Files
certctl/internal/api/handler/scep.go
T
shankar0123 36e722ba12 WIP: M-1 handler sentinel error mapping (checkpoint before branch cleanup)
Uncommitted migration work at the time of branch cleanup. Tagged as
checkpoint/m1-migration-wip so the commit survives git gc --prune=now.

Session context: Phase 3 Part B+C of the M-1 sentinel error migration
was in progress. 38 modified files, 4 new files (errors.go + errors_test.go
in internal/service/ and internal/api/handler/). Resume from this commit
via 'git checkout checkpoint/m1-migration-wip'.
2026-04-24 00:35:12 +00:00

370 lines
12 KiB
Go

package handler
import (
"context"
"crypto/x509"
"encoding/asn1"
"encoding/base64"
"encoding/pem"
"errors"
"fmt"
"io"
"net/http"
"strings"
"github.com/shankar0123/certctl/internal/api/middleware"
"github.com/shankar0123/certctl/internal/domain"
"github.com/shankar0123/certctl/internal/pkcs7"
"github.com/shankar0123/certctl/internal/service"
)
// SCEPService defines the service interface for SCEP enrollment operations.
// SCEP (RFC 8894) is a protocol for certificate enrollment used by MDM platforms
// and network devices.
type SCEPService interface {
// GetCACaps returns the SCEP server capabilities as a newline-separated string.
GetCACaps(ctx context.Context) string
// GetCACert returns the PEM-encoded CA certificate chain.
GetCACert(ctx context.Context) (string, error)
// PKCSReq processes a PKCS#10 CSR and returns a signed certificate.
PKCSReq(ctx context.Context, csrPEM string, challengePassword string, transactionID string) (*domain.SCEPEnrollResult, error)
}
// SCEPHandler handles HTTP requests for the SCEP protocol (RFC 8894).
//
// SCEP uses a single endpoint with operation-based dispatch via query parameters.
// All operations use GET or POST to the same path.
//
// Supported operations:
// - GET ?operation=GetCACaps — server capabilities
// - GET ?operation=GetCACert — CA certificate distribution
// - POST ?operation=PKIOperation — certificate enrollment (PKCSReq)
type SCEPHandler struct {
svc SCEPService
}
// NewSCEPHandler creates a new SCEPHandler.
func NewSCEPHandler(svc SCEPService) SCEPHandler {
return SCEPHandler{svc: svc}
}
// HandleSCEP is the single entry point for all SCEP operations.
// It dispatches based on the "operation" query parameter.
func (h SCEPHandler) HandleSCEP(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
operation := r.URL.Query().Get("operation")
switch operation {
case "GetCACaps":
h.getCACaps(w, r)
case "GetCACert":
h.getCACert(w, r)
case "PKIOperation":
h.pkiOperation(w, r)
default:
http.Error(w, fmt.Sprintf("Unknown SCEP operation: %s", operation), http.StatusBadRequest)
}
}
// getCACaps handles GET ?operation=GetCACaps
// Returns the SCEP server capabilities as plaintext, one per line.
func (h SCEPHandler) getCACaps(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
if r.Method != http.MethodGet {
http.Error(w, "Method not allowed", http.StatusMethodNotAllowed)
return
}
caps := h.svc.GetCACaps(r.Context())
w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "text/plain")
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
w.Write([]byte(caps))
}
// getCACert handles GET ?operation=GetCACert
// Returns the CA certificate(s). Single cert as DER, chain as PKCS#7.
func (h SCEPHandler) getCACert(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
if r.Method != http.MethodGet {
http.Error(w, "Method not allowed", http.StatusMethodNotAllowed)
return
}
caCertPEM, err := h.svc.GetCACert(r.Context())
if err != nil {
requestID := middleware.GetRequestID(r.Context())
ErrorWithRequestID(w, http.StatusInternalServerError, fmt.Sprintf("Failed to get CA certificate: %v", err), requestID)
return
}
// Parse PEM to DER chain
derCerts, err := pkcs7.PEMToDERChain(caCertPEM)
if err != nil {
requestID := middleware.GetRequestID(r.Context())
ErrorWithRequestID(w, http.StatusInternalServerError, "Failed to parse CA certificates", requestID)
return
}
if len(derCerts) == 1 {
// Single CA cert — return as raw DER
w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/x-x509-ca-cert")
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
w.Write(derCerts[0])
return
}
// Multiple certs (CA + RA or chain) — return as PKCS#7
pkcs7Data, err := pkcs7.BuildCertsOnlyPKCS7(derCerts)
if err != nil {
requestID := middleware.GetRequestID(r.Context())
ErrorWithRequestID(w, http.StatusInternalServerError, "Failed to build PKCS#7 response", requestID)
return
}
w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/x-x509-ca-ra-cert")
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
w.Write(pkcs7Data)
}
// pkiOperation handles POST ?operation=PKIOperation
// Processes a SCEP enrollment request containing a PKCS#7-wrapped CSR.
