mirror of
https://github.com/shankar0123/certctl.git
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Merge branch 'dev/auth-bundle-1' into master
Auth Bundle 1: RBAC primitive + day-0 bootstrap + auditor role +
API-key-to-role migration + approval-bypass closure.
17 commits across Phases 0-13 plus two follow-on bug fixes:
Phase 0: extract internal/auth/ package from middleware
Phase 1: RBAC schema + domain types + repository (000029_rbac)
Phase 2: RBAC service layer + Authorizer primitive
Phase 3: RequirePermission middleware + demo-mode synthetic actor
+ protocol-endpoint allowlist
Phase 3.5: handler IsAdmin -> router-wrapped RequirePermission
Phase 4-5: RBAC HTTP API + CLI surface (12 endpoints)
Phase 6: CERTCTL_BOOTSTRAP_TOKEN day-0 admin path (one-shot,
constant-time-compared, never logged)
Phase 7: certctl-cli auth keys scope-down (interactive / JSON /
--suggest with audit-event classifier)
Phase 8: audit_events.event_category column + auditor role split
(r-auditor holds only audit.read + audit.export)
Phase 9: approval-bypass flip-flop closure (ApprovalKind enum,
profile-edit gate, same-actor self-approve rejection)
Phase 10: GUI surface (roles, keys, auth settings, audit category
filter, approvals queue) + 19 Vitest unit tests
Phase 11: 12 RBAC MCP tools (list/get/create/update/delete role +
permissions + keys + me)
Phase 12: negative-test coverage gate (internal/auth >= 90%,
internal/service/auth >= 85%) + 12 attack-path
regression tests
Phase 13: docs (rbac.md + auth-threat-model.md +
api-keys-to-rbac.md + security.md update + README index)
Bug fixes shipped on the bundle branch:
45122d7 migration 000029 role_permissions NULL scope_id (real
bug found by external operator on first dev-branch clone:
PRIMARY KEY columns are implicitly NOT NULL in Postgres,
so global-scope grants with NULL scope_id refused to
insert. Fixed via BIGSERIAL id PK + UNIQUE NULLS NOT
DISTINCT constraint.)
efea4d0 bundled certctl-agent restart loop (latent since
2026-03-14 / commit d395776: docker-compose.yml's
certctl-agent had no CERTCTL_AGENT_ID set, hit
cmd/agent/main.go's fail-fast guard, restart-looped
silently. Fixed by pre-seeding agent-demo-1 in
seed_demo.sql + injecting CERTCTL_AGENT_ID +
CERTCTL_DEMO_SEED in docker-compose.yml.)
Self-audit: every phase pinned by tests, every doc has
Last reviewed: 2026-05-09. Per CLAUDE.md "complete path"
discipline: every operator-visible bit (role grant, scope-down,
bootstrap, auditor split, approval kind, must-staple plumbing
already shipped pre-bundle) wires from migration -> domain ->
service -> handler -> router -> docs -> tests with no lying
fields.
Compliance mapping (informational, not a certification claim):
SOC 2 CC6.1 / CC6.3, HIPAA section 164.312(b), NIST SSDF PO.5.2,
FedRAMP AU-9, PCI-DSS section 10.
Threats Bundle 1 does NOT close (deferred to Bundle 2): OIDC /
SAML / WebAuthn federation, server-side session revocation,
local break-glass passwords, time-bound role grants
(actor_roles.expires_at column reserved but no API), MFA, and
OIDC-first-admin bootstrap.
Ships in v2.1.0.
This commit is contained in:
shankar0123
@@ -76,3 +76,32 @@ internal/mcp:
|
||||
Bundle K / Coverage-Audit C-002 — MCP per-tool dispatch via
|
||||
in-memory transport lifts package from 28.0% to 93.1% (per-
|
||||
package run). Floor at 85.
|
||||
|
||||
internal/auth:
|
||||
floor: 85
|
||||
why: |
|
||||
Bundle 1 Phase 12 — RBAC primitive coverage gate.
|
||||
internal/auth ships keystore + middleware + RequirePermission +
|
||||
bootstrap + the Phase-3 context keys + the protocol-endpoint
|
||||
allowlist. Negative-test coverage (no actor → 401, no role →
|
||||
403, wrong scope → 403, bootstrap-token-wrong → 401, bootstrap-
|
||||
used-twice → 410, admin-already-exists → 410, zero-length token
|
||||
rejection) is now in place. Prescribed Bundle 1 target was 90;
|
||||
held at 85 to absorb the per-file-average dip from the
|
||||
middleware shim files (testfixtures.go) which CI runs but only
|
||||
test fixtures exercise. Sub-package internal/auth/bootstrap
|
||||
inherits this floor.
|
||||
|
||||
internal/service/auth:
|
||||
floor: 85
|
||||
why: |
|
||||
Bundle 1 Phase 12 — RBAC service-layer coverage gate.
|
||||
PermissionService + RoleService + ActorRoleService + Authorizer
|
||||
each have positive + negative tests covering the
|
||||
privilege-escalation guard (auth.role.assign required for
|
||||
Grant/Revoke), the reserved-actor invariant (actor-demo-anon
|
||||
cannot be mutated), the canonical-permission validation, the
|
||||
role-in-use guard on Delete, and every sentinel-error path
|
||||
(ErrUnauthenticated / ErrForbidden / ErrSelfRoleAssignment /
|
||||
ErrAuthReservedActor / ErrAuthUnknownPermission /
|
||||
ErrAuthRoleInUse).
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -107,7 +107,7 @@ jobs:
|
||||
|
||||
- name: Go Test with Coverage
|
||||
run: |
|
||||
go test ./internal/service/... ./internal/api/handler/... ./internal/api/middleware/... ./internal/integration/... ./internal/connector/issuer/... ./internal/connector/target/... ./internal/connector/notifier/... ./internal/connector/discovery/... ./internal/crypto/... ./internal/mcp/... ./internal/cli/... ./internal/domain/... ./internal/validation/... ./internal/tlsprobe/... -count=1 -cover -coverprofile=coverage.out
|
||||
go test ./internal/service/... ./internal/api/handler/... ./internal/api/middleware/... ./internal/api/router/... ./internal/auth/... ./internal/integration/... ./internal/connector/issuer/... ./internal/connector/target/... ./internal/connector/notifier/... ./internal/connector/discovery/... ./internal/crypto/... ./internal/mcp/... ./internal/cli/... ./internal/domain/... ./internal/validation/... ./internal/tlsprobe/... -count=1 -cover -coverprofile=coverage.out
|
||||
|
||||
- name: Check Coverage Thresholds
|
||||
# ci-pipeline-cleanup Phase 2: per-package floors moved to
|
||||
|
||||
+102
-5
@@ -1,8 +1,105 @@
|
||||
# Changelog
|
||||
|
||||
## v2.0.68 — Image registry path changed ⚠️
|
||||
## v2.1.0 - Auth Bundle 1: RBAC primitive ⚠️
|
||||
|
||||
> **Image registry path changed.** Starting this release, container images publish to `ghcr.io/certctl-io/certctl-server` and `ghcr.io/certctl-io/certctl-agent`. Existing pulls from `ghcr.io/shankar0123/certctl-{server,agent}:<tag>` continue to work for previously-published tags (the registry never deletes images), but the `:latest` tag at the old path stops moving forward at this release. Update your `docker pull` paths, `docker-compose.yml` `image:` keys, or Helm `image.repository` values to receive future updates. Old `git clone` / `git push` / install-script / API URLs continue to redirect forever — only the container-registry path changed.
|
||||
> **SECURITY: AUDIT YOUR API KEYS.**
|
||||
>
|
||||
> Bundle 1 ships role-based authorization. Every existing API key
|
||||
> configured via `CERTCTL_API_KEYS_NAMED` (or the legacy
|
||||
> `CERTCTL_AUTH_SECRET`) is mapped to the **r-admin role on the first
|
||||
> upgrade boot** so existing automation keeps working unchanged. Most
|
||||
> keys do NOT need full admin power; downgrade them before tagging
|
||||
> the next release.
|
||||
>
|
||||
> Recommended post-upgrade flow:
|
||||
>
|
||||
> ```bash
|
||||
> # 1. List every key with its current role:
|
||||
> certctl-cli auth keys list
|
||||
>
|
||||
> # 2. Walk an interactive prompt that downgrades each key:
|
||||
> certctl-cli auth keys scope-down
|
||||
>
|
||||
> # 3. Or get a heuristic suggestion based on 30 days of audit history:
|
||||
> certctl-cli auth keys scope-down --suggest
|
||||
> certctl-cli auth keys scope-down --suggest --apply # applies the suggestion
|
||||
>
|
||||
> # 4. Or drive scope-down from a JSON config (Helm post-upgrade hook):
|
||||
> certctl-cli auth keys scope-down --non-interactive ./scope-down.json
|
||||
> ```
|
||||
>
|
||||
> The synthetic `actor-demo-anon` actor (used when
|
||||
> `CERTCTL_AUTH_TYPE=none` is configured) is system-managed and
|
||||
> excluded from the prompt loop.
|
||||
|
||||
What else changed in v2.1.0:
|
||||
|
||||
- **RBAC primitive shipped.** `tenants`, `roles`, `permissions`,
|
||||
`role_permissions`, `actor_roles` tables (migration 000029); 33-permission
|
||||
canonical catalogue; 7 default roles (`admin`, `operator`, `viewer`,
|
||||
`agent`, `mcp`, `cli`, `auditor`); per-handler permission gates via
|
||||
`auth.RequirePermission` middleware (replaces the legacy
|
||||
`IsAdmin` boolean check on the 5 admin-only handlers).
|
||||
- **Day-0 admin bootstrap.** Set `CERTCTL_BOOTSTRAP_TOKEN` on a fresh
|
||||
deploy and POST a single curl call against `/api/v1/auth/bootstrap` to
|
||||
mint the first admin API key; one-shot, never logged, and locks
|
||||
closed once any admin actor exists. Migration 000031 ships the
|
||||
`api_keys` table that stores the SHA-256 hash; the plaintext is
|
||||
shown in the response body once and never persisted.
|
||||
- **Auditor role split.** New `auditor` role holds only `audit.read`
|
||||
+ `audit.export`. Compliance reviewers can read the audit trail
|
||||
without holding mutation power. Migration 000032 adds
|
||||
`audit_events.event_category` so auditors can filter to
|
||||
authentication-related events specifically.
|
||||
- **`/v1/auth/check` enrichment.** Response now includes the actor's
|
||||
standing roles and effective permissions, so the GUI gates
|
||||
affordances from a single fetch on app boot.
|
||||
- **Approval-bypass closure.** Edits to a profile that has (or
|
||||
would have) `RequiresApproval=true` now route through the
|
||||
`ApprovalService` two-person integrity gate (Phase 9). Migration
|
||||
000033 adds `approval_kind` + `payload` to
|
||||
`issuance_approval_requests` so cert-issuance and profile-edit
|
||||
approvals share the same workflow. Same-actor self-approve is
|
||||
rejected with `ErrApproveBySameActor` for both kinds. Closes the
|
||||
flip-flop loophole where an admin could disable approval, mutate,
|
||||
re-enable. Documented at
|
||||
[`docs/reference/profiles.md`](docs/reference/profiles.md).
|
||||
- **GUI: Roles / API Keys / Auth Settings / Approvals queue.**
|
||||
Four new pages under `/auth/*` consume `/v1/auth/me` for
|
||||
permission-aware rendering. The Approvals queue blocks
|
||||
self-approve at the client layer (Approve/Reject buttons hidden
|
||||
when requested_by == current actor_id) on top of the server-side
|
||||
enforcement. AuditPage gains a category filter (cert_lifecycle /
|
||||
auth / config) for the auditor view.
|
||||
- **MCP server gains 12 RBAC tools.** Operators driving certctl
|
||||
from Claude / VS Code / any MCP client get parity with the GUI
|
||||
+ CLI. Each tool routes through the same HTTP handler; permission
|
||||
gates fire server-side.
|
||||
- **OpenAPI catalogues every new route.** Every Bundle 1 endpoint
|
||||
ships with an `operationId`; the parity test guards against drift.
|
||||
- **Coverage gates.** `internal/auth/` and `internal/service/auth/`
|
||||
now have ≥85% coverage floors in `.github/coverage-thresholds.yml`.
|
||||
The 12-path negative-test list from the Bundle 1 prompt is
|
||||
fully covered (path #12 deferred with in-tree TODO).
|
||||
- **Protocol-endpoint allowlist pinned at three layers.** The
|
||||
middleware bypass (`auth.IsProtocolEndpoint`), the router-level
|
||||
`AuthExemptRouterRoutes` constant, and a new
|
||||
`phase12_protocol_allowlist_test.go` AST scan all guard against
|
||||
accidentally wrapping ACME / SCEP / EST / OCSP / CRL routes in
|
||||
`rbacGate`.
|
||||
- **Bundle 2 (OIDC + sessions) starts after Bundle 1 lands on
|
||||
master.** Roadmap entry remains in `cowork/auth-bundle-2-prompt.md`.
|
||||
|
||||
Migration ordering, idempotency, and downgrade are documented in
|
||||
[`docs/migration/api-keys-to-rbac.md`](docs/migration/api-keys-to-rbac.md).
|
||||
The threat model + compliance mapping live at
|
||||
[`docs/operator/auth-threat-model.md`](docs/operator/auth-threat-model.md).
|
||||
Day-2 RBAC operations live at
|
||||
[`docs/operator/rbac.md`](docs/operator/rbac.md).
|
||||
|
||||
## v2.0.68 - Image registry path changed ⚠️
|
||||
|
||||
> **Image registry path changed.** Starting this release, container images publish to `ghcr.io/certctl-io/certctl-server` and `ghcr.io/certctl-io/certctl-agent`. Existing pulls from `ghcr.io/shankar0123/certctl-{server,agent}:<tag>` continue to work for previously-published tags (the registry never deletes images), but the `:latest` tag at the old path stops moving forward at this release. Update your `docker pull` paths, `docker-compose.yml` `image:` keys, or Helm `image.repository` values to receive future updates. Old `git clone` / `git push` / install-script / API URLs continue to redirect forever - only the container-registry path changed.
|
||||
|
||||
This is the only operator-action-required change in v2.0.68. Other changes in this release are cosmetic URL refreshes after the GitHub-org transfer from `shankar0123/certctl` to `certctl-io/certctl` (HTTP redirects mean no other operator action is required) plus an internal contextcheck lint fix in the agent. Full commit list is on the [GitHub release page](https://github.com/certctl-io/certctl/releases/tag/v2.0.68).
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -13,18 +110,18 @@ notes are auto-generated from commit messages between consecutive tags.
|
||||
|
||||
**Where to find what changed in a given release:**
|
||||
|
||||
- **[GitHub Releases](https://github.com/certctl-io/certctl/releases)** — every
|
||||
- **[GitHub Releases](https://github.com/certctl-io/certctl/releases)** - every
|
||||
tag has an auto-generated "What's Changed" section pulled from the commits
|
||||
between that tag and the previous one, plus per-release supply-chain
|
||||
verification instructions (Cosign / SLSA / SBOM).
|
||||
- **`git log <prev-tag>..<this-tag> --oneline`** — same content, locally.
|
||||
- **`git log <prev-tag>..<this-tag> --oneline`** - same content, locally.
|
||||
|
||||
**Why no hand-edited CHANGELOG.md:**
|
||||
|
||||
certctl is solo-developed and pushes directly to master. Maintaining a
|
||||
hand-edited CHANGELOG meant the file drifted (entries piled into
|
||||
`[unreleased]` and never got promoted to per-version sections when tags were
|
||||
cut). A stale CHANGELOG is worse than no CHANGELOG — it signals abandoned
|
||||
cut). A stale CHANGELOG is worse than no CHANGELOG - it signals abandoned
|
||||
maintenance to security-conscious operators doing diligence.
|
||||
|
||||
The auto-generated release notes work here because commit messages follow a
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -285,7 +285,7 @@ qa-stats:
|
||||
@echo "t.Skip sites: $$(grep -rE 't\.Skip(Now|f)?\(' --include='*_test.go' . 2>/dev/null | wc -l | tr -d ' ')"
|
||||
@echo "qa_test.go Part_ subtests: $$(grep -cE 't\.Run\(\"Part[0-9]+_' deploy/test/qa_test.go 2>/dev/null || echo 0)"
|
||||
@echo "Seed unique mc-* IDs: $$(grep -oE "mc-[a-z0-9_-]+" migrations/seed_demo.sql 2>/dev/null | sort -u | wc -l | tr -d ' ')"
|
||||
@echo "Seed unique ag-* IDs: $$(grep -oE "ag-[a-z0-9_-]+" migrations/seed_demo.sql 2>/dev/null | sort -u | wc -l | tr -d ' ') (incl. agent_groups; agents-table count is 12)"
|
||||
@echo "Seed unique ag-* IDs: $$(grep -oE "ag-[a-z0-9_-]+" migrations/seed_demo.sql 2>/dev/null | sort -u | wc -l | tr -d ' ') (incl. agent_groups; agents-table count is 13 incl. agent-demo-1 + 3 cloud sentinels + server-scanner)"
|
||||
@echo "Seed unique iss-* IDs: $$(grep -oE "iss-[a-z0-9_-]+" migrations/seed_demo.sql 2>/dev/null | sort -u | wc -l | tr -d ' ') (issuers table count is 13)"
|
||||
@echo "Seed unique tgt-* IDs: $$(grep -oE "tgt-[a-z0-9_-]+" migrations/seed_demo.sql 2>/dev/null | sort -u | wc -l | tr -d ' ')"
|
||||
@echo "Seed unique nst-* IDs: $$(grep -oE "nst-[a-z0-9_-]+" migrations/seed_demo.sql 2>/dev/null | sort -u | wc -l | tr -d ' ')"
|
||||
|
||||
+521
-1
@@ -147,7 +147,16 @@ paths:
|
||||
get:
|
||||
tags: [Health]
|
||||
summary: Validate credentials
|
||||
description: Returns 200 if auth credentials are valid, 401 otherwise.
|
||||
description: |
|
||||
Returns 200 if auth credentials are valid, 401 otherwise.
|
||||
|
||||
Bundle 1 Phase 3 closure (M1): when the server has the RBAC
|
||||
primitive wired (Bundle 1 default), the response also includes
|
||||
the caller's `actor_id`, `actor_type`, `tenant_id`, the
|
||||
`roles` they hold, and `effective_permissions` they resolve
|
||||
to. The legacy `admin` boolean is preserved for back-compat
|
||||
with pre-Bundle-1 GUIs; new GUIs should switch to
|
||||
`effective_permissions` for affordance gating.
|
||||
operationId: checkAuth
|
||||
responses:
|
||||
"200":
|
||||
@@ -156,13 +165,464 @@ paths:
|
||||
application/json:
|
||||
schema:
|
||||
type: object
|
||||
required: [status]
|
||||
properties:
|
||||
status:
|
||||
type: string
|
||||
example: authenticated
|
||||
user:
|
||||
type: string
|
||||
description: Named-key identity (empty when CERTCTL_AUTH_TYPE=none)
|
||||
admin:
|
||||
type: boolean
|
||||
description: Legacy admin flag (back-compat with pre-Bundle-1 GUIs).
|
||||
actor_id:
|
||||
type: string
|
||||
description: Actor identifier for the authenticated request (Bundle 1+).
|
||||
actor_type:
|
||||
type: string
|
||||
enum: [User, System, Agent, APIKey, Anonymous]
|
||||
description: Actor-type discriminator (Bundle 1+).
|
||||
tenant_id:
|
||||
type: string
|
||||
description: Tenant the actor belongs to (Bundle 1 ships single-tenant `t-default`).
|
||||
admin_via_role:
|
||||
type: boolean
|
||||
description: True when the actor holds `r-admin`. Authoritative admin signal under Bundle 1+.
|
||||
roles:
|
||||
type: array
|
||||
items:
|
||||
type: string
|
||||
description: Role IDs (e.g. `r-admin`, `r-viewer`) the actor holds.
|
||||
effective_permissions:
|
||||
type: array
|
||||
items:
|
||||
type: object
|
||||
required: [permission, scope_type]
|
||||
properties:
|
||||
permission:
|
||||
type: string
|
||||
example: cert.bulk_revoke
|
||||
scope_type:
|
||||
type: string
|
||||
enum: [global, profile, issuer]
|
||||
scope_id:
|
||||
type: string
|
||||
"401":
|
||||
description: Unauthorized
|
||||
|
||||
# ─── Auth / RBAC (Bundle 1 Phase 4) ─────────────────────────────────
|
||||
# The RBAC primitive surface for managing roles, permissions, and the
|
||||
# role grants assigned to actors (API keys today; OIDC-federated users
|
||||
# in Bundle 2). Every mutating route runs through the service layer's
|
||||
# privilege-escalation guard — callers need `auth.role.assign` for
|
||||
# role grants on actors, `auth.role.create/edit/delete` for the role
|
||||
# lifecycle, `auth.key.*` for key management. Read endpoints require
|
||||
# `auth.role.list`. The /v1/auth/me endpoint has no permission gate
|
||||
# (every authenticated caller can read their own permissions).
|
||||
/api/v1/auth/bootstrap:
|
||||
get:
|
||||
tags: [Auth]
|
||||
summary: Probe whether the day-0 bootstrap endpoint is callable
|
||||
description: |
|
||||
Returns `{available: true}` when CERTCTL_BOOTSTRAP_TOKEN is set
|
||||
AND no admin-roled actor exists yet; otherwise `{available: false}`.
|
||||
Auth-exempt because it serves the GUI / install one-liner before
|
||||
the first admin key has been minted. Bundle 1 Phase 6.
|
||||
security: []
|
||||
operationId: getAuthBootstrap
|
||||
responses:
|
||||
"200":
|
||||
description: Bootstrap availability
|
||||
content:
|
||||
application/json:
|
||||
schema:
|
||||
type: object
|
||||
required: [available]
|
||||
properties:
|
||||
available:
|
||||
type: boolean
|
||||
post:
|
||||
tags: [Auth]
|
||||
summary: Mint the first admin API key from a one-shot bootstrap token
|
||||
description: |
|
||||
Operator POSTs the CERTCTL_BOOTSTRAP_TOKEN value plus the desired
|
||||
admin-key name. Returns the freshly minted plaintext key value
|
||||
once; the server stores only the SHA-256 hash. Subsequent calls
|
||||
return 410 Gone (the strategy is one-shot AND the admin-existence
|
||||
probe re-closes the door once the new admin lands). Auth-exempt
|
||||
because the endpoint authenticates via the bootstrap token
|
||||
itself. Bundle 1 Phase 6.
|
||||
security: []
|
||||
operationId: postAuthBootstrap
|
||||
requestBody:
|
||||
required: true
|
||||
content:
|
||||
application/json:
|
||||
schema:
|
||||
type: object
|
||||
required: [token, actor_name]
|
||||
properties:
|
||||
token:
|
||||
type: string
|
||||
description: The CERTCTL_BOOTSTRAP_TOKEN value (constant-time compared server-side).
|
||||
actor_name:
|
||||
type: string
|
||||
description: 3-64 chars, lowercase alphanumeric + hyphen + underscore.
|
||||
pattern: "^[a-z0-9][a-z0-9_-]{2,63}$"
|
||||
responses:
|
||||
"201":
|
||||
description: Admin key minted
|
||||
content:
|
||||
application/json:
|
||||
schema:
|
||||
type: object
|
||||
required: [actor_id, api_key_id, key_value, created_at, message]
|
||||
properties:
|
||||
actor_id: { type: string }
|
||||
api_key_id: { type: string }
|
||||
key_value:
|
||||
type: string
|
||||
description: The plaintext API key. Capture this — it is shown only once.
|
||||
created_at: { type: string, format: date-time }
|
||||
message: { type: string }
|
||||
"400": { description: Invalid actor_name or malformed body }
|
||||
"401": { description: Bootstrap token mismatch }
|
||||
"410":
|
||||
description: |
|
||||
Endpoint disabled. Either CERTCTL_BOOTSTRAP_TOKEN is unset,
|
||||
an admin actor already exists, or the strategy was already
|
||||
consumed by a successful prior call.
|
||||
|
||||
/api/v1/auth/me:
|
||||
get:
|
||||
tags: [Auth]
|
||||
summary: Current actor's roles + effective permissions
|
||||
description: |
|
||||
Returns the standing roles + effective permission set for the
|
||||
authenticated caller. This is the query the GUI uses to gate
|
||||
affordance rendering; /api/v1/auth/check returns the same shape
|
||||
on the boot path.
|
||||
operationId: getAuthMe
|
||||
responses:
|
||||
"200":
|
||||
description: Caller identity + roles + effective permissions
|
||||
content:
|
||||
application/json:
|
||||
schema:
|
||||
type: object
|
||||
required: [actor_id, actor_type, tenant_id, admin, roles, effective_permissions]
|
||||
properties:
|
||||
actor_id: { type: string }
|
||||
actor_type: { type: string, enum: [User, System, Agent, APIKey, Anonymous] }
|
||||
tenant_id: { type: string }
|
||||
admin: { type: boolean }
|
||||
roles:
|
||||
type: array
|
||||
items: { type: string }
|
||||
effective_permissions:
|
||||
type: array
|
||||
items:
|
||||
type: object
|
||||
required: [permission, scope_type]
|
||||
properties:
|
||||
permission: { type: string }
|
||||
scope_type: { type: string, enum: [global, profile, issuer] }
|
||||
scope_id: { type: string }
|
||||
"401":
|
||||
description: Unauthorized
|
||||
|
||||
/api/v1/auth/permissions:
|
||||
get:
|
||||
tags: [Auth]
|
||||
summary: List canonical permission catalogue
|
||||
description: |
|
||||
Returns every permission name registered in the canonical
|
||||
catalogue. Used by the GUI's role editor to populate the
|
||||
"grant permission" picker. Permission: `auth.role.list`.
|
||||
operationId: listAuthPermissions
|
||||
responses:
|
||||
"200":
|
||||
description: Permission catalogue
|
||||
content:
|
||||
application/json:
|
||||
schema:
|
||||
type: object
|
||||
properties:
|
||||
permissions:
|
||||
type: array
|
||||
items:
|
||||
type: object
|
||||
required: [id, name, namespace]
|
||||
properties:
|
||||
id: { type: string }
|
||||
name: { type: string }
|
||||
namespace: { type: string }
|
||||
"401": { description: Unauthorized }
|
||||
"403": { description: Forbidden }
|
||||
|
||||
/api/v1/auth/roles:
|
||||
get:
|
||||
tags: [Auth]
|
||||
summary: List roles for the active tenant
|
||||
description: Permission `auth.role.list`. Returns every role registered for `t-default` (Bundle 1 single-tenant).
|
||||
operationId: listAuthRoles
|
||||
responses:
|
||||
"200":
|
||||
description: Role list
|
||||
content:
|
||||
application/json:
|
||||
schema:
|
||||
type: object
|
||||
properties:
|
||||
roles:
|
||||
type: array
|
||||
items: { $ref: "#/components/schemas/AuthRole" }
|
||||
"401": { description: Unauthorized }
|
||||
"403": { description: Forbidden }
|
||||
post:
|
||||
tags: [Auth]
|
||||
summary: Create a custom role
|
||||
description: Permission `auth.role.create`. Default roles (`r-admin` / `r-operator` / `r-viewer` / `r-agent` / `r-mcp` / `r-cli` / `r-auditor`) are seeded by migration and immutable.
|
||||
operationId: createAuthRole
|
||||
requestBody:
|
||||
required: true
|
||||
content:
|
||||
application/json:
|
||||
schema:
|
||||
type: object
|
||||
required: [name]
|
||||
properties:
|
||||
name: { type: string }
|
||||
description: { type: string }
|
||||
responses:
|
||||
"201":
|
||||
description: Role created
|
||||
content:
|
||||
application/json:
|
||||
schema: { $ref: "#/components/schemas/AuthRole" }
|
||||
"400": { description: Validation error }
|
||||
"401": { description: Unauthorized }
|
||||
"403": { description: Forbidden }
|
||||
"409": { description: Role with that name already exists }
|
||||
|
||||
/api/v1/auth/roles/{id}:
|
||||
get:
|
||||
tags: [Auth]
|
||||
summary: Get a role and its permissions
|
||||
description: Permission `auth.role.list`.
|
||||
operationId: getAuthRole
|
||||
parameters:
|
||||
- in: path
|
||||
name: id
|
||||
required: true
|
||||
schema: { type: string }
|
||||
responses:
|
||||
"200":
|
||||
description: Role + permissions
|
||||
content:
|
||||
application/json:
|
||||
schema:
|
||||
type: object
|
||||
properties:
|
||||
role: { $ref: "#/components/schemas/AuthRole" }
|
||||
permissions:
|
||||
type: array
|
||||
items: { $ref: "#/components/schemas/AuthRolePermission" }
|
||||
"401": { description: Unauthorized }
|
||||
"403": { description: Forbidden }
|
||||
"404": { description: Role not found }
|
||||
put:
|
||||
tags: [Auth]
|
||||
summary: Update a custom role's name or description
|
||||
description: Permission `auth.role.edit`. Default roles cannot be renamed.
|
||||
operationId: updateAuthRole
|
||||
parameters:
|
||||
- in: path
|
||||
name: id
|
||||
required: true
|
||||
schema: { type: string }
|
||||
requestBody:
|
||||
required: true
|
||||
content:
|
||||
application/json:
|
||||
schema:
|
||||
type: object
|
||||
properties:
|
||||
name: { type: string }
|
||||
description: { type: string }
|
||||
responses:
|
||||
"200": { description: Updated }
|
||||
"400": { description: Validation error }
|
||||
"401": { description: Unauthorized }
|
||||
"403": { description: Forbidden }
|
||||
"404": { description: Role not found }
|
||||
"409": { description: Default role cannot be renamed / name collision }
|
||||
delete:
|
||||
tags: [Auth]
|
||||
summary: Delete a custom role
|
||||
description: Permission `auth.role.delete`. Fails with 409 when actors still hold the role (FK ON DELETE RESTRICT).
|
||||
operationId: deleteAuthRole
|
||||
parameters:
|
||||
- in: path
|
||||
name: id
|
||||
required: true
|
||||
schema: { type: string }
|
||||
responses:
|
||||
"204": { description: Deleted }
|
||||
"401": { description: Unauthorized }
|
||||
"403": { description: Forbidden }
|
||||
"404": { description: Role not found }
|
||||
"409": { description: Role still has active actor assignments }
|
||||
|
||||
/api/v1/auth/roles/{id}/permissions:
|
||||
post:
|
||||
tags: [Auth]
|
||||
summary: Grant a permission to a role at a scope
|
||||
description: Permission `auth.role.edit`. ScopeType defaults to `global`; per-profile / per-issuer scopes require ScopeID.
|
||||
operationId: grantAuthRolePermission
|
||||
parameters:
|
||||
- in: path
|
||||
name: id
|
||||
required: true
|
||||
schema: { type: string }
|
||||
requestBody:
|
||||
required: true
|
||||
content:
|
||||
application/json:
|
||||
schema:
|
||||
type: object
|
||||
required: [permission]
|
||||
properties:
|
||||
permission: { type: string }
|
||||
scope_type:
|
||||
type: string
|
||||
enum: [global, profile, issuer]
|
||||
default: global
|
||||
scope_id: { type: string }
|
||||
responses:
|
||||
"204": { description: Granted }
|
||||
"400": { description: Permission not in canonical catalogue / scope_id missing for non-global scope }
|
||||
"401": { description: Unauthorized }
|
||||
"403": { description: Forbidden }
|
||||
"404": { description: Role not found }
|
||||
|
||||
/api/v1/auth/roles/{id}/permissions/{perm}:
|
||||
delete:
|
||||
tags: [Auth]
|
||||
summary: Revoke a permission from a role
|
||||
description: Permission `auth.role.edit`.
|
||||
operationId: revokeAuthRolePermission
|
||||
parameters:
|
||||
- in: path
|
||||
name: id
|
||||
required: true
|
||||
schema: { type: string }
|
||||
- in: path
|
||||
name: perm
|
||||
required: true
|
||||
schema: { type: string }
|
||||
- in: query
|
||||
name: scope_type
|
||||
schema:
|
||||
type: string
|
||||
enum: [global, profile, issuer]
|
||||
- in: query
|
||||
name: scope_id
|
||||
schema: { type: string }
|
||||
responses:
|
||||
"204": { description: Revoked }
|
||||
"401": { description: Unauthorized }
|
||||
"403": { description: Forbidden }
|
||||
"404": { description: Role or permission grant not found }
|
||||
|
||||
/api/v1/auth/keys:
|
||||
get:
|
||||
tags: [Auth]
|
||||
summary: List actors with role grants in the active tenant
|
||||
description: |
|
||||
Returns every distinct (actor_id, actor_type) pair in the
|
||||
tenant that holds at least one role grant. Bundle 1 Phase 7
|
||||
ships this so the CLI's `auth keys list` and scope-down helper
|
||||
can enumerate the operator-key population without joining
|
||||
against the env-var-loaded namedKeys directly. Permission
|
||||
`auth.role.list`.
|
||||
operationId: listAuthKeys
|
||||
responses:
|
||||
"200":
|
||||
description: Actor list with role assignments
|
||||
content:
|
||||
application/json:
|
||||
schema:
|
||||
type: object
|
||||
properties:
|
||||
keys:
|
||||
type: array
|
||||
items:
|
||||
type: object
|
||||
required: [actor_id, actor_type, tenant_id, role_ids]
|
||||
properties:
|
||||
actor_id: { type: string }
|
||||
actor_type:
|
||||
type: string
|
||||
enum: [User, System, Agent, APIKey, Anonymous]
|
||||
tenant_id: { type: string }
|
||||
role_ids:
|
||||
type: array
|
||||
items: { type: string }
|
||||
"401": { description: Unauthorized }
|
||||
"403": { description: Forbidden }
|
||||
|
||||
/api/v1/auth/keys/{id}/roles:
|
||||
post:
|
||||
tags: [Auth]
|
||||
summary: Assign a role to an API key
|
||||
description: Permission `auth.role.assign`. The reserved `actor-demo-anon` actor cannot be re-assigned.
|
||||
operationId: assignAuthKeyRole
|
||||
parameters:
|
||||
- in: path
|
||||
name: id
|
||||
required: true
|
||||
schema: { type: string }
|
||||
requestBody:
|
||||
required: true
|
||||
content:
|
||||
application/json:
|
||||
schema:
|
||||
type: object
|
||||
required: [role_id]
|
||||
properties:
|
||||
role_id: { type: string }
|
||||
responses:
|
||||
"204": { description: Assigned }
|
||||
"400": { description: Validation error }
|
||||
"401": { description: Unauthorized }
|
||||
"403": { description: Forbidden }
|
||||
"404": { description: Role not found }
|
||||
"409": { description: Reserved system actor cannot be modified }
|
||||
|
||||
/api/v1/auth/keys/{id}/roles/{role_id}:
|
||||
delete:
|
||||
tags: [Auth]
|
||||
summary: Revoke a role from an API key
|
||||
description: Permission `auth.role.assign`. Revoking the synthetic `actor-demo-anon` admin grant is rejected.
|
||||
operationId: revokeAuthKeyRole
|
||||
parameters:
|
||||
- in: path
|
||||
name: id
|
||||
required: true
|
||||
schema: { type: string }
|
||||
- in: path
|
||||
name: role_id
|
||||
required: true
|
||||
schema: { type: string }
|
||||
responses:
|
||||
"204": { description: Revoked }
|
||||
"401": { description: Unauthorized }
|
||||
"403": { description: Forbidden }
|
||||
"404": { description: Role not assigned to actor }
|
||||
"409": { description: Reserved system actor cannot be modified }
|
||||
|
||||
/api/v1/version:
|
||||
get:
|
||||
tags: [Health]
|
||||
@@ -2708,10 +3168,22 @@ paths:
|
||||
get:
|
||||
tags: [Audit]
|
||||
summary: List audit events
|
||||
description: |
|
||||
Bundle 1 Phase 8 adds the optional `category` query parameter
|
||||
for auditor-role filtering. Allowed values: `cert_lifecycle`
|
||||
(cert/agent/deployment events), `auth` (role/key/bootstrap
|
||||
mutations), `config` (issuer/target/settings edits). Omitting
|
||||
the parameter returns every category.
|
||||
operationId: listAuditEvents
|
||||
parameters:
|
||||
- $ref: "#/components/parameters/page"
|
||||
- $ref: "#/components/parameters/per_page"
|
||||
- in: query
|
||||
name: category
|
||||
schema:
|
||||
type: string
|
||||
enum: [cert_lifecycle, auth, config]
|
||||
description: Filter to events of this event_category. (Bundle 1 Phase 8)
|
||||
responses:
|
||||
"200":
|
||||
description: Paginated list of audit events
|
||||
@@ -2726,6 +3198,8 @@ paths:
|
||||
type: array
|
||||
items:
|
||||
$ref: "#/components/schemas/AuditEvent"
|
||||
"400":
|
||||
description: Invalid `category` value
|
||||
"500":
|
||||
$ref: "#/components/responses/InternalError"
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -4361,6 +4835,45 @@ components:
|
||||
$ref: "#/components/schemas/ErrorResponse"
|
||||
|
||||
schemas:
|
||||
# ─── Auth / RBAC (Bundle 1 Phase 4) ─────────────────────────────
|
||||
AuthRole:
|
||||
type: object
|
||||
required: [id, tenant_id, name]
|
||||
properties:
|
||||
id:
|
||||
type: string
|
||||
description: Role ID (`r-` prefix).
|
||||
example: r-admin
|
||||
tenant_id:
|
||||
type: string
|
||||
example: t-default
|
||||
name:
|
||||
type: string
|
||||
example: admin
|
||||
description:
|
||||
type: string
|
||||
created_at:
|
||||
type: string
|
||||
format: date-time
|
||||
updated_at:
|
||||
type: string
|
||||
format: date-time
|
||||
|
||||
AuthRolePermission:
|
||||
type: object
|
||||
required: [role_id, permission_id, scope_type]
|
||||
properties:
|
||||
role_id:
|
||||
type: string
|
||||
permission_id:
|
||||
type: string
|
||||
scope_type:
|
||||
type: string
|
||||
enum: [global, profile, issuer]
|
||||
scope_id:
|
||||
type: string
|
||||
description: NULL/absent for global scope; profile/issuer ID otherwise.
|
||||
|
||||
# ─── Approvals ───────────────────────────────────────────────────
|
||||
ApprovalRequest:
|
||||
type: object
|
||||
@@ -5311,6 +5824,13 @@ components:
|
||||
timestamp:
|
||||
type: string
|
||||
format: date-time
|
||||
event_category:
|
||||
type: string
|
||||
enum: [cert_lifecycle, auth, config]
|
||||
description: |
|
||||
Bundle 1 Phase 8: classifies the event for auditor-role
|
||||
filtering. Empty / absent on rows from pre-Phase-8
|
||||
deployments (the migration backfills "cert_lifecycle").
|
||||
|
||||
# ─── Notifications ───────────────────────────────────────────────
|
||||
NotificationType:
|
||||
|
||||
+122
@@ -111,6 +111,8 @@ Examples:
|
||||
err = handleEST(client, cmdArgs)
|
||||
case "status":
|
||||
err = handleStatus(client)
|
||||
case "auth":
|
||||
err = handleAuth(client, cmdArgs)
|
||||
case "version":
|
||||
fmt.Println("certctl-cli version 0.1.0")
|
||||
default:
|
||||
@@ -364,3 +366,123 @@ func validateHTTPSScheme(serverURL string) error {
|
||||
return fmt.Errorf("server URL %q uses unsupported scheme %q — expected https://", serverURL, u.Scheme)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// handleAuth dispatches the `certctl-cli auth ...` subcommand tree.
|
||||
// Bundle 1 Phase 5: ships read + grant operations against the
|
||||
// /api/v1/auth/* surface introduced in Phase 4. Mutations like role
|
||||
// create / update / delete can be added in a Phase 5.5 follow-up; this
|
||||
// commit ships the operator-facing subset most useful for migration
|
||||
// and day-2 scope-down (`auth keys list` + `auth keys assign` +
|
||||
// `auth me`).
|
||||
func handleAuth(client *cli.Client, args []string) error {
|
||||
if len(args) == 0 {
|
||||
fmt.Fprintf(os.Stderr, "usage: auth <roles|permissions|keys|me> [...]\n")
|
||||
return nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
subcommand := args[0]
|
||||
subArgs := args[1:]
|
||||
|
||||
switch subcommand {
|
||||
case "roles":
|
||||
return handleAuthRoles(client, subArgs)
|
||||
case "permissions":
|
||||
return handleAuthPermissions(client, subArgs)
|
||||
case "keys":
|
||||
return handleAuthKeys(client, subArgs)
|
||||
case "me":
|
||||
return client.AuthMe()
|
||||
default:
|
||||
fmt.Fprintf(os.Stderr, "unknown auth subcommand: %s\n", subcommand)
|
||||
return nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func handleAuthRoles(client *cli.Client, args []string) error {
|
||||
if len(args) == 0 {
|
||||
fmt.Fprintf(os.Stderr, "usage: auth roles <list|get> [id]\n")
|
||||
return nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
switch args[0] {
|
||||
case "list":
|
||||
return client.AuthListRoles()
|
||||
case "get":
|
||||
if len(args) < 2 {
|
||||
fmt.Fprintf(os.Stderr, "usage: auth roles get <id>\n")
|
||||
return nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
return client.AuthGetRole(args[1])
|
||||
default:
|
||||
fmt.Fprintf(os.Stderr, "unknown roles subcommand: %s\n", args[0])
|
||||
return nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func handleAuthPermissions(client *cli.Client, args []string) error {
|
||||
if len(args) == 0 || args[0] != "list" {
|
||||
fmt.Fprintf(os.Stderr, "usage: auth permissions list\n")
|
||||
return nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
return client.AuthListPermissions()
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func handleAuthKeys(client *cli.Client, args []string) error {
|
||||
if len(args) == 0 {
|
||||
fmt.Fprintf(os.Stderr, "usage: auth keys <list|assign|revoke|scope-down> [...]\n")
|
||||
return nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
switch args[0] {
|
||||
case "list":
|
||||
return client.AuthListKeys()
|
||||
case "assign":
|
||||
// auth keys assign <key-id> --role <role-id>
|
||||
if len(args) < 4 || args[2] != "--role" {
|
||||
fmt.Fprintf(os.Stderr, "usage: auth keys assign <key-id> --role <role-id>\n")
|
||||
return nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
return client.AuthAssignRoleToKey(args[1], args[3])
|
||||
case "revoke":
|
||||
// auth keys revoke <key-id> --role <role-id>
|
||||
if len(args) < 4 || args[2] != "--role" {
|
||||
fmt.Fprintf(os.Stderr, "usage: auth keys revoke <key-id> --role <role-id>\n")
|
||||
return nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
return client.AuthRevokeRoleFromKey(args[1], args[3])
|
||||
case "scope-down":
|
||||
// Bundle 1 Phase 7 — interactive (default), --non-interactive
|
||||
// <config.json>, or --suggest [--apply].
|
||||
return handleAuthKeysScopeDown(client, args[1:])
|
||||
default:
|
||||
fmt.Fprintf(os.Stderr, "unknown keys subcommand: %s\n", args[0])
|
||||
return nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// handleAuthKeysScopeDown dispatches the three scope-down modes:
|
||||
//
|
||||
// auth keys scope-down → interactive
|
||||
// auth keys scope-down --non-interactive <config> → JSON-driven
|
||||
// auth keys scope-down --suggest [--apply] → audit-driven suggestions
|
||||
func handleAuthKeysScopeDown(client *cli.Client, args []string) error {
|
||||
if len(args) == 0 {
|
||||
return client.AuthScopeDown()
|
||||
}
|
||||
switch args[0] {
|
||||
case "--non-interactive":
|
||||
if len(args) < 2 {
|
||||
fmt.Fprintf(os.Stderr, "usage: auth keys scope-down --non-interactive <config.json>\n")
|
||||
return nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
return client.AuthScopeDownNonInteractive(args[1])
|
||||
case "--suggest":
|
||||
apply := false
|
||||
for _, a := range args[1:] {
|
||||
if a == "--apply" {
|
||||
apply = true
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
return client.AuthScopeDownSuggest(apply)
|
||||
default:
|
||||
fmt.Fprintf(os.Stderr, "unknown scope-down flag: %s\n", args[0])
|
||||
return nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,105 @@
|
||||
package main
|
||||
|
||||
import (
|
||||
"context"
|
||||
"fmt"
|
||||
"log/slog"
|
||||
"strings"
|
||||
|
||||
"github.com/certctl-io/certctl/internal/auth"
|
||||
"github.com/certctl-io/certctl/internal/config"
|
||||
"github.com/certctl-io/certctl/internal/domain"
|
||||
authdomain "github.com/certctl-io/certctl/internal/domain/auth"
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
// assembleNamedAPIKeys translates the operator's CERTCTL_API_KEYS_NAMED
|
||||
// env-var (preferred) or CERTCTL_AUTH_SECRET (legacy) into the
|
||||
// auth.NamedAPIKey slice the rest of the boot path consumes.
|
||||
//
|
||||
// Authentication unification (M-002): every authenticated request now
|
||||
// carries a named actor in the request context so audit events record
|
||||
// the real key identity instead of the hardcoded "api-key-user"
|
||||
// string. Named keys come from CERTCTL_API_KEYS_NAMED (preferred). For
|
||||
// backward compatibility CERTCTL_AUTH_SECRET is synthesized into
|
||||
// legacy-key-N entries with Admin=false.
|
||||
func assembleNamedAPIKeys(cfg *config.Config, logger *slog.Logger) []auth.NamedAPIKey {
|
||||
if config.AuthType(cfg.Auth.Type) == config.AuthTypeNone {
|
||||
return nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
var out []auth.NamedAPIKey
|
||||
for _, nk := range cfg.Auth.NamedKeys {
|
||||
out = append(out, auth.NamedAPIKey{
|
||||
Name: nk.Name,
|
||||
Key: nk.Key,
|
||||
Admin: nk.Admin,
|
||||
})
|
||||
}
|
||||
if len(out) == 0 && cfg.Auth.Secret != "" {
|
||||
idx := 0
|
||||
for _, p := range strings.Split(cfg.Auth.Secret, ",") {
|
||||
p = strings.TrimSpace(p)
|
||||
if p == "" {
|
||||
continue
|
||||
}
|
||||
out = append(out, auth.NamedAPIKey{
|
||||
Name: fmt.Sprintf("legacy-key-%d", idx),
|
||||
Key: p,
|
||||
Admin: false,
|
||||
})
|
||||
idx++
|
||||
}
|
||||
if len(out) > 0 && logger != nil {
|
||||
logger.Warn("CERTCTL_AUTH_SECRET is deprecated — set CERTCTL_API_KEYS_NAMED for named actor attribution and admin gating",
|
||||
"synthesized_keys", len(out))
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
return out
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// actorRoleGranter is the narrow interface backfillNamedKeyActorRoles
|
||||
// needs from the postgres ActorRoleRepository. Pulled out so the unit
|
||||
// test can inject a fake without spinning up the full repo / DB.
|
||||
type actorRoleGranter interface {
|
||||
Grant(ctx context.Context, ar *authdomain.ActorRole) error
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// backfillNamedKeyActorRoles is the Bundle 1 Phase 3 closure (C2)
|
||||
// startup hook that ensures every CERTCTL_API_KEYS_NAMED entry — and
|
||||
// every legacy CERTCTL_AUTH_SECRET synthesized fallback — has an
|
||||
// actor_roles row before the HTTP server accepts requests. Admin-flagged
|
||||
// keys grant `r-admin` (full canonical permission set); non-admin keys
|
||||
// grant `r-viewer` (read-only surface), matching the pre-Phase-3.5
|
||||
// capability shape.
|
||||
//
|
||||
// Idempotent via ON CONFLICT DO NOTHING in the repo Grant — reboots
|
||||
// don't create duplicates. Failures are logged but non-fatal: the server
|
||||
// still starts, and the operator can fix the grant via the RBAC API.
|
||||
//
|
||||
// The function is package-private + extracted from main() so the unit
|
||||
// test in auth_backfill_test.go can pin the role-mapping invariant
|
||||
// without depending on the full server bootstrap path.
|
||||
func backfillNamedKeyActorRoles(
|
||||
ctx context.Context,
|
||||
repo actorRoleGranter,
|
||||
keys []auth.NamedAPIKey,
|
||||
logger *slog.Logger,
|
||||
) {
|
||||
for _, nk := range keys {
|
||||
role := authdomain.RoleIDViewer
|
||||
if nk.Admin {
|
||||
role = authdomain.RoleIDAdmin
|
||||
}
|
||||
if err := repo.Grant(ctx, &authdomain.ActorRole{
|
||||
ActorID: nk.Name,
|
||||
ActorType: authdomain.ActorTypeValue(domain.ActorTypeAPIKey),
|
||||
RoleID: role,
|
||||
TenantID: authdomain.DefaultTenantID,
|
||||
GrantedBy: "bootstrap",
|
||||
}); err != nil {
|
||||
if logger != nil {
|
||||
logger.Warn("api-key actor-role backfill failed; key authenticates but RBAC routes will 403 until grant is added via /v1/auth/keys",
|
||||
"key", nk.Name, "role", role, "err", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,116 @@
|
||||
package main
|
||||
|
||||
import (
|
||||
"context"
|
||||
"errors"
|
||||
"io"
|
||||
"log/slog"
|
||||
"testing"
|
||||
|
||||
"github.com/certctl-io/certctl/internal/auth"
|
||||
authdomain "github.com/certctl-io/certctl/internal/domain/auth"
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
// fakeGranter is a tiny in-memory stand-in for the postgres ActorRoleRepository
|
||||
// — enough surface area for backfillNamedKeyActorRoles to call Grant against.
|
||||
type fakeGranter struct {
|
||||
calls []*authdomain.ActorRole
|
||||
err error
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func (f *fakeGranter) Grant(_ context.Context, ar *authdomain.ActorRole) error {
|
||||
f.calls = append(f.calls, ar)
|
||||
return f.err
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// TestBackfillNamedKeyActorRoles_RoleMapping pins the Bundle 1 Phase 3
|
||||
// closure (C2) invariant: admin-flagged named keys grant r-admin,
|
||||
// non-admin keys grant r-viewer, both at TenantID t-default with
|
||||
// ActorType APIKey and GrantedBy=bootstrap.
|
||||
func TestBackfillNamedKeyActorRoles_RoleMapping(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
repo := &fakeGranter{}
|
||||
logger := slog.New(slog.NewTextHandler(io.Discard, nil))
|
||||
|
||||
keys := []auth.NamedAPIKey{
|
||||
{Name: "alice-admin", Key: "AAA", Admin: true},
|
||||
{Name: "bob-viewer", Key: "BBB", Admin: false},
|
||||
{Name: "carol-admin", Key: "CCC", Admin: true},
|
||||
}
|
||||
backfillNamedKeyActorRoles(context.Background(), repo, keys, logger)
|
||||
|
||||
if len(repo.calls) != 3 {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("Grant call count = %d, want 3", len(repo.calls))
|
||||
}
|
||||
type want struct {
|
||||
actor, role string
|
||||
}
|
||||
wants := []want{
|
||||
{actor: "alice-admin", role: authdomain.RoleIDAdmin},
|
||||
{actor: "bob-viewer", role: authdomain.RoleIDViewer},
|
||||
{actor: "carol-admin", role: authdomain.RoleIDAdmin},
|
||||
}
|
||||
for i, w := range wants {
|
||||
got := repo.calls[i]
|
||||
if got.ActorID != w.actor {
|
||||
t.Errorf("call[%d].ActorID = %q, want %q", i, got.ActorID, w.actor)
|
||||
}
|
||||
if got.RoleID != w.role {
|
||||
t.Errorf("call[%d].RoleID = %q, want %q", i, got.RoleID, w.role)
|
||||
}
|
||||
if got.TenantID != authdomain.DefaultTenantID {
|
||||
t.Errorf("call[%d].TenantID = %q, want %q", i, got.TenantID, authdomain.DefaultTenantID)
|
||||
}
|
||||
if string(got.ActorType) != "APIKey" {
|
||||
t.Errorf("call[%d].ActorType = %q, want APIKey", i, got.ActorType)
|
||||
}
|
||||
if got.GrantedBy != "bootstrap" {
|
||||
t.Errorf("call[%d].GrantedBy = %q, want bootstrap", i, got.GrantedBy)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// TestBackfillNamedKeyActorRoles_EmptyKeysIsNoOp confirms the boot path
|
||||
// is safe when no named keys are configured (typical CERTCTL_AUTH_TYPE=
|
||||
// none deploy). No Grant calls; no panic.
|
||||
func TestBackfillNamedKeyActorRoles_EmptyKeysIsNoOp(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
repo := &fakeGranter{}
|
||||
logger := slog.New(slog.NewTextHandler(io.Discard, nil))
|
||||
backfillNamedKeyActorRoles(context.Background(), repo, nil, logger)
|
||||
if len(repo.calls) != 0 {
|
||||
t.Errorf("Grant called %d times for empty keys, want 0", len(repo.calls))
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// TestBackfillNamedKeyActorRoles_GrantErrorIsNonFatal confirms the
|
||||
// closure invariant that a Grant failure logs a warning and proceeds
|
||||
// rather than crashing the server during boot. Subsequent keys still
|
||||
// get processed.
|
||||
func TestBackfillNamedKeyActorRoles_GrantErrorIsNonFatal(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
repo := &fakeGranter{err: errors.New("simulated DB error")}
|
||||
logger := slog.New(slog.NewTextHandler(io.Discard, nil))
|
||||
|
||||
keys := []auth.NamedAPIKey{
|
||||
{Name: "alice", Key: "A", Admin: true},
|
||||
{Name: "bob", Key: "B", Admin: false},
|
||||
}
|
||||
// Should not panic.
|
||||
backfillNamedKeyActorRoles(context.Background(), repo, keys, logger)
|
||||
|
||||
if len(repo.calls) != 2 {
|
||||
t.Errorf("Grant calls = %d, want 2 (every key processed even when prior Grant errored)", len(repo.calls))
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// TestBackfillNamedKeyActorRoles_NilLoggerIsSafe pins that callers
|
||||
// passing nil for the logger don't NPE the goroutine. Belt-and-braces
|
||||
// for tests + future call sites that may not have a logger plumbed.
|
||||
func TestBackfillNamedKeyActorRoles_NilLoggerIsSafe(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
repo := &fakeGranter{err: errors.New("simulated")}
|
||||
keys := []auth.NamedAPIKey{
|
||||
{Name: "alice", Key: "A", Admin: true},
|
||||
}
|
||||
backfillNamedKeyActorRoles(context.Background(), repo, keys, nil)
|
||||
if len(repo.calls) != 1 {
|
||||
t.Errorf("Grant calls = %d, want 1", len(repo.calls))
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
+215
-42
@@ -5,6 +5,7 @@ import (
|
||||
"crypto"
|
||||
"crypto/tls"
|
||||
"crypto/x509"
|
||||
"encoding/json"
|
||||
"encoding/pem"
|
||||
"fmt"
|
||||
"log/slog"
|
||||
@@ -21,6 +22,8 @@ import (
|
||||
"github.com/certctl-io/certctl/internal/api/handler"
|
||||
"github.com/certctl-io/certctl/internal/api/middleware"
|
||||
"github.com/certctl-io/certctl/internal/api/router"
|
||||
"github.com/certctl-io/certctl/internal/auth"
|
||||
"github.com/certctl-io/certctl/internal/auth/bootstrap"
|
||||
"github.com/certctl-io/certctl/internal/config"
|
||||
discoveryawssm "github.com/certctl-io/certctl/internal/connector/discovery/awssm"
|
||||
discoveryazurekv "github.com/certctl-io/certctl/internal/connector/discovery/azurekv"
|
||||
@@ -32,11 +35,14 @@ import (
|
||||
notifyteams "github.com/certctl-io/certctl/internal/connector/notifier/teams"
|
||||
"github.com/certctl-io/certctl/internal/crypto/signer"
|
||||
"github.com/certctl-io/certctl/internal/domain"
|
||||
authdomainAlias "github.com/certctl-io/certctl/internal/domain/auth"
|
||||
"github.com/certctl-io/certctl/internal/ratelimit"
|
||||
"github.com/certctl-io/certctl/internal/repository"
|
||||
"github.com/certctl-io/certctl/internal/repository/postgres"
|
||||
"github.com/certctl-io/certctl/internal/scep/intune"
|
||||
"github.com/certctl-io/certctl/internal/scheduler"
|
||||
"github.com/certctl-io/certctl/internal/service"
|
||||
authsvc "github.com/certctl-io/certctl/internal/service/auth"
|
||||
"github.com/certctl-io/certctl/internal/trustanchor"
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -251,6 +257,77 @@ func main() {
|
||||
|
||||
// Initialize services (following the dependency graph)
|
||||
auditService := service.NewAuditService(auditRepo)
|
||||
|
||||
// RBAC primitive (Bundle 1 Phase 4). Wires the postgres auth repos
|
||||
// + service-layer Authorizer that the AuthHandler / RequirePermission
|
||||
// middleware uses. Migration 000029_rbac.up.sql provides the schema
|
||||
// and seeds the seven default roles + canonical permission catalogue
|
||||
// + actor-demo-anon synthetic admin (CERTCTL_AUTH_TYPE=none demo path).
|
||||
authRoleRepo := postgres.NewRoleRepository(db)
|
||||
authPermRepo := postgres.NewPermissionRepository(db)
|
||||
authActorRoleRepo := postgres.NewActorRoleRepository(db)
|
||||
authAPIKeyRepo := postgres.NewAPIKeyRepository(db)
|
||||
authAuthorizer := authsvc.NewAuthorizer(authActorRoleRepo)
|
||||
// authCheckerAdapter bridges authsvc.Authorizer (typed-string args)
|
||||
// to the auth.PermissionChecker interface (plain-string args) so
|
||||
// internal/auth doesn't have to import internal/service/auth.
|
||||
authCheckerAdapter := authPermissionCheckerAdapter{a: authAuthorizer}
|
||||
|
||||
// Bundle 1 Phase 6 — parse env-var named API keys + assemble the
|
||||
// runtime keystore + wire the bootstrap service. The keystore +
|
||||
// bootstrap handler must exist before the HandlerRegistry is
|
||||
// constructed below; the auth middleware that reads from the same
|
||||
// keystore is wired further down (next to the rest of the
|
||||
// middleware stack) but holds a reference to the same keystore so
|
||||
// runtime additions from bootstrap propagate without restart.
|
||||
//
|
||||
// boot-path operations use context.Background() because the long-
|
||||
// lived request context isn't constructed until later in main();
|
||||
// this matches the convention used by other one-shot setup calls
|
||||
// in this section (issuerService.SeedFromEnvVars, etc.).
|
||||
bootCtx := context.Background()
|
||||
namedKeys := assembleNamedAPIKeys(cfg, logger)
|
||||
backfillNamedKeyActorRoles(bootCtx, authActorRoleRepo, namedKeys, logger)
|
||||
authKeyStore := auth.NewMutableKeyStore(namedKeys)
|
||||
if persistedKeys, err := authAPIKeyRepo.List(bootCtx, authdomainAlias.DefaultTenantID); err == nil {
|
||||
for _, pk := range persistedKeys {
|
||||
authKeyStore.AddHashed(pk.Name, pk.KeyHash, pk.Admin)
|
||||
}
|
||||
if len(persistedKeys) > 0 {
|
||||
logger.Info("loaded persisted api_keys into runtime keystore",
|
||||
"count", len(persistedKeys))
|
||||
}
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
logger.Warn("api_keys boot loader failed; bootstrap-minted keys will not authenticate until next restart that succeeds",
|
||||
"err", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
bootstrapStrategy := bootstrap.NewEnvTokenStrategy(
|
||||
cfg.Auth.BootstrapToken,
|
||||
func(ctx context.Context) (bool, error) {
|
||||
return authActorRoleRepo.AdminExists(ctx, authdomainAlias.DefaultTenantID)
|
||||
},
|
||||
)
|
||||
bootstrapService := bootstrap.NewService(
|
||||
bootstrapStrategy,
|
||||
authAPIKeyRepo,
|
||||
authActorRoleRepo,
|
||||
auditService,
|
||||
authKeyStore,
|
||||
auth.HashAPIKey,
|
||||
)
|
||||
if cfg.Auth.BootstrapToken != "" {
|
||||
// Honour the prompt's "warn at startup if token set + admin
|
||||
// exists" requirement. The strategy re-probes on every Validate
|
||||
// so this boot-time warning is purely informational.
|
||||
if exists, probeErr := authActorRoleRepo.AdminExists(bootCtx, authdomainAlias.DefaultTenantID); probeErr == nil && exists {
|
||||
logger.Warn("CERTCTL_BOOTSTRAP_TOKEN set but admin actors already exist; bootstrap endpoint will return 410 Gone — unset the env var to silence this warning")
|
||||
} else if probeErr != nil {
|
||||
logger.Warn("CERTCTL_BOOTSTRAP_TOKEN admin-existence probe failed at startup; behaviour will be determined by the live probe at request time", "err", probeErr)
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
logger.Info("bootstrap endpoint enabled — POST /api/v1/auth/bootstrap to mint the first admin key (one-shot)")
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
bootstrapHandler := handler.NewBootstrapHandler(bootstrapService)
|
||||
policyService := service.NewPolicyService(policyRepo, auditService)
|
||||
policyService.SetCertRepo(certificateRepo) // D-008: CertificateLifetime arm needs CertificateVersion.NotBefore/NotAfter
|
||||
// G-1: RenewalPolicyService — distinct from PolicyService (compliance rules).
|
||||
@@ -483,6 +560,36 @@ func main() {
|
||||
defer issuerRegistry.StopLifecycles()
|
||||
targetService := service.NewTargetService(targetRepo, auditService, agentRepo, encryptionKey, logger)
|
||||
profileService := service.NewProfileService(profileRepo, auditService)
|
||||
// Bundle 1 Phase 9 — approval-bypass closure. Wire the profile
|
||||
// service's gate to the existing ApprovalService so edits to a
|
||||
// RequiresApproval=true profile route through the four-eyes
|
||||
// workflow. The profile-edit-apply callback registered on the
|
||||
// ApprovalService closes the loop: when an approver decides,
|
||||
// the callback deserializes req.Payload and persists the diff.
|
||||
profileService.SetApprovalService(approvalService)
|
||||
approvalService.SetProfileEditApply(func(ctx context.Context, req *domain.ApprovalRequest) error {
|
||||
var pendingProfile domain.CertificateProfile
|
||||
if err := json.Unmarshal(req.Payload, &pendingProfile); err != nil {
|
||||
return fmt.Errorf("decode profile-edit payload: %w", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
pendingProfile.ID = req.ProfileID
|
||||
if err := profileRepo.Update(ctx, &pendingProfile); err != nil {
|
||||
return fmt.Errorf("apply profile-edit diff: %w", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
// Audit row category=auth so the auditor surface keeps the
|
||||
// approval-decision history grouped with the request side.
|
||||
if auditService != nil {
|
||||
_ = auditService.RecordEventWithCategory(ctx, "approval-system",
|
||||
domain.ActorTypeSystem, "profile.edit_applied",
|
||||
domain.EventCategoryAuth, "certificate_profile",
|
||||
req.ProfileID,
|
||||
map[string]interface{}{
|
||||
"approval_id": req.ID,
|
||||
"requested_by": req.RequestedBy,
|
||||
})
|
||||
}
|
||||
return nil
|
||||
})
|
||||
teamService := service.NewTeamService(teamRepo, auditService)
|
||||
ownerService := service.NewOwnerService(ownerRepo, auditService)
|
||||
agentGroupRepo := postgres.NewAgentGroupRepository(db)
|
||||
@@ -661,6 +768,12 @@ func main() {
|
||||
// Bundle-5 / H-006: pass the *sql.DB pool so /ready can probe DB
|
||||
// connectivity via PingContext. /health stays shallow (liveness signal).
|
||||
healthHandler := handler.NewHealthHandler(cfg.Auth.Type, db)
|
||||
// Bundle 1 Phase 3 closure (M1): wire the AuthCheckResolver so
|
||||
// /v1/auth/check returns the caller's standing roles + effective
|
||||
// permissions in the same response. The shim is tiny — just a type-
|
||||
// erasure wrap around the repo so the handler layer doesn't have to
|
||||
// import internal/domain/auth or internal/repository/postgres.
|
||||
healthHandler.Resolver = authCheckResolverAdapter{repo: authActorRoleRepo}
|
||||
// U-3 ride-along (cat-u-no_version_endpoint, P2): the version handler
|
||||
// answers GET /api/v1/version with build identity (ldflags Version,
|
||||
// VCS commit/dirty/timestamp, Go runtime version). Wired through the
|
||||
@@ -961,6 +1074,32 @@ func main() {
|
||||
// Rank 8 of the 2026-05-03 deep-research deliverable. See
|
||||
// docs/intermediate-ca-hierarchy.md.
|
||||
IntermediateCAs: intermediateCAHandler,
|
||||
// Auth — RBAC primitive (Bundle 1 Phase 4). Wires the postgres
|
||||
// auth repos + service-layer Authorizer / RoleService /
|
||||
// ActorRoleService / PermissionService into the HTTP surface
|
||||
// under /api/v1/auth/*. The service layer enforces every
|
||||
// permission gate (auth.role.* + auth.role.assign privilege-
|
||||
// escalation guard); the Phase 3 RequirePermission middleware
|
||||
// is currently used by these RBAC routes via the in-handler
|
||||
// callerFromRequest path. Phase 3.5 router-wrapping conversion
|
||||
// of the legacy admin handlers (bulk_revocation, admin_*,
|
||||
// intermediate_ca) is the remaining sweep.
|
||||
Auth: handler.NewAuthHandler(
|
||||
authsvc.NewRoleService(authRoleRepo, authPermRepo, authAuthorizer, auditService),
|
||||
authsvc.NewPermissionService(authPermRepo),
|
||||
authsvc.NewActorRoleService(authActorRoleRepo, authRoleRepo, authAuthorizer, auditService),
|
||||
authCheckerAdapter,
|
||||
),
|
||||
// Bundle 1 Phase 6 — bootstrap day-0 admin endpoint. The
|
||||
// service is wired above; handler is auth-exempt at the
|
||||
// router (gated by the bootstrap.Strategy itself).
|
||||
Bootstrap: bootstrapHandler,
|
||||
// Checker is the load-bearing auth.PermissionChecker that
|
||||
// auth.RequirePermission middleware uses to gate the legacy admin
|
||||
// handlers (Bundle 1 Phase 3.5: bulk_revocation, admin_crl_cache,
|
||||
// admin_scep_intune, admin_est, intermediate_ca). Wraps live in
|
||||
// router.go via rbacGate(reg.Checker, perm, handler).
|
||||
Checker: authCheckerAdapter,
|
||||
})
|
||||
// Register EST (RFC 7030) handlers if enabled.
|
||||
//
|
||||
@@ -1477,49 +1616,19 @@ func main() {
|
||||
|
||||
// Build middleware stack.
|
||||
//
|
||||
// Authentication unification (M-002): every authenticated request now
|
||||
// carries a named actor in the request context so audit events record
|
||||
// the real key identity instead of the hardcoded "api-key-user" string.
|
||||
// Named keys come from CERTCTL_API_KEYS_NAMED (preferred). For backward
|
||||
// compatibility CERTCTL_AUTH_SECRET is synthesized into legacy-key-N
|
||||
// entries with Admin=false.
|
||||
var namedKeys []middleware.NamedAPIKey
|
||||
if config.AuthType(cfg.Auth.Type) != config.AuthTypeNone {
|
||||
// Translate typed config.NamedAPIKey -> middleware.NamedAPIKey. The
|
||||
// two structs are field-compatible but live in different packages to
|
||||
// preserve the config→middleware dependency direction.
|
||||
for _, nk := range cfg.Auth.NamedKeys {
|
||||
namedKeys = append(namedKeys, middleware.NamedAPIKey{
|
||||
Name: nk.Name,
|
||||
Key: nk.Key,
|
||||
Admin: nk.Admin,
|
||||
})
|
||||
// Bundle 1 Phase 6: namedKeys + authKeyStore + bootstrap service
|
||||
// are now constructed earlier (right after the auth repos) so the
|
||||
// HandlerRegistry can wire the bootstrap handler. The auth
|
||||
// middleware below reads from the same authKeyStore reference, so
|
||||
// runtime additions from bootstrap propagate without restart.
|
||||
var authMiddleware func(http.Handler) http.Handler
|
||||
switch config.AuthType(cfg.Auth.Type) {
|
||||
case config.AuthTypeNone:
|
||||
authMiddleware = auth.NewDemoModeAuth()
|
||||
default:
|
||||
authMiddleware = auth.NewAuthWithKeyStore(authKeyStore)
|
||||
}
|
||||
// Back-compat: if no named keys but legacy Secret is configured,
|
||||
// synthesize named entries so the audit trail still attributes the
|
||||
// action (instead of falling back to "api-key-user" / "anonymous").
|
||||
if len(namedKeys) == 0 && cfg.Auth.Secret != "" {
|
||||
parts := strings.Split(cfg.Auth.Secret, ",")
|
||||
idx := 0
|
||||
for _, p := range parts {
|
||||
p = strings.TrimSpace(p)
|
||||
if p == "" {
|
||||
continue
|
||||
}
|
||||
namedKeys = append(namedKeys, middleware.NamedAPIKey{
|
||||
Name: fmt.Sprintf("legacy-key-%d", idx),
|
||||
Key: p,
|
||||
Admin: false,
|
||||
})
|
||||
idx++
|
||||
}
|
||||
if len(namedKeys) > 0 {
|
||||
logger.Warn("CERTCTL_AUTH_SECRET is deprecated — set CERTCTL_API_KEYS_NAMED for named actor attribution and admin gating",
|
||||
"synthesized_keys", len(namedKeys))
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
authMiddleware := middleware.NewAuthWithNamedKeys(namedKeys)
|
||||
_ = bootstrapHandler // referenced by HandlerRegistry above
|
||||
corsMiddleware := middleware.NewCORS(middleware.CORSConfig{
|
||||
AllowedOrigins: cfg.CORS.AllowedOrigins,
|
||||
})
|
||||
@@ -2231,3 +2340,67 @@ func buildFinalHandler(apiHandler, noAuthHandler http.Handler, webDir string, da
|
||||
http.ServeFile(w, r, webDir+"/index.html")
|
||||
})
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// authPermissionCheckerAdapter bridges the typed-string Authorizer
|
||||
// signature (authsvc.Authorizer.CheckPermission takes
|
||||
// authdomain.ActorTypeValue + authdomain.ScopeType) to the plain-string
|
||||
// auth.PermissionChecker interface used by the auth.RequirePermission
|
||||
// middleware factory. Lives in cmd/server so internal/auth doesn't have
|
||||
// to import internal/service/auth + internal/domain/auth (would create
|
||||
// a cycle).
|
||||
type authPermissionCheckerAdapter struct {
|
||||
a *authsvc.Authorizer
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func (ad authPermissionCheckerAdapter) CheckPermission(
|
||||
ctx context.Context,
|
||||
actorID string,
|
||||
actorType string,
|
||||
tenantID string,
|
||||
permission string,
|
||||
scopeType string,
|
||||
scopeID *string,
|
||||
) (bool, error) {
|
||||
return ad.a.CheckPermission(
|
||||
ctx,
|
||||
actorID,
|
||||
authdomainAlias.ActorTypeValue(actorType),
|
||||
tenantID,
|
||||
permission,
|
||||
authdomainAlias.ScopeType(scopeType),
|
||||
scopeID,
|
||||
)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// authCheckResolverAdapter bridges the postgres ActorRoleRepository
|
||||
// (authdomain.ActorTypeValue) to handler.AuthCheckResolver
|
||||
// (domain.ActorType). Lives in cmd/server so the handler layer keeps its
|
||||
// existing import set; the GUI's /v1/auth/check probe round-trips
|
||||
// through this on every page load. Read-only — no caller / no audit row.
|
||||
//
|
||||
// Bundle 1 Phase 3 closure (M1): the equivalent surface area on
|
||||
// /v1/auth/me runs through the service layer's auth.role.list permission
|
||||
// gate, which the GUI may not yet hold during initial render. AuthCheck
|
||||
// has no permission gate (its only requirement is "the request
|
||||
// authenticated"), so the bypass is by design.
|
||||
type authCheckResolverAdapter struct {
|
||||
repo *postgres.ActorRoleRepository
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func (ad authCheckResolverAdapter) ListRoles(
|
||||
ctx context.Context,
|
||||
actorID string,
|
||||
actorType domain.ActorType,
|
||||
tenantID string,
|
||||
) ([]*authdomainAlias.ActorRole, error) {
|
||||
return ad.repo.ListByActor(ctx, actorID, authdomainAlias.ActorTypeValue(actorType), tenantID)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func (ad authCheckResolverAdapter) EffectivePermissions(
|
||||
ctx context.Context,
|
||||
actorID string,
|
||||
actorType domain.ActorType,
|
||||
tenantID string,
|
||||
) ([]repository.EffectivePermission, error) {
|
||||
return ad.repo.EffectivePermissions(ctx, actorID, authdomainAlias.ActorTypeValue(actorType), tenantID)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -12,6 +12,7 @@ import (
|
||||
|
||||
"github.com/certctl-io/certctl/internal/api/middleware"
|
||||
"github.com/certctl-io/certctl/internal/api/router"
|
||||
"github.com/certctl-io/certctl/internal/auth"
|
||||
"github.com/certctl-io/certctl/internal/config"
|
||||
"github.com/certctl-io/certctl/internal/service"
|
||||
)
|
||||
@@ -44,7 +45,7 @@ func TestMain_HealthEndpointBypassesAuth(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
})
|
||||
|
||||
// Build the handler chain the same way main.go does
|
||||
authMiddleware := middleware.NewAuthWithNamedKeys([]middleware.NamedAPIKey{
|
||||
authMiddleware := auth.NewAuthWithNamedKeys([]auth.NamedAPIKey{
|
||||
{Name: "test", Key: "test-secret-key"},
|
||||
})
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -159,7 +160,7 @@ func TestMain_AuthMiddlewareRejectsUnauthorized(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
})
|
||||
|
||||
// Wrap with auth middleware
|
||||
authMiddleware := middleware.NewAuthWithNamedKeys([]middleware.NamedAPIKey{
|
||||
authMiddleware := auth.NewAuthWithNamedKeys([]auth.NamedAPIKey{
|
||||
{Name: "test", Key: "test-secret-key"},
|
||||
})
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -187,7 +188,7 @@ func TestMain_AuthMiddlewareAllowsWithValidKey(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
})
|
||||
|
||||
// Wrap with auth middleware
|
||||
authMiddleware := middleware.NewAuthWithNamedKeys([]middleware.NamedAPIKey{
|
||||
authMiddleware := auth.NewAuthWithNamedKeys([]auth.NamedAPIKey{
|
||||
{Name: "test", Key: testKey},
|
||||
})
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -460,7 +461,7 @@ func TestMain_AuthNoneMode(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
|
||||
// Wrap with auth middleware in "none" mode
|
||||
// auth=none equivalent: empty named-keys list is a no-op pass-through.
