValidation (intentionally or accidentally). The dispatch must pick
+// 403, not 400.
+func TestErrToStatus_ForbiddenBeforeValidation(t *testing.T) {
+	doubled := fmt.Errorf("%w: %w", service.ErrSelfApproval, service.ErrValidation)
+	if got := errToStatus(doubled); got != http.StatusForbidden {
+		t.Errorf("double-wrapped err → %d, want 403 (ErrForbidden must dispatch before ErrValidation — M-003 gate)", got)
+	}
+}

internal/api/handler/export.go

@@ -46,12 +46,26 @@ func (h ExportHandler) ExportPEM(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
 
 	result, err := h.svc.ExportPEM(r.Context(), id)
 	if err != nil {
-		if strings.Contains(err.Error(), "not found") {
-			ErrorWithRequestID(w, http.StatusNotFound, "Certificate not found", requestID)
-			return
+		// M-1 (P2): dispatch routes through errToStatus. Pre-M-1 this branch
+		// classified 404 via strings.Contains(err.Error(), "not found"), which
+		// gave false positives on any error whose rendered text happened to
+		// contain "not found" — notably a transient DB failure when the service
+		// layer wrapped every certRepo.Get error with "certificate not found".
+		// Post-M-1: service/export.go now wraps with "failed to get certificate"
+		// and only the genuine sql.ErrNoRows path surfaces repository.ErrNotFound
+		// through the wrap chain, so errors.Is(err, repository.ErrNotFound) picks
+		// up the real 404s and everything else — including transient DB errors —
+		// correctly surfaces as 500 with server-side slog.Error capture (F-002
+		// redacted-500 pattern preserved).
+		status := errToStatus(err)
+		if status == http.StatusInternalServerError {
+			slog.Error("ExportPEM failed", "cert_id", id, "error", err.Error())
 		}
-		slog.Error("ExportPEM failed", "cert_id", id, "error", err.Error())
-		ErrorWithRequestID(w, http.StatusInternalServerError, "Failed to export certificate", requestID)
+		msg := "Failed to export certificate"
+		if status == http.StatusNotFound {
+			msg = "Certificate not found"
+		}
+		ErrorWithRequestID(w, status, msg, requestID)
 		return
 	}
 
@@ -94,16 +108,32 @@ func (h ExportHandler) ExportPKCS12(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
 
 	pfxData, err := h.svc.ExportPKCS12(r.Context(), id, req.Password)
 	if err != nil {
-		if strings.Contains(err.Error(), "not found") {
-			ErrorWithRequestID(w, http.StatusNotFound, "Certificate not found", requestID)
-			return
+		// M-1 (P2): dispatch routes through errToStatus. The pre-M-1 3-term
+		// substring net (`"not found"|"cannot be parsed"|"no certificates
+		// found"`) is replaced with sentinel dispatch:
+		//   - repository.ErrNotFound (from certificate.go Get/GetLatestVersion
+		//     sql.ErrNoRows wrap) → 404
+		//   - service.ErrUnprocessable (from service/export.go ExportPKCS12's
+		//     parsePEMCertificates-failure and empty-chain wraps) → 422 —
+		//     semantically correct because the caller's request is fine; our
+		//     stored PEM chain is what cannot be processed
+		//   - everything else → 500 with slog.Error capture (F-002 redacted-500
+		//     pattern preserved)
+		// A transient DB failure that pre-M-1 would have been swept into the
+		// 404 substring branch (because the service wrapped every certRepo.Get
+		// error with "certificate not found") now correctly surfaces as 500.
+		status := errToStatus(err)
+		if status == http.StatusInternalServerError {
+			slog.Error("ExportPKCS12 failed", "cert_id", id, "error", err.Error())
 		}
-		if strings.Contains(err.Error(), "cannot be parsed") || strings.Contains(err.Error(), "no certificates found") {
-			ErrorWithRequestID(w, http.StatusUnprocessableEntity, "Certificate data cannot be parsed as X.509", requestID)
-			return
+		msg := "Failed to export PKCS#12"
+		switch status {
+		case http.StatusNotFound:
+			msg = "Certificate not found"
+		case http.StatusUnprocessableEntity:
+			msg = "Certificate data cannot be parsed as X.509"
 		}
-		slog.Error("ExportPKCS12 failed", "cert_id", id, "error", err.Error())
-		ErrorWithRequestID(w, http.StatusInternalServerError, "Failed to export PKCS#12", requestID)
+		ErrorWithRequestID(w, status, msg, requestID)
 		return
 	}
 

internal/api/handler/export_handler_test.go

@@ -108,9 +108,17 @@ func TestExportPEM_Download(t *testing.T) {
 }
 
 func TestExportPEM_NotFound(t *testing.T) {
+	// M-1 (P2): wrap with service.ErrNotFound via %w so the handler's
+	// errToStatus choke point dispatches to 404 via errors.Is. Pre-M-1 this
+	// test used a raw `fmt.Errorf("certificate not found")` string and relied
+	// on the handler's strings.Contains(err.Error(), "not found") classifier
+	// — which was the same mechanism that silently misclassified transient DB
+	// failures whose text happened to include "not found" (see docblock on
+	// ExportPEM handler). Pinning the sentinel contract makes this test
+	// regression-proof against wrap-text changes.
 	mockSvc := &MockExportService{
 		ExportPEMFn: func(_ context.Context, _ string) (*service.ExportPEMResult, error) {
-			return nil, fmt.Errorf("certificate not found")
+			return nil, fmt.Errorf("%w: certificate", service.ErrNotFound)
 		},
 	}
 	h := NewExportHandler(mockSvc)
@@ -214,9 +222,11 @@ func TestExportPKCS12_EmptyPassword(t *testing.T) {
 }
 
 func TestExportPKCS12_NotFound(t *testing.T) {
+	// M-1 (P2): same sentinel migration as TestExportPEM_NotFound — see
+	// rationale there.
 	mockSvc := &MockExportService{
 		ExportPKCS12Fn: func(_ context.Context, _ string, _ string) ([]byte, error) {
-			return nil, fmt.Errorf("certificate not found")
+			return nil, fmt.Errorf("%w: certificate", service.ErrNotFound)
 		},
 	}
 	h := NewExportHandler(mockSvc)
@@ -231,6 +241,31 @@ func TestExportPKCS12_NotFound(t *testing.T) {
 	}
 }
 
+// TestExportPKCS12_Unprocessable pins the M-1 (P2) 422 contract: when the
+// service layer wraps a parse failure with service.ErrUnprocessable, the
+// handler's errToStatus choke point must dispatch to 422 Unprocessable
+// Entity. Pre-M-1 this was classified via a 2-term substring net
+// (`"cannot be parsed"|"no certificates found"`) at export.go:101, which
+// would have been silently broken by a message reword in service/export.go.
+// The new sentinel makes the dispatch survive message rewording.
+func TestExportPKCS12_Unprocessable(t *testing.T) {
+	mockSvc := &MockExportService{
+		ExportPKCS12Fn: func(_ context.Context, _ string, _ string) ([]byte, error) {
+			return nil, fmt.Errorf("%w: certificate data cannot be parsed as X.509: asn1 decode error", service.ErrUnprocessable)
+		},
+	}
+	h := NewExportHandler(mockSvc)
+
+	req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodPost, "/api/v1/certificates/mc-test-1/export/pkcs12", nil)
+	w := httptest.NewRecorder()
+
+	h.ExportPKCS12(w, req)
+
+	if w.Code != http.StatusUnprocessableEntity {
+		t.Fatalf("expected 422, got %d", w.Code)
+	}
+}
+
 func TestExportPKCS12_ServiceError(t *testing.T) {
 	mockSvc := &MockExportService{
 		ExportPKCS12Fn: func(_ context.Context, _ string, _ string) ([]byte, error) {

internal/api/handler/issuers.go

@@ -135,16 +135,13 @@ func (h IssuerHandler) CreateIssuer(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
 
 	created, err := h.svc.CreateIssuer(r.Context(), issuer)
 	if err != nil {
-		h.logger.Error("failed to create issuer", "error", err, "name", issuer.Name, "type", issuer.Type)
-		errMsg := err.Error()
-		switch {
-		case strings.Contains(errMsg, "unique") || strings.Contains(errMsg, "duplicate"):
-			ErrorWithRequestID(w, http.StatusConflict, "An issuer with this name already exists", requestID)
-		case strings.Contains(errMsg, "unsupported issuer type"):
-			ErrorWithRequestID(w, http.StatusBadRequest, errMsg, requestID)
-		default:
-			ErrorWithRequestID(w, http.StatusInternalServerError, "Failed to create issuer", requestID)
+		status := errToStatus(err)
+		msg := err.Error()
+		if status == http.StatusInternalServerError {
+			h.logger.Error("failed to create issuer", "error", err, "name", issuer.Name, "type", issuer.Type)
+			msg = "internal error"
 		}
+		ErrorWithRequestID(w, status, msg, requestID)
 		return
 	}
 
@@ -177,16 +174,13 @@ func (h IssuerHandler) UpdateIssuer(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
 
 	updated, err := h.svc.UpdateIssuer(r.Context(), id, issuer)
 	if err != nil {
-		h.logger.Error("failed to update issuer", "error", err, "id", id)
-		errMsg := err.Error()
-		switch {
-		case strings.Contains(errMsg, "unique") || strings.Contains(errMsg, "duplicate"):
-			ErrorWithRequestID(w, http.StatusConflict, "An issuer with this name already exists", requestID)
-		case strings.Contains(errMsg, "not found"):
-			ErrorWithRequestID(w, http.StatusNotFound, "Issuer not found", requestID)
-		default:
-			ErrorWithRequestID(w, http.StatusInternalServerError, "Failed to update issuer", requestID)
+		status := errToStatus(err)
+		msg := err.Error()
+		if status == http.StatusInternalServerError {
+			h.logger.Error("failed to update issuer", "error", err, "id", id)
+			msg = "internal error"
 		}
+		ErrorWithRequestID(w, status, msg, requestID)
 		return
 	}
 
@@ -210,13 +204,13 @@ func (h IssuerHandler) DeleteIssuer(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
 	}
 
 	if err := h.svc.DeleteIssuer(r.Context(), id); err != nil {
-		if strings.Contains(err.Error(), "violates foreign key") || strings.Contains(err.Error(), "RESTRICT") {
-			ErrorWithRequestID(w, http.StatusConflict, "Cannot delete issuer: certificates are still using this issuer", requestID)
-		} else if strings.Contains(err.Error(), "not found") {
-			ErrorWithRequestID(w, http.StatusNotFound, "Issuer not found", requestID)
-		} else {
-			ErrorWithRequestID(w, http.StatusInternalServerError, "Failed to delete issuer", requestID)
+		status := errToStatus(err)
+		msg := err.Error()
+		if status == http.StatusInternalServerError {
+			h.logger.Error("DeleteIssuer failed", "issuer_id", id, "error", err)
+			msg = "internal error"
 		}
+		ErrorWithRequestID(w, status, msg, requestID)
 		return
 	}
 

internal/api/handler/jobs.go

@@ -3,15 +3,14 @@ package handler
 import (
 	"context"
 	"encoding/json"
-	"errors"
 	"io"
+	"log/slog"
 	"net/http"
 	"strconv"
 	"strings"
 
 	"github.com/shankar0123/certctl/internal/api/middleware"
 	"github.com/shankar0123/certctl/internal/domain"
-	"github.com/shankar0123/certctl/internal/service"
 )
 
 // JobService defines the service interface for job operations.
@@ -160,22 +159,13 @@ func (h JobHandler) ApproveJob(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
 	actor := resolveActor(r.Context())
 
 	if err := h.svc.ApproveJob(r.Context(), jobID, actor); err != nil {
-		// M-003: self-approval by the certificate owner is forbidden.
-		if errors.Is(err, service.ErrSelfApproval) {
-			ErrorWithRequestID(w, http.StatusForbidden,
-				"Self-approval is forbidden: the certificate owner cannot approve their own renewal",
-				requestID)
-			return
+		status := errToStatus(err)
+		msg := err.Error()
+		if status == http.StatusInternalServerError {
+			slog.Error("ApproveJob failed", "job_id", jobID, "error", err)
+			msg = "internal error"
 		}
-		if strings.Contains(err.Error(), "not found") {
-			ErrorWithRequestID(w, http.StatusNotFound, "Job not found", requestID)
-			return
-		}
-		if strings.Contains(err.Error(), "cannot approve") {
-			ErrorWithRequestID(w, http.StatusBadRequest, err.Error(), requestID)
-			return
-		}
-		ErrorWithRequestID(w, http.StatusInternalServerError, "Failed to approve job", requestID)
+		ErrorWithRequestID(w, status, msg, requestID)
 		return
 	}
 