func (h SCEPHandler) pkiOperation(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
if r.Method != http.MethodPost {
http.Error(w, "Method not allowed", http.StatusMethodNotAllowed)
return
}
requestID := middleware.GetRequestID(r.Context())
body, err := io.ReadAll(io.LimitReader(r.Body, 1<<20)) // 1MB limit
if err != nil {
ErrorWithRequestID(w, http.StatusBadRequest, "Failed to read request body", requestID)
return
}
defer r.Body.Close()
if len(body) == 0 {
ErrorWithRequestID(w, http.StatusBadRequest, "Empty request body", requestID)
return
}
// Extract the PKCS#10 CSR from the PKCS#7 SignedData envelope
csrDER, challengePassword, transactionID, err := extractCSRFromPKCS7(body)
if err != nil {
ErrorWithRequestID(w, http.StatusBadRequest, fmt.Sprintf("Invalid SCEP message: %v", err), requestID)
return
}
// Validate the CSR
csr, err := x509.ParseCertificateRequest(csrDER)
if err != nil {
ErrorWithRequestID(w, http.StatusBadRequest, fmt.Sprintf("Invalid CSR: %v", err), requestID)
return
}
if err := csr.CheckSignature(); err != nil {
ErrorWithRequestID(w, http.StatusBadRequest, fmt.Sprintf("CSR signature invalid: %v", err), requestID)
return
}
// Convert DER CSR to PEM for the service layer
csrPEM := string(pem.EncodeToMemory(&pem.Block{
Type: "CERTIFICATE REQUEST",
Bytes: csrDER,
}))
result, err := h.svc.PKCSReq(r.Context(), csrPEM, challengePassword, transactionID)
if err != nil {
// M-1 (P2): typed-sentinel dispatch replaces the pre-M-1 substring
// branch `strings.Contains(err.Error(), "challenge password")`. The
// service layer now wraps both challenge-password failure modes (server
// misconfigured / client credential wrong) via `fmt.Errorf("%w: ...",
// ErrUnauthenticated)`, so errors.Is walks the wrap chain without
// depending on the exact wording of the error string. This also
// corrects the HTTP status: pre-M-1 returned 403 Forbidden, but RFC
// 7235 classifies this as 401 Unauthorized (authentication failure, not
// authorization denial). The errToStatus doc block enumerates this as
// the canonical ErrUnauthenticated call site.
if errors.Is(err, service.ErrUnauthenticated) {
ErrorWithRequestID(w, http.StatusUnauthorized, "Invalid challenge password", requestID)
return
}
// F-002 redacted-500: every other enrollment failure (CSR parse errors,
// issuer-layer failures, audit-layer failures) returns an opaque body
// so we don't leak internal state through the SCEP response. The
// logger already captured the real error at the service layer.
ErrorWithRequestID(w, http.StatusInternalServerError, "Enrollment failed", requestID)
return
}
// Build response: issued cert wrapped in PKCS#7 certs-only
h.writeSCEPResponse(w, result)
}
// writeSCEPResponse writes a SCEP enrollment response as PKCS#7 certs-only (DER).
func (h SCEPHandler) writeSCEPResponse(w http.ResponseWriter, result *domain.SCEPEnrollResult) {
var derCerts [][]byte
certDER, err := pkcs7.PEMToDERChain(result.CertPEM)
if err != nil || len(certDER) == 0 {
http.Error(w, "Failed to encode certificate", http.StatusInternalServerError)
return
}
derCerts = append(derCerts, certDER...)
if result.ChainPEM != "" {
chainDER, err := pkcs7.PEMToDERChain(result.ChainPEM)
if err == nil {
derCerts = append(derCerts, chainDER...)
}
}
pkcs7Data, err := pkcs7.BuildCertsOnlyPKCS7(derCerts)
if err != nil {
http.Error(w, "Failed to build PKCS#7 response", http.StatusInternalServerError)
return
}
w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/x-pki-message")
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
w.Write(pkcs7Data)
}
// extractCSRFromPKCS7 extracts a PKCS#10 CSR from a SCEP PKCS#7 SignedData envelope.
//
// SCEP clients wrap the CSR in a PKCS#7 SignedData structure. For the MVP, we parse
// the outer ASN.1 structure to find the encapsulated content (the CSR bytes), and
// extract the challenge password from the CSR attributes.