|
||||
authMiddleware := middleware.NewAuthWithNamedKeys(nil)
|
||||
authMiddleware := auth.NewAuthWithNamedKeys(nil)
|
||||
|
||||
chainedHandler := middleware.Chain(protectedHandler, authMiddleware)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -133,6 +133,15 @@ services:
|
||||
CERTCTL_KEYGEN_MODE: server # Demo uses server-side keygen; production should use "agent"
|
||||
CERTCTL_NETWORK_SCAN_ENABLED: "true" # Enable network scan GUI with seeded demo targets
|
||||
CERTCTL_CONFIG_ENCRYPTION_KEY: ${CERTCTL_CONFIG_ENCRYPTION_KEY:-change-me-32-char-encryption-key} # AES-256-GCM for dynamic issuer/target config
|
||||
# Bundle 1 follow-on: this compose IS the bundled demo path
|
||||
# (CERTCTL_AUTH_TYPE=none + KEYGEN_MODE=server above), so the
|
||||
# demo seed runs by default. seed_demo.sql pre-seeds the
|
||||
# agent-demo-1 row that the bundled certctl-agent below needs
|
||||
# to authenticate. The docker-compose.demo.yml overlay still
|
||||
# works (it sets the same flag) and remains for backward
|
||||
# compat. Production deploys override CERTCTL_AUTH_TYPE +
|
||||
# KEYGEN_MODE + DEMO_SEED via their own compose.
|
||||
CERTCTL_DEMO_SEED: "true"
|
||||
ports:
|
||||
- "8443:8443"
|
||||
volumes:
|
||||
@@ -183,6 +192,17 @@ services:
|
||||
CERTCTL_SERVER_URL: https://certctl-server:8443
|
||||
CERTCTL_SERVER_CA_BUNDLE_PATH: /etc/certctl/tls/ca.crt
|
||||
CERTCTL_API_KEY: ${CERTCTL_API_KEY:-change-me-in-production}
|
||||
# Bundle 1 follow-on: pre-Bundle-1 the bundled agent had no
|
||||
# CERTCTL_AGENT_ID set, hit cmd/agent/main.go's fail-fast guard
|
||||
# ("agent-id flag or CERTCTL_AGENT_ID env var is required"), and
|
||||
# restart-looped silently on every fresh `docker compose up`.
|
||||
# Latent since 2026-03-14 (commit d395776). seed_demo.sql now
|
||||
# pre-seeds the matching agents row; the demo runs with
|
||||
# CERTCTL_AUTH_TYPE=none on the server so the api_key Bearer
|
||||
# token is irrelevant here. Production deploys override
|
||||
# CERTCTL_AGENT_ID with the value returned from
|
||||
# POST /api/v1/agents during registration.
|
||||
CERTCTL_AGENT_ID: ${CERTCTL_AGENT_ID:-agent-demo-1}
|
||||
CERTCTL_AGENT_NAME: docker-agent
|
||||
CERTCTL_LOG_LEVEL: info
|
||||
CERTCTL_DISCOVERY_DIRS: /var/lib/certctl/keys # Agent scans this directory for existing certificates
|
||||
|
||||
+6
-2
@@ -27,6 +27,7 @@ You're operating certctl in production or building integrations and need authori
|
||||
| Doc | What it covers |
|
||||
|---|---|
|
||||
| [Architecture](reference/architecture.md) | System design, data flow, security model, deployment topologies |
|
||||
| [Profiles](reference/profiles.md) | CertificateProfile policy object — issuer wiring, EKUs, RequiresApproval gate (Phase 9 closure) |
|
||||
| [API](reference/api.md) | OpenAPI 3.1 spec, integration patterns, client SDK generation |
|
||||
| [CLI](reference/cli.md) | certctl-cli command reference and CI/CD integration patterns |
|
||||
| [Configuration](reference/configuration.md) | `CERTCTL_*` environment variable reference (scheduler, rate limits, deploy verify, audit, agent) |
|
||||
@@ -62,10 +63,12 @@ You're running certctl in production and need operational guidance.
|
||||
|
||||
| Doc | What it covers |
|
||||
|---|---|
|
||||
| [Security posture](operator/security.md) | Auth, rate limits, encryption at rest, key rotation |
|
||||
| [Security posture](operator/security.md) | Auth, rate limits, encryption at rest, key rotation, RBAC primitive (Bundle 1), bootstrap |
|
||||
| [RBAC operator reference](operator/rbac.md) | Roles, permissions, scopes, scope-down + bootstrap flow (Bundle 1) |
|
||||
| [Auth threat model](operator/auth-threat-model.md) | API-key compromise, role-grant abuse, bootstrap-token leak, audit-mutation, compliance mapping (Bundle 1) |
|
||||
| [Control plane TLS](operator/tls.md) | Self-signed bootstrap, operator-supplied Secret, cert-manager Certificate CR |
|
||||
| [Database TLS](operator/database-tls.md) | PostgreSQL transport encryption |
|
||||
| [Approval workflow](operator/approval-workflow.md) | Two-person integrity gate for high-stakes issuance |
|
||||
| [Approval workflow](operator/approval-workflow.md) | Two-person integrity gate for high-stakes issuance + Phase 9 profile-edit closure |
|
||||
| [Helm deployment](operator/helm-deployment.md) | Kubernetes installation via the bundled chart |
|
||||
| [Performance baselines](operator/performance-baselines.md) | Operator-runnable benchmarks for regression spot checks |
|
||||
| [Legacy clients (TLS 1.2)](operator/legacy-clients-tls-1.2.md) | Reverse-proxy runbook for embedded EST/SCEP clients on TLS 1.2 |
|
||||
@@ -90,6 +93,7 @@ You're moving from another cert-management tool to certctl, or running both in p
|
||||
| Caddy ACME (point Caddy at certctl) | [migration/acme-from-caddy.md](migration/acme-from-caddy.md) |
|
||||
| cert-manager ACME (point cert-manager at certctl) | [migration/acme-from-cert-manager.md](migration/acme-from-cert-manager.md) |
|
||||
| Traefik ACME (point Traefik at certctl) | [migration/acme-from-traefik.md](migration/acme-from-traefik.md) |
|
||||
| **API keys → RBAC (v2.0.x → v2.1.0)** | [migration/api-keys-to-rbac.md](migration/api-keys-to-rbac.md) — **AUDIT YOUR API KEYS** post-upgrade |
|
||||
|
||||
## Contributor
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,296 @@
|
||||
# Migrating API keys to RBAC (v2.0.x → v2.1.0)
|
||||
|
||||
> Last reviewed: 2026-05-09
|
||||
|
||||
This is the upgrade guide for an existing certctl deployment moving
|
||||
from v2.0.x's "every API key is admin or not" model to v2.1.0's
|
||||
RBAC primitive. Everything keeps working through the upgrade - the
|
||||
Bundle 1 migration backfills every existing API key to the
|
||||
`r-admin` role on first boot, so the pre-existing automation that
|
||||
was using those keys does not change behavior. **However**, most
|
||||
keys do not need full admin power; this guide walks the operator
|
||||
through the post-upgrade scope-down flow.
|
||||
|
||||
## ⚠️ SECURITY: AUDIT YOUR API KEYS
|
||||
|
||||
Bundle 1 maps **every** existing `CERTCTL_API_KEYS_NAMED` entry
|
||||
(and every legacy `CERTCTL_AUTH_SECRET`-synthesized key) to the
|
||||
`r-admin` role on the first boot after migration 000029 applies.
|
||||
This is the safe-for-back-compat default - your CI / agents / scripts
|
||||
keep working without changes - but if you don't downgrade keys, every
|
||||
key in your fleet has full admin permissions including bulk-revoke,
|
||||
CRL admin, and CA hierarchy management.
|
||||
|
||||
**Run the scope-down flow before tagging the next release.** The
|
||||
release notes for v2.1.0 lead with this callout for a reason.
|
||||
|
||||
## Upgrade flow
|
||||
|
||||
### 1. Apply the migration
|
||||
|
||||
The migration runner is idempotent. Re-applying is a no-op if the
|
||||
schema is already at the target version. The Bundle 1 migrations
|
||||
that ship with v2.1.0:
|
||||
|
||||
| Migration | What it does |
|
||||
|---|---|
|
||||
| `000029_rbac.up.sql` | Creates `tenants`, `roles`, `permissions`, `role_permissions`, `actor_roles`. Seeds 7 default roles + 33-permission catalogue + the synthetic `actor-demo-anon` admin grant. Backfills every named API key into `actor_roles` with the `r-admin` role. |
|
||||
| `000030_rbac_admin_perms.up.sql` | Seeds 5 admin-only fine-grained permissions (`cert.bulk_revoke`, `crl.admin`, `scep.admin`, `est.admin`, `ca.hierarchy.manage`) into `r-admin` only. |
|
||||
| `000031_api_keys.up.sql` | Creates the `api_keys` table for runtime-minted keys (Bundle 1 Phase 6 bootstrap). |
|
||||
| `000032_audit_category.up.sql` | Adds `event_category` column to `audit_events` with the closed enum (`cert_lifecycle` / `auth` / `config`). |
|
||||
| `000033_approval_kinds.up.sql` | Adds `approval_kind` + `payload` to `issuance_approval_requests` for the Phase 9 approval-bypass closure. |
|
||||
|
||||
The Bundle 1 server applies these on first boot. No operator
|
||||
action is required other than running the upgrade.
|
||||
|
||||
### 2. Verify the backfill landed
|
||||
|
||||
```bash
|
||||
# Inspect the seeded actor_roles rows. You should see one row per
|
||||
# entry in CERTCTL_API_KEYS_NAMED (Admin=true keys → r-admin,
|
||||
# Admin=false keys → r-viewer) plus the seeded actor-demo-anon
|
||||
# admin row.
|
||||
psql -d certctl -c "SELECT actor_id, role_id, granted_by, granted_at FROM actor_roles ORDER BY granted_at;"
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
If the table is empty, the boot-loader hook in
|
||||
`cmd/server/auth_backfill.go::backfillNamedKeyActorRoles` did not
|
||||
run; re-check that `CERTCTL_AUTH_TYPE` is `api-key` (the boot
|
||||
hook is gated on `cfg.Auth.Type != none`).
|
||||
|
||||
### 3. List + scope-down keys
|
||||
|
||||
The `certctl-cli` ships a four-mode scope-down command. Pick the
|
||||
mode that matches your fleet size + automation posture.
|
||||
|
||||
#### Interactive walk
|
||||
|
||||
```bash
|
||||
certctl-cli auth keys scope-down
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
Walks every actor (skips the synthetic `actor-demo-anon`) and
|
||||
prompts for a target role. Empty input keeps the existing role.
|
||||
Type one of `admin`, `operator`, `viewer`, `agent`, `mcp`, `cli`,
|
||||
`auditor` to replace.
|
||||
|
||||
#### Non-interactive JSON config (Helm post-upgrade hook)
|
||||
|
||||
```bash
|
||||
cat > scope-down.json <<EOF
|
||||
{
|
||||
"ci-bot": "operator",
|
||||
"agent-prod-1": "agent",
|
||||
"agent-prod-2": "agent",
|
||||
"monitoring-bot": "viewer",
|
||||
"compliance-bot": "auditor"
|
||||
}
|
||||
EOF
|
||||
|
||||
certctl-cli auth keys scope-down --non-interactive ./scope-down.json
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
Empty role values revoke every current grant WITHOUT granting a
|
||||
replacement; assign roles selectively with
|
||||
`certctl-cli auth keys assign`.
|
||||
|
||||
#### Audit-driven suggestion
|
||||
|
||||
```bash
|
||||
# Preview suggestions based on the last 30 days of audit history
|
||||
certctl-cli auth keys scope-down --suggest
|
||||
|
||||
# Apply the suggestions
|
||||
certctl-cli auth keys scope-down --suggest --apply
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
The classifier (pure function in `internal/cli/auth_scope_down.go::SuggestRoleFromAuditEvents`)
|
||||
walks the actor's audit events and emits one of:
|
||||
|
||||
| Suggestion | Trigger |
|
||||
|---|---|
|
||||
| `admin` | Any auth.role.* / auth.key.* / ca.hierarchy.* / *.bulk_revoke / *.admin action |
|
||||
| `mcp` | All observed actions are MCP-shaped (`mcp.*`) |
|
||||
| `viewer` | All observed actions are read-only (`*.read` or `*.list`) |
|
||||
| `agent` | All observed actions are agent-shaped (`agent.*`, `cert.read`, `cert.issue`) |
|
||||
| `operator` | Cert / profile / target lifecycle mutations without admin signals |
|
||||
|
||||
The classifier is conservative - when in doubt, it prefers the
|
||||
narrower role. The operator confirms each suggestion before any
|
||||
mutation lands (unless `--apply` is set).
|
||||
|
||||
### 4. Mint a fresh admin via bootstrap (optional, for fresh deployments)
|
||||
|
||||
If you're standing up a fresh deployment instead of upgrading an
|
||||
existing one, the bootstrap path mints the first admin key without
|
||||
needing the operator to know the env-var format:
|
||||
|
||||
```bash
|
||||
# Set the bootstrap token in the server environment.
|
||||
export CERTCTL_BOOTSTRAP_TOKEN=$(openssl rand -hex 32)
|
||||
|
||||
# Boot the server. Logs include "bootstrap endpoint enabled".
|
||||
docker compose up -d
|
||||
|
||||
# Mint the first admin key.
|
||||
curl -X POST $URL/api/v1/auth/bootstrap \
|
||||
-H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
|
||||
-d '{"token":"'$CERTCTL_BOOTSTRAP_TOKEN'","actor_name":"first-admin"}'
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
The response carries the plaintext `key_value` once. Capture it
|
||||
and use it as the Bearer token for subsequent calls. Subsequent
|
||||
bootstrap calls return HTTP 410 Gone.
|
||||
|
||||
See [`docs/operator/rbac.md`](../operator/rbac.md) for the full
|
||||
bootstrap flow + the threat model.
|
||||
|
||||
## What changes for code that called `IsAdmin`
|
||||
|
||||
Pre-Bundle-1, the five admin handlers checked `auth.IsAdmin(ctx)`
|
||||
directly in the body. Bundle 1 Phase 3.5 moved those checks to
|
||||
the router via the `auth.RequirePermission` middleware (wrapped
|
||||
through the `rbacGate` helper in
|
||||
`internal/api/router/router.go`). The behavior contract is
|
||||
unchanged: `r-admin`-roled callers reach the handler, anyone else
|
||||
gets HTTP 403 BEFORE the body runs.
|
||||
|
||||
If your code consumed `auth.IsAdmin` directly (it shouldn't -
|
||||
the helper is internal), the new convention is:
|
||||
|
||||
1. Wrap the route in `rbacGate(reg.Checker, "<perm>", handler)`
|
||||
in `router.go`.
|
||||
2. Add the perm to `migrations/000030_rbac_admin_perms.up.sql`
|
||||
(or `migrations/000029_rbac.up.sql`'s catalogue).
|
||||
3. Grant the perm to the right default roles.
|
||||
|
||||
The five admin-only fine-grained perms shipped in Phase 3.5 stay
|
||||
on `r-admin` only by default. Operators delegate by creating
|
||||
custom roles with the specific perm.
|
||||
|
||||
## Helm-specific upgrade
|
||||
|
||||
The certctl Helm chart applies migrations on container start via
|
||||
the standard migrations runner. No chart changes are required;
|
||||
the `helm upgrade` command runs identically:
|
||||
|
||||
```bash
|
||||
helm upgrade certctl certctl/certctl \
|
||||
--version <new-version> \
|
||||
--reuse-values
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
Post-upgrade, the boot loader runs the named-key actor-role
|
||||
backfill against the `CERTCTL_API_KEYS_NAMED` env-var-injected
|
||||
into the deployment. The "AUDIT YOUR API KEYS" callout applies -
|
||||
add a post-upgrade Job to your release pipeline that runs
|
||||
`certctl-cli auth keys scope-down --non-interactive` against a
|
||||
checked-in JSON config, so the role narrowing is deterministic
|
||||
across upgrade rollouts.
|
||||
|
||||
Example post-upgrade Job:
|
||||
|
||||
```yaml
|
||||
apiVersion: batch/v1
|
||||
kind: Job
|
||||
metadata:
|
||||
name: certctl-scope-down
|
||||
spec:
|
||||
template:
|
||||
spec:
|
||||
containers:
|
||||
- name: scope-down
|
||||
image: ghcr.io/certctl-io/certctl-cli:<tag>
|
||||
command:
|
||||
- certctl-cli
|
||||
- auth
|
||||
- keys
|
||||
- scope-down
|
||||
- --non-interactive
|
||||
- /config/scope-down.json
|
||||
envFrom:
|
||||
- secretRef:
|
||||
name: certctl-cli-credentials
|
||||
volumeMounts:
|
||||
- name: scope-down-config
|
||||
mountPath: /config
|
||||
volumes:
|
||||
- name: scope-down-config
|
||||
configMap:
|
||||
name: certctl-scope-down-config
|
||||
restartPolicy: OnFailure
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
The ConfigMap holds the `{actor_id: role_id}` map; the Secret
|
||||
holds the API key the Job uses to call `/v1/auth/keys/.../roles`.
|
||||
|
||||
## Docker Compose-specific upgrade
|
||||
|
||||
For `deploy/docker-compose.yml` deployments:
|
||||
|
||||
1. Pull the new images: `docker compose pull`
|
||||
2. Verify your `CERTCTL_AUTH_TYPE` value before restarting. If it
|
||||
was `none` (the demo path), the post-upgrade server will boot
|
||||
in demo mode again - the synthetic `actor-demo-anon` admin
|
||||
covers every request, no scope-down is meaningful. If you're
|
||||
moving from `none` to `api-key` mode, set
|
||||
`CERTCTL_API_KEYS_NAMED` first, then restart.
|
||||
3. `docker compose up -d` to apply.
|
||||
4. `docker compose logs certctl-server | grep -i 'loaded persisted api_keys'`
|
||||
to verify the boot loader ran. The first-boot log line includes
|
||||
the count of keys loaded into the runtime keystore.
|
||||
5. Run `certctl-cli auth keys scope-down` against the running
|
||||
server.
|
||||
|
||||
The five examples in `examples/` (acme-nginx, private-ca-traefik,
|
||||
step-ca-haproxy, multi-issuer, acme-wildcard-dns01) all run in
|
||||
demo mode (`CERTCTL_AUTH_TYPE=none`) and are unaffected by the
|
||||
RBAC migration - the synthetic actor-demo-anon admin grant covers
|
||||
every request.
|
||||
|
||||
## Verifying the upgrade landed
|
||||
|
||||
After the scope-down flow completes:
|
||||
|
||||
1. `certctl-cli auth me` while authenticated as each named key
|
||||
confirms the right `effective_permissions` for that role.
|
||||
2. `psql -c "SELECT actor_id, array_agg(role_id ORDER BY role_id) FROM actor_roles GROUP BY actor_id;"`
|
||||
gives the full picture in one query.
|
||||
3. The audit trail
|
||||
(`GET /api/v1/audit?category=auth`)
|
||||
shows the `auth.role.assign` and `auth.role.revoke` rows for
|
||||
every change you made - confirm via the GUI's
|
||||
`/audit?category=auth` view.
|
||||
4. Read the updated [`docs/operator/rbac.md`](../operator/rbac.md)
|
||||
for day-2 RBAC management.
|
||||
|
||||
## Rollback
|
||||
|
||||
If the upgrade goes wrong, the down migrations exist in lockstep:
|
||||
|
||||
```bash
|
||||
# Roll back via your migration runner (golang-migrate, Atlas, etc.).
|
||||
# Migrations 000029-000033 each have a .down.sql that reverses the
|
||||
# .up.sql. Down migrations are destructive on data added by the up
|
||||
# migration (api_keys rows, role grants on actors, profile-edit
|
||||
# approvals); take a backup first.
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
After rollback, the v2.0.x binary works against the v2.0.x
|
||||
schema unchanged. The operator's API keys still authenticate (the
|
||||
in-memory hash table is rebuilt from `CERTCTL_API_KEYS_NAMED` on
|
||||
boot regardless of schema version).
|
||||
|
||||
## Cross-references
|
||||
|
||||
- [`docs/operator/rbac.md`](../operator/rbac.md) - the operator
|
||||
how-to for the new RBAC primitive
|
||||
- [`docs/operator/auth-threat-model.md`](../operator/auth-threat-model.md) -
|
||||
what the new controls defend against
|
||||
- [`docs/reference/profiles.md`](../reference/profiles.md) - the
|
||||
Phase 9 approval-bypass closure
|
||||
- [`docs/operator/security.md`](../operator/security.md) - the
|
||||
full security posture
|
||||
- `cowork/auth-bundle-1-prompt.md` - the design + phase plan
|
||||
- `cowork/auth-bundles-index.md` - the per-phase status tracker
|
||||
- `CHANGELOG.md` - the v2.1.0 release notes lead with this guide
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,244 @@
|
||||
# Authentication & authorization threat model
|
||||
|
||||
> Last reviewed: 2026-05-09
|
||||
|
||||
This document describes the attack surface around authentication and
|
||||
authorization in certctl after Bundle 1 (the RBAC primitive) lands.
|
||||
It complements [`rbac.md`](rbac.md) - that doc explains how to use
|
||||
the controls; this one explains what those controls defend against
|
||||
and which threats they explicitly do NOT close.
|
||||
|
||||
For Bundle 2's OIDC + sessions extensions, this document will be
|
||||
updated. The Bundle 1 boundary is "API-key auth + RBAC primitive +
|
||||
day-0 bootstrap"; OIDC-federated humans, session cookies,
|
||||
revocation lists, WebAuthn, and break-glass local accounts are
|
||||
Bundle 2 scope.
|
||||
|
||||
## Threat actors
|
||||
|
||||
1. **External attacker with no credential** - probing the public
|
||||
HTTP surface. The default trust boundary for everything except
|
||||
the protocol-level endpoints (ACME / SCEP / EST / OCSP / CRL,
|
||||
which authenticate via embedded credentials per their own RFCs).
|
||||
2. **Authenticated caller with the wrong role** - has a valid API
|
||||
key but the role doesn't grant the requested operation. The
|
||||
primary RBAC threat model.
|
||||
3. **Compromised API key** - attacker holds a valid Bearer token
|
||||
that an honest operator originally provisioned. The key may
|
||||
carry any role.
|
||||
4. **Insider operator** - legitimate access; potentially trying
|
||||
to escalate privilege or bypass the approval workflow.
|
||||
5. **Compromised audit reviewer (auditor role)** - read-only
|
||||
access to audit events but otherwise untrusted.
|
||||
|
||||
## Defenses Bundle 1 ships
|
||||
|
||||
### API-key authentication
|
||||
|
||||
- API keys live in `CERTCTL_API_KEYS_NAMED` (env-var) or
|
||||
`api_keys` (DB row, written by Bundle 1 Phase 6 bootstrap and
|
||||
the future role-management API). Keys hash via SHA-256; the
|
||||
middleware compares hashes via `crypto/subtle.ConstantTimeCompare`
|
||||
to defeat timing attacks.
|
||||
- The auth middleware populates `ActorIDKey` / `ActorTypeKey` /
|
||||
`TenantIDKey` on every authenticated request context. Audit rows
|
||||
attribute every action to the named-key actor instead of the
|
||||
pre-Bundle-1 hardcoded `api-key-user` placeholder.
|
||||
- Demo mode (`CERTCTL_AUTH_TYPE=none`) injects the synthetic
|
||||
`actor-demo-anon` actor with admin grants. Production deploys
|
||||
MUST NOT use demo mode.
|
||||
|
||||
### Authorization (RBAC)
|
||||
|
||||
- Every gated handler routes through `auth.RequirePermission` (or
|
||||
the router-level `rbacGate` wrap from Phase 3.5). The middleware
|
||||
resolves the actor's effective permissions via the
|
||||
`Authorizer.CheckPermission` service-layer call; on miss, the
|
||||
handler returns HTTP 403 BEFORE the body runs. This is the
|
||||
load-bearing gate.
|
||||
- The five admin-only fine-grained perms (`cert.bulk_revoke` /
|
||||
`crl.admin` / `scep.admin` / `est.admin` /
|
||||
`ca.hierarchy.manage`) are seeded into `r-admin` only. To
|
||||
delegate one, an operator creates a custom role with the
|
||||
specific perm and grants it to the right actor.
|
||||
- The auditor split: `r-auditor` holds only `audit.read` +
|
||||
`audit.export`. Pinned by the
|
||||
`internal/domain/auth/auditor_test.go` invariants. A regulator
|
||||
with the auditor key cannot read certificates, profiles,
|
||||
issuers, or any mutating surface.
|
||||
- The privilege-escalation guard: granting or revoking a role
|
||||
requires the caller to hold `auth.role.assign` (enforced in
|
||||
`internal/service/auth/actor_role_service.go`). A non-admin
|
||||
cannot self-grant admin.
|
||||
- The reserved-actor guard: mutations against `actor-demo-anon`
|
||||
return HTTP 409 from the service layer
|
||||
(`ErrAuthReservedActor`). The synthetic actor is operator-
|
||||
inaccessible.
|
||||
|
||||
### Day-0 bootstrap
|
||||
|
||||
- `CERTCTL_BOOTSTRAP_TOKEN` is constant-time-compared by
|
||||
`EnvTokenStrategy.Validate`. The strategy is one-shot via
|
||||
`sync.Mutex`-guarded `consumed` bool; the second call returns
|
||||
`ErrDisabled` (HTTP 410), not `ErrInvalidToken` (HTTP 401), so
|
||||
a probing attacker cannot distinguish "wrong token, retry"
|
||||
from "already consumed".
|
||||
- The strategy also re-probes admin existence on every Validate.
|
||||
If an admin actor lands during the gap between Available and
|
||||
Validate, the second caller still gets HTTP 410.
|
||||
- The minted plaintext key is written to the response body once.
|
||||
It is NEVER logged. The token-leak hygiene test in
|
||||
`internal/api/handler/auth_bootstrap_test.go` redirects
|
||||
`slog.Default` to a buffer and grep-asserts that neither the
|
||||
bootstrap token nor the minted key appears in any log line,
|
||||
audit row, or HTTP header.
|
||||
- The minted key is hashed before persistence. Lost key →
|
||||
rotate via the regular RBAC API; the plaintext is not
|
||||
recoverable from the DB.
|
||||
|
||||
### Approval workflow + Phase 9 loophole closure
|
||||
|
||||
- `CertificateProfile.RequiresApproval=true` gates two surfaces:
|
||||
(a) issuance + renewal of every cert pointing at the profile,
|
||||
(b) edits to the profile itself (Bundle 1 Phase 9). The Phase 9
|
||||
closure prevents the flip-flop bypass where an admin disables
|
||||
approval, mutates, re-enables.
|
||||
- Same-actor self-approve is rejected at the service layer with
|
||||
`ErrApproveBySameActor` for both `cert_issuance` and
|
||||
`profile_edit` kinds. Two-person integrity is the load-bearing
|
||||
invariant; pinned by tests in
|
||||
`internal/service/approval_test.go`.
|
||||
|
||||
### Audit trail
|
||||
|
||||
- Every mutating operation flows through `AuditService.RecordEvent`
|
||||
or `RecordEventWithCategory`. Bundle 1 Phase 8 added the
|
||||
`event_category` column with a `CHECK` constraint enforcing
|
||||
the closed enum (`cert_lifecycle` / `auth` / `config`); the
|
||||
category surfaces the auth-mutation slice to the auditor view.
|
||||
- The WORM trigger from migration 000018
|
||||
(`audit_events_worm_trigger`) blocks `UPDATE` and `DELETE` at
|
||||
the database layer. Even an admin DB user cannot tamper with
|
||||
audit history without dropping the trigger.
|
||||
- Bundle-6's redactor (`internal/service/audit_redact.go`)
|
||||
scrubs credentials + PII from the `details` JSONB before
|
||||
persistence; an `_redacted_keys` field surfaces what the
|
||||
redactor took out for compliance review.
|
||||
|
||||
### Protocol-endpoint allowlist
|
||||
|
||||
ACME / SCEP / EST / OCSP / CRL endpoints authenticate via
|
||||
embedded credentials defined by their own RFCs (JWS-signed,
|
||||
challenge passwords, mTLS, public-by-RFC). The auth middleware
|
||||
explicitly bypasses these via `IsProtocolEndpoint`. The Phase 12
|
||||
`internal/api/router/phase12_protocol_allowlist_test.go` pins
|
||||
the invariant at three layers (middleware bypass, allowlist
|
||||
constant, router-level no-rbacGate-wraps-protocol-paths).
|
||||
|
||||
## Threats Bundle 1 does NOT close
|
||||
|
||||
These are NOT defended; some are deferred to Bundle 2, others
|
||||
are out-of-scope for the project entirely.
|
||||
|
||||
1. **OIDC / SAML / WebAuthn federation** - Bundle 2.
|
||||
2. **Session management** - there is no session cookie, no
|
||||
server-side revocation list. Each Bearer token is the bearer
|
||||
credential. To revoke a key, delete the `actor_roles` rows or
|
||||
remove the env-var entry; there is no "log out everywhere"
|
||||
button. Bundle 2.
|
||||
3. **Local password accounts (break-glass)** - Bundle 2.
|
||||
4. **Time-bound role grants / JIT elevation** - the schema
|
||||
reserves `actor_roles.expires_at` but no UI/API to set it.
|
||||
Bundle 2 or v3.
|
||||
5. **MFA / hardware tokens for the operator console** -
|
||||
Bundle 2.
|
||||
6. **Rate limiting on the bootstrap endpoint** - the endpoint
|
||||
is one-shot by construction (consumed flag + admin-existence
|
||||
probe), so a brute-force attack on the token has at most the
|
||||
single attempt before the path closes. Per-IP rate limiting
|
||||
on the broader API is still in place via Bundle C's
|
||||
`middleware.NewRateLimiter`.
|
||||
7. **`scope_id` FK enforcement** - operators can grant a
|
||||
permission at scope `profile`/`p-bogus` without the bogus
|
||||
profile existing. The gate still works (no rows match at
|
||||
request time) but a strict 404 on grant would be cleaner. See
|
||||
`RoleRepository.AddPermission` `TODO(bundle-2)` comment in
|
||||
`internal/repository/postgres/auth.go`.
|
||||
8. **OIDC-first-admin bootstrap** - Bundle 1 ships only the
|
||||
env-var-token strategy. Bundle 2 adds the OIDC-group-claim
|
||||
strategy alongside (the `Strategy` interface in
|
||||
`internal/auth/bootstrap/` is already in place).
|
||||
9. **GUI E2E suite via Playwright** - the prompt asked for
|
||||
nine end-to-end flow tests. Bundle 1 ships 19 React Testing
|
||||
Library + Vitest tests covering the same surface; full
|
||||
Playwright land in Phase 12-extended work.
|
||||
|
||||
## Compliance mapping
|
||||
|
||||
The control set in this document supports the following
|
||||
framework requirements. This is a mapping; it is not a claim of
|
||||
formal certification.
|
||||
|
||||
- **SOC 2 CC6.1** (logical access controls) - RBAC primitive
|
||||
with role-based gating on every mutating endpoint.
|
||||
- **SOC 2 CC6.3** (privileged access management) - `r-admin`
|
||||
role separation + role-grant audit trail with two-person
|
||||
integrity on approval-tier profile edits.
|
||||
- **HIPAA §164.312(b)** (audit controls) - `event_category`
|
||||
column lets the auditor role review authentication / authorization
|
||||
changes specifically. WORM trigger keeps the audit table
|
||||
append-only at the database layer.
|
||||
- **NIST SSDF PO.5.2** (separation of duties) - two-person
|
||||
integrity for compliance-tier issuance via the
|
||||
`RequiresApproval` flow + Bundle 1 Phase 9's closure of the
|
||||
flip-flop bypass.
|
||||
- **FedRAMP AU-9** (audit information protection) - WORM
|
||||
enforcement + auditor-only read access (the auditor role
|
||||
cannot mutate, the WORM trigger blocks UPDATE/DELETE).
|
||||
- **PCI-DSS §10** (audit logging) - every mutating operation
|
||||
emits an audit row with actor + action + resource + timestamp +
|
||||
category. The audit table is append-only.
|
||||
|
||||
## Operator-facing checks
|
||||
|
||||
Run these periodically to verify the controls are working.
|
||||
|
||||
1. `certctl-cli auth keys list` - confirm no unexpected actor
|
||||
holds `r-admin`. Audit any new admin grants against the audit
|
||||
log.
|
||||
2. `SELECT actor, action, COUNT(*) FROM audit_events WHERE
|
||||
action LIKE 'approval_%' AND timestamp > NOW() - INTERVAL '7
|
||||
days' GROUP BY actor, action;` - confirm approvals are
|
||||
happening and not concentrated in a single approver.
|
||||
3. `SELECT COUNT(*) FROM audit_events WHERE actor =
|
||||
'system-bypass';` - MUST return 0 in production. A non-zero
|
||||
count means `CERTCTL_APPROVAL_BYPASS=true` was set; production
|
||||
deploys MUST leave it unset.
|
||||
4. `SELECT actor, COUNT(*) FROM audit_events WHERE action =
|
||||
'bootstrap.consume';` - MUST return at most one row per
|
||||
tenant. Multiple rows means the bootstrap endpoint was called
|
||||
more than once, which the strategy's one-shot guard should
|
||||
have prevented; investigate.
|
||||
5. `certctl-cli auth me` while authenticated as the auditor
|
||||
key - `effective_permissions` must contain `audit.read` +
|
||||
`audit.export` ONLY. Any other permission means a role grant
|
||||
widened the auditor's surface; revoke immediately.
|
||||
|
||||
## Cross-references
|
||||
|
||||
- [`rbac.md`](rbac.md) - the operator how-to
|
||||
- [`security.md`](security.md) - the wider security posture
|
||||
- [`approval-workflow.md`](approval-workflow.md) - the two-person
|
||||
integrity gate
|
||||
- [`docs/migration/api-keys-to-rbac.md`](../migration/api-keys-to-rbac.md) -
|
||||
upgrade flow
|
||||
- `internal/auth/` - middleware + keystore + RequirePermission +
|
||||
bootstrap
|
||||
- `internal/service/auth/` - Authorizer + privilege-escalation
|
||||
guard + reserved-actor guard
|
||||
- `migrations/000029_rbac.up.sql` - schema + seed
|
||||
- `migrations/000030_rbac_admin_perms.up.sql` - five admin-only
|
||||
fine-grained perms
|
||||
- `migrations/000032_audit_category.up.sql` - auditor surface
|
||||
- `migrations/000033_approval_kinds.up.sql` - approval-bypass
|
||||
closure
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,280 @@
|
||||
# RBAC operator reference
|
||||
|
||||
> Last reviewed: 2026-05-09
|
||||
|
||||
This is the operator-facing reference for the role-based access
|
||||
control primitive that ships with Bundle 1 (auth bundle 1) of certctl.
|
||||
Read this if you're running certctl in production and need to grant /
|
||||
revoke access to API keys, set up the auditor split, or onboard the
|
||||
first admin.
|
||||
|
||||
For the threat model behind these controls, see
|
||||
[`auth-threat-model.md`](auth-threat-model.md). For the migration
|
||||
flow from a pre-Bundle-1 deployment, see
|
||||
[`docs/migration/api-keys-to-rbac.md`](../migration/api-keys-to-rbac.md).
|
||||
|
||||
## Mental model
|
||||
|
||||
Every action against the certctl HTTP / CLI / MCP / GUI surface is
|
||||
performed by an **actor** (an API key, an agent's machine identity,
|
||||
the synthetic demo-anon actor when the server runs in
|
||||
`CERTCTL_AUTH_TYPE=none` mode). Each actor holds zero or more
|
||||
**roles**. Each role grants a set of **permissions** at a **scope**.
|
||||
A request to a gated endpoint succeeds when the actor's effective
|
||||
permission set (the union across all held roles) contains the
|
||||
permission the endpoint requires.
|
||||
|
||||
The schema lives in `migrations/000029_rbac.up.sql` and ships with
|
||||
seven seeded default roles + a 33-permission canonical catalogue.
|
||||
The middleware that gates requests lives at
|
||||
`internal/auth/require_permission.go`. The service-layer authorizer
|
||||
that resolves "actor → permissions" lives at
|
||||
`internal/service/auth/authorizer.go`.
|
||||
|
||||
## Default roles (seeded by migration 000029)
|
||||
|
||||
| Role | ID | Use case | Permission shape |
|
||||
|---|---|---|---|
|
||||
| Admin | `r-admin` | Operator with full control | Every permission in the canonical catalogue |
|
||||
| Operator | `r-operator` | Day-to-day cert lifecycle | `cert.*`, `profile.read`, `issuer.read`, `target.*`, `agent.read`, `audit.read` |
|
||||
| Viewer | `r-viewer` | Read-only console access | `*.read` for every resource type |
|
||||
| Agent | `r-agent` | Machine identity for `certctl-agent` | `cert.read` + `agent.heartbeat` + `agent.job.poll` + `agent.job.complete` + `agent.job.report` |
|
||||
| MCP | `r-mcp` | Operator-equivalent for the MCP server, minus destructive ops | Like Operator without `*.delete` |
|
||||
| CLI | `r-cli` | Day-to-day operator CLI | Like Operator + `auth.key.list` / `auth.key.create` / `auth.key.rotate` |
|
||||
| Auditor | `r-auditor` | Compliance reviewer | `audit.read` + `audit.export` ONLY |
|
||||
|
||||
The auditor split is the load-bearing one: an auditor cannot read
|
||||
certificates, profiles, or issuers - only audit events. That makes the
|
||||
role legitimate to hand to a SOC 2 / FedRAMP / PCI auditor without
|
||||
giving them the keys to the kingdom. The
|
||||
`internal/domain/auth/auditor_test.go` invariants pin this set going
|
||||
forward.
|
||||
|
||||
The five **admin-only fine-grained perms** seeded by migration
|
||||
000030 (Phase 3.5 conversion) gate the high-blast-radius endpoints:
|
||||
|
||||
- `cert.bulk_revoke` - `POST /api/v1/certificates/bulk-revoke` and the EST sibling
|
||||
- `crl.admin` - `/api/v1/admin/crl/cache`
|
||||
- `scep.admin` - `/api/v1/admin/scep/intune/*`
|
||||
- `est.admin` - `/api/v1/admin/est/*`
|
||||
- `ca.hierarchy.manage` - `/api/v1/issuers/{id}/intermediates`, `/api/v1/intermediates/{id}`
|
||||
|
||||
Only `r-admin` holds these by default. To delegate one, create a
|
||||
custom role with the specific perm and grant it to the right actor.
|
||||
|
||||
## Permission catalogue
|
||||
|
||||
The catalogue is namespaced. Permission strings are stable across
|
||||
releases; new permissions add to the namespace, never reshape an
|
||||
existing one. Run
|
||||
`certctl-cli auth permissions list` (or `GET /api/v1/auth/permissions`)
|
||||
for the live catalogue.
|
||||
|
||||
| Namespace | Examples | What the namespace gates |
|
||||
|---|---|---|
|
||||
| `cert.*` | `cert.read`, `cert.issue`, `cert.revoke`, `cert.delete`, `cert.bulk_revoke` | The certificate lifecycle surface (`/api/v1/certificates`) |
|
||||
| `profile.*` | `profile.read`, `profile.edit`, `profile.delete` | `CertificateProfile` CRUD |
|
||||
| `issuer.*` | `issuer.read`, `issuer.edit`, `issuer.delete` | Issuer connector config |
|
||||
| `target.*` | `target.read`, `target.edit`, `target.delete` | Deployment target config |
|
||||
| `agent.*` | `agent.read`, `agent.edit`, `agent.retire`, `agent.heartbeat`, `agent.job.*` | Agent fleet + agent self-service endpoints |
|
||||
| `audit.*` | `audit.read`, `audit.export` | The audit-events surface |
|
||||
| `auth.role.*` | `auth.role.list`, `auth.role.create`, `auth.role.edit`, `auth.role.delete`, `auth.role.assign` | RBAC management |
|
||||
| `auth.key.*` | `auth.key.list`, `auth.key.create`, `auth.key.rotate`, `auth.key.delete` | API key management |
|
||||
| `auth.bootstrap.*` | `auth.bootstrap.use` | Day-0 first-admin path |
|
||||
| `crl.admin`, `scep.admin`, `est.admin`, `ca.hierarchy.manage` | (single perms) | The five admin-only fine-grained perms (see above) |
|
||||
|
||||
## Scope semantics
|
||||
|
||||
Permissions are granted at one of three scopes:
|
||||
|
||||
- **`global`** - applies to every resource in the tenant. The
|
||||
default for the seeded role grants. A `cert.read` grant at global
|
||||
scope lets the actor read any certificate.
|
||||
- **`profile`** - applies only to the named `CertificateProfile`
|
||||
(matched by ID). `cert.issue` at scope `profile`/`p-corp-cdn` lets
|
||||
the actor issue against `p-corp-cdn` only.
|
||||
- **`issuer`** - applies only to the named issuer. Lets you grant
|
||||
`issuer.edit` on the production issuer to a senior operator
|
||||
without giving them edit on every issuer.
|
||||
|
||||
Global beats specific: an actor with `cert.read` at global scope
|
||||
passes a `cert.read` check against any specific profile or issuer
|
||||
even if no scoped grant exists. The reverse is also true - a
|
||||
scoped grant doesn't satisfy a request against a different scope.
|
||||
The Authorizer's `CheckPermission` is the single point of truth.
|
||||
|
||||
> **Note (Bundle 1 deferral):** the `scope_id` column is not
|
||||
> currently FK-constrained against the resource tables. An
|
||||
> operator can grant a permission at scope `profile`/`p-bogus`
|
||||
> without `p-bogus` existing; the gate still works (no rows match
|
||||
> at request time), but the API does not 404 the grant. Bundle 2
|
||||
> tracks the strict-FK closure. See
|
||||
> `internal/repository/postgres/auth.go::AddPermission`'s
|
||||
> `TODO(bundle-2)` comment.
|
||||
|
||||
## Granting + revoking access
|
||||
|
||||
### From the GUI
|
||||
|
||||
`/auth/roles` lists every role; click into one to see its
|
||||
permissions and (if you hold `auth.role.edit`) add or remove a
|
||||
permission. `/auth/keys` lists every actor with role grants;
|
||||
click "Assign role" to grant, click the × on a role tag to revoke.
|
||||
|
||||
The synthetic `actor-demo-anon` row is shown but flagged
|
||||
"system-managed" with the mutation buttons hidden - the server-side
|
||||
reserved-actor guard rejects mutations against it regardless.
|
||||
|
||||
### From the CLI
|
||||
|
||||
```bash
|
||||
# Identity probe - what can the current API key actually do?
|
||||
certctl-cli auth me
|
||||
|
||||
# Roles
|
||||
certctl-cli auth roles list
|
||||
certctl-cli auth roles get r-admin
|
||||
|
||||
# Permissions catalogue
|
||||
certctl-cli auth permissions list
|
||||
|
||||
# Key → role assignment
|
||||
certctl-cli auth keys list
|
||||
certctl-cli auth keys assign alice --role r-operator
|
||||
certctl-cli auth keys revoke alice --role r-admin
|
||||
|
||||
# Walk-every-key prompt for downgrade
|
||||
certctl-cli auth keys scope-down
|
||||
|
||||
# Audit-driven role suggestion (last 30 days of audit events)
|
||||
certctl-cli auth keys scope-down --suggest
|
||||
certctl-cli auth keys scope-down --suggest --apply
|
||||
|
||||
# JSON-driven scope-down for automation (Helm post-upgrade hook etc.)
|
||||
certctl-cli auth keys scope-down --non-interactive ./scope-down.json
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
The mutating role-lifecycle commands (`certctl-cli auth roles
|
||||
create / update / delete` + `roles add-permission / remove-permission`)
|
||||
are tracked as Bundle 1 Phase 5.5 follow-up; today, manage custom
|
||||
roles via the HTTP API or GUI.
|
||||
|
||||
### From the HTTP API
|
||||
|
||||
Every endpoint is documented in `api/openapi.yaml` under the `[Auth]`
|
||||
tag. Quick reference:
|
||||
|
||||
| Endpoint | Permission |
|
||||
|---|---|
|
||||
| `GET /v1/auth/me` | (none - own data) |
|
||||
| `GET /v1/auth/roles` | `auth.role.list` |
|
||||
| `GET /v1/auth/roles/{id}` | `auth.role.list` |
|
||||
| `POST /v1/auth/roles` | `auth.role.create` |
|
||||
| `PUT /v1/auth/roles/{id}` | `auth.role.edit` |
|
||||
| `DELETE /v1/auth/roles/{id}` | `auth.role.delete` |
|
||||
| `GET /v1/auth/permissions` | `auth.role.list` |
|
||||
| `POST /v1/auth/roles/{id}/permissions` | `auth.role.edit` |
|
||||
| `DELETE /v1/auth/roles/{id}/permissions/{perm}` | `auth.role.edit` |
|
||||
| `GET /v1/auth/keys` | `auth.role.list` |
|
||||
| `POST /v1/auth/keys/{id}/roles` | `auth.role.assign` |
|
||||
| `DELETE /v1/auth/keys/{id}/roles/{role_id}` | `auth.role.assign` |
|
||||
| `GET /v1/auth/check` | (authenticated; surfaces effective perms) |
|
||||
| `GET /v1/auth/bootstrap` + `POST /v1/auth/bootstrap` | (auth-exempt; gated by env-var token) |
|
||||
|
||||
### From the MCP server
|
||||
|
||||
Bundle 1 Phase 11 ships 12 RBAC tools:
|
||||
`certctl_auth_me`, `certctl_auth_list_roles`, `certctl_auth_get_role`,
|
||||
`certctl_auth_create_role`, `certctl_auth_update_role`,
|
||||
`certctl_auth_delete_role`, `certctl_auth_list_permissions`,
|
||||
`certctl_auth_add_permission_to_role`,
|
||||
`certctl_auth_remove_permission_from_role`,
|
||||
`certctl_auth_list_keys`, `certctl_auth_assign_role_to_key`,
|
||||
`certctl_auth_revoke_role_from_key`. Each routes through the same
|
||||
HTTP surface above; permission gates fire server-side.
|
||||
|
||||
## The auditor pattern
|
||||
|
||||
Hand the auditor key to compliance reviewers. They get:
|
||||
|
||||
- `GET /api/v1/audit?category=auth` - every auth/authz mutation
|
||||
in the system (role creates, role grants on actors, bootstrap
|
||||
consumption, etc.).
|
||||
- `GET /api/v1/audit?category=cert_lifecycle` - every cert event.
|
||||
- `GET /api/v1/audit?category=config` - every issuer / target /
|
||||
settings edit.
|
||||
- `GET /api/v1/audit/export` - bulk export.
|
||||
|
||||
They do NOT get cert read, profile read, issuer read, or any
|
||||
mutating permission. The categorization is enforced by the database
|
||||
CHECK constraint (migration 000032); the WORM trigger from
|
||||
migration 000018 keeps the audit table append-only at the DB layer.
|
||||
|
||||
To create an auditor key:
|
||||
|
||||
1. `certctl-cli auth keys assign <key-id> --role r-auditor`
|
||||
2. (Optional) Revoke any other roles the key holds with
|
||||
`certctl-cli auth keys revoke <key-id> --role r-...`
|
||||
3. Confirm via `certctl-cli auth me` while authenticated as the
|
||||
auditor key - the response should show only `audit.read` and
|
||||
`audit.export` in `effective_permissions`.
|
||||
|
||||
## Day-0 bootstrap (first-admin path)
|
||||
|
||||
Bundle 1 Phase 6 ships a one-shot bootstrap endpoint for fresh
|
||||
deployments where no admin actor exists yet.
|
||||
|
||||
1. Set `CERTCTL_BOOTSTRAP_TOKEN=$(openssl rand -hex 32)` in the
|
||||
server environment.
|
||||
2. Boot the server. Logs include
|
||||
"bootstrap endpoint enabled - POST /api/v1/auth/bootstrap to
|
||||
mint the first admin key (one-shot)" when the path is callable.
|
||||
3. Run a single curl:
|
||||
|
||||
```bash
|
||||
curl -X POST $URL/api/v1/auth/bootstrap \
|
||||
-H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
|
||||
-d '{"token":"<the-token>","actor_name":"first-admin"}'
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
4. Capture the `key_value` from the response. **It is shown ONCE.**
|
||||
The server never logs it.
|
||||
5. Use the new key to authenticate against the rest of the API.
|
||||
The bootstrap path is now closed: subsequent calls return HTTP
|
||||
410 Gone, even with the same valid token, because an admin
|
||||
actor exists.
|
||||
|
||||
The token is constant-time-compared. The server logs a startup
|
||||
warning if `CERTCTL_BOOTSTRAP_TOKEN` is set AND admin actors
|
||||
already exist (config-drift signal). For OIDC-first-admin (the
|
||||
"first user who signs in via SSO becomes admin" pattern), wait for
|
||||
Bundle 2.
|
||||
|
||||
## Demo mode (`CERTCTL_AUTH_TYPE=none`)
|
||||
|
||||
When auth is disabled, the server injects a synthetic actor
|
||||
`actor-demo-anon` into every request context. That actor holds
|
||||
`r-admin` at global scope (seeded by migration 000029), so every
|
||||
gated route resolves with a populated actor and admin grants. The
|
||||
synthetic actor is reserved: the API rejects any mutation that
|
||||
targets it (HTTP 409 with `ErrAuthReservedActor`).
|
||||
|
||||
Production deployments MUST NOT use demo mode - there is no
|
||||
per-request actor identity for the audit trail, and every request
|
||||
flows as admin. Use it for the `docker compose up` demo + the five
|
||||
example folders only.
|
||||
|
||||
## Where to look next
|
||||
|
||||
- [Threat model](auth-threat-model.md) - what attacks this primitive
|
||||
defends against and which it does not
|
||||
- [Migration guide](../migration/api-keys-to-rbac.md) - moving
|
||||
pre-Bundle-1 deployments onto RBAC
|
||||
- [Profiles](../reference/profiles.md) - the `RequiresApproval=true`
|
||||
flow that Bundle 1 Phase 9 closure protects from flip-flop
|
||||
- [Approval workflow](approval-workflow.md) - the Rank 7 Infisical
|
||||
deep-research deliverable that the Phase 9 closure piggybacks on
|
||||
- `internal/auth/` - the middleware + keystore + RequirePermission
|
||||
- `internal/service/auth/` - the service-layer Authorizer
|
||||
- `cowork/auth-bundle-1-prompt.md` - the design + phase plan
|
||||
- `cowork/auth-bundles-index.md` - the per-phase status tracker
|
||||
+57
-12
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
|
||||
# certctl Security Posture & Operator Guidance
|
||||
|
||||
> Last reviewed: 2026-05-05
|
||||
> Last reviewed: 2026-05-09
|
||||
|
||||
This document collects the operator-facing security guidance that the source
|
||||
code's per-finding comment blocks reference. Each section names the audit
|
||||
@@ -67,7 +67,7 @@ Bundle B / M-001. PBKDF2-SHA256 at 600,000 rounds (OWASP 2024 Password
|
||||
Storage Cheat Sheet floor) for the operator-supplied passphrase that
|
||||
derives the AES-256-GCM key for sensitive config columns. v3 blob format
|
||||
with a per-ciphertext random salt; v1/v2 read fallback for legacy rows.
|
||||
See [internal/crypto/encryption.go](../internal/crypto/encryption.go) and
|
||||
See [internal/crypto/encryption.go](../../internal/crypto/encryption.go) and
|
||||
the accompanying tests for the format spec.
|
||||
|
||||
## Authentication surface
|
||||
@@ -75,15 +75,60 @@ the accompanying tests for the format spec.
|
||||
Bundle B / M-002. Two layers decide auth-exempt status:
|
||||
|
||||
1. **Router layer:** `internal/api/router/router.go::AuthExemptRouterRoutes`
|
||||
— the 4 endpoints registered via direct `r.mux.Handle` without going
|
||||
- the endpoints registered via direct `r.mux.Handle` without going
|
||||
through the middleware chain (`/health`, `/ready`, `/api/v1/auth/info`,
|
||||
`/api/v1/version`).
|
||||
`/api/v1/version`, plus `/api/v1/auth/bootstrap` GET + POST per
|
||||
Bundle 1 Phase 6).
|
||||
2. **Dispatch layer:** `internal/api/router/router.go::AuthExemptDispatchPrefixes`
|
||||
— URL-prefix routing in `cmd/server/main.go::buildFinalHandler` for
|
||||
`/.well-known/pki/*`, `/.well-known/est/*`, and `/scep[/...]*`.
|
||||
- URL-prefix routing in `cmd/server/main.go::buildFinalHandler` for
|
||||
`/.well-known/pki/*`, `/.well-known/est/*`, `/.well-known/est-mtls`,
|
||||
and `/scep[/...]*` (incl. `/scep-mtls`).
|
||||
|
||||
Both lists have AST-walking regression tests (`auth_exempt_test.go`) that
|
||||
fail CI if a new bypass lands without an updating the documented constant.
|
||||
fail CI if a new bypass lands without updating the documented constant.
|
||||
|
||||
### RBAC primitive (Bundle 1)
|
||||
|
||||
Bundle 1 ships role-based authorization on top of API-key
|
||||
authentication. Every gated handler routes through the
|
||||
`auth.RequirePermission` middleware (or its router-level wrap
|
||||
`rbacGate`); the middleware resolves the actor's effective
|
||||
permissions via the service-layer `Authorizer.CheckPermission`
|
||||
and returns HTTP 403 BEFORE the handler body runs on miss. The
|
||||
seven default roles (`admin` / `operator` / `viewer` / `agent` /
|
||||
`mcp` / `cli` / `auditor`), 33-permission canonical catalogue,
|
||||
and the auditor split (`r-auditor` holds only `audit.read` +
|
||||
`audit.export`) are seeded by migration 000029.
|
||||
|
||||
For the operator how-to, see [`rbac.md`](rbac.md). For the
|
||||
threat model + compliance mapping, see
|
||||
[`auth-threat-model.md`](auth-threat-model.md). For the upgrade
|
||||
flow from a pre-Bundle-1 deployment, see
|
||||
[`docs/migration/api-keys-to-rbac.md`](../migration/api-keys-to-rbac.md).
|
||||
|
||||
### Day-0 admin bootstrap (Bundle 1 Phase 6)
|
||||
|
||||
Fresh deployments where no admin actor exists yet can mint the
|
||||
first admin via `POST /api/v1/auth/bootstrap` - set
|
||||
`CERTCTL_BOOTSTRAP_TOKEN`, POST a single curl with the token, and
|
||||
the server returns the plaintext key value once. The token is
|
||||
constant-time-compared; the strategy is one-shot via mutex; the
|
||||
admin-existence probe re-closes the path once an admin lands.
|
||||
The token is NEVER logged. The minted plaintext key flows only
|
||||
into the HTTP response body. See
|
||||
[`rbac.md`](rbac.md#day-0-bootstrap-first-admin-path) for the
|
||||
full flow.
|
||||
|
||||
### Approval-bypass closure (Bundle 1 Phase 9)
|
||||
|
||||
`CertificateProfile.RequiresApproval=true` profiles route both
|
||||
issuance/renewal AND profile edits through the
|
||||
`ApprovalService` two-person integrity gate (Phase 9 closes the
|
||||
flip-flop loophole where an admin could disable approval, mutate,
|
||||
re-enable). Same-actor self-approve is rejected at the service
|
||||
layer with `ErrApproveBySameActor`. See
|
||||
[`docs/reference/profiles.md`](../reference/profiles.md) for the
|
||||
full gate semantics.
|
||||
|
||||
## Per-user rate limiting
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -95,12 +140,12 @@ budget when set non-zero.
|
||||
|
||||
## API key rotation
|
||||
|
||||
**Audit reference:** L-004. CWE-924 (improper enforcement of message integrity during transmission in a communication channel) — operator UX variant.
|
||||
**Audit reference:** L-004. CWE-924 (improper enforcement of message integrity during transmission in a communication channel) - operator UX variant.
|
||||
|
||||
certctl's API keys are configured via the `CERTCTL_API_KEYS_NAMED` env var
|
||||
(format `name1:key1,name2:key2:admin`) and parsed at startup into an
|
||||
in-memory list. There is no DB-resident key store, no GUI, no `/api/v1/keys`
|
||||
endpoint — the env var IS the key inventory.
|
||||
endpoint - the env var IS the key inventory.
|
||||
|
||||
Pre-Bundle-G the env var rejected duplicate names, so rotating a key
|
||||
required: stop accepting OLDKEY → restart → roll NEWKEY out. Any client
|
||||
@@ -118,7 +163,7 @@ rotation as:
|
||||
```
|
||||
CERTCTL_API_KEYS_NAMED="alice:OLDKEY:admin,alice:NEWKEY:admin"
|
||||
```
|
||||
Both entries MUST carry the same admin flag — startup fails loud if
|
||||
Both entries MUST carry the same admin flag - startup fails loud if
|
||||
they don't (a non-admin shouldn't share an identity with an admin).
|
||||
|
||||
3. **Restart certctl.** A startup INFO log confirms the rotation window
|
||||
@@ -139,7 +184,7 @@ rotation as:
|
||||
|
||||
6. **Restart certctl.** OLDKEY now fails with 401. Rotation complete.
|
||||
|
||||
The rotation window has no operator-set timeout — it lasts for as long
|
||||
The rotation window has no operator-set timeout - it lasts for as long
|
||||
as both entries are in the env var. Best practice is a 24-72h window
|
||||
covering a full deploy cadence; if a client hasn't rolled to NEWKEY by
|
||||
the end of step 4, extend the window before step 5.
|
||||
@@ -151,7 +196,7 @@ the end of step 4, extend the window before step 5.
|
||||
- Two entries with the same `name` but mismatched admin: **rejected at
|
||||
startup** (privilege escalation guard).
|
||||
- Two entries with the same `(name, key)` pair: **rejected at startup**
|
||||
(typo guard — rotation requires DIFFERENT keys under the same name).
|
||||
(typo guard - rotation requires DIFFERENT keys under the same name).
|
||||
- Single-entry steady state: unchanged from pre-Bundle-G behavior.
|
||||
|
||||
### What the contract does NOT do
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,113 @@
|
||||
# Certificate profiles
|
||||
|
||||
> Last reviewed: 2026-05-09
|
||||
|
||||
A `CertificateProfile` is the policy object that groups every cert with
|
||||
the same shape: which issuer mints it, which key algorithm + size are
|
||||
allowed, what EKUs and SANs the issuer should emit, what renewal
|
||||
window the scheduler uses, what targets get the cert deployed to. Every
|
||||
managed certificate references exactly one profile; changing a
|
||||
profile's policy retroactively affects renewal of every cert pointing
|
||||
at it.
|
||||
|
||||
This file documents the profile lifecycle as it stands after Bundle 1.
|
||||
For the schema, see `migrations/000003_certificate_profiles.up.sql` +
|
||||
`migrations/000027_approval_workflow.up.sql` +
|
||||
`migrations/000033_approval_kinds.up.sql`. For the API surface,
|
||||
see `api/openapi.yaml` under `/api/v1/profiles`.
|
||||
|
||||
## Anatomy
|
||||
|
||||
| Field | Default | Purpose |
|
||||
|---|---|---|
|
||||
| `id` | autogenerated `prof-<slug>` | Stable opaque identifier; used by every other resource. |
|
||||
| `name` | required | Human-readable label; rendered in the GUI's profile picker. |
|
||||
| `issuer_id` | required | Which issuer (Local / Vault / EJBCA / ACME / SCEP / EST / ADCS / etc.) mints certs against this profile. |
|
||||
| `default_validity_days` | 90 | Rendered into the issuer call as the requested NotAfter delta. |
|
||||
| `renewal_window_days` | 30 | Scheduler enqueues a renewal Job when `cert.NotAfter - now < renewal_window_days`. |
|
||||
| `allowed_key_algorithms` | RSA 2048+, ECDSA P-256+ | Validates incoming CSRs at issuance time. |
|
||||
| `allowed_ekus` | server, client | RFC 5280 §4.2.1.12 EKU set. |
|
||||
| `must_staple` | false | Per-profile RFC 7633 `id-pe-tlsfeature` extension toggle (Phase 5.6 of the SCEP master bundle). |
|
||||
| `requires_approval` | false | Bundle 1 Phase 9 - gates issuance + renewal AND profile edits behind a four-eyes approval workflow. See below. |
|
||||
|
||||
## RequiresApproval and the approval workflow
|
||||
|
||||
Setting `requires_approval=true` on a profile does two things:
|
||||
|
||||
1. **Issuance + renewal of every cert pointing at the profile gates
|
||||
on a non-requester admin's approval.** The scheduler enqueues a
|
||||
`Job` at status `AwaitingApproval`; the linked
|
||||
`issuance_approval_requests` row stays at `pending` until either
|
||||
approved (job → `Pending`, scheduler dispatches) or rejected (job
|
||||
→ `Cancelled`). Same actor cannot self-approve.
|
||||
2. **Edits to the profile itself gate on a non-requester admin's
|
||||
approval.** This is the Bundle 1 Phase 9 closure for the flip-flop
|
||||
loophole - without it an admin could set `requires_approval=false`,
|
||||
mutate any other field, set `requires_approval=true`, and the
|
||||
approval workflow would only have been bypassed during the
|
||||
"off" window. The Phase 9 gate fires under three conditions:
|
||||
- The live profile has `requires_approval=true` AND the operator
|
||||
submits any edit (regardless of whether the edit changes the
|
||||
flag).
|
||||
- The live profile has `requires_approval=false` AND the operator
|
||||
submits an edit that would set it to `true` (the flag-flip
|
||||
direction is gated too because otherwise the gate could be
|
||||
enabled by anyone and have no review).
|
||||
- Both arms route through `ApprovalService.RequestProfileEditApproval`
|
||||
which writes a row to `issuance_approval_requests` with
|
||||
`approval_kind=profile_edit`. The pending profile diff is
|
||||
serialized to `payload` (JSONB).
|
||||
|
||||
**Edit response shape.** When the gate fires, `PUT /api/v1/profiles/{id}`
|
||||
returns HTTP 202 Accepted with body
|
||||
`{"status":"pending_approval","pending_approval_id":"ar-…"}`.
|
||||
The operator copies the approval ID, hands it to a peer admin, and
|
||||
the peer POSTs `/api/v1/approvals/{id}/approve` with their own
|
||||
credentials. On approve, the server deserializes `payload`, applies
|
||||
the diff against the live profile, and emits a
|
||||
`profile.edit_applied` audit row with `event_category=auth`. On
|
||||
reject, the pending row is dropped; the live profile is unchanged.
|
||||
|
||||
**Same-actor self-approve is rejected** with HTTP 403 and the existing
|
||||
`ErrApproveBySameActor` sentinel. This is the load-bearing
|
||||
two-person-integrity invariant that satisfies SOC 2 CC6.3 + NIST
|
||||
SSDF PO.5.2.
|
||||
|
||||
**Bypass mode.** `CERTCTL_APPROVAL_BYPASS=true` short-circuits both
|
||||
issuance approvals and profile-edit approvals; every request
|
||||
auto-approves with `actor=system-bypass`. Used by dev / CI for fast
|
||||
iteration; production deploys MUST leave it unset. A single SQL
|
||||
query (`SELECT FROM audit_events WHERE actor='system-bypass'`)
|
||||
confirms zero rows.
|
||||
|
||||
## Operator workflows
|
||||
|
||||
**Enable approval for an existing profile.** Edit the profile, set
|
||||
`requires_approval=true`. The first time you do this, the edit
|
||||
itself is gated (the live profile is non-approval but the proposed
|
||||
state is approval-tier, so the flip-on direction still routes through
|
||||
the workflow). Hand the approval ID to a peer; once approved, every
|
||||
subsequent edit and every renewal of every cert pointing at the
|
||||
profile gates on the workflow.
|
||||
|
||||
**Disable approval.** Edit the profile, set `requires_approval=false`.
|
||||
This edit is gated because the live profile is currently
|
||||
approval-tier. A peer must approve the disable. Once disabled,
|
||||
subsequent edits flow through the direct-apply path again.
|
||||
|
||||
**Audit who approved what.** The audit trail records every approval
|
||||
request + decision under `event_category=auth`. Filter via
|
||||
`GET /api/v1/audit?category=auth` or the `auditor` role's
|
||||
audit-only view. Each row carries the approval ID + the requester
|
||||
+ the decider; the WORM trigger prevents tampering.
|
||||
|
||||
## Related
|
||||
|
||||
- `migrations/000027_approval_workflow.up.sql` (initial approval
|
||||
schema, Rank 7 of the 2026-05-03 deep-research deliverable)
|
||||
- `migrations/000033_approval_kinds.up.sql` (Phase 9 - adds
|
||||
`approval_kind` + `payload` + nullable cert/job FKs)
|
||||
- `internal/service/approval.go::RequestProfileEditApproval`
|
||||
- `internal/service/profile.go::UpdateProfile` (gate)
|
||||
- `internal/api/handler/profiles.go::UpdateProfile` (202 mapping)
|
||||
- `cowork/auth-bundle-1-prompt.md` (Phase 9 spec)
|
||||
@@ -5,7 +5,6 @@ import (
|
||||
"net/http"
|
||||
"time"
|
||||
|
||||
"github.com/certctl-io/certctl/internal/api/middleware"
|
||||
"github.com/certctl-io/certctl/internal/domain"
|
||||
"github.com/certctl-io/certctl/internal/repository"
|
||||
)
|
||||
@@ -74,10 +73,7 @@ func (h AdminCRLCacheHandler) ListCache(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request)
|
||||
Error(w, http.StatusMethodNotAllowed, "Method not allowed")
|
||||
return
|
||||
}
|
||||
if !middleware.IsAdmin(r.Context()) {
|
||||
Error(w, http.StatusForbidden, "Admin access required")
|
||||
return
|
||||
}
|
||||
// Bundle 1 Phase 3.5: gate moved to router.go (RequirePermission middleware).
|
||||
|
||||
rows, err := h.svc.CacheRows(r.Context())
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -6,10 +6,10 @@ import (
|
||||
"errors"
|
||||
"net/http"
|
||||
"net/http/httptest"
|
||||
"strings"
|
||||
"testing"
|
||||
|
||||
"github.com/certctl-io/certctl/internal/api/middleware"
|
||||
"github.com/certctl-io/certctl/internal/auth"
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
// fakeAdminCRLCacheService is the test stub for the
|
||||
@@ -31,55 +31,11 @@ func (f *fakeAdminCRLCacheService) CacheRows(_ context.Context) ([]CRLCacheRow,
|
||||
// gate test. A caller without an admin-tagged context must be
|
||||
// rejected with HTTP 403, and the service layer must never see
|
||||
// the request (no enumeration of issuer set / cache state).
|
||||
func TestAdminCRLCache_NonAdmin_Returns403(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
svc := &fakeAdminCRLCacheService{}
|
||||
h := NewAdminCRLCacheHandler(svc)
|
||||
|
||||
req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "/api/v1/admin/crl/cache", nil)
|
||||
req = req.WithContext(contextWithRequestID()) // request id only, no admin flag
|
||||
w := httptest.NewRecorder()
|
||||
|
||||
h.ListCache(w, req)
|
||||
|
||||
if w.Code != http.StatusForbidden {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("expected status 403, got %d (body=%q)", w.Code, w.Body.String())
|
||||
}
|
||||
var resp map[string]any
|
||||
if err := json.NewDecoder(w.Body).Decode(&resp); err != nil {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("decode response: %v", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
msg, _ := resp["message"].(string)
|
||||
if !strings.Contains(strings.ToLower(msg), "admin") {
|
||||
t.Errorf("expected message to mention admin requirement, got %q", msg)
|
||||
}
|
||||
if svc.called {
|
||||
t.Errorf("service was invoked despite non-admin caller — gate failed open")
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// TestAdminCRLCache_AdminExplicitFalse_Returns403 pins the
|
||||
// AdminKey-present-but-false case. Without this, a regression to
|
||||
// "key missing == deny, key present == allow" would silently grant
|
||||
// a false flag to any caller that managed to set the context value.
|
||||
func TestAdminCRLCache_AdminExplicitFalse_Returns403(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
svc := &fakeAdminCRLCacheService{}
|
||||
h := NewAdminCRLCacheHandler(svc)
|
||||
|
||||
req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "/api/v1/admin/crl/cache", nil)
|
||||
ctx := context.WithValue(context.Background(), middleware.RequestIDKey{}, "test-request-id")
|
||||
ctx = context.WithValue(ctx, middleware.AdminKey{}, false)
|
||||
req = req.WithContext(ctx)
|
||||
w := httptest.NewRecorder()
|
||||
|
||||
h.ListCache(w, req)
|
||||
|
||||
if w.Code != http.StatusForbidden {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("expected status 403 for admin=false, got %d", w.Code)
|
||||
}
|
||||
if svc.called {
|
||||
t.Error("service called despite admin=false gate")
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// TestAdminCRLCache_AdminPermitted_ForwardsActor confirms the
|
||||
// happy path: an admin-tagged context reaches the service and the
|
||||
@@ -99,8 +55,8 @@ func TestAdminCRLCache_AdminPermitted_ForwardsActor(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
|
||||
req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "/api/v1/admin/crl/cache", nil)
|
||||
ctx := context.WithValue(context.Background(), middleware.RequestIDKey{}, "test-request-id")
|
||||
ctx = context.WithValue(ctx, middleware.AdminKey{}, true)
|
||||
ctx = context.WithValue(ctx, middleware.UserKey{}, "ops-admin")
|
||||
ctx = context.WithValue(ctx, auth.AdminKey{}, true)
|
||||
ctx = context.WithValue(ctx, auth.UserKey{}, "ops-admin")
|
||||
req = req.WithContext(ctx)
|
||||
w := httptest.NewRecorder()
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -131,7 +87,7 @@ func TestAdminCRLCache_RejectsNonGetMethod(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
h := NewAdminCRLCacheHandler(&fakeAdminCRLCacheService{})
|
||||
|
||||
req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodPost, "/api/v1/admin/crl/cache", nil)
|
||||
ctx := context.WithValue(context.Background(), middleware.AdminKey{}, true)
|
||||
ctx := context.WithValue(context.Background(), auth.AdminKey{}, true)
|
||||
req = req.WithContext(ctx)
|
||||
w := httptest.NewRecorder()
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -150,7 +106,7 @@ func TestAdminCRLCache_PropagatesServiceError(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
h := NewAdminCRLCacheHandler(svc)
|
||||
|
||||
req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "/api/v1/admin/crl/cache", nil)
|
||||
ctx := context.WithValue(context.Background(), middleware.AdminKey{}, true)
|
||||
ctx := context.WithValue(context.Background(), auth.AdminKey{}, true)
|
||||
req = req.WithContext(ctx)
|
||||
w := httptest.NewRecorder()
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -7,7 +7,6 @@ import (
|
||||
"net/http"
|
||||
"time"
|
||||
|
||||
"github.com/certctl-io/certctl/internal/api/middleware"
|
||||
"github.com/certctl-io/certctl/internal/service"
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -76,10 +75,7 @@ func (h AdminESTHandler) Profiles(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
|
||||
Error(w, http.StatusMethodNotAllowed, "Method not allowed")
|
||||
return
|
||||
}
|
||||
if !middleware.IsAdmin(r.Context()) {
|
||||
Error(w, http.StatusForbidden, "Admin access required")
|
||||
return
|
||||
}
|
||||
// Bundle 1 Phase 3.5: gate moved to router.go (RequirePermission middleware).
|
||||
|
||||
now := time.Now()
|
||||
rows, err := h.svc.Profiles(r.Context(), now)
|
||||
@@ -104,10 +100,7 @@ func (h AdminESTHandler) ReloadTrust(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
|
||||
Error(w, http.StatusMethodNotAllowed, "Method not allowed")
|
||||
return
|
||||
}
|
||||
if !middleware.IsAdmin(r.Context()) {
|
||||
Error(w, http.StatusForbidden, "Admin access required")
|
||||
return
|
||||
}
|
||||
// Bundle 1 Phase 3.5: gate moved to router.go (RequirePermission middleware).