@@ -213,15 +203,13 @@ func (h JobHandler) RejectJob(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
 	actor := resolveActor(r.Context())
 
 	if err := h.svc.RejectJob(r.Context(), jobID, body.Reason, actor); err != nil {
-		if strings.Contains(err.Error(), "not found") {
-			ErrorWithRequestID(w, http.StatusNotFound, "Job not found", requestID)
-			return
+		status := errToStatus(err)
+		msg := err.Error()
+		if status == http.StatusInternalServerError {
+			slog.Error("RejectJob failed", "job_id", jobID, "error", err)
+			msg = "internal error"
 		}
-		if strings.Contains(err.Error(), "cannot reject") {
-			ErrorWithRequestID(w, http.StatusBadRequest, err.Error(), requestID)
-			return
-		}
-		ErrorWithRequestID(w, http.StatusInternalServerError, "Failed to reject job", requestID)
+		ErrorWithRequestID(w, status, msg, requestID)
 		return
 	}
 

internal/api/handler/notifications.go

@@ -2,6 +2,7 @@ package handler
 
 import (
 	"context"
+	"log/slog"
 	"net/http"
 	"strconv"
 	"strings"
@@ -107,7 +108,25 @@ func (h NotificationHandler) GetNotification(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Requ
 
 	notification, err := h.svc.GetNotification(r.Context(), id)
 	if err != nil {
-		ErrorWithRequestID(w, http.StatusNotFound, "Notification not found", requestID)
+		// M-1 (P2): dispatch routes through errToStatus. Pre-M-1 this branch was
+		// a blanket `any error → 404 Notification not found` shortcut — which
+		// silently demoted transient DB failures from the service's List() wrap
+		// (notification.go:386 pre-M-1) to 404 Not Found with no observable
+		// external signal. Post-M-1: service/notification.go GetNotification only
+		// wraps the genuine "not found" path with service.ErrNotFound via %w, and
+		// every other error (including the List() wrap) surfaces without that
+		// sentinel — so errors.Is(err, service.ErrNotFound) picks up the real
+		// 404s and everything else correctly surfaces as 500 with server-side
+		// slog.Error capture (F-002 redacted-500 pattern preserved).
+		status := errToStatus(err)
+		if status == http.StatusInternalServerError {
+			slog.Error("GetNotification failed", "notification_id", id, "error", err.Error())
+		}
+		msg := "Failed to get notification"
+		if status == http.StatusNotFound {
+			msg = "Notification not found"
+		}
+		ErrorWithRequestID(w, status, msg, requestID)
 		return
 	}
 
@@ -170,11 +189,26 @@ func (h NotificationHandler) RequeueNotification(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.
 	notificationID := parts[0]
 
 	if err := h.svc.RequeueNotification(r.Context(), notificationID); err != nil {
-		if strings.Contains(err.Error(), "not found") {
-			ErrorWithRequestID(w, http.StatusNotFound, "Notification not found", requestID)
-			return
+		// M-1 (P2): dispatch routes through errToStatus. Pre-M-1 this branch
+		// classified 404 via strings.Contains(err.Error(), "not found"), which
+		// would have given false positives on any error whose rendered text
+		// happened to contain "not found" — notably a transient DB failure whose
+		// driver message mentioned a missing relation or column. Post-M-1: the
+		// repo-layer Requeue (postgres/notification.go) wraps zero-rows-affected
+		// with repository.ErrNotFound via %w, and the service layer forwards
+		// that error with %w — so errors.Is(err, repository.ErrNotFound) walks
+		// the full wrap chain and picks up the real 404s while everything else
+		// (including transient DB errors) correctly surfaces as 500 with
+		// server-side slog.Error capture (F-002 redacted-500 pattern preserved).
+		status := errToStatus(err)
+		if status == http.StatusInternalServerError {
+			slog.Error("RequeueNotification failed", "notification_id", notificationID, "error", err.Error())
 		}
-		ErrorWithRequestID(w, http.StatusInternalServerError, "Failed to requeue notification", requestID)
+		msg := "Failed to requeue notification"
+		if status == http.StatusNotFound {
+			msg = "Notification not found"
+		}
+		ErrorWithRequestID(w, status, msg, requestID)
 		return
 	}
 

internal/api/handler/owners.go

@@ -3,6 +3,7 @@ package handler
 import (
 	"context"
 	"encoding/json"
+	"log/slog"
 	"net/http"
 	"strconv"
 	"strings"
@@ -184,13 +185,13 @@ func (h OwnerHandler) DeleteOwner(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
 	id = parts[0]
 
 	if err := h.svc.DeleteOwner(r.Context(), id); err != nil {
-		if strings.Contains(err.Error(), "violates foreign key") || strings.Contains(err.Error(), "RESTRICT") {
-			ErrorWithRequestID(w, http.StatusConflict, "Cannot delete owner: certificates are still assigned to this owner", requestID)
-		} else if strings.Contains(err.Error(), "not found") {
-			ErrorWithRequestID(w, http.StatusNotFound, "Owner not found", requestID)
-		} else {
-			ErrorWithRequestID(w, http.StatusInternalServerError, "Failed to delete owner", requestID)
+		status := errToStatus(err)
+		msg := err.Error()
+		if status == http.StatusInternalServerError {
+			slog.Error("DeleteOwner failed", "owner_id", id, "error", err)
+			msg = "internal error"
 		}
+		ErrorWithRequestID(w, status, msg, requestID)
 		return
 	}
 

internal/api/handler/profiles.go

@@ -3,12 +3,14 @@ package handler
 import (
 	"context"
 	"encoding/json"
+	"errors"
 	"net/http"
 	"strconv"
 	"strings"
 
 	"github.com/shankar0123/certctl/internal/api/middleware"
 	"github.com/shankar0123/certctl/internal/domain"
+	"github.com/shankar0123/certctl/internal/service"
 )
 
 // ProfileService defines the service interface for certificate profile operations.
@@ -21,6 +23,20 @@ type ProfileService interface {
 }
 
 // ProfileHandler handles HTTP requests for certificate profile operations.
+//
+// Error dispatch (post-M-1): every service error routes through the [errToStatus]
+// choke point via `errors.Is` walking the wrap chain, with one explicit
+// [service.ErrValidation] arm on the write paths (Create, Update) so the
+// composed "validation: <field-specific reason>" message the service layer
+// attaches via `fmt.Errorf("%w: ...", ErrValidation)` can be passed through to
+// the 400 response body. Before M-1, the Create and Update handlers branched on
+// `strings.Contains(err.Error(), "invalid"|"required"|"must be"|"cannot")` — a
+// fragile pattern where a single reword in [service.validateProfile] would
+// demote the 400 to 500 with no compile-time signal. The substring-based 404
+// branches on Update and Delete likewise depended on the repository's
+// human-readable "profile not found" message surviving forever; both now ride
+// the same [repository.ErrNotFound] wrap that G-1's renewal-policy and M-1's
+// other repositories use.
 type ProfileHandler struct {
 	svc ProfileService
 }
@@ -88,7 +104,18 @@ func (h ProfileHandler) GetProfile(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
 
 	profile, err := h.svc.GetProfile(r.Context(), id)
 	if err != nil {
-		ErrorWithRequestID(w, http.StatusNotFound, "Profile not found", requestID)
+		// M-1: route through errToStatus so a repo-level `sql.ErrNoRows`
+		// (wrapped as repository.ErrNotFound) becomes 404, but a transient DB
+		// failure no longer masquerades as 404 — it correctly surfaces 500. The
+		// pre-M-1 "any error → 404" shortcut was plausible when Get's only
+		// expected failure was "not found", but the choke point now gives us
+		// correct dispatch for free. Mirrors GetRenewalPolicy.
+		status := errToStatus(err)
+		msg := "Failed to get profile"
+		if status == http.StatusNotFound {
+			msg = "Profile not found"
+		}
+		ErrorWithRequestID(w, status, msg, requestID)
 		return
 	}
 
@@ -123,9 +150,15 @@ func (h ProfileHandler) CreateProfile(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
 
 	created, err := h.svc.CreateProfile(r.Context(), profile)
 	if err != nil {
-		// Check if it's a validation error from the service
-		if strings.Contains(err.Error(), "invalid") || strings.Contains(err.Error(), "required") ||
-			strings.Contains(err.Error(), "must be") || strings.Contains(err.Error(), "cannot") {
+		// M-1: replace the 4-term substring net
+		// (`"invalid"|"required"|"must be"|"cannot"`) with a single
+		// `errors.Is(err, service.ErrValidation)` arm. validateProfile wraps
+		// every field-specific failure via `fmt.Errorf("%w: <reason>",
+		// ErrValidation)`, so `err.Error()` still contains the human-readable
+		// reason (e.g., "RSA minimum key size must be at least 2048") and can be
+		// safely passed to the 400 body — but the status decision no longer
+		// depends on the exact wording. Other errors redact to a generic 500.
+		if errors.Is(err, service.ErrValidation) {
 			ErrorWithRequestID(w, http.StatusBadRequest, err.Error(), requestID)
 			return
 		}
@@ -162,16 +195,21 @@ func (h ProfileHandler) UpdateProfile(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
 
 	updated, err := h.svc.UpdateProfile(r.Context(), id, profile)
 	if err != nil {
-		if strings.Contains(err.Error(), "not found") {
-			ErrorWithRequestID(w, http.StatusNotFound, "Profile not found", requestID)
-			return
-		}
-		if strings.Contains(err.Error(), "invalid") || strings.Contains(err.Error(), "required") ||
-			strings.Contains(err.Error(), "must be") || strings.Contains(err.Error(), "cannot") {
+		// M-1: explicit ErrValidation arm preserves the user-facing reason in
+		// the 400 body (validateProfile wraps every failure via
+		// `fmt.Errorf("%w: ...", ErrValidation)`); every other error — including
+		// repo-layer ErrNotFound on a missing row — routes through errToStatus
+		// so the 404/500 decision no longer depends on substring matching.
+		if errors.Is(err, service.ErrValidation) {
 			ErrorWithRequestID(w, http.StatusBadRequest, err.Error(), requestID)
 			return
 		}
-		ErrorWithRequestID(w, http.StatusInternalServerError, "Failed to update profile", requestID)
+		status := errToStatus(err)
+		msg := "Failed to update profile"
+		if status == http.StatusNotFound {
+			msg = "Profile not found"
+		}
+		ErrorWithRequestID(w, status, msg, requestID)
 		return
 	}
 
@@ -195,11 +233,14 @@ func (h ProfileHandler) DeleteProfile(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
 	}
 
 	if err := h.svc.DeleteProfile(r.Context(), id); err != nil {
-		if strings.Contains(err.Error(), "not found") {
-			ErrorWithRequestID(w, http.StatusNotFound, "Profile not found", requestID)
-			return
+		// M-1: sentinel dispatch replaces the substring 404 check — see the
+		// parallel comment block in UpdateProfile for the rationale.
+		status := errToStatus(err)
+		msg := "Failed to delete profile"
+		if status == http.StatusNotFound {
+			msg = "Profile not found"
 		}
-		ErrorWithRequestID(w, http.StatusInternalServerError, "Failed to delete profile", requestID)
+		ErrorWithRequestID(w, status, msg, requestID)
 		return
 	}
 

internal/api/handler/renewal_policy.go

@@ -26,14 +26,28 @@ type RenewalPolicyService interface {
 
 // RenewalPolicyHandler serves /api/v1/renewal-policies CRUD endpoints.
 //
-// G-1 design note: the service-level `ErrRenewalPolicyDuplicateName` /
-// `ErrRenewalPolicyInUse` sentinels alias the repository sentinels (same var
-// identity), so `errors.Is` walks transparently across layers. Delete/Update
-// not-found detection intentionally uses a `strings.Contains(err.Error(),
-// "not found")` substring check — the repo wraps `sql.ErrNoRows` as
-// `fmt.Errorf("renewal policy not found: %s", id)` which strips the sentinel,
-// and the handler red-tests' `ErrMockNotFound = errors.New("mock not found
-// error")` follows the same substring convention.
+// Error dispatch (post-M-1): every service error routes through the [errToStatus]
+// choke point via `errors.Is` walking the wrap chain. Three sentinel identities
+// cover the full dispatch surface:
+//
+//   - [service.ErrRenewalPolicyDuplicateName] / [service.ErrRenewalPolicyInUse]
+//     are `var`-aliased to the repository-layer sentinels of the same name (G-1),
+//     so handler-side `errors.Is` succeeds against a sentinel raised three layers
+//     deep in [internal/repository/postgres.RenewalPolicyRepository] without the
+//     service layer having to translate. [errToStatus] routes both to 409.
+//   - [repository.ErrNotFound] is wrapped around `sql.ErrNoRows` inside the
+//     repo's Get/Update/Delete methods via `fmt.Errorf("%w: renewal policy %s",
+//     repository.ErrNotFound, id)` (M-1). [errToStatus] routes that to 404 in
+//     the same switch arm as [service.ErrNotFound], preserving the existing
+//     404-on-missing behavior that the pre-M-1 substring check provided —
+//     without the rewording-regression risk that motivated the migration.
+//
+// The handler layer keeps two explicit `errors.Is` arms for the
+// duplicate-name / in-use sentinels so each 409 response can carry a
+// constraint-specific human-readable message ("with that name" vs. "still
+// referenced by managed certificates"); every other error path — including
+// not-found — delegates the status decision to [errToStatus] and provides a
+// generic body via the F-002 redacted-500 pattern.
 type RenewalPolicyHandler struct {
 	svc RenewalPolicyService
 }
@@ -105,11 +119,18 @@ func (h RenewalPolicyHandler) GetRenewalPolicy(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Re
 
 	policy, err := h.svc.GetRenewalPolicy(r.Context(), id)
 	if err != nil {
-		// Matches the PolicyHandler.GetPolicy convention: any error from the
-		// service surfaces as 404. The repo wraps sql.ErrNoRows as
-		// "renewal policy not found: %s" and there's no other expected failure
-		// mode on Get — the caller gets a clean 404.
-		ErrorWithRequestID(w, http.StatusNotFound, "Renewal policy not found", requestID)
+		// M-1: route through errToStatus so a repo-level `sql.ErrNoRows`
+		// (wrapped as repository.ErrNotFound) becomes 404, but a transient DB
+		// failure no longer masquerades as 404 — it correctly surfaces 500.
+		// The pre-M-1 "any error → 404" shortcut was plausible when Get's only
+		// expected failure was "not found", but the choke point now gives us
+		// correct dispatch for free.
+		status := errToStatus(err)
+		msg := "Failed to get renewal policy"
+		if status == http.StatusNotFound {
+			msg = "Renewal policy not found"
+		}
+		ErrorWithRequestID(w, status, msg, requestID)
 		return
 	}
 