//
// Returns: csrDER, challengePassword, transactionID, error
func extractCSRFromPKCS7(data []byte) ([]byte, string, string, error) {
// Try to decode as PKCS#7 SignedData
csrDER, err := parseSignedDataForCSR(data)
if err != nil {
// Fallback: some clients send the CSR directly (not wrapped in PKCS#7)
// or send base64-encoded data
decoded, decErr := base64.StdEncoding.DecodeString(strings.TrimSpace(string(data)))
if decErr == nil {
// Try the decoded data as PKCS#7
csrDER2, err2 := parseSignedDataForCSR(decoded)
if err2 == nil {
return extractCSRFields(csrDER2)
}
// Maybe the decoded data IS the CSR directly
if _, parseErr := x509.ParseCertificateRequest(decoded); parseErr == nil {
return extractCSRFields(decoded)
}
}
// Maybe the raw data IS the CSR directly (no PKCS#7 wrapping)
if _, parseErr := x509.ParseCertificateRequest(data); parseErr == nil {
return extractCSRFields(data)
}
return nil, "", "", fmt.Errorf("failed to extract CSR from PKCS#7: %w", err)
}
return extractCSRFields(csrDER)
}
// extractCSRFields extracts the challenge password and transaction ID from CSR attributes.
func extractCSRFields(csrDER []byte) ([]byte, string, string, error) {
csr, err := x509.ParseCertificateRequest(csrDER)
if err != nil {
return nil, "", "", fmt.Errorf("invalid CSR: %w", err)
}
challengePassword := ""
transactionID := ""
// OID for challengePassword: 1.2.840.113549.1.9.7
oidChallengePassword := asn1.ObjectIdentifier{1, 2, 840, 113549, 1, 9, 7}
// Extract challenge password from parsed CSR attributes.
// Attributes is []pkix.AttributeTypeAndValueSET where each has Type (OID)
// and Value ([][]pkix.AttributeTypeAndValue). The challenge password value
// is stored as a string in the inner AttributeTypeAndValue.Value field.
for _, attr := range csr.Attributes {
if attr.Type.Equal(oidChallengePassword) {
if len(attr.Value) > 0 && len(attr.Value[0]) > 0 {
if pwd, ok := attr.Value[0][0].Value.(string); ok {
challengePassword = pwd
}
}
}
}
// Use CN as fallback transaction ID if not found in attributes
if transactionID == "" && csr.Subject.CommonName != "" {
transactionID = csr.Subject.CommonName
}
return csrDER, challengePassword, transactionID, nil
}
// pkcs7ContentInfo represents the outer ContentInfo structure.
type pkcs7ContentInfo struct {
ContentType asn1.ObjectIdentifier
Content asn1.RawValue `asn1:"explicit,tag:0"`
}
// pkcs7SignedData represents a simplified SignedData structure for CSR extraction.
type pkcs7SignedData struct {
Version int
DigestAlgorithms asn1.RawValue
EncapContentInfo asn1.RawValue
}
// pkcs7EncapContent represents the EncapsulatedContentInfo.
type pkcs7EncapContent struct {
ContentType asn1.ObjectIdentifier
Content asn1.RawValue `asn1:"explicit,optional,tag:0"`
}
// parseSignedDataForCSR extracts the encapsulated content (CSR) from PKCS#7 SignedData.
func parseSignedDataForCSR(data []byte) ([]byte, error) {
var contentInfo pkcs7ContentInfo
rest, err := asn1.Unmarshal(data, &contentInfo)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to parse ContentInfo: %w", err)
}
if len(rest) > 0 {
// Trailing data is OK for some implementations
}
// OID for signedData: 1.2.840.113549.1.7.2
oidSignedData := asn1.ObjectIdentifier{1, 2, 840, 113549, 1, 7, 2}
if !contentInfo.ContentType.Equal(oidSignedData) {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("not SignedData: got OID %v", contentInfo.ContentType)
}
// Parse the SignedData
var signedData pkcs7SignedData
_, err = asn1.Unmarshal(contentInfo.Content.Bytes, &signedData)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to parse SignedData: %w", err)
}
// Parse the EncapsulatedContentInfo to get the CSR
var encapContent pkcs7EncapContent
_, err = asn1.Unmarshal(signedData.EncapContentInfo.FullBytes, &encapContent)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to parse EncapsulatedContentInfo: %w", err)
}
if len(encapContent.Content.Bytes) == 0 {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("empty encapsulated content")
}
// The content may be wrapped in an OCTET STRING
var csrBytes []byte
var octetString asn1.RawValue
if _, err := asn1.Unmarshal(encapContent.Content.Bytes, &octetString); err == nil && octetString.Tag == asn1.TagOctetString {
csrBytes = octetString.Bytes
} else {
csrBytes = encapContent.Content.Bytes
}
// Validate it's a parseable CSR
if _, err := x509.ParseCertificateRequest(csrBytes); err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("extracted content is not a valid CSR: %w", err)
}
return csrBytes, nil
}