|
||||
|
||||
var body adminESTReloadRequest
|
||||
// An empty body is permitted: it implicitly targets the legacy
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -11,6 +11,7 @@ import (
|
||||
"time"
|
||||
|
||||
"github.com/certctl-io/certctl/internal/api/middleware"
|
||||
"github.com/certctl-io/certctl/internal/auth"
|
||||
"github.com/certctl-io/certctl/internal/service"
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -45,38 +46,6 @@ func (f *fakeAdminESTService) ReloadTrust(_ context.Context, pathID string) erro
|
||||
|
||||
// ----- M-008 admin-gate triplet for Profiles (GET) -----
|
||||
|
||||
func TestAdminEST_Profiles_NonAdmin_Returns403(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
svc := &fakeAdminESTService{}
|
||||
h := NewAdminESTHandler(svc)
|
||||
req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "/api/v1/admin/est/profiles", nil)
|
||||
req = req.WithContext(contextWithRequestID())
|
||||
w := httptest.NewRecorder()
|
||||
h.Profiles(w, req)
|
||||
if w.Code != http.StatusForbidden {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("non-admin status = %d, want 403", w.Code)
|
||||
}
|
||||
if svc.profilesCalled {
|
||||
t.Errorf("service was invoked despite non-admin caller — gate failed open")
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func TestAdminEST_Profiles_AdminExplicitFalse_Returns403(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
svc := &fakeAdminESTService{}
|
||||
h := NewAdminESTHandler(svc)
|
||||
req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "/api/v1/admin/est/profiles", nil)
|
||||
ctx := context.WithValue(context.Background(), middleware.RequestIDKey{}, "test-request-id")
|
||||
ctx = context.WithValue(ctx, middleware.AdminKey{}, false)
|
||||
req = req.WithContext(ctx)
|
||||
w := httptest.NewRecorder()
|
||||
h.Profiles(w, req)
|
||||
if w.Code != http.StatusForbidden {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("admin=false status = %d, want 403", w.Code)
|
||||
}
|
||||
if svc.profilesCalled {
|
||||
t.Errorf("service was invoked despite admin=false — gate failed open")
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func TestAdminEST_Profiles_AdminTrue_Returns200(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
svc := &fakeAdminESTService{
|
||||
rows: []service.ESTStatsSnapshot{
|
||||
@@ -86,7 +55,7 @@ func TestAdminEST_Profiles_AdminTrue_Returns200(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
h := NewAdminESTHandler(svc)
|
||||
req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "/api/v1/admin/est/profiles", nil)
|
||||
ctx := context.WithValue(context.Background(), middleware.RequestIDKey{}, "test-request-id")
|
||||
ctx = context.WithValue(ctx, middleware.AdminKey{}, true)
|
||||
ctx = context.WithValue(ctx, auth.AdminKey{}, true)
|
||||
req = req.WithContext(ctx)
|
||||
w := httptest.NewRecorder()
|
||||
h.Profiles(w, req)
|
||||
@@ -121,7 +90,7 @@ func TestAdminEST_Profiles_NilRowsSerializedAsEmptyArray(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
h := NewAdminESTHandler(svc)
|
||||
req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "/api/v1/admin/est/profiles", nil)
|
||||
ctx := context.WithValue(context.Background(), middleware.RequestIDKey{}, "test-request-id")
|
||||
ctx = context.WithValue(ctx, middleware.AdminKey{}, true)
|
||||
ctx = context.WithValue(ctx, auth.AdminKey{}, true)
|
||||
req = req.WithContext(ctx)
|
||||
w := httptest.NewRecorder()
|
||||
h.Profiles(w, req)
|
||||
@@ -133,42 +102,6 @@ func TestAdminEST_Profiles_NilRowsSerializedAsEmptyArray(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
|
||||
// ----- M-008 admin-gate triplet for ReloadTrust (POST) -----
|
||||
|
||||
func TestAdminEST_ReloadTrust_NonAdmin_Returns403(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
svc := &fakeAdminESTService{}
|
||||
h := NewAdminESTHandler(svc)
|
||||
req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodPost, "/api/v1/admin/est/reload-trust",
|
||||
strings.NewReader(`{"path_id":"corp"}`))
|
||||
req.ContentLength = int64(len(`{"path_id":"corp"}`))
|
||||
req = req.WithContext(contextWithRequestID())
|
||||
w := httptest.NewRecorder()
|
||||
h.ReloadTrust(w, req)
|
||||
if w.Code != http.StatusForbidden {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("non-admin status = %d, want 403", w.Code)
|
||||
}
|
||||
if svc.reloadCalled {
|
||||
t.Errorf("service was invoked despite non-admin caller — gate failed open")
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func TestAdminEST_ReloadTrust_AdminExplicitFalse_Returns403(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
svc := &fakeAdminESTService{}
|
||||
h := NewAdminESTHandler(svc)
|
||||
req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodPost, "/api/v1/admin/est/reload-trust",
|
||||
strings.NewReader(`{"path_id":"corp"}`))
|
||||
req.ContentLength = int64(len(`{"path_id":"corp"}`))
|
||||
ctx := context.WithValue(context.Background(), middleware.RequestIDKey{}, "test-request-id")
|
||||
ctx = context.WithValue(ctx, middleware.AdminKey{}, false)
|
||||
req = req.WithContext(ctx)
|
||||
w := httptest.NewRecorder()
|
||||
h.ReloadTrust(w, req)
|
||||
if w.Code != http.StatusForbidden {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("admin=false status = %d, want 403", w.Code)
|
||||
}
|
||||
if svc.reloadCalled {
|
||||
t.Errorf("service was invoked despite admin=false — gate failed open")
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func TestAdminEST_ReloadTrust_HappyPath(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
svc := &fakeAdminESTService{}
|
||||
h := NewAdminESTHandler(svc)
|
||||
@@ -177,7 +110,7 @@ func TestAdminEST_ReloadTrust_HappyPath(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
strings.NewReader(body))
|
||||
req.ContentLength = int64(len(body))
|
||||
ctx := context.WithValue(context.Background(), middleware.RequestIDKey{}, "test-request-id")
|
||||
ctx = context.WithValue(ctx, middleware.AdminKey{}, true)
|
||||
ctx = context.WithValue(ctx, auth.AdminKey{}, true)
|
||||
req = req.WithContext(ctx)
|
||||
w := httptest.NewRecorder()
|
||||
h.ReloadTrust(w, req)
|
||||
@@ -197,7 +130,7 @@ func TestAdminEST_ReloadTrust_UnknownPathID_Returns404(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
strings.NewReader(body))
|
||||
req.ContentLength = int64(len(body))
|
||||
ctx := context.WithValue(context.Background(), middleware.RequestIDKey{}, "test-request-id")
|
||||
ctx = context.WithValue(ctx, middleware.AdminKey{}, true)
|
||||
ctx = context.WithValue(ctx, auth.AdminKey{}, true)
|
||||
req = req.WithContext(ctx)
|
||||
w := httptest.NewRecorder()
|
||||
h.ReloadTrust(w, req)
|
||||
@@ -214,7 +147,7 @@ func TestAdminEST_ReloadTrust_MTLSDisabled_Returns409(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
strings.NewReader(body))
|
||||
req.ContentLength = int64(len(body))
|
||||
ctx := context.WithValue(context.Background(), middleware.RequestIDKey{}, "test-request-id")
|
||||
ctx = context.WithValue(ctx, middleware.AdminKey{}, true)
|
||||
ctx = context.WithValue(ctx, auth.AdminKey{}, true)
|
||||
req = req.WithContext(ctx)
|
||||
w := httptest.NewRecorder()
|
||||
h.ReloadTrust(w, req)
|
||||
@@ -231,7 +164,7 @@ func TestAdminEST_ReloadTrust_ParseError_Returns500(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
strings.NewReader(body))
|
||||
req.ContentLength = int64(len(body))
|
||||
ctx := context.WithValue(context.Background(), middleware.RequestIDKey{}, "test-request-id")
|
||||
ctx = context.WithValue(ctx, middleware.AdminKey{}, true)
|
||||
ctx = context.WithValue(ctx, auth.AdminKey{}, true)
|
||||
req = req.WithContext(ctx)
|
||||
w := httptest.NewRecorder()
|
||||
h.ReloadTrust(w, req)
|
||||
@@ -248,7 +181,7 @@ func TestAdminEST_ReloadTrust_MalformedJSON_Returns400(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
strings.NewReader(body))
|
||||
req.ContentLength = int64(len(body))
|
||||
ctx := context.WithValue(context.Background(), middleware.RequestIDKey{}, "test-request-id")
|
||||
ctx = context.WithValue(ctx, middleware.AdminKey{}, true)
|
||||
ctx = context.WithValue(ctx, auth.AdminKey{}, true)
|
||||
req = req.WithContext(ctx)
|
||||
w := httptest.NewRecorder()
|
||||
h.ReloadTrust(w, req)
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -7,7 +7,6 @@ import (
|
||||
"net/http"
|
||||
"time"
|
||||
|
||||
"github.com/certctl-io/certctl/internal/api/middleware"
|
||||
"github.com/certctl-io/certctl/internal/service"
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -90,10 +89,7 @@ func (h AdminSCEPIntuneHandler) Profiles(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request)
|
||||
Error(w, http.StatusMethodNotAllowed, "Method not allowed")
|
||||
return
|
||||
}
|
||||
if !middleware.IsAdmin(r.Context()) {
|
||||
Error(w, http.StatusForbidden, "Admin access required")
|
||||
return
|
||||
}
|
||||
// Bundle 1 Phase 3.5: gate moved to router.go (RequirePermission middleware).
|
||||
|
||||
now := time.Now()
|
||||
rows, err := h.svc.Profiles(r.Context(), now)
|
||||
@@ -118,10 +114,7 @@ func (h AdminSCEPIntuneHandler) Stats(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
|
||||
Error(w, http.StatusMethodNotAllowed, "Method not allowed")
|
||||
return
|
||||
}
|
||||
if !middleware.IsAdmin(r.Context()) {
|
||||
Error(w, http.StatusForbidden, "Admin access required")
|
||||
return
|
||||
}
|
||||
// Bundle 1 Phase 3.5: gate moved to router.go (RequirePermission middleware).
|
||||
|
||||
now := time.Now()
|
||||
rows, err := h.svc.Stats(r.Context(), now)
|
||||
@@ -146,10 +139,7 @@ func (h AdminSCEPIntuneHandler) ReloadTrust(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Reque
|
||||
Error(w, http.StatusMethodNotAllowed, "Method not allowed")
|
||||
return
|
||||
}
|
||||
if !middleware.IsAdmin(r.Context()) {
|
||||
Error(w, http.StatusForbidden, "Admin access required")
|
||||
return
|
||||
}
|
||||
// Bundle 1 Phase 3.5: gate moved to router.go (RequirePermission middleware).
|
||||
|
||||
var body adminScepIntuneReloadRequest
|
||||
// An empty body is permitted: it implicitly targets the legacy
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -11,6 +11,7 @@ import (
|
||||
"time"
|
||||
|
||||
"github.com/certctl-io/certctl/internal/api/middleware"
|
||||
"github.com/certctl-io/certctl/internal/auth"
|
||||
"github.com/certctl-io/certctl/internal/service"
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -49,52 +50,6 @@ func (f *fakeAdminSCEPIntuneService) ReloadTrust(_ context.Context, pathID strin
|
||||
// M-008 admin-gate triplet for Stats (GET).
|
||||
// =============================================================================
|
||||
|
||||
func TestAdminSCEPIntune_NonAdmin_Returns403(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
svc := &fakeAdminSCEPIntuneService{}
|
||||
h := NewAdminSCEPIntuneHandler(svc)
|
||||
|
||||
req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "/api/v1/admin/scep/intune/stats", nil)
|
||||
req = req.WithContext(contextWithRequestID()) // request id only, no admin flag
|
||||
w := httptest.NewRecorder()
|
||||
|
||||
h.Stats(w, req)
|
||||
|
||||
if w.Code != http.StatusForbidden {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("expected 403 for non-admin, got %d (body=%q)", w.Code, w.Body.String())
|
||||
}
|
||||
var resp map[string]any
|
||||
if err := json.NewDecoder(w.Body).Decode(&resp); err != nil {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("decode response: %v", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
msg, _ := resp["message"].(string)
|
||||
if !strings.Contains(strings.ToLower(msg), "admin") {
|
||||
t.Errorf("expected message to mention admin requirement, got %q", msg)
|
||||
}
|
||||
if svc.statsCalled {
|
||||
t.Errorf("service was invoked despite non-admin caller — gate failed open")
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func TestAdminSCEPIntune_AdminExplicitFalse_Returns403(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
svc := &fakeAdminSCEPIntuneService{}
|
||||
h := NewAdminSCEPIntuneHandler(svc)
|
||||
|
||||
req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "/api/v1/admin/scep/intune/stats", nil)
|
||||
ctx := context.WithValue(context.Background(), middleware.RequestIDKey{}, "test-request-id")
|
||||
ctx = context.WithValue(ctx, middleware.AdminKey{}, false)
|
||||
req = req.WithContext(ctx)
|
||||
w := httptest.NewRecorder()
|
||||
|
||||
h.Stats(w, req)
|
||||
|
||||
if w.Code != http.StatusForbidden {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("expected 403 for admin=false, got %d", w.Code)
|
||||
}
|
||||
if svc.statsCalled {
|
||||
t.Error("service called despite admin=false gate")
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func TestAdminSCEPIntune_AdminPermitted_ForwardsActor(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
svc := &fakeAdminSCEPIntuneService{
|
||||
rows: []service.IntuneStatsSnapshot{
|
||||
@@ -106,8 +61,8 @@ func TestAdminSCEPIntune_AdminPermitted_ForwardsActor(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
|
||||
req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "/api/v1/admin/scep/intune/stats", nil)
|
||||
ctx := context.WithValue(context.Background(), middleware.RequestIDKey{}, "test-request-id")
|
||||
ctx = context.WithValue(ctx, middleware.AdminKey{}, true)
|
||||
ctx = context.WithValue(ctx, middleware.UserKey{}, "ops-admin")
|
||||
ctx = context.WithValue(ctx, auth.AdminKey{}, true)
|
||||
ctx = context.WithValue(ctx, auth.UserKey{}, "ops-admin")
|
||||
req = req.WithContext(ctx)
|
||||
w := httptest.NewRecorder()
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -135,45 +90,6 @@ func TestAdminSCEPIntune_AdminPermitted_ForwardsActor(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
// M-008 triplet for ReloadTrust (POST).
|
||||
// =============================================================================
|
||||
|
||||
func TestAdminSCEPIntuneReload_NonAdmin_Returns403(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
svc := &fakeAdminSCEPIntuneService{}
|
||||
h := NewAdminSCEPIntuneHandler(svc)
|
||||
req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodPost, "/api/v1/admin/scep/intune/reload-trust",
|
||||
strings.NewReader(`{"path_id":"corp"}`))
|
||||
req.ContentLength = int64(len(`{"path_id":"corp"}`))
|
||||
req = req.WithContext(contextWithRequestID())
|
||||
w := httptest.NewRecorder()
|
||||
|
||||
h.ReloadTrust(w, req)
|
||||
|
||||
if w.Code != http.StatusForbidden {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("expected 403 non-admin, got %d", w.Code)
|
||||
}
|
||||
if svc.reloadCalled {
|
||||
t.Error("service called despite non-admin gate")
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func TestAdminSCEPIntuneReload_AdminExplicitFalse_Returns403(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
svc := &fakeAdminSCEPIntuneService{}
|
||||
h := NewAdminSCEPIntuneHandler(svc)
|
||||
req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodPost, "/api/v1/admin/scep/intune/reload-trust",
|
||||
strings.NewReader(`{"path_id":"corp"}`))
|
||||
req.ContentLength = int64(len(`{"path_id":"corp"}`))
|
||||
ctx := context.WithValue(context.Background(), middleware.AdminKey{}, false)
|
||||
req = req.WithContext(ctx)
|
||||
w := httptest.NewRecorder()
|
||||
|
||||
h.ReloadTrust(w, req)
|
||||
|
||||
if w.Code != http.StatusForbidden {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("expected 403 admin=false, got %d", w.Code)
|
||||
}
|
||||
if svc.reloadCalled {
|
||||
t.Error("service called despite admin=false gate")
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func TestAdminSCEPIntuneReload_AdminPermitted_ForwardsActor(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
svc := &fakeAdminSCEPIntuneService{}
|
||||
h := NewAdminSCEPIntuneHandler(svc)
|
||||
@@ -181,8 +97,8 @@ func TestAdminSCEPIntuneReload_AdminPermitted_ForwardsActor(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodPost, "/api/v1/admin/scep/intune/reload-trust",
|
||||
strings.NewReader(body))
|
||||
req.ContentLength = int64(len(body))
|
||||
ctx := context.WithValue(context.Background(), middleware.AdminKey{}, true)
|
||||
ctx = context.WithValue(ctx, middleware.UserKey{}, "ops-admin")
|
||||
ctx := context.WithValue(context.Background(), auth.AdminKey{}, true)
|
||||
ctx = context.WithValue(ctx, auth.UserKey{}, "ops-admin")
|
||||
req = req.WithContext(ctx)
|
||||
w := httptest.NewRecorder()
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -211,7 +127,7 @@ func TestAdminSCEPIntuneReload_AdminPermitted_ForwardsActor(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
func TestAdminSCEPIntuneStats_RejectsNonGetMethod(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
h := NewAdminSCEPIntuneHandler(&fakeAdminSCEPIntuneService{})
|
||||
req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodPost, "/api/v1/admin/scep/intune/stats", nil)
|
||||
ctx := context.WithValue(context.Background(), middleware.AdminKey{}, true)
|
||||
ctx := context.WithValue(context.Background(), auth.AdminKey{}, true)
|
||||
req = req.WithContext(ctx)
|
||||
w := httptest.NewRecorder()
|
||||
h.Stats(w, req)
|
||||
@@ -223,7 +139,7 @@ func TestAdminSCEPIntuneStats_RejectsNonGetMethod(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
func TestAdminSCEPIntuneReload_RejectsNonPostMethod(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
h := NewAdminSCEPIntuneHandler(&fakeAdminSCEPIntuneService{})
|
||||
req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "/api/v1/admin/scep/intune/reload-trust", nil)
|
||||
ctx := context.WithValue(context.Background(), middleware.AdminKey{}, true)
|
||||
ctx := context.WithValue(context.Background(), auth.AdminKey{}, true)
|
||||
req = req.WithContext(ctx)
|
||||
w := httptest.NewRecorder()
|
||||
h.ReloadTrust(w, req)
|
||||
@@ -236,7 +152,7 @@ func TestAdminSCEPIntuneStats_PropagatesServiceError(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
svc := &fakeAdminSCEPIntuneService{statsErr: errors.New("registry walk failed")}
|
||||
h := NewAdminSCEPIntuneHandler(svc)
|
||||
req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "/api/v1/admin/scep/intune/stats", nil)
|
||||
ctx := context.WithValue(context.Background(), middleware.AdminKey{}, true)
|
||||
ctx := context.WithValue(context.Background(), auth.AdminKey{}, true)
|
||||
req = req.WithContext(ctx)
|
||||
w := httptest.NewRecorder()
|
||||
h.Stats(w, req)
|
||||
@@ -251,7 +167,7 @@ func TestAdminSCEPIntuneReload_ProfileNotFound_Returns404(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodPost, "/api/v1/admin/scep/intune/reload-trust",
|
||||
strings.NewReader(`{"path_id":"nonexistent"}`))
|
||||
req.ContentLength = int64(len(`{"path_id":"nonexistent"}`))
|
||||
ctx := context.WithValue(context.Background(), middleware.AdminKey{}, true)
|
||||
ctx := context.WithValue(context.Background(), auth.AdminKey{}, true)
|
||||
req = req.WithContext(ctx)
|
||||
w := httptest.NewRecorder()
|
||||
h.ReloadTrust(w, req)
|
||||
@@ -266,7 +182,7 @@ func TestAdminSCEPIntuneReload_IntuneDisabled_Returns409(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodPost, "/api/v1/admin/scep/intune/reload-trust",
|
||||
strings.NewReader(`{"path_id":"iot"}`))
|
||||
req.ContentLength = int64(len(`{"path_id":"iot"}`))
|
||||
ctx := context.WithValue(context.Background(), middleware.AdminKey{}, true)
|
||||
ctx := context.WithValue(context.Background(), auth.AdminKey{}, true)
|
||||
req = req.WithContext(ctx)
|
||||
w := httptest.NewRecorder()
|
||||
h.ReloadTrust(w, req)
|
||||
@@ -281,7 +197,7 @@ func TestAdminSCEPIntuneReload_BadReloadPropagates500(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodPost, "/api/v1/admin/scep/intune/reload-trust",
|
||||
strings.NewReader(`{"path_id":"corp"}`))
|
||||
req.ContentLength = int64(len(`{"path_id":"corp"}`))
|
||||
ctx := context.WithValue(context.Background(), middleware.AdminKey{}, true)
|
||||
ctx := context.WithValue(context.Background(), auth.AdminKey{}, true)
|
||||
req = req.WithContext(ctx)
|
||||
w := httptest.NewRecorder()
|
||||
h.ReloadTrust(w, req)
|
||||
@@ -294,7 +210,7 @@ func TestAdminSCEPIntuneReload_EmptyBodyTargetsLegacyRoot(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
svc := &fakeAdminSCEPIntuneService{}
|
||||
h := NewAdminSCEPIntuneHandler(svc)
|
||||
req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodPost, "/api/v1/admin/scep/intune/reload-trust", nil)
|
||||
ctx := context.WithValue(context.Background(), middleware.AdminKey{}, true)
|
||||
ctx := context.WithValue(context.Background(), auth.AdminKey{}, true)
|
||||
req = req.WithContext(ctx)
|
||||
w := httptest.NewRecorder()
|
||||
h.ReloadTrust(w, req)
|
||||
@@ -312,7 +228,7 @@ func TestAdminSCEPIntuneReload_RejectsMalformedJSON(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodPost, "/api/v1/admin/scep/intune/reload-trust",
|
||||
strings.NewReader(bad))
|
||||
req.ContentLength = int64(len(bad))
|
||||
ctx := context.WithValue(context.Background(), middleware.AdminKey{}, true)
|
||||
ctx := context.WithValue(context.Background(), auth.AdminKey{}, true)
|
||||
req = req.WithContext(ctx)
|
||||
w := httptest.NewRecorder()
|
||||
h.ReloadTrust(w, req)
|
||||
@@ -347,52 +263,6 @@ func TestAdminSCEPIntuneServiceImpl_ReloadUnknownPathReturnsNotFound(t *testing.
|
||||
// M-008 admin-gate triplet for Profiles (GET) — Phase 9 follow-up endpoint.
|
||||
// =============================================================================
|
||||
|
||||
func TestAdminSCEPProfiles_NonAdmin_Returns403(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
svc := &fakeAdminSCEPIntuneService{}
|
||||
h := NewAdminSCEPIntuneHandler(svc)
|
||||
|
||||
req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "/api/v1/admin/scep/profiles", nil)
|
||||
req = req.WithContext(contextWithRequestID()) // request id only, no admin flag
|
||||
w := httptest.NewRecorder()
|
||||
|
||||
h.Profiles(w, req)
|
||||
|
||||
if w.Code != http.StatusForbidden {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("expected 403 for non-admin, got %d (body=%q)", w.Code, w.Body.String())
|
||||
}
|
||||
var resp map[string]any
|
||||
if err := json.NewDecoder(w.Body).Decode(&resp); err != nil {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("decode response: %v", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
msg, _ := resp["message"].(string)
|
||||
if !strings.Contains(strings.ToLower(msg), "admin") {
|
||||
t.Errorf("expected message to mention admin requirement, got %q", msg)
|
||||
}
|
||||
if svc.profilesCalled {
|
||||
t.Errorf("service was invoked despite non-admin caller — gate failed open")
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func TestAdminSCEPProfiles_AdminExplicitFalse_Returns403(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
svc := &fakeAdminSCEPIntuneService{}
|
||||
h := NewAdminSCEPIntuneHandler(svc)
|
||||
|
||||
req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "/api/v1/admin/scep/profiles", nil)
|
||||
ctx := context.WithValue(context.Background(), middleware.RequestIDKey{}, "test-request-id")
|
||||
ctx = context.WithValue(ctx, middleware.AdminKey{}, false)
|
||||
req = req.WithContext(ctx)
|
||||
w := httptest.NewRecorder()
|
||||
|
||||
h.Profiles(w, req)
|
||||
|
||||
if w.Code != http.StatusForbidden {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("expected 403 for admin=false, got %d", w.Code)
|
||||
}
|
||||
if svc.profilesCalled {
|
||||
t.Error("service called despite admin=false gate")
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func TestAdminSCEPProfiles_AdminPermitted_ForwardsActor(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
svc := &fakeAdminSCEPIntuneService{
|
||||
profileRows: []service.SCEPProfileStatsSnapshot{
|
||||
@@ -417,8 +287,8 @@ func TestAdminSCEPProfiles_AdminPermitted_ForwardsActor(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
|
||||
req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "/api/v1/admin/scep/profiles", nil)
|
||||
ctx := context.WithValue(context.Background(), middleware.RequestIDKey{}, "test-request-id")
|
||||
ctx = context.WithValue(ctx, middleware.AdminKey{}, true)
|
||||
ctx = context.WithValue(ctx, middleware.UserKey{}, "ops-admin")
|
||||
ctx = context.WithValue(ctx, auth.AdminKey{}, true)
|
||||
ctx = context.WithValue(ctx, auth.UserKey{}, "ops-admin")
|
||||
req = req.WithContext(ctx)
|
||||
w := httptest.NewRecorder()
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -461,7 +331,7 @@ func TestAdminSCEPProfiles_AdminPermitted_ForwardsActor(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
func TestAdminSCEPProfiles_RejectsNonGetMethod(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
h := NewAdminSCEPIntuneHandler(&fakeAdminSCEPIntuneService{})
|
||||
req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodPost, "/api/v1/admin/scep/profiles", nil)
|
||||
ctx := context.WithValue(context.Background(), middleware.AdminKey{}, true)
|
||||
ctx := context.WithValue(context.Background(), auth.AdminKey{}, true)
|
||||
req = req.WithContext(ctx)
|
||||
w := httptest.NewRecorder()
|
||||
h.Profiles(w, req)
|
||||
@@ -474,7 +344,7 @@ func TestAdminSCEPProfiles_PropagatesServiceError(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
svc := &fakeAdminSCEPIntuneService{profilesErr: errors.New("registry walk failed")}
|
||||
h := NewAdminSCEPIntuneHandler(svc)
|
||||
req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "/api/v1/admin/scep/profiles", nil)
|
||||
ctx := context.WithValue(context.Background(), middleware.AdminKey{}, true)
|
||||
ctx := context.WithValue(context.Background(), auth.AdminKey{}, true)
|
||||
req = req.WithContext(ctx)
|
||||
w := httptest.NewRecorder()
|
||||
h.Profiles(w, req)
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -8,6 +8,7 @@ import (
|
||||
"strconv"
|
||||
|
||||
"github.com/certctl-io/certctl/internal/api/middleware"
|
||||
"github.com/certctl-io/certctl/internal/auth"
|
||||
"github.com/certctl-io/certctl/internal/domain"
|
||||
"github.com/certctl-io/certctl/internal/repository"
|
||||
"github.com/certctl-io/certctl/internal/service"
|
||||
@@ -111,7 +112,7 @@ func (h ApprovalHandler) GetApproval(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
|
||||
|
||||
// Approve transitions a pending approval request to approved + transitions
|
||||
// the linked Job from AwaitingApproval to Pending. RBAC: the authenticated
|
||||
// actor extracted via middleware.UserKey must NOT equal the request's
|
||||
// actor extracted via auth.UserKey must NOT equal the request's
|
||||
// RequestedBy — the service-layer check enforces this and the handler
|
||||
// surfaces it as HTTP 403.
|
||||
//
|
||||
@@ -153,7 +154,7 @@ func (h ApprovalHandler) decision(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request, action
|
||||
// Extract authenticated actor. The auth middleware sets UserKey to the
|
||||
// API-key NamedAPIKey.Name (or empty for unauthenticated). RBAC at the
|
||||
// service layer requires a non-empty actor.
|
||||
actor, _ := r.Context().Value(middleware.UserKey{}).(string)
|
||||
actor, _ := r.Context().Value(auth.UserKey{}).(string)
|
||||
if actor == "" {
|
||||
ErrorWithRequestID(w, http.StatusUnauthorized,
|
||||
"authentication required to approve / reject", requestID)
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -10,7 +10,7 @@ import (
|
||||
"sync"
|
||||
"testing"
|
||||
|
||||
"github.com/certctl-io/certctl/internal/api/middleware"
|
||||
"github.com/certctl-io/certctl/internal/auth"
|
||||
"github.com/certctl-io/certctl/internal/domain"
|
||||
"github.com/certctl-io/certctl/internal/repository"
|
||||
"github.com/certctl-io/certctl/internal/service"
|
||||
@@ -117,7 +117,7 @@ func reqWithActor(t *testing.T, method, target string, body string, actor string
|
||||
}
|
||||
req.Header.Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
|
||||
if actor != "" {
|
||||
req = req.WithContext(context.WithValue(req.Context(), middleware.UserKey{}, actor))
|
||||
req = req.WithContext(context.WithValue(req.Context(), auth.UserKey{}, actor))
|
||||
}
|
||||
if pathID != "" {
|
||||
req.SetPathValue("id", pathID)
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -14,6 +14,12 @@ import (
|
||||
type AuditService interface {
|
||||
ListAuditEvents(ctx context.Context, page, perPage int) ([]domain.AuditEvent, int64, error)
|
||||
GetAuditEvent(ctx context.Context, id string) (*domain.AuditEvent, error)
|
||||
// ListAuditEventsByCategory (Bundle 1 Phase 8) returns audit
|
||||
// rows whose event_category column matches eventCategory.
|
||||
// eventCategory is one of "cert_lifecycle", "auth", "config";
|
||||
// empty string returns all categories. Used by the auditor role
|
||||
// (filtered to "auth" via /v1/audit?category=auth).
|
||||
ListAuditEventsByCategory(ctx context.Context, eventCategory string, page, perPage int) ([]domain.AuditEvent, int64, error)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// AuditHandler handles HTTP requests for audit event operations.
|
||||
@@ -27,7 +33,12 @@ func NewAuditHandler(svc AuditService) AuditHandler {
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// ListAuditEvents lists audit events.
|
||||
// GET /api/v1/audit?page=1&per_page=50
|
||||
// GET /api/v1/audit?page=1&per_page=50&category=auth
|
||||
//
|
||||
// Bundle 1 Phase 8 adds the optional `category` query parameter for
|
||||
// auditor-role filtering. Allowed values: cert_lifecycle, auth, config.
|
||||
// Unknown values surface 400 so misuse is caught loud (instead of
|
||||
// silently returning all rows).
|
||||
func (h AuditHandler) ListAuditEvents(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
|
||||
if r.Method != http.MethodGet {
|
||||
Error(w, http.StatusMethodNotAllowed, "Method not allowed")
|
||||
@@ -49,8 +60,29 @@ func (h AuditHandler) ListAuditEvents(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
|
||||
perPage = parsed
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
category := query.Get("category")
|
||||
if category != "" {
|
||||
switch category {
|
||||
case domain.EventCategoryCertLifecycle, domain.EventCategoryAuth, domain.EventCategoryConfig:
|
||||
// ok
|
||||
default:
|
||||
ErrorWithRequestID(w, http.StatusBadRequest,
|
||||
"Invalid category — allowed: cert_lifecycle, auth, config",
|
||||
requestID)
|
||||
return
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
events, total, err := h.svc.ListAuditEvents(r.Context(), page, perPage)
|
||||
var (
|
||||
events []domain.AuditEvent
|
||||
total int64
|
||||
err error
|
||||
)
|
||||
if category != "" {
|
||||
events, total, err = h.svc.ListAuditEventsByCategory(r.Context(), category, page, perPage)
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
events, total, err = h.svc.ListAuditEvents(r.Context(), page, perPage)
|
||||
}
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
ErrorWithRequestID(w, http.StatusInternalServerError, "Failed to list audit events", requestID)
|
||||
return
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,157 @@
|
||||
package handler
|
||||
|
||||
import (
|
||||
"context"
|
||||
"encoding/json"
|
||||
"net/http"
|
||||
"net/http/httptest"
|
||||
"testing"
|
||||
|
||||
"github.com/certctl-io/certctl/internal/domain"
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
// =============================================================================
|
||||
// Bundle 1 Phase 8 — audit category-filter HTTP behaviour.
|
||||
// =============================================================================
|
||||
|
||||
// TestListAuditEvents_Phase8_CategoryFilterDispatchesToService pins the
|
||||
// happy-path: ?category=auth routes through ListAuditEventsByCategory
|
||||
// with the right argument.
|
||||
func TestListAuditEvents_Phase8_CategoryFilterDispatchesToService(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
var capturedCategory string
|
||||
mockSvc := &mockAuditService{
|
||||
listByCatFunc: func(category string, _, _ int) ([]domain.AuditEvent, int64, error) {
|
||||
capturedCategory = category
|
||||
return []domain.AuditEvent{
|
||||
{ID: "audit-1", Action: "auth.role.assign", EventCategory: domain.EventCategoryAuth},
|
||||
}, 1, nil
|
||||
},
|
||||
}
|
||||
h := NewAuditHandler(mockSvc)
|
||||
req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "/api/v1/audit?category=auth", nil)
|
||||
rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
|
||||
h.ListAuditEvents(rec, req)
|
||||
if rec.Code != http.StatusOK {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("status = %d, want 200", rec.Code)
|
||||
}
|
||||
if capturedCategory != "auth" {
|
||||
t.Errorf("captured category = %q, want auth", capturedCategory)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// TestListAuditEvents_Phase8_NoCategoryFallsBackToListAuditEvents pins
|
||||
// that the legacy unfiltered path still routes through ListAuditEvents
|
||||
// (preserves back-compat).
|
||||
func TestListAuditEvents_Phase8_NoCategoryFallsBackToListAuditEvents(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
listCalled := false
|
||||
listByCatCalled := false
|
||||
mockSvc := &mockAuditService{
|
||||
listFunc: func(_, _ int) ([]domain.AuditEvent, int64, error) {
|
||||
listCalled = true
|
||||
return nil, 0, nil
|
||||
},
|
||||
listByCatFunc: func(_ string, _, _ int) ([]domain.AuditEvent, int64, error) {
|
||||
listByCatCalled = true
|
||||
return nil, 0, nil
|
||||
},
|
||||
}
|
||||
h := NewAuditHandler(mockSvc)
|
||||
req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "/api/v1/audit", nil)
|
||||
rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
|
||||
h.ListAuditEvents(rec, req)
|
||||
if !listCalled {
|
||||
t.Errorf("ListAuditEvents not called for unfiltered request")
|
||||
}
|
||||
if listByCatCalled {
|
||||
t.Errorf("ListAuditEventsByCategory called unexpectedly for unfiltered request")
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// TestListAuditEvents_Phase8_RejectsUnknownCategory pins the 400 surface
|
||||
// for misuse. Allowed values are exactly cert_lifecycle/auth/config;
|
||||
// anything else surfaces a clear error rather than silently returning
|
||||
// every row.
|
||||
func TestListAuditEvents_Phase8_RejectsUnknownCategory(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
mockSvc := &mockAuditService{}
|
||||
h := NewAuditHandler(mockSvc)
|
||||
for _, bad := range []string{"agent", "AUTH", "auth%20", "system"} {
|
||||
req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "/api/v1/audit?category="+bad, nil)
|
||||
rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
|
||||
h.ListAuditEvents(rec, req)
|
||||
if rec.Code != http.StatusBadRequest {
|
||||
t.Errorf("category=%q got status %d, want 400", bad, rec.Code)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// TestListAuditEvents_Phase8_AcceptsAllThreeCategories pins that each of
|
||||
// the three documented enum values dispatches without a 400.
|
||||
func TestListAuditEvents_Phase8_AcceptsAllThreeCategories(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
mockSvc := &mockAuditService{
|
||||
listByCatFunc: func(_ string, _, _ int) ([]domain.AuditEvent, int64, error) {
|
||||
return nil, 0, nil
|
||||
},
|
||||
}
|
||||
h := NewAuditHandler(mockSvc)
|
||||
for _, cat := range []string{
|
||||
domain.EventCategoryCertLifecycle,
|
||||
domain.EventCategoryAuth,
|
||||
domain.EventCategoryConfig,
|
||||
} {
|
||||
req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "/api/v1/audit?category="+cat, nil)
|
||||
rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
|
||||
h.ListAuditEvents(rec, req)
|
||||
if rec.Code != http.StatusOK {
|
||||
t.Errorf("category=%s got status %d, want 200", cat, rec.Code)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// TestListAuditEvents_Phase8_CategoryAndPageCombine confirms the query
|
||||
// parser respects both the page and category params concurrently.
|
||||
func TestListAuditEvents_Phase8_CategoryAndPageCombine(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
var capturedCategory string
|
||||
var capturedPage int
|
||||
mockSvc := &mockAuditService{
|
||||
listByCatFunc: func(category string, page, _ int) ([]domain.AuditEvent, int64, error) {
|
||||
capturedCategory = category
|
||||
capturedPage = page
|
||||
return nil, 0, nil
|
||||
},
|
||||
}
|
||||
h := NewAuditHandler(mockSvc)
|
||||
req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "/api/v1/audit?category=auth&page=3", nil)
|
||||
rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
|
||||
h.ListAuditEvents(rec, req)
|
||||
if capturedCategory != "auth" || capturedPage != 3 {
|
||||
t.Errorf("captured (cat=%q page=%d), want (auth, 3)", capturedCategory, capturedPage)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// TestListAuditEvents_Phase8_ResponseSurfacesEventCategory confirms the
|
||||
// JSON output carries the event_category field for downstream auditors.
|
||||
func TestListAuditEvents_Phase8_ResponseSurfacesEventCategory(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
mockSvc := &mockAuditService{
|
||||
listByCatFunc: func(_ string, _, _ int) ([]domain.AuditEvent, int64, error) {
|
||||
return []domain.AuditEvent{
|
||||
{ID: "a1", Action: "auth.role.assign", EventCategory: "auth"},
|
||||
{ID: "a2", Action: "issuer.edit", EventCategory: "config"},
|
||||
}, 2, nil
|
||||
},
|
||||
}
|
||||
h := NewAuditHandler(mockSvc)
|
||||
req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "/api/v1/audit?category=auth", nil)
|
||||
rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
|
||||
h.ListAuditEvents(rec, req)
|
||||
var resp struct {
|
||||
Data []domain.AuditEvent `json:"data"`
|
||||
}
|
||||
if err := json.NewDecoder(rec.Body).Decode(&resp); err != nil {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("decode: %v", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
if len(resp.Data) != 2 || resp.Data[0].EventCategory != "auth" || resp.Data[1].EventCategory != "config" {
|
||||
t.Errorf("event_category not surfaced in JSON: %+v", resp.Data)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
var _ = context.Background // keep import even if other tests strip it
|
||||
@@ -16,6 +16,7 @@ import (
|
||||
// mockAuditService implements AuditService for testing.
|
||||
type mockAuditService struct {
|
||||
listFunc func(page, perPage int) ([]domain.AuditEvent, int64, error)
|
||||
listByCatFunc func(category string, page, perPage int) ([]domain.AuditEvent, int64, error)
|
||||
getFunc func(id string) (*domain.AuditEvent, error)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -26,6 +27,16 @@ func (m *mockAuditService) ListAuditEvents(_ context.Context, page, perPage int)
|
||||
return nil, 0, nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func (m *mockAuditService) ListAuditEventsByCategory(_ context.Context, category string, page, perPage int) ([]domain.AuditEvent, int64, error) {
|
||||
if m.listByCatFunc != nil {
|
||||
return m.listByCatFunc(category, page, perPage)
|
||||
}
|
||||
if m.listFunc != nil {
|
||||
return m.listFunc(page, perPage)
|
||||
}
|
||||
return nil, 0, nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func (m *mockAuditService) GetAuditEvent(_ context.Context, id string) (*domain.AuditEvent, error) {
|
||||
if m.getFunc != nil {
|
||||
return m.getFunc(id)
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,528 @@
|
||||
package handler
|
||||
|
||||
import (
|
||||
"context"
|
||||
"encoding/json"
|
||||
"errors"
|
||||
"net/http"
|
||||
"strings"
|
||||
|
||||
"github.com/certctl-io/certctl/internal/auth"
|
||||
"github.com/certctl-io/certctl/internal/domain"
|
||||
authdomain "github.com/certctl-io/certctl/internal/domain/auth"
|
||||
"github.com/certctl-io/certctl/internal/repository"
|
||||
authsvc "github.com/certctl-io/certctl/internal/service/auth"
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
// AuthHandler exposes the RBAC primitive over HTTP. Bundle 1 Phase 4 wires
|
||||
// the routes registered by HandlerRegistry under /v1/auth/*.
|
||||
//
|
||||
// Every mutating endpoint runs through the service layer, which enforces
|
||||
// the privilege-escalation guard (callers need auth.role.assign for
|
||||
// Grant/Revoke, auth.role.create/edit/delete for the role lifecycle,
|
||||
// auth.key.* for key management). Read endpoints require auth.role.list.
|
||||
//
|
||||
// The /v1/auth/me endpoint has no permission requirement (every
|
||||
// authenticated caller can read their own permissions); this is the
|
||||
// query the GUI uses to gate affordance rendering.
|
||||
type AuthHandler struct {
|
||||
roles AuthRoleService
|
||||
perms AuthPermissionService
|
||||
actors AuthActorRoleService
|
||||
checker auth.PermissionChecker
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// AuthRoleService is the service-layer dependency the AuthHandler uses
|
||||
// for role + role-permission lifecycle. Mirrors internal/service/auth.
|
||||
type AuthRoleService interface {
|
||||
List(ctx context.Context, caller *authsvc.Caller) ([]*authdomain.Role, error)
|
||||
Get(ctx context.Context, caller *authsvc.Caller, id string) (*authdomain.Role, error)
|
||||
Create(ctx context.Context, caller *authsvc.Caller, role *authdomain.Role) error
|
||||
Update(ctx context.Context, caller *authsvc.Caller, role *authdomain.Role) error
|
||||
Delete(ctx context.Context, caller *authsvc.Caller, id string) error
|
||||
ListPermissions(ctx context.Context, caller *authsvc.Caller, roleID string) ([]*authdomain.RolePermission, error)
|
||||
AddPermission(ctx context.Context, caller *authsvc.Caller, roleID, permName string, scopeType authdomain.ScopeType, scopeID *string) error
|
||||
RemovePermission(ctx context.Context, caller *authsvc.Caller, roleID, permName string, scopeType authdomain.ScopeType, scopeID *string) error
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// AuthPermissionService exposes the canonical permission catalogue.
|
||||
type AuthPermissionService interface {
|
||||
List(ctx context.Context) ([]*authdomain.Permission, error)
|
||||
IsRegistered(name string) bool
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// AuthActorRoleService manages role grants on actors and surfaces the
|
||||
// effective-permissions query the GUI's /v1/auth/me handler uses.
|
||||
type AuthActorRoleService interface {
|
||||
Grant(ctx context.Context, caller *authsvc.Caller, ar *authdomain.ActorRole) error
|
||||
Revoke(ctx context.Context, caller *authsvc.Caller, actorID string, actorType domain.ActorType, roleID string) error
|
||||
ListForActor(ctx context.Context, caller *authsvc.Caller, actorID string, actorType domain.ActorType) ([]*authdomain.ActorRole, error)
|
||||
EffectivePermissions(ctx context.Context, caller *authsvc.Caller, actorID string, actorType domain.ActorType) ([]repository.EffectivePermission, error)
|
||||
// ListKeys (Bundle 1 Phase 7) returns every actor in the tenant
|
||||
// with at least one role grant. The CLI's `auth keys list` and
|
||||
// scope-down helper consume this. The synthetic actor-demo-anon
|
||||
// row is included; the CLI filters it out of the interactive
|
||||
// prompt loop.
|
||||
ListKeys(ctx context.Context, caller *authsvc.Caller) ([]repository.ActorWithRoles, error)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// NewAuthHandler constructs an AuthHandler with the service-layer
|
||||
// dependencies wired in cmd/server/main.go.
|
||||
func NewAuthHandler(
|
||||
roles AuthRoleService,
|
||||
perms AuthPermissionService,
|
||||
actors AuthActorRoleService,
|
||||
checker auth.PermissionChecker,
|
||||
) AuthHandler {
|
||||
return AuthHandler{
|
||||
roles: roles,
|
||||
perms: perms,
|
||||
actors: actors,
|
||||
checker: checker,
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// =============================================================================
|
||||
// JSON request / response shapes
|
||||
// =============================================================================
|
||||
|
||||
type roleResponse struct {
|
||||
ID string `json:"id"`
|
||||
TenantID string `json:"tenant_id"`
|
||||
Name string `json:"name"`
|
||||
Description string `json:"description"`
|
||||
CreatedAt string `json:"created_at"`
|
||||
UpdatedAt string `json:"updated_at"`
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func roleToResponse(r *authdomain.Role) roleResponse {
|
||||
return roleResponse{
|
||||
ID: r.ID,
|
||||
TenantID: r.TenantID,
|
||||
Name: r.Name,
|
||||
Description: r.Description,
|
||||
CreatedAt: r.CreatedAt.UTC().Format("2006-01-02T15:04:05Z07:00"),
|
||||
UpdatedAt: r.UpdatedAt.UTC().Format("2006-01-02T15:04:05Z07:00"),
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
type permissionResponse struct {
|
||||
ID string `json:"id"`
|
||||
Name string `json:"name"`
|
||||
Namespace string `json:"namespace"`
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func permToResponse(p *authdomain.Permission) permissionResponse {
|
||||
return permissionResponse{ID: p.ID, Name: p.Name, Namespace: p.Namespace}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
type rolePermissionResponse struct {
|
||||
RoleID string `json:"role_id"`
|
||||
PermissionID string `json:"permission_id"`
|
||||
ScopeType string `json:"scope_type"`
|
||||
ScopeID *string `json:"scope_id,omitempty"`
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func rolePermToResponse(g *authdomain.RolePermission) rolePermissionResponse {
|
||||
return rolePermissionResponse{
|
||||
RoleID: g.RoleID,
|
||||
PermissionID: g.PermissionID,
|
||||
ScopeType: string(g.ScopeType),
|
||||
ScopeID: g.ScopeID,
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
type createRoleRequest struct {
|
||||
Name string `json:"name"`
|
||||
Description string `json:"description"`
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
type updateRoleRequest struct {
|
||||
Name string `json:"name"`
|
||||
Description string `json:"description"`
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
type addPermissionRequest struct {
|
||||
Permission string `json:"permission"`
|
||||
ScopeType string `json:"scope_type,omitempty"` // defaults to "global"
|
||||
ScopeID *string `json:"scope_id,omitempty"`
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
type assignRoleRequest struct {
|
||||
RoleID string `json:"role_id"`
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
type meResponse struct {
|
||||
ActorID string `json:"actor_id"`
|
||||
ActorType string `json:"actor_type"`
|
||||
TenantID string `json:"tenant_id"`
|
||||
Admin bool `json:"admin"` // back-compat with /v1/auth/check
|
||||
Roles []string `json:"roles"`
|
||||
EffectivePermissions []effectivePermissionPayload `json:"effective_permissions"`
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
type effectivePermissionPayload struct {
|
||||
Permission string `json:"permission"`
|
||||
ScopeType string `json:"scope_type"`
|
||||
ScopeID *string `json:"scope_id,omitempty"`
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// =============================================================================
|
||||
// Handlers
|
||||
// =============================================================================
|
||||
|
||||
// ListRoles handles GET /api/v1/auth/roles.
|
||||
// Permission: auth.role.list (enforced at the service layer).
|
||||
func (h AuthHandler) ListRoles(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
|
||||
caller, err := callerFromRequest(r)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
writeAuthError(w, err)
|
||||
return
|
||||
}
|
||||
roles, err := h.roles.List(r.Context(), caller)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
writeAuthError(w, err)
|
||||
return
|
||||
}
|
||||
out := make([]roleResponse, 0, len(roles))
|
||||
for _, role := range roles {
|
||||
out = append(out, roleToResponse(role))
|
||||
}
|
||||
writeJSON(w, http.StatusOK, map[string]interface{}{"roles": out})
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// GetRole handles GET /api/v1/auth/roles/{id}.
|
||||
func (h AuthHandler) GetRole(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
|
||||
caller, err := callerFromRequest(r)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
writeAuthError(w, err)
|
||||
return
|
||||
}
|
||||
id := r.PathValue("id")
|
||||
role, err := h.roles.Get(r.Context(), caller, id)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
writeAuthError(w, err)
|
||||
return
|
||||
}
|
||||
perms, err := h.roles.ListPermissions(r.Context(), caller, id)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
writeAuthError(w, err)
|
||||
return
|
||||
}
|
||||
permResponses := make([]rolePermissionResponse, 0, len(perms))
|
||||
for _, p := range perms {
|
||||
permResponses = append(permResponses, rolePermToResponse(p))
|
||||
}
|
||||
writeJSON(w, http.StatusOK, map[string]interface{}{
|
||||
"role": roleToResponse(role),
|
||||
"permissions": permResponses,
|
||||
})
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// CreateRole handles POST /api/v1/auth/roles.
|
||||
func (h AuthHandler) CreateRole(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
|
||||
caller, err := callerFromRequest(r)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
writeAuthError(w, err)
|
||||
return
|
||||
}
|
||||
var req createRoleRequest
|
||||
if err := json.NewDecoder(r.Body).Decode(&req); err != nil {
|
||||
Error(w, http.StatusBadRequest, "Invalid request body")
|
||||
return
|
||||
}
|
||||
if strings.TrimSpace(req.Name) == "" {
|
||||
Error(w, http.StatusBadRequest, "role name is required")
|
||||
return
|
||||
}
|
||||
role := &authdomain.Role{Name: req.Name, Description: req.Description}
|
||||
if err := h.roles.Create(r.Context(), caller, role); err != nil {
|
||||
writeAuthError(w, err)
|
||||
return
|
||||
}
|
||||
writeJSON(w, http.StatusCreated, roleToResponse(role))
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// UpdateRole handles PUT /api/v1/auth/roles/{id}.
|
||||
func (h AuthHandler) UpdateRole(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
|
||||
caller, err := callerFromRequest(r)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
writeAuthError(w, err)
|
||||
return
|
||||
}
|
||||
id := r.PathValue("id")
|
||||
var req updateRoleRequest
|
||||
if err := json.NewDecoder(r.Body).Decode(&req); err != nil {
|
||||
Error(w, http.StatusBadRequest, "Invalid request body")
|
||||
return
|
||||
}
|
||||
role := &authdomain.Role{ID: id, Name: req.Name, Description: req.Description}
|
||||
if err := h.roles.Update(r.Context(), caller, role); err != nil {
|
||||
writeAuthError(w, err)
|
||||
return
|
||||
}
|
||||
writeJSON(w, http.StatusOK, roleToResponse(role))
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// DeleteRole handles DELETE /api/v1/auth/roles/{id}.
|
||||
func (h AuthHandler) DeleteRole(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
|
||||
caller, err := callerFromRequest(r)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
writeAuthError(w, err)
|
||||
return
|
||||
}
|
||||
id := r.PathValue("id")
|
||||
if err := h.roles.Delete(r.Context(), caller, id); err != nil {
|
||||
writeAuthError(w, err)
|
||||
return
|
||||
}
|
||||
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusNoContent)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// ListPermissions handles GET /api/v1/auth/permissions.
|
||||
func (h AuthHandler) ListPermissions(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
|
||||
if _, err := callerFromRequest(r); err != nil {
|
||||
writeAuthError(w, err)
|
||||
return
|
||||
}
|
||||
perms, err := h.perms.List(r.Context())
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
writeAuthError(w, err)
|
||||
return
|
||||
}
|
||||
out := make([]permissionResponse, 0, len(perms))
|
||||
for _, p := range perms {
|
||||
out = append(out, permToResponse(p))
|
||||
}
|
||||
writeJSON(w, http.StatusOK, map[string]interface{}{"permissions": out})
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// ListKeys handles GET /api/v1/auth/keys (Bundle 1 Phase 7).
|
||||
// Permission: auth.role.list. Returns every distinct actor in the
|
||||
// tenant with at least one role grant — the CLI's `auth keys list`
|
||||
// and scope-down flow consume this.
|
||||
func (h AuthHandler) ListKeys(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
|
||||
caller, err := callerFromRequest(r)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
writeAuthError(w, err)
|
||||
return
|
||||
}
|
||||
keys, err := h.actors.ListKeys(r.Context(), caller)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
writeAuthError(w, err)
|
||||
return
|
||||
}
|
||||
type keyEntry struct {
|
||||
ActorID string `json:"actor_id"`
|
||||
ActorType string `json:"actor_type"`
|
||||
TenantID string `json:"tenant_id"`
|
||||
RoleIDs []string `json:"role_ids"`
|
||||
}
|
||||
out := make([]keyEntry, 0, len(keys))
|
||||
for _, k := range keys {
|
||||
out = append(out, keyEntry{
|
||||
ActorID: k.ActorID,
|
||||
ActorType: string(k.ActorType),
|
||||
TenantID: k.TenantID,
|
||||
RoleIDs: k.RoleIDs,
|
||||
})
|
||||
}
|
||||
writeJSON(w, http.StatusOK, map[string]interface{}{"keys": out})
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// AddRolePermission handles POST /api/v1/auth/roles/{id}/permissions.
|
||||
func (h AuthHandler) AddRolePermission(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
|
||||
caller, err := callerFromRequest(r)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
writeAuthError(w, err)
|
||||
return
|
||||
}
|
||||
roleID := r.PathValue("id")
|
||||
var req addPermissionRequest
|
||||
if err := json.NewDecoder(r.Body).Decode(&req); err != nil {
|
||||
Error(w, http.StatusBadRequest, "Invalid request body")
|
||||
return
|
||||
}
|
||||
if req.Permission == "" {
|
||||
Error(w, http.StatusBadRequest, "permission is required")
|
||||
return
|
||||
}
|
||||
scopeType := authdomain.ScopeType(req.ScopeType)
|
||||
if scopeType == "" {
|
||||
scopeType = authdomain.ScopeTypeGlobal
|
||||
}
|
||||
if err := h.roles.AddPermission(r.Context(), caller, roleID, req.Permission, scopeType, req.ScopeID); err != nil {
|
||||
writeAuthError(w, err)
|
||||
return
|
||||
}
|
||||
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusNoContent)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// RemoveRolePermission handles DELETE /api/v1/auth/roles/{id}/permissions/{perm}.
|
||||
func (h AuthHandler) RemoveRolePermission(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
|
||||
caller, err := callerFromRequest(r)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
writeAuthError(w, err)
|
||||
return
|
||||
}
|
||||
roleID := r.PathValue("id")
|
||||
permName := r.PathValue("perm")
|
||||
scopeType := authdomain.ScopeType(r.URL.Query().Get("scope_type"))
|
||||
if scopeType == "" {
|
||||
scopeType = authdomain.ScopeTypeGlobal
|
||||
}
|
||||
var scopeID *string
|
||||
if v := r.URL.Query().Get("scope_id"); v != "" {
|
||||
scopeID = &v
|
||||
}
|
||||
if err := h.roles.RemovePermission(r.Context(), caller, roleID, permName, scopeType, scopeID); err != nil {
|
||||
writeAuthError(w, err)
|
||||
return
|
||||
}
|
||||
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusNoContent)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// AssignRoleToKey handles POST /api/v1/auth/keys/{id}/roles.
|
||||
// {id} is the API-key actor name (e.g. "alice", "ops-admin"); the
|
||||
// service layer resolves to the actor_roles row.
|
||||
func (h AuthHandler) AssignRoleToKey(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
|
||||
caller, err := callerFromRequest(r)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
writeAuthError(w, err)
|
||||
return
|
||||
}
|
||||
keyID := r.PathValue("id")
|
||||
var req assignRoleRequest
|
||||
if err := json.NewDecoder(r.Body).Decode(&req); err != nil {
|
||||
Error(w, http.StatusBadRequest, "Invalid request body")
|
||||
return
|
||||
}
|
||||
if req.RoleID == "" {
|
||||
Error(w, http.StatusBadRequest, "role_id is required")
|
||||
return
|
||||
}
|
||||
ar := &authdomain.ActorRole{
|
||||
ActorID: keyID,
|
||||
ActorType: authdomain.ActorTypeValue(domain.ActorTypeAPIKey),
|
||||
RoleID: req.RoleID,
|
||||
}
|
||||
if err := h.actors.Grant(r.Context(), caller, ar); err != nil {
|
||||
writeAuthError(w, err)
|
||||
return
|
||||
}
|
||||
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusNoContent)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// RevokeRoleFromKey handles DELETE /api/v1/auth/keys/{id}/roles/{role_id}.
|
||||
func (h AuthHandler) RevokeRoleFromKey(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
|
||||
caller, err := callerFromRequest(r)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
writeAuthError(w, err)
|
||||
return
|
||||
}
|
||||
keyID := r.PathValue("id")
|
||||
roleID := r.PathValue("role_id")
|
||||
if err := h.actors.Revoke(r.Context(), caller, keyID, domain.ActorTypeAPIKey, roleID); err != nil {
|
||||
writeAuthError(w, err)
|
||||
return
|
||||
}
|
||||
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusNoContent)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Me handles GET /api/v1/auth/me. Returns the current actor's effective
|
||||
// permissions plus admin flag (back-compat with /v1/auth/check). No
|
||||
// permission required: every authenticated caller can read their own.
|
||||
func (h AuthHandler) Me(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
|
||||
caller, err := callerFromRequest(r)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
writeAuthError(w, err)
|
||||
return
|
||||
}
|
||||
roles, err := h.actors.ListForActor(r.Context(), caller, caller.ActorID, caller.ActorType)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
writeAuthError(w, err)
|
||||
return
|
||||
}
|
||||
roleIDs := make([]string, 0, len(roles))
|
||||
hasAdmin := false
|
||||
for _, role := range roles {
|
||||
roleIDs = append(roleIDs, role.RoleID)
|
||||
if role.RoleID == authdomain.RoleIDAdmin {
|
||||
hasAdmin = true
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
effective, err := h.actors.EffectivePermissions(r.Context(), caller, caller.ActorID, caller.ActorType)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
writeAuthError(w, err)
|
||||
return
|
||||
}
|
||||
payload := make([]effectivePermissionPayload, 0, len(effective))
|
||||
for _, p := range effective {
|
||||
payload = append(payload, effectivePermissionPayload{
|
||||
Permission: p.PermissionName,
|
||||
ScopeType: string(p.ScopeType),
|
||||
ScopeID: p.ScopeID,
|
||||
})
|
||||
}
|
||||
writeJSON(w, http.StatusOK, meResponse{
|
||||
ActorID: caller.ActorID,
|
||||
ActorType: string(caller.ActorType),
|
||||
TenantID: caller.TenantID,
|
||||
Admin: hasAdmin,
|
||||
Roles: roleIDs,
|
||||
EffectivePermissions: payload,
|
||||
})
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// =============================================================================
|
||||
// Helpers
|
||||
// =============================================================================
|
||||
|
||||
// callerFromRequest builds an authsvc.Caller from request context. The
|
||||
// auth middleware (Phase 3) populates ActorIDKey / ActorTypeKey /
|
||||
// TenantIDKey on every authenticated request. Returns auth.ErrNoActor
|
||||
// when no actor is in context (handler returns 401).
|
||||
func callerFromRequest(r *http.Request) (*authsvc.Caller, error) {
|
||||
ctx := r.Context()
|
||||
actorID := auth.GetActorID(ctx)
|
||||
if actorID == "" {
|
||||
return nil, auth.ErrNoActor
|
||||
}
|
||||
actorType := auth.GetActorType(ctx)
|
||||
if actorType == "" {
|
||||
actorType = auth.ActorTypeAPIKey
|
||||
}
|
||||
tenantID := auth.GetTenantID(ctx)
|
||||
return &authsvc.Caller{
|
||||
ActorID: actorID,
|
||||
ActorType: domain.ActorType(actorType),
|
||||
TenantID: tenantID,
|
||||
}, nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// writeAuthError translates service-layer + repository sentinel errors
|
||||
// into HTTP status codes. Any non-mapped error is 500.
|
||||
func writeAuthError(w http.ResponseWriter, err error) {
|
||||
switch {
|
||||
case errors.Is(err, auth.ErrNoActor), errors.Is(err, authsvc.ErrUnauthenticated):
|
||||
Error(w, http.StatusUnauthorized, "Authentication required")
|
||||
case errors.Is(err, authsvc.ErrForbidden), errors.Is(err, authsvc.ErrSelfRoleAssignment):
|
||||
Error(w, http.StatusForbidden, err.Error())
|
||||
case errors.Is(err, authsvc.ErrInvalidPermission):
|
||||
Error(w, http.StatusBadRequest, err.Error())
|
||||
case errors.Is(err, repository.ErrAuthNotFound):
|
||||
Error(w, http.StatusNotFound, "Not found")
|
||||
case errors.Is(err, repository.ErrAuthDuplicateName), errors.Is(err, repository.ErrAuthRoleInUse), errors.Is(err, repository.ErrAuthReservedActor):
|
||||
Error(w, http.StatusConflict, err.Error())
|
||||
case errors.Is(err, repository.ErrAuthUnknownPermission):
|
||||
Error(w, http.StatusBadRequest, err.Error())
|
||||
default:
|
||||
Error(w, http.StatusInternalServerError, "Internal error")
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func writeJSON(w http.ResponseWriter, status int, v interface{}) {
|
||||
w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/json; charset=utf-8")
|
||||
w.WriteHeader(status)
|
||||
_ = json.NewEncoder(w).Encode(v)
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,127 @@
|
||||
package handler
|
||||
|
||||
import (
|
||||
"encoding/json"
|
||||
"errors"
|
||||
"net/http"
|
||||
"strings"
|
||||
|
||||
"github.com/certctl-io/certctl/internal/auth/bootstrap"
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
// BootstrapHandler exposes the Bundle 1 Phase 6 day-0 admin path.
|
||||
//
|
||||
// Threat model (from cowork/auth-bundle-1-prompt.md): the control
|
||||
// plane comes up with no admin actors. The operator hands the
|
||||
// CERTCTL_BOOTSTRAP_TOKEN to a single curl call; the server mints
|
||||
// the first admin key and locks the door. No subsequent invocation
|
||||
// can mint another admin via this path — the strategy state and the
|
||||
// "admin already exists" probe both close it. After bootstrap the
|
||||
// operator manages keys via /v1/auth/keys/...
|
||||
//
|
||||
// Handler shape:
|
||||
//
|
||||
// GET /v1/auth/bootstrap → 200 {available:true|false}
|
||||
// POST /v1/auth/bootstrap → 201 {api_key, key_value, actor_id}
|
||||
//
|
||||
// The GET surface is intentionally probable from any caller; it
|
||||
// returns availability (no token, no admin probe) so the GUI and the
|
||||
// install one-liner can decide whether to render the bootstrap
|
||||
// affordance. The POST surface requires the bootstrap token and
|
||||
// returns the plaintext key value once.
|
||||
type BootstrapHandler struct {
|
||||
svc *bootstrap.Service
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// NewBootstrapHandler constructs a BootstrapHandler. svc may be nil
|
||||
// to disable both methods (handler returns 410 Gone on every call).
|
||||
func NewBootstrapHandler(svc *bootstrap.Service) BootstrapHandler {
|
||||
return BootstrapHandler{svc: svc}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
type bootstrapAvailableResponse struct {
|
||||
Available bool `json:"available"`
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
type bootstrapRequest struct {
|
||||
Token string `json:"token"`
|
||||
ActorName string `json:"actor_name"`
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
type bootstrapResponse struct {
|
||||
ActorID string `json:"actor_id"`
|
||||
APIKeyID string `json:"api_key_id"`
|
||||
KeyValue string `json:"key_value"`
|
||||
CreatedAt string `json:"created_at"`
|
||||
Message string `json:"message"`
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Available is the GET probe. Returns {available: true} when the
|
||||
// strategy is callable AND no admin actors exist; otherwise {available:
|
||||
// false}. The endpoint never reveals the bootstrap token's existence
|
||||
// independently of admin actor state — the GUI uses this to decide
|
||||
// whether to render the "first-time setup" wizard.
|
||||
func (h BootstrapHandler) Available(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
|
||||
if r.Method != http.MethodGet {
|
||||
Error(w, http.StatusMethodNotAllowed, "Method not allowed")
|
||||
return
|
||||
}
|
||||
available := false
|
||||
if h.svc != nil {
|
||||
ok, err := h.svc.Available(r.Context())
|
||||
if err == nil {
|
||||
available = ok
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
JSON(w, http.StatusOK, bootstrapAvailableResponse{Available: available})
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Mint is the POST handler that consumes the token + creates the
|
||||
// first admin key.
|
||||
//
|
||||
// Status mapping:
|
||||
//
|
||||
// 410 Gone → strategy disabled (no token, admin exists, or one-shot already consumed)
|
||||
// 401 Unauthorized → token mismatch
|
||||
// 400 Bad Request → invalid actor_name
|
||||
// 201 Created → key minted; response carries the plaintext key value
|
||||
func (h BootstrapHandler) Mint(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
|
||||
if r.Method != http.MethodPost {
|
||||
Error(w, http.StatusMethodNotAllowed, "Method not allowed")
|
||||
return
|
||||
}
|
||||
if h.svc == nil {
|
||||
// No service wired = endpoint disabled. Same status as the
|
||||
// "already consumed" path so callers can't differentiate
|
||||
// configuration from state.
|
||||
Error(w, http.StatusGone, "bootstrap endpoint disabled")
|
||||
return
|
||||
}
|
||||
var body bootstrapRequest
|
||||
if err := json.NewDecoder(http.MaxBytesReader(w, r.Body, 4096)).Decode(&body); err != nil {
|
||||
Error(w, http.StatusBadRequest, "Invalid JSON body")
|
||||
return
|
||||
}
|
||||
body.ActorName = strings.TrimSpace(body.ActorName)
|
||||
result, err := h.svc.ValidateAndMint(r.Context(), body.Token, body.ActorName)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
switch {
|
||||
case errors.Is(err, bootstrap.ErrDisabled):
|
||||
Error(w, http.StatusGone, "bootstrap endpoint disabled")
|
||||
case errors.Is(err, bootstrap.ErrInvalidToken):
|
||||
Error(w, http.StatusUnauthorized, "Invalid bootstrap token")
|
||||
case errors.Is(err, bootstrap.ErrInvalidActorName):
|
||||
Error(w, http.StatusBadRequest, "Invalid actor_name (3-64 chars, lowercase alnum + - + _)")
|
||||
default:
|
||||
Error(w, http.StatusInternalServerError, "Bootstrap failed")
|
||||
}
|
||||
return
|
||||
}
|
||||
JSON(w, http.StatusCreated, bootstrapResponse{
|
||||
ActorID: result.APIKey.Name,
|
||||
APIKeyID: result.APIKey.ID,
|
||||
KeyValue: result.KeyValue,
|
||||
CreatedAt: result.APIKey.CreatedAt.UTC().Format("2006-01-02T15:04:05Z07:00"),
|
||||
Message: "Admin API key created. This is the only time the key value is shown — capture it now.",
|
||||
})
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,275 @@
|
||||
package handler
|
||||
|
||||
import (
|
||||
"bytes"
|
||||
"context"
|
||||
"crypto/sha256"
|
||||
"encoding/hex"
|
||||
"encoding/json"
|
||||
"io"
|
||||
"log/slog"
|
||||
"net/http"
|
||||
"net/http/httptest"
|
||||
"strings"
|
||||
"sync"
|
||||
"testing"
|
||||
|
||||
"github.com/certctl-io/certctl/internal/auth/bootstrap"
|
||||
"github.com/certctl-io/certctl/internal/domain"
|
||||
authdomain "github.com/certctl-io/certctl/internal/domain/auth"
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
// =============================================================================
|
||||
// In-memory fakes (copies of the bootstrap-package fakes; the package
|
||||
// boundary keeps the bootstrap-package tests independent).
|
||||
// =============================================================================
|
||||
|
||||
type stubMinter struct{ created []*authdomain.APIKey }
|
||||
|
||||
func (s *stubMinter) Create(_ context.Context, k *authdomain.APIKey) error {
|
||||
s.created = append(s.created, k)
|
||||
return nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
func (s *stubMinter) GetByName(_ context.Context, _ string) (*authdomain.APIKey, error) {
|
||||
return nil, nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
type stubGranter struct{ calls []*authdomain.ActorRole }
|
||||
|
||||
func (s *stubGranter) Grant(_ context.Context, ar *authdomain.ActorRole) error {
|
||||
s.calls = append(s.calls, ar)
|
||||
return nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
type stubAudit struct{ calls []map[string]interface{} }
|
||||
|
||||
func (s *stubAudit) RecordEventWithCategory(_ context.Context, _ string, _ domain.ActorType, _ string, _ string, _ string, _ string, details map[string]interface{}) error {
|
||||
s.calls = append(s.calls, details)
|
||||
return nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
type stubKeyStore struct {
|
||||
mu sync.Mutex
|
||||
rows []string
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func (s *stubKeyStore) AddHashed(name, hash string, _ bool) {
|
||||
s.mu.Lock()
|
||||
defer s.mu.Unlock()
|
||||
s.rows = append(s.rows, name+":"+hash)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func sha(s string) string {
|
||||
h := sha256.Sum256([]byte(s))
|
||||
return hex.EncodeToString(h[:])
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func newBootstrapHandlerWith(token string, probe bootstrap.AdminExistenceProbe) (BootstrapHandler, *stubMinter, *stubGranter, *stubAudit, *stubKeyStore) {
|
||||
strategy := bootstrap.NewEnvTokenStrategy(token, probe)
|
||||
minter := &stubMinter{}
|
||||
granter := &stubGranter{}
|
||||
audit := &stubAudit{}
|
||||
store := &stubKeyStore{}
|
||||
svc := bootstrap.NewService(strategy, minter, granter, audit, store, sha)
|
||||
return NewBootstrapHandler(svc), minter, granter, audit, store
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// =============================================================================
|
||||
// Handler tests
|
||||
// =============================================================================
|
||||
|
||||
// TestBootstrapHandler_Mint_ValidTokenReturns201 is the happy path.
|
||||
// Plaintext key value present in the response body; only the hash is
|
||||
// persisted via the minter.
|
||||
func TestBootstrapHandler_Mint_ValidTokenReturns201(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
h, minter, granter, audit, store := newBootstrapHandlerWith("the-token", nil)
|
||||
|
||||
body, _ := json.Marshal(map[string]string{"token": "the-token", "actor_name": "first-admin"})
|
||||
req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodPost, "/api/v1/auth/bootstrap", bytes.NewReader(body))
|
||||
rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
|
||||
h.Mint(rec, req)
|
||||
|
||||
if rec.Code != http.StatusCreated {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("status = %d, want 201; body=%s", rec.Code, rec.Body.String())
|
||||
}
|
||||
var resp bootstrapResponse
|
||||
if err := json.NewDecoder(rec.Body).Decode(&resp); err != nil {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("decode: %v", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
if resp.ActorID != "first-admin" {
|
||||
t.Errorf("actor_id = %q, want first-admin", resp.ActorID)
|
||||
}
|
||||
if resp.KeyValue == "" {
|
||||
t.Errorf("key_value missing from response")
|
||||
}
|
||||
if len(minter.created) != 1 || len(granter.calls) != 1 || len(audit.calls) != 1 || len(store.rows) != 1 {
|
||||
t.Errorf("side effects mismatch: minter=%d grants=%d audit=%d keystore=%d",
|
||||
len(minter.created), len(granter.calls), len(audit.calls), len(store.rows))
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// TestBootstrapHandler_Mint_WrongToken_401 pins the wrong-token mapping.
|
||||
func TestBootstrapHandler_Mint_WrongToken_401(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
h, _, _, _, _ := newBootstrapHandlerWith("the-token", nil)
|
||||
body, _ := json.Marshal(map[string]string{"token": "wrong", "actor_name": "first-admin"})
|
||||
req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodPost, "/api/v1/auth/bootstrap", bytes.NewReader(body))
|
||||
rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
|
||||
h.Mint(rec, req)
|
||||
if rec.Code != http.StatusUnauthorized {
|
||||
t.Errorf("status = %d, want 401", rec.Code)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// TestBootstrapHandler_Mint_TwiceReturns410 pins the one-shot
|
||||
// invariant. Second call after a successful first call returns 410
|
||||
// Gone, NOT 401 (which would suggest "wrong token, retry").
|
||||
func TestBootstrapHandler_Mint_TwiceReturns410(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
h, _, _, _, _ := newBootstrapHandlerWith("the-token", nil)
|
||||
|
||||
body, _ := json.Marshal(map[string]string{"token": "the-token", "actor_name": "first-admin"})
|
||||
rec1 := httptest.NewRecorder()
|
||||
h.Mint(rec1, httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodPost, "/api/v1/auth/bootstrap", bytes.NewReader(body)))
|
||||
if rec1.Code != http.StatusCreated {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("first call status = %d, want 201", rec1.Code)
|
||||
}
|
||||
rec2 := httptest.NewRecorder()
|
||||
h.Mint(rec2, httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodPost, "/api/v1/auth/bootstrap", bytes.NewReader(body)))
|
||||
if rec2.Code != http.StatusGone {
|
||||
t.Errorf("second call status = %d, want 410 Gone", rec2.Code)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// TestBootstrapHandler_Mint_AdminExists410 pins that the admin-
|
||||
// existence probe gates the endpoint. Operator forgets to unset
|
||||
// CERTCTL_BOOTSTRAP_TOKEN after onboarding → endpoint stays 410.
|
||||
func TestBootstrapHandler_Mint_AdminExists410(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
probe := func(_ context.Context) (bool, error) { return true, nil }
|
||||
h, _, _, _, _ := newBootstrapHandlerWith("the-token", probe)
|
||||
|
||||
body, _ := json.Marshal(map[string]string{"token": "the-token", "actor_name": "first-admin"})
|
||||
rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
|
||||
h.Mint(rec, httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodPost, "/api/v1/auth/bootstrap", bytes.NewReader(body)))
|
||||
if rec.Code != http.StatusGone {
|
||||
t.Errorf("status = %d, want 410 Gone (admin already exists)", rec.Code)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// TestBootstrapHandler_Mint_NoTokenConfigured410 pins that an unset
|
||||
// CERTCTL_BOOTSTRAP_TOKEN closes the path (410), matching the
|
||||
// "endpoint disabled" semantics the prompt requires.
|
||||
func TestBootstrapHandler_Mint_NoTokenConfigured410(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
h, _, _, _, _ := newBootstrapHandlerWith("", nil)
|
||||
|
||||
body, _ := json.Marshal(map[string]string{"token": "anything", "actor_name": "first-admin"})
|
||||
rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
|
||||
h.Mint(rec, httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodPost, "/api/v1/auth/bootstrap", bytes.NewReader(body)))
|
||||
if rec.Code != http.StatusGone {
|
||||
t.Errorf("status = %d, want 410 Gone (no token configured)", rec.Code)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// TestBootstrapHandler_Mint_BadActorName_400 pins the actor-name
|
||||
// validation surface (charset, length).
|
||||
func TestBootstrapHandler_Mint_BadActorName_400(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
h, _, _, _, _ := newBootstrapHandlerWith("the-token", nil)
|
||||
cases := []string{"", "AB", "has space", "Has-Caps"}
|
||||
for _, name := range cases {
|
||||
body, _ := json.Marshal(map[string]string{"token": "the-token", "actor_name": name})
|
||||
rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
|
||||
// Each request consumes the strategy on success so we rebuild
|
||||
// per case.
|
||||
h2, _, _, _, _ := newBootstrapHandlerWith("the-token", nil)
|
||||
h2.Mint(rec, httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodPost, "/api/v1/auth/bootstrap", bytes.NewReader(body)))
|
||||
if rec.Code != http.StatusBadRequest {
|
||||
t.Errorf("name=%q status = %d, want 400", name, rec.Code)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
_ = h
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// TestBootstrapHandler_Available_NoTokenSet pins the GET probe shape:
|
||||
// {available:false} when the token is unset.
|
||||
func TestBootstrapHandler_Available_NoTokenSet(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
h, _, _, _, _ := newBootstrapHandlerWith("", nil)
|
||||
rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
|
||||
h.Available(rec, httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "/api/v1/auth/bootstrap", nil))
|
||||
if rec.Code != http.StatusOK {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("status = %d, want 200", rec.Code)
|
||||
}
|
||||
var resp bootstrapAvailableResponse
|
||||
_ = json.NewDecoder(rec.Body).Decode(&resp)
|
||||
if resp.Available {
|
||||
t.Errorf("available=true with no token, want false")
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// TestBootstrapHandler_Available_TokenSetNoAdmin returns true.
|
||||
func TestBootstrapHandler_Available_TokenSetNoAdmin(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
probe := func(_ context.Context) (bool, error) { return false, nil }
|
||||
h, _, _, _, _ := newBootstrapHandlerWith("the-token", probe)
|
||||
rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
|
||||
h.Available(rec, httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "/api/v1/auth/bootstrap", nil))
|
||||
var resp bootstrapAvailableResponse
|
||||
_ = json.NewDecoder(rec.Body).Decode(&resp)
|
||||
if !resp.Available {
|
||||
t.Errorf("available=false with token set + no admin, want true")
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// TestBootstrapHandler_TokenLeakHygiene scans the slog logger output
|
||||
// after a happy-path mint. The bootstrap token MUST NOT appear in any
|
||||
// log line. Audit details, app logs, error wrappers — none of them
|
||||
// can contain the token.
|
||||
func TestBootstrapHandler_TokenLeakHygiene(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
const token = "extremely-secret-bootstrap-token-do-not-leak"
|
||||
|
||||
// Capture every slog write. Tests in this package (and the
|
||||
// upstream service package) currently use the global slog
|
||||
// default; we redirect it for the duration of this test.
|
||||
var logBuf bytes.Buffer
|
||||
origLogger := slog.Default()
|
||||
slog.SetDefault(slog.New(slog.NewJSONHandler(&logBuf, &slog.HandlerOptions{Level: slog.LevelDebug})))
|
||||
defer slog.SetDefault(origLogger)
|
||||
|
||||
h, _, _, audit, _ := newBootstrapHandlerWith(token, nil)
|
||||
|
||||
body, _ := json.Marshal(map[string]string{"token": token, "actor_name": "first-admin"})
|
||||
rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
|
||||
h.Mint(rec, httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodPost, "/api/v1/auth/bootstrap", bytes.NewReader(body)))
|
||||
if rec.Code != http.StatusCreated {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("status = %d", rec.Code)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if strings.Contains(logBuf.String(), token) {
|
||||
t.Errorf("bootstrap token leaked into slog output")
|
||||
}
|
||||
for i, c := range audit.calls {
|
||||
blob, _ := json.Marshal(c)
|
||||
if strings.Contains(string(blob), token) {
|
||||
t.Errorf("bootstrap token leaked into audit details[%d]: %s", i, blob)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
if strings.Contains(rec.Header().Get("Location"), token) {
|
||||
t.Errorf("bootstrap token leaked into Location header")
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// TestBootstrapHandler_Mint_BodyReadCapped guards against a bad-faith
|
||||
// caller posting a 1MB token field. The handler caps the request body
|
||||
// at 4KB; a 5KB body should fail to decode.
|
||||
func TestBootstrapHandler_Mint_BodyReadCapped(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
h, _, _, _, _ := newBootstrapHandlerWith("t", nil)
|
||||
huge := strings.Repeat("a", 5000)
|
||||
body := []byte(`{"token":"t","actor_name":"first-admin","filler":"` + huge + `"}`)
|
||||
rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
|
||||
req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodPost, "/api/v1/auth/bootstrap", bytes.NewReader(body))
|
||||
h.Mint(rec, req)
|
||||
if rec.Code != http.StatusBadRequest {
|
||||
t.Errorf("oversized body should yield 400, got %d", rec.Code)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// keep io reachable (some compiler runs strip unused imports during
|
||||
// AST refactors; explicit ref guards against that without producing a
|
||||
// real test side effect).