@@ -158,11 +179,11 @@ func (h RenewalPolicyHandler) CreateRenewalPolicy(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http
 // UpdateRenewalPolicy replaces the fields of an existing renewal policy.
 // PUT /api/v1/renewal-policies/{id}
 //
-// Error mapping:
-//   - invalid JSON / empty ID      → 400
-//   - ErrRenewalPolicyDuplicateName → 409
-//   - error text contains "not found" → 404 (see struct doc comment re: substring check)
-//   - anything else                → 500
+// Error mapping (post-M-1, sentinel-driven):
+//   - invalid JSON / empty ID                      → 400
+//   - ErrRenewalPolicyDuplicateName (pg 23505)     → 409 (explicit arm, custom msg)
+//   - ErrNotFound (wrapping sql.ErrNoRows)         → 404 (via errToStatus)
+//   - anything else                                → 500 (via errToStatus, body redacted)
 func (h RenewalPolicyHandler) UpdateRenewalPolicy(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
 	if r.Method != http.MethodPut {
 		Error(w, http.StatusMethodNotAllowed, "Method not allowed")
@@ -191,11 +212,17 @@ func (h RenewalPolicyHandler) UpdateRenewalPolicy(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http
 			ErrorWithRequestID(w, http.StatusConflict, "A renewal policy with that name already exists", requestID)
 			return
 		}
-		if strings.Contains(err.Error(), "not found") {
-			ErrorWithRequestID(w, http.StatusNotFound, "Renewal policy not found", requestID)
-			return
+		// M-1: drop the `strings.Contains(err.Error(), "not found")` branch.
+		// [repository.ErrNotFound] now wraps sql.ErrNoRows at the three
+		// renewal-policy repo methods (Get/Update/Delete), so errToStatus
+		// routes a missing row to 404 via errors.Is without depending on the
+		// repo's fmt.Errorf format string surviving a future reword.
+		status := errToStatus(err)
+		msg := "Failed to update renewal policy"
+		if status == http.StatusNotFound {
+			msg = "Renewal policy not found"
 		}
-		ErrorWithRequestID(w, http.StatusInternalServerError, "Failed to update renewal policy", requestID)
+		ErrorWithRequestID(w, status, msg, requestID)
 		return
 	}
 
@@ -205,11 +232,11 @@ func (h RenewalPolicyHandler) UpdateRenewalPolicy(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http
 // DeleteRenewalPolicy removes a renewal policy.
 // DELETE /api/v1/renewal-policies/{id}
 //
-// Error mapping:
-//   - empty ID (trailing slash)    → 400
-//   - ErrRenewalPolicyInUse (pg 23503 FK-RESTRICT against managed_certificates.renewal_policy_id) → 409
-//   - error text contains "not found" → 404
-//   - anything else                → 500
+// Error mapping (post-M-1, sentinel-driven):
+//   - empty ID (trailing slash)                    → 400
+//   - ErrRenewalPolicyInUse (pg 23503 FK-RESTRICT) → 409 (explicit arm, custom msg)
+//   - ErrNotFound (wrapping sql.ErrNoRows)         → 404 (via errToStatus)
+//   - anything else                                → 500 (via errToStatus, body redacted)
 func (h RenewalPolicyHandler) DeleteRenewalPolicy(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
 	if r.Method != http.MethodDelete {
 		Error(w, http.StatusMethodNotAllowed, "Method not allowed")
@@ -231,11 +258,14 @@ func (h RenewalPolicyHandler) DeleteRenewalPolicy(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http
 			ErrorWithRequestID(w, http.StatusConflict, "Renewal policy is still referenced by managed certificates", requestID)
 			return
 		}
-		if strings.Contains(err.Error(), "not found") {
-			ErrorWithRequestID(w, http.StatusNotFound, "Renewal policy not found", requestID)
-			return
+		// M-1: sentinel dispatch replaces the substring check — see the
+		// parallel comment block in UpdateRenewalPolicy for the rationale.
+		status := errToStatus(err)
+		msg := "Failed to delete renewal policy"
+		if status == http.StatusNotFound {
+			msg = "Renewal policy not found"
 		}
-		ErrorWithRequestID(w, http.StatusInternalServerError, "Failed to delete renewal policy", requestID)
+		ErrorWithRequestID(w, status, msg, requestID)
 		return
 	}
 

internal/api/handler/scep.go

@@ -6,6 +6,7 @@ import (
 	"encoding/asn1"
 	"encoding/base64"
 	"encoding/pem"
+	"errors"
 	"fmt"
 	"io"
 	"net/http"
@@ -14,6 +15,7 @@ import (
 	"github.com/shankar0123/certctl/internal/api/middleware"
 	"github.com/shankar0123/certctl/internal/domain"
 	"github.com/shankar0123/certctl/internal/pkcs7"
+	"github.com/shankar0123/certctl/internal/service"
 )
 
 // SCEPService defines the service interface for SCEP enrollment operations.
@@ -171,11 +173,25 @@ func (h SCEPHandler) pkiOperation(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
 
 	result, err := h.svc.PKCSReq(r.Context(), csrPEM, challengePassword, transactionID)
 	if err != nil {
-		if strings.Contains(err.Error(), "challenge password") {
-			ErrorWithRequestID(w, http.StatusForbidden, "Invalid challenge password", requestID)
+		// M-1 (P2): typed-sentinel dispatch replaces the pre-M-1 substring
+		// branch `strings.Contains(err.Error(), "challenge password")`. The
+		// service layer now wraps both challenge-password failure modes (server
+		// misconfigured / client credential wrong) via `fmt.Errorf("%w: ...",
+		// ErrUnauthenticated)`, so errors.Is walks the wrap chain without
+		// depending on the exact wording of the error string. This also
+		// corrects the HTTP status: pre-M-1 returned 403 Forbidden, but RFC
+		// 7235 classifies this as 401 Unauthorized (authentication failure, not
+		// authorization denial). The errToStatus doc block enumerates this as
+		// the canonical ErrUnauthenticated call site.
+		if errors.Is(err, service.ErrUnauthenticated) {
+			ErrorWithRequestID(w, http.StatusUnauthorized, "Invalid challenge password", requestID)
 			return
 		}
-		ErrorWithRequestID(w, http.StatusInternalServerError, fmt.Sprintf("Enrollment failed: %v", err), requestID)
+		// F-002 redacted-500: every other enrollment failure (CSR parse errors,
+		// issuer-layer failures, audit-layer failures) returns an opaque body
+		// so we don't leak internal state through the SCEP response. The
+		// logger already captured the real error at the service layer.
+		ErrorWithRequestID(w, http.StatusInternalServerError, "Enrollment failed", requestID)
 		return
 	}
 

internal/api/handler/scep_handler_test.go

@@ -4,12 +4,14 @@ import (
 	"context"
 	"encoding/pem"
 	"errors"
+	"fmt"
 	"net/http"
 	"net/http/httptest"
 	"strings"
 	"testing"
 
 	"github.com/shankar0123/certctl/internal/domain"
+	"github.com/shankar0123/certctl/internal/service"
 )
 
 // mockSCEPService implements SCEPService for testing.
@@ -214,9 +216,21 @@ func TestSCEP_PKIOperation_Success_RawCSR(t *testing.T) {
 	}
 }
 
+// TestSCEP_PKIOperation_ChallengePasswordRejected pins the M-1 (P2) dispatch
+// contract: when the service wraps the failure via `fmt.Errorf("%w: ...",
+// service.ErrUnauthenticated)` the handler's errToStatus choke point must
+// return 401 Unauthorized, NOT 403 Forbidden.
+//
+// This is a deliberate semantic correction. Pre-M-1 the handler inspected
+// err.Error() for the "challenge password" substring and returned 403, which
+// misclassified the RFC 7235 condition (the caller presented no valid
+// application-layer credential — that is auth failure, not authorization
+// denial). The errToStatus doc explicitly cites this code path as the
+// canonical ErrUnauthenticated consumer; see handler/errors.go and the
+// symmetric M-1 comment block at handler/scep.go in the pkiOperation arm.
 func TestSCEP_PKIOperation_ChallengePasswordRejected(t *testing.T) {
 	svc := &mockSCEPService{
-		EnrollErr: errors.New("invalid challenge password"),
+		EnrollErr: fmt.Errorf("%w: invalid challenge password", service.ErrUnauthenticated),
 	}
 	h := NewSCEPHandler(svc)
 
@@ -230,8 +244,8 @@ func TestSCEP_PKIOperation_ChallengePasswordRejected(t *testing.T) {
 	w := httptest.NewRecorder()
 	h.HandleSCEP(w, req)
 
-	if w.Code != http.StatusForbidden {
-		t.Errorf("expected 403, got %d: %s", w.Code, w.Body.String())
+	if w.Code != http.StatusUnauthorized {
+		t.Errorf("expected 401 Unauthorized (M-1 dispatch of service.ErrUnauthenticated), got %d: %s", w.Code, w.Body.String())
 	}
 }
 

internal/api/handler/test_utils.go

@@ -1,11 +1,27 @@
 package handler
 
-import "errors"
+import (
+	"errors"
+	"fmt"
 
-var (
-	// Mock errors for testing
-	ErrMockServiceFailed = errors.New("mock service error")
-	ErrMockNotFound      = errors.New("mock not found error")
-	ErrMockUnauthorized  = errors.New("mock unauthorized error")
-	ErrMockConflict      = errors.New("mock conflict error")
+	"github.com/shankar0123/certctl/internal/service"
+)
+
+// Mock errors for testing.
+//
+// M-1: Since the handler layer now classifies errors via the typed-sentinel
+// dispatch in [errToStatus] (errors.Is on service + repository sentinels rather
+// than substring matching on err.Error()), handler mocks MUST wrap the
+// appropriate generic sentinel so `errors.Is(err, service.ErrNotFound)` etc.
+// succeed. Using raw errors.New() breaks the dispatch and degrades every
+// mock-driven negative-path test to a 500 Internal Server Error — the same
+// silent-regression trap the migration was designed to eliminate.
+//
+// ErrMockServiceFailed deliberately stays untyped so it continues to exercise
+// the default 500 path.
+var (
+	ErrMockServiceFailed = errors.New("mock service error")
+	ErrMockNotFound      = fmt.Errorf("%w: mock not found", service.ErrNotFound)
+	ErrMockUnauthorized  = fmt.Errorf("%w: mock unauthenticated", service.ErrUnauthenticated)
+	ErrMockConflict      = fmt.Errorf("%w: mock conflict", service.ErrConflict)
 )

internal/integration/lifecycle_test.go

@@ -1318,7 +1318,10 @@ func (m *mockProfileService) ListProfiles(_ context.Context, page, perPage int)
 }
 
 func (m *mockProfileService) GetProfile(_ context.Context, id string) (*domain.CertificateProfile, error) {
-	return nil, fmt.Errorf("profile not found")
+	// M-1: wrap service.ErrNotFound so the handler's errToStatus choke point
+	// routes this to 404 via errors.Is. The Error() message still contains
+	// "not found" so any pre-migration substring assertions continue to pass.
+	return nil, fmt.Errorf("%w: profile not found", service.ErrNotFound)
 }
 
 func (m *mockProfileService) CreateProfile(_ context.Context, profile domain.CertificateProfile) (*domain.CertificateProfile, error) {
@@ -1341,7 +1344,8 @@ func (m *mockAgentGroupService) ListAgentGroups(_ context.Context, page, perPage
 }
 
 func (m *mockAgentGroupService) GetAgentGroup(_ context.Context, id string) (*domain.AgentGroup, error) {
-	return nil, fmt.Errorf("agent group not found")
+	// M-1: wrap service.ErrNotFound — see GetProfile above for rationale.
+	return nil, fmt.Errorf("%w: agent group not found", service.ErrNotFound)
 }
 
 func (m *mockAgentGroupService) CreateAgentGroup(_ context.Context, group domain.AgentGroup) (*domain.AgentGroup, error) {

internal/repository/interfaces.go

@@ -18,7 +18,17 @@ import (
 // managed_certificates.renewal_policy_id to renewal_policies.id with ON
 // DELETE RESTRICT). Both map onto the same 409 status but with distinct
 // messages so operators can tell them apart.
+//
+// M-1: ErrNotFound is the repo-layer "row not found" sentinel. Repositories
+// that historically returned fmt.Errorf("... not found: %s", id) without
+// wrapping sql.ErrNoRows now wrap ErrNotFound via fmt.Errorf("%w: ...", so
+// the handler layer's single errToStatus choke point can route them to HTTP
+// 404 via errors.Is without substring-matching the message text. Existing
+// service-level service.ErrNotFound stays a distinct value — both map to 404
+// through explicit branches in handler/errors.go (mirrors the G-1 treatment
+// of the repo-level 409 sentinels).
 var (
+	ErrNotFound                   = errors.New("repository: not found")
 	ErrRenewalPolicyDuplicateName = errors.New("renewal policy name already exists")
 	ErrRenewalPolicyInUse         = errors.New("renewal policy is still referenced by managed certificates")
 )

internal/repository/postgres/agent.go

@@ -3,11 +3,13 @@ package postgres
 import (
 	"context"
 	"database/sql"
+	"errors"
 	"fmt"
 	"time"
 
 	"github.com/google/uuid"
 	"github.com/shankar0123/certctl/internal/domain"
+	"github.com/shankar0123/certctl/internal/repository"
 )
 
 // AgentRepository implements repository.AgentRepository
@@ -72,8 +74,13 @@ func (r *AgentRepository) Get(ctx context.Context, id string) (*domain.Agent, er
 
 	agent, err := scanAgent(row)
 	if err != nil {
-		if err == sql.ErrNoRows {
-			return nil, fmt.Errorf("agent not found")
+		// M-1 (P2): wrap sql.ErrNoRows with repository.ErrNotFound via %w so
+		// the handler's errToStatus choke point dispatches to 404 via
+		// errors.Is instead of the pre-M-1 strings.Contains(err.Error(),
+		// "not found") branch at handler/agents.go. Mirrors agent_group and
+		// profile repositories.
+		if errors.Is(err, sql.ErrNoRows) {
+			return nil, fmt.Errorf("%w: agent %s", repository.ErrNotFound, id)
 		}
 		return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to query agent: %w", err)
 	}
@@ -169,8 +176,12 @@ func (r *AgentRepository) Update(ctx context.Context, agent *domain.Agent) error
 		return fmt.Errorf("failed to get rows affected: %w", err)
 	}
 
+	// M-1 (P2): wrap the zero-rows-affected condition with
+	// repository.ErrNotFound so the handler's errToStatus dispatches to 404
+	// via errors.Is without substring matching. Mirrors agent_group and
+	// profile repositories.
 	if rows == 0 {
-		return fmt.Errorf("agent not found")
+		return fmt.Errorf("%w: agent %s", repository.ErrNotFound, agent.ID)
 	}
 
 	return nil
@@ -189,8 +200,10 @@ func (r *AgentRepository) Delete(ctx context.Context, id string) error {
 		return fmt.Errorf("failed to get rows affected: %w", err)
 	}
 
+	// M-1 (P2): zero-rows-affected → repository.ErrNotFound wrap. Mirrors
+	// agent_group and profile repositories.
 	if rows == 0 {
-		return fmt.Errorf("agent not found")
+		return fmt.Errorf("%w: agent %s", repository.ErrNotFound, id)
 	}
 
 	return nil
@@ -236,8 +249,13 @@ func (r *AgentRepository) UpdateHeartbeat(ctx context.Context, id string, metada
 		return fmt.Errorf("failed to get rows affected: %w", err)
 	}
 
+	// M-1 (P2): zero-rows-affected → repository.ErrNotFound wrap. Note the
+	// UPDATE filters on `retired_at IS NULL`, so a retired agent row also
+	// returns zero-rows-affected here. The service layer short-circuits with
+	// ErrAgentRetired (410) BEFORE reaching this path via Heartbeat's
+	// explicit Get check, so the 404 vs 410 distinction is drawn upstream.
 	if rows == 0 {
-		return fmt.Errorf("agent not found")
+		return fmt.Errorf("%w: agent %s", repository.ErrNotFound, id)
 	}
 
 	return nil
@@ -258,8 +276,13 @@ func (r *AgentRepository) GetByAPIKey(ctx context.Context, keyHash string) (*dom
 
 	agent, err := scanAgent(row)
 	if err != nil {
-		if err == sql.ErrNoRows {
-			return nil, fmt.Errorf("agent not found")
+		// M-1 (P2): wrap sql.ErrNoRows with repository.ErrNotFound via %w.
+		// The auth middleware calls this on every request; a missing row
+		// must surface as 404 (well, 401 upstream — the middleware treats
+		// "no agent matched" as auth failure) via the errToStatus choke
+		// point, not via substring matching.
+		if errors.Is(err, sql.ErrNoRows) {
+			return nil, fmt.Errorf("%w: agent with api key not found", repository.ErrNotFound)
 		}
 		return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to query agent: %w", err)
 	}

internal/repository/postgres/agent_group.go

@@ -3,10 +3,12 @@ package postgres
 import (
 	"context"
 	"database/sql"
+	"errors"
 	"fmt"
 	"time"
 
 	"github.com/shankar0123/certctl/internal/domain"
+	"github.com/shankar0123/certctl/internal/repository"
 )
 
 // AgentGroupRepository implements agent group CRUD with PostgreSQL.
@@ -49,8 +51,12 @@ func (r *AgentGroupRepository) Get(ctx context.Context, id string) (*domain.Agen
 	g := &domain.AgentGroup{}
 	err := row.Scan(&g.ID, &g.Name, &g.Description, &g.MatchOS, &g.MatchArchitecture,
 		&g.MatchIPCIDR, &g.MatchVersion, &g.Enabled, &g.CreatedAt, &g.UpdatedAt)
-	if err == sql.ErrNoRows {
-		return nil, fmt.Errorf("agent group not found: %s", id)
+	// M-1 (P2): wrap sql.ErrNoRows with repository.ErrNotFound via %w so the
+	// handler's errToStatus choke point dispatches to 404 via errors.Is
+	// instead of the pre-M-1 strings.Contains(err.Error(), "not found")
+	// branch at handler/agent_groups.go. Mirrors profile repository.
+	if errors.Is(err, sql.ErrNoRows) {
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("%w: agent group %s", repository.ErrNotFound, id)
 	}
 	if err != nil {
 		return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to get agent group: %w", err)
@@ -83,8 +89,11 @@ func (r *AgentGroupRepository) Update(ctx context.Context, group *domain.AgentGr
 		return fmt.Errorf("failed to update agent group: %w", err)
 	}
 	rows, _ := result.RowsAffected()
+	// M-1 (P2): wrap the zero-rows-affected condition with
+	// repository.ErrNotFound so the handler's errToStatus dispatches to 404
+	// via errors.Is without substring matching. Mirrors profile repository.
 	if rows == 0 {
-		return fmt.Errorf("agent group not found: %s", group.ID)
+		return fmt.Errorf("%w: agent group %s", repository.ErrNotFound, group.ID)
 	}
 	return nil
 }
@@ -96,8 +105,11 @@ func (r *AgentGroupRepository) Delete(ctx context.Context, id string) error {
 		return fmt.Errorf("failed to delete agent group: %w", err)
 	}
 	rows, _ := result.RowsAffected()
+	// M-1 (P2): wrap zero-rows-affected with repository.ErrNotFound so the
+	// handler's errToStatus dispatches to 404 via errors.Is. Mirrors profile
+	// repository.
 	if rows == 0 {
-		return fmt.Errorf("agent group not found: %s", id)
+		return fmt.Errorf("%w: agent group %s", repository.ErrNotFound, id)
 	}
 	return nil
 }

internal/repository/postgres/certificate.go

@@ -264,8 +264,14 @@ func (r *CertificateRepository) Get(ctx context.Context, id string) (*domain.Man
 
 	cert, err := r.scanCertificate(ctx, row)
 	if err != nil {
-		if err == sql.ErrNoRows {
-			return nil, fmt.Errorf("certificate not found")
+		// M-1 (P2): wrap sql.ErrNoRows with repository.ErrNotFound via %w so
+		// the handler's errToStatus choke point dispatches to 404 via
+		// errors.Is instead of the pre-M-1 strings.Contains(err.Error(),
+		// "not found") branch at handler/export.go (ExportPEM + ExportPKCS12).
+		// scanCertificate already wraps sql.ErrNoRows via %w, so errors.Is
+		// walks through. Mirrors profile and agent_group repositories.
+		if errors.Is(err, sql.ErrNoRows) {
+			return nil, fmt.Errorf("%w: certificate %s", repository.ErrNotFound, id)
 		}
 		return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to query certificate: %w", err)
 	}
@@ -396,8 +402,11 @@ func (r *CertificateRepository) Update(ctx context.Context, cert *domain.Managed
 		return fmt.Errorf("failed to get rows affected: %w", err)
 	}
 
+	// M-1 (P2): zero-rows-affected → repository.ErrNotFound wrap so the
+	// handler's errToStatus dispatches to 404 via errors.Is. Mirrors profile
+	// and agent_group repositories.
 	if rows == 0 {
-		return fmt.Errorf("certificate not found")
+		return fmt.Errorf("%w: certificate %s", repository.ErrNotFound, cert.ID)
 	}
 
 	return nil
@@ -418,8 +427,10 @@ func (r *CertificateRepository) Archive(ctx context.Context, id string) error {
 		return fmt.Errorf("failed to get rows affected: %w", err)
 	}
 
+	// M-1 (P2): zero-rows-affected → repository.ErrNotFound wrap. Mirrors
+	// profile and agent_group repositories.
 	if rows == 0 {
-		return fmt.Errorf("certificate not found")
+		return fmt.Errorf("%w: certificate %s", repository.ErrNotFound, id)
 	}
 
 	return nil
@@ -583,6 +594,16 @@ func (r *CertificateRepository) GetLatestVersion(ctx context.Context, certID str
 	v.KeySize = int(keySize.Int64)
 
 	if err != nil {
+		// M-1 (P2): wrap sql.ErrNoRows with repository.ErrNotFound via %w so
+		// the handler's errToStatus choke point dispatches to 404 via
+		// errors.Is. The export service surfaces "no certificate version
+		// found" on this path — pre-M-1 the handler branched on
+		// strings.Contains(err.Error(), "not found"), now it walks the wrap
+		// chain. Non-ErrNoRows errors preserve their "failed to get latest
+		// certificate version" framing.
+		if errors.Is(err, sql.ErrNoRows) {
+			return nil, fmt.Errorf("%w: certificate version for %s", repository.ErrNotFound, certID)
+		}
 		return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to get latest certificate version: %w", err)
 	}
 

internal/repository/postgres/notification.go

@@ -138,7 +138,15 @@ func (r *NotificationRepository) List(ctx context.Context, filter *repository.No
 	return notifs, nil
 }
 