|
||||
var _ = io.Discard
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,436 @@
|
||||
package handler
|
||||
|
||||
import (
|
||||
"bytes"
|
||||
"context"
|
||||
"encoding/json"
|
||||
"errors"
|
||||
"net/http"
|
||||
"net/http/httptest"
|
||||
"strings"
|
||||
"testing"
|
||||
|
||||
"github.com/certctl-io/certctl/internal/auth"
|
||||
"github.com/certctl-io/certctl/internal/domain"
|
||||
authdomain "github.com/certctl-io/certctl/internal/domain/auth"
|
||||
"github.com/certctl-io/certctl/internal/repository"
|
||||
authsvc "github.com/certctl-io/certctl/internal/service/auth"
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
// =============================================================================
|
||||
// In-memory fakes — sufficient for handler-level translation tests. The
|
||||
// service-layer privilege guards live in internal/service/auth and are
|
||||
// covered there; these tests pin HTTP shape (status code, JSON envelope,
|
||||
// error mapping).
|
||||
// =============================================================================
|
||||
|
||||
type fakeAuthRoleSvc struct {
|
||||
roles map[string]*authdomain.Role
|
||||
rolePerms map[string][]*authdomain.RolePermission
|
||||
listErr error
|
||||
createErr error
|
||||
deleteErr error
|
||||
addPermErr error
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func newFakeAuthRoleSvc() *fakeAuthRoleSvc {
|
||||
return &fakeAuthRoleSvc{
|
||||
roles: map[string]*authdomain.Role{},
|
||||
rolePerms: map[string][]*authdomain.RolePermission{},
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
func (f *fakeAuthRoleSvc) List(_ context.Context, _ *authsvc.Caller) ([]*authdomain.Role, error) {
|
||||
if f.listErr != nil {
|
||||
return nil, f.listErr
|
||||
}
|
||||
out := make([]*authdomain.Role, 0, len(f.roles))
|
||||
for _, r := range f.roles {
|
||||
out = append(out, r)
|
||||
}
|
||||
return out, nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
func (f *fakeAuthRoleSvc) Get(_ context.Context, _ *authsvc.Caller, id string) (*authdomain.Role, error) {
|
||||
r, ok := f.roles[id]
|
||||
if !ok {
|
||||
return nil, repository.ErrAuthNotFound
|
||||
}
|
||||
return r, nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
func (f *fakeAuthRoleSvc) Create(_ context.Context, _ *authsvc.Caller, role *authdomain.Role) error {
|
||||
if f.createErr != nil {
|
||||
return f.createErr
|
||||
}
|
||||
if role.ID == "" {
|
||||
role.ID = "r-" + role.Name
|
||||
}
|
||||
f.roles[role.ID] = role
|
||||
return nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
func (f *fakeAuthRoleSvc) Update(_ context.Context, _ *authsvc.Caller, role *authdomain.Role) error {
|
||||
f.roles[role.ID] = role
|
||||
return nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
func (f *fakeAuthRoleSvc) Delete(_ context.Context, _ *authsvc.Caller, id string) error {
|
||||
if f.deleteErr != nil {
|
||||
return f.deleteErr
|
||||
}
|
||||
delete(f.roles, id)
|
||||
return nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
func (f *fakeAuthRoleSvc) ListPermissions(_ context.Context, _ *authsvc.Caller, roleID string) ([]*authdomain.RolePermission, error) {
|
||||
return f.rolePerms[roleID], nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
func (f *fakeAuthRoleSvc) AddPermission(_ context.Context, _ *authsvc.Caller, roleID, permName string, scopeType authdomain.ScopeType, scopeID *string) error {
|
||||
if f.addPermErr != nil {
|
||||
return f.addPermErr
|
||||
}
|
||||
f.rolePerms[roleID] = append(f.rolePerms[roleID], &authdomain.RolePermission{
|
||||
RoleID: roleID, PermissionID: "p-" + permName, ScopeType: scopeType, ScopeID: scopeID,
|
||||
})
|
||||
return nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
func (f *fakeAuthRoleSvc) RemovePermission(_ context.Context, _ *authsvc.Caller, _ string, _ string, _ authdomain.ScopeType, _ *string) error {
|
||||
return nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
type fakeAuthPermSvc struct {
|
||||
perms []*authdomain.Permission
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func newFakeAuthPermSvc() *fakeAuthPermSvc {
|
||||
out := make([]*authdomain.Permission, 0, len(authdomain.CanonicalPermissions))
|
||||
for _, p := range authdomain.CanonicalPermissions {
|
||||
out = append(out, &authdomain.Permission{ID: "p-" + p, Name: p, Namespace: p})
|
||||
}
|
||||
return &fakeAuthPermSvc{perms: out}
|
||||
}
|
||||
func (f *fakeAuthPermSvc) List(_ context.Context) ([]*authdomain.Permission, error) {
|
||||
return f.perms, nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
func (f *fakeAuthPermSvc) IsRegistered(name string) bool {
|
||||
for _, p := range f.perms {
|
||||
if p.Name == name {
|
||||
return true
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
return false
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
type fakeAuthActorSvc struct {
|
||||
grantErr error
|
||||
revokeErr error
|
||||
roles []*authdomain.ActorRole
|
||||
effective []repository.EffectivePermission
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func newFakeAuthActorSvc() *fakeAuthActorSvc {
|
||||
return &fakeAuthActorSvc{}
|
||||
}
|
||||
func (f *fakeAuthActorSvc) Grant(_ context.Context, _ *authsvc.Caller, ar *authdomain.ActorRole) error {
|
||||
if f.grantErr != nil {
|
||||
return f.grantErr
|
||||
}
|
||||
f.roles = append(f.roles, ar)
|
||||
return nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
func (f *fakeAuthActorSvc) Revoke(_ context.Context, _ *authsvc.Caller, _ string, _ domain.ActorType, _ string) error {
|
||||
return f.revokeErr
|
||||
}
|
||||
func (f *fakeAuthActorSvc) ListForActor(_ context.Context, _ *authsvc.Caller, _ string, _ domain.ActorType) ([]*authdomain.ActorRole, error) {
|
||||
return f.roles, nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
func (f *fakeAuthActorSvc) EffectivePermissions(_ context.Context, _ *authsvc.Caller, _ string, _ domain.ActorType) ([]repository.EffectivePermission, error) {
|
||||
return f.effective, nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
func (f *fakeAuthActorSvc) ListKeys(_ context.Context, _ *authsvc.Caller) ([]repository.ActorWithRoles, error) {
|
||||
out := make([]repository.ActorWithRoles, 0, len(f.roles))
|
||||
for _, ar := range f.roles {
|
||||
out = append(out, repository.ActorWithRoles{
|
||||
ActorID: ar.ActorID,
|
||||
ActorType: ar.ActorType,
|
||||
TenantID: ar.TenantID,
|
||||
RoleIDs: []string{ar.RoleID},
|
||||
})
|
||||
}
|
||||
return out, nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
type fakePermChecker struct {
|
||||
check func(ctx context.Context, actorID, actorType, tenantID, perm, scopeType string, scopeID *string) (bool, error)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func (f *fakePermChecker) CheckPermission(ctx context.Context, actorID, actorType, tenantID, perm, scopeType string, scopeID *string) (bool, error) {
|
||||
if f.check == nil {
|
||||
return true, nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
return f.check(ctx, actorID, actorType, tenantID, perm, scopeType, scopeID)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func newAuthHandlerWithFakes() (AuthHandler, *fakeAuthRoleSvc, *fakeAuthPermSvc, *fakeAuthActorSvc) {
|
||||
roles := newFakeAuthRoleSvc()
|
||||
perms := newFakeAuthPermSvc()
|
||||
actors := newFakeAuthActorSvc()
|
||||
checker := &fakePermChecker{}
|
||||
return NewAuthHandler(roles, perms, actors, checker), roles, perms, actors
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// withAuthCtx populates the Phase 3 actor context keys on a request.
|
||||
func withAuthCtx(req *http.Request, actorID, actorType string) *http.Request {
|
||||
ctx := req.Context()
|
||||
ctx = context.WithValue(ctx, auth.ActorIDKey{}, actorID)
|
||||
ctx = context.WithValue(ctx, auth.ActorTypeKey{}, actorType)
|
||||
return req.WithContext(ctx)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// =============================================================================
|
||||
// Tests
|
||||
// =============================================================================
|
||||
|
||||
func TestAuthHandler_NoActorReturns401(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
h, _, _, _ := newAuthHandlerWithFakes()
|
||||
req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "/api/v1/auth/roles", nil)
|
||||
rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
|
||||
h.ListRoles(rec, req)
|
||||
if rec.Code != http.StatusUnauthorized {
|
||||
t.Errorf("ListRoles without actor should yield 401; got %d", rec.Code)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func TestAuthHandler_ListRolesReturnsAllRoles(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
h, roleSvc, _, _ := newAuthHandlerWithFakes()
|
||||
roleSvc.roles["r-admin"] = &authdomain.Role{ID: "r-admin", Name: "admin"}
|
||||
roleSvc.roles["r-viewer"] = &authdomain.Role{ID: "r-viewer", Name: "viewer"}
|
||||
req := withAuthCtx(httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "/api/v1/auth/roles", nil), "alice", auth.ActorTypeAPIKey)
|
||||
rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
|
||||
h.ListRoles(rec, req)
|
||||
if rec.Code != http.StatusOK {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("got %d; body=%s", rec.Code, rec.Body.String())
|
||||
}
|
||||
var resp struct {
|
||||
Roles []roleResponse `json:"roles"`
|
||||
}
|
||||
if err := json.Unmarshal(rec.Body.Bytes(), &resp); err != nil {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("decode: %v", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
if len(resp.Roles) != 2 {
|
||||
t.Errorf("expected 2 roles; got %d", len(resp.Roles))
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func TestAuthHandler_CreateRoleReturns201(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
h, _, _, _ := newAuthHandlerWithFakes()
|
||||
body, _ := json.Marshal(createRoleRequest{Name: "custom", Description: "Test role"})
|
||||
req := withAuthCtx(httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodPost, "/api/v1/auth/roles", bytes.NewReader(body)), "alice", auth.ActorTypeAPIKey)
|
||||
rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
|
||||
h.CreateRole(rec, req)
|
||||
if rec.Code != http.StatusCreated {
|
||||
t.Errorf("expected 201; got %d, body=%s", rec.Code, rec.Body.String())
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func TestAuthHandler_CreateRoleRejectsEmptyName(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
h, _, _, _ := newAuthHandlerWithFakes()
|
||||
body, _ := json.Marshal(createRoleRequest{Name: " ", Description: "blank"})
|
||||
req := withAuthCtx(httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodPost, "/api/v1/auth/roles", bytes.NewReader(body)), "alice", auth.ActorTypeAPIKey)
|
||||
rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
|
||||
h.CreateRole(rec, req)
|
||||
if rec.Code != http.StatusBadRequest {
|
||||
t.Errorf("blank name should be 400; got %d", rec.Code)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func TestAuthHandler_DeleteRoleReturns204(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
h, roleSvc, _, _ := newAuthHandlerWithFakes()
|
||||
roleSvc.roles["r-x"] = &authdomain.Role{ID: "r-x", Name: "x"}
|
||||
req := withAuthCtx(httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodDelete, "/api/v1/auth/roles/r-x", nil), "alice", auth.ActorTypeAPIKey)
|
||||
req.SetPathValue("id", "r-x")
|
||||
rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
|
||||
h.DeleteRole(rec, req)
|
||||
if rec.Code != http.StatusNoContent {
|
||||
t.Errorf("delete should be 204; got %d", rec.Code)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func TestAuthHandler_DeleteRoleInUseReturns409(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
h, roleSvc, _, _ := newAuthHandlerWithFakes()
|
||||
roleSvc.deleteErr = repository.ErrAuthRoleInUse
|
||||
req := withAuthCtx(httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodDelete, "/api/v1/auth/roles/r-x", nil), "alice", auth.ActorTypeAPIKey)
|
||||
req.SetPathValue("id", "r-x")
|
||||
rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
|
||||
h.DeleteRole(rec, req)
|
||||
if rec.Code != http.StatusConflict {
|
||||
t.Errorf("ErrAuthRoleInUse should be 409; got %d", rec.Code)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func TestAuthHandler_DeleteRoleNotFoundReturns404(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
h, roleSvc, _, _ := newAuthHandlerWithFakes()
|
||||
roleSvc.deleteErr = repository.ErrAuthNotFound
|
||||
req := withAuthCtx(httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodDelete, "/api/v1/auth/roles/missing", nil), "alice", auth.ActorTypeAPIKey)
|
||||
req.SetPathValue("id", "missing")
|
||||
rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
|
||||
h.DeleteRole(rec, req)
|
||||
if rec.Code != http.StatusNotFound {
|
||||
t.Errorf("ErrAuthNotFound should be 404; got %d", rec.Code)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func TestAuthHandler_ForbiddenMappedTo403(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
h, roleSvc, _, _ := newAuthHandlerWithFakes()
|
||||
roleSvc.listErr = authsvc.ErrForbidden
|
||||
req := withAuthCtx(httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "/api/v1/auth/roles", nil), "bob", auth.ActorTypeAPIKey)
|
||||
rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
|
||||
h.ListRoles(rec, req)
|
||||
if rec.Code != http.StatusForbidden {
|
||||
t.Errorf("ErrForbidden should be 403; got %d", rec.Code)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func TestAuthHandler_AssignRoleToKey(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
h, _, _, actorSvc := newAuthHandlerWithFakes()
|
||||
body, _ := json.Marshal(assignRoleRequest{RoleID: "r-viewer"})
|
||||
req := withAuthCtx(httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodPost, "/api/v1/auth/keys/alice/roles", bytes.NewReader(body)), "admin", auth.ActorTypeAPIKey)
|
||||
req.SetPathValue("id", "alice")
|
||||
rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
|
||||
h.AssignRoleToKey(rec, req)
|
||||
if rec.Code != http.StatusNoContent {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("expected 204; got %d, body=%s", rec.Code, rec.Body.String())
|
||||
}
|
||||
if len(actorSvc.roles) != 1 {
|
||||
t.Errorf("expected 1 grant recorded; got %d", len(actorSvc.roles))
|
||||
}
|
||||
if actorSvc.roles[0].RoleID != "r-viewer" || actorSvc.roles[0].ActorID != "alice" {
|
||||
t.Errorf("grant fields wrong; got %+v", actorSvc.roles[0])
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func TestAuthHandler_AssignRoleSelfRoleAssignReturns403(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
h, _, _, actorSvc := newAuthHandlerWithFakes()
|
||||
actorSvc.grantErr = errors.New("auth.role.assign required: " + authsvc.ErrSelfRoleAssignment.Error())
|
||||
// Force the wrapped sentinel:
|
||||
actorSvc.grantErr = authsvc.ErrSelfRoleAssignment
|
||||
body, _ := json.Marshal(assignRoleRequest{RoleID: "r-admin"})
|
||||
req := withAuthCtx(httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodPost, "/api/v1/auth/keys/alice/roles", bytes.NewReader(body)), "bob", auth.ActorTypeAPIKey)
|
||||
req.SetPathValue("id", "alice")
|
||||
rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
|
||||
h.AssignRoleToKey(rec, req)
|
||||
if rec.Code != http.StatusForbidden {
|
||||
t.Errorf("ErrSelfRoleAssignment should be 403; got %d", rec.Code)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func TestAuthHandler_RevokeRoleFromKey(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
h, _, _, _ := newAuthHandlerWithFakes()
|
||||
req := withAuthCtx(httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodDelete, "/api/v1/auth/keys/alice/roles/r-viewer", nil), "admin", auth.ActorTypeAPIKey)
|
||||
req.SetPathValue("id", "alice")
|
||||
req.SetPathValue("role_id", "r-viewer")
|
||||
rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
|
||||
h.RevokeRoleFromKey(rec, req)
|
||||
if rec.Code != http.StatusNoContent {
|
||||
t.Errorf("revoke should be 204; got %d", rec.Code)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func TestAuthHandler_RevokeReservedActorReturns409(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
h, _, _, actorSvc := newAuthHandlerWithFakes()
|
||||
actorSvc.revokeErr = repository.ErrAuthReservedActor
|
||||
req := withAuthCtx(httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodDelete, "/api/v1/auth/keys/actor-demo-anon/roles/r-admin", nil), "admin", auth.ActorTypeAPIKey)
|
||||
req.SetPathValue("id", "actor-demo-anon")
|
||||
req.SetPathValue("role_id", "r-admin")
|
||||
rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
|
||||
h.RevokeRoleFromKey(rec, req)
|
||||
if rec.Code != http.StatusConflict {
|
||||
t.Errorf("ErrAuthReservedActor should be 409; got %d", rec.Code)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func TestAuthHandler_AddRolePermissionInvalidJSON(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
h, _, _, _ := newAuthHandlerWithFakes()
|
||||
req := withAuthCtx(httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodPost, "/api/v1/auth/roles/r-admin/permissions", strings.NewReader("not json")), "admin", auth.ActorTypeAPIKey)
|
||||
req.SetPathValue("id", "r-admin")
|
||||
rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
|
||||
h.AddRolePermission(rec, req)
|
||||
if rec.Code != http.StatusBadRequest {
|
||||
t.Errorf("invalid JSON should be 400; got %d", rec.Code)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func TestAuthHandler_AddRolePermissionDefaultScopeGlobal(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
h, roleSvc, _, _ := newAuthHandlerWithFakes()
|
||||
body, _ := json.Marshal(addPermissionRequest{Permission: "cert.read"})
|
||||
req := withAuthCtx(httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodPost, "/api/v1/auth/roles/r-admin/permissions", bytes.NewReader(body)), "admin", auth.ActorTypeAPIKey)
|
||||
req.SetPathValue("id", "r-admin")
|
||||
rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
|
||||
h.AddRolePermission(rec, req)
|
||||
if rec.Code != http.StatusNoContent {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("expected 204; got %d, body=%s", rec.Code, rec.Body.String())
|
||||
}
|
||||
grants := roleSvc.rolePerms["r-admin"]
|
||||
if len(grants) != 1 {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("expected 1 grant; got %d", len(grants))
|
||||
}
|
||||
if grants[0].ScopeType != authdomain.ScopeTypeGlobal {
|
||||
t.Errorf("default scope should be global; got %q", grants[0].ScopeType)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func TestAuthHandler_AddRolePermissionInvalidPermission(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
h, roleSvc, _, _ := newAuthHandlerWithFakes()
|
||||
roleSvc.addPermErr = authsvc.ErrInvalidPermission
|
||||
body, _ := json.Marshal(addPermissionRequest{Permission: "fake"})
|
||||
req := withAuthCtx(httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodPost, "/api/v1/auth/roles/r-admin/permissions", bytes.NewReader(body)), "admin", auth.ActorTypeAPIKey)
|
||||
req.SetPathValue("id", "r-admin")
|
||||
rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
|
||||
h.AddRolePermission(rec, req)
|
||||
if rec.Code != http.StatusBadRequest {
|
||||
t.Errorf("ErrInvalidPermission should be 400; got %d", rec.Code)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func TestAuthHandler_ListPermissionsReturnsCanonical(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
h, _, _, _ := newAuthHandlerWithFakes()
|
||||
req := withAuthCtx(httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "/api/v1/auth/permissions", nil), "alice", auth.ActorTypeAPIKey)
|
||||
rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
|
||||
h.ListPermissions(rec, req)
|
||||
if rec.Code != http.StatusOK {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("got %d", rec.Code)
|
||||
}
|
||||
var resp struct {
|
||||
Permissions []permissionResponse `json:"permissions"`
|
||||
}
|
||||
if err := json.Unmarshal(rec.Body.Bytes(), &resp); err != nil {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("decode: %v", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
if len(resp.Permissions) != len(authdomain.CanonicalPermissions) {
|
||||
t.Errorf("permission count: got %d, want %d (canonical catalogue size)", len(resp.Permissions), len(authdomain.CanonicalPermissions))
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func TestAuthHandler_MeReturnsActorIdentity(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
h, _, _, actorSvc := newAuthHandlerWithFakes()
|
||||
actorSvc.roles = []*authdomain.ActorRole{
|
||||
{RoleID: "r-admin", ActorID: "alice"},
|
||||
}
|
||||
actorSvc.effective = []repository.EffectivePermission{
|
||||
{PermissionName: "cert.read", ScopeType: authdomain.ScopeTypeGlobal, ScopeID: nil},
|
||||
}
|
||||
req := withAuthCtx(httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "/api/v1/auth/me", nil), "alice", auth.ActorTypeAPIKey)
|
||||
rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
|
||||
h.Me(rec, req)
|
||||
if rec.Code != http.StatusOK {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("got %d; body=%s", rec.Code, rec.Body.String())
|
||||
}
|
||||
var resp meResponse
|
||||
if err := json.Unmarshal(rec.Body.Bytes(), &resp); err != nil {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("decode: %v", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
if resp.ActorID != "alice" {
|
||||
t.Errorf("actor id = %q, want alice", resp.ActorID)
|
||||
}
|
||||
if !resp.Admin {
|
||||
t.Errorf("alice has r-admin; admin flag should be true (back-compat)")
|
||||
}
|
||||
if len(resp.EffectivePermissions) != 1 || resp.EffectivePermissions[0].Permission != "cert.read" {
|
||||
t.Errorf("effective_permissions wrong; got %+v", resp.EffectivePermissions)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -172,7 +172,7 @@ func authenticatedContext(actor string) context.Context {
|
||||
type userKey struct{}
|
||||
// The middleware UserKey is a private type in the middleware package, so
|
||||
// in this handler test we can't construct one directly. Bulk-renew and
|
||||
// bulk-reassign read the actor through the same middleware.GetUser path
|
||||
// bulk-reassign read the actor through the same auth.GetUser path
|
||||
// that bulk-revoke does — adminContext() in the existing test suite is
|
||||
// the canonical helper. Reuse it (delivers both UserKey and AdminKey).
|
||||
_ = userKey{}
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -11,6 +11,7 @@ import (
|
||||
"testing"
|
||||
|
||||
"github.com/certctl-io/certctl/internal/api/middleware"
|
||||
"github.com/certctl-io/certctl/internal/auth"
|
||||
"github.com/certctl-io/certctl/internal/domain"
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -30,7 +31,7 @@ func (m *mockBulkRenewalService) BulkRenew(ctx context.Context, criteria domain.
|
||||
// bulk-renew is NOT admin-gated, any authenticated caller can use it.
|
||||
func authedContext() context.Context {
|
||||
ctx := context.WithValue(context.Background(), middleware.RequestIDKey{}, "test-request-id-renew")
|
||||
ctx = context.WithValue(ctx, middleware.UserKey{}, "alice")
|
||||
ctx = context.WithValue(ctx, auth.UserKey{}, "alice")
|
||||
return ctx
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -126,7 +127,7 @@ func TestBulkRenew_Handler_ActorAttribution(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
h.BulkRenew(w, req)
|
||||
|
||||
if capturedActor != "alice" {
|
||||
t.Errorf("actor not threaded from middleware.UserKey: got %q, want 'alice'", capturedActor)
|
||||
t.Errorf("actor not threaded from auth.UserKey: got %q, want 'alice'", capturedActor)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -50,15 +50,12 @@ func (h BulkRevocationHandler) BulkRevoke(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request
|
||||
|
||||
requestID := middleware.GetRequestID(r.Context())
|
||||
|
||||
// M-003: admin-only gate. Non-admin callers are rejected before any
|
||||
// criteria/body processing to avoid leaking validation behavior to
|
||||
// unauthorized actors.
|
||||
if !middleware.IsAdmin(r.Context()) {
|
||||
ErrorWithRequestID(w, http.StatusForbidden,
|
||||
"Bulk revocation requires admin privileges",
|
||||
requestID)
|
||||
return
|
||||
}
|
||||
// Bundle 1 Phase 3.5: M-003 admin-only gate moved to router.go.
|
||||
// auth.RequirePermission(checker, "cert.bulk_revoke", nil) wraps
|
||||
// this handler at registration time; non-admin callers without
|
||||
// the cert.bulk_revoke permission get 403 from the middleware
|
||||
// before reaching the handler body. The pre-3.5 in-body
|
||||
// auth.IsAdmin check is gone.
|
||||
|
||||
var req bulkRevokeRequest
|
||||
if err := json.NewDecoder(r.Body).Decode(&req); err != nil {
|
||||
@@ -127,11 +124,7 @@ func (h BulkRevocationHandler) BulkRevokeEST(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Requ
|
||||
return
|
||||
}
|
||||
requestID := middleware.GetRequestID(r.Context())
|
||||
if !middleware.IsAdmin(r.Context()) {
|
||||
ErrorWithRequestID(w, http.StatusForbidden,
|
||||
"EST bulk revocation requires admin privileges", requestID)
|
||||
return
|
||||
}
|
||||
// Bundle 1 Phase 3.5: gate moved to router.go (cert.bulk_revoke perm).
|
||||
var req bulkRevokeRequest
|
||||
if err := json.NewDecoder(r.Body).Decode(&req); err != nil {
|
||||
ErrorWithRequestID(w, http.StatusBadRequest, "Invalid request body", requestID)
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -41,30 +41,12 @@ func TestBulkRevokeEST_AdminTrue_PinsSourceToEST(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func TestBulkRevokeEST_NonAdmin_Returns403(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
called := false
|
||||
svc := &mockBulkRevocationService{
|
||||
BulkRevokeFn: func(_ context.Context, _ domain.BulkRevocationCriteria, _ string, _ string) (*domain.BulkRevocationResult, error) {
|
||||
called = true
|
||||
return nil, nil
|
||||
},
|
||||
}
|
||||
h := NewBulkRevocationHandler(svc)
|
||||
body := `{"reason":"keyCompromise","profile_id":"prof-iot"}`
|
||||
req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodPost,
|
||||
"/api/v1/est/certificates/bulk-revoke", bytes.NewBufferString(body))
|
||||
req.Header.Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
|
||||
// non-admin context (no AdminKey).
|
||||
req = req.WithContext(context.Background())
|
||||
w := httptest.NewRecorder()
|
||||
h.BulkRevokeEST(w, req)
|
||||
if w.Code != http.StatusForbidden {
|
||||
t.Errorf("non-admin status = %d, want 403", w.Code)
|
||||
}
|
||||
if called {
|
||||
t.Error("service was called despite non-admin caller")
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
// TestBulkRevokeEST_NonAdmin_Returns403 was deleted as part of Bundle 1
|
||||
// Phase 3.5: the in-handler auth.IsAdmin gate moved to router.go via
|
||||
// auth.RequirePermission(checker, "cert.bulk_revoke", nil). The
|
||||
// non-admin rejection is now exercised by the router-level integration
|
||||
// suite (internal/api/router/rbac_gate_integration_test.go) rather
|
||||
// than by a direct-handler test that bypasses middleware.
|
||||
|
||||
func TestBulkRevokeEST_EmptyCriteria_400(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
svc := &mockBulkRevocationService{}
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -7,10 +7,10 @@ import (
|
||||
"fmt"
|
||||
"net/http"
|
||||
"net/http/httptest"
|
||||
"strings"
|
||||
"testing"
|
||||
|
||||
"github.com/certctl-io/certctl/internal/api/middleware"
|
||||
"github.com/certctl-io/certctl/internal/auth"
|
||||
"github.com/certctl-io/certctl/internal/domain"
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -31,7 +31,7 @@ func (m *mockBulkRevocationService) BulkRevoke(ctx context.Context, criteria dom
|
||||
// M-003: bulk revocation handler requires admin context to reach the service.
|
||||
func adminContext() context.Context {
|
||||
ctx := context.WithValue(context.Background(), middleware.RequestIDKey{}, "test-request-id-bulk")
|
||||
ctx = context.WithValue(ctx, middleware.AdminKey{}, true)
|
||||
ctx = context.WithValue(ctx, auth.AdminKey{}, true)
|
||||
return ctx
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -194,65 +194,11 @@ func TestBulkRevoke_ServiceError_500(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
// for M-003. A caller without an admin-tagged context must be rejected with
|
||||
// HTTP 403, regardless of how well-formed its body is, and the service layer
|
||||
// must never see the request.
|
||||
func TestBulkRevoke_NonAdmin_Returns403(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
var serviceCalled bool
|
||||
svc := &mockBulkRevocationService{
|
||||
BulkRevokeFn: func(ctx context.Context, criteria domain.BulkRevocationCriteria, reason string, actor string) (*domain.BulkRevocationResult, error) {
|
||||
serviceCalled = true
|
||||
return &domain.BulkRevocationResult{}, nil
|
||||
},
|
||||
}
|
||||
h := NewBulkRevocationHandler(svc)
|
||||
|
||||
// Well-formed body + well-formed reason + filter — the only thing
|
||||
// missing is an admin-tagged context. The gate must still fire.
|
||||
body := `{"reason":"keyCompromise","certificate_ids":["mc-1","mc-2"]}`
|
||||
req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodPost, "/api/v1/certificates/bulk-revoke", bytes.NewBufferString(body))
|
||||
req.Header.Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
|
||||
req = req.WithContext(contextWithRequestID()) // request id only, no admin flag
|
||||
w := httptest.NewRecorder()
|
||||
|
||||
h.BulkRevoke(w, req)
|
||||
|
||||
if w.Code != http.StatusForbidden {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("expected status 403, got %d (body=%q)", w.Code, w.Body.String())
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
var resp map[string]any
|
||||
if err := json.NewDecoder(w.Body).Decode(&resp); err != nil {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("failed to decode response: %v", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
msg, _ := resp["message"].(string)
|
||||
if !strings.Contains(strings.ToLower(msg), "admin") {
|
||||
t.Errorf("expected message to mention admin requirement, got %q", msg)
|
||||
}
|
||||
if serviceCalled {
|
||||
t.Errorf("service was invoked despite non-admin caller — gate failed open")
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// TestBulkRevoke_AdminExplicitFalse_Returns403 pins the specific case where the
|
||||
// AdminKey exists but is set to false — e.g., a non-admin named-key caller.
|
||||
// Without this we could regress to "key missing == deny, key present == allow"
|
||||
// which would silently grant a false flag.
|
||||
func TestBulkRevoke_AdminExplicitFalse_Returns403(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
h := NewBulkRevocationHandler(&mockBulkRevocationService{})
|
||||
|
||||
body := `{"reason":"keyCompromise","certificate_ids":["mc-1"]}`
|
||||
req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodPost, "/api/v1/certificates/bulk-revoke", bytes.NewBufferString(body))
|
||||
req.Header.Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
|
||||
|
||||
ctx := context.WithValue(context.Background(), middleware.RequestIDKey{}, "test-request-id")
|
||||
ctx = context.WithValue(ctx, middleware.AdminKey{}, false)
|
||||
req = req.WithContext(ctx)
|
||||
w := httptest.NewRecorder()
|
||||
|
||||
h.BulkRevoke(w, req)
|
||||
|
||||
if w.Code != http.StatusForbidden {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("expected status 403 for admin=false, got %d", w.Code)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// TestBulkRevoke_AdminPermitted_ForwardsActor confirms the happy path:
|
||||
// an admin-tagged context reaches the service and the actor (from the auth
|
||||
@@ -273,8 +219,8 @@ func TestBulkRevoke_AdminPermitted_ForwardsActor(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
req.Header.Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
|
||||
|
||||
ctx := context.WithValue(context.Background(), middleware.RequestIDKey{}, "test-request-id")
|
||||
ctx = context.WithValue(ctx, middleware.AdminKey{}, true)
|
||||
ctx = context.WithValue(ctx, middleware.UserKey{}, "ops-admin")
|
||||
ctx = context.WithValue(ctx, auth.AdminKey{}, true)
|
||||
ctx = context.WithValue(ctx, auth.UserKey{}, "ops-admin")
|
||||
req = req.WithContext(ctx)
|
||||
w := httptest.NewRecorder()
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -6,9 +6,34 @@ import (
|
||||
"net/http"
|
||||
"time"
|
||||
|
||||
"github.com/certctl-io/certctl/internal/api/middleware"
|
||||
"github.com/certctl-io/certctl/internal/auth"
|
||||
"github.com/certctl-io/certctl/internal/domain"
|
||||
authdomain "github.com/certctl-io/certctl/internal/domain/auth"
|
||||
"github.com/certctl-io/certctl/internal/repository"
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
// AuthCheckResolver is the optional dependency HealthHandler uses to enrich
|
||||
// the /v1/auth/check response with the caller's standing roles and
|
||||
// effective permission set. The auth handler's /v1/auth/me endpoint
|
||||
// returns the same shape; we duplicate it here so the GUI can render the
|
||||
// auth gate from a single round-trip on app boot. main.go wires this
|
||||
// from the same authsvc.ActorRoleService used by AuthHandler; tests pass
|
||||
// nil and AuthCheck degrades to the legacy minimal payload.
|
||||
//
|
||||
// Bundle 1 Phase 3 closure (M1): pre-closure, /v1/auth/check returned
|
||||
// only {status, user, admin}. The GUI had to second-fetch /v1/auth/me to
|
||||
// know which buttons to render — and Me is gated by the rbacGate on
|
||||
// auth.role.list which the GUI's pre-render path may not yet hold (chicken-
|
||||
// and-egg with the role-list affordance). Folding the same payload into
|
||||
// AuthCheck keeps the GUI's boot path single-shot.
|
||||
type AuthCheckResolver interface {
|
||||
// ListRoles returns the actor's standing role grants.
|
||||
ListRoles(ctx context.Context, actorID string, actorType domain.ActorType, tenantID string) ([]*authdomain.ActorRole, error)
|
||||
// EffectivePermissions returns the deduplicated (perm, scope) triples
|
||||
// the actor holds across all of its roles.
|
||||
EffectivePermissions(ctx context.Context, actorID string, actorType domain.ActorType, tenantID string) ([]repository.EffectivePermission, error)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// HealthHandler handles health and readiness check endpoints.
|
||||
//
|
||||
// Bundle-5 / Audit H-006 / CWE-754 (Improper Check for Unusual or
|
||||
@@ -45,6 +70,13 @@ type HealthHandler struct {
|
||||
// ReadyProbeTimeout is the per-probe ceiling for the DB ping. Defaults
|
||||
// to 2s when zero. Exposed so tests can shorten it.
|
||||
ReadyProbeTimeout time.Duration
|
||||
|
||||
// AuthCheck (M1) — optional. When set, AuthCheck includes the caller's
|
||||
// standing roles + effective permissions in the response so the GUI
|
||||
// can gate affordances from a single fetch. Nil resolver degrades to
|
||||
// the legacy {status, user, admin} payload (preserves test fixtures
|
||||
// and the no-db deploy path).
|
||||
Resolver AuthCheckResolver
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// NewHealthHandler creates a new HealthHandler.
|
||||
@@ -53,6 +85,10 @@ type HealthHandler struct {
|
||||
// Ready returns 200 with {"db":"not_configured"} — preserves backwards
|
||||
// compatibility for the call sites that haven't wired the dependency yet.
|
||||
// Production main.go always passes a non-nil pool.
|
||||
//
|
||||
// Bundle 1 Phase 3 closure (M1): the resolver is wired separately via
|
||||
// HealthHandler.Resolver after construction so existing call sites
|
||||
// (legacy tests, no-db deploys) keep compiling without churn.
|
||||
func NewHealthHandler(authType string, db *sql.DB) HealthHandler {
|
||||
return HealthHandler{
|
||||
AuthType: authType,
|
||||
@@ -145,15 +181,69 @@ func (h HealthHandler) AuthInfo(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
|
||||
// that would otherwise 403 at the server. This is a hint for UX only —
|
||||
// authorization remains enforced at the handler layer (bulk_revocation.go).
|
||||
//
|
||||
// Bundle 1 Phase 3 closure (M1): when HealthHandler.Resolver is wired,
|
||||
// the response is enriched with the caller's standing roles and effective
|
||||
// permissions. This mirrors the /v1/auth/me payload but lives on /auth/check
|
||||
// so the GUI can gate affordance rendering with a single fetch on app
|
||||
// boot. Resolver lookups are best-effort: failures fall back to the
|
||||
// legacy minimal payload rather than 500-ing the GUI's auth probe.
|
||||
//
|
||||
// The auth middleware runs before this handler, so reaching here means auth
|
||||
// passed. `user` falls back to an empty string when auth is disabled
|
||||
// (CERTCTL_AUTH_TYPE=none).
|
||||
// GET /api/v1/auth/check
|
||||
func (h HealthHandler) AuthCheck(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
|
||||
ctx := r.Context()
|
||||
response := map[string]interface{}{
|
||||
"status": "authenticated",
|
||||
"user": middleware.GetUser(r.Context()),
|
||||
"admin": middleware.IsAdmin(r.Context()),
|
||||
"user": auth.GetUser(ctx),
|
||||
"admin": auth.IsAdmin(ctx),
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if h.Resolver != nil {
|
||||
actorID, _ := ctx.Value(auth.ActorIDKey{}).(string)
|
||||
actorType, _ := ctx.Value(auth.ActorTypeKey{}).(string)
|
||||
tenantID, _ := ctx.Value(auth.TenantIDKey{}).(string)
|
||||
if tenantID == "" {
|
||||
tenantID = authdomain.DefaultTenantID
|
||||
}
|
||||
if actorID != "" && actorType != "" {
|
||||
at := domain.ActorType(actorType)
|
||||
roles, rerr := h.Resolver.ListRoles(ctx, actorID, at, tenantID)
|
||||
perms, perr := h.Resolver.EffectivePermissions(ctx, actorID, at, tenantID)
|
||||
if rerr == nil && perr == nil {
|
||||
roleIDs := make([]string, 0, len(roles))
|
||||
hasAdmin := false
|
||||
for _, role := range roles {
|
||||
roleIDs = append(roleIDs, role.RoleID)
|
||||
if role.RoleID == authdomain.RoleIDAdmin {
|
||||
hasAdmin = true
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
permPayload := make([]map[string]interface{}, 0, len(perms))
|
||||
for _, p := range perms {
|
||||
entry := map[string]interface{}{
|
||||
"permission": p.PermissionName,
|
||||
"scope_type": string(p.ScopeType),
|
||||
}
|
||||
if p.ScopeID != nil {
|
||||
entry["scope_id"] = *p.ScopeID
|
||||
}
|
||||
permPayload = append(permPayload, entry)
|
||||
}
|
||||
response["actor_id"] = actorID
|
||||
response["actor_type"] = actorType
|
||||
response["tenant_id"] = tenantID
|
||||
response["roles"] = roleIDs
|
||||
response["effective_permissions"] = permPayload
|
||||
// Authoritative admin signal: the standing-roles list. The
|
||||
// legacy `admin` boolean above is preserved for back-compat
|
||||
// (in-handler IsAdmin for non-rbacGate routes), but the
|
||||
// rbacGate-gated routes now key off effective_permissions.
|
||||
response["admin_via_role"] = hasAdmin
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
JSON(w, http.StatusOK, response)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -9,7 +9,10 @@ import (
|
||||
"testing"
|
||||
"time"
|
||||
|
||||
"github.com/certctl-io/certctl/internal/api/middleware"
|
||||
"github.com/certctl-io/certctl/internal/auth"
|
||||
"github.com/certctl-io/certctl/internal/domain"
|
||||
authdomain "github.com/certctl-io/certctl/internal/domain/auth"
|
||||
"github.com/certctl-io/certctl/internal/repository"
|
||||
_ "github.com/lib/pq" // Bundle-5 / H-006: postgres driver for /ready DB-probe regression test
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -238,8 +241,8 @@ func TestAuthCheck_AdminCaller_ReportsAdminTrue(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
handler := NewHealthHandler("api-key", nil)
|
||||
|
||||
req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "/api/v1/auth/check", nil)
|
||||
ctx := context.WithValue(req.Context(), middleware.AdminKey{}, true)
|
||||
ctx = context.WithValue(ctx, middleware.UserKey{}, "ops-admin")
|
||||
ctx := context.WithValue(req.Context(), auth.AdminKey{}, true)
|
||||
ctx = context.WithValue(ctx, auth.UserKey{}, "ops-admin")
|
||||
req = req.WithContext(ctx)
|
||||
|
||||
w := httptest.NewRecorder()
|
||||
@@ -276,8 +279,8 @@ func TestAuthCheck_NonAdminCaller_ReportsAdminFalse(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
handler := NewHealthHandler("api-key", nil)
|
||||
|
||||
req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "/api/v1/auth/check", nil)
|
||||
ctx := context.WithValue(req.Context(), middleware.AdminKey{}, false)
|
||||
ctx = context.WithValue(ctx, middleware.UserKey{}, "alice")
|
||||
ctx := context.WithValue(req.Context(), auth.AdminKey{}, false)
|
||||
ctx = context.WithValue(ctx, auth.UserKey{}, "alice")
|
||||
req = req.WithContext(ctx)
|
||||
|
||||
w := httptest.NewRecorder()
|
||||
@@ -338,6 +341,120 @@ func TestAuthCheck_NoAuthContext_DefaultsToEmptyUserAndFalseAdmin(t *testing.T)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// fakeAuthCheckResolver is a tiny in-memory stand-in for the postgres
|
||||
// ActorRoleRepository so the M1 enrichment can be tested without a DB.
|
||||
type fakeAuthCheckResolver struct {
|
||||
roles []*authdomain.ActorRole
|
||||
perms []repository.EffectivePermission
|
||||
err error
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func (f fakeAuthCheckResolver) ListRoles(_ context.Context, _ string, _ domain.ActorType, _ string) ([]*authdomain.ActorRole, error) {
|
||||
return f.roles, f.err
|
||||
}
|
||||
func (f fakeAuthCheckResolver) EffectivePermissions(_ context.Context, _ string, _ domain.ActorType, _ string) ([]repository.EffectivePermission, error) {
|
||||
return f.perms, f.err
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// TestAuthCheck_M1_ResolverEnrichesResponseWithRolesAndPerms is the
|
||||
// Bundle 1 Phase 3 closure (M1) regression: when HealthHandler.Resolver
|
||||
// is wired, the response includes actor_id / actor_type / tenant_id /
|
||||
// roles / effective_permissions / admin_via_role. The legacy `admin`
|
||||
// boolean is preserved for back-compat with pre-Bundle-1 GUIs.
|
||||
func TestAuthCheck_M1_ResolverEnrichesResponseWithRolesAndPerms(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
handler := NewHealthHandler("api-key", nil)
|
||||
scopeID := "profile-prod"
|
||||
handler.Resolver = fakeAuthCheckResolver{
|
||||
roles: []*authdomain.ActorRole{
|
||||
{ActorID: "alice", RoleID: authdomain.RoleIDAdmin, TenantID: authdomain.DefaultTenantID},
|
||||
{ActorID: "alice", RoleID: authdomain.RoleIDOperator, TenantID: authdomain.DefaultTenantID},
|
||||
},
|
||||
perms: []repository.EffectivePermission{
|
||||
{PermissionName: "cert.bulk_revoke", ScopeType: authdomain.ScopeTypeGlobal},
|
||||
{PermissionName: "cert.issue", ScopeType: authdomain.ScopeTypeProfile, ScopeID: &scopeID},
|
||||
},
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
ctx := context.Background()
|
||||
ctx = context.WithValue(ctx, auth.ActorIDKey{}, "alice")
|
||||
ctx = context.WithValue(ctx, auth.ActorTypeKey{}, "APIKey")
|
||||
ctx = context.WithValue(ctx, auth.TenantIDKey{}, "t-default")
|
||||
ctx = context.WithValue(ctx, auth.UserKey{}, "alice")
|
||||
ctx = context.WithValue(ctx, auth.AdminKey{}, true)
|
||||
|
||||
req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "/api/v1/auth/check", nil).WithContext(ctx)
|
||||
w := httptest.NewRecorder()
|
||||
handler.AuthCheck(w, req)
|
||||
|
||||
if w.Code != http.StatusOK {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("expected status 200, got %d", w.Code)
|
||||
}
|
||||
var result map[string]any
|
||||
if err := json.NewDecoder(w.Body).Decode(&result); err != nil {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("decode: %v", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if result["actor_id"] != "alice" {
|
||||
t.Errorf("actor_id = %v, want alice", result["actor_id"])
|
||||
}
|
||||
if result["actor_type"] != "APIKey" {
|
||||
t.Errorf("actor_type = %v, want APIKey", result["actor_type"])
|
||||
}
|
||||
if result["tenant_id"] != "t-default" {
|
||||
t.Errorf("tenant_id = %v, want t-default", result["tenant_id"])
|
||||
}
|
||||
if result["admin_via_role"] != true {
|
||||
t.Errorf("admin_via_role = %v, want true (alice holds r-admin)", result["admin_via_role"])
|
||||
}
|
||||
roles, ok := result["roles"].([]any)
|
||||
if !ok || len(roles) != 2 {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("roles = %v, want 2-element slice", result["roles"])
|
||||
}
|
||||
perms, ok := result["effective_permissions"].([]any)
|
||||
if !ok || len(perms) != 2 {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("effective_permissions = %v, want 2-element slice", result["effective_permissions"])
|
||||
}
|
||||
first := perms[0].(map[string]any)
|
||||
if first["permission"] != "cert.bulk_revoke" || first["scope_type"] != "global" {
|
||||
t.Errorf("perm[0] = %v, want cert.bulk_revoke/global", first)
|
||||
}
|
||||
second := perms[1].(map[string]any)
|
||||
if second["permission"] != "cert.issue" || second["scope_type"] != "profile" || second["scope_id"] != "profile-prod" {
|
||||
t.Errorf("perm[1] = %v, want cert.issue/profile/profile-prod", second)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// TestAuthCheck_M1_NilResolverPreservesLegacyShape pins backwards
|
||||
// compatibility: when no resolver is wired, the response keeps the
|
||||
// original {status, user, admin} contract that pre-Bundle-1 GUIs key
|
||||
// off. New keys (actor_id, roles, ...) must be absent.
|
||||
func TestAuthCheck_M1_NilResolverPreservesLegacyShape(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
handler := NewHealthHandler("api-key", nil) // Resolver left nil
|
||||
|
||||
ctx := context.Background()
|
||||
ctx = context.WithValue(ctx, auth.ActorIDKey{}, "alice")
|
||||
ctx = context.WithValue(ctx, auth.ActorTypeKey{}, "APIKey")
|
||||
ctx = context.WithValue(ctx, auth.UserKey{}, "alice")
|
||||
ctx = context.WithValue(ctx, auth.AdminKey{}, true)
|
||||
|
||||
req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "/api/v1/auth/check", nil).WithContext(ctx)
|
||||
w := httptest.NewRecorder()
|
||||
handler.AuthCheck(w, req)
|
||||
|
||||
var result map[string]any
|
||||
if err := json.NewDecoder(w.Body).Decode(&result); err != nil {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("decode: %v", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
for _, k := range []string{"actor_id", "actor_type", "tenant_id", "roles", "effective_permissions", "admin_via_role"} {
|
||||
if _, present := result[k]; present {
|
||||
t.Errorf("%s should be absent in legacy (nil resolver) response, got %v", k, result[k])
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
if result["admin"] != true || result["user"] != "alice" {
|
||||
t.Errorf("legacy fields not preserved: admin=%v user=%v", result["admin"], result["user"])
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// --- Bundle-5 / H-006: /ready DB-probe regression coverage ---
|
||||
|
||||
// TestReady_DBPingSuccess_Returns200WithReachable confirms that when the
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -9,6 +9,7 @@ import (
|
||||
"time"
|
||||
|
||||
"github.com/certctl-io/certctl/internal/api/middleware"
|
||||
"github.com/certctl-io/certctl/internal/auth"
|
||||
"github.com/certctl-io/certctl/internal/crypto/signer"
|
||||
"github.com/certctl-io/certctl/internal/domain"
|
||||
"github.com/certctl-io/certctl/internal/service"
|
||||
@@ -36,12 +37,15 @@ type IntermediateCAServicer interface {
|
||||
// All routes are pinned at /api/v1/issuers/{id}/intermediates and
|
||||
// /api/v1/intermediates/{id}.
|
||||
//
|
||||
// Admin gate: every method calls middleware.IsAdmin first and surfaces
|
||||
// HTTP 403 for non-admin Bearer callers (M-003 admin-gating pattern,
|
||||
// matches AdminCRLCacheHandler / AdminESTHandler / AdminSCEPIntuneHandler).
|
||||
// CA hierarchy management is a high-blast-radius surface — adding a
|
||||
// child CA mints a new sub-CA cert that becomes a trust root for every
|
||||
// downstream leaf. Operators expect this gated behind admin role.
|
||||
// Bundle 1 Phase 3.5: the admin gate moved from in-handler auth.IsAdmin
|
||||
// checks to router-level auth.RequirePermission middleware (rbacGate
|
||||
// wraps the handler with the ca.hierarchy.manage permission gate before
|
||||
// the handler body runs — non-admin Bearer callers get 403 from the
|
||||
// middleware layer instead of from each handler method). CA hierarchy
|
||||
// management is a high-blast-radius surface — adding a child CA mints a
|
||||
// new sub-CA cert that becomes a trust root for every downstream leaf.
|
||||
// The router gate guarantees the only callers reaching this handler
|
||||
// hold the admin role at global scope.
|
||||
type IntermediateCAHandler struct {
|
||||
svc IntermediateCAServicer
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -111,10 +115,7 @@ func (h IntermediateCAHandler) Create(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
|
||||
Error(w, http.StatusMethodNotAllowed, "Method not allowed")
|
||||
return
|
||||
}
|
||||
if !middleware.IsAdmin(r.Context()) {
|
||||
Error(w, http.StatusForbidden, "Admin access required")
|
||||
return
|
||||
}
|
||||
// Bundle 1 Phase 3.5: gate moved to router.go (RequirePermission middleware).
|
||||
requestID := middleware.GetRequestID(r.Context())
|
||||
|
||||
issuerID := r.PathValue("id")
|
||||
@@ -122,7 +123,7 @@ func (h IntermediateCAHandler) Create(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
|
||||
ErrorWithRequestID(w, http.StatusBadRequest, "issuer id required", requestID)
|
||||
return
|
||||
}
|
||||
actor, _ := r.Context().Value(middleware.UserKey{}).(string)
|
||||
actor, _ := r.Context().Value(auth.UserKey{}).(string)
|
||||
if actor == "" {
|
||||
ErrorWithRequestID(w, http.StatusUnauthorized,
|
||||
"authentication required", requestID)
|
||||
@@ -211,10 +212,7 @@ func (h IntermediateCAHandler) List(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
|
||||
Error(w, http.StatusMethodNotAllowed, "Method not allowed")
|
||||
return
|
||||
}
|
||||
if !middleware.IsAdmin(r.Context()) {
|
||||
Error(w, http.StatusForbidden, "Admin access required")
|
||||
return
|
||||
}
|
||||
// Bundle 1 Phase 3.5: gate moved to router.go (RequirePermission middleware).
|
||||
requestID := middleware.GetRequestID(r.Context())
|
||||
|
||||
issuerID := r.PathValue("id")
|
||||
@@ -237,10 +235,7 @@ func (h IntermediateCAHandler) Get(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
|
||||
Error(w, http.StatusMethodNotAllowed, "Method not allowed")
|
||||
return
|
||||
}
|
||||
if !middleware.IsAdmin(r.Context()) {
|
||||
Error(w, http.StatusForbidden, "Admin access required")
|
||||
return
|
||||
}
|
||||
// Bundle 1 Phase 3.5: gate moved to router.go (RequirePermission middleware).
|
||||
requestID := middleware.GetRequestID(r.Context())
|
||||
|
||||
id := r.PathValue("id")
|
||||
@@ -270,10 +265,7 @@ func (h IntermediateCAHandler) Retire(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
|
||||
Error(w, http.StatusMethodNotAllowed, "Method not allowed")
|
||||
return
|
||||
}
|
||||
if !middleware.IsAdmin(r.Context()) {
|
||||
Error(w, http.StatusForbidden, "Admin access required")
|
||||
return
|
||||
}
|
||||
// Bundle 1 Phase 3.5: gate moved to router.go (RequirePermission middleware).
|
||||
requestID := middleware.GetRequestID(r.Context())
|
||||
|
||||
id := r.PathValue("id")
|
||||
@@ -281,7 +273,7 @@ func (h IntermediateCAHandler) Retire(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
|
||||
ErrorWithRequestID(w, http.StatusBadRequest, "id required", requestID)
|
||||
return
|
||||
}
|
||||
actor, _ := r.Context().Value(middleware.UserKey{}).(string)
|
||||
actor, _ := r.Context().Value(auth.UserKey{}).(string)
|
||||
if actor == "" {
|
||||
ErrorWithRequestID(w, http.StatusUnauthorized,
|
||||
"authentication required", requestID)
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -16,7 +16,7 @@ import (
|
||||
"testing"
|
||||
"time"
|
||||
|
||||
"github.com/certctl-io/certctl/internal/api/middleware"
|
||||
"github.com/certctl-io/certctl/internal/auth"
|
||||
"github.com/certctl-io/certctl/internal/domain"
|
||||
"github.com/certctl-io/certctl/internal/service"
|
||||
)
|
||||
@@ -80,8 +80,8 @@ func (m *mockIntermediateCAService) LoadHierarchy(ctx context.Context, issuerID
|
||||
// authenticated user — the standard "admin caller" shape for these
|
||||
// tests.
|
||||
func withAdmin(actor string, admin bool) context.Context {
|
||||
ctx := context.WithValue(context.Background(), middleware.UserKey{}, actor)
|
||||
ctx = context.WithValue(ctx, middleware.AdminKey{}, admin)
|
||||
ctx := context.WithValue(context.Background(), auth.UserKey{}, actor)
|
||||
ctx = context.WithValue(ctx, auth.AdminKey{}, admin)
|
||||
return ctx
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -111,81 +111,12 @@ func helperRootCertPEM(t *testing.T) []byte {
|
||||
// authenticated one — must get HTTP 403 from every endpoint. CA
|
||||
// hierarchy management is a high-blast-radius surface; the gate is
|
||||
// non-negotiable. M-008 admin-gate triplet test #1.
|
||||
func TestIntermediateCA_Handler_NonAdmin_Returns403(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
cases := []struct {
|
||||
name string
|
||||
method string
|
||||
path string
|
||||
pathArgs map[string]string
|
||||
invoke func(h IntermediateCAHandler) http.HandlerFunc
|
||||
}{
|
||||
{
|
||||
name: "Create",
|
||||
method: http.MethodPost,
|
||||
path: "/api/v1/issuers/iss-1/intermediates",
|
||||
pathArgs: map[string]string{"id": "iss-1"},
|
||||
invoke: func(h IntermediateCAHandler) http.HandlerFunc { return h.Create },
|
||||
},
|
||||
{
|
||||
name: "List",
|
||||
method: http.MethodGet,
|
||||
path: "/api/v1/issuers/iss-1/intermediates",
|
||||
pathArgs: map[string]string{"id": "iss-1"},
|
||||
invoke: func(h IntermediateCAHandler) http.HandlerFunc { return h.List },
|
||||
},
|
||||
{
|
||||
name: "Get",
|
||||
method: http.MethodGet,
|
||||
path: "/api/v1/intermediates/ica-1",
|
||||
pathArgs: map[string]string{"id": "ica-1"},
|
||||
invoke: func(h IntermediateCAHandler) http.HandlerFunc { return h.Get },
|
||||
},
|
||||
{
|
||||
name: "Retire",
|
||||
method: http.MethodPost,
|
||||
path: "/api/v1/intermediates/ica-1/retire",
|
||||
pathArgs: map[string]string{"id": "ica-1"},
|
||||
invoke: func(h IntermediateCAHandler) http.HandlerFunc { return h.Retire },
|
||||
},
|
||||
}
|
||||
for _, tc := range cases {
|
||||
t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
h := NewIntermediateCAHandler(&mockIntermediateCAService{})
|
||||
req := httptest.NewRequest(tc.method, tc.path, bytes.NewReader([]byte("{}")))
|
||||
for k, v := range tc.pathArgs {
|
||||
req.SetPathValue(k, v)
|
||||
}
|
||||
// Authenticated user but admin=false.
|
||||
req = req.WithContext(withAdmin("alice", false))
|
||||
w := httptest.NewRecorder()
|
||||
tc.invoke(h)(w, req)
|
||||
if w.Code != http.StatusForbidden {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("%s: expected 403 for non-admin, got %d body=%s", tc.name, w.Code, w.Body.String())
|
||||
}
|
||||
})
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// TestIntermediateCA_Handler_AdminExplicitFalse_Returns403 pins the
|
||||
// "AdminKey present but false" path — distinct from the
|
||||
// AdminKey-absent path. Without this distinction a regression that
|
||||
// reads AdminKey as "presence implies admin" would slip past the
|
||||
// non-admin check. M-008 admin-gate triplet test #2.
|
||||
func TestIntermediateCA_Handler_AdminExplicitFalse_Returns403(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
h := NewIntermediateCAHandler(&mockIntermediateCAService{})
|
||||
req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodPost, "/api/v1/issuers/iss-1/intermediates",
|
||||
bytes.NewReader([]byte(`{"name":"r"}`)))
|
||||
req.SetPathValue("id", "iss-1")
|
||||
// AdminKey explicitly set to false — distinct from missing key.
|
||||
ctx := context.WithValue(context.Background(), middleware.UserKey{}, "alice")
|
||||
ctx = context.WithValue(ctx, middleware.AdminKey{}, false)
|
||||
req = req.WithContext(ctx)
|
||||
w := httptest.NewRecorder()
|
||||
h.Create(w, req)
|
||||
if w.Code != http.StatusForbidden {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("expected 403 for AdminKey=false, got %d", w.Code)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// TestIntermediateCA_Handler_AdminPermitted_ForwardsActor pins the
|
||||
// admin-allowed actor-attribution path. An admin caller's actor
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -14,19 +14,19 @@ import (
|
||||
//
|
||||
// The audit's request is "Admin-gated operation role-gate test coverage
|
||||
// needs verification". Verified-already-clean recon: only one handler
|
||||
// in internal/api/handler/ calls middleware.IsAdmin to gate access:
|
||||
// in internal/api/handler/ calls auth.IsAdmin to gate access:
|
||||
// bulk_revocation.go — which has 3 dedicated tests
|
||||
// (NonAdmin_Returns403, AdminExplicitFalse_Returns403,
|
||||
// AdminPermitted_ForwardsActor) covering all three branches.
|
||||
//
|
||||
// This test enforces the invariant going forward by walking every
|
||||
// .go file in this package, finding every middleware.IsAdmin call
|
||||
// .go file in this package, finding every auth.IsAdmin call
|
||||
// site, and asserting the file appears in AdminGatedHandlers below.
|
||||
// Adding a new middleware.IsAdmin call without updating the constant
|
||||
// Adding a new auth.IsAdmin call without updating the constant
|
||||
// AND adding a parallel test triplet fails CI.
|
||||
|
||||
// AdminGatedHandlers is the documented allowlist of handler files that
|
||||
// gate access on middleware.IsAdmin. Every entry MUST have:
|
||||
// gate access on auth.IsAdmin. Every entry MUST have:
|
||||
// - a non-admin-rejection test ("_NonAdmin_Returns403")
|
||||
// - an explicit-false-admin-rejection test ("_AdminExplicitFalse_Returns403")
|
||||
// - an admin-allowed actor-attribution test ("_AdminPermitted_ForwardsActor")
|
||||
@@ -34,16 +34,18 @@ import (
|
||||
// Keys are the handler filenames; values are short descriptions of why
|
||||
// the gate exists. health.go is an INFORMATIONAL caller of IsAdmin (it
|
||||
// surfaces the flag to the GUI but does not gate) — explicitly excluded.
|
||||
var AdminGatedHandlers = map[string]string{
|
||||
"bulk_revocation.go": "M-003: bulk revocation is fleet-scale destructive — admin-only",
|
||||
"admin_crl_cache.go": "CRL/OCSP-Responder Phase 5: cache state reveals issuer set + CRL cadence — admin-only",
|
||||
"admin_scep_intune.go": "SCEP RFC 8894 + Intune master bundle Phase 9.2 + Phase 9 follow-up: profiles + stats endpoints reveal per-profile RA cert expiries + Intune trust anchor expiries + mTLS bundle paths; reload-trust is a privileged action — admin-only",
|
||||
"admin_est.go": "EST RFC 7030 hardening master bundle Phase 7.2: profiles endpoint reveals per-profile counter snapshot + mTLS trust-anchor expiries + auth modes; reload-trust is a privileged action — admin-only",
|
||||
"intermediate_ca.go": "Rank 8: CA hierarchy management mints sub-CA certs that become trust roots for every downstream leaf — admin-only fleet-scale destructive surface",
|
||||
}
|
||||
// Bundle 1 Phase 3.5: the five legacy admin-gated handlers
|
||||
// (bulk_revocation, admin_crl_cache, admin_scep_intune, admin_est,
|
||||
// intermediate_ca) had their in-body auth.IsAdmin checks removed and
|
||||
// the gate moved to router.go via auth.RequirePermission middleware.
|
||||
// AdminGatedHandlers is now empty; the only legitimate auth.IsAdmin
|
||||
// call site in this package is health.go (informational, surfaces the
|
||||
// admin flag to the GUI but doesn't gate). New routes should not add
|
||||
// in-handler auth.IsAdmin checks; gate at the router level instead.
|
||||
var AdminGatedHandlers = map[string]string{}
|
||||
|
||||
// InformationalIsAdminCallers is the documented allowlist of files that
|
||||
// call middleware.IsAdmin without using the result to gate access. The
|
||||
// call auth.IsAdmin without using the result to gate access. The
|
||||
// only legitimate use of an informational call is reporting the flag to
|
||||
// a downstream consumer (e.g. health.go::AuthCheck reports admin to the
|
||||
// GUI so it can hide admin-only buttons).
|
||||
@@ -64,15 +66,13 @@ func TestM008_AdminGatedHandlers_PinExpectedSet(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
|
||||
if !slicesEqual008(actual, expected) {
|
||||
t.Errorf(
|
||||
"middleware.IsAdmin call sites changed:\n"+
|
||||
"auth.IsAdmin call sites changed:\n"+
|
||||
" actual: %v\n"+
|
||||
" expected: %v\n"+
|
||||
"\n"+
|
||||
"If you added a new admin gate, append it to AdminGatedHandlers AND\n"+
|
||||
"add the 3-test triplet (_NonAdmin_Returns403 / _AdminExplicitFalse_Returns403 /\n"+
|
||||
"_AdminPermitted_ForwardsActor) — see bulk_revocation_handler_test.go for\n"+
|
||||
"the template.\n"+
|
||||
"\n"+
|
||||
"Bundle 1 Phase 3.5 removed in-handler auth.IsAdmin checks; new\n"+
|
||||
"admin-gated routes wrap at the router level via\n"+
|
||||
"auth.RequirePermission middleware (see router.go::rbacGate).\n"+
|
||||
"If you added an informational caller (no gating), append to\n"+
|
||||
"InformationalIsAdminCallers with a justification.",
|
||||
actual, expected)
|
||||
@@ -143,10 +143,10 @@ func scanIsAdminCallers(dir string) ([]string, error) {
|
||||
if parseErr != nil {
|
||||
continue
|
||||
}
|
||||
// Substring-match middleware.IsAdmin — cheap and sufficient
|
||||
// Substring-match auth.IsAdmin — cheap and sufficient
|
||||
// because the import path is fixed and there's no aliasing
|
||||
// shenanigans elsewhere in this package.
|
||||
if strings.Contains(string(body), "middleware.IsAdmin(") {
|
||||
if strings.Contains(string(body), "auth.IsAdmin(") {
|
||||
out = append(out, name)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -4,13 +4,14 @@ import (
|
||||
"context"
|
||||
"encoding/json"
|
||||
"errors"
|
||||
"github.com/certctl-io/certctl/internal/repository"
|
||||
"net/http"
|
||||
"strconv"
|
||||
"strings"
|
||||
|
||||
"github.com/certctl-io/certctl/internal/api/middleware"
|
||||
"github.com/certctl-io/certctl/internal/domain"
|
||||
"github.com/certctl-io/certctl/internal/repository"
|
||||
"github.com/certctl-io/certctl/internal/service"
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
// ProfileService defines the service interface for certificate profile operations.
|
||||
@@ -164,6 +165,24 @@ func (h ProfileHandler) UpdateProfile(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
|
||||
|
||||
updated, err := h.svc.UpdateProfile(r.Context(), id, profile)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
// Bundle 1 Phase 9: a profile with RequiresApproval=true (or
|
||||
// an edit that would set it true) routes through the approval
|
||||
// workflow. The service returns ErrProfileEditPendingApproval
|
||||
// wrapped with the new approval ID; surface 202 Accepted +
|
||||
// pending_approval_id so the operator knows to chase a
|
||||
// non-requester admin to approve via /v1/approvals/{id}/approve.
|
||||
if errors.Is(err, service.ErrProfileEditPendingApproval) {
|
||||
approvalID := ""
|
||||
if msg := err.Error(); strings.Contains(msg, "approval=") {
|
||||
approvalID = msg[strings.Index(msg, "approval=")+len("approval="):]
|
||||
}
|
||||
JSON(w, http.StatusAccepted, map[string]interface{}{
|
||||
"status": "pending_approval",
|
||||
"pending_approval_id": approvalID,
|
||||
"message": "profile edit requires approval (see /v1/approvals/{id}/approve)",
|
||||
})
|
||||
return
|
||||
}
|
||||
if errors.Is(err, repository.ErrNotFound) {
|
||||
ErrorWithRequestID(w, http.StatusNotFound, "Profile not found", requestID)
|
||||
return
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ import (
|
||||
"strings"
|
||||
"time"
|
||||
|
||||
"github.com/certctl-io/certctl/internal/api/middleware"
|
||||
"github.com/certctl-io/certctl/internal/auth"
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
// resolveActor extracts the authenticated named-key identity from the request
|
||||
@@ -23,7 +23,7 @@ import (
|
||||
// or "api" — always go through this helper so the named-key identity flows to
|
||||
// services and the audit trail.
|
||||
func resolveActor(ctx context.Context) string {
|
||||
if user := middleware.GetUser(ctx); user != "" {
|
||||
if user := auth.GetUser(ctx); user != "" {
|
||||
return user
|
||||
}
|
||||
return "api"
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -12,6 +12,8 @@ import (
|
||||
"strings"
|
||||
"sync"
|
||||
"time"
|
||||
|
||||
"github.com/certctl-io/certctl/internal/auth"
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
// AuditRecorder is the interface that the audit middleware uses to record API calls.
|
||||
@@ -115,7 +117,7 @@ func (a *AuditMiddleware) Middleware(next http.Handler) http.Handler {
|
||||
|
||||
// Extract actor from auth context
|
||||
actor := "anonymous"
|
||||
if user := GetUser(r.Context()); user != "" {
|
||||
if user := auth.GetUser(r.Context()); user != "" {
|
||||
actor = user
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -11,6 +11,8 @@ import (
|
||||
"sync"
|
||||
"testing"
|
||||
"time"
|
||||
|
||||
"github.com/certctl-io/certctl/internal/auth"
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
// mockAuditRecorder captures RecordAPICall invocations for testing.
|
||||
@@ -271,7 +273,7 @@ func TestAuditLog_ExtractsAuthenticatedActor(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodDelete, "/api/v1/certificates/mc-1", nil)
|
||||
// Simulate auth middleware having set the named-key identity in context
|
||||
// (post-M-002: actor is the named-key name, not the old "api-key-user").
|
||||
ctx := context.WithValue(req.Context(), UserKey{}, "ops-admin")
|
||||
ctx := context.WithValue(req.Context(), auth.UserKey{}, "ops-admin")
|
||||
req = req.WithContext(ctx)
|
||||
|
||||
rr := httptest.NewRecorder()
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -2,9 +2,6 @@ package middleware
|
||||
|
||||
import (
|
||||
"context"
|
||||
"crypto/sha256"
|
||||
"crypto/subtle"
|
||||
"encoding/hex"
|
||||
"fmt"
|
||||
"log"
|
||||
"log/slog"
|
||||
@@ -14,24 +11,22 @@ import (
|
||||
"time"
|
||||
|
||||
"github.com/google/uuid"
|
||||
|
||||
"github.com/certctl-io/certctl/internal/auth"
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
// Bundle 1 / Phase 0: the auth surface (NamedAPIKey, HashAPIKey, AuthConfig,
|
||||
// NewAuthWithNamedKeys, NewAuth, UserKey, AdminKey, GetUser, IsAdmin) moved
|
||||
// to internal/auth/. The rate limiter below still keys per-user via
|
||||
// auth.GetUser(ctx); other middlewares in this package are auth-agnostic.
|
||||
//
|
||||
// Existing callers continue to import internal/auth/middleware "as
|
||||
// middleware" only for the non-auth helpers below; auth-related references
|
||||
// have been migrated to the new package.
|
||||
|
||||
// RequestIDKey is the context key for storing request IDs.
|
||||
type RequestIDKey struct{}
|
||||
|
||||
// UserKey is the context key for storing authenticated user information.
|
||||
type UserKey struct{}
|
||||
|
||||
// AdminKey is the context key for storing admin flag information.
|
||||
type AdminKey struct{}
|
||||
|
||||
// NamedAPIKey represents a named API key with optional admin flag.
|
||||
type NamedAPIKey struct {
|
||||
Name string
|
||||
Key string
|
||||
Admin bool
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// RequestID middleware generates a unique request ID and adds it to the request context and response headers.
|
||||
func RequestID(next http.Handler) http.Handler {
|
||||
return http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
|
||||
@@ -46,7 +41,7 @@ func RequestID(next http.Handler) http.Handler {
|
||||
// Deprecated: Use NewLogging for structured logging with slog.
|
||||
//
|
||||
// CWE-117 log-injection defense: r.Method and r.URL.Path are
|
||||
// attacker-controllable (request-line bytes — Go's net/http leaves
|
||||
// attacker-controllable (request-line bytes; Go's net/http leaves
|
||||
// percent-decoded path segments in r.URL.Path, which can include CR/LF
|
||||
// in the decoded form even though the raw HTTP request line cannot).
|
||||
// strings.ReplaceAll on CR/LF/NUL strips the forgery vector before the
|
||||
@@ -54,7 +49,7 @@ func RequestID(next http.Handler) http.Handler {
|
||||
//
|
||||
// The replacement is intentionally inlined at the call site (literal
|
||||
// strings.ReplaceAll chains) because CodeQL's go/log-injection
|
||||
// taint tracker only recognizes that exact pattern as a sanitizer —
|
||||
// taint tracker only recognizes that exact pattern as a sanitizer;
|
||||
// strings.NewReplacer / wrapper helpers don't trigger the recognition,
|
||||
// reopening the alert. The OWASP example in the CodeQL rule docs uses
|
||||
// the same pattern.
|
||||
@@ -71,7 +66,7 @@ func Logging(next http.Handler) http.Handler {
|
||||
requestID := getRequestID(r.Context())
|
||||
|
||||
// Strip CR/LF/NUL from attacker-controllable request fields
|
||||
// before logging. Inlined per CodeQL #32 — the ReplaceAll
|
||||
// before logging. Inlined per CodeQL #32; the ReplaceAll
|
||||
// chain is the pattern the analyzer pattern-matches as a
|
||||
// sanitizer.
|
||||
method := strings.ReplaceAll(r.Method, "\n", "")
|
||||
@@ -133,143 +128,11 @@ func Recovery(next http.Handler) http.Handler {
|
||||
})
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// HashAPIKey computes the SHA-256 hash of an API key for secure storage.
|
||||
// We use SHA-256 rather than bcrypt because API keys are high-entropy
|
||||
// random strings (not user-chosen passwords), so rainbow tables and
|
||||
// brute-force attacks are not a practical concern.
|
||||
func HashAPIKey(key string) string {
|
||||
h := sha256.Sum256([]byte(key))
|
||||
return hex.EncodeToString(h[:])
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// AuthConfig holds configuration for the Auth middleware.
|
||||
//
|
||||
// G-1 (P1): valid Type values are "api-key" or "none" only. "jwt" was
|
||||
// removed because no JWT middleware ships with certctl (silent auth
|
||||
// downgrade pre-G-1). The single source of truth for the allowed set
|
||||
// lives at internal/config.AuthType / config.ValidAuthTypes() — prefer
|
||||
// those constants over string literals when comparing.
|
||||
type AuthConfig struct {
|
||||
Type string // "api-key" or "none" (see config.AuthType constants)
|
||||
Secret string // The raw API key or comma-separated list of valid API keys
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// NewAuthWithNamedKeys creates an authentication middleware that validates
|
||||
// Bearer tokens against a set of named API keys. Each key carries a name
|
||||
// (propagated as the actor via context) and an admin flag (consulted by
|
||||
// authorization gates such as bulk revocation).
|
||||
//
|
||||
// When namedKeys is empty the returned middleware is a no-op pass-through,
|
||||
// which is used in demo/development mode (CERTCTL_AUTH_TYPE=none). When one
|
||||
// or more keys are provided, requests must include a matching Bearer token
|
||||
// or they are rejected with 401.
|
||||
func NewAuthWithNamedKeys(namedKeys []NamedAPIKey) func(http.Handler) http.Handler {
|
||||
if len(namedKeys) == 0 {
|
||||
return func(next http.Handler) http.Handler {
|
||||
return next
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Pre-compute hashes of all valid keys for constant-time comparison.
|
||||
type keyEntry struct {
|
||||
hash string
|
||||
name string
|
||||
admin bool
|
||||
}
|
||||
var entries []keyEntry
|
||||
for _, nk := range namedKeys {
|
||||
entries = append(entries, keyEntry{
|
||||
hash: HashAPIKey(nk.Key),
|
||||
name: nk.Name,
|
||||
admin: nk.Admin,
|
||||
})
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Warn if only one key is configured in production mode
|
||||
if len(entries) == 1 {
|
||||
slog.Warn("only one API key configured — consider adding a rotation key for zero-downtime rotation")
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
return func(next http.Handler) http.Handler {
|
||||
return http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
|
||||
authHeader := r.Header.Get("Authorization")
|
||||
if authHeader == "" {
|
||||
w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/json; charset=utf-8")
|
||||
w.Header().Set("WWW-Authenticate", `Bearer realm="certctl"`)
|
||||
http.Error(w, `{"error":"Authorization header required"}`, http.StatusUnauthorized)
|
||||
return
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Extract Bearer token
|
||||
if len(authHeader) < 8 || authHeader[:7] != "Bearer " {
|
||||
w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/json; charset=utf-8")
|
||||
http.Error(w, `{"error":"Invalid Authorization header format, expected: Bearer <token>"}`, http.StatusUnauthorized)
|
||||
return
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
token := authHeader[7:]
|
||||
tokenHash := HashAPIKey(token)
|
||||
|
||||
// Check against all valid keys using constant-time comparison
|
||||
var matched *keyEntry
|
||||
for i := range entries {
|
||||
if subtle.ConstantTimeCompare([]byte(tokenHash), []byte(entries[i].hash)) == 1 {
|
||||
matched = &entries[i]
|
||||
break
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if matched == nil {
|
||||
w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/json; charset=utf-8")
|
||||
http.Error(w, `{"error":"Invalid API key"}`, http.StatusUnauthorized)
|
||||
return
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Store the authenticated identity and admin flag in context
|
||||
ctx := context.WithValue(r.Context(), UserKey{}, matched.name)
|
||||
ctx = context.WithValue(ctx, AdminKey{}, matched.admin)
|
||||
next.ServeHTTP(w, r.WithContext(ctx))
|
||||
})
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// NewAuth is a legacy shim that converts a comma-separated Secret list into
|
||||
// synthesized legacy-key-N named entries and delegates to NewAuthWithNamedKeys.
|
||||
// It preserves the pre-M-002 behavior for callers that still pass raw AuthConfig
|
||||
// (primarily cmd/server/main_test.go). The synthesized actor is "legacy-key-N"
|
||||
// rather than the old hardcoded "api-key-user" so audit events carry
|
||||
// meaningful identity even on the legacy path.
|
||||
//
|
||||
// Deprecated: Use NewAuthWithNamedKeys with explicit NamedAPIKey entries.
|
||||
func NewAuth(cfg AuthConfig) func(http.Handler) http.Handler {
|
||||
if cfg.Type == "none" {
|
||||
return func(next http.Handler) http.Handler {
|
||||
return next
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
var namedKeys []NamedAPIKey
|
||||
idx := 0
|
||||
for _, k := range strings.Split(cfg.Secret, ",") {
|
||||
k = strings.TrimSpace(k)
|
||||
if k == "" {
|
||||
continue
|
||||
}
|
||||
namedKeys = append(namedKeys, NamedAPIKey{
|
||||
Name: fmt.Sprintf("legacy-key-%d", idx),
|
||||
Key: k,
|
||||
Admin: false,
|
||||
})
|
||||
idx++
|
||||
}
|
||||
return NewAuthWithNamedKeys(namedKeys)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// RateLimitConfig holds configuration for the rate limiter.
|
||||
//
|
||||
// Bundle B / Audit M-025 (OWASP ASVS L2 §11.2.1) extends this with per-user
|
||||
// and per-IP keying. The historic RPS / BurstSize fields are preserved for
|
||||
// source compatibility — they now describe the per-key budget rather than
|
||||
// source compatibility; they now describe the per-key budget rather than
|
||||
// the global budget. PerUserRPS / PerUserBurstSize, when non-zero, override
|
||||
// RPS / BurstSize for authenticated callers; the IP-keyed fallback
|
||||
// continues to use RPS / BurstSize so unauthenticated callers don't get
|
||||
@@ -278,8 +141,9 @@ type RateLimitConfig struct {
|
||||
RPS float64 // Tokens per second per key (default applies to IP-keyed buckets)
|
||||
BurstSize int // Max tokens per key (default applies to IP-keyed buckets)
|
||||
|
||||
// PerUserRPS overrides RPS for authenticated callers (keyed by UserKey
|
||||
// in context). Zero means "use RPS as the authenticated budget too".
|
||||
// PerUserRPS overrides RPS for authenticated callers (keyed by
|
||||
// auth.UserKey in context). Zero means "use RPS as the authenticated
|
||||
// budget too".
|
||||
PerUserRPS float64
|
||||
|
||||
// PerUserBurstSize overrides BurstSize for authenticated callers.
|
||||
@@ -295,11 +159,11 @@ type RateLimitConfig struct {
|
||||
// authenticated user and each unauthenticated IP gets its own bucket. Keys
|
||||
// are computed per request:
|
||||
//
|
||||
// - Authenticated: "user:" + middleware.GetUser(ctx)
|
||||
// - Authenticated: "user:" + auth.GetUser(ctx)
|
||||
// - Unauthenticated: "ip:" + r.RemoteAddr's host portion
|
||||
//
|
||||
// The bucket map is sync.RWMutex-guarded; create-on-demand for new keys.
|
||||
// There is no eviction — for a long-running server with millions of unique
|
||||
// There is no eviction; for a long-running server with millions of unique
|
||||
// IPs this can leak memory. A future enhancement is per-key TTL via a
|
||||
// lazy sweeper. For now the leak is bounded by realistic operator IP
|
||||
// fan-out and is acceptable per OWASP ASVS L2 (the threat model is abuse
|
||||
@@ -339,9 +203,9 @@ func NewRateLimiter(cfg RateLimitConfig) func(http.Handler) http.Handler {
|
||||
|
||||
// rateLimitKey computes the per-request bucket key. Authenticated callers
|
||||
// get a "user:<name>" key derived from the UserKey context value populated
|
||||
// by NewAuthWithNamedKeys; everyone else falls back to "ip:<host>" parsed
|
||||
// from r.RemoteAddr (X-Forwarded-For is intentionally NOT consulted here
|
||||
// — operators behind a trusted proxy must configure that proxy to set
|
||||
// by auth.NewAuthWithNamedKeys; everyone else falls back to "ip:<host>"
|
||||
// parsed from r.RemoteAddr (X-Forwarded-For is intentionally NOT consulted
|
||||
// here; operators behind a trusted proxy must configure that proxy to set
|
||||
// RemoteAddr correctly, or the rate limiter would be trivially bypassable
|
||||
// by spoofing the header).
|
||||
//
|
||||
@@ -349,7 +213,7 @@ func NewRateLimiter(cfg RateLimitConfig) func(http.Handler) http.Handler {
|
||||
// unauthenticated so a misconfigured auth middleware doesn't grant the
|
||||
// same bucket to every anonymous request.
|
||||
func rateLimitKey(r *http.Request) (string, bool) {
|
||||
if user := GetUser(r.Context()); user != "" {
|
||||
if user := auth.GetUser(r.Context()); user != "" {
|
||||
return "user:" + user, true
|
||||
}
|
||||
host := r.RemoteAddr
|
||||
@@ -463,7 +327,7 @@ func NewCORS(cfg CORSConfig) func(http.Handler) http.Handler {
|
||||
// Security default: deny CORS when no origins are configured.
|
||||
// This prevents CSRF attacks from arbitrary origins.
|
||||
if len(cfg.AllowedOrigins) == 0 {
|
||||
// No CORS headers set — only same-origin requests can read response
|
||||
// No CORS headers set; only same-origin requests can read response
|
||||
if r.Method == http.MethodOptions {
|
||||
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusNoContent)
|
||||
return
|
||||
@@ -538,23 +402,6 @@ func getRequestID(ctx context.Context) string {
|
||||
return id
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// GetUser extracts the authenticated user from context.
|
||||
// Returns the name of the matched API key and whether it was found.
|
||||
func GetUser(ctx context.Context) string {
|
||||
user, ok := ctx.Value(UserKey{}).(string)
|
||||
if !ok {
|
||||
return ""
|
||||
}
|
||||
return user
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// IsAdmin extracts the admin flag from context.
|
||||
// Returns true if the authenticated user has admin privileges.
|
||||
func IsAdmin(ctx context.Context) bool {
|
||||
admin, ok := ctx.Value(AdminKey{}).(bool)
|
||||
return ok && admin
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// responseWriter wraps http.ResponseWriter to capture the status code.
|
||||
type responseWriter struct {
|
||||
http.ResponseWriter
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -5,6 +5,8 @@ import (
|
||||
"net/http"
|
||||
"net/http/httptest"
|
||||
"testing"
|
||||
|
||||
"github.com/certctl-io/certctl/internal/auth"
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
// Bundle B / Audit M-025 (OWASP ASVS L2 §11.2.1): per-key rate-limiter
|
||||
@@ -61,7 +63,7 @@ func TestRateLimiter_M025_SameUserDifferentIPsShareBucket(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
mkReq := func(remote string) *http.Request {
|
||||
req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "/", nil)
|
||||
req.RemoteAddr = remote
|
||||
ctx := context.WithValue(req.Context(), UserKey{}, "alice")
|
||||
ctx := context.WithValue(req.Context(), auth.UserKey{}, "alice")
|
||||
return req.WithContext(ctx)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -88,7 +90,7 @@ func TestRateLimiter_M025_TwoUsersHaveIndependentBuckets(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
mkReq := func(user string) *http.Request {
|
||||
req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "/", nil)
|
||||
req.RemoteAddr = "10.0.0.1:54321"
|
||||
ctx := context.WithValue(req.Context(), UserKey{}, user)
|
||||
ctx := context.WithValue(req.Context(), auth.UserKey{}, user)
|
||||
return req.WithContext(ctx)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -145,7 +147,7 @@ func TestRateLimiter_M025_PerUserBudgetOverride(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
userReq := func() *http.Request {
|
||||
req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "/", nil)
|
||||
req.RemoteAddr = "10.0.0.42:54321"
|
||||
ctx := context.WithValue(req.Context(), UserKey{}, "carol")
|
||||
ctx := context.WithValue(req.Context(), auth.UserKey{}, "carol")
|
||||
return req.WithContext(ctx)
|
||||
}
|
||||
for i := 1; i <= 5; i++ {
|
||||
@@ -171,7 +173,7 @@ func TestRateLimiter_M025_EmptyUserKeyTreatedAsAnonymous(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
mkReq := func(remote string) *http.Request {
|
||||
req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "/", nil)
|
||||
req.RemoteAddr = remote
|
||||
ctx := context.WithValue(req.Context(), UserKey{}, "")
|
||||
ctx := context.WithValue(req.Context(), auth.UserKey{}, "")
|
||||
return req.WithContext(ctx)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -92,6 +92,14 @@ var SpecParityExceptions = map[string]string{
|
||||
"POST /acme/key-change": "Phase 4 default-profile shorthand for key rollover.",
|
||||
"POST /acme/revoke-cert": "Phase 4 default-profile shorthand for revoke-cert.",
|
||||
"GET /acme/renewal-info/{cert_id}": "Phase 4 default-profile shorthand for ARI.",
|
||||
|
||||
// Bundle 1 / Phase 4 RBAC API: shipped with full OpenAPI schema in
|
||||
// the Phase 0-5 closure commit. The 11 routes (auth/me + permissions
|
||||
// catalogue + 5 role-lifecycle + 2 role-permission grant/revoke + 2
|
||||
// actor-role grant/revoke) live in api/openapi.yaml under tag
|
||||
// `[Auth]`. Shared shapes: AuthRole + AuthRolePermission in the
|
||||
// schemas section. AuthCheck (Bundle 1 M1) now returns the same
|
||||
// effective_permissions + roles fields as auth/me on the boot path.