-// UpdateStatus updates a notification's delivery status
+// UpdateStatus updates a notification's delivery status.
+//
+// M-1 (P2): zero-rows-affected now wraps repository.ErrNotFound via %w so the
+// handler's errToStatus choke point dispatches to 404 via errors.Is. Pre-M-1
+// the return was a raw fmt.Errorf("notification not found") string that the
+// service layer re-wrapped and the handler classified via strings.Contains —
+// one sentinel-message reword away from silently demoting 404 to 500. The
+// behavior (error on concurrent-delete / bad-id) is unchanged; only the error
+// identity is now type-safe.
 func (r *NotificationRepository) UpdateStatus(ctx context.Context, id string, status string, sentAt time.Time) error {
 	result, err := r.db.ExecContext(ctx, `
 		UPDATE notification_events SET status = $1, sent_at = $2 WHERE id = $3
@@ -154,7 +162,7 @@ func (r *NotificationRepository) UpdateStatus(ctx context.Context, id string, st
 	}
 
 	if rows == 0 {
-		return fmt.Errorf("notification not found")
+		return fmt.Errorf("%w: notification %s", repository.ErrNotFound, id)
 	}
 
 	return nil
@@ -307,10 +315,12 @@ func (r *NotificationRepository) RecordFailedAttempt(ctx context.Context, id str
 		return fmt.Errorf("failed to get rows affected: %w", err)
 	}
 	if rows == 0 {
-		// Same "not found" error shape as UpdateStatus above. The scheduler
-		// logs-and-continues on this so a concurrently-deleted row doesn't
-		// break the sweep.
-		return fmt.Errorf("notification not found")
+		// M-1 (P2): wrap repository.ErrNotFound (was raw
+		// fmt.Errorf("notification not found")). Same "not found" shape as
+		// UpdateStatus — the scheduler logs-and-continues on a concurrently
+		// deleted row, but callers that surface the error (the handler) now
+		// discriminate via errors.Is instead of substring matching.
+		return fmt.Errorf("%w: notification %s", repository.ErrNotFound, id)
 	}
 	return nil
 }
@@ -342,7 +352,8 @@ func (r *NotificationRepository) MarkAsDead(ctx context.Context, id string, last
 		return fmt.Errorf("failed to get rows affected: %w", err)
 	}
 	if rows == 0 {
-		return fmt.Errorf("notification not found")
+		// M-1 (P2): wrap repository.ErrNotFound. See UpdateStatus rationale.
+		return fmt.Errorf("%w: notification %s", repository.ErrNotFound, id)
 	}
 	return nil
 }
@@ -379,7 +390,8 @@ func (r *NotificationRepository) Requeue(ctx context.Context, id string) error {
 		return fmt.Errorf("failed to get rows affected: %w", err)
 	}
 	if rows == 0 {
-		return fmt.Errorf("notification not found")
+		// M-1 (P2): wrap repository.ErrNotFound. See UpdateStatus rationale.
+		return fmt.Errorf("%w: notification %s", repository.ErrNotFound, id)
 	}
 	return nil
 }

internal/repository/postgres/profile.go

@@ -4,11 +4,13 @@ import (
 	"context"
 	"database/sql"
 	"encoding/json"
+	"errors"
 	"fmt"
 	"time"
 
 	"github.com/google/uuid"
 	"github.com/shankar0123/certctl/internal/domain"
+	"github.com/shankar0123/certctl/internal/repository"
 )
 
 // ProfileRepository implements repository.CertificateProfileRepository
@@ -63,8 +65,11 @@ func (r *ProfileRepository) Get(ctx context.Context, id string) (*domain.Certifi
 
 	p, err := scanProfile(row)
 	if err != nil {
-		if err == sql.ErrNoRows {
-			return nil, fmt.Errorf("profile not found")
+		if errors.Is(err, sql.ErrNoRows) {
+			// M-1: wrap repository.ErrNotFound so the handler's errToStatus
+			// choke point can route this to HTTP 404 via errors.Is without
+			// substring-matching the "not found" message text.
+			return nil, fmt.Errorf("%w: profile %s", repository.ErrNotFound, id)
 		}
 		return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to query profile: %w", err)
 	}
@@ -159,7 +164,8 @@ func (r *ProfileRepository) Update(ctx context.Context, profile *domain.Certific
 	}
 
 	if rows == 0 {
-		return fmt.Errorf("profile not found")
+		// M-1: wrap repository.ErrNotFound — see Get for rationale.
+		return fmt.Errorf("%w: profile %s", repository.ErrNotFound, profile.ID)
 	}
 
 	return nil
@@ -178,7 +184,8 @@ func (r *ProfileRepository) Delete(ctx context.Context, id string) error {
 	}
 
 	if rows == 0 {
-		return fmt.Errorf("profile not found")
+		// M-1: wrap repository.ErrNotFound — see Get for rationale.
+		return fmt.Errorf("%w: profile %s", repository.ErrNotFound, id)
 	}
 
 	return nil

internal/repository/postgres/renewal_policy.go

@@ -72,7 +72,10 @@ func (r *RenewalPolicyRepository) Get(ctx context.Context, id string) (*domain.R
 	policy, err := scanRenewalPolicy(row)
 	if err != nil {
 		if errors.Is(err, sql.ErrNoRows) {
-			return nil, fmt.Errorf("renewal policy not found: %s", id)
+			// M-1: wrap repository.ErrNotFound so the handler's errToStatus
+			// choke point can route this to HTTP 404 via errors.Is without
+			// substring-matching the "not found" message text.
+			return nil, fmt.Errorf("%w: renewal policy %s", repository.ErrNotFound, id)
 		}
 		return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to query renewal policy: %w", err)
 	}
@@ -252,7 +255,8 @@ func (r *RenewalPolicyRepository) Update(ctx context.Context, id string, policy
 	updated, err := scanRenewalPolicy(row)
 	if err != nil {
 		if errors.Is(err, sql.ErrNoRows) {
-			return fmt.Errorf("renewal policy not found: %s", id)
+			// M-1: wrap repository.ErrNotFound — see Get for rationale.
+			return fmt.Errorf("%w: renewal policy %s", repository.ErrNotFound, id)
 		}
 		if isUniqueViolation(err) {
 			return repository.ErrRenewalPolicyDuplicateName
@@ -283,7 +287,8 @@ func (r *RenewalPolicyRepository) Delete(ctx context.Context, id string) error {
 		return fmt.Errorf("failed to read RowsAffected for delete: %w", err)
 	}
 	if rows == 0 {
-		return fmt.Errorf("renewal policy not found: %s", id)
+		// M-1: wrap repository.ErrNotFound — see Get for rationale.
+		return fmt.Errorf("%w: renewal policy %s", repository.ErrNotFound, id)
 	}
 	return nil
 }

internal/service/agent.go

@@ -6,10 +6,12 @@ import (
 	"crypto/sha256"
 	"encoding/base64"
 	"encoding/hex"
+	"errors"
 	"fmt"
 	"log/slog"
 	"time"
 
+	"github.com/lib/pq"
 	"github.com/shankar0123/certctl/internal/domain"
 	"github.com/shankar0123/certctl/internal/repository"
 )
@@ -409,6 +411,16 @@ func (s *AgentService) RegisterAgent(ctx context.Context, agent domain.Agent) (*
 	agent.LastHeartbeatAt = &now
 
 	if err := s.agentRepo.Create(ctx, &agent); err != nil {
+		// M-1 (P2): explicit pg-23505 dispatch wraps unique-constraint
+		// violations on the agent name with ErrConflict so the handler's
+		// errors.Is(err, service.ErrConflict) arm fires 409 deterministically
+		// instead of relying on the errToStatus *pq.Error SQLSTATE fallback.
+		// Mirrors the duplicate-name paths in IssuerService and
+		// RenewalPolicyService.
+		var pgErr *pq.Error
+		if errors.As(err, &pgErr) && pgErr.Code == "23505" {
+			return nil, fmt.Errorf("%w: agent name already exists", ErrConflict)
+		}
 		return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to register agent: %w", err)
 	}
 	return &agent, nil

internal/service/agent_group.go

@@ -143,12 +143,20 @@ func (s *AgentGroupService) ListMembers(ctx context.Context, id string) ([]domai
 }
 
 // validateAgentGroup checks that an agent group's configuration is valid.
+//
+// M-1 (P2): every return wraps ErrValidation via %w so the handler's
+// errToStatus choke point dispatches these to HTTP 400 via errors.Is without
+// the substring-matching on "invalid"/"required" that the pre-M-1
+// agent_groups handler relied on at handler/agent_groups.go:126. The composed
+// Error() string still contains the original human-readable text, so the
+// handler safely passes err.Error() through to the response body on the 400
+// arm. Mirrors validateProfile.
 func validateAgentGroup(g *domain.AgentGroup) error {
 	if g.Name == "" {
-		return fmt.Errorf("agent group name is required")
+		return fmt.Errorf("%w: agent group name is required", ErrValidation)
 	}
 	if len(g.Name) > 255 {
-		return fmt.Errorf("agent group name exceeds 255 characters")
+		return fmt.Errorf("%w: agent group name exceeds 255 characters", ErrValidation)
 	}
 	return nil
 }

internal/service/agent_retire.go

@@ -26,8 +26,12 @@ import (
 // three cloud secret-manager discovery sources; retiring any of them orphans
 // its subsystem. The guard fires unconditionally — force=true does not bypass
 // it, because a sentinel is a structural invariant of the deployment, not
-// a piece of fleet state the operator owns. Handler maps this to HTTP 403.
-var ErrAgentIsSentinel = errors.New("agent is a reserved sentinel and cannot be retired")
+// a piece of fleet state the operator owns.
+//
+// M-1 (P2): wraps [ErrForbidden] so the handler-layer errToStatus choke point
+// resolves HTTP 403 via errors.Is. Call sites can still errors.Is against
+// ErrAgentIsSentinel for domain-specific branches.
+var ErrAgentIsSentinel = fmt.Errorf("%w: agent is a reserved sentinel and cannot be retired", ErrForbidden)
 
 // ErrBlockedByDependencies is returned by RetireAgent when at least one of
 // (active targets, active certificates, pending jobs) referencing the agent
@@ -35,15 +39,22 @@ var ErrAgentIsSentinel = errors.New("agent is a reserved sentinel and cannot be
 // a *BlockedByDependenciesError (see below), so handlers doing errors.As
 // can surface the per-bucket counts in the 409 body for operator
 // troubleshooting. Tests use errors.Is; handlers use errors.As.
-var ErrBlockedByDependencies = errors.New("agent has active downstream dependencies")
+//
+// M-1 (P2): wraps [ErrConflict] so errToStatus resolves HTTP 409 via
+// errors.Is, keeping the per-bucket errors.As path unchanged for the
+// detailed 409 body. BlockedByDependenciesError.Unwrap still returns the
+// domain-specific sentinel for chained Is checks.
+var ErrBlockedByDependencies = fmt.Errorf("%w: agent has active downstream dependencies", ErrConflict)
 
 // ErrForceReasonRequired is returned when force=true is supplied without a
 // non-empty reason. The force escape hatch is deliberately chatty: operators
 // pulling the emergency cord must leave an auditable breadcrumb explaining
-// why a cascade was justified. Handler maps this to HTTP 400 so the operator
-// retries with --reason rather than silently skipping the guard. Checked
-// before any DB mutation to keep the no-reason path transactionally clean.
-var ErrForceReasonRequired = errors.New("force=true requires a non-empty reason")
+// why a cascade was justified. Operators must retry with --reason rather
+// than silently skipping the guard. Checked before any DB mutation to keep
+// the no-reason path transactionally clean.
+//
+// M-1 (P2): wraps [ErrValidation] so errToStatus resolves HTTP 400.
+var ErrForceReasonRequired = fmt.Errorf("%w: force=true requires a non-empty reason", ErrValidation)
 
 // ErrAgentRetired is returned by Heartbeat (and any future agent-authenticated
 // call site) when a retired agent is still polling. The handler layer maps
@@ -52,6 +63,12 @@ var ErrForceReasonRequired = errors.New("force=true requires a non-empty reason"
 // forever on a soft-retired identity. IsRetired() on the domain model is
 // the single source of truth; the sentinel exists so service and handler
 // callers can errors.Is against one symbol.
+//
+// M-1 (P2): deliberately NOT wrapped under any generic sentinel. 410 Gone is
+// semantically distinct from 403/404/409 — it signals a permanently-terminated
+// resource identity and drives deterministic agent-binary shutdown (see
+// cmd/agent/main.go). errToStatus tests it FIRST so it cannot be demoted by
+// the generic cascade.
 var ErrAgentRetired = errors.New("agent has been retired")
 
 // BlockedByDependenciesError wraps ErrBlockedByDependencies and carries the

internal/service/audit.go

@@ -143,6 +143,15 @@ func (s *AuditService) ListAuditEvents(ctx context.Context, page, perPage int) (
 }
 