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func TestRouter_OpenAPIParity(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,138 @@
|
||||
package router
|
||||
|
||||
import (
|
||||
"go/parser"
|
||||
"go/token"
|
||||
"os"
|
||||
"strings"
|
||||
"testing"
|
||||
|
||||
"github.com/certctl-io/certctl/internal/auth"
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
// =============================================================================
|
||||
// Bundle 1 Phase 12 (Category F) — protocol endpoints MUST NOT be wrapped in
|
||||
// rbacGate / auth.RequirePermission.
|
||||
//
|
||||
// The prompt's exit criterion: "Negative test asserts that ACME / SCEP /
|
||||
// EST / OCSP / CRL endpoints are NOT wrapped in RequirePermission.
|
||||
// Implementation: scan the router config and assert each protocol-
|
||||
// endpoint route is in the allowlist constant from Phase 3."
|
||||
//
|
||||
// Two complementary checks ride here:
|
||||
//
|
||||
// 1. Scan router.go's source for every literal route path that matches
|
||||
// a protocol-endpoint prefix; assert NONE of those paths appear
|
||||
// inside a rbacGate(...) call. The AST walker is intentionally
|
||||
// loose — substring match against the rbacGate function name is
|
||||
// sufficient and avoids false negatives from formatting.
|
||||
//
|
||||
// 2. Pin the protocol-endpoint dispatch prefixes (cmd/server/main.go's
|
||||
// buildFinalHandler dispatch) against the allowlist constant in
|
||||
// auth.IsProtocolEndpoint. If a future commit adds a new protocol
|
||||
// endpoint without extending the allowlist, this test breaks.
|
||||
// =============================================================================
|
||||
|
||||
// protocolEndpointPrefixes is the canonical set of URL prefixes the
|
||||
// auth middleware MUST bypass. Mirrors auth.IsProtocolEndpoint's
|
||||
// internal switch. This test pins the constant against the actual
|
||||
// router shape.
|
||||
var protocolEndpointPrefixes = []string{
|
||||
"/acme",
|
||||
"/scep",
|
||||
"/.well-known/est",
|
||||
"/.well-known/pki/ocsp",
|
||||
"/.well-known/pki/crl",
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// TestPhase12_ProtocolEndpointsNotGated walks router.go and asserts
|
||||
// no rbacGate(...) call references a path under a protocol-endpoint
|
||||
// prefix. We accept false negatives (the test is conservative) but
|
||||
// never false positives — if rbacGate wraps a protocol path, the test
|
||||
// fails with the offending line.
|
||||
func TestPhase12_ProtocolEndpointsNotGated(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
src, err := os.ReadFile("router.go")
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("read router.go: %v", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
fset := token.NewFileSet()
|
||||
if _, perr := parser.ParseFile(fset, "router.go", src, parser.SkipObjectResolution); perr != nil {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("parse router.go: %v", perr)
|
||||
}
|
||||
body := string(src)
|
||||
|
||||
// Find every line containing rbacGate(. For each, scan for any
|
||||
// of the protocol prefixes appearing on the same line. If both
|
||||
// land on a single line, that's a Category-F violation.
|
||||
for i, line := range strings.Split(body, "\n") {
|
||||
if !strings.Contains(line, "rbacGate(") {
|
||||
continue
|
||||
}
|
||||
for _, prefix := range protocolEndpointPrefixes {
|
||||
// We look for `"<prefix>"` or `"<prefix>/...` shapes —
|
||||
// the path argument is always a quoted string in the
|
||||
// repo's r.Register("METHOD /path", ...) convention.
|
||||
if strings.Contains(line, `"`+prefix) {
|
||||
t.Errorf("router.go line %d: rbacGate wraps a protocol-endpoint path %q (Category F violation): %s",
|
||||
i+1, prefix, strings.TrimSpace(line))
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// TestPhase12_IsProtocolEndpoint_CoversCanonicalPrefixes pins the
|
||||
// auth.IsProtocolEndpoint allowlist against the canonical prefix
|
||||
// set. If a future commit adds a new protocol that the auth
|
||||
// middleware needs to bypass, both this slice AND
|
||||
// auth.IsProtocolEndpoint must change in lockstep.
|
||||
func TestPhase12_IsProtocolEndpoint_CoversCanonicalPrefixes(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
for _, prefix := range protocolEndpointPrefixes {
|
||||
// IsProtocolEndpoint takes a full path; pass the prefix as
|
||||
// a synthetic representative request path.
|
||||
probe := prefix
|
||||
if !strings.HasSuffix(probe, "/") {
|
||||
probe = probe + "/probe"
|
||||
}
|
||||
if !auth.IsProtocolEndpoint(probe) {
|
||||
t.Errorf("IsProtocolEndpoint(%q) = false; the canonical prefix list is out of sync with the auth allowlist", probe)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// TestPhase12_RBACGateRoutesAreUnderAPIv1 belt-and-braces: every
|
||||
// rbacGate-wrapped path the parity test enumerates must start with
|
||||
// `/api/v1/` so we can never accidentally wrap a protocol endpoint
|
||||
// (those all live under `/acme`, `/scep`, or `/.well-known/`).
|
||||
func TestPhase12_RBACGateRoutesAreUnderAPIv1(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
src, err := os.ReadFile("router.go")
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("read router.go: %v", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
for i, line := range strings.Split(string(src), "\n") {
|
||||
if !strings.Contains(line, "rbacGate(") {
|
||||
continue
|
||||
}
|
||||
// Find the quoted path argument. Look for the first
|
||||
// occurrence of `"METHOD /...`.
|
||||
startQuote := strings.Index(line, `"`)
|
||||
if startQuote < 0 {
|
||||
continue
|
||||
}
|
||||
endQuote := strings.Index(line[startQuote+1:], `"`)
|
||||
if endQuote < 0 {
|
||||
continue
|
||||
}
|
||||
path := line[startQuote+1 : startQuote+1+endQuote]
|
||||
// The Register signature is "METHOD /path" — split on
|
||||
// whitespace.
|
||||
parts := strings.Fields(path)
|
||||
if len(parts) != 2 {
|
||||
continue
|
||||
}
|
||||
urlPath := parts[1]
|
||||
if !strings.HasPrefix(urlPath, "/api/v1/") {
|
||||
t.Errorf("router.go line %d: rbacGate wraps non-API-v1 path %q: %s",
|
||||
i+1, urlPath, strings.TrimSpace(line))
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,233 @@
|
||||
package router
|
||||
|
||||
import (
|
||||
"context"
|
||||
"net/http"
|
||||
"net/http/httptest"
|
||||
"testing"
|
||||
|
||||
"github.com/certctl-io/certctl/internal/auth"
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
// =============================================================================
|
||||
// Bundle 1 Phase 3.5 integration tests for the rbacGate wraps. The
|
||||
// pre-Phase-3.5 in-handler auth.IsAdmin checks moved to the router via
|
||||
// auth.RequirePermission middleware; these tests pin the router-level
|
||||
// invariant that non-permitted callers get 403 BEFORE the handler body
|
||||
// runs, and that the protocol-endpoint allowlist (ACME / SCEP / EST /
|
||||
// OCSP / CRL) bypasses the gate.
|
||||
// =============================================================================
|
||||
|
||||
// fakeChecker satisfies auth.PermissionChecker. permFn returns the
|
||||
// canned (allowed, error) tuple per call.
|
||||
type fakeChecker struct {
|
||||
permFn func(ctx context.Context, actorID, actorType, tenantID, perm, scopeType string, scopeID *string) (bool, error)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func (f *fakeChecker) CheckPermission(ctx context.Context, actorID, actorType, tenantID, perm, scopeType string, scopeID *string) (bool, error) {
|
||||
if f.permFn == nil {
|
||||
return true, nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
return f.permFn(ctx, actorID, actorType, tenantID, perm, scopeType, scopeID)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// reachedHandler is a sentinel to confirm the gated handler body
|
||||
// actually ran.
|
||||
type reachedHandler struct{ called bool }
|
||||
|
||||
func (rh *reachedHandler) ServeHTTP(w http.ResponseWriter, _ *http.Request) {
|
||||
rh.called = true
|
||||
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// withActor is a tiny test helper: builds a request with the Phase 3
|
||||
// auth-context keys populated.
|
||||
func withActor(req *http.Request, actorID, actorType string) *http.Request {
|
||||
ctx := req.Context()
|
||||
ctx = context.WithValue(ctx, auth.ActorIDKey{}, actorID)
|
||||
ctx = context.WithValue(ctx, auth.ActorTypeKey{}, actorType)
|
||||
return req.WithContext(ctx)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func TestRBACGate_DeniedActorReturns403_HandlerNotReached(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
rh := &reachedHandler{}
|
||||
checker := &fakeChecker{permFn: func(_ context.Context, _, _, _, perm, _ string, _ *string) (bool, error) {
|
||||
if perm != "cert.bulk_revoke" {
|
||||
t.Errorf("perm = %q, want cert.bulk_revoke", perm)
|
||||
}
|
||||
return false, nil
|
||||
}}
|
||||
gated := rbacGate(checker, "cert.bulk_revoke", rh.ServeHTTP)
|
||||
|
||||
req := withActor(httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodPost, "/api/v1/certificates/bulk-revoke", nil), "bob", auth.ActorTypeAPIKey)
|
||||
rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
|
||||
gated.ServeHTTP(rec, req)
|
||||
|
||||
if rec.Code != http.StatusForbidden {
|
||||
t.Errorf("non-permitted caller should get 403; got %d", rec.Code)
|
||||
}
|
||||
if rh.called {
|
||||
t.Errorf("handler body must NOT run when middleware denies the request")
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func TestRBACGate_PermittedActorReachesHandler(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
rh := &reachedHandler{}
|
||||
checker := &fakeChecker{permFn: func(_ context.Context, _, _, _, _, _ string, _ *string) (bool, error) {
|
||||
return true, nil
|
||||
}}
|
||||
gated := rbacGate(checker, "cert.bulk_revoke", rh.ServeHTTP)
|
||||
|
||||
req := withActor(httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodPost, "/api/v1/certificates/bulk-revoke", nil), "alice", auth.ActorTypeAPIKey)
|
||||
rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
|
||||
gated.ServeHTTP(rec, req)
|
||||
|
||||
if rec.Code != http.StatusOK {
|
||||
t.Errorf("permitted caller should reach handler 200; got %d", rec.Code)
|
||||
}
|
||||
if !rh.called {
|
||||
t.Errorf("handler body must run when middleware allows the request")
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func TestRBACGate_NoCheckerNoOps(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
// Test deployments / demo configs may construct HandlerRegistry
|
||||
// without a Checker. rbacGate must fall through to the handler in
|
||||
// that case so the route stays callable; the middleware is purely
|
||||
// optional defense-in-depth here.
|
||||
rh := &reachedHandler{}
|
||||
gated := rbacGate(nil, "cert.bulk_revoke", rh.ServeHTTP)
|
||||
|
||||
req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodPost, "/api/v1/certificates/bulk-revoke", nil)
|
||||
rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
|
||||
gated.ServeHTTP(rec, req)
|
||||
|
||||
if rec.Code != http.StatusOK {
|
||||
t.Errorf("nil-checker rbacGate should fall through; got %d", rec.Code)
|
||||
}
|
||||
if !rh.called {
|
||||
t.Errorf("nil-checker rbacGate should reach handler unconditionally")
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func TestRBACGate_NoActorReturns401(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
rh := &reachedHandler{}
|
||||
checker := &fakeChecker{} // permFn nil -> always allow; never called
|
||||
gated := rbacGate(checker, "cert.bulk_revoke", rh.ServeHTTP)
|
||||
|
||||
// No ActorIDKey in context.
|
||||
req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodPost, "/api/v1/certificates/bulk-revoke", nil)
|
||||
rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
|
||||
gated.ServeHTTP(rec, req)
|
||||
|
||||
if rec.Code != http.StatusUnauthorized {
|
||||
t.Errorf("missing actor should yield 401; got %d", rec.Code)
|
||||
}
|
||||
if rh.called {
|
||||
t.Errorf("handler body must NOT run when no actor in context")
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// TestRBACGate_AuditorRole_403sOnAdminRoutes is the Bundle 1 Phase 8
|
||||
// exit-criterion test: an actor holding only the auditor role
|
||||
// (audit.read + audit.export) gets 403 on every rbacGate-wrapped admin
|
||||
// route. This pins the prompt's "auditor user can list/export audit
|
||||
// events but gets 403 on every other endpoint" requirement.
|
||||
//
|
||||
// We exercise every admin perm name registered in router.go's rbacGate
|
||||
// calls (cert.bulk_revoke / crl.admin / scep.admin / est.admin /
|
||||
// ca.hierarchy.manage). The checker simulates the auditor's permission
|
||||
// matrix — only audit.read + audit.export return true; every admin
|
||||
// permission returns false. The handler MUST NOT be reached for any
|
||||
// admin perm; the wrapper MUST emit 403.
|
||||
func TestRBACGate_AuditorRole_403sOnAdminRoutes(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
auditorPerms := map[string]bool{
|
||||
"audit.read": true,
|
||||
"audit.export": true,
|
||||
}
|
||||
checker := &fakeChecker{permFn: func(_ context.Context, _, _, _, perm, _ string, _ *string) (bool, error) {
|
||||
return auditorPerms[perm], nil
|
||||
}}
|
||||
for _, adminPerm := range []string{
|
||||
"cert.bulk_revoke",
|
||||
"crl.admin",
|
||||
"scep.admin",
|
||||
"est.admin",
|
||||
"ca.hierarchy.manage",
|
||||
} {
|
||||
t.Run(adminPerm, func(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
rh := &reachedHandler{}
|
||||
gated := rbacGate(checker, adminPerm, rh.ServeHTTP)
|
||||
req := withActor(httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodPost, "/api/v1/", nil), "audrey", auth.ActorTypeAPIKey)
|
||||
rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
|
||||
gated.ServeHTTP(rec, req)
|
||||
if rec.Code != http.StatusForbidden {
|
||||
t.Errorf("auditor on %q route should get 403; got %d", adminPerm, rec.Code)
|
||||
}
|
||||
if rh.called {
|
||||
t.Errorf("handler body must NOT run for auditor on admin route %q", adminPerm)
|
||||
}
|
||||
})
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// TestRBACGate_AuditorRole_PassesAuditReadGate confirms the positive
|
||||
// half of the auditor invariant: a route gated on audit.read does
|
||||
// reach the handler when the auditor calls it. (Bundle 1 doesn't
|
||||
// currently wrap any audit route via rbacGate at the router level —
|
||||
// /v1/audit relies on auth.role.list at the service layer instead;
|
||||
// this test simulates a future wrap to pin the symmetric path.)
|
||||
func TestRBACGate_AuditorRole_PassesAuditReadGate(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
auditorPerms := map[string]bool{
|
||||
"audit.read": true,
|
||||
"audit.export": true,
|
||||
}
|
||||
checker := &fakeChecker{permFn: func(_ context.Context, _, _, _, perm, _ string, _ *string) (bool, error) {
|
||||
return auditorPerms[perm], nil
|
||||
}}
|
||||
rh := &reachedHandler{}
|
||||
gated := rbacGate(checker, "audit.read", rh.ServeHTTP)
|
||||
req := withActor(httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "/api/v1/audit", nil), "audrey", auth.ActorTypeAPIKey)
|
||||
rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
|
||||
gated.ServeHTTP(rec, req)
|
||||
if rec.Code != http.StatusOK {
|
||||
t.Errorf("auditor on audit.read route should reach handler 200; got %d", rec.Code)
|
||||
}
|
||||
if !rh.called {
|
||||
t.Errorf("handler body must run for auditor on audit-read gate")
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// TestRBACGate_DemoModeChainReachesHandler is the end-to-end Bundle 1
|
||||
// Phase 3 closure (C1) regression: when CERTCTL_AUTH_TYPE=none, the
|
||||
// auth.NewDemoModeAuth middleware injects the synthetic actor-demo-anon
|
||||
// actor into context. The rbacGate downstream sees a populated actor +
|
||||
// the fake checker (standing in for the seeded admin grant on the
|
||||
// demo actor) and forwards the request. Without the C1 fix, the
|
||||
// pre-closure NewAuthWithNamedKeys no-op pass-through would have left
|
||||
// context unpopulated and the rbacGate would 401 every demo request.
|
||||
func TestRBACGate_DemoModeChainReachesHandler(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
rh := &reachedHandler{}
|
||||
// Mirror the seeded admin grant on actor-demo-anon: the checker
|
||||
// allows every permission for the demo actor (matches the data
|
||||
// migration seeds in 000029_rbac.up.sql).
|
||||
checker := &fakeChecker{permFn: func(_ context.Context, actorID, _, _, _, _ string, _ *string) (bool, error) {
|
||||
if actorID != auth.DemoAnonActorID {
|
||||
t.Errorf("checker called for unexpected actor %q (want demo-anon)", actorID)
|
||||
}
|
||||
return true, nil
|
||||
}}
|
||||
gated := rbacGate(checker, "cert.bulk_revoke", rh.ServeHTTP)
|
||||
chain := auth.NewDemoModeAuth()(gated)
|
||||
|
||||
req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodPost, "/api/v1/certificates/bulk-revoke", nil)
|
||||
rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
|
||||
chain.ServeHTTP(rec, req)
|
||||
|
||||
if rec.Code != http.StatusOK {
|
||||
t.Errorf("demo-mode caller against admin route should reach handler 200; got %d", rec.Code)
|
||||
}
|
||||
if !rh.called {
|
||||
t.Errorf("handler body must run for demo-mode caller (C1 closure regression)")
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -5,8 +5,20 @@ import (
|
||||
|
||||
"github.com/certctl-io/certctl/internal/api/handler"
|
||||
"github.com/certctl-io/certctl/internal/api/middleware"
|
||||
"github.com/certctl-io/certctl/internal/auth"
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
// rbacGate wraps a handler with auth.RequirePermission(checker, perm,
|
||||
// nil). Used by RegisterHandlers to gate the legacy admin routes
|
||||
// (Bundle 1 Phase 3.5). When checker is nil the wrap is a no-op so
|
||||
// tests / demo deployments without the RBAC stack continue to work.
|
||||
func rbacGate(checker auth.PermissionChecker, perm string, h http.HandlerFunc) http.Handler {
|
||||
if checker == nil {
|
||||
return h
|
||||
}
|
||||
return auth.RequirePermission(checker, perm, nil)(h)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Router wraps http.ServeMux and manages route registration with middleware.
|
||||
type Router struct {
|
||||
mux *http.ServeMux
|
||||
@@ -70,6 +82,8 @@ var AuthExemptRouterRoutes = []string{
|
||||
"GET /ready", // K8s/Docker readiness probe; cannot carry Bearer
|
||||
"GET /api/v1/auth/info", // GUI calls before login to detect auth mode
|
||||
"GET /api/v1/version", // Rollout probes need build identity without key
|
||||
"GET /api/v1/auth/bootstrap", // Bundle 1 Phase 6 — GUI / install one-liner probes "is bootstrap available?" pre-admin; safe (no token, no admin probe leakage)
|
||||
"POST /api/v1/auth/bootstrap", // Bundle 1 Phase 6 — operator POSTs CERTCTL_BOOTSTRAP_TOKEN to mint the first admin; the endpoint is gated by the bootstrap.Strategy and the admin-existence probe
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// AuthExemptDispatchPrefixes is the documented allowlist of URL prefixes
|
||||
@@ -112,6 +126,28 @@ type HandlerRegistry struct {
|
||||
Digest handler.DigestHandler
|
||||
HealthChecks *handler.HealthCheckHandler
|
||||
BulkRevocation handler.BulkRevocationHandler
|
||||
|
||||
// Auth (Bundle 1 Phase 4) handles RBAC management endpoints under
|
||||
// /api/v1/auth/{roles,permissions,keys,me}. Wired in cmd/server with
|
||||
// the service-layer Authorizer + RoleService + ActorRoleService +
|
||||
// PermissionService dependencies. Phase 5 ships the CLI mirror.
|
||||
Auth handler.AuthHandler
|
||||
|
||||
// Bootstrap (Bundle 1 Phase 6) handles the day-0 admin path under
|
||||
// /api/v1/auth/bootstrap. GET probes availability without revealing
|
||||
// state; POST consumes CERTCTL_BOOTSTRAP_TOKEN once and mints the
|
||||
// first admin API key. Both routes are auth-exempt (the endpoint
|
||||
// itself authenticates via the bootstrap token).
|
||||
Bootstrap handler.BootstrapHandler
|
||||
|
||||
// Checker is the load-bearing auth.PermissionChecker that
|
||||
// auth.RequirePermission middleware uses to gate the legacy admin
|
||||
// handlers (Bundle 1 Phase 3.5). cmd/server wires the postgres
|
||||
// Authorizer here via the authPermissionCheckerAdapter shim. When
|
||||
// nil, the wraps are no-ops and the routes fall through unguarded
|
||||
// (only valid in tests / demo deployments — production MUST
|
||||
// configure a Checker).
|
||||
Checker auth.PermissionChecker
|
||||
// L-1 master closure (cat-l-fa0c1ac07ab5 + cat-l-8a1fb258a38a):
|
||||
// server-side bulk endpoints replace pre-L-1 client-side N×HTTP
|
||||
// loops in CertificatesPage.tsx. See handler/bulk_renewal.go and
|
||||
@@ -218,6 +254,39 @@ func (r *Router) RegisterHandlers(reg HandlerRegistry) {
|
||||
// Auth check endpoint (uses full middleware chain via r.Register)
|
||||
r.Register("GET /api/v1/auth/check", http.HandlerFunc(reg.Health.AuthCheck))
|
||||
|
||||
// Bundle 1 Phase 6 — bootstrap routes. Auth-exempt because the
|
||||
// endpoint itself authenticates via the CERTCTL_BOOTSTRAP_TOKEN
|
||||
// (see internal/auth/bootstrap). Both routes are pinned in the
|
||||
// AuthExemptRouterRoutes allowlist above.
|
||||
r.mux.Handle("GET /api/v1/auth/bootstrap", middleware.Chain(
|
||||
http.HandlerFunc(reg.Bootstrap.Available),
|
||||
middleware.CORS,
|
||||
middleware.ContentType,
|
||||
))
|
||||
r.mux.Handle("POST /api/v1/auth/bootstrap", middleware.Chain(
|
||||
http.HandlerFunc(reg.Bootstrap.Mint),
|
||||
middleware.CORS,
|
||||
middleware.ContentType,
|
||||
))
|
||||
|
||||
// RBAC management routes (Bundle 1 Phase 4). Permission gates are
|
||||
// enforced inside each handler via the service layer; the Phase 3
|
||||
// auth.RequirePermission middleware factory will wrap these in a
|
||||
// Phase 3.5 router-level pass once the legacy admin handlers are
|
||||
// converted in lockstep.
|
||||
r.Register("GET /api/v1/auth/me", http.HandlerFunc(reg.Auth.Me))
|
||||
r.Register("GET /api/v1/auth/permissions", http.HandlerFunc(reg.Auth.ListPermissions))
|
||||
r.Register("GET /api/v1/auth/roles", http.HandlerFunc(reg.Auth.ListRoles))
|
||||
r.Register("POST /api/v1/auth/roles", http.HandlerFunc(reg.Auth.CreateRole))
|
||||
r.Register("GET /api/v1/auth/roles/{id}", http.HandlerFunc(reg.Auth.GetRole))
|
||||
r.Register("PUT /api/v1/auth/roles/{id}", http.HandlerFunc(reg.Auth.UpdateRole))
|
||||
r.Register("DELETE /api/v1/auth/roles/{id}", http.HandlerFunc(reg.Auth.DeleteRole))
|
||||
r.Register("POST /api/v1/auth/roles/{id}/permissions", http.HandlerFunc(reg.Auth.AddRolePermission))
|
||||
r.Register("DELETE /api/v1/auth/roles/{id}/permissions/{perm}", http.HandlerFunc(reg.Auth.RemoveRolePermission))
|
||||
r.Register("GET /api/v1/auth/keys", http.HandlerFunc(reg.Auth.ListKeys))
|
||||
r.Register("POST /api/v1/auth/keys/{id}/roles", http.HandlerFunc(reg.Auth.AssignRoleToKey))
|
||||
r.Register("DELETE /api/v1/auth/keys/{id}/roles/{role_id}", http.HandlerFunc(reg.Auth.RevokeRoleFromKey))
|
||||
|
||||
// Certificates routes: /api/v1/certificates
|
||||
// Bulk operations MUST register before {id} routes — Go 1.22 ServeMux
|
||||
// gives literal segments precedence over pattern-var segments, but
|
||||
@@ -227,11 +296,11 @@ func (r *Router) RegisterHandlers(reg HandlerRegistry) {
|
||||
// in, {total_matched, total_<verb>, total_skipped, total_failed,
|
||||
// errors[]} out). L-1 master added bulk-renew + bulk-reassign
|
||||
// alongside the pre-existing bulk-revoke.
|
||||
r.Register("POST /api/v1/certificates/bulk-revoke", http.HandlerFunc(reg.BulkRevocation.BulkRevoke))
|
||||
r.Register("POST /api/v1/certificates/bulk-revoke", rbacGate(reg.Checker, "cert.bulk_revoke", reg.BulkRevocation.BulkRevoke))
|
||||
// EST RFC 7030 hardening Phase 11.2 — Source-scoped EST bulk-revoke.
|
||||
// Same handler instance + same admin gate; the BulkRevokeEST method
|
||||
// pins Source=EST so the operation only affects EST-issued certs.
|
||||
r.Register("POST /api/v1/est/certificates/bulk-revoke", http.HandlerFunc(reg.BulkRevocation.BulkRevokeEST))
|
||||
r.Register("POST /api/v1/est/certificates/bulk-revoke", rbacGate(reg.Checker, "cert.bulk_revoke", reg.BulkRevocation.BulkRevokeEST))
|
||||
r.Register("POST /api/v1/certificates/bulk-renew", http.HandlerFunc(reg.BulkRenewal.BulkRenew))
|
||||
r.Register("POST /api/v1/certificates/bulk-reassign", http.HandlerFunc(reg.BulkReassignment.BulkReassign))
|
||||
r.Register("GET /api/v1/certificates", http.HandlerFunc(reg.Certificates.ListCertificates))
|
||||
@@ -355,18 +424,18 @@ func (r *Router) RegisterHandlers(reg HandlerRegistry) {
|
||||
// Bundle CRL/OCSP-Responder Phase 5: admin observability for the
|
||||
// scheduler-driven CRL pre-generation cache. Admin-gated inside
|
||||
// the handler (M-003 pattern); non-admin callers get 403.
|
||||
r.Register("GET /api/v1/admin/crl/cache", http.HandlerFunc(reg.AdminCRLCache.ListCache))
|
||||
r.Register("GET /api/v1/admin/crl/cache", rbacGate(reg.Checker, "crl.admin", reg.AdminCRLCache.ListCache))
|
||||
// SCEP RFC 8894 + Intune master bundle Phase 9.2 + Phase 9 follow-up
|
||||
// (the project's SCEP GUI restructure spec). All three endpoints are
|
||||
// admin-gated at the handler layer; the M-008 regression scanner pins
|
||||
// the gate set and TestM008_AdminGatedHandlers_HaveTripletTests
|
||||
// enforces the per-handler test triplet.
|
||||
r.Register("GET /api/v1/admin/scep/profiles", http.HandlerFunc(reg.AdminSCEPIntune.Profiles))
|
||||
r.Register("GET /api/v1/admin/scep/intune/stats", http.HandlerFunc(reg.AdminSCEPIntune.Stats))
|
||||
r.Register("POST /api/v1/admin/scep/intune/reload-trust", http.HandlerFunc(reg.AdminSCEPIntune.ReloadTrust))
|
||||
r.Register("GET /api/v1/admin/scep/profiles", rbacGate(reg.Checker, "scep.admin", reg.AdminSCEPIntune.Profiles))
|
||||
r.Register("GET /api/v1/admin/scep/intune/stats", rbacGate(reg.Checker, "scep.admin", reg.AdminSCEPIntune.Stats))
|
||||
r.Register("POST /api/v1/admin/scep/intune/reload-trust", rbacGate(reg.Checker, "scep.admin", reg.AdminSCEPIntune.ReloadTrust))
|
||||
// EST RFC 7030 hardening Phase 7.2 — admin-gated EST observability.
|
||||
r.Register("GET /api/v1/admin/est/profiles", http.HandlerFunc(reg.AdminEST.Profiles))
|
||||
r.Register("POST /api/v1/admin/est/reload-trust", http.HandlerFunc(reg.AdminEST.ReloadTrust))
|
||||
r.Register("GET /api/v1/admin/est/profiles", rbacGate(reg.Checker, "est.admin", reg.AdminEST.Profiles))
|
||||
r.Register("POST /api/v1/admin/est/reload-trust", rbacGate(reg.Checker, "est.admin", reg.AdminEST.ReloadTrust))
|
||||
|
||||
// Notifications routes: /api/v1/notifications
|
||||
r.Register("GET /api/v1/notifications", http.HandlerFunc(reg.Notifications.ListNotifications))
|
||||
@@ -392,10 +461,10 @@ func (r *Router) RegisterHandlers(reg HandlerRegistry) {
|
||||
// /retire literal segment resolves before the {id} pattern-var
|
||||
// route under Go 1.22 ServeMux precedence — the ordering below
|
||||
// matches the notifications + approvals blocks above.
|
||||
r.Register("POST /api/v1/issuers/{id}/intermediates", http.HandlerFunc(reg.IntermediateCAs.Create))
|
||||
r.Register("GET /api/v1/issuers/{id}/intermediates", http.HandlerFunc(reg.IntermediateCAs.List))
|
||||
r.Register("POST /api/v1/intermediates/{id}/retire", http.HandlerFunc(reg.IntermediateCAs.Retire))
|
||||
r.Register("GET /api/v1/intermediates/{id}", http.HandlerFunc(reg.IntermediateCAs.Get))
|
||||
r.Register("POST /api/v1/issuers/{id}/intermediates", rbacGate(reg.Checker, "ca.hierarchy.manage", reg.IntermediateCAs.Create))
|
||||
r.Register("GET /api/v1/issuers/{id}/intermediates", rbacGate(reg.Checker, "ca.hierarchy.manage", reg.IntermediateCAs.List))
|
||||
r.Register("POST /api/v1/intermediates/{id}/retire", rbacGate(reg.Checker, "ca.hierarchy.manage", reg.IntermediateCAs.Retire))
|
||||
r.Register("GET /api/v1/intermediates/{id}", rbacGate(reg.Checker, "ca.hierarchy.manage", reg.IntermediateCAs.Get))
|
||||
|
||||
// Stats routes: /api/v1/stats
|
||||
r.Register("GET /api/v1/stats/summary", http.HandlerFunc(reg.Stats.GetDashboardSummary))
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,28 @@
|
||||
package auth
|
||||
|
||||
import (
|
||||
"crypto/sha256"
|
||||
"encoding/hex"
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
// NamedAPIKey represents a named API key with optional admin flag.
|
||||
//
|
||||
// Name is the canonical actor identity propagated through the request
|
||||
// context (UserKey) and into the audit trail. Two NamedAPIKey rows
|
||||
// MAY share a Name during a rotation overlap window per audit L-004
|
||||
// (CWE-924); both keys validate to the same actor + admin flag so the
|
||||
// per-user rate-limit bucket stays consistent during rotation.
|
||||
type NamedAPIKey struct {
|
||||
Name string
|
||||
Key string
|
||||
Admin bool
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// HashAPIKey computes the SHA-256 hash of an API key for secure storage.
|
||||
// We use SHA-256 rather than bcrypt because API keys are high-entropy
|
||||
// random strings (not user-chosen passwords), so rainbow tables and
|
||||
// brute-force attacks are not a practical concern.
|
||||
func HashAPIKey(key string) string {
|
||||
h := sha256.Sum256([]byte(key))
|
||||
return hex.EncodeToString(h[:])
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,194 @@
|
||||
// Package bootstrap ships the day-0 admin-creation primitive for Bundle 1
|
||||
// Phase 6. The control plane comes up with no admin-roled actors; the
|
||||
// operator hands the env-var token to a single curl call; the server
|
||||
// mints the first admin API key, returns the key value once, then locks
|
||||
// the bootstrap door behind it.
|
||||
//
|
||||
// The Strategy interface is the forward-compat seam: Bundle 2 plugs in an
|
||||
// OIDC-first-admin strategy (the operator logs in via OIDC, the server
|
||||
// recognizes their group claim, the first such login auto-grants r-admin)
|
||||
// alongside the env-var-token strategy this file ships. Both implementations
|
||||
// satisfy the same interface; the boot path picks one based on which
|
||||
// CERTCTL_BOOTSTRAP_* env var is set.
|
||||
package bootstrap
|
||||
|
||||
import (
|
||||
"context"
|
||||
"crypto/subtle"
|
||||
"errors"
|
||||
"sync"
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
// Sentinel errors the HTTP handler maps to status codes.
|
||||
var (
|
||||
// ErrDisabled is returned when the bootstrap path is not callable
|
||||
// either because (a) no token was set, or (b) admin actors already
|
||||
// exist, or (c) the token was already consumed by an earlier call.
|
||||
// Maps to HTTP 410 Gone.
|
||||
ErrDisabled = errors.New("bootstrap: endpoint disabled")
|
||||
|
||||
// ErrInvalidToken is returned when the supplied token does not
|
||||
// match the env-var token (constant-time compared). Maps to HTTP
|
||||
// 401 Unauthorized. Deliberately does NOT distinguish between
|
||||
// "wrong token" and "no token configured" so callers cannot use
|
||||
// timing or status to probe the server's bootstrap state.
|
||||
ErrInvalidToken = errors.New("bootstrap: invalid token")
|
||||
|
||||
// ErrInvalidActorName is returned when the requested admin-key
|
||||
// name is empty or contains characters that would break audit
|
||||
// attribution. Maps to HTTP 400.
|
||||
ErrInvalidActorName = errors.New("bootstrap: invalid actor name")
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
// Strategy is the bundle 1 -> bundle 2 forward-compat seam. Each
|
||||
// strategy gates the day-0 admin path with a different credential type:
|
||||
// Bundle 1 ships EnvTokenStrategy (CERTCTL_BOOTSTRAP_TOKEN); Bundle 2
|
||||
// adds OIDCFirstAdminStrategy (CERTCTL_BOOTSTRAP_OIDC_GROUP). The
|
||||
// service holds whichever strategy was wired at boot.
|
||||
type Strategy interface {
|
||||
// Available reports whether the strategy is currently callable.
|
||||
// Returns false once the strategy is consumed (one-shot semantics)
|
||||
// OR once the strategy detects an existing admin (via the
|
||||
// AdminExistenceProbe). The HTTP handler maps !Available to 410
|
||||
// Gone before doing any token validation, so probing for "is there
|
||||
// a bootstrap path open" is safe.
|
||||
Available(ctx context.Context) (bool, error)
|
||||
|
||||
// Validate consumes the credential and returns nil when the caller
|
||||
// is permitted to mint the first admin. The strategy MUST atomic-
|
||||
// flip its consumed state on first successful Validate so a
|
||||
// concurrent racing call gets ErrDisabled. Returning a non-nil
|
||||
// error MUST NOT mark the strategy consumed; the operator can
|
||||
// retry with the correct credential.
|
||||
Validate(ctx context.Context, token string) error
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// AdminExistenceProbe is the callback the EnvTokenStrategy uses to ask
|
||||
// the actor-role repository whether any actor holds r-admin. Lives at
|
||||
// this package boundary so the strategy doesn't import internal/repository
|
||||
// (would create a cycle: bootstrap -> repository -> postgres -> bootstrap
|
||||
// when the postgres adapter is wired).
|
||||
type AdminExistenceProbe func(ctx context.Context) (bool, error)
|
||||
|
||||
// EnvTokenStrategy is the env-var-token Bundle 1 implementation. The
|
||||
// operator sets CERTCTL_BOOTSTRAP_TOKEN, the server boots with this
|
||||
// strategy, the first valid Validate call atomically flips the
|
||||
// `consumed` flag and the next call returns ErrDisabled.
|
||||
//
|
||||
// The token comparison is crypto/subtle.ConstantTimeCompare so timing
|
||||
// attacks can't leak the token byte-by-byte. The token itself never
|
||||
// leaves this package: the strategy holds it in memory, the handler
|
||||
// receives only error sentinels, the audit row records the event but
|
||||
// not the token value.
|
||||
type EnvTokenStrategy struct {
|
||||
token string // set once at construction; never mutated
|
||||
probe AdminExistenceProbe // optional; nil = skip the existence probe
|
||||
mu sync.Mutex // guards consumed
|
||||
consumed bool // flipped to true after first successful Validate
|
||||
tokenLength int // cached for early-reject fast path
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// NewEnvTokenStrategy constructs the env-var-token strategy. token must
|
||||
// be the raw value of CERTCTL_BOOTSTRAP_TOKEN. probe is optional; when
|
||||
// non-nil it gates Available + Validate on "no admin exists yet" so the
|
||||
// caller can't bootstrap a second admin after the fleet has stabilized.
|
||||
//
|
||||
// When token is empty the returned strategy is born consumed —
|
||||
// Available returns false, Validate returns ErrDisabled. This matches
|
||||
// the boot-path contract that an unset env var disables the endpoint.
|
||||
func NewEnvTokenStrategy(token string, probe AdminExistenceProbe) *EnvTokenStrategy {
|
||||
s := &EnvTokenStrategy{
|
||||
token: token,
|
||||
probe: probe,
|
||||
tokenLength: len(token),
|
||||
}
|
||||
if token == "" {
|
||||
s.consumed = true
|
||||
}
|
||||
return s
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Available implements Strategy.
|
||||
func (s *EnvTokenStrategy) Available(ctx context.Context) (bool, error) {
|
||||
s.mu.Lock()
|
||||
consumed := s.consumed
|
||||
s.mu.Unlock()
|
||||
if consumed {
|
||||
return false, nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
if s.probe != nil {
|
||||
exists, err := s.probe(ctx)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
return false, err
|
||||
}
|
||||
if exists {
|
||||
return false, nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
return true, nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Validate implements Strategy.
|
||||
func (s *EnvTokenStrategy) Validate(ctx context.Context, token string) error {
|
||||
// Fast-path: if the strategy is disabled, return Disabled before
|
||||
// doing any constant-time compare. The state flip below acquires
|
||||
// the same mutex so this read is safe.
|
||||
s.mu.Lock()
|
||||
if s.consumed {
|
||||
s.mu.Unlock()
|
||||
return ErrDisabled
|
||||
}
|
||||
// Refuse zero-length tokens up front. ConstantTimeCompare returns
|
||||
// 1 when both inputs are empty, which would otherwise produce a
|
||||
// permanent backdoor on misconfigured deployments where token=""
|
||||
// at construction; NewEnvTokenStrategy already covers that, but
|
||||
// belt-and-braces here in case a future caller passes the strategy
|
||||
// raw.
|
||||
if s.tokenLength == 0 || len(token) == 0 {
|
||||
s.mu.Unlock()
|
||||
return ErrInvalidToken
|
||||
}
|
||||
// Constant-time compare. Length-pad implicit: ConstantTimeCompare
|
||||
// returns 0 when lengths differ (and runs in constant time
|
||||
// relative to the shorter length).
|
||||
if subtle.ConstantTimeCompare([]byte(s.token), []byte(token)) != 1 {
|
||||
s.mu.Unlock()
|
||||
return ErrInvalidToken
|
||||
}
|
||||
// External probe: respect the "admin already exists" gate even
|
||||
// after a valid token was supplied. This closes the race where a
|
||||
// fleet first-admin lands during the gap between Available and
|
||||
// Validate.
|
||||
if s.probe != nil {
|
||||
// Drop the lock for the probe — repo calls may be slow and
|
||||
// holding the mutex through I/O would serialize every
|
||||
// concurrent bootstrap attempt. Re-acquire after.
|
||||
s.mu.Unlock()
|
||||
exists, err := s.probe(ctx)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
return err
|
||||
}
|
||||
if exists {
|
||||
return ErrDisabled
|
||||
}
|
||||
s.mu.Lock()
|
||||
// Re-check consumed because a concurrent caller might have
|
||||
// flipped it while we were probing.
|
||||
if s.consumed {
|
||||
s.mu.Unlock()
|
||||
return ErrDisabled
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
s.consumed = true
|
||||
s.mu.Unlock()
|
||||
return nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// IsConsumed reports whether the strategy has already been used. Test
|
||||
// helper; production callers should use Available which also runs the
|
||||
// admin-existence probe.
|
||||
func (s *EnvTokenStrategy) IsConsumed() bool {
|
||||
s.mu.Lock()
|
||||
defer s.mu.Unlock()
|
||||
return s.consumed
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,125 @@
|
||||
package bootstrap
|
||||
|
||||
import (
|
||||
"context"
|
||||
"errors"
|
||||
"testing"
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
// TestEnvTokenStrategy_EmptyTokenIsBornDisabled pins the load-bearing
|
||||
// invariant that an unset CERTCTL_BOOTSTRAP_TOKEN closes the bootstrap
|
||||
// path at construction time. The handler depends on this — without it,
|
||||
// a misconfigured deploy that forgot to set the env var would expose
|
||||
// the endpoint with a token of "" that an attacker could trivially
|
||||
// match by also sending "".
|
||||
func TestEnvTokenStrategy_EmptyTokenIsBornDisabled(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
s := NewEnvTokenStrategy("", nil)
|
||||
avail, err := s.Available(context.Background())
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("Available err = %v, want nil", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
if avail {
|
||||
t.Errorf("Available = true for empty token, want false")
|
||||
}
|
||||
if got := s.Validate(context.Background(), ""); !errors.Is(got, ErrDisabled) {
|
||||
t.Errorf("Validate('') for empty-token strategy = %v, want ErrDisabled", got)
|
||||
}
|
||||
if got := s.Validate(context.Background(), "anything"); !errors.Is(got, ErrDisabled) {
|
||||
t.Errorf("Validate('anything') for empty-token strategy = %v, want ErrDisabled", got)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// TestEnvTokenStrategy_WrongTokenReturnsInvalidToken pins that the
|
||||
// strategy maps a token mismatch to ErrInvalidToken (HTTP 401), not
|
||||
// ErrDisabled (410). Misclassifying these would let a probing attacker
|
||||
// distinguish "no token set" from "wrong token" via response status.
|
||||
func TestEnvTokenStrategy_WrongTokenReturnsInvalidToken(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
s := NewEnvTokenStrategy("correct-token", nil)
|
||||
if got := s.Validate(context.Background(), "wrong-token"); !errors.Is(got, ErrInvalidToken) {
|
||||
t.Errorf("Validate(wrong) = %v, want ErrInvalidToken", got)
|
||||
}
|
||||
if got := s.Validate(context.Background(), ""); !errors.Is(got, ErrInvalidToken) {
|
||||
t.Errorf("Validate('') = %v, want ErrInvalidToken", got)
|
||||
}
|
||||
if s.IsConsumed() {
|
||||
t.Errorf("strategy consumed after failed Validate; must remain available for retry")
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// TestEnvTokenStrategy_OneShotConsumption pins the invariant that the
|
||||
// first valid Validate call locks the strategy. The bootstrap path is
|
||||
// strictly one-shot; the second call MUST return ErrDisabled (HTTP
|
||||
// 410), not ErrInvalidToken (which would suggest "wrong token, try
|
||||
// again").
|
||||
func TestEnvTokenStrategy_OneShotConsumption(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
s := NewEnvTokenStrategy("correct-token", nil)
|
||||
if err := s.Validate(context.Background(), "correct-token"); err != nil {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("first Validate = %v, want nil", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
if !s.IsConsumed() {
|
||||
t.Errorf("IsConsumed = false after successful Validate, want true")
|
||||
}
|
||||
if got := s.Validate(context.Background(), "correct-token"); !errors.Is(got, ErrDisabled) {
|
||||
t.Errorf("second Validate = %v, want ErrDisabled", got)
|
||||
}
|
||||
avail, err := s.Available(context.Background())
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("Available err = %v", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
if avail {
|
||||
t.Errorf("Available = true after consumption, want false")
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// TestEnvTokenStrategy_AdminExistsClosesPath pins the invariant that
|
||||
// the admin-existence probe gates Available + Validate. The strategy
|
||||
// must NOT mint a second admin even if the operator forgot to unset
|
||||
// CERTCTL_BOOTSTRAP_TOKEN after onboarding.
|
||||
func TestEnvTokenStrategy_AdminExistsClosesPath(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
probe := func(_ context.Context) (bool, error) { return true, nil }
|
||||
s := NewEnvTokenStrategy("correct-token", probe)
|
||||
avail, err := s.Available(context.Background())
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("Available err = %v", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
if avail {
|
||||
t.Errorf("Available = true with admin exists probe, want false")
|
||||
}
|
||||
if got := s.Validate(context.Background(), "correct-token"); !errors.Is(got, ErrDisabled) {
|
||||
t.Errorf("Validate = %v with admin exists, want ErrDisabled", got)
|
||||
}
|
||||
if s.IsConsumed() {
|
||||
t.Errorf("strategy must NOT be consumed when admin-existence probe rejects; allows retry after operator removes the duplicate admin")
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// TestEnvTokenStrategy_AdminProbeError surfaces the error to the
|
||||
// caller without consuming the strategy. The HTTP handler maps this
|
||||
// to 500; the operator can retry once the underlying issue is fixed.
|
||||
func TestEnvTokenStrategy_AdminProbeError(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
probeErr := errors.New("boom")
|
||||
probe := func(_ context.Context) (bool, error) { return false, probeErr }
|
||||
s := NewEnvTokenStrategy("correct-token", probe)
|
||||
if _, err := s.Available(context.Background()); !errors.Is(err, probeErr) {
|
||||
t.Errorf("Available err = %v, want probeErr", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
if got := s.Validate(context.Background(), "correct-token"); !errors.Is(got, probeErr) {
|
||||
t.Errorf("Validate err = %v, want probeErr", got)
|
||||
}
|
||||
if s.IsConsumed() {
|
||||
t.Errorf("strategy must NOT be consumed on probe error")
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// TestEnvTokenStrategy_ZeroLengthRejectedEvenWithMatchingToken belt-
|
||||
// and-braces against the ConstantTimeCompare("","")=1 footgun. A
|
||||
// strategy explicitly constructed with token="" is born disabled
|
||||
// (ErrDisabled); but if a future caller bypasses the constructor, the
|
||||
// Validate path also rejects zero-length tokens up front.
|
||||
func TestEnvTokenStrategy_ZeroLengthRejectedEvenWithMatchingToken(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
// Directly construct a strategy with token=""
|
||||
s := &EnvTokenStrategy{token: "", tokenLength: 0, consumed: false}
|
||||
if got := s.Validate(context.Background(), ""); !errors.Is(got, ErrInvalidToken) {
|
||||
t.Errorf("Validate('','') = %v, want ErrInvalidToken (zero-length guard)", got)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,204 @@
|
||||
package bootstrap
|
||||
|
||||
import (
|
||||
"context"
|
||||
"crypto/rand"
|
||||
"encoding/hex"
|
||||
"fmt"
|
||||
"regexp"
|
||||
"time"
|
||||
|
||||
"github.com/certctl-io/certctl/internal/domain"
|
||||
authdomain "github.com/certctl-io/certctl/internal/domain/auth"
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
// actorNameRe matches the operator-supplied admin-key name. Constraints:
|
||||
// 3-64 chars, lowercase alphanumeric + hyphen + underscore. Strict
|
||||
// charset prevents audit-attribution shenanigans (control characters,
|
||||
// log-injection sequences, mixed-case look-alikes for an existing
|
||||
// admin actor's name).
|
||||
var actorNameRe = regexp.MustCompile(`^[a-z0-9][a-z0-9_-]{2,63}$`)
|
||||
|
||||
// APIKeyMinter is the slice of APIKeyRepository the bootstrap service
|
||||
// needs. Pulled out as a small interface so the service can be unit-
|
||||
// tested with an in-memory fake.
|
||||
type APIKeyMinter interface {
|
||||
Create(ctx context.Context, key *authdomain.APIKey) error
|
||||
GetByName(ctx context.Context, name string) (*authdomain.APIKey, error)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// RoleGranter is the slice of ActorRoleRepository the bootstrap
|
||||
// service needs.
|
||||
type RoleGranter interface {
|
||||
Grant(ctx context.Context, ar *authdomain.ActorRole) error
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// AuditRecorder is the slice of AuditService the bootstrap service
|
||||
// needs. Phase 8 ships RecordEventWithCategory which classifies the
|
||||
// row's event_category column directly; the bootstrap path always
|
||||
// emits with category=auth.
|
||||
type AuditRecorder interface {
|
||||
RecordEventWithCategory(ctx context.Context, actor string, actorType domain.ActorType, action, eventCategory, resourceType, resourceID string, details map[string]interface{}) error
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// KeyStoreAdder is the runtime hook the bootstrap service uses to
|
||||
// register the just-minted key with the auth middleware so the next
|
||||
// request authenticates without a process restart. The HTTP-layer
|
||||
// auth middleware exposes this via internal/auth.MutableKeyStore.
|
||||
type KeyStoreAdder interface {
|
||||
AddHashed(name, hashHex string, admin bool)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Service ties the bootstrap Strategy to the persistence layer. Kept
|
||||
// separate from the HTTP handler so unit tests can drive it without
|
||||
// httptest, and so the same service can back a future
|
||||
// `certctl auth bootstrap` CLI command.
|
||||
type Service struct {
|
||||
strategy Strategy
|
||||
keys APIKeyMinter
|
||||
roles RoleGranter
|
||||
audit AuditRecorder
|
||||
keyStore KeyStoreAdder
|
||||
hashAPIKey func(string) string // injected so the auth package's HashAPIKey doesn't import this package
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// NewService constructs a bootstrap Service.
|
||||
//
|
||||
// hashAPIKey takes the plaintext key and returns the SHA-256 hex used
|
||||
// by the auth middleware's keystore lookup. Pass internal/auth.HashAPIKey
|
||||
// at the production wire site; tests can pass a deterministic hash for
|
||||
// matching against MutableKeyStore lookups.
|
||||
//
|
||||
// keyStore is optional. Production wires the same MutableKeyStore the
|
||||
// auth middleware reads from so the minted key authenticates the next
|
||||
// request; when nil the bootstrap still persists the key to the DB
|
||||
// but the operator must restart to pick it up via the boot loader.
|
||||
func NewService(strategy Strategy, keys APIKeyMinter, roles RoleGranter, audit AuditRecorder, keyStore KeyStoreAdder, hashAPIKey func(string) string) *Service {
|
||||
return &Service{
|
||||
strategy: strategy,
|
||||
keys: keys,
|
||||
roles: roles,
|
||||
audit: audit,
|
||||
keyStore: keyStore,
|
||||
hashAPIKey: hashAPIKey,
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// MintResult is the success payload returned to the HTTP handler. Key
|
||||
// is the plaintext value the operator must capture before the response
|
||||
// is dropped — the server holds it for ~milliseconds and never logs it.
|
||||
type MintResult struct {
|
||||
APIKey *authdomain.APIKey
|
||||
KeyValue string
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Available reports whether the bootstrap endpoint is currently
|
||||
// callable. Returns the strategy's verdict plus a sentinel
|
||||
// (ErrDisabled) when not. The HTTP handler maps the sentinel to 410
|
||||
// Gone before reading any token from the request body so a probing
|
||||
// attacker can't distinguish "no token configured" from "wrong
|
||||
// token".
|
||||
func (s *Service) Available(ctx context.Context) (bool, error) {
|
||||
if s == nil || s.strategy == nil {
|
||||
return false, ErrDisabled
|
||||
}
|
||||
return s.strategy.Available(ctx)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// ValidateAndMint consumes the strategy's credential and persists the
|
||||
// first admin API key. The response carries the plaintext key value
|
||||
// once; the operator MUST capture it before the response goes out the
|
||||
// wire. Subsequent calls return ErrDisabled (one-shot semantics).
|
||||
//
|
||||
// Side effects:
|
||||
// 1. Strategy.Validate atomically flips its consumed state.
|
||||
// 2. A new row is written to api_keys (id, name, sha256(key), admin=true).
|
||||
// 3. A new row is written to actor_roles (actor=name, role=r-admin).
|
||||
// 4. The MutableKeyStore (if wired) gains a runtime entry so the next
|
||||
// request authenticates without a restart.
|
||||
// 5. An audit event records the bootstrap consumption with
|
||||
// event_category=auth, action=bootstrap.consume.
|
||||
//
|
||||
// The plaintext key is NEVER logged. It exists in three places:
|
||||
// - the random buffer this function generates,
|
||||
// - the MintResult.KeyValue field (the handler writes it to the
|
||||
// response then discards),
|
||||
// - the HTTP response body itself.
|
||||
//
|
||||
// If the persistence calls fail AFTER the strategy is consumed, the
|
||||
// service does NOT roll back the strategy state — by design. A failed
|
||||
// ValidateAndMint call leaves bootstrap closed; the operator must
|
||||
// recover via DB seeding (insert into actor_roles directly) rather
|
||||
// than retry. The alternative (retry) opens a window for a successful
|
||||
// validate-then-fail sequence to mint two admin keys on retry, which
|
||||
// silently widens the trust radius.
|
||||
func (s *Service) ValidateAndMint(ctx context.Context, token, actorName string) (*MintResult, error) {
|
||||
if s == nil || s.strategy == nil || s.keys == nil || s.roles == nil {
|
||||
return nil, ErrDisabled
|
||||
}
|
||||
if !actorNameRe.MatchString(actorName) {
|
||||
return nil, ErrInvalidActorName
|
||||
}
|
||||
if err := s.strategy.Validate(ctx, token); err != nil {
|
||||
return nil, err
|
||||
}
|
||||
// Strategy is now consumed; if anything below fails the operator
|
||||
// has to recover via DB. See the docstring on MintFirstAdmin.
|
||||
keyValue, err := generateAPIKey()
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
return nil, fmt.Errorf("bootstrap: random key generation: %w", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
keyHash := s.hashAPIKey(keyValue)
|
||||
now := time.Now().UTC()
|
||||
apiKey := &authdomain.APIKey{
|
||||
Name: actorName,
|
||||
KeyHash: keyHash,
|
||||
TenantID: authdomain.DefaultTenantID,
|
||||
Admin: true,
|
||||
CreatedBy: "bootstrap",
|
||||
CreatedAt: now,
|
||||
}
|
||||
if err := s.keys.Create(ctx, apiKey); err != nil {
|
||||
return nil, fmt.Errorf("bootstrap: persist key: %w", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
if err := s.roles.Grant(ctx, &authdomain.ActorRole{
|
||||
ActorID: actorName,
|
||||
ActorType: authdomain.ActorTypeValue(domain.ActorTypeAPIKey),
|
||||
RoleID: authdomain.RoleIDAdmin,
|
||||
TenantID: authdomain.DefaultTenantID,
|
||||
GrantedBy: "bootstrap",
|
||||
}); err != nil {
|
||||
return nil, fmt.Errorf("bootstrap: grant admin role: %w", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
if s.keyStore != nil {
|
||||
s.keyStore.AddHashed(actorName, keyHash, true)
|
||||
}
|
||||
if s.audit != nil {
|
||||
// Phase 8 promotes event_category to a first-class column.
|
||||
// Bootstrap is unambiguously an auth event. Errors from the
|
||||
// audit write are intentionally ignored: the bootstrap mint
|
||||
// succeeded and the consequent audit-row miss is preferable
|
||||
// to surfacing a 500 to the operator after the admin-key
|
||||
// already landed in the DB. The audit-row gap is detectable
|
||||
// in monitoring (every successful mint should have a paired
|
||||
// bootstrap.consume row).
|
||||
_ = s.audit.RecordEventWithCategory(ctx, "bootstrap-token", domain.ActorTypeSystem,
|
||||
"bootstrap.consume", domain.EventCategoryAuth, "api_key", apiKey.ID,
|
||||
map[string]interface{}{
|
||||
"actor_name": actorName,
|
||||
"role_id": authdomain.RoleIDAdmin,
|
||||
})
|
||||
}
|
||||
return &MintResult{APIKey: apiKey, KeyValue: keyValue}, nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// generateAPIKey returns 32 random bytes hex-encoded (64-char output).
|
||||
// Same entropy budget as `openssl rand -hex 32` which the agent
|
||||
// bootstrap docs recommend.
|
||||
func generateAPIKey() (string, error) {
|
||||
buf := make([]byte, 32)
|
||||
if _, err := rand.Read(buf); err != nil {
|
||||
return "", err
|
||||
}
|
||||
return hex.EncodeToString(buf), nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,215 @@
|
||||
package bootstrap
|
||||
|
||||
import (
|
||||
"context"
|
||||
"crypto/sha256"
|
||||
"encoding/hex"
|
||||
"errors"
|
||||
"strings"
|
||||
"testing"
|
||||
|
||||
"github.com/certctl-io/certctl/internal/domain"
|
||||
authdomain "github.com/certctl-io/certctl/internal/domain/auth"
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
type fakeMinter struct {
|
||||
created []*authdomain.APIKey
|
||||
createErr error
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func (f *fakeMinter) Create(_ context.Context, k *authdomain.APIKey) error {
|
||||
if f.createErr != nil {
|
||||
return f.createErr
|
||||
}
|
||||
f.created = append(f.created, k)
|
||||
return nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
func (f *fakeMinter) GetByName(_ context.Context, _ string) (*authdomain.APIKey, error) {
|
||||
return nil, errors.New("not implemented for these tests")
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
type fakeGranter struct {
|
||||
grants []*authdomain.ActorRole
|
||||
err error
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func (f *fakeGranter) Grant(_ context.Context, ar *authdomain.ActorRole) error {
|
||||
f.grants = append(f.grants, ar)
|
||||
return f.err
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
type fakeAudit struct {
|
||||
calls []map[string]interface{}
|
||||
category string
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func (f *fakeAudit) RecordEventWithCategory(_ context.Context, _ string, _ domain.ActorType, _ string, eventCategory, _ string, _ string, details map[string]interface{}) error {
|
||||
f.calls = append(f.calls, details)
|
||||
f.category = eventCategory
|
||||
return nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
type fakeKeyStore struct {
|
||||
added []addedEntry
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
type addedEntry struct {
|
||||
name string
|
||||
hash string
|
||||
admin bool
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func (f *fakeKeyStore) AddHashed(name, hash string, admin bool) {
|
||||
f.added = append(f.added, addedEntry{name: name, hash: hash, admin: admin})
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func sha(s string) string {
|
||||
h := sha256.Sum256([]byte(s))
|
||||
return hex.EncodeToString(h[:])
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// TestService_ValidateAndMint_HappyPath pins the load-bearing flow:
|
||||
// valid token → strategy consumed → api_keys row created → admin role
|
||||
// granted → keystore updated → audit row recorded → result carries the
|
||||
// plaintext key + the persisted APIKey row.
|
||||
func TestService_ValidateAndMint_HappyPath(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
strategy := NewEnvTokenStrategy("the-token", nil)
|
||||
minter := &fakeMinter{}
|
||||
granter := &fakeGranter{}
|
||||
audit := &fakeAudit{}
|
||||
store := &fakeKeyStore{}
|
||||
svc := NewService(strategy, minter, granter, audit, store, sha)
|
||||
|
||||
result, err := svc.ValidateAndMint(context.Background(), "the-token", "first-admin")
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("ValidateAndMint err = %v", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
if result == nil || result.KeyValue == "" {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("result.KeyValue empty")
|
||||
}
|
||||
if len(result.KeyValue) < 32 {
|
||||
t.Errorf("KeyValue length = %d, want >= 32 (entropy budget)", len(result.KeyValue))
|
||||
}
|
||||
if !strategy.IsConsumed() {
|
||||
t.Errorf("strategy not consumed after successful mint")
|
||||
}
|
||||
if len(minter.created) != 1 {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("minter.Create call count = %d, want 1", len(minter.created))
|
||||
}
|
||||
apiKey := minter.created[0]
|
||||
if apiKey.Name != "first-admin" || !apiKey.Admin || apiKey.CreatedBy != "bootstrap" {
|
||||
t.Errorf("api_key wrong fields: %+v", apiKey)
|
||||
}
|
||||
if apiKey.KeyHash != sha(result.KeyValue) {
|
||||
t.Errorf("KeyHash != sha(KeyValue); persistence shape is wrong")
|
||||
}
|
||||
if len(granter.grants) != 1 {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("granter.Grant call count = %d, want 1", len(granter.grants))
|
||||
}
|
||||
if granter.grants[0].RoleID != authdomain.RoleIDAdmin {
|
||||
t.Errorf("granted role = %q, want %q", granter.grants[0].RoleID, authdomain.RoleIDAdmin)
|
||||
}
|
||||
if granter.grants[0].ActorID != "first-admin" {
|
||||
t.Errorf("granted actor = %q, want first-admin", granter.grants[0].ActorID)
|
||||
}
|
||||
if granter.grants[0].GrantedBy != "bootstrap" {
|
||||
t.Errorf("GrantedBy = %q, want bootstrap", granter.grants[0].GrantedBy)
|
||||
}
|
||||
if len(store.added) != 1 || store.added[0].name != "first-admin" || !store.added[0].admin {
|
||||
t.Errorf("keystore.AddHashed not called with first-admin/admin=true: %+v", store.added)
|
||||
}
|
||||
if store.added[0].hash != apiKey.KeyHash {
|
||||
t.Errorf("keystore hash != api_key hash; runtime auth would fail")
|
||||
}
|
||||
if len(audit.calls) != 1 {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("audit RecordEventWithCategory calls = %d, want 1", len(audit.calls))
|
||||
}
|
||||
if audit.calls[0]["actor_name"] != "first-admin" {
|
||||
t.Errorf("audit details lost actor_name: %+v", audit.calls[0])
|
||||
}
|
||||
if audit.category != "auth" {
|
||||
t.Errorf("audit category = %q, want auth", audit.category)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// TestService_ValidateAndMint_RejectsInvalidActorName pins the
|
||||
// ErrInvalidActorName mapping (HTTP 400). Strict charset prevents
|
||||
// log-injection / lookalike actor names.
|
||||
func TestService_ValidateAndMint_RejectsInvalidActorName(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
svc := NewService(NewEnvTokenStrategy("t", nil), &fakeMinter{}, &fakeGranter{}, nil, nil, sha)
|
||||
cases := []string{
|
||||
"", // empty
|
||||
"AB", // too short
|
||||
"Has-Caps", // uppercase rejected
|
||||
"contains spaces", // space rejected
|
||||
strings.Repeat("a", 65), // 65 chars > 64 max
|
||||
"newline\nsuffix", // log injection
|
||||
"💀-evil", // non-ASCII
|
||||
}
|
||||
for _, name := range cases {
|
||||
_, err := svc.ValidateAndMint(context.Background(), "t", name)
|
||||
if !errors.Is(err, ErrInvalidActorName) {
|
||||
t.Errorf("name=%q err = %v, want ErrInvalidActorName", name, err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// TestService_ValidateAndMint_PropagatesStrategyError pins that a
|
||||
// failed Validate (wrong token / disabled / probe error) propagates
|
||||
// without persisting anything.
|
||||
func TestService_ValidateAndMint_PropagatesStrategyError(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
strategy := NewEnvTokenStrategy("the-token", nil)
|
||||
minter := &fakeMinter{}
|
||||
granter := &fakeGranter{}
|
||||
store := &fakeKeyStore{}
|
||||
svc := NewService(strategy, minter, granter, nil, store, sha)
|
||||
|
||||
_, err := svc.ValidateAndMint(context.Background(), "wrong-token", "first-admin")
|
||||
if !errors.Is(err, ErrInvalidToken) {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("err = %v, want ErrInvalidToken", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
if len(minter.created) != 0 || len(granter.grants) != 0 || len(store.added) != 0 {
|
||||
t.Errorf("persistence side effects fired despite Validate failure: minter=%d grants=%d keystore=%d", len(minter.created), len(granter.grants), len(store.added))
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// TestService_ValidateAndMint_NilDepsReturnDisabled exercises the
|
||||
// no-strategy / no-repo guard. Returns ErrDisabled (handler maps to
|
||||
// 410). Belt-and-braces for partially-wired test or future call sites.
|
||||
func TestService_ValidateAndMint_NilDepsReturnDisabled(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
cases := []struct {
|
||||
name string
|
||||
svc *Service
|
||||
}{
|
||||
{"nil service", nil},
|
||||
{"nil strategy", NewService(nil, &fakeMinter{}, &fakeGranter{}, nil, nil, sha)},
|
||||
{"nil minter", NewService(NewEnvTokenStrategy("t", nil), nil, &fakeGranter{}, nil, nil, sha)},
|
||||
{"nil granter", NewService(NewEnvTokenStrategy("t", nil), &fakeMinter{}, nil, nil, nil, sha)},
|
||||
}
|
||||
for _, tc := range cases {
|
||||
_, err := tc.svc.ValidateAndMint(context.Background(), "t", "first-admin")
|
||||
if !errors.Is(err, ErrDisabled) {
|
||||
t.Errorf("%s: err = %v, want ErrDisabled", tc.name, err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// TestService_GenerateAPIKey_HighEntropy pins the generated key shape:
|
||||
// 64 hex chars (32 random bytes). Belt-and-braces against future
|
||||
// refactors that might shrink the entropy budget.
|
||||
func TestService_GenerateAPIKey_HighEntropy(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
seen := map[string]bool{}
|
||||
for i := 0; i < 100; i++ {
|
||||
k, err := generateAPIKey()
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("iter %d: %v", i, err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
if len(k) != 64 {
|
||||
t.Errorf("len = %d, want 64", len(k))
|
||||
}
|
||||
if seen[k] {
|
||||
t.Errorf("key collision in 100 iters — entropy budget regressed")
|
||||
}
|
||||
seen[k] = true
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,132 @@
|
||||
// Package auth holds the certctl auth surface: API-key validation, the
|
||||
// authenticated-actor context keys, and the helpers that consumers across
|
||||
// the codebase use to read the actor identity (rate limiter, audit
|
||||
// recorder, handler-level admin gates, GUI affordance hints).
|
||||
//
|
||||
// Bundle 1 / Phase 0 split this code out of internal/api/middleware so
|
||||
// Bundle 2 (OIDC + sessions) and the broader RBAC primitive (roles +
|
||||
// permissions + scoped grants) have a clean home that doesn't bloat the
|
||||
// generic-middleware package. Phase 0 is a pure refactor; behaviour
|
||||
// matches the pre-extract NewAuthWithNamedKeys / NewAuth surface
|
||||
// byte-for-byte.
|
||||
package auth
|
||||
|
||||
import "context"
|
||||
|
||||
// UserKey is the context key for storing the authenticated actor's
|
||||
// canonical name. Populated by Middleware (a.k.a. NewAuthWithNamedKeys)
|
||||
// from the matched NamedAPIKey.Name. Read by GetUser.
|
||||
type UserKey struct{}
|
||||
|
||||
// AdminKey is the context key for storing the admin flag. Populated by
|
||||
// Middleware from the matched NamedAPIKey.Admin. Read by IsAdmin.
|
||||
//
|
||||
// Bundle 1 keeps the boolean shape for backwards compatibility with the
|
||||
// pre-RBAC handler gates. Phase 3 introduces RequirePermission and the
|
||||
// boolean becomes informational only (admin role membership ↔ this flag).
|
||||
type AdminKey struct{}
|
||||
|
||||
// GetUser extracts the authenticated user from context. Returns the name
|
||||
// of the matched API key, or "" if the request was not authenticated
|
||||
// (none mode, missing Bearer, or a misconfigured chain).
|
||||
func GetUser(ctx context.Context) string {
|
||||
user, ok := ctx.Value(UserKey{}).(string)
|
||||
if !ok {
|
||||
return ""
|
||||
}
|
||||
return user
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// IsAdmin extracts the admin flag from context. Returns true only when
|
||||
// the authenticated actor's NamedAPIKey carried Admin=true.
|
||||
//
|
||||
// Bundle 1 maintains the boolean for back-compat. Bundle 1 Phase 3
|
||||
// introduces auth.RequirePermission as the load-bearing authorization
|
||||
// gate; legacy IsAdmin callers (5 admin handlers tracked in M-008)
|
||||
// migrate to RequirePermission in that phase.
|
||||
func IsAdmin(ctx context.Context) bool {
|
||||
admin, ok := ctx.Value(AdminKey{}).(bool)
|
||||
return ok && admin
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// =============================================================================
|
||||
// Bundle 1 Phase 3: RBAC-aware context keys.
|
||||
//
|
||||
// ActorIDKey, ActorTypeKey, and TenantIDKey are populated by the auth
|
||||
// middleware (NewAuthWithNamedKeys, NewDemoModeAuth, and Bundle 2's
|
||||
// session middleware) so that downstream RBAC checks have a stable
|
||||
// identity + tenancy view of the caller.
|
||||
//
|
||||
// UserKey + AdminKey continue to be populated for back-compat with
|
||||
// existing audit / rate-limiter / handler code; the new keys are the
|
||||
// canonical Phase 3+ identity.
|
||||
// =============================================================================
|
||||
|
||||
// ActorIDKey is the canonical actor identifier (e.g. an API-key name,
|
||||
// an OIDC user id, or the synthetic `actor-demo-anon`). Phase 3
|
||||
// middleware populates this; auth.RequirePermission and
|
||||
// auth.CallerFromContext read it.
|
||||
type ActorIDKey struct{}
|
||||
|
||||
// ActorTypeKey is the typed-string actor type (User, System, Agent,
|
||||
// APIKey, Anonymous) corresponding to internal/domain.ActorType. Stored
|
||||
// as a string so the internal/auth package doesn't need to import the
|
||||
// domain package and create a cycle.
|
||||
type ActorTypeKey struct{}
|
||||
|
||||
// TenantIDKey is the tenant the request executes in. Bundle 1 ships
|
||||
// single-tenant; every authenticated request gets the seeded
|
||||
// `t-default` tenant unless the future managed-service offering
|
||||
// configures a different one.
|
||||
type TenantIDKey struct{}
|
||||
|
||||
// GetActorID returns the canonical actor id from context, or "" when
|
||||
// no actor is present (anonymous request, missing middleware in test
|
||||
// harnesses, etc.). Falls back to the legacy UserKey value for
|
||||
// back-compat with handlers that have not yet adopted the new keys.
|
||||
func GetActorID(ctx context.Context) string {
|
||||
if id, ok := ctx.Value(ActorIDKey{}).(string); ok && id != "" {
|
||||
return id
|
||||
}
|
||||
return GetUser(ctx)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// GetActorType returns the actor type string from context, or "" when
|
||||
// no actor type was set. Phase 3 middleware sets this to "APIKey" for
|
||||
// validated bearer-token requests and "Anonymous" for the demo-mode
|
||||
// synthetic actor.
|
||||
func GetActorType(ctx context.Context) string {
|
||||
if t, ok := ctx.Value(ActorTypeKey{}).(string); ok {
|
||||
return t
|
||||
}
|
||||
return ""
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// GetTenantID returns the tenant id from context, or the seeded
|
||||
// default tenant when no value was set. Returning the default rather
|
||||
// than "" keeps RBAC lookups working in deployments that haven't
|
||||
// configured a tenant explicitly (the Bundle 1 baseline).
|
||||
func GetTenantID(ctx context.Context) string {
|
||||
if t, ok := ctx.Value(TenantIDKey{}).(string); ok && t != "" {
|
||||
return t
|
||||
}
|
||||
return DefaultTenantID
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// DefaultTenantID is the seeded single tenant. Mirrors
|
||||
// internal/domain/auth.DefaultTenantID; duplicated here to avoid a
|
||||
// cross-package import in the hot-path middleware.
|
||||
const DefaultTenantID = "t-default"
|
||||
|
||||
// DemoAnonActorID is the synthetic actor id used by the demo-mode
|
||||
// auth middleware when CERTCTL_AUTH_TYPE=none. Mirrors
|
||||
// internal/domain/auth.DemoAnonActorID.
|
||||
const DemoAnonActorID = "actor-demo-anon"
|
||||
|
||||
// ActorTypeAPIKey + ActorTypeAnonymous mirror the corresponding
|
||||
// domain.ActorType values. Stored as untyped strings here so callers
|
||||
// don't have to import the domain package.
|
||||
const (
|
||||
ActorTypeAPIKey = "APIKey"
|
||||
ActorTypeAnonymous = "Anonymous"
|
||||
)
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,157 @@
|
||||
package auth
|
||||
|
||||
import (
|
||||
"crypto/subtle"
|
||||
"sync"
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
// KeyStore is the lookup contract NewAuthWithKeyStore consults to
|
||||
// resolve a Bearer token (already SHA-256 hashed by the middleware) to
|
||||
// a NamedAPIKey identity. The interface exists so the same auth
|
||||
// middleware can serve both the env-var-keys-only path (immutable
|
||||
// in-memory hash table built at startup) and the bootstrap-extended
|
||||
// path (env-var keys plus runtime-minted admin keys persisted in
|
||||
// `api_keys`). Bundle 2 will plug in an OIDC-session lookup behind the
|
||||
// same interface.
|
||||
//
|
||||
// LookupByHash MUST be safe for concurrent reads. Implementations that
|
||||
// support runtime additions wrap their backing slice/map in a
|
||||
// sync.RWMutex (see MutableKeyStore) so the request path remains lock-
|
||||
// free in the steady state.
|
||||
type KeyStore interface {
|
||||
// LookupByHash returns the NamedAPIKey whose SHA-256 hash matches
|
||||
// the supplied hex-encoded hash. The matched bool is false when no
|
||||
// entry matches; callers MUST treat false as "wrong key" (HTTP
|
||||
// 401) and never as "fall through to a default identity".
|
||||
//
|
||||
// The supplied hash is the output of HashAPIKey(token) — already a
|
||||
// 64-char lowercase hex string. Implementations compare it against
|
||||
// stored hashes via crypto/subtle.ConstantTimeCompare so a
|
||||
// timing-attacking caller can't byte-by-byte recover a key.
|
||||
LookupByHash(hash string) (NamedAPIKey, bool)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// StaticKeyStore is the immutable Bundle-0 behaviour: the entries are
|
||||
// fixed at construction and the lookup is a constant-time scan. Used
|
||||
// by deployments that haven't enabled the Bundle-1 bootstrap flow and
|
||||
// by tests that don't need runtime additions.
|
||||
type StaticKeyStore struct {
|
||||
entries []entry
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
type entry struct {
|
||||
hash string // SHA-256 hex
|
||||
name string
|
||||
admin bool
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// NewStaticKeyStore builds an immutable KeyStore from a slice of
|
||||
// NamedAPIKey values. Each key is hashed once at construction. The
|
||||
// returned store is safe for concurrent reads with no locking; mutation
|
||||
// is not supported.
|
||||
func NewStaticKeyStore(keys []NamedAPIKey) *StaticKeyStore {
|
||||
out := &StaticKeyStore{
|
||||
entries: make([]entry, 0, len(keys)),
|
||||
}
|
||||
for _, nk := range keys {
|
||||
out.entries = append(out.entries, entry{
|
||||
hash: HashAPIKey(nk.Key),
|
||||
name: nk.Name,
|
||||
admin: nk.Admin,
|
||||
})
|
||||
}
|
||||
return out
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// LookupByHash implements KeyStore.
|
||||
func (s *StaticKeyStore) LookupByHash(hash string) (NamedAPIKey, bool) {
|
||||
for i := range s.entries {
|
||||
if subtle.ConstantTimeCompare([]byte(hash), []byte(s.entries[i].hash)) == 1 {
|
||||
e := s.entries[i]
|
||||
return NamedAPIKey{Name: e.name, Admin: e.admin}, true
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
return NamedAPIKey{}, false
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Len reports how many entries the store holds. Test/debug helper; the
|
||||
// request path uses LookupByHash which is the load-bearing contract.
|
||||
func (s *StaticKeyStore) Len() int { return len(s.entries) }
|
||||
|
||||
// MutableKeyStore is the Bundle-1 Phase 6 KeyStore that supports
|
||||
// runtime additions. The Bundle 1 bootstrap flow inserts a new row
|
||||
// into `api_keys`, then calls Add(...) so the just-minted key
|
||||
// authenticates the very next request without a server restart. The
|
||||
// backing store loads the same `api_keys` rows on startup so DB-
|
||||
// persisted keys survive process restart.
|
||||
//
|
||||
// Concurrency: a sync.RWMutex guards a slice of entries. Reads
|
||||
// (LookupByHash) take the read lock; Add takes the write lock. The
|
||||
// in-memory slice mirrors the env-var named-key entries plus every
|
||||
// `api_keys` row loaded at boot plus every Add that fires after
|
||||
// startup.
|
||||
type MutableKeyStore struct {
|
||||
mu sync.RWMutex
|
||||
entries []entry
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// NewMutableKeyStore seeds a MutableKeyStore with the provided keys.
|
||||
// Pass the env-var named keys here at boot; Add additional keys
|
||||
// (loaded from `api_keys` or minted by bootstrap) after construction.
|
||||
func NewMutableKeyStore(seed []NamedAPIKey) *MutableKeyStore {
|
||||
out := &MutableKeyStore{
|
||||
entries: make([]entry, 0, len(seed)),
|
||||
}
|
||||
for _, nk := range seed {
|
||||
out.entries = append(out.entries, entry{
|
||||
hash: HashAPIKey(nk.Key),
|
||||
name: nk.Name,
|
||||
admin: nk.Admin,
|
||||
})
|
||||
}
|
||||
return out
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// LookupByHash implements KeyStore.
|
||||
func (s *MutableKeyStore) LookupByHash(hash string) (NamedAPIKey, bool) {
|
||||
s.mu.RLock()
|
||||
defer s.mu.RUnlock()
|
||||
for i := range s.entries {
|
||||
if subtle.ConstantTimeCompare([]byte(hash), []byte(s.entries[i].hash)) == 1 {
|
||||
e := s.entries[i]
|
||||
return NamedAPIKey{Name: e.name, Admin: e.admin}, true
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
return NamedAPIKey{}, false
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Add registers a new key with the store. The plaintext key is hashed
|
||||
// once and stored alongside the name + admin flag. Idempotent on
|
||||
// duplicate hashes (an existing entry for the same hash is replaced
|
||||
// in-place so re-running the bootstrap loader on startup is safe).
|
||||
func (s *MutableKeyStore) Add(key NamedAPIKey) {
|
||||
s.AddHashed(key.Name, HashAPIKey(key.Key), key.Admin)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// AddHashed registers a key whose SHA-256 hash is already computed.
|
||||
// Used by the api_keys boot loader (the DB stores the hash, not the
|
||||
// plaintext, so the loader has no plaintext to re-hash).
|
||||
func (s *MutableKeyStore) AddHashed(name, hashHex string, admin bool) {
|
||||
s.mu.Lock()
|
||||
defer s.mu.Unlock()
|
||||
for i := range s.entries {
|
||||
if s.entries[i].hash == hashHex {
|
||||
s.entries[i].name = name
|
||||
s.entries[i].admin = admin
|
||||
return
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
s.entries = append(s.entries, entry{hash: hashHex, name: name, admin: admin})
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Len reports the current entry count. Test helper.
|
||||
func (s *MutableKeyStore) Len() int {
|
||||
s.mu.RLock()
|
||||
defer s.mu.RUnlock()
|
||||
return len(s.entries)
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,159 @@
|
||||
package auth
|
||||
|
||||
import (
|
||||
"context"
|
||||
"fmt"
|
||||
"log/slog"
|
||||
"net/http"
|
||||
"strings"
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
// AuthConfig holds configuration for the legacy NewAuth shim.
|
||||
//
|
||||
// G-1 (P1): valid Type values are "api-key" or "none" only. "jwt" was
|
||||
// removed because no JWT middleware ships with certctl (silent auth
|
||||
// downgrade pre-G-1). The single source of truth for the allowed set
|
||||
// lives at internal/config.AuthType / config.ValidAuthTypes(); prefer
|
||||
// those constants over string literals when comparing.
|
||||
//
|
||||
// Bundle 2 will extend ValidAuthTypes() with "oidc"; Bundle 1 leaves
|
||||
// the surface unchanged.
|
||||
type AuthConfig struct {
|
||||
Type string // "api-key" or "none" (see config.AuthType constants)
|
||||
Secret string // The raw API key or comma-separated list of valid API keys
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// NewAuthWithNamedKeys creates an authentication middleware that validates
|
||||
// Bearer tokens against a set of named API keys. Each key carries a name
|
||||
// (propagated as the actor via context) and an admin flag (consulted by
|
||||
// authorization gates such as bulk revocation).
|
||||
//
|
||||
// When namedKeys is empty the returned middleware is a no-op pass-through,
|
||||
// which is used in demo/development mode (CERTCTL_AUTH_TYPE=none). When one
|
||||
// or more keys are provided, requests must include a matching Bearer token
|
||||
// or they are rejected with 401.
|
||||
//
|
||||
// Bundle 1 Phase 3 extends Middleware with the RBAC primitive. This
|
||||
// function continues to exist as the API-key validator; Phase 3 wraps it
|
||||
// with the role lookup that populates the future ActorIDKey / RolesKey
|
||||
// context values.
|
||||
func NewAuthWithNamedKeys(namedKeys []NamedAPIKey) func(http.Handler) http.Handler {
|
||||
if len(namedKeys) == 0 {
|
||||
return func(next http.Handler) http.Handler {
|
||||
return next
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
if len(namedKeys) == 1 {
|
||||
slog.Warn("only one API key configured — consider adding a rotation key for zero-downtime rotation")
|
||||
}
|
||||
return NewAuthWithKeyStore(NewStaticKeyStore(namedKeys))
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// NewAuthWithKeyStore is the Bundle-1 Phase-6 entry point. It builds a
|
||||
// Bearer-token middleware whose lookup table is supplied by the caller
|
||||
// instead of being baked into the closure. Production wiring passes a
|
||||
// MutableKeyStore so the bootstrap path can mint new admin keys at
|
||||
// runtime; tests pass a StaticKeyStore for the immutable case. A nil
|
||||
// store yields the demo-mode pass-through (matches NewAuthWithNamedKeys
|
||||
// with an empty slice).
|
||||
func NewAuthWithKeyStore(store KeyStore) func(http.Handler) http.Handler {
|
||||
if store == nil {
|
||||
return func(next http.Handler) http.Handler { return next }
|
||||
}
|
||||
return func(next http.Handler) http.Handler {
|
||||
return http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
|
||||
authHeader := r.Header.Get("Authorization")
|
||||
if authHeader == "" {
|
||||
w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/json; charset=utf-8")
|
||||
w.Header().Set("WWW-Authenticate", `Bearer realm="certctl"`)
|
||||
http.Error(w, `{"error":"Authorization header required"}`, http.StatusUnauthorized)
|
||||
return
|
||||
}
|
||||
if len(authHeader) < 8 || authHeader[:7] != "Bearer " {
|
||||
w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/json; charset=utf-8")
|
||||
http.Error(w, `{"error":"Invalid Authorization header format, expected: Bearer <token>"}`, http.StatusUnauthorized)
|
||||
return
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
token := authHeader[7:]
|
||||
matched, ok := store.LookupByHash(HashAPIKey(token))
|
||||
if !ok {
|
||||
w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/json; charset=utf-8")
|
||||
http.Error(w, `{"error":"Invalid API key"}`, http.StatusUnauthorized)
|
||||
return
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Bundle 1 Phase 0 legacy UserKey/AdminKey + Phase 3 RBAC
|
||||
// ActorIDKey/ActorTypeKey/TenantIDKey are populated on every
|
||||
// authenticated request so downstream RequirePermission +
|
||||
// audit-attribution code see a consistent actor.
|
||||
ctx := context.WithValue(r.Context(), UserKey{}, matched.Name)
|
||||
ctx = context.WithValue(ctx, AdminKey{}, matched.Admin)
|
||||
ctx = context.WithValue(ctx, ActorIDKey{}, matched.Name)
|
||||
ctx = context.WithValue(ctx, ActorTypeKey{}, ActorTypeAPIKey)
|
||||
ctx = context.WithValue(ctx, TenantIDKey{}, DefaultTenantID)
|
||||
next.ServeHTTP(w, r.WithContext(ctx))
|
||||
})
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// NewDemoModeAuth returns a middleware that injects the synthetic
|
||||
// `actor-demo-anon` identity into every request context. Used when
|
||||
// CERTCTL_AUTH_TYPE=none is configured (the demo path) so that
|
||||
// RBAC-gated handlers see an admin-equivalent caller without operator
|
||||
// configuration.
|
||||
//
|
||||
// The synthetic actor is seeded by migration 000029_rbac.up.sql with
|
||||
// the admin role at global scope, so RequirePermission resolves
|
||||
// every gated request as an admin. The reserved-actor guard in the
|
||||
// service layer prevents the API from accidentally mutating this
|
||||
// actor's role assignments.
|
||||
//
|
||||
// Production deployments MUST NOT use this middleware. The cmd/server
|
||||
// startup wires it only when CERTCTL_AUTH_TYPE=none is explicitly
|
||||
// configured.
|
||||
func NewDemoModeAuth() func(http.Handler) http.Handler {
|
||||
return func(next http.Handler) http.Handler {
|
||||
return http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
|
||||
ctx := r.Context()
|
||||
ctx = context.WithValue(ctx, UserKey{}, DemoAnonActorID)
|
||||
ctx = context.WithValue(ctx, AdminKey{}, true)
|
||||
ctx = context.WithValue(ctx, ActorIDKey{}, DemoAnonActorID)
|
||||
ctx = context.WithValue(ctx, ActorTypeKey{}, ActorTypeAnonymous)
|
||||
ctx = context.WithValue(ctx, TenantIDKey{}, DefaultTenantID)
|
||||
next.ServeHTTP(w, r.WithContext(ctx))
|
||||
})
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// NewAuth is a legacy shim that converts a comma-separated Secret list into
|
||||
// synthesized legacy-key-N named entries and delegates to NewAuthWithNamedKeys.
|
||||
// It preserves the pre-M-002 behavior for callers that still pass raw AuthConfig
|
||||
// (primarily cmd/server/main_test.go). The synthesized actor is "legacy-key-N"
|
||||
// rather than the old hardcoded "api-key-user" so audit events carry
|
||||
// meaningful identity even on the legacy path.
|
||||
//
|
||||
// Deprecated: Use NewAuthWithNamedKeys with explicit NamedAPIKey entries.
|
||||
func NewAuth(cfg AuthConfig) func(http.Handler) http.Handler {
|
||||
if cfg.Type == "none" {
|
||||
return func(next http.Handler) http.Handler {
|
||||
return next
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
var namedKeys []NamedAPIKey
|
||||
idx := 0
|
||||
for _, k := range strings.Split(cfg.Secret, ",") {
|
||||
k = strings.TrimSpace(k)
|
||||
if k == "" {
|
||||
continue
|
||||
}
|
||||
namedKeys = append(namedKeys, NamedAPIKey{
|
||||
Name: fmt.Sprintf("legacy-key-%d", idx),
|
||||
Key: k,
|
||||
Admin: false,
|
||||
})
|
||||
idx++
|
||||
}
|
||||
return NewAuthWithNamedKeys(namedKeys)
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
|
||||
package middleware
|
||||
package auth
|
||||
|
||||
import (
|
||||
"net/http"
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,49 @@
|
||||
package auth
|
||||
|
||||
import "strings"
|
||||
|
||||
// ProtocolEndpointPrefixes lists the URL path prefixes that authenticate
|
||||
// via the protocol itself rather than via certctl's Bearer / cookie
|
||||
// stack. Bundle 1 Phase 3 uses this allowlist as the explicit "do NOT
|
||||
// wrap with RequirePermission" set: the RBAC middleware applies only to
|
||||
// admin handlers replacing legacy IsAdmin checks plus any new
|
||||
// permission-gated routes; the endpoints below keep their existing
|
||||
// protocol-level auth.
|
||||
//
|
||||
// Adding a new protocol endpoint that doesn't take a Bearer token MUST
|
||||
// also add the prefix here and a parallel test in Phase 12 asserting
|
||||
// the route is unwrapped.
|
||||
//
|
||||
// Per the Phase 3 audit:
|
||||
//
|
||||
// ACME server : /acme/profile/<id>/* + /acme/* (JWS-signed, RFC 8555).
|
||||
// SCEP server : /scep (challenge password +
|
||||
// signed CSR, RFC 8894).
|
||||
// EST server : /.well-known/est/* (mTLS client cert,
|
||||
// RFC 7030).
|
||||
// OCSP responder : /.well-known/pki/ocsp (RFC 6960, public).
|
||||
// CRL distrib. : /.well-known/pki/crl/* (RFC 5280, public).
|
||||
//
|
||||
// Plus the existing public-route bypass list at internal/api/router
|
||||
// (router.go:69-72): /health, /ready, /api/v1/auth/info. Those bypass
|
||||
// EVERY middleware stack, not just RBAC, so they're not in this
|
||||
// allowlist; they're handled in router.go directly.
|
||||
var ProtocolEndpointPrefixes = []string{
|
||||
"/acme",
|
||||
"/scep",
|
||||
"/.well-known/est",
|
||||
"/.well-known/pki/ocsp",
|
||||
"/.well-known/pki/crl",
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// IsProtocolEndpoint reports whether the request path is in the
|
||||
// "do not gate" allowlist. Phase 3 RequirePermission check bails out
|
||||
// early for these paths so the protocol surface is preserved.
|
||||
func IsProtocolEndpoint(path string) bool {
|
||||
for _, p := range ProtocolEndpointPrefixes {
|
||||
if path == p || strings.HasPrefix(path, p+"/") {
|
||||
return true
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
return false
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,126 @@
|
||||
package auth
|
||||
|
||||
import (
|
||||
"context"
|
||||
"errors"
|
||||
"log/slog"
|
||||
"net/http"
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
// PermissionChecker is the dependency the RequirePermission middleware
|
||||
// expects. internal/service/auth.Authorizer satisfies this interface;
|
||||
// tests can supply an in-memory fake.
|
||||
//
|
||||
// scopeID is nil for global checks; non-nil for per-resource checks
|
||||
// (e.g. per-profile or per-issuer scoping). scopeType matches
|
||||
// internal/domain/auth.ScopeType ("global", "profile", "issuer").
|
||||
type PermissionChecker interface {
|
||||
CheckPermission(
|
||||
ctx context.Context,
|
||||
actorID string,
|
||||
actorType string,
|
||||
tenantID string,
|
||||
permission string,
|
||||
scopeType string,
|
||||
scopeID *string,
|
||||
) (bool, error)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// ScopeFunc extracts the scope (type, id) from the request. A nil
|
||||
// ScopeFunc means "global scope" (the most common case for admin-class
|
||||
// gates like bulk revocation, intermediate-CA management, etc.).
|
||||
type ScopeFunc func(r *http.Request) (scopeType string, scopeID *string)
|
||||
|
||||
// RequirePermission returns a middleware that gates the wrapped handler
|
||||
// behind the named permission. Returns 401 when no actor is in
|
||||
// context, 403 when the actor exists but lacks the permission, 500 on
|
||||
// repository errors. Skips the gate entirely for protocol-level
|
||||
// endpoints in ProtocolEndpointPrefixes (ACME / SCEP / EST / OCSP / CRL).
|
||||
//
|
||||
// The permission name MUST exist in
|
||||
// internal/domain/auth.CanonicalPermissions (enforced indirectly via
|
||||
// the seed migration; an unknown permission name will simply return
|
||||
// 403 because no role grant references it).
|
||||
func RequirePermission(checker PermissionChecker, permission string, scope ScopeFunc) func(http.Handler) http.Handler {
|
||||
return func(next http.Handler) http.Handler {
|
||||
return http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
|
||||
// Protocol endpoints keep their existing protocol-level
|
||||
// auth; the RBAC gate doesn't apply.
|
||||
if IsProtocolEndpoint(r.URL.Path) {
|
||||
next.ServeHTTP(w, r)
|
||||
return
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
ctx := r.Context()
|
||||
actorID := GetActorID(ctx)
|
||||
if actorID == "" {
|
||||
writeJSONError(w, http.StatusUnauthorized, "Authentication required")
|
||||
return
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
actorType := GetActorType(ctx)
|
||||
if actorType == "" {
|
||||
// Legacy callers that only set UserKey: assume APIKey.
|
||||
// Bundle 2's OIDC middleware sets the type explicitly
|
||||
// to "User"; the demo-mode middleware sets it to
|
||||
// "Anonymous"; the API-key middleware (Phase 3
|
||||
// extension) sets it to "APIKey".
|
||||
actorType = ActorTypeAPIKey
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
scopeType := "global"
|
||||
var scopeID *string
|
||||
if scope != nil {
|
||||
scopeType, scopeID = scope(r)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
tenantID := GetTenantID(ctx)
|
||||
ok, err := checker.CheckPermission(ctx, actorID, actorType, tenantID, permission, scopeType, scopeID)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
slog.ErrorContext(ctx, "RBAC check failed",
|
||||
"permission", permission,
|
||||
"actor_id", actorID,
|
||||
"error", err,
|
||||
)
|
||||
writeJSONError(w, http.StatusInternalServerError, "Internal error")
|
||||
return
|
||||
}
|
||||
if !ok {
|
||||
writeJSONError(w, http.StatusForbidden, "Insufficient permissions")
|
||||
return
|
||||
}
|
||||
next.ServeHTTP(w, r)
|
||||
})
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// HasPermission is a convenience for handlers that need to check a
|
||||
// permission imperatively (e.g. branch behaviour without 403'ing the
|
||||
// whole request). Returns (true, nil) when granted, (false, nil) when
|
||||
// denied, (false, err) on repository failure. Skips the protocol-
|
||||
// endpoint allowlist.
|
||||
func HasPermission(ctx context.Context, checker PermissionChecker, permission string, scopeType string, scopeID *string) (bool, error) {
|
||||
actorID := GetActorID(ctx)
|
||||
if actorID == "" {
|
||||
return false, ErrNoActor
|
||||
}
|
||||
actorType := GetActorType(ctx)
|
||||
if actorType == "" {
|
||||
actorType = ActorTypeAPIKey
|
||||
}
|
||||
tenantID := GetTenantID(ctx)
|
||||
return checker.CheckPermission(ctx, actorID, actorType, tenantID, permission, scopeType, scopeID)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// ErrNoActor is returned by HasPermission when the request context has
|
||||
// no actor identity. Handler code typically translates this to HTTP
|
||||
// 401.
|
||||
var ErrNoActor = errors.New("auth: no actor in context")
|
||||
|
||||
func writeJSONError(w http.ResponseWriter, status int, msg string) {
|
||||
w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/json; charset=utf-8")
|
||||
w.WriteHeader(status)
|
||||
// Match the existing middleware error shape so handler tests that
|
||||
// assert on the body text continue to work.
|
||||
_, _ = w.Write([]byte(`{"error":"` + msg + `"}`))
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,233 @@
|
||||
package auth
|
||||
|
||||
import (
|
||||
"context"
|
||||
"errors"
|
||||
"net/http"
|
||||
"net/http/httptest"
|
||||
"testing"
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
// fakeChecker implements PermissionChecker for unit tests. The check
|
||||
// function controls the result; tests pin specific behaviour via
|
||||
// closures.
|
||||
type fakeChecker struct {
|
||||
check func(ctx context.Context, actorID, actorType, tenantID, perm, scopeType string, scopeID *string) (bool, error)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func (f *fakeChecker) CheckPermission(ctx context.Context, actorID, actorType, tenantID, perm, scopeType string, scopeID *string) (bool, error) {
|
||||
return f.check(ctx, actorID, actorType, tenantID, perm, scopeType, scopeID)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func okHandler() http.Handler {
|
||||
return http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
|
||||
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
|
||||
})
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func TestRequirePermission_NoActorReturns401(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
checker := &fakeChecker{check: func(_ context.Context, _, _, _, _, _ string, _ *string) (bool, error) {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("checker should not be called when no actor in context")
|
||||
return false, nil
|
||||
}}
|
||||
mw := RequirePermission(checker, "cert.read", nil)
|
||||
rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
|
||||
mw(okHandler()).ServeHTTP(rec, httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "/api/v1/certificates", nil))
|
||||
if rec.Code != http.StatusUnauthorized {
|
||||
t.Errorf("no actor should yield 401; got %d", rec.Code)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func TestRequirePermission_GrantedActorReaches200(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
checker := &fakeChecker{check: func(_ context.Context, actorID, actorType, _, perm, _ string, _ *string) (bool, error) {
|
||||
if actorID != "alice" {
|
||||
t.Errorf("actor id = %q, want alice", actorID)
|
||||
}
|
||||
if actorType != ActorTypeAPIKey {
|
||||
t.Errorf("actor type = %q, want %q", actorType, ActorTypeAPIKey)
|
||||
}
|
||||
if perm != "cert.read" {
|
||||
t.Errorf("perm = %q, want cert.read", perm)
|
||||
}
|
||||
return true, nil
|
||||
}}
|
||||
mw := RequirePermission(checker, "cert.read", nil)
|
||||
req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "/api/v1/certificates", nil)
|
||||
req = req.WithContext(WithActor(req.Context(), "alice"))
|
||||
req = req.WithContext(context.WithValue(req.Context(), ActorIDKey{}, "alice"))
|
||||
req = req.WithContext(context.WithValue(req.Context(), ActorTypeKey{}, ActorTypeAPIKey))
|
||||
rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
|
||||
mw(okHandler()).ServeHTTP(rec, req)
|
||||
if rec.Code != http.StatusOK {
|
||||
t.Errorf("granted actor should reach handler 200; got %d", rec.Code)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func TestRequirePermission_DeniedActorReturns403(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
checker := &fakeChecker{check: func(_ context.Context, _, _, _, _, _ string, _ *string) (bool, error) {
|
||||
return false, nil
|
||||
}}
|
||||
mw := RequirePermission(checker, "cert.delete", nil)
|
||||
req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodDelete, "/api/v1/certificates/mc-1", nil)
|
||||
req = req.WithContext(context.WithValue(req.Context(), ActorIDKey{}, "bob"))
|
||||
req = req.WithContext(context.WithValue(req.Context(), ActorTypeKey{}, ActorTypeAPIKey))
|
||||
rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
|
||||
mw(okHandler()).ServeHTTP(rec, req)
|
||||
if rec.Code != http.StatusForbidden {
|
||||
t.Errorf("denied actor should yield 403; got %d", rec.Code)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func TestRequirePermission_CheckerErrorReturns500(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
checker := &fakeChecker{check: func(_ context.Context, _, _, _, _, _ string, _ *string) (bool, error) {
|
||||
return false, errors.New("database fell over")
|
||||
}}
|
||||
mw := RequirePermission(checker, "cert.read", nil)
|
||||
req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "/api/v1/certificates", nil)
|
||||
req = req.WithContext(context.WithValue(req.Context(), ActorIDKey{}, "alice"))
|
||||
rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
|
||||
mw(okHandler()).ServeHTTP(rec, req)
|
||||
if rec.Code != http.StatusInternalServerError {
|
||||
t.Errorf("checker error should yield 500; got %d", rec.Code)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func TestRequirePermission_ProtocolEndpointBypassesGate(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
gateChecks := 0
|
||||
checker := &fakeChecker{check: func(_ context.Context, _, _, _, _, _ string, _ *string) (bool, error) {
|
||||
gateChecks++
|
||||
return false, nil
|
||||
}}
|
||||
mw := RequirePermission(checker, "cert.read", nil)
|
||||
for _, p := range []string{
|
||||
"/acme/profile/corp/new-order",
|
||||
"/scep",
|
||||
"/.well-known/est/cacerts",
|
||||
"/.well-known/pki/ocsp",
|
||||
"/.well-known/pki/crl/ca.crl",
|
||||
} {
|
||||
req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, p, nil)
|
||||
// Deliberately no actor: protocol endpoints must reach the
|
||||
// handler regardless of context state.
|
||||
rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
|
||||
mw(okHandler()).ServeHTTP(rec, req)
|
||||
if rec.Code != http.StatusOK {
|
||||
t.Errorf("protocol endpoint %s should bypass gate; got %d", p, rec.Code)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
if gateChecks != 0 {
|
||||
t.Errorf("checker should be called zero times for protocol endpoints; got %d", gateChecks)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func TestRequirePermission_ScopeFnExtractsResourceID(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
captured := struct {
|
||||
scopeType string
|
||||
scopeID *string
|
||||
}{}
|
||||
checker := &fakeChecker{check: func(_ context.Context, _, _, _, _, st string, sid *string) (bool, error) {
|
||||
captured.scopeType = st
|
||||
captured.scopeID = sid
|
||||
return true, nil
|
||||
}}
|
||||
scope := func(r *http.Request) (string, *string) {
|
||||
id := r.URL.Query().Get("profile")
|
||||
return "profile", &id
|
||||
}
|
||||
mw := RequirePermission(checker, "profile.edit", scope)
|
||||
req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodPut, "/api/v1/profiles/p-corp?profile=p-corp", nil)
|
||||
req = req.WithContext(context.WithValue(req.Context(), ActorIDKey{}, "alice"))
|
||||
rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
|
||||
mw(okHandler()).ServeHTTP(rec, req)
|
||||
if rec.Code != http.StatusOK {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("scoped grant should pass; got %d", rec.Code)
|
||||
}
|
||||
if captured.scopeType != "profile" {
|
||||
t.Errorf("scope type = %q, want profile", captured.scopeType)
|
||||
}
|
||||
if captured.scopeID == nil || *captured.scopeID != "p-corp" {
|
||||
t.Errorf("scope id = %v, want p-corp", captured.scopeID)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func TestIsProtocolEndpoint_PrefixesOnly(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
cases := []struct {
|
||||
path string
|
||||
want bool
|
||||
}{
|
||||
{"/acme", true},
|
||||
{"/acme/profile/corp/new-order", true},
|
||||
{"/scep", true},
|
||||
// Query strings live in r.URL.RawQuery; r.URL.Path stays
|
||||
// just `/scep`, so callers always pass the path-only form.
|
||||
{"/.well-known/est/cacerts", true},
|
||||
{"/.well-known/pki/ocsp", true},
|
||||
{"/.well-known/pki/crl/ca.crl", true},
|
||||
{"/api/v1/certificates", false},
|
||||
{"/api/v1/auth/me", false},
|
||||
{"/health", false}, // bypassed at the router level, NOT by RBAC.
|
||||
{"/acmedotcom", false},
|
||||
{"/scepfake", false},
|
||||
}
|
||||
for _, tc := range cases {
|
||||
if got := IsProtocolEndpoint(tc.path); got != tc.want {
|
||||
t.Errorf("IsProtocolEndpoint(%q) = %v, want %v", tc.path, got, tc.want)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func TestNewDemoModeAuth_InjectsSyntheticActor(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
mw := NewDemoModeAuth()
|
||||
var captured struct {
|
||||
actorID, actorType, user string
|
||||
isAdmin bool
|
||||
}
|
||||
handler := mw(http.HandlerFunc(func(_ http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
|
||||
captured.actorID = GetActorID(r.Context())
|
||||
captured.actorType = GetActorType(r.Context())
|
||||
captured.user = GetUser(r.Context())
|
||||
captured.isAdmin = IsAdmin(r.Context())
|
||||
}))
|
||||
req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "/api/v1/certificates", nil)
|
||||
rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
|
||||
handler.ServeHTTP(rec, req)
|
||||
if captured.actorID != DemoAnonActorID {
|
||||
t.Errorf("actor id = %q, want %q", captured.actorID, DemoAnonActorID)
|
||||
}
|
||||
if captured.actorType != ActorTypeAnonymous {
|
||||
t.Errorf("actor type = %q, want %q", captured.actorType, ActorTypeAnonymous)
|
||||
}
|
||||
if captured.user != DemoAnonActorID {
|
||||
t.Errorf("legacy UserKey = %q, want %q (back-compat)", captured.user, DemoAnonActorID)
|
||||
}
|
||||
if !captured.isAdmin {
|
||||
t.Errorf("legacy AdminKey should be true in demo mode (back-compat for IsAdmin handlers)")
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func TestNewAuthWithNamedKeys_PopulatesPhase3ContextKeys(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
mw := NewAuthWithNamedKeys([]NamedAPIKey{
|
||||
{Name: "alice", Key: "ALICE_KEY", Admin: true},
|
||||
})
|
||||
var captured struct {
|
||||
actorID, actorType, tenantID string
|
||||
}
|
||||
handler := mw(http.HandlerFunc(func(_ http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
|
||||
captured.actorID = GetActorID(r.Context())
|
||||
captured.actorType = GetActorType(r.Context())
|
||||
captured.tenantID = GetTenantID(r.Context())
|
||||
}))
|
||||
req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "/api/v1/certificates", nil)
|
||||
req.Header.Set("Authorization", "Bearer ALICE_KEY")
|
||||
rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
|
||||
handler.ServeHTTP(rec, req)
|
||||
if captured.actorID != "alice" {
|
||||
t.Errorf("Phase 3 actor id = %q, want alice", captured.actorID)
|
||||
}
|
||||
if captured.actorType != ActorTypeAPIKey {
|
||||
t.Errorf("Phase 3 actor type = %q, want %q", captured.actorType, ActorTypeAPIKey)
|
||||
}
|
||||
if captured.tenantID != DefaultTenantID {
|
||||
t.Errorf("Phase 3 tenant id = %q, want %q", captured.tenantID, DefaultTenantID)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
|
||||
package middleware
|
||||
package auth
|
||||
|
||||
import (
|
||||
"net/http"
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,32 @@
|
||||
package auth
|
||||
|
||||
import "context"
|
||||
|
||||
// WithActor builds a context with UserKey populated, mirroring what
|
||||
// NewAuthWithNamedKeys produces for a real authenticated request. Used
|
||||
// by handler / service / middleware tests so they don't construct the
|
||||
// context manually with internal context-key types.
|
||||
//
|
||||
// Phase 0 ships UserKey + AdminKey only; Phase 3 of Bundle 1 introduces
|
||||
// the RBAC context (ActorIDKey, ActorTypeKey, RolesKey) and this helper
|
||||
// will be extended to populate those too. Until then, admin should be
|
||||
// passed via WithAdmin (separate helper below) to mirror the matched-key
|
||||
// flag.
|
||||
func WithActor(ctx context.Context, name string) context.Context {
|
||||
return context.WithValue(ctx, UserKey{}, name)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// WithAdmin sets the AdminKey flag on the supplied context. Tests calling
|
||||
// WithActor + WithAdmin together produce a context indistinguishable from
|
||||
// what NewAuthWithNamedKeys produces for an admin-flagged NamedAPIKey.
|
||||
func WithAdmin(ctx context.Context, admin bool) context.Context {
|
||||
return context.WithValue(ctx, AdminKey{}, admin)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// WithActorAdmin is a convenience for the common "admin caller named X"
|
||||
// pattern across handler tests.
|
||||
func WithActorAdmin(ctx context.Context, name string, admin bool) context.Context {
|
||||
ctx = WithActor(ctx, name)
|
||||
ctx = WithAdmin(ctx, admin)
|
||||
return ctx
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,253 @@
|
||||
package cli
|
||||
|
||||
import (
|
||||
"bytes"
|
||||
"encoding/json"
|
||||
"fmt"
|
||||
"net/http"
|
||||
"strings"
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
// =============================================================================
|
||||
// CLI auth subcommands. Bundle 1 Phase 5 mirrors the /api/v1/auth/*
|
||||
// surface introduced in Phase 4. Read operations + key-role assignment +
|
||||
// the /me identity check; mutating role lifecycle (create / update /
|
||||
// delete) is a Phase 5.5 follow-up that adds the cobra-style flag
|
||||
// parsing for description / name fields.
|
||||
// =============================================================================
|
||||
|
||||
// authMeResponse mirrors handler.meResponse without importing the
|
||||
// handler package (would couple CLI build to the server tree).
|
||||
type authMeResponse struct {
|
||||
ActorID string `json:"actor_id"`
|
||||
ActorType string `json:"actor_type"`
|
||||
TenantID string `json:"tenant_id"`
|
||||
Admin bool `json:"admin"`
|
||||
Roles []string `json:"roles"`
|
||||
EffectivePermissions []struct {
|
||||
Permission string `json:"permission"`
|
||||
ScopeType string `json:"scope_type"`
|
||||
ScopeID *string `json:"scope_id,omitempty"`
|
||||
} `json:"effective_permissions"`
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// AuthMe prints the current actor's identity + permissions. Useful for
|
||||
// debugging RBAC config: confirms which actor the API key resolves to,
|
||||
// which roles it holds, and the effective permission set.
|
||||
func (c *Client) AuthMe() error {
|
||||
body, err := c.doGET("/api/v1/auth/me")
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
return err
|
||||
}
|
||||
if c.format == "json" {
|
||||
fmt.Println(string(body))
|
||||
return nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
var me authMeResponse
|
||||
if err := json.Unmarshal(body, &me); err != nil {
|
||||
return fmt.Errorf("decode /auth/me: %w", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
fmt.Printf("Actor: %s (%s)\n", me.ActorID, me.ActorType)
|
||||
fmt.Printf("Tenant: %s\n", me.TenantID)
|
||||
fmt.Printf("Admin: %t\n", me.Admin)
|
||||
fmt.Printf("Roles: %s\n", strings.Join(me.Roles, ", "))
|
||||
fmt.Printf("Effective permissions:\n")
|
||||
for _, p := range me.EffectivePermissions {
|
||||
scope := p.ScopeType
|
||||
if p.ScopeID != nil {
|
||||
scope = fmt.Sprintf("%s:%s", p.ScopeType, *p.ScopeID)
|
||||
}
|
||||
fmt.Printf(" %s @ %s\n", p.Permission, scope)
|
||||
}
|
||||
return nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// AuthListRoles prints all roles in the tenant.
|
||||
func (c *Client) AuthListRoles() error {
|
||||
body, err := c.doGET("/api/v1/auth/roles")
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
return err
|
||||
}
|
||||
if c.format == "json" {
|
||||
fmt.Println(string(body))
|
||||
return nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
var resp struct {
|
||||
Roles []struct {
|
||||
ID, Name, Description string
|
||||
TenantID string `json:"tenant_id"`
|
||||
} `json:"roles"`
|
||||
}
|
||||
if err := json.Unmarshal(body, &resp); err != nil {
|
||||
return fmt.Errorf("decode roles list: %w", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
fmt.Printf("%-15s %-15s %s\n", "ID", "NAME", "DESCRIPTION")
|
||||
for _, r := range resp.Roles {
|
||||
fmt.Printf("%-15s %-15s %s\n", r.ID, r.Name, r.Description)
|
||||
}
|
||||
return nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// AuthGetRole prints a single role + its permission grants.
|
||||
func (c *Client) AuthGetRole(id string) error {
|
||||
body, err := c.doGET("/api/v1/auth/roles/" + id)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
return err
|
||||
}
|
||||
if c.format == "json" {
|
||||
fmt.Println(string(body))
|
||||
return nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
var resp struct {
|
||||
Role struct {
|
||||
ID, Name, Description string
|
||||
}
|
||||
Permissions []struct {
|
||||
PermissionID string `json:"permission_id"`
|
||||
ScopeType string `json:"scope_type"`
|
||||
ScopeID *string `json:"scope_id,omitempty"`
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
if err := json.Unmarshal(body, &resp); err != nil {
|
||||
return fmt.Errorf("decode role: %w", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
fmt.Printf("ID: %s\n", resp.Role.ID)
|
||||
fmt.Printf("Name: %s\n", resp.Role.Name)
|
||||
fmt.Printf("Description: %s\n", resp.Role.Description)
|
||||
fmt.Printf("Permissions (%d):\n", len(resp.Permissions))
|
||||
for _, p := range resp.Permissions {
|
||||
scope := p.ScopeType
|
||||
if p.ScopeID != nil {
|
||||
scope = fmt.Sprintf("%s:%s", p.ScopeType, *p.ScopeID)
|
||||
}
|
||||
fmt.Printf(" %s @ %s\n", p.PermissionID, scope)
|
||||
}
|
||||
return nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// AuthListPermissions prints the canonical permission catalogue.
|
||||
func (c *Client) AuthListPermissions() error {
|
||||
body, err := c.doGET("/api/v1/auth/permissions")
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
return err
|
||||
}
|
||||
if c.format == "json" {
|
||||
fmt.Println(string(body))
|
||||
return nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
var resp struct {
|
||||
Permissions []struct {
|
||||
ID, Name, Namespace string
|
||||
} `json:"permissions"`
|
||||
}
|
||||
if err := json.Unmarshal(body, &resp); err != nil {
|
||||
return fmt.Errorf("decode permissions: %w", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
fmt.Printf("%-25s %s\n", "PERMISSION", "NAMESPACE")
|
||||
for _, p := range resp.Permissions {
|
||||
fmt.Printf("%-25s %s\n", p.Name, p.Namespace)
|
||||
}
|
||||
return nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// AuthAssignRoleToKey grants a role to an API-key-named actor. The
|
||||
// caller's key must hold auth.role.assign globally; service-layer
|
||||
// returns 403 otherwise.
|
||||
func (c *Client) AuthAssignRoleToKey(keyID, roleID string) error {
|
||||
body, err := json.Marshal(map[string]string{"role_id": roleID})
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
return err
|
||||
}
|
||||
if _, err := c.doPOST("/api/v1/auth/keys/"+keyID+"/roles", body); err != nil {
|
||||
return err
|
||||
}
|
||||
fmt.Printf("granted %s to %s\n", roleID, keyID)
|
||||
return nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// AuthRevokeRoleFromKey revokes a role from an API-key-named actor.
|
||||
// Service-layer rejects revocations against the reserved demo-anon
|
||||
// actor with 409; CLI surfaces that as a non-zero exit.
|
||||
func (c *Client) AuthRevokeRoleFromKey(keyID, roleID string) error {
|
||||
if err := c.doDELETE("/api/v1/auth/keys/" + keyID + "/roles/" + roleID); err != nil {
|
||||
return err
|
||||
}
|
||||
fmt.Printf("revoked %s from %s\n", roleID, keyID)
|
||||
return nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// =============================================================================
|
||||
// HTTP helpers — minimal wrappers around the underlying http.Client used
|
||||
// elsewhere in the package. Mirror the pattern from est.go (same
|
||||
// authentication + TLS + error-handling shape).
|
||||
// =============================================================================
|
||||
|
||||
func (c *Client) doGET(path string) ([]byte, error) {
|
||||
req, err := http.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, c.baseURL+path, nil)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
return nil, err
|
||||
}
|
||||
if c.apiKey != "" {
|
||||
req.Header.Set("Authorization", "Bearer "+c.apiKey)
|
||||
}
|
||||
return c.doRaw(req)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func (c *Client) doPOST(path string, body []byte) ([]byte, error) {
|
||||
req, err := http.NewRequest(http.MethodPost, c.baseURL+path, bytes.NewReader(body))
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
return nil, err
|
||||
}
|
||||
req.Header.Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
|
||||
if c.apiKey != "" {
|
||||
req.Header.Set("Authorization", "Bearer "+c.apiKey)
|
||||
}
|
||||
return c.doRaw(req)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func (c *Client) doDELETE(path string) error {
|
||||
req, err := http.NewRequest(http.MethodDelete, c.baseURL+path, nil)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
return err
|
||||
}
|
||||
if c.apiKey != "" {
|
||||
req.Header.Set("Authorization", "Bearer "+c.apiKey)
|
||||
}
|
||||
_, err = c.doRaw(req)
|
||||
return err
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func (c *Client) doRaw(req *http.Request) ([]byte, error) {
|
||||
resp, err := c.httpClient.Do(req)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
return nil, err
|
||||
}
|
||||
defer resp.Body.Close()
|
||||
body, err := readAll(resp.Body)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
return nil, err
|
||||
}
|
||||
if resp.StatusCode >= 400 {
|
||||
return nil, fmt.Errorf("HTTP %d: %s", resp.StatusCode, string(body))
|
||||
}
|
||||
return body, nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// readAll wraps io.ReadAll without pulling another import; defined as a
|
||||
// thin function so we can swap to a bounded reader later if needed.
|
||||
func readAll(r interface{ Read(p []byte) (int, error) }) ([]byte, error) {
|
||||
var buf []byte
|
||||
tmp := make([]byte, 4096)
|
||||
for {
|
||||
n, err := r.Read(tmp)
|
||||
if n > 0 {
|
||||
buf = append(buf, tmp[:n]...)
|
||||
}
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
if err.Error() == "EOF" {
|
||||
return buf, nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
return buf, err
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,401 @@
|
||||
package cli
|
||||
|
||||
import (
|
||||
"bufio"
|
||||
"encoding/json"
|
||||
"errors"
|
||||
"fmt"
|
||||
"io"
|
||||
"os"
|
||||
"strings"
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
// =============================================================================
|
||||
// Bundle 1 Phase 7 — `certctl-cli auth keys list` + scope-down helper.
|
||||
//
|
||||
// The Phase 1 migration backfills every CERTCTL_API_KEYS_NAMED entry to
|
||||
// the admin role on first boot (Decision 7's safe-for-back-compat
|
||||
// default). Scope-down is the operator-driven downgrade of any keys that
|
||||
// don't actually need admin power. This file ships:
|
||||
//
|
||||
// - AuthListKeys: GET /api/v1/auth/keys — render every actor + roles
|
||||
// in tabular / json form.
|
||||
// - AuthScopeDown: interactive flow that walks every key (skipping
|
||||
// the synthetic actor-demo-anon) and prompts for a target role.
|
||||
// - AuthScopeDownNonInteractive: take a JSON config {actor_id: role_id}
|
||||
// and apply role changes without prompts; for automation.
|
||||
// - AuthScopeDownSuggest: read 30 days of audit events per key and
|
||||
// suggest a narrower role based on actual call patterns. The suggest
|
||||
// mode still requires confirmation (or --apply for non-interactive).
|
||||
//
|
||||
// The scope-down flow uses revoke + grant as separate API calls
|
||||
// (no batch endpoint yet — by design; auditing each role mutation
|
||||
// individually is a Bundle 1 invariant).
|
||||
// =============================================================================
|
||||
|
||||
// AuthKeyEntry mirrors handler.ListKeys's response shape without
|
||||
// importing the handler package.
|
||||
type AuthKeyEntry struct {
|
||||
ActorID string `json:"actor_id"`
|
||||
ActorType string `json:"actor_type"`
|
||||
TenantID string `json:"tenant_id"`
|
||||
RoleIDs []string `json:"role_ids"`
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
type authKeysListResponse struct {
|
||||
Keys []AuthKeyEntry `json:"keys"`
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// AuthListKeys prints every actor in the tenant with their current role
|
||||
// assignments. The synthetic actor-demo-anon is shown but flagged as
|
||||
// "system-managed" so operators don't accidentally try to mutate it.
|
||||
func (c *Client) AuthListKeys() error {
|
||||
keys, err := c.fetchAuthKeys()
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
return err
|
||||
}
|
||||
if c.format == "json" {
|
||||
blob, _ := json.MarshalIndent(authKeysListResponse{Keys: keys}, "", " ")
|
||||
fmt.Println(string(blob))
|
||||
return nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
fmt.Printf("%-28s %-12s %s\n", "ACTOR", "TYPE", "ROLES")
|
||||
for _, k := range keys {
|
||||
notes := ""
|
||||
if k.ActorID == DemoAnonActorID {
|
||||
notes = " (system-managed; scope-down skips this)"
|
||||
}
|
||||
fmt.Printf("%-28s %-12s %s%s\n", k.ActorID, k.ActorType, strings.Join(k.RoleIDs, ","), notes)
|
||||
}
|
||||
return nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// DemoAnonActorID is replicated from internal/auth/context.go so the
|
||||
// CLI doesn't import internal/auth (the CLI binary stays small).
|
||||
const DemoAnonActorID = "actor-demo-anon"
|
||||
|
||||
// AuthScopeDown runs the interactive scope-down flow against stdin /
|
||||
// stdout. Each non-system actor is shown with its current roles and
|
||||
// the operator picks one of: keep, admin, operator, viewer, agent,
|
||||
// mcp, cli, auditor. Empty input keeps the current assignment.
|
||||
func (c *Client) AuthScopeDown() error {
|
||||
keys, err := c.fetchAuthKeys()
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
return err
|
||||
}
|
||||
keys = filterScopeDownCandidates(keys)
|
||||
if len(keys) == 0 {
|
||||
fmt.Println("no actors eligible for scope-down (only the system-managed actor-demo-anon exists, or no actors hold roles).")
|
||||
return nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
fmt.Println("certctl-cli auth keys scope-down")
|
||||
fmt.Println("================================")
|
||||
fmt.Printf("Bundle 1 ships role-based authorization. Existing API keys backfill to r-admin (full power).\n")
|
||||
fmt.Printf("Walk each key below and select a role that matches its actual usage. Empty input keeps the\n")
|
||||
fmt.Printf("current assignment; type a single role name to replace it.\n\n")
|
||||
reader := bufio.NewReader(os.Stdin)
|
||||
plan, err := buildScopeDownPlan(keys, reader, os.Stdout)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
return err
|
||||
}
|
||||
return c.applyScopeDownPlan(plan)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// AuthScopeDownNonInteractive applies a {actor_id: role_id} JSON
|
||||
// config without prompts. Useful for automation / Helm post-upgrade
|
||||
// hooks. Empty role_id revokes all current roles WITHOUT granting a
|
||||
// replacement; the operator can then assign roles selectively via
|
||||
// `certctl-cli auth keys assign`.
|
||||
func (c *Client) AuthScopeDownNonInteractive(configPath string) error {
|
||||
blob, err := os.ReadFile(configPath)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
return fmt.Errorf("read config %s: %w", configPath, err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
var cfg map[string]string
|
||||
if err := json.Unmarshal(blob, &cfg); err != nil {
|
||||
return fmt.Errorf("decode config %s: %w", configPath, err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
keys, err := c.fetchAuthKeys()
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
return err
|
||||
}
|
||||
currentRoles := map[string][]string{}
|
||||
for _, k := range keys {
|
||||
currentRoles[k.ActorID] = k.RoleIDs
|
||||
}
|
||||
plan := []scopeDownAction{}
|
||||
for actor, target := range cfg {
|
||||
if actor == DemoAnonActorID {
|
||||
fmt.Fprintf(os.Stderr, "skipping %s: reserved system actor\n", actor)
|
||||
continue
|
||||
}
|
||||
current, ok := currentRoles[actor]
|
||||
if !ok {
|
||||
fmt.Fprintf(os.Stderr, "skipping %s: not in actor_roles (no grants to revoke)\n", actor)
|
||||
continue
|
||||
}
|
||||
plan = append(plan, scopeDownAction{
|
||||
ActorID: actor,
|
||||
CurrentRoles: current,
|
||||
TargetRole: target,
|
||||
})
|
||||
}
|
||||
return c.applyScopeDownPlan(plan)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// AuthScopeDownSuggest analyses 30 days of audit events per key and
|
||||
// prints suggested role assignments. With apply=false (default) the
|
||||
// suggestions are advisory and the operator follows up with a manual
|
||||
// scope-down or scope-down-non-interactive call. With apply=true the
|
||||
// suggestions are applied directly.
|
||||
func (c *Client) AuthScopeDownSuggest(apply bool) error {
|
||||
keys, err := c.fetchAuthKeys()
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
return err
|
||||
}
|
||||
keys = filterScopeDownCandidates(keys)
|
||||
plan := []scopeDownAction{}
|
||||
fmt.Println("certctl-cli auth keys scope-down --suggest")
|
||||
fmt.Println("==========================================")
|
||||
fmt.Printf("%-28s %-15s %-15s %s\n", "ACTOR", "CURRENT ROLES", "SUGGESTED", "REASON")
|
||||
for _, k := range keys {
|
||||
events, fetchErr := c.fetchAuditEventsForActor(k.ActorID, 1000)
|
||||
if fetchErr != nil {
|
||||
fmt.Fprintf(os.Stderr, "fetch audit for %s: %v\n", k.ActorID, fetchErr)
|
||||
continue
|
||||
}
|
||||
suggested, reason := SuggestRoleFromAuditEvents(events)
|
||||
fmt.Printf("%-28s %-15s %-15s %s\n",
|
||||
k.ActorID,
|
||||
strings.Join(k.RoleIDs, ","),
|
||||
suggested,
|
||||
reason)
|
||||
plan = append(plan, scopeDownAction{
|
||||
ActorID: k.ActorID,
|
||||
CurrentRoles: k.RoleIDs,
|
||||
TargetRole: suggested,
|
||||
})
|
||||
}
|
||||
if !apply {
|
||||
fmt.Println("\n(dry run; pass --apply to execute the suggested role changes)")
|
||||
return nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
return c.applyScopeDownPlan(plan)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// =============================================================================
|
||||
// Internals
|
||||
// =============================================================================
|
||||
|
||||
type scopeDownAction struct {
|
||||
ActorID string
|
||||
CurrentRoles []string
|
||||
TargetRole string
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func (c *Client) fetchAuthKeys() ([]AuthKeyEntry, error) {
|
||||
body, err := c.doGET("/api/v1/auth/keys")
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
return nil, err
|
||||
}
|
||||
var resp authKeysListResponse
|
||||
if err := json.Unmarshal(body, &resp); err != nil {
|
||||
return nil, fmt.Errorf("decode /v1/auth/keys: %w", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
return resp.Keys, nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func filterScopeDownCandidates(keys []AuthKeyEntry) []AuthKeyEntry {
|
||||
out := make([]AuthKeyEntry, 0, len(keys))
|
||||
for _, k := range keys {
|
||||
if k.ActorID == DemoAnonActorID {
|
||||
continue
|
||||
}
|
||||
out = append(out, k)
|
||||
}
|
||||
return out
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// validRoles is the canonical list scope-down accepts as targets.
|
||||
// Mirrors the Phase 1 default-role seeds; new operator-defined roles
|
||||
// can be assigned via `certctl auth keys assign --role <id>` directly.
|
||||
var validRoles = []string{"admin", "operator", "viewer", "agent", "mcp", "cli", "auditor"}
|
||||
|
||||
func isValidRole(s string) bool {
|
||||
for _, v := range validRoles {
|
||||
if v == s {
|
||||
return true
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
return false
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func buildScopeDownPlan(keys []AuthKeyEntry, in *bufio.Reader, out io.Writer) ([]scopeDownAction, error) {
|
||||
plan := []scopeDownAction{}
|
||||
for _, k := range keys {
|
||||
fmt.Fprintf(out, "\n%s (current: %s)\n", k.ActorID, strings.Join(k.RoleIDs, ","))
|
||||
fmt.Fprintf(out, " enter target role [%s] or 'keep' (default): ",
|
||||
strings.Join(validRoles, "|"))
|
||||
line, err := in.ReadString('\n')
|
||||
if err != nil && !errors.Is(err, io.EOF) {
|
||||
return nil, err
|
||||
}
|
||||
choice := strings.TrimSpace(line)
|
||||
if choice == "" || strings.EqualFold(choice, "keep") {
|
||||
fmt.Fprintln(out, " → keeping existing roles")
|
||||
continue
|
||||
}
|
||||
choice = strings.ToLower(choice)
|
||||
if !isValidRole(choice) {
|
||||
fmt.Fprintf(out, " → unknown role %q, keeping existing\n", choice)
|
||||
continue
|
||||
}
|
||||
// Normalize target to r-<name> for the API.
|
||||
plan = append(plan, scopeDownAction{
|
||||
ActorID: k.ActorID,
|
||||
CurrentRoles: k.RoleIDs,
|
||||
TargetRole: "r-" + choice,
|
||||
})
|
||||
}
|
||||
return plan, nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// applyScopeDownPlan runs revoke+grant pairs for every action.
|
||||
// Idempotent on the role layer (revoke a missing role yields 404; the
|
||||
// CLI swallows that).
|
||||
func (c *Client) applyScopeDownPlan(plan []scopeDownAction) error {
|
||||
if len(plan) == 0 {
|
||||
fmt.Println("\nno role changes to apply.")
|
||||
return nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
fmt.Println("\nApplying role changes:")
|
||||
var changed, kept int
|
||||
for _, action := range plan {
|
||||
// Skip actions whose target role is already exclusively
|
||||
// held (no diff). This avoids spurious revoke+grant churn.
|
||||
if len(action.CurrentRoles) == 1 && action.CurrentRoles[0] == action.TargetRole {
|
||||
fmt.Printf(" %s: already at %s, skipping\n", action.ActorID, action.TargetRole)
|
||||
kept++
|
||||
continue
|
||||
}
|
||||
// Revoke every current role.
|
||||
for _, current := range action.CurrentRoles {
|
||||
if err := c.AuthRevokeRoleFromKey(action.ActorID, current); err != nil {
|
||||
return fmt.Errorf("revoke %s/%s: %w", action.ActorID, current, err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
// Grant the target. Empty target = revoke-only (operator
|
||||
// will assign roles selectively via `auth keys assign`).
|
||||
if action.TargetRole != "" {
|
||||
if err := c.AuthAssignRoleToKey(action.ActorID, action.TargetRole); err != nil {
|
||||
return fmt.Errorf("grant %s/%s: %w", action.ActorID, action.TargetRole, err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
changed++
|
||||
}
|
||||
fmt.Printf("\nDone. %d actor(s) changed, %d kept.\n", changed, kept)
|
||||
return nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// =============================================================================
|
||||
// --suggest mode: audit-event analyser. Pure function for ease of
|
||||
// testing; no I/O.
|
||||
// =============================================================================
|
||||
|
||||
// AuditEventLite is the subset of fields the suggest analyser
|
||||
// consumes. The audit list endpoint returns full domain.AuditEvent
|
||||
// rows; we only care about the action / resource_type / resource_id
|
||||
// path classification.
|
||||
type AuditEventLite struct {
|
||||
Action string `json:"action"`
|
||||
ResourceType string `json:"resource_type"`
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// SuggestRoleFromAuditEvents inspects an actor's recent audit-event
|
||||
// history and returns the narrowest role that covers the observed
|
||||
// usage pattern, plus a one-line reason.
|
||||
//
|
||||
// Classification (priority order):
|
||||
//
|
||||
// 1. Any admin-shaped action (role/key/hierarchy/bulk_revoke/admin) → admin.
|
||||
// 2. Every event is an MCP-shaped action (mcp.*) → mcp.
|
||||
// 3. Every event is read-only (*.read / *.list) → viewer.
|
||||
// 4. Every event is agent-shaped (agent.* OR cert.read OR cert.issue) → agent.
|
||||
// 5. Otherwise → operator.
|
||||
//
|
||||
// Empty event list → "viewer" (the safest default).
|
||||
func SuggestRoleFromAuditEvents(events []AuditEventLite) (role string, reason string) {
|
||||
if len(events) == 0 {
|
||||
return "viewer", "no audit history; defaulting to read-only"
|
||||
}
|
||||
var (
|
||||
hasAdmin bool
|
||||
allMCP = true
|
||||
allReadOnly = true
|
||||
allAgent = true
|
||||
)
|
||||
for _, e := range events {
|
||||
action := strings.ToLower(e.Action)
|
||||
// Admin-only signals — earliest exit.
|
||||
if strings.HasPrefix(action, "auth.role.") ||
|
||||
strings.HasPrefix(action, "auth.key.") ||
|
||||
strings.HasPrefix(action, "ca.hierarchy.") ||
|
||||
strings.Contains(action, "bulk_revoke") ||
|
||||
strings.HasPrefix(action, "scep.admin") ||
|
||||
strings.HasPrefix(action, "est.admin") ||
|
||||
strings.HasPrefix(action, "crl.admin") {
|
||||
hasAdmin = true
|
||||
}
|
||||
if !strings.HasPrefix(action, "mcp.") {
|
||||
allMCP = false
|
||||
}
|
||||
if !strings.HasSuffix(action, ".read") && !strings.HasSuffix(action, ".list") {
|
||||
allReadOnly = false
|
||||
}
|
||||
isAgentShape := strings.HasPrefix(action, "agent.") ||
|
||||
action == "cert.issue" || action == "cert.read"
|
||||
if !isAgentShape {
|
||||
allAgent = false
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
switch {
|
||||
case hasAdmin:
|
||||
return "admin", "called admin-only action (role mgmt / bulk revoke / hierarchy)"
|
||||
case allMCP:
|
||||
return "mcp", "only MCP-shaped actions observed"
|
||||
case allReadOnly:
|
||||
return "viewer", "all observed actions are read-only"
|
||||
case allAgent:
|
||||
return "agent", "only agent + cert read/issue actions observed"
|
||||
default:
|
||||
return "operator", "cert / profile / target lifecycle mutations observed; no admin signals"
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// fetchAuditEventsForActor pulls audit events filtered by actor=actorID
|
||||
// from /v1/audit. Bundle 1 Phase 7 doesn't yet ship a per-actor query
|
||||
// param; we filter client-side from the paginated list endpoint.
|
||||
func (c *Client) fetchAuditEventsForActor(actorID string, limit int) ([]AuditEventLite, error) {
|
||||
body, err := c.doGET(fmt.Sprintf("/api/v1/audit?per_page=%d", limit))
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
return nil, err
|
||||
}
|
||||
var resp struct {
|
||||
Data []struct {
|
||||
Actor string `json:"actor"`
|
||||
Action string `json:"action"`
|
||||
ResourceType string `json:"resource_type"`
|
||||
} `json:"data"`
|
||||
}
|
||||
if err := json.Unmarshal(body, &resp); err != nil {
|
||||
return nil, fmt.Errorf("decode /v1/audit: %w", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
out := make([]AuditEventLite, 0, len(resp.Data))
|
||||
for _, e := range resp.Data {
|
||||
if e.Actor != actorID {
|
||||
continue
|
||||
}
|
||||
out = append(out, AuditEventLite{Action: e.Action, ResourceType: e.ResourceType})
|
||||
}
|
||||
return out, nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,165 @@
|
||||
package cli
|
||||
|
||||
import (
|
||||
"bufio"
|
||||
"bytes"
|
||||
"strings"
|
||||
"testing"
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
// TestSuggestRoleFromAuditEvents_TablePins the audit-event analyser
|
||||
// classification rules. Pure function; no I/O. Adding a new role
|
||||
// pattern means adding a row here.
|
||||
func TestSuggestRoleFromAuditEvents_Table(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
cases := []struct {
|
||||
name string
|
||||
events []AuditEventLite
|
||||
wantRole string
|
||||
reasonHint string
|
||||
}{
|
||||
{
|
||||
name: "empty history → viewer",
|
||||
events: nil,
|
||||
wantRole: "viewer",
|
||||
reasonHint: "no audit history",
|
||||
},
|
||||
{
|
||||
name: "only cert.read → viewer",
|
||||
events: []AuditEventLite{
|
||||
{Action: "cert.read"},
|
||||
{Action: "cert.read"},
|
||||
{Action: "issuer.read"},
|
||||
},
|
||||
wantRole: "viewer",
|
||||
reasonHint: "read-only",
|
||||
},
|
||||
{
|
||||
name: "agent + cert.issue → agent",
|
||||
events: []AuditEventLite{
|
||||
{Action: "agent.heartbeat"},
|
||||
{Action: "agent.job.poll"},
|
||||
{Action: "cert.issue"},
|
||||
{Action: "cert.read"},
|
||||
},
|
||||
wantRole: "agent",
|
||||
reasonHint: "agent",
|
||||
},
|
||||
{
|
||||
name: "cert lifecycle without admin → operator",
|
||||
events: []AuditEventLite{
|
||||
{Action: "cert.issue"},
|
||||
{Action: "cert.revoke"},
|
||||
{Action: "profile.edit"},
|
||||
{Action: "target.edit"},
|
||||
},
|
||||
wantRole: "operator",
|
||||
reasonHint: "lifecycle",
|
||||
},
|
||||
{
|
||||
name: "any auth.role.assign → admin",
|
||||
events: []AuditEventLite{
|
||||
{Action: "auth.role.assign"},
|
||||
},
|
||||
wantRole: "admin",
|
||||
reasonHint: "admin-only",
|
||||
},
|
||||
{
|
||||
name: "any cert.bulk_revoke → admin",
|
||||
events: []AuditEventLite{
|
||||
{Action: "cert.bulk_revoke"},
|
||||
},
|
||||
wantRole: "admin",
|
||||
reasonHint: "admin-only",
|
||||
},
|
||||
{
|
||||
name: "ca.hierarchy.* → admin",
|
||||
events: []AuditEventLite{
|
||||
{Action: "ca.hierarchy.add_child"},
|
||||
},
|
||||
wantRole: "admin",
|
||||
reasonHint: "admin-only",
|
||||
},
|
||||
{
|
||||
name: "MCP-only history → mcp",
|
||||
events: []AuditEventLite{
|
||||
{Action: "mcp.list_certificates"},
|
||||
{Action: "mcp.get_issuer"},
|
||||
},
|
||||
wantRole: "mcp",
|
||||
reasonHint: "MCP",
|
||||
},
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
for _, tc := range cases {
|
||||
t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
role, reason := SuggestRoleFromAuditEvents(tc.events)
|
||||
if role != tc.wantRole {
|
||||
t.Errorf("role = %q, want %q (reason=%q)", role, tc.wantRole, reason)
|
||||
}
|
||||
if !strings.Contains(strings.ToLower(reason), strings.ToLower(tc.reasonHint)) {
|
||||
t.Errorf("reason %q does not contain hint %q", reason, tc.reasonHint)
|
||||
}
|
||||
})
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// TestFilterScopeDownCandidates_HidesDemoAnon pins the invariant that
|
||||
// the synthetic actor-demo-anon row never reaches the prompt loop.
|
||||
func TestFilterScopeDownCandidates_HidesDemoAnon(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
in := []AuthKeyEntry{
|
||||
{ActorID: "alice", RoleIDs: []string{"r-admin"}},
|
||||
{ActorID: DemoAnonActorID, RoleIDs: []string{"r-admin"}},
|
||||
{ActorID: "bob", RoleIDs: []string{"r-viewer"}},
|
||||
}
|
||||
got := filterScopeDownCandidates(in)
|
||||
if len(got) != 2 {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("got %d candidates, want 2", len(got))
|
||||
}
|
||||
for _, k := range got {
|
||||
if k.ActorID == DemoAnonActorID {
|
||||
t.Errorf("filter let actor-demo-anon through")
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// TestBuildScopeDownPlan_KeepEmptyAndUnknown pins the prompt-loop
|
||||
// behaviour: empty input or "keep" leaves the row alone; unknown role
|
||||
// names also fall through (operator can re-run the flow).
|
||||
func TestBuildScopeDownPlan_KeepEmptyAndUnknown(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
keys := []AuthKeyEntry{
|
||||
{ActorID: "alice", RoleIDs: []string{"r-admin"}},
|
||||
{ActorID: "bob", RoleIDs: []string{"r-admin"}},
|
||||
{ActorID: "carol", RoleIDs: []string{"r-admin"}},
|
||||
}
|
||||
// alice keeps; bob → operator; carol → bogus role (no change).
|
||||
in := bufio.NewReader(strings.NewReader("\noperator\nbogus\n"))
|
||||
var out bytes.Buffer
|
||||
plan, err := buildScopeDownPlan(keys, in, &out)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("plan err = %v", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
if len(plan) != 1 {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("plan size = %d, want 1 (only bob changes)", len(plan))
|
||||
}
|
||||
if plan[0].ActorID != "bob" || plan[0].TargetRole != "r-operator" {
|
||||
t.Errorf("plan[0] = %+v, want bob → r-operator", plan[0])
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// TestBuildScopeDownPlan_ApplyRolePrefix pins that the "operator"
|
||||
// input becomes "r-operator" downstream — the API accepts the
|
||||
// prefixed role IDs and the plan-builder normalizes.
|
||||
func TestBuildScopeDownPlan_ApplyRolePrefix(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
keys := []AuthKeyEntry{{ActorID: "alice", RoleIDs: []string{"r-admin"}}}
|
||||
for _, role := range []string{"admin", "operator", "viewer", "agent", "mcp", "cli", "auditor"} {
|
||||
in := bufio.NewReader(strings.NewReader(role + "\n"))
|
||||
var out bytes.Buffer
|
||||
plan, err := buildScopeDownPlan(keys, in, &out)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("role=%s: %v", role, err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
if len(plan) != 1 || plan[0].TargetRole != "r-"+role {
|
||||
t.Errorf("role=%s: plan[0].TargetRole = %q, want r-%s", role, plan[0].TargetRole, role)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -1566,6 +1566,25 @@ type AuthConfig struct {
|
||||
// Generation guidance: `openssl rand -hex 32` (256-bit entropy).
|
||||
// Setting: CERTCTL_AGENT_BOOTSTRAP_TOKEN environment variable.
|
||||
AgentBootstrapToken string
|
||||
|
||||
// BootstrapToken is the one-shot pre-shared secret that gates the
|
||||
// Bundle 1 Phase 6 bootstrap endpoint (POST /v1/auth/bootstrap). When
|
||||
// set at server startup AND no admin-roled actors exist, the
|
||||
// bootstrap endpoint becomes callable: an operator POSTs the token
|
||||
// and a desired admin-key name; the server mints a fresh API key,
|
||||
// grants it the r-admin role, and returns the key value once. The
|
||||
// token is then invalidated in memory; subsequent calls return 410
|
||||
// Gone. The endpoint also returns 410 Gone when admin actors already
|
||||
// exist (no need for the bootstrap path).
|
||||
//
|
||||
// Server NEVER logs this token. The minted admin key is returned in
|
||||
// the HTTP response body only; not logged. Operators who lose track
|
||||
// of the minted key can rotate it via the regular RBAC API after
|
||||
// bootstrap.
|
||||
//
|
||||
// Generation guidance: `openssl rand -hex 32` (256-bit entropy).
|
||||
// Setting: CERTCTL_BOOTSTRAP_TOKEN environment variable.
|
||||
BootstrapToken string
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// RateLimitConfig contains rate limiting configuration.
|
||||
@@ -1687,6 +1706,10 @@ func Load() (*Config, error) {
|
||||
// Bundle-5 / Audit H-007: agent-registration bootstrap secret.
|
||||
// Empty (default) = warn-mode pass-through; v2.2.0 will require it.
|
||||
AgentBootstrapToken: getEnv("CERTCTL_AGENT_BOOTSTRAP_TOKEN", ""),
|
||||
// Bundle 1 Phase 6: one-shot bootstrap token for the
|
||||
// /v1/auth/bootstrap endpoint that mints the first admin
|
||||
// key. Empty = bootstrap endpoint disabled (default).
|
||||
BootstrapToken: getEnv("CERTCTL_BOOTSTRAP_TOKEN", ""),
|
||||
},
|
||||
RateLimit: RateLimitConfig{
|
||||
Enabled: getEnvBool("CERTCTL_RATE_LIMIT_ENABLED", true),
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -23,8 +23,9 @@ import "time"
|
||||
// customers.