 // GetAuditEvent returns a single audit event (handler interface method).
+//
+// M-1 (P2): the pre-M-1 zero-events path returned a bare
+// `fmt.Errorf("audit event not found")` and the handler dispatched via a
+// blanket `any error → 404 Audit event not found` shortcut. That silently
+// demoted transient DB failures from the auditRepo.List wrap (line 154 above)
+// to 404 Not Found. Now the zero-events path wraps ErrNotFound via %w so
+// errors.Is(err, service.ErrNotFound) picks up the real 404 at the handler's
+// errToStatus choke point, and the repo.List wrap surfaces as 500 with
+// server-side slog.Error capture (F-002 redacted-500 pattern preserved).
 func (s *AuditService) GetAuditEvent(ctx context.Context, id string) (*domain.AuditEvent, error) {
 	filter := &repository.AuditFilter{
 		ResourceID: id,
@@ -155,7 +164,7 @@ func (s *AuditService) GetAuditEvent(ctx context.Context, id string) (*domain.Au
 	}
 
 	if len(events) == 0 {
-		return nil, fmt.Errorf("audit event not found")
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("%w: audit event not found", ErrNotFound)
 	}
 
 	return events[0], nil

internal/service/ca_operations.go

@@ -43,6 +43,15 @@ func (s *CAOperationsSvc) SetIssuerRegistry(registry *IssuerRegistry) {
 
 // GenerateDERCRL generates a DER-encoded X.509 CRL for the given issuer.
 // Short-lived certificates (profile TTL < 1 hour) are excluded from the CRL.
+//
+// M-1 (P2): the pre-M-1 issuer-not-found path returned a bare
+// `fmt.Errorf("issuer not found: %s", issuerID)` with no sentinel wrap. A
+// pre-M-1 handler strings.Contains(err.Error(), "not found") classifier would
+// sweep both this path and any transient error whose text happened to mention
+// "not found" into 404. Post-M-1 this path wraps service.ErrNotFound via %w so
+// errors.Is picks up the genuine 404 at errToStatus, and truly-unexpected
+// errors (e.g., registry misconfigured) surface as 500 via the generic-error
+// fallback.
 func (s *CAOperationsSvc) GenerateDERCRL(ctx context.Context, issuerID string) ([]byte, error) {
 	if s.revocationRepo == nil {
 		return nil, fmt.Errorf("revocation repository not configured")
@@ -53,7 +62,7 @@ func (s *CAOperationsSvc) GenerateDERCRL(ctx context.Context, issuerID string) (
 
 	issuerConn, ok := s.issuerRegistry.Get(issuerID)
 	if !ok {
-		return nil, fmt.Errorf("issuer not found: %s", issuerID)
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("%w: issuer %s", ErrNotFound, issuerID)
 	}
 
 	// Scope the query to this issuer so the migration 000012 composite index
@@ -98,6 +107,11 @@ func (s *CAOperationsSvc) GenerateDERCRL(ctx context.Context, issuerID string) (
 }
 
 // GetOCSPResponse generates a signed OCSP response for the given certificate serial.
+//
+// M-1 (P2): see GenerateDERCRL above — same sentinel-wrap rationale applies.
+// The issuer-not-found path wraps service.ErrNotFound via %w so errors.Is
+// picks up the genuine 404 at errToStatus; transient/misconfiguration errors
+// surface as 500.
 func (s *CAOperationsSvc) GetOCSPResponse(ctx context.Context, issuerID string, serialHex string) ([]byte, error) {
 	if s.revocationRepo == nil {
 		return nil, fmt.Errorf("revocation repository not configured")
@@ -108,7 +122,7 @@ func (s *CAOperationsSvc) GetOCSPResponse(ctx context.Context, issuerID string,
 
 	issuerConn, ok := s.issuerRegistry.Get(issuerID)
 	if !ok {
-		return nil, fmt.Errorf("issuer not found: %s", issuerID)
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("%w: issuer %s", ErrNotFound, issuerID)
 	}
 
 	serial := new(big.Int)

internal/service/certificate.go

@@ -376,10 +376,21 @@ func (s *CertificateService) CreateCertificate(ctx context.Context, cert domain.
 
 // UpdateCertificate modifies a certificate (handler interface method).
 func (s *CertificateService) UpdateCertificate(ctx context.Context, id string, patch domain.ManagedCertificate) (*domain.ManagedCertificate, error) {
-	// Fetch existing certificate so partial updates don't zero out fields
+	// Fetch existing certificate so partial updates don't zero out fields.
+	//
+	// M-1 (P2): the pre-M-1 wrap was `"certificate not found: %w"` on every
+	// certRepo.Get error — which coupled to the handler's strings.Contains
+	// substring classifier on "not found" and gave false positives on transient
+	// DB failures (connection refused, context deadline, etc.), demoting a 500
+	// to a 404. Now the repo wraps only the genuine sql.ErrNoRows path with
+	// repository.ErrNotFound (certificate.go Get), so the errors.Is walk
+	// through the handler's errToStatus choke point discriminates correctly:
+	// truly-missing → 404, everything else → 500 (the intended outcome). The
+	// wrap text is changed from "certificate not found" to "failed to get
+	// certificate" to match the semantic.
 	existing, err := s.certRepo.Get(ctx, id)
 	if err != nil {
-		return nil, fmt.Errorf("certificate not found: %w", err)
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to get certificate: %w", err)
 	}
 
 	// Merge non-zero fields from patch into existing
@@ -501,10 +512,14 @@ func (s *CertificateService) GetOCSPResponse(ctx context.Context, issuerID strin
 
 // GetCertificateDeployments returns all deployment targets for a certificate (M20).
 func (s *CertificateService) GetCertificateDeployments(ctx context.Context, certID string) ([]domain.DeploymentTarget, error) {
-	// Verify certificate exists
+	// Verify certificate exists. See M-1 (P2) note on UpdateCertificate for
+	// the wrap-text correction rationale — same treatment applies here: the
+	// repo's sql.ErrNoRows wrap with repository.ErrNotFound escapes cleanly
+	// through fmt.Errorf("%w", ...) so errors.Is picks up the genuine 404
+	// while transient DB errors correctly surface as 500.
 	_, err := s.certRepo.Get(ctx, certID)
 	if err != nil {
-		return nil, fmt.Errorf("certificate not found: %w", err)
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to get certificate: %w", err)
 	}
 
 	if s.targetRepo == nil {

internal/service/discovery.go

@@ -166,9 +166,20 @@ func (s *DiscoveryService) ClaimDiscovered(ctx context.Context, id string, manag
 		return fmt.Errorf("failed to get discovered certificate: %w", err)
 	}
 
-	// Verify the managed cert exists
+	// Verify the managed cert exists.
+	//
+	// M-1 (P2): the pre-M-1 wrap was a bare `fmt.Errorf("managed certificate not
+	// found: %s", managedCertID)` with no %w and no sentinel. That threw away the
+	// underlying error entirely — a transient DB failure from certRepo.Get (e.g.,
+	// connection dropped, query timeout) would be flattened into the same "not
+	// found" string as a genuine sql.ErrNoRows, which the pre-M-1 handler
+	// strings.Contains classifier then swept into 404. Post-M-1 we propagate the
+	// underlying error via %w so errors.Is walks the chain correctly:
+	// certRepo.Get wraps genuine sql.ErrNoRows with repository.ErrNotFound (see
+	// postgres/certificate.go Get), and errToStatus dispatches that to 404;
+	// transient errors surface as 500 via the generic-error fallback.
 	if _, err := s.certRepo.Get(ctx, managedCertID); err != nil {
-		return fmt.Errorf("managed certificate not found: %s", managedCertID)
+		return fmt.Errorf("failed to get managed certificate %s: %w", managedCertID, err)
 	}
 
 	if err := s.discoveryRepo.UpdateDiscoveredStatus(ctx, id, domain.DiscoveryStatusManaged, managedCertID); err != nil {

internal/service/errors.go

@@ -0,0 +1,73 @@
+package service
+
+import "errors"
+
+// M-1 (P2) coverage-gap closure: generic service-layer error sentinels.
+//
+// Before M-1, API handlers classified service errors by substring-matching the
+// wrapped message text (`strings.Contains(err.Error(), "not found")` and
+// friends). That made every HTTP status mapping one `fmt.Errorf` reword away
+// from silently regressing — including the M-003 self-approval privilege
+// boundary, where `handler/jobs.go:174/:220` ignored the already-defined
+// ErrSelfApproval sentinel and relied on the literal string "cannot approve".
+//
+// These six generic sentinels form the type-safe surface the handler layer
+// dispatches against via `errors.Is`. Domain-specific sentinels (ErrSelfApproval,
+// ErrAgentIsSentinel, ErrBlockedByDependencies, ErrForceReasonRequired,
+// ErrAgentNotFound) are declared in their own topical files (job.go,
+// agent_retire.go, target.go) and wrap one of these generics via
+// `fmt.Errorf("%w: ...", ErrForbidden)`. The wrap chain lets call sites continue
+// to `errors.Is(err, ErrSelfApproval)` for domain-specific logic while the
+// handler's single choke point in `api/handler/errors.go` can match on the
+// generic sentinel to pick the HTTP status.
+//
+// Dispatch order in errToStatus matters — see the doc block at the top of
+// `internal/api/handler/errors.go`.
+//
+// ErrAgentRetired is deliberately NOT wrapped here. 410 Gone is semantically
+// distinct from 403/404/409 and must short-circuit the generic dispatch. Keep
+// its standalone declaration in agent_retire.go untouched; errToStatus tests
+// it first.
+var (
+	// ErrNotFound indicates a lookup for a resource that does not exist.
+	// Handlers translate this to HTTP 404.
+	ErrNotFound = errors.New("not found")
+
+	// ErrValidation indicates malformed, missing, or out-of-range input from
+	// the caller. Handlers translate this to HTTP 400.
+	ErrValidation = errors.New("validation failed")
+
+	// ErrConflict indicates a state conflict: unique-constraint violation,
+	// foreign-key dependency, or a state machine transition that is not
+	// allowed from the current state. Handlers translate this to HTTP 409.
+	ErrConflict = errors.New("conflict")
+
+	// ErrForbidden indicates an authorization / privilege-boundary denial.
+	// The caller is authenticated but is not permitted to perform the action.
+	// Handlers translate this to HTTP 403.
+	ErrForbidden = errors.New("forbidden")
+
+	// ErrUnauthenticated indicates the caller failed to authenticate — most
+	// commonly a SCEP challenge-password mismatch, where the transport itself
+	// is valid but the application-layer credential is wrong. Handlers
+	// translate this to HTTP 401.
+	ErrUnauthenticated = errors.New("unauthenticated")
+
+	// ErrNotImplemented indicates the requested operation is defined but not
+	// yet wired up — reserved for feature-flag-gated code paths. Handlers
+	// translate this to HTTP 501.
+	ErrNotImplemented = errors.New("not implemented")
+
+	// ErrUnprocessable indicates the request was well-formed and the
+	// referenced resource exists, but server-side stored data could not be
+	// processed — e.g., a certificate PEM in inventory that fails X.509
+	// decoding because the stored blob is corrupt or was inserted with the
+	// wrong encoding. Distinct from ErrValidation: ErrValidation means the
+	// caller sent bad input (400), while ErrUnprocessable means the caller's
+	// input was fine but our own data cannot satisfy the operation (422
+	// Unprocessable Entity). Today the only call site is ExportPKCS12's parse
+	// path in internal/service/export.go; keeping the sentinel generic so
+	// other "stored-data-unparseable" paths can reuse it without inventing a
+	// second variant.
+	ErrUnprocessable = errors.New("unprocessable")
+)

internal/service/errors_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,110 @@
+package service
+
+import (
+	"errors"
+	"fmt"
+	"testing"
+)
+
+// TestGenericSentinels_IdentityDistinct guards against an accidental
+// `var ErrX = ErrY` alias where two generic sentinels share identity. Each
+// must be a distinct error value so errors.Is dispatch in errToStatus can
+// route them to different HTTP status codes.
+func TestGenericSentinels_IdentityDistinct(t *testing.T) {
+	sentinels := []struct {
+		name string
+		err  error
+	}{
+		{"ErrNotFound", ErrNotFound},
+		{"ErrValidation", ErrValidation},
+		{"ErrConflict", ErrConflict},
+		{"ErrForbidden", ErrForbidden},
+		{"ErrUnauthenticated", ErrUnauthenticated},
+		{"ErrNotImplemented", ErrNotImplemented},
+	}
+	for i := range sentinels {
+		for j := range sentinels {
+			if i == j {
+				continue
+			}
+			if errors.Is(sentinels[i].err, sentinels[j].err) {
+				t.Errorf("%s and %s alias the same error value — each generic sentinel must be distinct",
+					sentinels[i].name, sentinels[j].name)
+			}
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+// TestWrappedSentinels_ChainWalk is the core M-1 invariant: wrapping a
+// domain-specific sentinel under a generic sentinel via fmt.Errorf("%w: ...")
+// must preserve BOTH identities on the wrap chain. Call sites that check
+// errors.Is(err, ErrSelfApproval) for domain logic AND the handler-layer
+// errToStatus that checks errors.Is(err, ErrForbidden) for the HTTP status
+// both need to succeed on the same error value.
+//
+// If this test fails, every handler dispatch that routes through errToStatus
+// is silently broken.
+func TestWrappedSentinels_ChainWalk(t *testing.T) {
+	cases := []struct {
+		name    string
+		err     error
+		generic error
+	}{
+		{"ErrSelfApproval wraps ErrForbidden", ErrSelfApproval, ErrForbidden},
+		{"ErrAgentIsSentinel wraps ErrForbidden", ErrAgentIsSentinel, ErrForbidden},
+		{"ErrBlockedByDependencies wraps ErrConflict", ErrBlockedByDependencies, ErrConflict},
+		{"ErrForceReasonRequired wraps ErrValidation", ErrForceReasonRequired, ErrValidation},
+		{"ErrAgentNotFound wraps ErrValidation", ErrAgentNotFound, ErrValidation},
+	}
+	for _, c := range cases {
+		t.Run(c.name, func(t *testing.T) {
+			if !errors.Is(c.err, c.generic) {
+				t.Errorf("errors.Is(%v, %v) = false; want true", c.err, c.generic)
+			}
+			if !errors.Is(c.err, c.err) {
+				t.Errorf("errors.Is(err, err) = false; want true — domain sentinel lost self-identity after wrap")
+			}
+		})
+	}
+}
+
+// TestErrAgentRetired_StandaloneGone locks the 410 Gone semantics in place.
+// ErrAgentRetired MUST NOT wrap any generic sentinel — 410 is semantically
+// distinct from 403/404/409 (permanently-terminated resource identity) and
+// the errToStatus dispatch tests it FIRST before any generic check. If this
+// test goes red because someone wrapped it under ErrForbidden or ErrNotFound,
+// the agent-binary shutdown behavior at cmd/agent/main.go:1291 silently
+// regresses.
+func TestErrAgentRetired_StandaloneGone(t *testing.T) {
+	if errors.Is(ErrAgentRetired, ErrForbidden) {
+		t.Error("ErrAgentRetired must NOT wrap ErrForbidden — 410 Gone would demote to 403")
+	}
+	if errors.Is(ErrAgentRetired, ErrNotFound) {
+		t.Error("ErrAgentRetired must NOT wrap ErrNotFound — 410 Gone would demote to 404")
+	}
+	if errors.Is(ErrAgentRetired, ErrConflict) {
+		t.Error("ErrAgentRetired must NOT wrap ErrConflict — 410 Gone would demote to 409")
+	}
+	if errors.Is(ErrAgentRetired, ErrValidation) {
+		t.Error("ErrAgentRetired must NOT wrap ErrValidation — 410 Gone would demote to 400")
+	}
+	if !errors.Is(ErrAgentRetired, ErrAgentRetired) {
+		t.Error("ErrAgentRetired lost self-identity")
+	}
+}
+
+// TestSentinels_SurviveDoubleWrap verifies that wrapping a sentinel-wrapped
+// error a SECOND time (e.g., a call site doing fmt.Errorf("%w: ctx-info",
+// ErrSelfApproval)) preserves both the domain sentinel and the generic
+// sentinel. This is critical because the errToStatus dispatch order places
+// ErrForbidden BEFORE ErrValidation — if double-wrapping broke the chain,
+// the M-003 gate would demote to 400.
+func TestSentinels_SurviveDoubleWrap(t *testing.T) {
+	doubled := fmt.Errorf("%w: additional context from call site", ErrSelfApproval)
+	if !errors.Is(doubled, ErrSelfApproval) {
+		t.Error("double-wrapped ErrSelfApproval lost domain identity")
+	}
+	if !errors.Is(doubled, ErrForbidden) {
+		t.Error("double-wrapped ErrSelfApproval lost ErrForbidden wrap — M-003 gate would demote to 500")
+	}
+}

internal/service/export.go

@@ -38,16 +38,31 @@ type ExportPEMResult struct {
 
 // ExportPEM returns the PEM-encoded certificate and chain for the latest version.
 func (s *ExportService) ExportPEM(ctx context.Context, certID string) (*ExportPEMResult, error) {
-	// Verify certificate exists
+	// Verify certificate exists.
+	//
+	// M-1 (P2): the pre-M-1 wrap was `"certificate not found: %w"` on every
+	// certRepo.Get error — which gave the handler's strings.Contains(err.Error(),
+	// "not found") check a false positive on transient DB failures (connection
+	// refused, context deadline, etc.), demoting a 500 to a 404. Now the repo
+	// wraps only the genuine sql.ErrNoRows path with repository.ErrNotFound
+	// (certificate.go Get), so the errors.Is walk through the handler's
+	// errToStatus discriminates correctly: truly-missing → 404, everything else
+	// → 500 (the intended outcome). The wrap text is changed from "certificate
+	// not found" to "failed to get certificate" to match the semantic.
 	cert, err := s.certRepo.Get(ctx, certID)
 	if err != nil {
-		return nil, fmt.Errorf("certificate not found: %w", err)
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to get certificate: %w", err)
 	}
 
-	// Get latest version (contains the PEM chain)
+	// Get latest version (contains the PEM chain).
+	//
+	// M-1 (P2): same wrap-text correction as above — pre-M-1 any
+	// GetLatestVersion error surfaced as "no certificate version found",
+	// which bled into the handler's substring classifier. Now the repo wraps
+	// sql.ErrNoRows with repository.ErrNotFound; the wrap chain walks cleanly.
 	version, err := s.certRepo.GetLatestVersion(ctx, certID)
 	if err != nil {
-		return nil, fmt.Errorf("no certificate version found: %w", err)
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to get latest certificate version: %w", err)
 	}
 
 	// Split PEM chain into leaf cert + chain
@@ -73,26 +88,37 @@ func (s *ExportService) ExportPEM(ctx context.Context, certID string) (*ExportPE
 // The private key is NOT included — it lives on the agent and never touches the control plane.
 // The PKCS#12 bundle is encrypted with the provided password (can be empty for cert-only bundles).
 func (s *ExportService) ExportPKCS12(ctx context.Context, certID string, password string) ([]byte, error) {
-	// Verify certificate exists
+	// Verify certificate exists. See M-1 (P2) note on ExportPEM for the wrap-text
+	// correction — same rationale applies here.
 	cert, err := s.certRepo.Get(ctx, certID)
 	if err != nil {
-		return nil, fmt.Errorf("certificate not found: %w", err)
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to get certificate: %w", err)
 	}
 
-	// Get latest version
+	// Get latest version. Same wrap-text correction as ExportPEM.
 	version, err := s.certRepo.GetLatestVersion(ctx, certID)
 	if err != nil {
-		return nil, fmt.Errorf("no certificate version found: %w", err)
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to get latest certificate version: %w", err)
 	}
 
-	// Parse PEM chain into x509.Certificate objects
+	// Parse PEM chain into x509.Certificate objects.
+	//
+	// M-1 (P2): wrap both parse-failure paths with ErrUnprocessable so the
+	// handler's errToStatus choke point dispatches to 422 Unprocessable Entity
+	// via errors.Is instead of the pre-M-1 two-term substring net
+	// (`"cannot be parsed"|"no certificates found"`) at handler/export.go:101.
+	// 422 is the correct status here — the caller's request is syntactically
+	// fine; the stored PEM chain is what can't be processed. The composed
+	// Error() string still carries the "certificate data cannot be parsed as
+	// X.509"/"no certificates found in PEM chain" wording so server-side
+	// slog.Error capture and any future 422 body propagation stay readable.
 	certs, err := parsePEMCertificates(version.PEMChain)
 	if err != nil {
-		return nil, fmt.Errorf("certificate data cannot be parsed as X.509: %w", err)
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("%w: certificate data cannot be parsed as X.509: %v", ErrUnprocessable, err)
 	}
 
 	if len(certs) == 0 {
-		return nil, fmt.Errorf("no certificates found in PEM chain")
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("%w: no certificates found in PEM chain", ErrUnprocessable)
 	}
 
 	// Build PKCS#12 bundle: leaf cert + CA chain (no private key)

internal/service/issuer.go

@@ -262,10 +262,18 @@ func (s *IssuerService) Delete(ctx context.Context, id string, actor string) err
 
 // TestConnection tests the connection to an issuer by instantiating a throwaway
 // connector and calling ValidateConfig. Records the result in the database.
+//
+// M-1 (P2): the pre-M-1 wrap was `"issuer not found: %w"` on every
+// issuerRepo.Get error — which coupled to handler substring classifiers on
+// "not found" and could have demoted transient DB failures to 404. Now the
+// repo wraps only the genuine sql.ErrNoRows path with repository.ErrNotFound
+// (postgres/issuer.go Get), so errors.Is walks the wrap chain correctly:
+// truly-missing → 404, everything else → 500. The wrap text is changed from
+// "issuer not found" to "failed to get issuer" to match the semantic.
 func (s *IssuerService) TestConnection(ctx context.Context, id string) error {
 	iss, err := s.issuerRepo.Get(ctx, id)
 	if err != nil {
-		return fmt.Errorf("issuer not found: %w", err)
+		return fmt.Errorf("failed to get issuer: %w", err)
 	}
 
 	// Get the decrypted config

internal/service/job.go

@@ -3,7 +3,6 @@ package service
 import (
 	"time"
 	"context"
-	"errors"
 	"fmt"
 	"log/slog"
 	"strings"
@@ -16,8 +15,16 @@ import (
 // approve a renewal job is the same person listed as the owner of the
 // underlying certificate. M-003 enforces separation of duties: the owner who
 // requested (or benefits from) the renewal must not be the same identity that
-// approves it. Handlers map this sentinel to HTTP 403 Forbidden.
-var ErrSelfApproval = errors.New("self-approval forbidden: actor is the owner of the certificate")
+// approves it.
+//
+// M-1 (P2): wraps [ErrForbidden] via fmt.Errorf("%w", ...) so the single
+// handler-layer errToStatus choke point resolves HTTP 403 via
+// errors.Is(err, ErrForbidden). Call sites can continue to
+// errors.Is(err, ErrSelfApproval) for domain-specific logging — both succeed
+// because %w builds a wrap chain. Pre-M-1, handler/jobs.go classified the
+// failure by substring-matching "cannot approve" in the message; a reword
+// would have silently demoted 403 to 500 with no observable signal.
+var ErrSelfApproval = fmt.Errorf("%w: self-approval forbidden: actor is the owner of the certificate", ErrForbidden)
 
 // JobService manages job processing and status tracking.
 // It coordinates between the scheduler and various job-specific services.
@@ -403,9 +410,17 @@ func (s *JobService) GetJob(ctx context.Context, id string) (*domain.Job, error)
 // duties. Callers must pass a non-empty actor; empty actor is treated as an
 // anonymous system caller and permitted (internal/system paths).
 func (s *JobService) ApproveJob(ctx context.Context, id, actor string) error {
+	// M-1 (P2): the pre-M-1 wrap was `"job not found: %w"` on every jobRepo.Get
+	// error — which coupled to the handler's strings.Contains substring classifier
+	// on "not found" and gave false positives on transient DB failures, demoting a
+	// 500 to a 404. Now the repo wraps only the genuine sql.ErrNoRows path with
+	// repository.ErrNotFound (postgres/job.go Get), so errors.Is walks the wrap
+	// chain correctly: truly-missing → 404, everything else → 500. The wrap text
+	// is changed from "job not found" to "failed to get job" to match the
+	// semantic.
 	job, err := s.jobRepo.Get(ctx, id)
 	if err != nil {
-		return fmt.Errorf("job not found: %w", err)
+		return fmt.Errorf("failed to get job: %w", err)
 	}
 
 	if job.Status != domain.JobStatusAwaitingApproval {
@@ -435,9 +450,13 @@ func (s *JobService) ApproveJob(ctx context.Context, id, actor string) error {
 // owner is permitted to cancel their own pending renewal. actor is recorded
 // on the log line for audit attribution.
 func (s *JobService) RejectJob(ctx context.Context, id, reason, actor string) error {
+	// M-1 (P2): wrap-text correction — see ApproveJob for rationale. Same
+	// repo.Get sql.ErrNoRows → repository.ErrNotFound propagation; text changed
+	// from "job not found" to "failed to get job" so transient DB errors stay
+	// 500 while genuine 404s are picked up via errors.Is at errToStatus.
 	job, err := s.jobRepo.Get(ctx, id)
 	if err != nil {
-		return fmt.Errorf("job not found: %w", err)
+		return fmt.Errorf("failed to get job: %w", err)
 	}
 
 	if job.Status != domain.JobStatusAwaitingApproval {

internal/service/notification.go

@@ -383,6 +383,15 @@ func (s *NotificationService) ListNotifications(ctx context.Context, page, perPa
 }
 