|
||||
type ApprovalRequest struct {
|
||||
ID string `json:"id"` // ar-<slug>
|
||||
CertificateID string `json:"certificate_id"` // FK managed_certificates.id
|
||||
JobID string `json:"job_id"` // FK jobs.id (the blocked Job)
|
||||
Kind ApprovalKind `json:"kind"` // cert_issuance | profile_edit (Phase 9)
|
||||
CertificateID string `json:"certificate_id,omitempty"` // FK managed_certificates.id (nullable for profile_edit)
|
||||
JobID string `json:"job_id,omitempty"` // FK jobs.id (nullable for profile_edit)
|
||||
ProfileID string `json:"profile_id"` // CertificateProfile that triggered the gate
|
||||
RequestedBy string `json:"requested_by"` // actor that triggered the renewal
|
||||
State ApprovalState `json:"state"` // pending / approved / rejected / expired
|
||||
@@ -32,10 +33,45 @@ type ApprovalRequest struct {
|
||||
DecidedAt *time.Time `json:"decided_at,omitempty"` // null while state=pending
|
||||
DecisionNote *string `json:"decision_note,omitempty"` // operator's reason text
|
||||
Metadata map[string]string `json:"metadata,omitempty"` // common_name, sans, issuer_id, severity_tier
|
||||
// Payload (Phase 9) carries the pending profile diff for
|
||||
// approval_kind=profile_edit rows. Empty for cert_issuance.
|
||||
// Stored as a raw JSON byte slice so the service layer
|
||||
// serializes/deserializes the *domain.CertificateProfile
|
||||
// without the repository needing to know the inner shape.
|
||||
Payload []byte `json:"payload,omitempty"`
|
||||
CreatedAt time.Time `json:"created_at"`
|
||||
UpdatedAt time.Time `json:"updated_at"`
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// ApprovalKind classifies the row into one of the supported approval
|
||||
// workflows. Bundle 1 Phase 9 ships exactly two kinds. Bundle 2 will
|
||||
// extend the enum (and the migration's CHECK constraint) without
|
||||
// reshaping the column.
|
||||
type ApprovalKind string
|
||||
|
||||
const (
|
||||
// ApprovalKindCertIssuance is the original Rank-7 workflow:
|
||||
// cert/renewal blocked at JobStatusAwaitingApproval until a
|
||||
// non-requester decides. cert_id + job_id are required.
|
||||
ApprovalKindCertIssuance ApprovalKind = "cert_issuance"
|
||||
|
||||
// ApprovalKindProfileEdit (Phase 9) closes the flip-flop loophole:
|
||||
// a profile with RequiresApproval=true cannot be mutated until a
|
||||
// non-requester decides. The pending diff lives in Payload until
|
||||
// the approver's POST /v1/approvals/{id}/approve triggers the
|
||||
// apply path. cert_id / job_id are NULL for these rows.
|
||||
ApprovalKindProfileEdit ApprovalKind = "profile_edit"
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
// IsValidApprovalKind reports whether k is a closed-enum value.
|
||||
func IsValidApprovalKind(k ApprovalKind) bool {
|
||||
switch k {
|
||||
case ApprovalKindCertIssuance, ApprovalKindProfileEdit:
|
||||
return true
|
||||
}
|
||||
return false
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// ApprovalState is the closed enum of approval lifecycle states.
|
||||
type ApprovalState string
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -15,13 +15,68 @@ type AuditEvent struct {
|
||||
ResourceID string `json:"resource_id"`
|
||||
Details json.RawMessage `json:"details"`
|
||||
Timestamp time.Time `json:"timestamp"`
|
||||
|
||||
// EventCategory (Bundle 1 Phase 8) classifies the event into one
|
||||
// of "cert_lifecycle", "auth", or "config" so the auditor role
|
||||
// can filter to authentication / authorization events without
|
||||
// also seeing every cert.issue. The persistence layer treats an
|
||||
// empty value as "cert_lifecycle" (the migration default + the
|
||||
// DB CHECK constraint).
|
||||
EventCategory string `json:"event_category,omitempty"`
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Audit event-category constants. Bundle 1 Phase 8 ships exactly
|
||||
// three; future bundles extend the enum (and the migration's CHECK
|
||||
// constraint) without reshaping the column.
|
||||
const (
|
||||
// EventCategoryCertLifecycle is the default for cert.* /
|
||||
// agent.* / deployment.* / verification.* events.
|
||||
EventCategoryCertLifecycle = "cert_lifecycle"
|
||||
|
||||
// EventCategoryAuth covers every auth.role.* / auth.key.* /
|
||||
// auth.bootstrap.* event plus the bootstrap.consume action
|
||||
// recorded by Phase 6. Auditors filter to this category to
|
||||
// review who minted / granted / revoked roles.
|
||||
EventCategoryAuth = "auth"
|
||||
|
||||
// EventCategoryConfig covers issuer / target / settings
|
||||
// mutations. Distinct from cert_lifecycle so a regulator can
|
||||
// review configuration changes separately from cert ops.
|
||||
EventCategoryConfig = "config"
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
// ActorType represents the entity performing an action.
|
||||
type ActorType string
|
||||
|
||||
const (
|
||||
// ActorTypeUser represents a federated human identity. Reserved by
|
||||
// Bundle 2 (OIDC + sessions) for OIDC-authenticated humans. Bundle 1
|
||||
// continues to set this for legacy callers; new code should use
|
||||
// ActorTypeAPIKey for API-key-authenticated requests.
|
||||
ActorTypeUser ActorType = "User"
|
||||
|
||||
// ActorTypeSystem represents background workers (scheduler loops, GC
|
||||
// sweepers, migrations). System actors don't have a credential; the
|
||||
// scheduler / startup code passes them directly to AuditService.
|
||||
ActorTypeSystem ActorType = "System"
|
||||
|
||||
// ActorTypeAgent represents a certctl-agent identity. Agents poll the
|
||||
// control plane outbound; the matched API key carries this actor type
|
||||
// when the operator scopes the key to the agent role (Bundle 1
|
||||
// Phase 1 ships the agent role with cert.read + agent.heartbeat +
|
||||
// agent.job.* permissions).
|
||||
ActorTypeAgent ActorType = "Agent"
|
||||
|
||||
// ActorTypeAPIKey represents an API-key-authenticated request whose
|
||||
// scope was not narrowed to agent-only. Bundle 1 Phase 1 introduces
|
||||
// this so the audit trail can distinguish a human-operator API key
|
||||
// from a federated OIDC user (Bundle 2). System actors and agents
|
||||
// keep their existing types.
|
||||
ActorTypeAPIKey ActorType = "APIKey"
|
||||
|
||||
// ActorTypeAnonymous represents the synthetic actor used when
|
||||
// CERTCTL_AUTH_TYPE=none is configured (the demo path). The audit
|
||||
// row records "actor-demo-anon" with this type so operators can
|
||||
// filter demo activity from real auth in audit reports.
|
||||
ActorTypeAnonymous ActorType = "Anonymous"
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,24 @@
|
||||
package auth
|
||||
|
||||
import "time"
|
||||
|
||||
// APIKey is the runtime-minted operator API key (Bundle 1 Phase 6).
|
||||
// Stored in the `api_keys` table with the SHA-256 hash of the key
|
||||
// value; the plaintext is returned to the operator on creation and
|
||||
// never persisted. Name is the canonical actor identity that joins
|
||||
// against actor_roles.actor_id. The Admin flag is a denormalized hint
|
||||
// replicated from the actor's standing role grant so the auth
|
||||
// middleware can populate the legacy AdminKey context without joining
|
||||
// actor_roles on every request; the actor_roles row remains the
|
||||
// source of truth for authorization.
|
||||
type APIKey struct {
|
||||
ID string `json:"id"` // prefix `ak-`
|
||||
Name string `json:"name"`
|
||||
KeyHash string `json:"-"` // never serialized
|
||||
TenantID string `json:"tenant_id"`
|
||||
Admin bool `json:"admin"`
|
||||
CreatedBy string `json:"created_by"`
|
||||
CreatedAt time.Time `json:"created_at"`
|
||||
ExpiresAt *time.Time `json:"expires_at,omitempty"`
|
||||
LastUsedAt *time.Time `json:"last_used_at,omitempty"`
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,83 @@
|
||||
package auth
|
||||
|
||||
import "testing"
|
||||
|
||||
// =============================================================================
|
||||
// Bundle 1 Phase 8 — auditor role invariants. Pin the seeded permission
|
||||
// set so a future refactor that accidentally widens it gets caught.
|
||||
// =============================================================================
|
||||
|
||||
// TestAuditorRoleHoldsExactlyAuditReadAndExport pins the load-bearing
|
||||
// invariant that the auditor role has read-only audit access AND
|
||||
// nothing else. Any drift here breaks the SOC 2 / FedRAMP separation
|
||||
// the prompt requires.
|
||||
func TestAuditorRoleHoldsExactlyAuditReadAndExport(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
got, ok := DefaultRoles[RoleIDAuditor]
|
||||
if !ok {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("auditor role missing from DefaultRoles")
|
||||
}
|
||||
want := map[string]bool{
|
||||
"audit.read": true,
|
||||
"audit.export": true,
|
||||
}
|
||||
if len(got) != len(want) {
|
||||
t.Errorf("auditor permission count = %d, want %d (auditor role widened?)", len(got), len(want))
|
||||
}
|
||||
for _, p := range got {
|
||||
if !want[p] {
|
||||
t.Errorf("auditor holds %q but should not — auditor must be read-only", p)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
for w := range want {
|
||||
found := false
|
||||
for _, p := range got {
|
||||
if p == w {
|
||||
found = true
|
||||
break
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
if !found {
|
||||
t.Errorf("auditor role missing %q", w)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// TestAuditorRoleDoesNotHoldMutatingOrReadingNonAuditPerms pins that
|
||||
// the auditor role grants ZERO mutating perms (cert.*, profile.*,
|
||||
// issuer.*, target.*, agent.*) AND zero non-audit read perms. The
|
||||
// auditor is "audit-only", not "read-only across everything".
|
||||
func TestAuditorRoleDoesNotHoldMutatingOrReadingNonAuditPerms(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
got := DefaultRoles[RoleIDAuditor]
|
||||
for _, p := range got {
|
||||
switch p {
|
||||
case "audit.read", "audit.export":
|
||||
// allowed
|
||||
default:
|
||||
t.Errorf("auditor holds non-audit permission %q — should be audit-only", p)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// TestAuditorRoleSeparateFromViewer pins that auditor and viewer
|
||||
// permission sets are disjoint EXCEPT for nothing — viewer gets
|
||||
// resource-read perms (cert/profile/issuer/target/agent) which auditor
|
||||
// must NOT inherit. Closes the "auditor sees customer cert data" leg.
|
||||
func TestAuditorRoleSeparateFromViewer(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
auditorSet := map[string]bool{}
|
||||
for _, p := range DefaultRoles[RoleIDAuditor] {
|
||||
auditorSet[p] = true
|
||||
}
|
||||
viewerSet := map[string]bool{}
|
||||
for _, p := range DefaultRoles[RoleIDViewer] {
|
||||
viewerSet[p] = true
|
||||
}
|
||||
for v := range viewerSet {
|
||||
if v == "audit.read" {
|
||||
// shared by design (viewer can read audit)
|
||||
continue
|
||||
}
|
||||
if auditorSet[v] {
|
||||
t.Errorf("auditor inherits viewer permission %q — must be disjoint except audit.read", v)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,106 @@
|
||||
// Package auth holds the RBAC domain types: tenants, roles, permissions,
|
||||
// role-permission grants, and actor-role assignments. Bundle 1 Phase 1
|
||||
// ships these as the schema primitive; Phase 2 wires the service layer,
|
||||
// Phase 3 wires the middleware gate (auth.RequirePermission).
|
||||
//
|
||||
// Schema convention follows the rest of certctl per CLAUDE.md
|
||||
// "Architecture Decisions": TEXT primary keys with prefixes (`t-`, `r-`,
|
||||
// `p-`, `ar-`), TIMESTAMPTZ for time columns, idempotent migrations.
|
||||
//
|
||||
// Multi-tenant readiness: every identity-related row carries a TenantID.
|
||||
// Bundle 1 ships single-tenant by default (one seeded "t-default" tenant);
|
||||
// the future managed-service offering activates multi-tenant by adding
|
||||
// tenants without a schema migration.
|
||||
package auth
|
||||
|
||||
import "time"
|
||||
|
||||
// Tenant is a billing / isolation boundary. Bundle 1 ships single-tenant
|
||||
// (one seeded "t-default" tenant); the column exists from day one so the
|
||||
// future managed-service offering activates multi-tenant by adding
|
||||
// tenants without a schema migration.
|
||||
type Tenant struct {
|
||||
ID string `json:"id"` // prefix `t-`
|
||||
Name string `json:"name"`
|
||||
Description string `json:"description"`
|
||||
CreatedAt time.Time `json:"created_at"`
|
||||
UpdatedAt time.Time `json:"updated_at"`
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Role is a named bag of permissions assigned to actors. Bundle 1 seeds
|
||||
// seven default roles: admin, operator, viewer, agent, mcp, cli, auditor
|
||||
// (auditor reserved for Phase 8). Operators can create custom roles via
|
||||
// the RBAC API.
|
||||
type Role struct {
|
||||
ID string `json:"id"` // prefix `r-`
|
||||
TenantID string `json:"tenant_id"`
|
||||
Name string `json:"name"`
|
||||
Description string `json:"description"`
|
||||
CreatedAt time.Time `json:"created_at"`
|
||||
UpdatedAt time.Time `json:"updated_at"`
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Permission is a typed string in the canonical catalog (cert.*,
|
||||
// profile.*, issuer.*, target.*, agent.*, audit.*, auth.role.*,
|
||||
// auth.key.*, auth.bootstrap.*). Bundle 2 extends with auth.session.*
|
||||
// and auth.oidc.* permissions. The schema treats permissions as rows
|
||||
// for FK joins; the service layer treats them as opaque strings keyed
|
||||
// by Name.
|
||||
type Permission struct {
|
||||
ID string `json:"id"` // prefix `p-`
|
||||
Name string `json:"name"`
|
||||
Namespace string `json:"namespace"` // e.g. "cert", "auth.role"
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// ScopeType enumerates what RolePermission.ScopeID refers to. Bundle 1
|
||||
// MVP supports global, profile, issuer scopes; per-cert / per-deployment-
|
||||
// target scoping deferred to a future bundle.
|
||||
type ScopeType string
|
||||
|
||||
const (
|
||||
// ScopeTypeGlobal applies the permission across all resources.
|
||||
// ScopeID is NULL for ScopeTypeGlobal grants.
|
||||
ScopeTypeGlobal ScopeType = "global"
|
||||
|
||||
// ScopeTypeProfile applies the permission only to the named
|
||||
// CertificateProfile (matched by ID).
|
||||
ScopeTypeProfile ScopeType = "profile"
|
||||
|
||||
// ScopeTypeIssuer applies the permission only to the named Issuer
|
||||
// (matched by ID).
|
||||
ScopeTypeIssuer ScopeType = "issuer"
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
// RolePermission is a (role, permission, scope) triple. A role grants
|
||||
// the permission at the named scope to all actors holding the role.
|
||||
// Most rows are global-scoped (ScopeID NULL); per-profile and per-issuer
|
||||
// scopes are operator-configurable.
|
||||
type RolePermission struct {
|
||||
RoleID string `json:"role_id"`
|
||||
PermissionID string `json:"permission_id"`
|
||||
ScopeType ScopeType `json:"scope_type"`
|
||||
ScopeID *string `json:"scope_id,omitempty"` // NULL for global
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// ActorRole assigns a Role to an Actor (an API key, an OIDC-federated
|
||||
// user, an agent, or the synthetic demo-anon actor). The schema reserves
|
||||
// ExpiresAt + GrantedBy columns so future time-bound grants and JIT
|
||||
// elevation can be added without a migration.
|
||||
type ActorRole struct {
|
||||
ID string `json:"id"` // prefix `ar-`
|
||||
ActorID string `json:"actor_id"`
|
||||
ActorType ActorTypeValue `json:"actor_type"`
|
||||
RoleID string `json:"role_id"`
|
||||
GrantedAt time.Time `json:"granted_at"`
|
||||
ExpiresAt *time.Time `json:"expires_at,omitempty"`
|
||||
GrantedBy string `json:"granted_by"`
|
||||
TenantID string `json:"tenant_id"`
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// ActorTypeValue is the typed-string actor identifier used in
|
||||
// ActorRole.ActorType. It mirrors the values in
|
||||
// internal/domain.ActorType (User, System, Agent, APIKey, Anonymous);
|
||||
// callers should reference internal/domain constants directly when
|
||||
// possible. This package-local alias exists so the auth subpackage
|
||||
// avoids importing the parent domain package and creating a cycle.
|
||||
type ActorTypeValue string
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,173 @@
|
||||
package auth
|
||||
|
||||
// Seed identifiers and constants used by the Phase 1 migration and the
|
||||
// service / handler layers. Centralised here so production code, tests,
|
||||
// and migration SQL stay in lockstep on the canonical role / permission
|
||||
// names.
|
||||
|
||||
// DefaultTenantID is the seeded tenant created by migration
|
||||
// 000029_rbac.up.sql. Bundle 1 ships single-tenant; every actor_role
|
||||
// row carries this tenant_id by default.
|
||||
const DefaultTenantID = "t-default"
|
||||
|
||||
// Seeded role IDs. Stable identifiers used by the migration backfill
|
||||
// and the demo-mode synthetic-actor seed.
|
||||
const (
|
||||
RoleIDAdmin = "r-admin"
|
||||
RoleIDOperator = "r-operator"
|
||||
RoleIDViewer = "r-viewer"
|
||||
RoleIDAgent = "r-agent"
|
||||
RoleIDMCP = "r-mcp"
|
||||
RoleIDCLI = "r-cli"
|
||||
RoleIDAuditor = "r-auditor"
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
// DemoAnonActorID is the synthetic actor used when
|
||||
// CERTCTL_AUTH_TYPE=none is configured (the demo path). Phase 1
|
||||
// migration seeds the actor + admin role assignment unconditionally;
|
||||
// Phase 3 of Bundle 1 wires the middleware to inject this actor into
|
||||
// the request context when no-auth mode is active. Reserved system
|
||||
// actor: the API rejects mutations / deletions targeting this id.
|
||||
const DemoAnonActorID = "actor-demo-anon"
|
||||
|
||||
// CanonicalPermissions is the canonical Bundle 1 permission catalog,
|
||||
// seeded by migration 000029_rbac.up.sql. Bundle 2 extends with
|
||||
// auth.session.* and auth.oidc.* permissions (those land in Bundle 2
|
||||
// Phase 5's migration).
|
||||
//
|
||||
// Naming convention: <namespace>.<verb>. Read permissions use
|
||||
// `<resource>.read`; mutations use `.create`, `.edit`, `.delete`,
|
||||
// `.assign`, `.revoke`, `.use`, `.export`, etc. The catalog is the
|
||||
// single source of truth referenced by:
|
||||
// - migration 000029_rbac.up.sql (seeds the rows)
|
||||
// - service layer (RoleService.Create rejects unknown permissions)
|
||||
// - handler layer (auth.RequirePermission perm string)
|
||||
var CanonicalPermissions = []string{
|
||||
// Certificate lifecycle
|
||||
"cert.read",
|
||||
"cert.issue",
|
||||
"cert.revoke",
|
||||
"cert.delete",
|
||||
|
||||
// Profile management
|
||||
"profile.read",
|
||||
"profile.edit",
|
||||
"profile.delete",
|
||||
|
||||
// Issuer management
|
||||
"issuer.read",
|
||||
"issuer.edit",
|
||||
"issuer.delete",
|
||||
|
||||
// Target management
|
||||
"target.read",
|
||||
"target.edit",
|
||||
"target.delete",
|
||||
|
||||
// Agent management
|
||||
"agent.read",
|
||||
"agent.edit",
|
||||
"agent.retire",
|
||||
"agent.heartbeat",
|
||||
"agent.job.poll",
|
||||
"agent.job.complete",
|
||||
"agent.job.report",
|
||||
|
||||
// Audit access (Phase 8 introduces the auditor split)
|
||||
"audit.read",
|
||||
"audit.export",
|
||||
|
||||
// RBAC primitive (Phase 4 surfaces these via /v1/auth/roles)
|
||||
"auth.role.list",
|
||||
"auth.role.create",
|
||||
"auth.role.edit",
|
||||
"auth.role.delete",
|
||||
"auth.role.assign",
|
||||
"auth.role.revoke",
|
||||
|
||||
// API-key management (Phase 4 + Phase 7 scope-down)
|
||||
"auth.key.list",
|
||||
"auth.key.create",
|
||||
"auth.key.rotate",
|
||||
"auth.key.delete",
|
||||
|
||||
// Bootstrap path (Phase 6)
|
||||
"auth.bootstrap.use",
|
||||
|
||||
// Bundle 1 Phase 3.5: admin-only fine-grained perms for the
|
||||
// legacy admin handlers, seeded by migration 000030. Wrapped at
|
||||
// the router level via auth.RequirePermission middleware; the
|
||||
// in-handler auth.IsAdmin checks have been removed in Phase 3.5.
|
||||
"cert.bulk_revoke",
|
||||
"crl.admin",
|
||||
"scep.admin",
|
||||
"est.admin",
|
||||
"ca.hierarchy.manage",
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// DefaultRoles describes the seven default roles seeded by the
|
||||
// migration, mapped to the permissions each role holds at global
|
||||
// scope. Permissions not in CanonicalPermissions cause the migration
|
||||
// to fail-closed.
|
||||
var DefaultRoles = map[string][]string{
|
||||
RoleIDAdmin: CanonicalPermissions, // admin gets every permission
|
||||
|
||||
RoleIDOperator: {
|
||||
"cert.read", "cert.issue", "cert.revoke", "cert.delete",
|
||||
"profile.read", "profile.edit",
|
||||
"issuer.read", "issuer.edit",
|
||||
"target.read", "target.edit", "target.delete",
|
||||
"agent.read", "agent.edit",
|
||||
"audit.read",
|
||||
},
|
||||
|
||||
RoleIDViewer: {
|
||||
"cert.read",
|
||||
"profile.read",
|
||||
"issuer.read",
|
||||
"target.read",
|
||||
"agent.read",
|
||||
"audit.read",
|
||||
},
|
||||
|
||||
RoleIDAgent: {
|
||||
"cert.read",
|
||||
"agent.heartbeat",
|
||||
"agent.job.poll",
|
||||
"agent.job.complete",
|
||||
"agent.job.report",
|
||||
},
|
||||
|
||||
RoleIDMCP: {
|
||||
// MCP gets operator-equivalent minus destructive ops.
|
||||
// Defense in depth for Claude / IDE integrations where
|
||||
// destructive verbs warrant additional scrutiny.
|
||||
"cert.read", "cert.issue", "cert.revoke",
|
||||
"profile.read", "profile.edit",
|
||||
"issuer.read", "issuer.edit",
|
||||
"target.read", "target.edit",
|
||||
"agent.read",
|
||||
"audit.read",
|
||||
},
|
||||
|
||||
RoleIDCLI: {
|
||||
// CLI = operator-equivalent. Operators can scope down via
|
||||
// `certctl auth keys scope-down` if they want narrower CLI
|
||||
// access in production.
|
||||
"cert.read", "cert.issue", "cert.revoke", "cert.delete",
|
||||
"profile.read", "profile.edit",
|
||||
"issuer.read", "issuer.edit",
|
||||
"target.read", "target.edit", "target.delete",
|
||||
"agent.read", "agent.edit",
|
||||
"audit.read",
|
||||
"auth.key.list", "auth.key.create", "auth.key.rotate",
|
||||
},
|
||||
|
||||
RoleIDAuditor: {
|
||||
// Phase 8 ships the auditor split. Phase 1 reserves the
|
||||
// role id + the read-only permission set so subsequent
|
||||
// phases don't have to renumber.
|
||||
"audit.read",
|
||||
"audit.export",
|
||||
},
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,95 @@
|
||||
package auth
|
||||
|
||||
import "testing"
|
||||
|
||||
// TestCanonicalPermissions_HasNoDuplicates pins the permission catalogue
|
||||
// against accidental duplication. Migration 000029_rbac.up.sql seeds one
|
||||
// permission row per name; if the catalogue has duplicates, the
|
||||
// migration fails on the (name) UNIQUE constraint. Catch the regression
|
||||
// at compile time instead of at startup.
|
||||
func TestCanonicalPermissions_HasNoDuplicates(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
seen := make(map[string]struct{}, len(CanonicalPermissions))
|
||||
for _, p := range CanonicalPermissions {
|
||||
if _, ok := seen[p]; ok {
|
||||
t.Errorf("duplicate permission in CanonicalPermissions: %q", p)
|
||||
}
|
||||
seen[p] = struct{}{}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// TestDefaultRoles_ReferenceCanonicalPermissionsOnly pins that every
|
||||
// permission referenced in DefaultRoles is also present in
|
||||
// CanonicalPermissions. The migration seeds one row per permission;
|
||||
// referencing a non-canonical permission would fail at runtime.
|
||||
func TestDefaultRoles_ReferenceCanonicalPermissionsOnly(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
canonical := make(map[string]struct{}, len(CanonicalPermissions))
|
||||
for _, p := range CanonicalPermissions {
|
||||
canonical[p] = struct{}{}
|
||||
}
|
||||
for roleID, perms := range DefaultRoles {
|
||||
for _, p := range perms {
|
||||
if _, ok := canonical[p]; !ok {
|
||||
t.Errorf("role %s references non-canonical permission %q", roleID, p)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// TestDefaultRoles_AdminHasEveryPermission pins the invariant that the
|
||||
// admin role is assigned the full canonical catalogue. Bundle 1
|
||||
// Phase 1's migration relies on this for the admin grant SELECT * FROM
|
||||
// permissions; if the role somehow only got a subset, downstream
|
||||
// RequirePermission gates would 403 admin actors on permissions that
|
||||
// were forgotten.
|
||||
func TestDefaultRoles_AdminHasEveryPermission(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
adminPerms := DefaultRoles[RoleIDAdmin]
|
||||
if len(adminPerms) != len(CanonicalPermissions) {
|
||||
t.Errorf("admin role permission count = %d, want %d (full canonical catalogue)",
|
||||
len(adminPerms), len(CanonicalPermissions))
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// TestSeededIDs_HavePrefixes pins the TEXT-PK-with-prefix convention
|
||||
// (CLAUDE.md "Architecture Decisions").
|
||||
func TestSeededIDs_HavePrefixes(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
cases := []struct {
|
||||
id string
|
||||
prefix string
|
||||
}{
|
||||
{DefaultTenantID, "t-"},
|
||||
{RoleIDAdmin, "r-"},
|
||||
{RoleIDOperator, "r-"},
|
||||
{RoleIDViewer, "r-"},
|
||||
{RoleIDAgent, "r-"},
|
||||
{RoleIDMCP, "r-"},
|
||||
{RoleIDCLI, "r-"},
|
||||
{RoleIDAuditor, "r-"},
|
||||
// DemoAnonActorID is an actor id, not a role / tenant id; it
|
||||
// uses the actor- prefix instead of t-/r-/p-/ar-. Pin
|
||||
// separately so a future rename doesn't silently regress.
|
||||
{DemoAnonActorID, "actor-"},
|
||||
}
|
||||
for _, tc := range cases {
|
||||
if len(tc.id) <= len(tc.prefix) || tc.id[:len(tc.prefix)] != tc.prefix {
|
||||
t.Errorf("id %q missing prefix %q", tc.id, tc.prefix)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// TestScopeType_EnumValuesPinned pins the three Bundle 1 scope types
|
||||
// against drift. Migration 000029_rbac.up.sql has a CHECK constraint
|
||||
// `scope_type IN ('global', 'profile', 'issuer')`; if Bundle 1 code
|
||||
// adds a fourth value, the migration must be updated in lockstep.
|
||||
func TestScopeType_EnumValuesPinned(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
want := []ScopeType{ScopeTypeGlobal, ScopeTypeProfile, ScopeTypeIssuer}
|
||||
gotValues := []string{string(ScopeTypeGlobal), string(ScopeTypeProfile), string(ScopeTypeIssuer)}
|
||||
wantValues := []string{"global", "profile", "issuer"}
|
||||
for i, v := range wantValues {
|
||||
if gotValues[i] != v {
|
||||
t.Errorf("scope type %d: got %q, want %q", i, gotValues[i], v)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
if len(want) != 3 {
|
||||
t.Errorf("ScopeType enum size = %d, want 3 (any change requires migration update)", len(want))
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -40,6 +40,11 @@ func RegisterTools(s *gomcp.Server, client *Client) {
|
||||
registerDiscoveryReadTools(s, client) // Phase E — P1-10..P1-13
|
||||
registerIntermediateCATools(s, client) // Phase F — P1-6..P1-9
|
||||
registerVerificationTools(s, client) // Phase G — P1-32, P1-34, P1-35
|
||||
// Bundle 1 Phase 11 — RBAC management tools (12 tools).
|
||||
// auth_me + role lifecycle + permission grants + key→role grants.
|
||||
// All route through the existing HTTP client; permission gates fire
|
||||
// server-side. See internal/mcp/tools_auth.go.
|
||||
registerAuthTools(s, client)
|
||||
// Phase G P1-33 (POST /api/v1/agents/{id}/discoveries) is
|
||||
// intentionally NOT exposed via MCP — it is a machine-to-machine
|
||||
// channel for agents to push filesystem-scan reports, not an
|
||||
@@ -1310,7 +1315,7 @@ func registerHealthTools(s *gomcp.Server, c *Client) {
|
||||
// assistants for cert-renewal in regulated environments need natural-language
|
||||
// approve/reject. The service layer enforces ErrApproveBySameActor (the
|
||||
// requesting actor cannot self-approve) and the handler extracts the
|
||||
// decided_by actor from middleware.UserKey — so the MCP server's API key
|
||||
// decided_by actor from auth.UserKey — so the MCP server's API key
|
||||
// identity becomes the audit-trail actor automatically. Two-person integrity
|
||||
// is preserved as long as the MCP server's key is distinct from the
|
||||
// requesting actor's; the tool inputs deliberately omit any actor_id field
|
||||
@@ -1706,7 +1711,7 @@ func registerDiscoveryReadTools(s *gomcp.Server, c *Client) {
|
||||
//
|
||||
// 2026-05-05 CLI/API/MCP↔GUI parity audit closure. Rank 8 primitive
|
||||
// (multi-level CA hierarchy management). The handlers are admin-gated via
|
||||
// middleware.IsAdmin — non-admin callers see HTTP 403 regardless of MCP
|
||||
// auth.IsAdmin — non-admin callers see HTTP 403 regardless of MCP
|
||||
// surface. We expose the full management API rather than carving it off
|
||||
// because the operator ran the original Rank 8 deliverable to make this
|
||||
// a first-class managed primitive; gating by API key role at the handler
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,201 @@
|
||||
package mcp
|
||||
|
||||
import (
|
||||
"context"
|
||||
"net/url"
|
||||
|
||||
gomcp "github.com/modelcontextprotocol/go-sdk/mcp"
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
// =============================================================================
|
||||
// Bundle 1 Phase 11 — RBAC MCP tools.
|
||||
//
|
||||
// 12 tools mirroring the Phase-4 + Phase-7 HTTP surface so operators
|
||||
// driving certctl from Claude / VS Code / any MCP client get the same
|
||||
// management capability the GUI + CLI already expose. Every tool routes
|
||||
// through the existing HTTP client (no parallel business logic), so
|
||||
// permission gates fire server-side: a non-admin caller's MCP tool
|
||||
// invocation returns whatever 403 the underlying HTTP handler emits.
|
||||
//
|
||||
// Coverage map (each tool → HTTP endpoint → permission):
|
||||
//
|
||||
// certctl_auth_me GET /v1/auth/me (no perm; own data)
|
||||
// certctl_auth_list_roles GET /v1/auth/roles auth.role.list
|
||||
// certctl_auth_get_role GET /v1/auth/roles/{id} auth.role.list
|
||||
// certctl_auth_create_role POST /v1/auth/roles auth.role.create
|
||||
// certctl_auth_update_role PUT /v1/auth/roles/{id} auth.role.edit
|
||||
// certctl_auth_delete_role DELETE /v1/auth/roles/{id} auth.role.delete
|
||||
// certctl_auth_list_permissions GET /v1/auth/permissions auth.role.list
|
||||
// certctl_auth_add_permission_to_role POST /v1/auth/roles/{id}/permissions auth.role.edit
|
||||
// certctl_auth_remove_permission_from_role DELETE /v1/auth/roles/{id}/permissions/{perm} auth.role.edit
|
||||
// certctl_auth_list_keys GET /v1/auth/keys auth.role.list
|
||||
// certctl_auth_assign_role_to_key POST /v1/auth/keys/{id}/roles auth.role.assign
|
||||
// certctl_auth_revoke_role_from_key DELETE /v1/auth/keys/{id}/roles/{role_id} auth.role.assign
|
||||
//
|
||||
// CLAUDE.md asks for a re-derive after each MCP-tool addition:
|
||||
// grep -cE 'mcp\.AddTool\(' internal/mcp/tools*.go
|
||||
// =============================================================================
|
||||
|
||||
func registerAuthTools(s *gomcp.Server, c *Client) {
|
||||
// ── Identity probe ────────────────────────────────────────────────
|
||||
gomcp.AddTool(s, &gomcp.Tool{
|
||||
Name: "certctl_auth_me",
|
||||
Description: "Return the current actor's identity, roles, and effective permissions (GET /v1/auth/me). Useful for verifying which API key the MCP server is calling under and what operations it can perform without 403.",
|
||||
}, func(ctx context.Context, req *gomcp.CallToolRequest, _ struct{}) (*gomcp.CallToolResult, any, error) {
|
||||
data, err := c.Get("/api/v1/auth/me", nil)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
return errorResult(err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
return textResult(data)
|
||||
})
|
||||
|
||||
// ── Roles ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
|
||||
gomcp.AddTool(s, &gomcp.Tool{
|
||||
Name: "certctl_auth_list_roles",
|
||||
Description: "List every role in the active tenant (GET /v1/auth/roles). Permission: auth.role.list.",
|
||||
}, func(ctx context.Context, req *gomcp.CallToolRequest, _ struct{}) (*gomcp.CallToolResult, any, error) {
|
||||
data, err := c.Get("/api/v1/auth/roles", nil)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
return errorResult(err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
return textResult(data)
|
||||
})
|
||||
|
||||
gomcp.AddTool(s, &gomcp.Tool{
|
||||
Name: "certctl_auth_get_role",
|
||||
Description: "Get a single role by id, including its current permission grants (GET /v1/auth/roles/{id}). Permission: auth.role.list.",
|
||||
}, func(ctx context.Context, req *gomcp.CallToolRequest, input AuthRoleIDInput) (*gomcp.CallToolResult, any, error) {
|
||||
data, err := c.Get("/api/v1/auth/roles/"+input.ID, nil)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
return errorResult(err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
return textResult(data)
|
||||
})
|
||||
|
||||
gomcp.AddTool(s, &gomcp.Tool{
|
||||
Name: "certctl_auth_create_role",
|
||||
Description: "Create a new custom role (POST /v1/auth/roles). The 7 default roles (admin / operator / viewer / agent / mcp / cli / auditor) are seeded by migration; this tool is for tenant-specific custom roles. Permission: auth.role.create.",
|
||||
}, func(ctx context.Context, req *gomcp.CallToolRequest, input AuthCreateRoleInput) (*gomcp.CallToolResult, any, error) {
|
||||
data, err := c.Post("/api/v1/auth/roles", input)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
return errorResult(err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
return textResult(data)
|
||||
})
|
||||
|
||||
gomcp.AddTool(s, &gomcp.Tool{
|
||||
Name: "certctl_auth_update_role",
|
||||
Description: "Update a custom role's name or description (PUT /v1/auth/roles/{id}). Default roles cannot be renamed. Permission: auth.role.edit.",
|
||||
}, func(ctx context.Context, req *gomcp.CallToolRequest, input AuthUpdateRoleInput) (*gomcp.CallToolResult, any, error) {
|
||||
body := map[string]string{}
|
||||
if input.Name != "" {
|
||||
body["name"] = input.Name
|
||||
}
|
||||
if input.Description != "" {
|
||||
body["description"] = input.Description
|
||||
}
|
||||
data, err := c.Put("/api/v1/auth/roles/"+input.ID, body)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
return errorResult(err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
return textResult(data)
|
||||
})
|
||||
|
||||
gomcp.AddTool(s, &gomcp.Tool{
|
||||
Name: "certctl_auth_delete_role",
|
||||
Description: "Delete a custom role (DELETE /v1/auth/roles/{id}). Fails with 409 when actors still hold the role; revoke their assignments first via certctl_auth_revoke_role_from_key. Permission: auth.role.delete.",
|
||||
}, func(ctx context.Context, req *gomcp.CallToolRequest, input AuthRoleIDInput) (*gomcp.CallToolResult, any, error) {
|
||||
data, err := c.Delete("/api/v1/auth/roles/" + input.ID)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
return errorResult(err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
return textResult(data)
|
||||
})
|
||||
|
||||
// ── Permissions ───────────────────────────────────────────────────
|
||||
gomcp.AddTool(s, &gomcp.Tool{
|
||||
Name: "certctl_auth_list_permissions",
|
||||
Description: "List the canonical permission catalogue (GET /v1/auth/permissions). Used by the role editor to populate the grant picker. Permission: auth.role.list.",
|
||||
}, func(ctx context.Context, req *gomcp.CallToolRequest, _ struct{}) (*gomcp.CallToolResult, any, error) {
|
||||
data, err := c.Get("/api/v1/auth/permissions", nil)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
return errorResult(err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
return textResult(data)
|
||||
})
|
||||
|
||||
gomcp.AddTool(s, &gomcp.Tool{
|
||||
Name: "certctl_auth_add_permission_to_role",
|
||||
Description: "Grant a permission to a role at a scope (POST /v1/auth/roles/{id}/permissions). Body: permission name (must be in canonical catalogue), scope_type (global|profile|issuer), and scope_id (required for non-global). Permission: auth.role.edit.",
|
||||
}, func(ctx context.Context, req *gomcp.CallToolRequest, input AuthRolePermissionGrantInput) (*gomcp.CallToolResult, any, error) {
|
||||
body := map[string]any{"permission": input.Permission}
|
||||
if input.ScopeType != "" {
|
||||
body["scope_type"] = input.ScopeType
|
||||
}
|
||||
if input.ScopeID != "" {
|
||||
body["scope_id"] = input.ScopeID
|
||||
}
|
||||
data, err := c.Post("/api/v1/auth/roles/"+input.RoleID+"/permissions", body)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
return errorResult(err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
return textResult(data)
|
||||
})
|
||||
|
||||
gomcp.AddTool(s, &gomcp.Tool{
|
||||
Name: "certctl_auth_remove_permission_from_role",
|
||||
Description: "Revoke a permission from a role (DELETE /v1/auth/roles/{id}/permissions/{perm}?scope_type=&scope_id=). The scope_type + scope_id query params disambiguate when a permission is granted at multiple scopes. Permission: auth.role.edit.",
|
||||
}, func(ctx context.Context, req *gomcp.CallToolRequest, input AuthRolePermissionRevokeInput) (*gomcp.CallToolResult, any, error) {
|
||||
path := "/api/v1/auth/roles/" + input.RoleID + "/permissions/" + input.Permission
|
||||
q := url.Values{}
|
||||
if input.ScopeType != "" {
|
||||
q.Set("scope_type", input.ScopeType)
|
||||
}
|
||||
if input.ScopeID != "" {
|
||||
q.Set("scope_id", input.ScopeID)
|
||||
}
|
||||
if encoded := q.Encode(); encoded != "" {
|
||||
path += "?" + encoded
|
||||
}
|
||||
data, err := c.Delete(path)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
return errorResult(err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
return textResult(data)
|
||||
})
|
||||
|
||||
// ── Keys ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
|
||||
gomcp.AddTool(s, &gomcp.Tool{
|
||||
Name: "certctl_auth_list_keys",
|
||||
Description: "List every actor in the active tenant with at least one role grant (GET /v1/auth/keys). Includes the synthetic actor-demo-anon row when CERTCTL_AUTH_TYPE=none is configured; that row is system-managed and cannot be mutated. Permission: auth.role.list.",
|
||||
}, func(ctx context.Context, req *gomcp.CallToolRequest, _ struct{}) (*gomcp.CallToolResult, any, error) {
|
||||
data, err := c.Get("/api/v1/auth/keys", nil)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
return errorResult(err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
return textResult(data)
|
||||
})
|
||||
|
||||
gomcp.AddTool(s, &gomcp.Tool{
|
||||
Name: "certctl_auth_assign_role_to_key",
|
||||
Description: "Assign a role to an API key actor (POST /v1/auth/keys/{id}/roles). Body: role_id. Privilege-escalation guard: the caller must hold auth.role.assign globally (admin role or equivalent). Permission: auth.role.assign.",
|
||||
}, func(ctx context.Context, req *gomcp.CallToolRequest, input AuthAssignKeyRoleInput) (*gomcp.CallToolResult, any, error) {
|
||||
data, err := c.Post("/api/v1/auth/keys/"+input.KeyID+"/roles",
|
||||
map[string]string{"role_id": input.RoleID})
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
return errorResult(err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
return textResult(data)
|
||||
})
|
||||
|
||||
gomcp.AddTool(s, &gomcp.Tool{
|
||||
Name: "certctl_auth_revoke_role_from_key",
|
||||
Description: "Revoke a role from an API key actor (DELETE /v1/auth/keys/{id}/roles/{role_id}). Rejects revocations against the reserved actor-demo-anon (HTTP 409). Permission: auth.role.assign.",
|
||||
}, func(ctx context.Context, req *gomcp.CallToolRequest, input AuthRevokeKeyRoleInput) (*gomcp.CallToolResult, any, error) {
|
||||
data, err := c.Delete("/api/v1/auth/keys/" + input.KeyID + "/roles/" + input.RoleID)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
return errorResult(err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
return textResult(data)
|
||||
})
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,249 @@
|
||||
package mcp
|
||||
|
||||
import (
|
||||
"encoding/json"
|
||||
"errors"
|
||||
"net/http"
|
||||
"net/http/httptest"
|
||||
"strings"
|
||||
"testing"
|
||||
|
||||
gomcp "github.com/modelcontextprotocol/go-sdk/mcp"
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
// =============================================================================
|
||||
// Bundle 1 Phase 11 — RBAC MCP tool tests.
|
||||
//
|
||||
// Each tool gets a positive (mock API returns 200/201/204) and a
|
||||
// negative (mock API returns 4xx). Tests assert the right HTTP method
|
||||
// + path + body are emitted, and that errors are fenced via
|
||||
// errorResult (LLM-prompt-injection defense).
|
||||
//
|
||||
// We bypass the gomcp framework's tool dispatch and exercise the
|
||||
// HTTP-client pipeline that each tool's handler delegates to. That
|
||||
// keeps the tests fast (no MCP wire-protocol setup) while pinning the
|
||||
// load-bearing contract: the right URL gets called.
|
||||
// =============================================================================
|
||||
|
||||
// authMockAPI returns an httptest server that records every request
|
||||
// and returns either canned 200/201 responses for paths under
|
||||
// /api/v1/auth/* OR a 4xx error when the path is in `errPaths`.
|
||||
func authMockAPI(log *requestLog, errPaths map[string]int) *httptest.Server {
|
||||
return httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
|
||||
body := ""
|
||||
if r.Body != nil {
|
||||
buf := make([]byte, 8192)
|
||||
n, _ := r.Body.Read(buf)
|
||||
body = string(buf[:n])
|
||||
}
|
||||
log.add(capturedRequest{Method: r.Method, Path: r.URL.Path, Query: r.URL.RawQuery, Body: body})
|
||||
if code, ok := errPaths[r.Method+" "+r.URL.Path]; ok {
|
||||
w.WriteHeader(code)
|
||||
_, _ = w.Write([]byte(`{"error":"forbidden"}`))
|
||||
return
|
||||
}
|
||||
w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
|
||||
switch r.Method {
|
||||
case http.MethodPost:
|
||||
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusCreated)
|
||||
_ = json.NewEncoder(w).Encode(map[string]string{"id": "r-new"})
|
||||
case http.MethodPut, http.MethodDelete:
|
||||
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusNoContent)
|
||||
default:
|
||||
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
|
||||
_ = json.NewEncoder(w).Encode(map[string]any{"data": []any{}, "total": 0})
|
||||
}
|
||||
}))
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func TestAuthMCP_AllToolsRegister(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
log := &requestLog{}
|
||||
api := authMockAPI(log, nil)
|
||||
defer api.Close()
|
||||
client, err := NewClient(api.URL, "k", "", false)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("NewClient: %v", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
server := gomcp.NewServer(&gomcp.Implementation{Name: "certctl-test", Version: "test"}, nil)
|
||||
registerAuthTools(server, client) // must not panic
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// TestAuthMCP_PathsAndMethods walks every Phase-11 tool's HTTP target
|
||||
// and asserts the right method + URL fires against the mock API. Each
|
||||
// row in the table is one tool's positive case.
|
||||
func TestAuthMCP_PathsAndMethods(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
log := &requestLog{}
|
||||
api := authMockAPI(log, nil)
|
||||
defer api.Close()
|
||||
client, err := NewClient(api.URL, "k", "", false)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("NewClient: %v", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
cases := []struct {
|
||||
name string
|
||||
fire func() ([]byte, error)
|
||||
wantMethod string
|
||||
wantPath string
|
||||
}{
|
||||
{
|
||||
name: "auth_me",
|
||||
fire: func() ([]byte, error) { return client.Get("/api/v1/auth/me", nil) },
|
||||
wantMethod: "GET",
|
||||
wantPath: "/api/v1/auth/me",
|
||||
},
|
||||
{
|
||||
name: "auth_list_roles",
|
||||
fire: func() ([]byte, error) { return client.Get("/api/v1/auth/roles", nil) },
|
||||
wantMethod: "GET",
|
||||
wantPath: "/api/v1/auth/roles",
|
||||
},
|
||||
{
|
||||
name: "auth_get_role",
|
||||
fire: func() ([]byte, error) { return client.Get("/api/v1/auth/roles/r-admin", nil) },
|
||||
wantMethod: "GET",
|
||||
wantPath: "/api/v1/auth/roles/r-admin",
|
||||
},
|
||||
{
|
||||
name: "auth_create_role",
|
||||
fire: func() ([]byte, error) {
|
||||
return client.Post("/api/v1/auth/roles", map[string]string{"name": "release-manager"})
|
||||
},
|
||||
wantMethod: "POST",
|
||||
wantPath: "/api/v1/auth/roles",
|
||||
},
|
||||
{
|
||||
name: "auth_update_role",
|
||||
fire: func() ([]byte, error) {
|
||||
return client.Put("/api/v1/auth/roles/r-release", map[string]string{"name": "release"})
|
||||
},
|
||||
wantMethod: "PUT",
|
||||
wantPath: "/api/v1/auth/roles/r-release",
|
||||
},
|
||||
{
|
||||
name: "auth_delete_role",
|
||||
fire: func() ([]byte, error) { return client.Delete("/api/v1/auth/roles/r-release") },
|
||||
wantMethod: "DELETE",
|
||||
wantPath: "/api/v1/auth/roles/r-release",
|
||||
},
|
||||
{
|
||||
name: "auth_list_permissions",
|
||||
fire: func() ([]byte, error) { return client.Get("/api/v1/auth/permissions", nil) },
|
||||
wantMethod: "GET",
|
||||
wantPath: "/api/v1/auth/permissions",
|
||||
},
|
||||
{
|
||||
name: "auth_add_permission_to_role",
|
||||
fire: func() ([]byte, error) {
|
||||
return client.Post("/api/v1/auth/roles/r-admin/permissions",
|
||||
map[string]string{"permission": "cert.read"})
|
||||
},
|
||||
wantMethod: "POST",
|
||||
wantPath: "/api/v1/auth/roles/r-admin/permissions",
|
||||
},
|
||||
{
|
||||
name: "auth_remove_permission_from_role",
|
||||
fire: func() ([]byte, error) { return client.Delete("/api/v1/auth/roles/r-admin/permissions/cert.read") },
|
||||
wantMethod: "DELETE",
|
||||
wantPath: "/api/v1/auth/roles/r-admin/permissions/cert.read",
|
||||
},
|
||||
{
|
||||
name: "auth_list_keys",
|
||||
fire: func() ([]byte, error) { return client.Get("/api/v1/auth/keys", nil) },
|
||||
wantMethod: "GET",
|
||||
wantPath: "/api/v1/auth/keys",
|
||||
},
|
||||
{
|
||||
name: "auth_assign_role_to_key",
|
||||
fire: func() ([]byte, error) {
|
||||
return client.Post("/api/v1/auth/keys/alice/roles",
|
||||
map[string]string{"role_id": "r-operator"})
|
||||
},
|
||||
wantMethod: "POST",
|
||||
wantPath: "/api/v1/auth/keys/alice/roles",
|
||||
},
|
||||
{
|
||||
name: "auth_revoke_role_from_key",
|
||||
fire: func() ([]byte, error) { return client.Delete("/api/v1/auth/keys/alice/roles/r-admin") },
|
||||
wantMethod: "DELETE",
|
||||
wantPath: "/api/v1/auth/keys/alice/roles/r-admin",
|
||||
},
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
for _, tc := range cases {
|
||||
t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
if _, err := tc.fire(); err != nil {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("client call err = %v", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
req := log.last()
|
||||
if req.Method != tc.wantMethod {
|
||||
t.Errorf("method = %q, want %q", req.Method, tc.wantMethod)
|
||||
}
|
||||
if req.Path != tc.wantPath {
|
||||
t.Errorf("path = %q, want %q", req.Path, tc.wantPath)
|
||||
}
|
||||
})
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// TestAuthMCP_ForbiddenSurfacesFencedError pins the negative case for
|
||||
// every tool: a 403 from the underlying API surfaces as a fenced
|
||||
// error string the LLM consumer can recognize as untrusted data
|
||||
// (LLM-prompt-injection defense).
|
||||
func TestAuthMCP_ForbiddenSurfacesFencedError(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
log := &requestLog{}
|
||||
api := authMockAPI(log, map[string]int{
|
||||
"GET /api/v1/auth/me": http.StatusForbidden,
|
||||
"GET /api/v1/auth/roles": http.StatusForbidden,
|
||||
"GET /api/v1/auth/roles/r-x": http.StatusForbidden,
|
||||
"POST /api/v1/auth/roles": http.StatusForbidden,
|
||||
"PUT /api/v1/auth/roles/r-x": http.StatusForbidden,
|
||||
"DELETE /api/v1/auth/roles/r-x": http.StatusForbidden,
|
||||
"GET /api/v1/auth/permissions": http.StatusForbidden,
|
||||
"POST /api/v1/auth/roles/r-x/permissions": http.StatusForbidden,
|
||||
"DELETE /api/v1/auth/roles/r-x/permissions/cert.read": http.StatusForbidden,
|
||||
"GET /api/v1/auth/keys": http.StatusForbidden,
|
||||
"POST /api/v1/auth/keys/alice/roles": http.StatusForbidden,
|
||||
"DELETE /api/v1/auth/keys/alice/roles/r-admin": http.StatusForbidden,
|
||||
})
|
||||
defer api.Close()
|
||||
client, _ := NewClient(api.URL, "k", "", false)
|
||||
|
||||
calls := []func() ([]byte, error){
|
||||
func() ([]byte, error) { return client.Get("/api/v1/auth/me", nil) },
|
||||
func() ([]byte, error) { return client.Get("/api/v1/auth/roles", nil) },
|
||||
func() ([]byte, error) { return client.Get("/api/v1/auth/roles/r-x", nil) },
|
||||
func() ([]byte, error) {
|
||||
return client.Post("/api/v1/auth/roles", map[string]string{"name": "x"})
|
||||
},
|
||||
func() ([]byte, error) { return client.Put("/api/v1/auth/roles/r-x", map[string]string{}) },
|
||||
func() ([]byte, error) { return client.Delete("/api/v1/auth/roles/r-x") },
|
||||
func() ([]byte, error) { return client.Get("/api/v1/auth/permissions", nil) },
|
||||
func() ([]byte, error) {
|
||||
return client.Post("/api/v1/auth/roles/r-x/permissions", map[string]string{"permission": "cert.read"})
|
||||
},
|
||||
func() ([]byte, error) {
|
||||
return client.Delete("/api/v1/auth/roles/r-x/permissions/cert.read")
|
||||
},
|
||||
func() ([]byte, error) { return client.Get("/api/v1/auth/keys", nil) },
|
||||
func() ([]byte, error) {
|
||||
return client.Post("/api/v1/auth/keys/alice/roles", map[string]string{"role_id": "r-operator"})
|
||||
},
|
||||
func() ([]byte, error) { return client.Delete("/api/v1/auth/keys/alice/roles/r-admin") },
|
||||
}
|
||||
for i, fire := range calls {
|
||||
_, err := fire()
|
||||
if err == nil {
|
||||
t.Errorf("call[%d] expected an error from forbidden mock; got nil", i)
|
||||
continue
|
||||
}
|
||||
// errorResult wraps the error in fences. Since we're testing
|
||||
// the underlying client, we just confirm that a non-nil error
|
||||
// surfaces; the textual fence is exercised by TestErrorResult.
|
||||
_ = errors.Unwrap(err)
|
||||
if !strings.Contains(strings.ToLower(err.Error()), "forbidden") &&
|
||||
!strings.Contains(err.Error(), "403") {
|
||||
t.Errorf("call[%d] err = %v, expected to mention forbidden / 403", i, err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -417,6 +417,20 @@ var allHappyPathCases = []toolCase{
|
||||
{"certctl_list_certificate_deployments", map[string]any{"id": "mc-1"}, http.MethodGet, "/api/v1/certificates/mc-1/deployments"},
|
||||
{"certctl_verify_job", map[string]any{"id": "j-1", "target_id": "t-1", "expected_fingerprint": "AA:BB", "actual_fingerprint": "AA:BB", "verified": true}, http.MethodPost, "/api/v1/jobs/j-1/verify"},
|
||||
{"certctl_get_job_verification", map[string]any{"id": "j-1"}, http.MethodGet, "/api/v1/jobs/j-1/verification"},
|
||||
|
||||
// Bundle 1 Phase 11 — RBAC tools.
|
||||
{"certctl_auth_me", map[string]any{}, http.MethodGet, "/api/v1/auth/me"},
|
||||
{"certctl_auth_list_roles", map[string]any{}, http.MethodGet, "/api/v1/auth/roles"},
|
||||
{"certctl_auth_get_role", map[string]any{"id": "r-admin"}, http.MethodGet, "/api/v1/auth/roles/r-admin"},
|
||||
{"certctl_auth_create_role", map[string]any{"name": "release"}, http.MethodPost, "/api/v1/auth/roles"},
|
||||
{"certctl_auth_update_role", map[string]any{"id": "r-x", "name": "renamed"}, http.MethodPut, "/api/v1/auth/roles/r-x"},
|
||||
{"certctl_auth_delete_role", map[string]any{"id": "r-x"}, http.MethodDelete, "/api/v1/auth/roles/r-x"},
|
||||
{"certctl_auth_list_permissions", map[string]any{}, http.MethodGet, "/api/v1/auth/permissions"},
|
||||
{"certctl_auth_add_permission_to_role", map[string]any{"role_id": "r-admin", "permission": "cert.read"}, http.MethodPost, "/api/v1/auth/roles/r-admin/permissions"},
|
||||
{"certctl_auth_remove_permission_from_role", map[string]any{"role_id": "r-admin", "permission": "cert.read"}, http.MethodDelete, "/api/v1/auth/roles/r-admin/permissions/cert.read"},
|
||||
{"certctl_auth_list_keys", map[string]any{}, http.MethodGet, "/api/v1/auth/keys"},
|
||||
{"certctl_auth_assign_role_to_key", map[string]any{"key_id": "alice", "role_id": "r-operator"}, http.MethodPost, "/api/v1/auth/keys/alice/roles"},
|
||||
{"certctl_auth_revoke_role_from_key", map[string]any{"key_id": "alice", "role_id": "r-admin"}, http.MethodDelete, "/api/v1/auth/keys/alice/roles/r-admin"},
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// TestMCP_AllTools_HappyPath dispatches every tool against the mock API in
|
||||
|
||||
+55
-1
@@ -361,7 +361,7 @@ type ListApprovalsInput struct {
|
||||
|
||||
// ApprovalDecisionInput is the MCP tool input for approve / reject endpoints.
|
||||
// The decided_by actor is derived server-side from the authenticated API-key
|
||||
// name (middleware.UserKey) — NOT from this body. The two-person-integrity
|
||||
// name (auth.UserKey) — NOT from this body. The two-person-integrity
|
||||
// contract (ErrApproveBySameActor) is enforced regardless of who pushes the
|
||||
// decision through MCP, so as long as the MCP server's API key identity is
|
||||
// distinct from the requesting actor, the contract holds.
|
||||
@@ -552,3 +552,57 @@ type VerifyJobInput struct {
|
||||
// ── Empty ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
|
||||
|
||||
type EmptyInput struct{}
|
||||
|
||||
// ── Auth (Bundle 1 Phase 11 — RBAC) ────────────────────────────────
|
||||
|
||||
// AuthRoleIDInput is the role-id-only input shape used by the get +
|
||||
// delete tools. Distinct from the certificate-shaped GetByIDInput so
|
||||
// the jsonschema description points at the role prefix specifically.
|
||||
type AuthRoleIDInput struct {
|
||||
ID string `json:"id" jsonschema:"Role ID (e.g. r-admin, r-operator)"`
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// AuthCreateRoleInput is the body for certctl_auth_create_role.
|
||||
type AuthCreateRoleInput struct {
|
||||
Name string `json:"name" jsonschema:"Role display name (required, must be unique within the tenant)"`
|
||||
Description string `json:"description,omitempty" jsonschema:"Optional human-readable description of what the role grants"`
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// AuthUpdateRoleInput is the body for certctl_auth_update_role.
|
||||
type AuthUpdateRoleInput struct {
|
||||
ID string `json:"id" jsonschema:"Role ID to update (e.g. r-release-manager)"`
|
||||
Name string `json:"name,omitempty" jsonschema:"New role display name. Empty = unchanged"`
|
||||
Description string `json:"description,omitempty" jsonschema:"New description. Empty = unchanged"`
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// AuthRolePermissionGrantInput is the body for
|
||||
// certctl_auth_add_permission_to_role.
|
||||
type AuthRolePermissionGrantInput struct {
|
||||
RoleID string `json:"role_id" jsonschema:"Role ID to grant the permission to"`
|
||||
Permission string `json:"permission" jsonschema:"Canonical permission name (e.g. cert.read, auth.role.assign). Must be in the catalogue returned by certctl_auth_list_permissions"`
|
||||
ScopeType string `json:"scope_type,omitempty" jsonschema:"Scope type: global (default) | profile | issuer"`
|
||||
ScopeID string `json:"scope_id,omitempty" jsonschema:"Scope ID; required when scope_type is profile or issuer"`
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// AuthRolePermissionRevokeInput is the input for
|
||||
// certctl_auth_remove_permission_from_role.
|
||||
type AuthRolePermissionRevokeInput struct {
|
||||
RoleID string `json:"role_id" jsonschema:"Role ID to revoke the permission from"`
|
||||
Permission string `json:"permission" jsonschema:"Canonical permission name to revoke"`
|
||||
ScopeType string `json:"scope_type,omitempty" jsonschema:"Optional scope type to disambiguate when the permission is granted at multiple scopes"`
|
||||
ScopeID string `json:"scope_id,omitempty" jsonschema:"Optional scope ID for scope_type=profile|issuer revocations"`
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// AuthAssignKeyRoleInput is the body for
|
||||
// certctl_auth_assign_role_to_key.
|
||||
type AuthAssignKeyRoleInput struct {
|
||||
KeyID string `json:"key_id" jsonschema:"API-key actor ID (the named-key Name from CERTCTL_API_KEYS_NAMED, or an ak-<slug> ID minted by the bootstrap path)"`
|
||||
RoleID string `json:"role_id" jsonschema:"Role ID to assign (e.g. r-operator)"`
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// AuthRevokeKeyRoleInput is the input for
|
||||
// certctl_auth_revoke_role_from_key.
|
||||
type AuthRevokeKeyRoleInput struct {
|
||||
KeyID string `json:"key_id" jsonschema:"API-key actor ID. Reserved actor-demo-anon is rejected server-side"`
|
||||
RoleID string `json:"role_id" jsonschema:"Role ID to revoke"`
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,170 @@
|
||||
package repository
|
||||
|
||||
import (
|
||||
"context"
|
||||
"errors"
|
||||
|
||||
authdomain "github.com/certctl-io/certctl/internal/domain/auth"
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
// Sentinel errors for the RBAC repositories. Postgres implementations
|
||||
// translate SQLSTATE codes (23505 unique-violation, 23503 FK-violation,
|
||||
// no-rows) into these so handler / service code branches via errors.Is.
|
||||
var (
|
||||
// ErrAuthNotFound is returned by Get / GetByName when no row matches.
|
||||
// Maps to HTTP 404.
|
||||
ErrAuthNotFound = errors.New("auth: row not found")
|
||||
|
||||
// ErrAuthDuplicateName is returned by Create when a UNIQUE constraint
|
||||
// fires (e.g. roles.name within a tenant). Maps to HTTP 409.
|
||||
ErrAuthDuplicateName = errors.New("auth: duplicate name")
|
||||
|
||||
// ErrAuthRoleInUse is returned by RoleRepository.Delete when active
|
||||
// actor_roles still reference the role (FK ON DELETE RESTRICT).
|
||||
// Maps to HTTP 409.
|
||||
ErrAuthRoleInUse = errors.New("auth: role still has active actor assignments")
|
||||
|
||||
// ErrAuthReservedActor is returned when a mutation targets a system-
|
||||
// reserved actor (currently `actor-demo-anon`). Maps to HTTP 409.
|
||||
ErrAuthReservedActor = errors.New("auth: reserved system actor cannot be modified")
|
||||
|
||||
// ErrAuthUnknownPermission is returned when a RolePermission grant
|
||||
// references a permission name not in the canonical catalog.
|
||||
// Maps to HTTP 400.
|
||||
ErrAuthUnknownPermission = errors.New("auth: permission not in canonical catalog")
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
// TenantRepository wraps the tenants table. Bundle 1 ships single-tenant
|
||||
// (one seeded `t-default`); the future managed-service offering activates
|
||||
// multi-tenant by inserting additional tenants.
|
||||
type TenantRepository interface {
|
||||
Get(ctx context.Context, id string) (*authdomain.Tenant, error)
|
||||
List(ctx context.Context) ([]*authdomain.Tenant, error)
|
||||
EnsureDefault(ctx context.Context) error
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// RoleRepository wraps the roles + role_permissions tables.
|
||||
type RoleRepository interface {
|
||||
Get(ctx context.Context, id string) (*authdomain.Role, error)
|
||||
GetByName(ctx context.Context, tenantID, name string) (*authdomain.Role, error)
|
||||
List(ctx context.Context, tenantID string) ([]*authdomain.Role, error)
|
||||
Create(ctx context.Context, role *authdomain.Role) error
|
||||
Update(ctx context.Context, role *authdomain.Role) error
|
||||
// Delete fails with ErrAuthRoleInUse when active actor_roles still
|
||||
// reference the role (FK ON DELETE RESTRICT).
|
||||
Delete(ctx context.Context, id string) error
|
||||
|
||||
// ListPermissions returns the (Permission, ScopeType, ScopeID)
|
||||
// triples granted to the role.
|
||||
ListPermissions(ctx context.Context, roleID string) ([]*authdomain.RolePermission, error)
|
||||
// AddPermission creates a row in role_permissions. ON CONFLICT DO
|
||||
// NOTHING preserves idempotency for re-applied seeds.
|
||||
AddPermission(ctx context.Context, grant *authdomain.RolePermission) error
|
||||
// RemovePermission deletes a specific (role, permission, scope) row.
|
||||
RemovePermission(ctx context.Context, grant *authdomain.RolePermission) error
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// PermissionRepository wraps the permissions table.
|
||||
type PermissionRepository interface {
|
||||
List(ctx context.Context) ([]*authdomain.Permission, error)
|
||||
GetByName(ctx context.Context, name string) (*authdomain.Permission, error)
|
||||
// IsCanonical returns true when name is in
|
||||
// authdomain.CanonicalPermissions. The migration seeds the catalog;
|
||||
// this is an in-memory check so callers (RoleService.AddPermission)
|
||||
// can fail-fast without a DB roundtrip.
|
||||
IsCanonical(name string) bool
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// ActorRoleRepository wraps the actor_roles table.
|
||||
type ActorRoleRepository interface {
|
||||
// ListByActor returns all standing role grants for an actor.
|
||||
ListByActor(ctx context.Context, actorID string, actorType authdomain.ActorTypeValue, tenantID string) ([]*authdomain.ActorRole, error)
|
||||
// ListByRole returns all actors holding a given role. Used by
|
||||
// RoleService.Delete to enforce the in-use guard.
|
||||
ListByRole(ctx context.Context, roleID string) ([]*authdomain.ActorRole, error)
|
||||
|
||||
// Grant creates an actor_roles row. Idempotent via ON CONFLICT.
|
||||
// The reserved actor `actor-demo-anon` admin grant is seeded by
|
||||
// the migration; this method will create additional grants for it
|
||||
// only if the operator explicitly wires that, which the API
|
||||
// layer rejects.
|
||||
Grant(ctx context.Context, ar *authdomain.ActorRole) error
|
||||
// Revoke deletes an actor_roles row by (actor_id, actor_type,
|
||||
// role_id, tenant_id). The API layer must reject revocations
|
||||
// targeting `actor-demo-anon` to preserve the demo path.
|
||||
Revoke(ctx context.Context, actorID string, actorType authdomain.ActorTypeValue, roleID, tenantID string) error
|
||||
|
||||
// EffectivePermissions returns the deduplicated set of
|
||||
// (permission_name, scope_type, scope_id) triples granted to the
|
||||
// actor across all roles they hold. The middleware-level
|
||||
// auth.RequirePermission gate (Phase 3) calls this on every
|
||||
// gated request; implementations should cache or use SQL JOINs
|
||||
// for performance.
|
||||
EffectivePermissions(ctx context.Context, actorID string, actorType authdomain.ActorTypeValue, tenantID string) ([]EffectivePermission, error)
|
||||
|
||||
// AdminExists reports whether ANY actor in the tenant currently
|
||||
// holds the r-admin role. Bundle 1 Phase 6's bootstrap probe
|
||||
// uses this to gate the day-0 endpoint: once the answer flips
|
||||
// from false to true the bootstrap path stays closed forever
|
||||
// (the seeded actor-demo-anon admin only exists in demo mode;
|
||||
// in api-key mode the operator either uses bootstrap or
|
||||
// CERTCTL_API_KEYS_NAMED to mint the first admin). The query
|
||||
// excludes the synthetic actor-demo-anon so demo-mode deploys
|
||||
// can still bootstrap a real admin if/when the operator
|
||||
// switches to api-key mode without re-migrating.
|
||||
AdminExists(ctx context.Context, tenantID string) (bool, error)
|
||||
|
||||
// ListDistinctActors returns one row per (actor_id, actor_type)
|
||||
// pair with at least one actor_roles grant in the tenant.
|
||||
// Bundle 1 Phase 7's `auth keys list` + scope-down helper use
|
||||
// this to enumerate the actor population without joining
|
||||
// against the env-var-loaded namedKeys (whose canonical record
|
||||
// is the actor_roles backfill from Phase 1 / C2). The synthetic
|
||||
// actor-demo-anon is included so the GUI can render it as
|
||||
// "system-managed, scope-down hidden"; Phase 7's interactive
|
||||
// flow filters it out of the prompt loop.
|
||||
ListDistinctActors(ctx context.Context, tenantID string) ([]ActorWithRoles, error)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// ActorWithRoles is the (actor, roles) projection returned by
|
||||
// ActorRoleRepository.ListDistinctActors. Roles is the slice of role
|
||||
// IDs the actor holds; the caller can resolve role names via the
|
||||
// RoleRepository or the CLI's already-cached role list.
|
||||
type ActorWithRoles struct {
|
||||
ActorID string
|
||||
ActorType authdomain.ActorTypeValue
|
||||
TenantID string
|
||||
RoleIDs []string
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// EffectivePermission is the (permission, scope) pair returned by
|
||||
// ActorRoleRepository.EffectivePermissions. Multiple actor_roles rows
|
||||
// may grant the same permission at different scopes; callers receive
|
||||
// every grant and the matcher handles "global beats specific" semantics.
|
||||
type EffectivePermission struct {
|
||||
PermissionName string
|
||||
ScopeType authdomain.ScopeType
|
||||
ScopeID *string // NULL = global
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// APIKeyRepository wraps the api_keys table. Bundle 1 Phase 6 ships
|
||||
// this so the bootstrap endpoint (POST /v1/auth/bootstrap) can mint
|
||||
// the first admin API key without needing the operator to roundtrip
|
||||
// through CERTCTL_API_KEYS_NAMED. Operator-tier keys live here;
|
||||
// agent-tier keys remain on the agents table (`api_key_hash` column).
|
||||
type APIKeyRepository interface {
|
||||
// Create stores a new key row. ID + CreatedAt default if zero.
|
||||
// The plaintext key is NOT stored — callers pass only the
|
||||
// SHA-256 hex hash. Returns ErrAuthDuplicateName when the
|
||||
// (name) UNIQUE constraint fires.
|
||||
Create(ctx context.Context, key *authdomain.APIKey) error
|
||||
// GetByName returns a single row by operator-visible name.
|
||||
// Returns ErrAuthNotFound when no row matches.
|
||||
GetByName(ctx context.Context, name string) (*authdomain.APIKey, error)
|
||||
// List returns every key row across the tenant. Bundle 1 ships
|
||||
// single-tenant so tenantID is typically t-default.
|
||||
List(ctx context.Context, tenantID string) ([]*authdomain.APIKey, error)
|
||||
// Delete removes a key row by name. Used by the RBAC API's key
|
||||
// rotation/revocation paths.
|
||||
Delete(ctx context.Context, name string) error
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -47,6 +47,10 @@ type AuditFilter struct {
|
||||
ActorType string // "user", "agent", "system"
|
||||
ResourceType string // e.g., "certificate", "policy", "agent"
|
||||
ResourceID string
|
||||
// EventCategory (Bundle 1 Phase 8) filters by event_category
|
||||
// column. Allowed values: "cert_lifecycle", "auth", "config".
|
||||
// Empty string disables the filter (all categories returned).
|
||||
EventCategory string
|
||||
From time.Time
|
||||
To time.Time
|
||||
Page int
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -60,19 +60,41 @@ func (r *ApprovalRepository) Create(ctx context.Context, req *domain.ApprovalReq
|
||||
metadataJSON = []byte("{}")
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Bundle 1 Phase 9: empty Kind defaults to cert_issuance to
|
||||
// preserve back-compat for every Phase-7-2026-05-03 caller.
|
||||
if req.Kind == "" {
|
||||
req.Kind = domain.ApprovalKindCertIssuance
|
||||
}
|
||||
if !domain.IsValidApprovalKind(req.Kind) {
|
||||
return fmt.Errorf("invalid approval kind %q", req.Kind)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// nullable cert_id / job_id for profile_edit rows.
|
||||
var certID, jobID interface{}
|
||||
if req.CertificateID != "" {
|
||||
certID = req.CertificateID
|
||||
}
|
||||
if req.JobID != "" {
|
||||
jobID = req.JobID
|
||||
}
|
||||
var payload interface{}
|
||||
if len(req.Payload) > 0 {
|
||||
payload = req.Payload
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
const q = `
|
||||
INSERT INTO issuance_approval_requests
|
||||
(id, certificate_id, job_id, profile_id, requested_by,
|
||||
state, decided_by, decided_at, decision_note, metadata,
|
||||
created_at, updated_at)
|
||||
created_at, updated_at, approval_kind, payload)
|
||||
VALUES
|
||||
($1, $2, $3, $4, $5, $6, $7, $8, $9, $10, $11, $12)
|
||||
($1, $2, $3, $4, $5, $6, $7, $8, $9, $10, $11, $12, $13, $14)
|
||||
`
|
||||
|
||||
_, err = r.db.ExecContext(ctx, q,
|
||||
req.ID, req.CertificateID, req.JobID, req.ProfileID, req.RequestedBy,
|
||||
req.ID, certID, jobID, req.ProfileID, req.RequestedBy,
|
||||
string(req.State), req.DecidedBy, req.DecidedAt, req.DecisionNote, metadataJSON,
|
||||
req.CreatedAt, req.UpdatedAt,
|
||||
req.CreatedAt, req.UpdatedAt, string(req.Kind), payload,
|
||||
)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
var pqErr *pq.Error
|
||||
@@ -89,7 +111,7 @@ func (r *ApprovalRepository) Get(ctx context.Context, id string) (*domain.Approv
|
||||
const q = `
|
||||
SELECT id, certificate_id, job_id, profile_id, requested_by,
|
||||
state, decided_by, decided_at, decision_note, metadata,
|
||||
created_at, updated_at
|
||||
created_at, updated_at, approval_kind, payload
|
||||
FROM issuance_approval_requests
|
||||
WHERE id = $1
|
||||
`
|
||||
@@ -103,7 +125,7 @@ func (r *ApprovalRepository) GetByJobID(ctx context.Context, jobID string) (*dom
|
||||
const q = `
|
||||
SELECT id, certificate_id, job_id, profile_id, requested_by,
|
||||
state, decided_by, decided_at, decision_note, metadata,
|
||||
created_at, updated_at
|
||||
created_at, updated_at, approval_kind, payload
|
||||
FROM issuance_approval_requests
|
||||
WHERE job_id = $1
|
||||
ORDER BY created_at DESC
|
||||
@@ -131,7 +153,7 @@ func (r *ApprovalRepository) List(ctx context.Context, filter *repository.Approv
|
||||
q := `
|
||||
SELECT id, certificate_id, job_id, profile_id, requested_by,
|
||||
state, decided_by, decided_at, decision_note, metadata,
|
||||
created_at, updated_at
|
||||
created_at, updated_at, approval_kind, payload
|
||||
FROM issuance_approval_requests
|
||||
WHERE 1 = 1
|
||||
`
|
||||
@@ -269,16 +291,20 @@ type rowScanner interface {
|
||||
func scanApprovalRow(row rowScanner) (*domain.ApprovalRequest, error) {
|
||||
var (
|
||||
req domain.ApprovalRequest
|
||||
certID sql.NullString
|
||||
jobID sql.NullString
|
||||
stateStr string
|
||||
decidedBy sql.NullString
|
||||
decidedAt sql.NullTime
|
||||
decisionNote sql.NullString
|
||||
metadataJSON []byte
|
||||
kindStr string
|
||||
payload []byte
|
||||
)
|
||||
err := row.Scan(
|
||||
&req.ID, &req.CertificateID, &req.JobID, &req.ProfileID, &req.RequestedBy,
|
||||
&req.ID, &certID, &jobID, &req.ProfileID, &req.RequestedBy,
|
||||
&stateStr, &decidedBy, &decidedAt, &decisionNote, &metadataJSON,
|
||||
&req.CreatedAt, &req.UpdatedAt,
|
||||
&req.CreatedAt, &req.UpdatedAt, &kindStr, &payload,
|
||||
)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
if errors.Is(err, sql.ErrNoRows) {
|
||||
@@ -288,6 +314,16 @@ func scanApprovalRow(row rowScanner) (*domain.ApprovalRequest, error) {
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
req.State = domain.ApprovalState(stateStr)
|
||||
req.Kind = domain.ApprovalKind(kindStr)
|
||||
if certID.Valid {
|
||||
req.CertificateID = certID.String
|
||||
}
|
||||
if jobID.Valid {
|
||||
req.JobID = jobID.String
|
||||
}
|
||||
if len(payload) > 0 {
|
||||
req.Payload = payload
|
||||
}
|
||||
if decidedBy.Valid {
|
||||
s := decidedBy.String
|
||||
req.DecidedBy = &s
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -39,14 +39,21 @@ func (r *AuditRepository) CreateWithTx(ctx context.Context, q repository.Querier
|
||||
if event.ID == "" {
|
||||
event.ID = uuid.New().String()
|
||||
}
|
||||
// Bundle 1 Phase 8: empty EventCategory defaults to
|
||||
// cert_lifecycle (matches the migration's DEFAULT clause + the
|
||||
// DB CHECK constraint). The boundary catches callers that
|
||||
// haven't yet been migrated to the categorized API.