 // GetNotification returns a single notification (handler interface method).
+//
+// M-1 (P2): the not-found branch now wraps service.ErrNotFound via %w so the
+// handler's errToStatus choke point dispatches to 404 via errors.Is. Pre-M-1
+// this returned a raw fmt.Errorf("notification not found") and the handler
+// relied on a blanket "any error from this service call → 404" shortcut —
+// which silently demoted transient DB failures (the List() error wrap above)
+// to 404. Post-M-1 the handler uses errToStatus; the List() error wrap still
+// surfaces as 500 (no sentinel attached), and only this explicit not-found
+// branch maps to 404.
 func (s *NotificationService) GetNotification(ctx context.Context, id string) (*domain.NotificationEvent, error) {
 	filter := &repository.NotificationFilter{
 		PerPage: 1,
@@ -400,7 +409,7 @@ func (s *NotificationService) GetNotification(ctx context.Context, id string) (*
 		}
 	}
 
-	return nil, fmt.Errorf("notification not found")
+	return nil, fmt.Errorf("%w: notification %s", ErrNotFound, id)
 }
 
 // MarkAsRead marks a notification as read (handler interface method).
@@ -568,6 +577,13 @@ func (s *NotificationService) RetryFailedNotifications(ctx context.Context) erro
 //     "pg: deadlock detected" surfaces in the handler response and the
 //     operator UI. The service has no fallback — a silent "success" that
 //     didn't actually mutate the row would be worse than a loud error.
+//
+// M-1 (P2): the repo's Requeue (postgres/notification.go) now wraps
+// repository.ErrNotFound on zero-rows-affected. Because this method wraps
+// the repo error with %w, errors.Is(err, repository.ErrNotFound) walks
+// cleanly through both wrap layers — so the handler's errToStatus choke
+// point dispatches a genuine missing-row Requeue to 404 and a transient
+// "pg: deadlock detected" to 500 without substring matching.
 func (s *NotificationService) RequeueNotification(ctx context.Context, id string) error {
 	if err := s.notifRepo.Requeue(ctx, id); err != nil {
 		return fmt.Errorf("failed to requeue notification: %w", err)

internal/service/profile.go

@@ -139,42 +139,51 @@ func (s *ProfileService) Get(ctx context.Context, id string) (*domain.Certificat
 }
 
 // validateProfile checks that a profile's configuration is valid.
+//
+// M-1: every return here wraps ErrValidation via %w so the handler's
+// errToStatus choke point dispatches these to HTTP 400 via errors.Is without
+// the substring-matching on "invalid"/"required"/"must be"/"cannot" that the
+// pre-M-1 profile handler relied on. The composed Error() string still
+// contains the original human-readable text (e.g. "RSA minimum key size must
+// be at least 2048"), so the handler safely passes err.Error() through to the
+// response body on the 400 arm. Substring assertions in profile_test.go
+// continue to match for the same reason.
 func validateProfile(p *domain.CertificateProfile) error {
 	if p.Name == "" {
-		return fmt.Errorf("profile name is required")
+		return fmt.Errorf("%w: profile name is required", ErrValidation)
 	}
 	if len(p.Name) > 255 {
-		return fmt.Errorf("profile name exceeds 255 characters")
+		return fmt.Errorf("%w: profile name exceeds 255 characters", ErrValidation)
 	}
 
 	// Validate key algorithms
 	for _, alg := range p.AllowedKeyAlgorithms {
 		if !domain.ValidKeyAlgorithms[alg.Algorithm] {
-			return fmt.Errorf("invalid key algorithm: %s (allowed: RSA, ECDSA, Ed25519)", alg.Algorithm)
+			return fmt.Errorf("%w: invalid key algorithm: %s (allowed: RSA, ECDSA, Ed25519)", ErrValidation, alg.Algorithm)
 		}
 		if alg.Algorithm == domain.KeyAlgorithmRSA && alg.MinSize < 2048 {
-			return fmt.Errorf("RSA minimum key size must be at least 2048, got %d", alg.MinSize)
+			return fmt.Errorf("%w: RSA minimum key size must be at least 2048, got %d", ErrValidation, alg.MinSize)
 		}
 		if alg.Algorithm == domain.KeyAlgorithmECDSA && alg.MinSize < 256 {
-			return fmt.Errorf("ECDSA minimum key size must be at least 256, got %d", alg.MinSize)
+			return fmt.Errorf("%w: ECDSA minimum key size must be at least 256, got %d", ErrValidation, alg.MinSize)
 		}
 	}
 
 	// Validate EKUs
 	for _, eku := range p.AllowedEKUs {
 		if !domain.ValidEKUs[eku] {
-			return fmt.Errorf("invalid EKU: %s", eku)
+			return fmt.Errorf("%w: invalid EKU: %s", ErrValidation, eku)
 		}
 	}
 
 	// Validate max TTL
 	if p.MaxTTLSeconds < 0 {
-		return fmt.Errorf("max_ttl_seconds cannot be negative")
+		return fmt.Errorf("%w: max_ttl_seconds cannot be negative", ErrValidation)
 	}
 
 	// Validate short-lived consistency
 	if p.AllowShortLived && p.MaxTTLSeconds >= 3600 {
-		return fmt.Errorf("allow_short_lived is true but max_ttl_seconds (%d) is >= 3600; short-lived certs must have TTL under 1 hour", p.MaxTTLSeconds)
+		return fmt.Errorf("%w: allow_short_lived is true but max_ttl_seconds (%d) is >= 3600; short-lived certs must have TTL under 1 hour", ErrValidation, p.MaxTTLSeconds)
 	}
 
 	return nil

internal/service/scep.go

@@ -84,10 +84,22 @@ func (s *SCEPService) PKCSReq(ctx context.Context, csrPEM string, challengePassw
 	// this branch also protects future call sites (tests, library reuse, a
 	// future REST-over-HTTPS wrapper) from silently accepting unauthenticated
 	// CSRs.
+	//
+	// M-1 (P2): both failure modes now wrap service.ErrUnauthenticated via %w so
+	// the handler's errToStatus choke point dispatches them to HTTP 401 via
+	// errors.Is instead of relying on a `strings.Contains(err.Error(), "challenge
+	// password")` substring branch at handler/scep.go:174. This is a deliberate
+	// semantic correction: the pre-M-1 substring branch returned 403 Forbidden,
+	// but SCEP challenge-password failure is an authentication failure (the
+	// caller has no valid credential at the application layer), not an
+	// authorization denial (the caller has a credential but is not permitted),
+	// and 401 Unauthorized is the correct RFC 7235 status. The errToStatus doc
+	// block explicitly cites this site as the canonical ErrUnauthenticated use
+	// case.
 	if s.challengePassword == "" {
 		s.logger.Warn("SCEP enrollment rejected: server has no challenge password configured",
 			"transaction_id", transactionID)
-		return nil, fmt.Errorf("SCEP challenge password not configured on server")
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("%w: SCEP challenge password not configured on server", ErrUnauthenticated)
 	}
 	// Constant-time compare avoids leaking the configured secret through
 	// response-time variance. ConstantTimeCompare returns 1 only when both
@@ -96,7 +108,7 @@ func (s *SCEPService) PKCSReq(ctx context.Context, csrPEM string, challengePassw
 	if subtle.ConstantTimeCompare([]byte(challengePassword), []byte(s.challengePassword)) != 1 {
 		s.logger.Warn("SCEP enrollment rejected: invalid challenge password",
 			"transaction_id", transactionID)
-		return nil, fmt.Errorf("invalid challenge password")
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("%w: invalid challenge password", ErrUnauthenticated)
 	}
 
 	return s.processEnrollment(ctx, csrPEM, transactionID, "scep_pkcsreq")

internal/service/scep_test.go

@@ -148,6 +148,13 @@ func TestSCEPService_PKCSReq_ChallengePassword_Invalid(t *testing.T) {
 	if err == nil {
 		t.Fatal("expected error for invalid challenge password")
 	}
+	// M-1 (P2): pin the sentinel wrap so the handler's errToStatus dispatch
+	// (errors.Is → 401 Unauthorized) stays contract-stable. The parallel
+	// substring check is retained because it also pins the user-facing reason
+	// that service.ErrUnauthenticated composes with via fmt.Errorf("%w: ...").
+	if !errors.Is(err, ErrUnauthenticated) {
+		t.Errorf("expected errors.Is(err, ErrUnauthenticated), got: %v", err)
+	}
 	if !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "challenge password") {
 		t.Errorf("expected 'challenge password' in error, got: %v", err)
 	}
@@ -171,6 +178,12 @@ func TestSCEPService_PKCSReq_ChallengePassword_EmptyServerConfigRejected(t *test
 		if err == nil {
 			t.Fatalf("expected rejection when server challenge password is empty (client=%q)", clientPassword)
 		}
+		// M-1 (P2): pin the sentinel wrap on the "no shared secret configured"
+		// branch so both H-2 failure modes route to the same 401 arm at the
+		// handler. Preserves the explanatory substring assertion alongside.
+		if !errors.Is(err, ErrUnauthenticated) {
+			t.Errorf("expected errors.Is(err, ErrUnauthenticated) for client=%q, got: %v", clientPassword, err)
+		}
 		if !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "not configured") {
 			t.Errorf("expected 'not configured' in error, got: %v", err)
 		}
@@ -193,6 +206,12 @@ func TestSCEPService_PKCSReq_ChallengePassword_ConstantTimeLengthIndependence(t
 		if err == nil {
 			t.Fatalf("expected rejection for bad password %q", bad)
 		}
+		// M-1 (P2): pin sentinel-wrap on every bad-password input so both the
+		// length-mismatch and content-mismatch ConstantTimeCompare paths map to
+		// the same 401 arm.
+		if !errors.Is(err, ErrUnauthenticated) {
+			t.Errorf("expected errors.Is(err, ErrUnauthenticated) for %q, got: %v", bad, err)
+		}
 		if !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "invalid challenge password") {
 			t.Errorf("expected 'invalid challenge password' for %q, got: %v", bad, err)
 		}

internal/service/target.go

@@ -3,7 +3,6 @@ package service
 import (
 	"context"
 	"encoding/json"
-	"errors"
 	"fmt"
 	"log/slog"
 	"time"
@@ -18,7 +17,15 @@ import (
 // agent. The handler layer maps this to HTTP 400 via [errors.Is]. See C-002 in
 // cowork/certctl-coverage-gap-audit.md — this sentinel replaces a silent
 // Postgres FK violation (23503 → HTTP 500) with a deterministic 400.
-var ErrAgentNotFound = errors.New("referenced agent does not exist")
+//
+// M-1 (P2): wraps [ErrValidation] via fmt.Errorf("%w", ...) so the single
+// handler-layer errToStatus choke point resolves HTTP 400 via
+// errors.Is(err, ErrValidation). "Referenced FK does not exist in POST body"
+// is invalid input — not a missing-resource lookup — which is why this wraps
+// ErrValidation (400) rather than ErrNotFound (404). Pre-M-1, target handlers
+// classified this via strings.Contains(err.Error(), "not found"); a message
+// reword would have silently promoted 400 to 500 with no observable signal.
+var ErrAgentNotFound = fmt.Errorf("%w: referenced agent does not exist", ErrValidation)
 
 // validTargetTypes is the set of allowed target types for validation.
 var validTargetTypes = map[domain.TargetType]bool{
@@ -215,10 +222,20 @@ func (s *TargetService) Delete(ctx context.Context, id string, actor string) err
 // TestConnection tests a target's connectivity by checking the assigned agent's heartbeat status.
 // Target connectors run on agents, not on the server, so we can't instantiate a connector here.
 // Instead, we verify the agent is online and reachable.
+//
+// M-1 (P2): the pre-M-1 wraps were `"target not found: %w"` and
+// `"assigned agent not found: %w"` on every targetRepo.Get / agentRepo.Get error
+// — which coupled to pre-M-1 handler strings.Contains substring classifiers on
+// "not found" and gave false positives on transient DB failures. Now both
+// repos wrap only the genuine sql.ErrNoRows path with repository.ErrNotFound,
+// so errors.Is walks the chain correctly: truly-missing → 404, everything else
+// → 500. The wrap text is changed to "failed to get target" / "failed to get
+// agent" to match the semantic (agent-misconfigured stays 500 — "assigned
+// agent" is a data-integrity issue, not a consumer 404).
 func (s *TargetService) TestConnection(ctx context.Context, id string) error {
 	target, err := s.targetRepo.Get(ctx, id)
 	if err != nil {
-		return fmt.Errorf("target not found: %w", err)
+		return fmt.Errorf("failed to get target: %w", err)
 	}
 
 	if target.AgentID == "" {
@@ -229,7 +246,7 @@ func (s *TargetService) TestConnection(ctx context.Context, id string) error {
 	agent, err := s.agentRepo.Get(ctx, target.AgentID)
 	if err != nil {
 		s.updateTestStatus(ctx, target, "failed")
-		return fmt.Errorf("assigned agent not found: %w", err)
+		return fmt.Errorf("failed to get assigned agent: %w", err)
 	}
 
 	// I-004: AgentRepository.Get intentionally surfaces retired rows (the banner