|
||||
if event.EventCategory == "" {
|
||||
event.EventCategory = domain.EventCategoryCertLifecycle
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
err := q.QueryRowContext(ctx, `
|
||||
INSERT INTO audit_events (
|
||||
id, actor, actor_type, action, resource_type, resource_id, details, timestamp
|
||||
) VALUES ($1, $2, $3, $4, $5, $6, $7, $8)
|
||||
id, actor, actor_type, action, resource_type, resource_id, details, timestamp, event_category
|
||||
) VALUES ($1, $2, $3, $4, $5, $6, $7, $8, $9)
|
||||
RETURNING id
|
||||
`, event.ID, event.Actor, event.ActorType, event.Action, event.ResourceType,
|
||||
event.ResourceID, event.Details, event.Timestamp).Scan(&event.ID)
|
||||
event.ResourceID, event.Details, event.Timestamp, event.EventCategory).Scan(&event.ID)
|
||||
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
return fmt.Errorf("failed to create audit event: %w", err)
|
||||
@@ -104,6 +111,11 @@ func (r *AuditRepository) List(ctx context.Context, filter *repository.AuditFilt
|
||||
args = append(args, filter.To)
|
||||
argCount++
|
||||
}
|
||||
if filter.EventCategory != "" {
|
||||
whereConditions = append(whereConditions, fmt.Sprintf("event_category = $%d", argCount))
|
||||
args = append(args, filter.EventCategory)
|
||||
argCount++
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
whereClause := ""
|
||||
if len(whereConditions) > 0 {
|
||||
@@ -120,7 +132,7 @@ func (r *AuditRepository) List(ctx context.Context, filter *repository.AuditFilt
|
||||
// Get paginated results
|
||||
offset := (filter.Page - 1) * filter.PerPage
|
||||
query := fmt.Sprintf(`
|
||||
SELECT id, actor, actor_type, action, resource_type, resource_id, details, timestamp
|
||||
SELECT id, actor, actor_type, action, resource_type, resource_id, details, timestamp, event_category
|
||||
FROM audit_events
|
||||
%s
|
||||
ORDER BY timestamp DESC
|
||||
@@ -139,7 +151,7 @@ func (r *AuditRepository) List(ctx context.Context, filter *repository.AuditFilt
|
||||
for rows.Next() {
|
||||
var event domain.AuditEvent
|
||||
if err := rows.Scan(&event.ID, &event.Actor, &event.ActorType, &event.Action,
|
||||
&event.ResourceType, &event.ResourceID, &event.Details, &event.Timestamp); err != nil {
|
||||
&event.ResourceType, &event.ResourceID, &event.Details, &event.Timestamp, &event.EventCategory); err != nil {
|
||||
return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to scan audit event: %w", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
events = append(events, &event)
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,620 @@
|
||||
package postgres
|
||||
|
||||
import (
|
||||
"context"
|
||||
"database/sql"
|
||||
"errors"
|
||||
"fmt"
|
||||
"time"
|
||||
|
||||
"github.com/google/uuid"
|
||||
"github.com/lib/pq"
|
||||
|
||||
authdomain "github.com/certctl-io/certctl/internal/domain/auth"
|
||||
"github.com/certctl-io/certctl/internal/repository"
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
// canonicalPermissionSet is built once at package init from the
|
||||
// authdomain.CanonicalPermissions catalogue. Lookup is O(1); used by
|
||||
// PermissionRepository.IsCanonical so the service layer can fail-fast
|
||||
// before issuing a DB round-trip.
|
||||
var canonicalPermissionSet = func() map[string]struct{} {
|
||||
m := make(map[string]struct{}, len(authdomain.CanonicalPermissions))
|
||||
for _, p := range authdomain.CanonicalPermissions {
|
||||
m[p] = struct{}{}
|
||||
}
|
||||
return m
|
||||
}()
|
||||
|
||||
// =============================================================================
|
||||
// TenantRepository
|
||||
// =============================================================================
|
||||
|
||||
// TenantRepository is the postgres implementation of
|
||||
// repository.TenantRepository.
|
||||
type TenantRepository struct {
|
||||
db *sql.DB
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// NewTenantRepository constructs a TenantRepository.
|
||||
func NewTenantRepository(db *sql.DB) *TenantRepository {
|
||||
return &TenantRepository{db: db}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func (r *TenantRepository) Get(ctx context.Context, id string) (*authdomain.Tenant, error) {
|
||||
row := r.db.QueryRowContext(ctx,
|
||||
`SELECT id, name, description, created_at, updated_at FROM tenants WHERE id = $1`, id)
|
||||
var t authdomain.Tenant
|
||||
if err := row.Scan(&t.ID, &t.Name, &t.Description, &t.CreatedAt, &t.UpdatedAt); err != nil {
|
||||
if errors.Is(err, sql.ErrNoRows) {
|
||||
return nil, repository.ErrAuthNotFound
|
||||
}
|
||||
return nil, fmt.Errorf("tenant.get: %w", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
return &t, nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func (r *TenantRepository) List(ctx context.Context) ([]*authdomain.Tenant, error) {
|
||||
rows, err := r.db.QueryContext(ctx,
|
||||
`SELECT id, name, description, created_at, updated_at FROM tenants ORDER BY id`)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
return nil, fmt.Errorf("tenant.list: %w", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
defer rows.Close()
|
||||
var out []*authdomain.Tenant
|
||||
for rows.Next() {
|
||||
var t authdomain.Tenant
|
||||
if err := rows.Scan(&t.ID, &t.Name, &t.Description, &t.CreatedAt, &t.UpdatedAt); err != nil {
|
||||
return nil, fmt.Errorf("tenant.list scan: %w", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
out = append(out, &t)
|
||||
}
|
||||
return out, rows.Err()
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func (r *TenantRepository) EnsureDefault(ctx context.Context) error {
|
||||
_, err := r.db.ExecContext(ctx, `
|
||||
INSERT INTO tenants (id, name, description)
|
||||
VALUES ($1, 'default', 'Single-tenant default seeded by Bundle 1 Phase 1.')
|
||||
ON CONFLICT (id) DO NOTHING
|
||||
`, authdomain.DefaultTenantID)
|
||||
return err
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// =============================================================================
|
||||
// RoleRepository
|
||||
// =============================================================================
|
||||
|
||||
// RoleRepository is the postgres implementation of repository.RoleRepository.
|
||||
type RoleRepository struct {
|
||||
db *sql.DB
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func NewRoleRepository(db *sql.DB) *RoleRepository {
|
||||
return &RoleRepository{db: db}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func (r *RoleRepository) Get(ctx context.Context, id string) (*authdomain.Role, error) {
|
||||
row := r.db.QueryRowContext(ctx,
|
||||
`SELECT id, tenant_id, name, description, created_at, updated_at
|
||||
FROM roles WHERE id = $1`, id)
|
||||
return scanRole(row)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func (r *RoleRepository) GetByName(ctx context.Context, tenantID, name string) (*authdomain.Role, error) {
|
||||
row := r.db.QueryRowContext(ctx,
|
||||
`SELECT id, tenant_id, name, description, created_at, updated_at
|
||||
FROM roles WHERE tenant_id = $1 AND name = $2`, tenantID, name)
|
||||
return scanRole(row)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func (r *RoleRepository) List(ctx context.Context, tenantID string) ([]*authdomain.Role, error) {
|
||||
rows, err := r.db.QueryContext(ctx,
|
||||
`SELECT id, tenant_id, name, description, created_at, updated_at
|
||||
FROM roles WHERE tenant_id = $1 ORDER BY name`, tenantID)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
return nil, fmt.Errorf("role.list: %w", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
defer rows.Close()
|
||||
var out []*authdomain.Role
|
||||
for rows.Next() {
|
||||
var role authdomain.Role
|
||||
if err := rows.Scan(&role.ID, &role.TenantID, &role.Name, &role.Description, &role.CreatedAt, &role.UpdatedAt); err != nil {
|
||||
return nil, fmt.Errorf("role.list scan: %w", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
out = append(out, &role)
|
||||
}
|
||||
return out, rows.Err()
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func (r *RoleRepository) Create(ctx context.Context, role *authdomain.Role) error {
|
||||
if role.ID == "" {
|
||||
role.ID = "r-" + uuid.NewString()
|
||||
}
|
||||
if role.TenantID == "" {
|
||||
role.TenantID = authdomain.DefaultTenantID
|
||||
}
|
||||
now := time.Now().UTC()
|
||||
if role.CreatedAt.IsZero() {
|
||||
role.CreatedAt = now
|
||||
}
|
||||
if role.UpdatedAt.IsZero() {
|
||||
role.UpdatedAt = now
|
||||
}
|
||||
_, err := r.db.ExecContext(ctx, `
|
||||
INSERT INTO roles (id, tenant_id, name, description, created_at, updated_at)
|
||||
VALUES ($1, $2, $3, $4, $5, $6)
|
||||
`, role.ID, role.TenantID, role.Name, role.Description, role.CreatedAt, role.UpdatedAt)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
var pqErr *pq.Error
|
||||
if errors.As(err, &pqErr) && pqErr.Code == "23505" {
|
||||
return repository.ErrAuthDuplicateName
|
||||
}
|
||||
return fmt.Errorf("role.create: %w", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
return nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func (r *RoleRepository) Update(ctx context.Context, role *authdomain.Role) error {
|
||||
role.UpdatedAt = time.Now().UTC()
|
||||
res, err := r.db.ExecContext(ctx, `
|
||||
UPDATE roles SET name = $1, description = $2, updated_at = $3
|
||||
WHERE id = $4
|
||||
`, role.Name, role.Description, role.UpdatedAt, role.ID)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
var pqErr *pq.Error
|
||||
if errors.As(err, &pqErr) && pqErr.Code == "23505" {
|
||||
return repository.ErrAuthDuplicateName
|
||||
}
|
||||
return fmt.Errorf("role.update: %w", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
n, _ := res.RowsAffected()
|
||||
if n == 0 {
|
||||
return repository.ErrAuthNotFound
|
||||
}
|
||||
return nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func (r *RoleRepository) Delete(ctx context.Context, id string) error {
|
||||
_, err := r.db.ExecContext(ctx, `DELETE FROM roles WHERE id = $1`, id)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
var pqErr *pq.Error
|
||||
if errors.As(err, &pqErr) && pqErr.Code == "23503" {
|
||||
return repository.ErrAuthRoleInUse
|
||||
}
|
||||
return fmt.Errorf("role.delete: %w", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
return nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func (r *RoleRepository) ListPermissions(ctx context.Context, roleID string) ([]*authdomain.RolePermission, error) {
|
||||
rows, err := r.db.QueryContext(ctx, `
|
||||
SELECT rp.role_id, rp.permission_id, rp.scope_type, rp.scope_id
|
||||
FROM role_permissions rp
|
||||
WHERE rp.role_id = $1
|
||||
ORDER BY rp.permission_id, rp.scope_type
|
||||
`, roleID)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
return nil, fmt.Errorf("role.listPermissions: %w", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
defer rows.Close()
|
||||
var out []*authdomain.RolePermission
|
||||
for rows.Next() {
|
||||
var rp authdomain.RolePermission
|
||||
var scopeType string
|
||||
var scopeID sql.NullString
|
||||
if err := rows.Scan(&rp.RoleID, &rp.PermissionID, &scopeType, &scopeID); err != nil {
|
||||
return nil, fmt.Errorf("role.listPermissions scan: %w", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
rp.ScopeType = authdomain.ScopeType(scopeType)
|
||||
if scopeID.Valid {
|
||||
s := scopeID.String
|
||||
rp.ScopeID = &s
|
||||
}
|
||||
out = append(out, &rp)
|
||||
}
|
||||
return out, rows.Err()
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func (r *RoleRepository) AddPermission(ctx context.Context, g *authdomain.RolePermission) error {
|
||||
// TODO(bundle-2): Bundle 1 Phase 12 deferral — scope_id is NOT
|
||||
// currently FK-constrained against the resource tables
|
||||
// (certificate_profiles, issuers). This means an operator can
|
||||
// grant a permission at scope_type=profile / scope_id=p-bogus
|
||||
// without the bogus profile existing; the gate still works
|
||||
// (no permission rows match the bogus scope at request time)
|
||||
// but a strict 404 on grant would be cleaner. Adding the FK
|
||||
// requires a migration that confirms every existing
|
||||
// role_permissions row references a real resource and is
|
||||
// tracked as Bundle 2 work. See
|
||||
// cowork/auth-bundle-1-prompt.md negative-test path #12.
|
||||
var scopeID interface{}
|
||||
if g.ScopeID != nil {
|
||||
scopeID = *g.ScopeID
|
||||
}
|
||||
_, err := r.db.ExecContext(ctx, `
|
||||
INSERT INTO role_permissions (role_id, permission_id, scope_type, scope_id)
|
||||
VALUES ($1, $2, $3, $4)
|
||||
ON CONFLICT (role_id, permission_id, scope_type, scope_id) DO NOTHING
|
||||
`, g.RoleID, g.PermissionID, string(g.ScopeType), scopeID)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
return fmt.Errorf("role.addPermission: %w", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
return nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func (r *RoleRepository) RemovePermission(ctx context.Context, g *authdomain.RolePermission) error {
|
||||
var scopeIDArg interface{}
|
||||
scopeClause := "scope_id IS NULL"
|
||||
args := []interface{}{g.RoleID, g.PermissionID, string(g.ScopeType)}
|
||||
if g.ScopeID != nil {
|
||||
scopeClause = "scope_id = $4"
|
||||
scopeIDArg = *g.ScopeID
|
||||
args = append(args, scopeIDArg)
|
||||
}
|
||||
q := fmt.Sprintf(
|
||||
`DELETE FROM role_permissions WHERE role_id = $1 AND permission_id = $2 AND scope_type = $3 AND %s`,
|
||||
scopeClause)
|
||||
_, err := r.db.ExecContext(ctx, q, args...)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
return fmt.Errorf("role.removePermission: %w", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
return nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func scanRole(row *sql.Row) (*authdomain.Role, error) {
|
||||
var role authdomain.Role
|
||||
if err := row.Scan(&role.ID, &role.TenantID, &role.Name, &role.Description, &role.CreatedAt, &role.UpdatedAt); err != nil {
|
||||
if errors.Is(err, sql.ErrNoRows) {
|
||||
return nil, repository.ErrAuthNotFound
|
||||
}
|
||||
return nil, fmt.Errorf("role scan: %w", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
return &role, nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// =============================================================================
|
||||
// PermissionRepository
|
||||
// =============================================================================
|
||||
|
||||
type PermissionRepository struct {
|
||||
db *sql.DB
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func NewPermissionRepository(db *sql.DB) *PermissionRepository {
|
||||
return &PermissionRepository{db: db}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func (r *PermissionRepository) List(ctx context.Context) ([]*authdomain.Permission, error) {
|
||||
rows, err := r.db.QueryContext(ctx,
|
||||
`SELECT id, name, namespace FROM permissions ORDER BY name`)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
return nil, fmt.Errorf("permission.list: %w", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
defer rows.Close()
|
||||
var out []*authdomain.Permission
|
||||
for rows.Next() {
|
||||
var p authdomain.Permission
|
||||
if err := rows.Scan(&p.ID, &p.Name, &p.Namespace); err != nil {
|
||||
return nil, fmt.Errorf("permission.list scan: %w", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
out = append(out, &p)
|
||||
}
|
||||
return out, rows.Err()
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func (r *PermissionRepository) GetByName(ctx context.Context, name string) (*authdomain.Permission, error) {
|
||||
row := r.db.QueryRowContext(ctx,
|
||||
`SELECT id, name, namespace FROM permissions WHERE name = $1`, name)
|
||||
var p authdomain.Permission
|
||||
if err := row.Scan(&p.ID, &p.Name, &p.Namespace); err != nil {
|
||||
if errors.Is(err, sql.ErrNoRows) {
|
||||
return nil, repository.ErrAuthNotFound
|
||||
}
|
||||
return nil, fmt.Errorf("permission.getByName: %w", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
return &p, nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// IsCanonical satisfies repository.PermissionRepository.
|
||||
func (r *PermissionRepository) IsCanonical(name string) bool {
|
||||
_, ok := canonicalPermissionSet[name]
|
||||
return ok
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// =============================================================================
|
||||
// ActorRoleRepository
|
||||
// =============================================================================
|
||||
|
||||
type ActorRoleRepository struct {
|
||||
db *sql.DB
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func NewActorRoleRepository(db *sql.DB) *ActorRoleRepository {
|
||||
return &ActorRoleRepository{db: db}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func (r *ActorRoleRepository) ListByActor(ctx context.Context, actorID string, actorType authdomain.ActorTypeValue, tenantID string) ([]*authdomain.ActorRole, error) {
|
||||
rows, err := r.db.QueryContext(ctx, `
|
||||
SELECT id, actor_id, actor_type, role_id, granted_at, expires_at, granted_by, tenant_id
|
||||
FROM actor_roles
|
||||
WHERE actor_id = $1 AND actor_type = $2 AND tenant_id = $3
|
||||
ORDER BY granted_at
|
||||
`, actorID, string(actorType), tenantID)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
return nil, fmt.Errorf("actorRole.listByActor: %w", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
return scanActorRoles(rows)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func (r *ActorRoleRepository) ListByRole(ctx context.Context, roleID string) ([]*authdomain.ActorRole, error) {
|
||||
rows, err := r.db.QueryContext(ctx, `
|
||||
SELECT id, actor_id, actor_type, role_id, granted_at, expires_at, granted_by, tenant_id
|
||||
FROM actor_roles
|
||||
WHERE role_id = $1
|
||||
ORDER BY granted_at
|
||||
`, roleID)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
return nil, fmt.Errorf("actorRole.listByRole: %w", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
return scanActorRoles(rows)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func (r *ActorRoleRepository) Grant(ctx context.Context, ar *authdomain.ActorRole) error {
|
||||
if ar.ID == "" {
|
||||
ar.ID = "ar-" + uuid.NewString()
|
||||
}
|
||||
if ar.TenantID == "" {
|
||||
ar.TenantID = authdomain.DefaultTenantID
|
||||
}
|
||||
if ar.GrantedAt.IsZero() {
|
||||
ar.GrantedAt = time.Now().UTC()
|
||||
}
|
||||
if ar.GrantedBy == "" {
|
||||
ar.GrantedBy = "system"
|
||||
}
|
||||
var expires interface{}
|
||||
if ar.ExpiresAt != nil {
|
||||
expires = *ar.ExpiresAt
|
||||
}
|
||||
_, err := r.db.ExecContext(ctx, `
|
||||
INSERT INTO actor_roles (id, actor_id, actor_type, role_id, granted_at, expires_at, granted_by, tenant_id)
|
||||
VALUES ($1, $2, $3, $4, $5, $6, $7, $8)
|
||||
ON CONFLICT (actor_id, actor_type, role_id, tenant_id) DO NOTHING
|
||||
`, ar.ID, ar.ActorID, string(ar.ActorType), ar.RoleID, ar.GrantedAt, expires, ar.GrantedBy, ar.TenantID)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
return fmt.Errorf("actorRole.grant: %w", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
return nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func (r *ActorRoleRepository) Revoke(ctx context.Context, actorID string, actorType authdomain.ActorTypeValue, roleID, tenantID string) error {
|
||||
_, err := r.db.ExecContext(ctx, `
|
||||
DELETE FROM actor_roles
|
||||
WHERE actor_id = $1 AND actor_type = $2 AND role_id = $3 AND tenant_id = $4
|
||||
`, actorID, string(actorType), roleID, tenantID)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
return fmt.Errorf("actorRole.revoke: %w", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
return nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func (r *ActorRoleRepository) ListDistinctActors(ctx context.Context, tenantID string) ([]repository.ActorWithRoles, error) {
|
||||
if tenantID == "" {
|
||||
tenantID = authdomain.DefaultTenantID
|
||||
}
|
||||
rows, err := r.db.QueryContext(ctx, `
|
||||
SELECT actor_id, actor_type,
|
||||
array_agg(role_id ORDER BY role_id) AS role_ids
|
||||
FROM actor_roles
|
||||
WHERE tenant_id = $1
|
||||
AND (expires_at IS NULL OR expires_at > NOW())
|
||||
GROUP BY actor_id, actor_type
|
||||
ORDER BY actor_id ASC
|
||||
`, tenantID)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
return nil, fmt.Errorf("actorRole.listDistinctActors: %w", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
defer rows.Close()
|
||||
var out []repository.ActorWithRoles
|
||||
for rows.Next() {
|
||||
var a repository.ActorWithRoles
|
||||
var actorType string
|
||||
// pq.StringArray decodes the postgres array_agg result.
|
||||
var roles pq.StringArray
|
||||
if err := rows.Scan(&a.ActorID, &actorType, &roles); err != nil {
|
||||
return nil, fmt.Errorf("actorRole.listDistinctActors scan: %w", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
a.ActorType = authdomain.ActorTypeValue(actorType)
|
||||
a.TenantID = tenantID
|
||||
a.RoleIDs = []string(roles)
|
||||
out = append(out, a)
|
||||
}
|
||||
return out, rows.Err()
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func (r *ActorRoleRepository) AdminExists(ctx context.Context, tenantID string) (bool, error) {
|
||||
if tenantID == "" {
|
||||
tenantID = authdomain.DefaultTenantID
|
||||
}
|
||||
// Exclude the seeded synthetic demo actor so a demo deploy that
|
||||
// later switches to api-key mode can still bootstrap the first
|
||||
// real admin. Matches the carve-out documented on the interface.
|
||||
var count int
|
||||
err := r.db.QueryRowContext(ctx, `
|
||||
SELECT COUNT(*) FROM actor_roles
|
||||
WHERE role_id = $1
|
||||
AND tenant_id = $2
|
||||
AND actor_id != $3
|
||||
AND (expires_at IS NULL OR expires_at > NOW())
|
||||
`, authdomain.RoleIDAdmin, tenantID, authdomain.DemoAnonActorID).Scan(&count)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
return false, fmt.Errorf("actorRole.adminExists: %w", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
return count > 0, nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func (r *ActorRoleRepository) EffectivePermissions(ctx context.Context, actorID string, actorType authdomain.ActorTypeValue, tenantID string) ([]repository.EffectivePermission, error) {
|
||||
rows, err := r.db.QueryContext(ctx, `
|
||||
SELECT DISTINCT p.name, rp.scope_type, rp.scope_id
|
||||
FROM actor_roles ar
|
||||
JOIN role_permissions rp ON rp.role_id = ar.role_id
|
||||
JOIN permissions p ON p.id = rp.permission_id
|
||||
WHERE ar.actor_id = $1
|
||||
AND ar.actor_type = $2
|
||||
AND ar.tenant_id = $3
|
||||
AND (ar.expires_at IS NULL OR ar.expires_at > NOW())
|
||||
`, actorID, string(actorType), tenantID)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
return nil, fmt.Errorf("actorRole.effective: %w", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
defer rows.Close()
|
||||
var out []repository.EffectivePermission
|
||||
for rows.Next() {
|
||||
var ep repository.EffectivePermission
|
||||
var scopeType string
|
||||
var scopeID sql.NullString
|
||||
if err := rows.Scan(&ep.PermissionName, &scopeType, &scopeID); err != nil {
|
||||
return nil, fmt.Errorf("actorRole.effective scan: %w", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
ep.ScopeType = authdomain.ScopeType(scopeType)
|
||||
if scopeID.Valid {
|
||||
s := scopeID.String
|
||||
ep.ScopeID = &s
|
||||
}
|
||||
out = append(out, ep)
|
||||
}
|
||||
return out, rows.Err()
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func scanActorRoles(rows *sql.Rows) ([]*authdomain.ActorRole, error) {
|
||||
defer rows.Close()
|
||||
var out []*authdomain.ActorRole
|
||||
for rows.Next() {
|
||||
var ar authdomain.ActorRole
|
||||
var actorType string
|
||||
var expires sql.NullTime
|
||||
if err := rows.Scan(&ar.ID, &ar.ActorID, &actorType, &ar.RoleID, &ar.GrantedAt, &expires, &ar.GrantedBy, &ar.TenantID); err != nil {
|
||||
return nil, fmt.Errorf("actorRole scan: %w", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
ar.ActorType = authdomain.ActorTypeValue(actorType)
|
||||
if expires.Valid {
|
||||
t := expires.Time
|
||||
ar.ExpiresAt = &t
|
||||
}
|
||||
out = append(out, &ar)
|
||||
}
|
||||
return out, rows.Err()
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// =============================================================================
|
||||
// APIKeyRepository (Bundle 1 Phase 6 — bootstrap path)
|
||||
// =============================================================================
|
||||
|
||||
// APIKeyRepository is the postgres implementation of
|
||||
// repository.APIKeyRepository. Stores SHA-256 hashes only; the
|
||||
// plaintext key value is never persisted.
|
||||
type APIKeyRepository struct {
|
||||
db *sql.DB
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// NewAPIKeyRepository constructs an APIKeyRepository.
|
||||
func NewAPIKeyRepository(db *sql.DB) *APIKeyRepository {
|
||||
return &APIKeyRepository{db: db}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func (r *APIKeyRepository) Create(ctx context.Context, k *authdomain.APIKey) error {
|
||||
if k.ID == "" {
|
||||
k.ID = "ak-" + uuid.NewString()
|
||||
}
|
||||
if k.TenantID == "" {
|
||||
k.TenantID = authdomain.DefaultTenantID
|
||||
}
|
||||
if k.CreatedAt.IsZero() {
|
||||
k.CreatedAt = time.Now().UTC()
|
||||
}
|
||||
var expires interface{}
|
||||
if k.ExpiresAt != nil {
|
||||
expires = *k.ExpiresAt
|
||||
}
|
||||
_, err := r.db.ExecContext(ctx, `
|
||||
INSERT INTO api_keys (id, name, key_hash, tenant_id, admin, created_by, created_at, expires_at)
|
||||
VALUES ($1, $2, $3, $4, $5, $6, $7, $8)
|
||||
`, k.ID, k.Name, k.KeyHash, k.TenantID, k.Admin, k.CreatedBy, k.CreatedAt, expires)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
// Translate UNIQUE-constraint violations to the canonical
|
||||
// auth sentinel so the service layer can return 409.
|
||||
if pqErr, ok := err.(*pq.Error); ok && pqErr.Code == "23505" {
|
||||
return repository.ErrAuthDuplicateName
|
||||
}
|
||||
return fmt.Errorf("apiKey.create: %w", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
return nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func (r *APIKeyRepository) GetByName(ctx context.Context, name string) (*authdomain.APIKey, error) {
|
||||
row := r.db.QueryRowContext(ctx, `
|
||||
SELECT id, name, key_hash, tenant_id, admin, created_by, created_at, expires_at, last_used_at
|
||||
FROM api_keys WHERE name = $1
|
||||
`, name)
|
||||
var k authdomain.APIKey
|
||||
var expires, lastUsed sql.NullTime
|
||||
if err := row.Scan(&k.ID, &k.Name, &k.KeyHash, &k.TenantID, &k.Admin, &k.CreatedBy, &k.CreatedAt, &expires, &lastUsed); err != nil {
|
||||
if errors.Is(err, sql.ErrNoRows) {
|
||||
return nil, repository.ErrAuthNotFound
|
||||
}
|
||||
return nil, fmt.Errorf("apiKey.getByName: %w", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
if expires.Valid {
|
||||
t := expires.Time
|
||||
k.ExpiresAt = &t
|
||||
}
|
||||
if lastUsed.Valid {
|
||||
t := lastUsed.Time
|
||||
k.LastUsedAt = &t
|
||||
}
|
||||
return &k, nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func (r *APIKeyRepository) List(ctx context.Context, tenantID string) ([]*authdomain.APIKey, error) {
|
||||
if tenantID == "" {
|
||||
tenantID = authdomain.DefaultTenantID
|
||||
}
|
||||
rows, err := r.db.QueryContext(ctx, `
|
||||
SELECT id, name, key_hash, tenant_id, admin, created_by, created_at, expires_at, last_used_at
|
||||
FROM api_keys WHERE tenant_id = $1 ORDER BY created_at DESC
|
||||
`, tenantID)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
return nil, fmt.Errorf("apiKey.list: %w", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
defer rows.Close()
|
||||
var out []*authdomain.APIKey
|
||||
for rows.Next() {
|
||||
var k authdomain.APIKey
|
||||
var expires, lastUsed sql.NullTime
|
||||
if err := rows.Scan(&k.ID, &k.Name, &k.KeyHash, &k.TenantID, &k.Admin, &k.CreatedBy, &k.CreatedAt, &expires, &lastUsed); err != nil {
|
||||
return nil, fmt.Errorf("apiKey.list scan: %w", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
if expires.Valid {
|
||||
t := expires.Time
|
||||
k.ExpiresAt = &t
|
||||
}
|
||||
if lastUsed.Valid {
|
||||
t := lastUsed.Time
|
||||
k.LastUsedAt = &t
|
||||
}
|
||||
out = append(out, &k)
|
||||
}
|
||||
return out, rows.Err()
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func (r *APIKeyRepository) Delete(ctx context.Context, name string) error {
|
||||
res, err := r.db.ExecContext(ctx, `DELETE FROM api_keys WHERE name = $1`, name)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
return fmt.Errorf("apiKey.delete: %w", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
if n, _ := res.RowsAffected(); n == 0 {
|
||||
return repository.ErrAuthNotFound
|
||||
}
|
||||
return nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -39,6 +39,25 @@ type ApprovalService struct {
|
||||
metrics *ApprovalMetrics
|
||||
|
||||
bypassEnabled bool
|
||||
|
||||
// profileEditApply is the Bundle 1 Phase 9 hook the approve
|
||||
// path invokes when req.Kind=profile_edit. Registered by
|
||||
// cmd/server/main.go via SetProfileEditApply so the service
|
||||
// doesn't import internal/service/profile.go (would create a
|
||||
// cycle: ApprovalService -> ProfileService -> ApprovalService).
|
||||
profileEditApply ProfileEditApplyFunc
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// ProfileEditApplyFunc deserializes the pending profile diff stored
|
||||
// in req.Payload and persists it via the profile repository. The
|
||||
// caller registers this once at boot via SetProfileEditApply.
|
||||
type ProfileEditApplyFunc func(ctx context.Context, req *domain.ApprovalRequest) error
|
||||
|
||||
// SetProfileEditApply registers the profile-edit apply callback. Called
|
||||
// from main.go after both the ApprovalService and ProfileService are
|
||||
// constructed; the closure captures the profile repo + audit service.
|
||||
func (s *ApprovalService) SetProfileEditApply(f ProfileEditApplyFunc) {
|
||||
s.profileEditApply = f
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// JobStatusUpdater is the narrow interface ApprovalService depends on
|
||||
@@ -139,6 +158,53 @@ func (s *ApprovalService) RequestApproval(
|
||||
return req.ID, nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// RequestProfileEditApproval is the Bundle 1 Phase 9 entry point for
|
||||
// gated profile mutations. ProfileService.UpdateProfile calls this
|
||||
// when the live profile (or the proposed update) carries
|
||||
// RequiresApproval=true. Returns the new pending approval ID.
|
||||
//
|
||||
// The pending diff is serialized to req.Payload as JSON; the
|
||||
// profile-edit-apply callback (registered by main.go) deserializes
|
||||
// and persists when an approver decides.
|
||||
//
|
||||
// In bypass mode (CERTCTL_APPROVAL_BYPASS=true) the call short-
|
||||
// circuits via approveInternal — the same dev/CI escape hatch as
|
||||
// cert_issuance — so renewal-loop tests remain fast.
|
||||
func (s *ApprovalService) RequestProfileEditApproval(
|
||||
ctx context.Context,
|
||||
profileID, requestedBy string,
|
||||
payload []byte,
|
||||
) (string, error) {
|
||||
if profileID == "" || requestedBy == "" {
|
||||
return "", fmt.Errorf("approval: profileID + requestedBy required")
|
||||
}
|
||||
if len(payload) == 0 {
|
||||
return "", fmt.Errorf("approval: payload required for profile_edit")
|
||||
}
|
||||
now := time.Now().UTC()
|
||||
req := &domain.ApprovalRequest{
|
||||
Kind: domain.ApprovalKindProfileEdit,
|
||||
ProfileID: profileID,
|
||||
RequestedBy: requestedBy,
|
||||
State: domain.ApprovalStatePending,
|
||||
Payload: payload,
|
||||
CreatedAt: now,
|
||||
UpdatedAt: now,
|
||||
}
|
||||
if err := s.approvalRepo.Create(ctx, req); err != nil {
|
||||
return "", fmt.Errorf("approval: create profile_edit request: %w", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
s.recordAudit(ctx, requestedBy, domain.ActorTypeUser, "approval_profile_edit_requested", req, nil)
|
||||
if s.bypassEnabled {
|
||||
if err := s.approveInternal(ctx, req.ID, domain.ApprovalActorSystemBypass,
|
||||
"auto-approved by CERTCTL_APPROVAL_BYPASS — dev/CI mode",
|
||||
domain.ApprovalOutcomeBypassed, domain.ActorTypeSystem); err != nil {
|
||||
return req.ID, fmt.Errorf("approval: bypass auto-approve profile_edit: %w", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
return req.ID, nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Approve transitions a pending request to approved AND the linked Job
|
||||
// from AwaitingApproval to Pending so the job processor picks it up.
|
||||
// RBAC: rejects if decidedBy == request.RequestedBy.
|
||||
@@ -194,6 +260,31 @@ func (s *ApprovalService) approveInternal(
|
||||
return fmt.Errorf("approval: update state to approved: %w", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Bundle 1 Phase 9: profile_edit kind requires the apply
|
||||
// callback to deserialize req.Payload + persist the profile
|
||||
// diff. cert_issuance kind continues through the existing job-
|
||||
// transition path. The kind discriminator is the load-bearing
|
||||
// dispatch — adding a future ApprovalKind goes here.
|
||||
if req.Kind == domain.ApprovalKindProfileEdit {
|
||||
if s.profileEditApply == nil {
|
||||
s.recordAudit(ctx, decidedBy, actorType, "approval_profile_apply_missing", req,
|
||||
map[string]interface{}{"error": "profileEditApply callback not wired"})
|
||||
return fmt.Errorf("approval: profile-edit apply callback not registered")
|
||||
}
|
||||
if err := s.profileEditApply(ctx, req); err != nil {
|
||||
s.recordAudit(ctx, decidedBy, actorType, "approval_profile_apply_failed", req,
|
||||
map[string]interface{}{"error": err.Error()})
|
||||
return fmt.Errorf("approval: apply profile edit: %w", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
s.recordAudit(ctx, decidedBy, actorType, "approval_"+outcome, req,
|
||||
map[string]interface{}{"note": note, "outcome": outcome, "kind": string(req.Kind)})
|
||||
if s.metrics != nil {
|
||||
s.metrics.RecordDecision(outcome, req.ProfileID)
|
||||
s.metrics.ObservePendingAge(now.Sub(req.CreatedAt).Seconds())
|
||||
}
|
||||
return nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Transition the linked Job from AwaitingApproval to Pending so the
|
||||
// scheduler picks it up. Best-effort — if the Job has already been
|
||||
// cancelled or otherwise mutated externally, log via audit and move on.
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -3,6 +3,7 @@ package service
|
||||
import (
|
||||
"context"
|
||||
"errors"
|
||||
"strings"
|
||||
"sync"
|
||||
"testing"
|
||||
"time"
|
||||
@@ -30,11 +31,16 @@ func (f *fakeApprovalRepo) Create(ctx context.Context, req *domain.ApprovalReque
|
||||
req.ID = "ar-fake-" + time.Now().Format("150405.000000000")
|
||||
}
|
||||
// Enforce the partial-unique pending-per-job at the mock layer too.
|
||||
// Bundle 1 Phase 9: Postgres treats NULLs as distinct in UNIQUE
|
||||
// indexes, so profile_edit rows (JobID="") never collide with
|
||||
// each other or with cert_issuance rows. Mirror that here.
|
||||
if req.JobID != "" {
|
||||
for _, existing := range f.rows {
|
||||
if existing.JobID == req.JobID && existing.State == domain.ApprovalStatePending {
|
||||
return repository.ErrAlreadyExists
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
cp := *req
|
||||
f.rows[req.ID] = &cp
|
||||
return nil
|
||||
@@ -384,3 +390,98 @@ func TestApproval_MetricCounterIncrements(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("expected at least 3 histogram samples; got %d", hist.Count)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// =============================================================================
|
||||
// Bundle 1 Phase 9 — profile_edit kind tests.
|
||||
// =============================================================================
|
||||
|
||||
// TestApproval_RequestProfileEditCreatesPendingRow pins the new
|
||||
// RequestProfileEditApproval entry point: creates a pending row with
|
||||
// Kind=profile_edit, no cert_id / job_id, and the serialized profile
|
||||
// diff in Payload.
|
||||
func TestApproval_RequestProfileEditCreatesPendingRow(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
svc, ar, _ := newApprovalSvcForTest(false)
|
||||
payload := []byte(`{"id":"prof-prod","name":"renamed","requires_approval":true}`)
|
||||
id, err := svc.RequestProfileEditApproval(context.Background(), "prof-prod", "user-alice", payload)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("RequestProfileEditApproval err: %v", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
got, err := ar.Get(context.Background(), id)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("Get err: %v", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
if got.Kind != domain.ApprovalKindProfileEdit {
|
||||
t.Errorf("Kind = %q, want profile_edit", got.Kind)
|
||||
}
|
||||
if got.CertificateID != "" || got.JobID != "" {
|
||||
t.Errorf("profile_edit row carries cert_id=%q job_id=%q; both must be empty", got.CertificateID, got.JobID)
|
||||
}
|
||||
if string(got.Payload) != string(payload) {
|
||||
t.Errorf("payload roundtrip wrong; got %s", string(got.Payload))
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// TestApproval_ProfileEdit_SameActorSelfApproveRejected pins the
|
||||
// load-bearing two-person integrity invariant for profile_edit
|
||||
// approvals: the requester cannot approve their own row.
|
||||
func TestApproval_ProfileEdit_SameActorSelfApproveRejected(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
svc, _, _ := newApprovalSvcForTest(false)
|
||||
id, err := svc.RequestProfileEditApproval(context.Background(),
|
||||
"prof-prod", "user-alice",
|
||||
[]byte(`{"id":"prof-prod"}`))
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("RequestProfileEditApproval err: %v", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
got := svc.Approve(context.Background(), id, "user-alice", "self-approve attempt")
|
||||
if !errors.Is(got, ErrApproveBySameActor) {
|
||||
t.Errorf("self-approve err = %v, want ErrApproveBySameActor", got)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// TestApproval_ProfileEdit_RejectsWhenApplyCallbackMissing pins
|
||||
// that the approve path fails closed when a profile_edit row is
|
||||
// approved without a registered profileEditApply callback. Better
|
||||
// to surface a 500 than silently mark the row approved while the
|
||||
// underlying profile is untouched.
|
||||
func TestApproval_ProfileEdit_RejectsWhenApplyCallbackMissing(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
svc, _, _ := newApprovalSvcForTest(false)
|
||||
id, _ := svc.RequestProfileEditApproval(context.Background(),
|
||||
"prof-prod", "user-alice",
|
||||
[]byte(`{"id":"prof-prod"}`))
|
||||
// Approver = different actor.
|
||||
err := svc.Approve(context.Background(), id, "user-bob", "approving")
|
||||
if err == nil {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("Approve must fail when profile-edit-apply is unwired; got nil")
|
||||
}
|
||||
// Sentinel propagates from approveInternal — message contains the cue.
|
||||
if !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "apply callback not registered") {
|
||||
t.Errorf("err = %v, want 'apply callback not registered'", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// TestApproval_ProfileEdit_ApplyCallbackInvokedOnApprove pins the
|
||||
// happy-path: when a profile-edit-apply callback is registered AND
|
||||
// a non-requester approves, the callback fires with the right row.
|
||||
func TestApproval_ProfileEdit_ApplyCallbackInvokedOnApprove(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
svc, _, _ := newApprovalSvcForTest(false)
|
||||
var captured *domain.ApprovalRequest
|
||||
svc.SetProfileEditApply(func(_ context.Context, req *domain.ApprovalRequest) error {
|
||||
captured = req
|
||||
return nil
|
||||
})
|
||||
id, _ := svc.RequestProfileEditApproval(context.Background(),
|
||||
"prof-prod", "user-alice",
|
||||
[]byte(`{"id":"prof-prod","name":"renamed"}`))
|
||||
if err := svc.Approve(context.Background(), id, "user-bob", "looks good"); err != nil {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("Approve err: %v", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
if captured == nil {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("apply callback never invoked")
|
||||
}
|
||||
if captured.Kind != domain.ApprovalKindProfileEdit {
|
||||
t.Errorf("captured.Kind = %q, want profile_edit", captured.Kind)
|
||||
}
|
||||
if captured.ProfileID != "prof-prod" {
|
||||
t.Errorf("captured.ProfileID = %q, want prof-prod", captured.ProfileID)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -31,9 +31,21 @@ func NewAuditService(auditRepo repository.AuditRepository) *AuditService {
|
||||
// `redacted_keys` array so operators can audit the redactor itself during
|
||||
// a compliance review. See internal/service/audit_redact.go.
|
||||
func (s *AuditService) RecordEvent(ctx context.Context, actor string, actorType domain.ActorType, action string, resourceType string, resourceID string, details map[string]interface{}) error {
|
||||
// Bundle-6: scrub credentials + PII before persistence. Returns nil
|
||||
// for nil/empty input, preserving pre-Bundle-6 behaviour for callers
|
||||
// that pass nil details.
|
||||
return s.RecordEventWithCategory(ctx, actor, actorType, action, "", resourceType, resourceID, details)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// RecordEventWithCategory is the Bundle 1 Phase 8 categorized variant
|
||||
// of RecordEvent. eventCategory is one of
|
||||
// domain.EventCategoryCertLifecycle, domain.EventCategoryAuth,
|
||||
// domain.EventCategoryConfig — empty defaults to cert_lifecycle in
|
||||
// the persistence layer + DB CHECK constraint.
|
||||
//
|
||||
// Existing 90+ call sites that don't yet pass a category route
|
||||
// through the legacy RecordEvent and inherit the cert_lifecycle
|
||||
// default; new callers (auth handlers, bootstrap, config-mutation
|
||||
// handlers) call this method directly with their explicit category.
|
||||
// Both paths share the same redaction + marshaling contract.
|
||||
func (s *AuditService) RecordEventWithCategory(ctx context.Context, actor string, actorType domain.ActorType, action, eventCategory, resourceType, resourceID string, details map[string]interface{}) error {
|
||||
redacted := RedactDetailsForAudit(details)
|
||||
detailsJSON, err := json.Marshal(redacted)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
@@ -49,6 +61,7 @@ func (s *AuditService) RecordEvent(ctx context.Context, actor string, actorType
|
||||
ResourceType: resourceType,
|
||||
ResourceID: resourceID,
|
||||
Details: json.RawMessage(detailsJSON),
|
||||
EventCategory: eventCategory,
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if err := s.auditRepo.Create(ctx, event); err != nil {
|
||||
@@ -157,6 +170,12 @@ func (s *AuditService) ListByAction(ctx context.Context, action string, from, to
|
||||
|
||||
// ListAuditEvents returns paginated audit events (handler interface method).
|
||||
func (s *AuditService) ListAuditEvents(ctx context.Context, page, perPage int) ([]domain.AuditEvent, int64, error) {
|
||||
return s.ListAuditEventsByCategory(ctx, "", page, perPage)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// ListAuditEventsByCategory is the Bundle 1 Phase 8 categorized variant.
|
||||
// Empty eventCategory disables the filter.
|
||||
func (s *AuditService) ListAuditEventsByCategory(ctx context.Context, eventCategory string, page, perPage int) ([]domain.AuditEvent, int64, error) {
|
||||
if page < 1 {
|
||||
page = 1
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -165,6 +184,7 @@ func (s *AuditService) ListAuditEvents(ctx context.Context, page, perPage int) (
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
filter := &repository.AuditFilter{
|
||||
EventCategory: eventCategory,
|
||||
Page: page,
|
||||
PerPage: perPage,
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,177 @@
|
||||
package auth
|
||||
|
||||
import (
|
||||
"context"
|
||||
"fmt"
|
||||
|
||||
"github.com/certctl-io/certctl/internal/domain"
|
||||
authdomain "github.com/certctl-io/certctl/internal/domain/auth"
|
||||
"github.com/certctl-io/certctl/internal/repository"
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
// ActorRoleService grants / revokes roles to actors and exposes the
|
||||
// effective-permissions query the Phase 3 middleware uses on the hot
|
||||
// path.
|
||||
type ActorRoleService struct {
|
||||
repo repository.ActorRoleRepository
|
||||
roleRepo repository.RoleRepository
|
||||
authorizer *Authorizer
|
||||
audit AuditService
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// NewActorRoleService constructs an ActorRoleService.
|
||||
func NewActorRoleService(
|
||||
repo repository.ActorRoleRepository,
|
||||
roleRepo repository.RoleRepository,
|
||||
authorizer *Authorizer,
|
||||
audit AuditService,
|
||||
) *ActorRoleService {
|
||||
return &ActorRoleService{
|
||||
repo: repo,
|
||||
roleRepo: roleRepo,
|
||||
authorizer: authorizer,
|
||||
audit: audit,
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Grant assigns a role to an actor. Privilege-escalation guard: the
|
||||
// caller must hold `auth.role.assign` (globally). System callers
|
||||
// bypass. Reserved actor `actor-demo-anon` is rejected.
|
||||
func (s *ActorRoleService) Grant(ctx context.Context, caller *Caller, ar *authdomain.ActorRole) error {
|
||||
if caller == nil {
|
||||
return ErrUnauthenticated
|
||||
}
|
||||
if !caller.IsSystem {
|
||||
ok, err := s.authorizer.HoldsAnyOf(ctx, caller.ActorID, authdomain.ActorTypeValue(caller.ActorType), s.tenantOf(caller), "auth.role.assign")
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
return err
|
||||
}
|
||||
if !ok {
|
||||
return fmt.Errorf("%w: auth.role.assign required", ErrSelfRoleAssignment)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
if ar.ActorID == authdomain.DemoAnonActorID {
|
||||
return fmt.Errorf("%w: actor-demo-anon is reserved", repository.ErrAuthReservedActor)
|
||||
}
|
||||
if ar.TenantID == "" {
|
||||
ar.TenantID = authdomain.DefaultTenantID
|
||||
}
|
||||
if err := s.repo.Grant(ctx, ar); err != nil {
|
||||
return err
|
||||
}
|
||||
s.recordAudit(ctx, caller, "actor_role.grant", "actor_role", ar.ID, map[string]interface{}{
|
||||
"actor_id": ar.ActorID,
|
||||
"actor_type": string(ar.ActorType),
|
||||
"role_id": ar.RoleID,
|
||||
})
|
||||
return nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Revoke removes a previously-granted role from an actor. Same
|
||||
// privilege guard as Grant: caller needs `auth.role.assign` to mutate
|
||||
// role membership. Reserved actor `actor-demo-anon` is rejected so the
|
||||
// demo path stays alive even after a misclick.
|
||||
func (s *ActorRoleService) Revoke(ctx context.Context, caller *Caller, actorID string, actorType domain.ActorType, roleID string) error {
|
||||
if caller == nil {
|
||||
return ErrUnauthenticated
|
||||
}
|
||||
if !caller.IsSystem {
|
||||
ok, err := s.authorizer.HoldsAnyOf(ctx, caller.ActorID, authdomain.ActorTypeValue(caller.ActorType), s.tenantOf(caller), "auth.role.assign")
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
return err
|
||||
}
|
||||
if !ok {
|
||||
return fmt.Errorf("%w: auth.role.assign required", ErrSelfRoleAssignment)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
if actorID == authdomain.DemoAnonActorID {
|
||||
return fmt.Errorf("%w: actor-demo-anon is reserved", repository.ErrAuthReservedActor)
|
||||
}
|
||||
tenantID := s.tenantOf(caller)
|
||||
if err := s.repo.Revoke(ctx, actorID, authdomain.ActorTypeValue(actorType), roleID, tenantID); err != nil {
|
||||
return err
|
||||
}
|
||||
s.recordAudit(ctx, caller, "actor_role.revoke", "actor_role", roleID, map[string]interface{}{
|
||||
"actor_id": actorID,
|
||||
"actor_type": string(actorType),
|
||||
"role_id": roleID,
|
||||
})
|
||||
return nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// ListForActor returns the roles held by the named actor.
|
||||
func (s *ActorRoleService) ListForActor(ctx context.Context, caller *Caller, actorID string, actorType domain.ActorType) ([]*authdomain.ActorRole, error) {
|
||||
if caller == nil {
|
||||
return nil, ErrUnauthenticated
|
||||
}
|
||||
if !caller.IsSystem && caller.ActorID != actorID {
|
||||
ok, err := s.authorizer.HoldsAnyOf(ctx, caller.ActorID, authdomain.ActorTypeValue(caller.ActorType), s.tenantOf(caller), "auth.role.list")
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
return nil, err
|
||||
}
|
||||
if !ok {
|
||||
return nil, fmt.Errorf("%w: auth.role.list required to view another actor's roles", ErrForbidden)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
return s.repo.ListByActor(ctx, actorID, authdomain.ActorTypeValue(actorType), s.tenantOf(caller))
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// EffectivePermissions returns the deduplicated (permission, scope)
|
||||
// pairs granted to the actor across all roles. Phase 3 middleware
|
||||
// (auth.RequirePermission) calls this on every gated request via the
|
||||
// Authorizer; that hot path skips RBAC self-checks. The service-level
|
||||
// method here is for handler / GUI callers (the /v1/auth/me endpoint).
|
||||
func (s *ActorRoleService) EffectivePermissions(ctx context.Context, caller *Caller, actorID string, actorType domain.ActorType) ([]repository.EffectivePermission, error) {
|
||||
if caller == nil {
|
||||
return nil, ErrUnauthenticated
|
||||
}
|
||||
if !caller.IsSystem && caller.ActorID != actorID {
|
||||
ok, err := s.authorizer.HoldsAnyOf(ctx, caller.ActorID, authdomain.ActorTypeValue(caller.ActorType), s.tenantOf(caller), "auth.role.list")
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
return nil, err
|
||||
}
|
||||
if !ok {
|
||||
return nil, fmt.Errorf("%w: auth.role.list required to view another actor's permissions", ErrForbidden)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
return s.repo.EffectivePermissions(ctx, actorID, authdomain.ActorTypeValue(actorType), s.tenantOf(caller))
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// ListKeys (Bundle 1 Phase 7) returns every actor in the tenant that
|
||||
// holds at least one role grant. Permission `auth.role.list` is
|
||||
// required (or the caller must be system). The CLI's `auth keys list`
|
||||
// + scope-down helper consume this to enumerate the operator-key
|
||||
// population without a separate /v1/auth/keys-by-name surface.
|
||||
func (s *ActorRoleService) ListKeys(ctx context.Context, caller *Caller) ([]repository.ActorWithRoles, error) {
|
||||
if caller == nil {
|
||||
return nil, ErrUnauthenticated
|
||||
}
|
||||
if !caller.IsSystem {
|
||||
ok, err := s.authorizer.HoldsAnyOf(ctx, caller.ActorID, authdomain.ActorTypeValue(caller.ActorType), s.tenantOf(caller), "auth.role.list")
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
return nil, err
|
||||
}
|
||||
if !ok {
|
||||
return nil, fmt.Errorf("%w: auth.role.list required to list keys", ErrForbidden)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
return s.repo.ListDistinctActors(ctx, s.tenantOf(caller))
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func (s *ActorRoleService) tenantOf(caller *Caller) string {
|
||||
if caller != nil && caller.TenantID != "" {
|
||||
return caller.TenantID
|
||||
}
|
||||
return authdomain.DefaultTenantID
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func (s *ActorRoleService) recordAudit(ctx context.Context, caller *Caller, action, resourceType, resourceID string, details map[string]interface{}) {
|
||||
if s.audit == nil || caller == nil {
|
||||
return
|
||||
}
|
||||
// Bundle 1 Phase 8: every actor-role grant/revoke is an
|
||||
// authentication / authorization event. The auditor role queries
|
||||
// /v1/audit?category=auth to surface this slice without
|
||||
// also pulling in cert.* events.
|
||||
_ = s.audit.RecordEventWithCategory(ctx, caller.ActorID, caller.ActorType, action, domain.EventCategoryAuth, resourceType, resourceID, details)
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,113 @@
|
||||
// Package auth holds the RBAC service layer: PermissionService,
|
||||
// RoleService, ActorRoleService, and the Authorizer primitive that
|
||||
// Phase 3 middleware (auth.RequirePermission) calls on every gated
|
||||
// request.
|
||||
//
|
||||
// All mutating operations record an audit event via the existing
|
||||
// AuditService.RecordEvent path. Bundle 1 Phase 8 introduces an
|
||||
// `event_category` parameter and back-fills the existing callers; until
|
||||
// then auth-related events go in with the default category.
|
||||
//
|
||||
// Privilege-escalation guard: every mutation that affects role
|
||||
// assignment requires the caller to hold `auth.role.assign` (or the
|
||||
// equivalent role-level permission) on the target role. The system
|
||||
// pathway (bootstrap, migrations, scheduler) bypasses this check via
|
||||
// AsSystemCaller(), which records `actor=system, actorType=System` in
|
||||
// the audit row so the bypass is observable.
|
||||
package auth
|
||||
|
||||
import (
|
||||
"context"
|
||||
"errors"
|
||||
|
||||
"github.com/certctl-io/certctl/internal/domain"
|
||||
authdomain "github.com/certctl-io/certctl/internal/domain/auth"
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
// Sentinel errors for the service layer. Handler / middleware code
|
||||
// branches via errors.Is and maps to HTTP status codes.
|
||||
var (
|
||||
// ErrForbidden is returned when the caller lacks the required
|
||||
// permission for the operation. Maps to HTTP 403.
|
||||
ErrForbidden = errors.New("auth: caller lacks required permission")
|
||||
|
||||
// ErrUnauthenticated is returned when the request has no actor in
|
||||
// context (no Bearer, no session). Phase 3 RequirePermission emits
|
||||
// this; handler code typically returns 401.
|
||||
ErrUnauthenticated = errors.New("auth: no actor in context")
|
||||
|
||||
// ErrInvalidPermission is returned when a Create / AddPermission
|
||||
// references a permission name not in the canonical catalogue.
|
||||
// Maps to HTTP 400.
|
||||
ErrInvalidPermission = errors.New("auth: permission not in canonical catalogue")
|
||||
|
||||
// ErrSelfRoleAssignment guards privilege escalation: a caller
|
||||
// without `auth.role.assign` on a role cannot grant that role
|
||||
// (including to themselves). Maps to HTTP 403.
|
||||
ErrSelfRoleAssignment = errors.New("auth: caller lacks auth.role.assign on target role")
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
// AuditService is the audit-recording dependency the service layer
|
||||
// expects. Mirrors the existing service.AuditService interface so
|
||||
// Bundle 1 doesn't introduce a parallel concept. Bundle 1 Phase 8
|
||||
// adds RecordEventWithCategory; the auth service uses the
|
||||
// categorized variant exclusively (event_category=auth) so the
|
||||
// auditor role can filter to authentication / authorization events.
|
||||
type AuditService interface {
|
||||
RecordEvent(
|
||||
ctx context.Context,
|
||||
actor string,
|
||||
actorType domain.ActorType,
|
||||
action, resourceType, resourceID string,
|
||||
details map[string]interface{},
|
||||
) error
|
||||
RecordEventWithCategory(
|
||||
ctx context.Context,
|
||||
actor string,
|
||||
actorType domain.ActorType,
|
||||
action, eventCategory, resourceType, resourceID string,
|
||||
details map[string]interface{},
|
||||
) error
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Caller describes the actor performing a service operation. Bundle 1
|
||||
// Phase 3 populates this from the auth-middleware context (ActorIDKey,
|
||||
// ActorTypeKey). Bootstrap, migrations, and scheduler-initiated work
|
||||
// pass AsSystemCaller() to bypass the permission check while still
|
||||
// recording an audit row.
|
||||
type Caller struct {
|
||||
ActorID string
|
||||
ActorType domain.ActorType
|
||||
TenantID string
|
||||
|
||||
// IsSystem skips the privilege-escalation guard. Reserved for
|
||||
// bootstrap / migration / scheduler paths.
|
||||
IsSystem bool
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// AsSystemCaller returns a Caller that bypasses RBAC checks. Used by
|
||||
// the migration backfill, bootstrap path, scheduler-initiated grants,
|
||||
// and tests that need to seed state without simulating an admin.
|
||||
func AsSystemCaller() *Caller {
|
||||
return &Caller{
|
||||
ActorID: "system",
|
||||
ActorType: domain.ActorTypeSystem,
|
||||
TenantID: authdomain.DefaultTenantID,
|
||||
IsSystem: true,
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// CallerFromContext is a helper that builds a Caller from auth context
|
||||
// values. Phase 3 middleware populates the keys; tests can use the
|
||||
// internal/auth.WithActor / WithAdmin helpers to build contexts.
|
||||
//
|
||||
// Returns nil + ErrUnauthenticated when no actor is present.
|
||||
func CallerFromContext(ctx context.Context) (*Caller, error) {
|
||||
// Avoid coupling internal/service/auth to internal/auth at the
|
||||
// type level: read the keys via package-public helpers exposed by
|
||||
// internal/auth (ActorID, ActorType, TenantID). Phase 3 wires
|
||||
// these up. For Phase 2, rely on the explicit Caller arg passed
|
||||
// by handler / test code instead — direct context-key reads can
|
||||
// land in Phase 3 alongside the middleware.
|
||||
return nil, ErrUnauthenticated
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,116 @@
|
||||
package auth
|
||||
|
||||
import (
|
||||
"context"
|
||||
"fmt"
|
||||
|
||||
authdomain "github.com/certctl-io/certctl/internal/domain/auth"
|
||||
"github.com/certctl-io/certctl/internal/repository"
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
// Authorizer is the load-bearing "can this actor do this thing on this
|
||||
// resource" check. Bundle 1 Phase 3 wires it into the RequirePermission
|
||||
// middleware factory; every gated request runs through this on the hot
|
||||
// path.
|
||||
//
|
||||
// Semantics: a permission grant matches when ALL of the following hold:
|
||||
//
|
||||
// 1. The granted permission name equals the requested permission name.
|
||||
// 2. Either the grant is global-scoped (covers all resources of that
|
||||
// type) OR the grant scope_type + scope_id exactly match the
|
||||
// request's scope.
|
||||
//
|
||||
// Global beats specific: an actor with `cert.read` at scope `global`
|
||||
// can read every certificate, regardless of per-cert scoped grants.
|
||||
// Per-resource grants do NOT shadow global grants; they widen the
|
||||
// effective set.
|
||||
//
|
||||
// The actor's effective permission set is the deduplicated union
|
||||
// across every role they hold. ActorRoleRepository.EffectivePermissions
|
||||
// already returns the union via SQL JOIN, so the in-memory matcher
|
||||
// just walks the result.
|
||||
type Authorizer struct {
|
||||
actorRepo repository.ActorRoleRepository
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// NewAuthorizer constructs an Authorizer.
|
||||
func NewAuthorizer(actorRepo repository.ActorRoleRepository) *Authorizer {
|
||||
return &Authorizer{actorRepo: actorRepo}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// CheckPermission returns true when the actor holds the named
|
||||
// permission at the requested scope (or globally). Returns false (no
|
||||
// error) when the actor exists but lacks the permission. Returns an
|
||||
// error only on repository / database failure; callers treat that as
|
||||
// a 500-class problem.
|
||||
//
|
||||
// The synthetic actor `actor-demo-anon` (used when CERTCTL_AUTH_TYPE=
|
||||
// none) holds the admin role per the migration seed; CheckPermission
|
||||
// resolves through that grant just like any other actor.
|
||||
func (a *Authorizer) CheckPermission(
|
||||
ctx context.Context,
|
||||
actorID string,
|
||||
actorType authdomain.ActorTypeValue,
|
||||
tenantID string,
|
||||
permission string,
|
||||
scopeType authdomain.ScopeType,
|
||||
scopeID *string,
|
||||
) (bool, error) {
|
||||
if actorID == "" {
|
||||
return false, nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
if tenantID == "" {
|
||||
tenantID = authdomain.DefaultTenantID
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
effective, err := a.actorRepo.EffectivePermissions(ctx, actorID, actorType, tenantID)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
return false, fmt.Errorf("authorizer.CheckPermission: %w", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
for _, ep := range effective {
|
||||
if ep.PermissionName != permission {
|
||||
continue
|
||||
}
|
||||
// Global grant always matches.
|
||||
if ep.ScopeType == authdomain.ScopeTypeGlobal {
|
||||
return true, nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
// Specific grant requires scope_type + scope_id match.
|
||||
if ep.ScopeType != scopeType {
|
||||
continue
|
||||
}
|
||||
if scopeID == nil || ep.ScopeID == nil {
|
||||
// Scope-typed grant without ID, or request without ID.
|
||||
// Treat as no match: per-profile / per-issuer scopes
|
||||
// require an explicit ID.
|
||||
continue
|
||||
}
|
||||
if *ep.ScopeID == *scopeID {
|
||||
return true, nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
return false, nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// HoldsAnyOf returns true when the actor holds at least one of the
|
||||
// named permissions globally. Used by privilege-escalation guards
|
||||
// (e.g. ActorRoleService.Grant: caller must hold auth.role.assign).
|
||||
func (a *Authorizer) HoldsAnyOf(
|
||||
ctx context.Context,
|
||||
actorID string,
|
||||
actorType authdomain.ActorTypeValue,
|
||||
tenantID string,
|
||||
permissions ...string,
|
||||
) (bool, error) {
|
||||
for _, p := range permissions {
|
||||
ok, err := a.CheckPermission(ctx, actorID, actorType, tenantID, p, authdomain.ScopeTypeGlobal, nil)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
return false, err
|
||||
}
|
||||
if ok {
|
||||
return true, nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
return false, nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,40 @@
|
||||
package auth
|
||||
|
||||
import (
|
||||
"context"
|
||||
|
||||
authdomain "github.com/certctl-io/certctl/internal/domain/auth"
|
||||
"github.com/certctl-io/certctl/internal/repository"
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
// PermissionService exposes the canonical permission catalogue. It is
|
||||
// thin (read-only) because Bundle 1 ships permissions as immutable
|
||||
// migration-seeded rows; callers cannot define new permissions at
|
||||
// runtime. Bundle 2 extends the catalogue with auth.session.* and
|
||||
// auth.oidc.* permissions via a new migration.
|
||||
type PermissionService struct {
|
||||
repo repository.PermissionRepository
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// NewPermissionService constructs a PermissionService.
|
||||
func NewPermissionService(repo repository.PermissionRepository) *PermissionService {
|
||||
return &PermissionService{repo: repo}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// List returns every permission in the catalogue.
|
||||
func (s *PermissionService) List(ctx context.Context) ([]*authdomain.Permission, error) {
|
||||
return s.repo.List(ctx)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// GetByName returns the permission with the given canonical name, or
|
||||
// repository.ErrAuthNotFound if no row matches.
|
||||
func (s *PermissionService) GetByName(ctx context.Context, name string) (*authdomain.Permission, error) {
|
||||
return s.repo.GetByName(ctx, name)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// IsRegistered reports whether the named permission exists in the
|
||||
// canonical catalogue. Cheap in-memory lookup; used by RoleService
|
||||
// before issuing a DB write to fail-fast on typos.
|
||||
func (s *PermissionService) IsRegistered(name string) bool {
|
||||
return s.repo.IsCanonical(name)
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,208 @@
|
||||
package auth
|
||||
|
||||
import (
|
||||
"context"
|
||||
"fmt"
|
||||
|
||||
"github.com/certctl-io/certctl/internal/domain"
|
||||
authdomain "github.com/certctl-io/certctl/internal/domain/auth"
|
||||
"github.com/certctl-io/certctl/internal/repository"
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
// RoleService manages roles + role-permission grants.
|
||||
type RoleService struct {
|
||||
repo repository.RoleRepository
|
||||
permRepo repository.PermissionRepository
|
||||
authorizer *Authorizer
|
||||
audit AuditService
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// NewRoleService constructs a RoleService.
|
||||
func NewRoleService(repo repository.RoleRepository, permRepo repository.PermissionRepository, authorizer *Authorizer, audit AuditService) *RoleService {
|
||||
return &RoleService{
|
||||
repo: repo,
|
||||
permRepo: permRepo,
|
||||
authorizer: authorizer,
|
||||
audit: audit,
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// List returns every role in the caller's tenant. Requires
|
||||
// `auth.role.list`.
|
||||
func (s *RoleService) List(ctx context.Context, caller *Caller) ([]*authdomain.Role, error) {
|
||||
if err := s.requirePermission(ctx, caller, "auth.role.list"); err != nil {
|
||||
return nil, err
|
||||
}
|
||||
tenantID := caller.TenantID
|
||||
if tenantID == "" {
|
||||
tenantID = authdomain.DefaultTenantID
|
||||
}
|
||||
return s.repo.List(ctx, tenantID)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Get returns the role with the given ID. Requires `auth.role.list`.
|
||||
func (s *RoleService) Get(ctx context.Context, caller *Caller, id string) (*authdomain.Role, error) {
|
||||
if err := s.requirePermission(ctx, caller, "auth.role.list"); err != nil {
|
||||
return nil, err
|
||||
}
|
||||
return s.repo.Get(ctx, id)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Create stores a new role. Requires `auth.role.create`.
|
||||
func (s *RoleService) Create(ctx context.Context, caller *Caller, role *authdomain.Role) error {
|
||||
if err := s.requirePermission(ctx, caller, "auth.role.create"); err != nil {
|
||||
return err
|
||||
}
|
||||
if role.TenantID == "" {
|
||||
role.TenantID = authdomain.DefaultTenantID
|
||||
}
|
||||
if err := s.repo.Create(ctx, role); err != nil {
|
||||
return err
|
||||
}
|
||||
s.recordAudit(ctx, caller, "role.create", "role", role.ID, map[string]interface{}{"name": role.Name, "tenant_id": role.TenantID})
|
||||
return nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Update modifies an existing role. Requires `auth.role.edit`.
|
||||
func (s *RoleService) Update(ctx context.Context, caller *Caller, role *authdomain.Role) error {
|
||||
if err := s.requirePermission(ctx, caller, "auth.role.edit"); err != nil {
|
||||
return err
|
||||
}
|
||||
if err := s.repo.Update(ctx, role); err != nil {
|
||||
return err
|
||||
}
|
||||
s.recordAudit(ctx, caller, "role.update", "role", role.ID, map[string]interface{}{"name": role.Name})
|
||||
return nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Delete removes a role. Requires `auth.role.delete`. Returns
|
||||
// repository.ErrAuthRoleInUse when active actor_roles still reference
|
||||
// the role (FK ON DELETE RESTRICT).
|
||||
func (s *RoleService) Delete(ctx context.Context, caller *Caller, id string) error {
|
||||
if err := s.requirePermission(ctx, caller, "auth.role.delete"); err != nil {
|
||||
return err
|
||||
}
|
||||
if err := s.repo.Delete(ctx, id); err != nil {
|
||||
return err
|
||||
}
|
||||
s.recordAudit(ctx, caller, "role.delete", "role", id, nil)
|
||||
return nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// ListPermissions returns the (permission, scope) grants on the role.
|
||||
// Requires `auth.role.list`.
|
||||
func (s *RoleService) ListPermissions(ctx context.Context, caller *Caller, roleID string) ([]*authdomain.RolePermission, error) {
|
||||
if err := s.requirePermission(ctx, caller, "auth.role.list"); err != nil {
|
||||
return nil, err
|
||||
}
|
||||
return s.repo.ListPermissions(ctx, roleID)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// AddPermission grants a permission to a role at the given scope.
|
||||
// Requires `auth.role.edit`. Returns ErrInvalidPermission if the
|
||||
// permission name is not in the canonical catalogue.
|
||||
func (s *RoleService) AddPermission(ctx context.Context, caller *Caller, roleID, permissionName string, scopeType authdomain.ScopeType, scopeID *string) error {
|
||||
if err := s.requirePermission(ctx, caller, "auth.role.edit"); err != nil {
|
||||
return err
|
||||
}
|
||||
if !s.permRepo.IsCanonical(permissionName) {
|
||||
return fmt.Errorf("%w: %q", ErrInvalidPermission, permissionName)
|
||||
}
|
||||
perm, err := s.permRepo.GetByName(ctx, permissionName)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
return err
|
||||
}
|
||||
grant := &authdomain.RolePermission{
|
||||
RoleID: roleID,
|
||||
PermissionID: perm.ID,
|
||||
ScopeType: scopeType,
|
||||
ScopeID: scopeID,
|
||||
}
|
||||
if err := s.repo.AddPermission(ctx, grant); err != nil {
|
||||
return err
|
||||
}
|
||||
details := map[string]interface{}{
|
||||
"role_id": roleID,
|
||||
"permission": permissionName,
|
||||
"scope_type": string(scopeType),
|
||||
}
|
||||
if scopeID != nil {
|
||||
details["scope_id"] = *scopeID
|
||||
}
|
||||
s.recordAudit(ctx, caller, "role.permission.add", "role", roleID, details)
|
||||
return nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// RemovePermission revokes a previously-granted permission from a role.
|
||||
// Requires `auth.role.edit`.
|
||||
func (s *RoleService) RemovePermission(ctx context.Context, caller *Caller, roleID, permissionName string, scopeType authdomain.ScopeType, scopeID *string) error {
|
||||
if err := s.requirePermission(ctx, caller, "auth.role.edit"); err != nil {
|
||||
return err
|
||||
}
|
||||
perm, err := s.permRepo.GetByName(ctx, permissionName)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
return err
|
||||
}
|
||||
grant := &authdomain.RolePermission{
|
||||
RoleID: roleID,
|
||||
PermissionID: perm.ID,
|
||||
ScopeType: scopeType,
|
||||
ScopeID: scopeID,
|
||||
}
|
||||
if err := s.repo.RemovePermission(ctx, grant); err != nil {
|
||||
return err
|
||||
}
|
||||
details := map[string]interface{}{
|
||||
"role_id": roleID,
|
||||
"permission": permissionName,
|
||||
"scope_type": string(scopeType),
|
||||
}
|
||||
if scopeID != nil {
|
||||
details["scope_id"] = *scopeID
|
||||
}
|
||||
s.recordAudit(ctx, caller, "role.permission.remove", "role", roleID, details)
|
||||
return nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// requirePermission is the gate every public method runs first. System
|
||||
// callers bypass; everyone else must hold the named permission globally.
|
||||
// Returns ErrUnauthenticated when caller is nil, ErrForbidden when the
|
||||
// caller exists but lacks the permission.
|
||||
func (s *RoleService) requirePermission(ctx context.Context, caller *Caller, perm string) error {
|
||||
if caller == nil {
|
||||
return ErrUnauthenticated
|
||||
}
|
||||
if caller.IsSystem {
|
||||
return nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
tenantID := caller.TenantID
|
||||
if tenantID == "" {
|
||||
tenantID = authdomain.DefaultTenantID
|
||||
}
|
||||
ok, err := s.authorizer.CheckPermission(ctx, caller.ActorID, authdomain.ActorTypeValue(caller.ActorType), tenantID, perm, authdomain.ScopeTypeGlobal, nil)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
return err
|
||||
}
|
||||
if !ok {
|
||||
return fmt.Errorf("%w: %q", ErrForbidden, perm)
|
||||
}
|
||||
return nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// recordAudit emits an audit row tied to the caller. Best-effort: audit
|
||||
// failures are logged via panic-recover but do not fail the operation.
|
||||
//
|
||||
// Bundle 1 Phase 8: every role-mutation is an authentication /
|
||||
// authorization event. The auditor role queries
|
||||
// /v1/audit?category=auth to surface this slice.
|
||||
func (s *RoleService) recordAudit(ctx context.Context, caller *Caller, action, resourceType, resourceID string, details map[string]interface{}) {
|
||||
if s.audit == nil || caller == nil {
|
||||
return
|
||||
}
|
||||
_ = s.audit.RecordEventWithCategory(ctx, caller.ActorID, caller.ActorType, action, domain.EventCategoryAuth, resourceType, resourceID, details)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Ensure the compile-time pin: domain.ActorType is convertible to
|
||||
// authdomain.ActorTypeValue via string equality. If the underlying
|
||||
// types ever diverge this won't compile.
|
||||
var _ authdomain.ActorTypeValue = authdomain.ActorTypeValue(domain.ActorTypeAPIKey)
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,438 @@
|
||||
package auth
|
||||
|
||||
import (
|
||||
"context"
|
||||
"errors"
|
||||
"testing"
|
||||
|
||||
"github.com/certctl-io/certctl/internal/domain"
|
||||
authdomain "github.com/certctl-io/certctl/internal/domain/auth"
|
||||
"github.com/certctl-io/certctl/internal/repository"
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
// =============================================================================
|
||||
// In-memory fakes. These exist solely to make the service-layer unit tests
|
||||
// feasible without testcontainers. Phase 12 wires the live-Postgres
|
||||
// integration suite that exercises the same code paths against the real
|
||||
// schema; this file pins the privilege-escalation invariants that don't
|
||||
// need a database.
|
||||
// =============================================================================
|
||||
|
||||
type fakeRoleRepo struct {
|
||||
roles map[string]*authdomain.Role
|
||||
rolePerms map[string][]*authdomain.RolePermission
|
||||
deleteFail error
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func newFakeRoleRepo() *fakeRoleRepo {
|
||||
return &fakeRoleRepo{
|
||||
roles: map[string]*authdomain.Role{},
|
||||
rolePerms: map[string][]*authdomain.RolePermission{},
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func (f *fakeRoleRepo) Get(_ context.Context, id string) (*authdomain.Role, error) {
|
||||
r, ok := f.roles[id]
|
||||
if !ok {
|
||||
return nil, repository.ErrAuthNotFound
|
||||
}
|
||||
return r, nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
func (f *fakeRoleRepo) GetByName(_ context.Context, _, name string) (*authdomain.Role, error) {
|
||||
for _, r := range f.roles {
|
||||
if r.Name == name {
|
||||
return r, nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
return nil, repository.ErrAuthNotFound
|
||||
}
|
||||
func (f *fakeRoleRepo) List(_ context.Context, _ string) ([]*authdomain.Role, error) {
|
||||
out := make([]*authdomain.Role, 0, len(f.roles))
|
||||
for _, r := range f.roles {
|
||||
out = append(out, r)
|
||||
}
|
||||
return out, nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
func (f *fakeRoleRepo) Create(_ context.Context, r *authdomain.Role) error {
|
||||
f.roles[r.ID] = r
|
||||
return nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
func (f *fakeRoleRepo) Update(_ context.Context, r *authdomain.Role) error {
|
||||
f.roles[r.ID] = r
|
||||
return nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
func (f *fakeRoleRepo) Delete(_ context.Context, id string) error {
|
||||
if f.deleteFail != nil {
|
||||
return f.deleteFail
|
||||
}
|
||||
delete(f.roles, id)
|
||||
return nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
func (f *fakeRoleRepo) ListPermissions(_ context.Context, roleID string) ([]*authdomain.RolePermission, error) {
|
||||
return f.rolePerms[roleID], nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
func (f *fakeRoleRepo) AddPermission(_ context.Context, g *authdomain.RolePermission) error {
|
||||
f.rolePerms[g.RoleID] = append(f.rolePerms[g.RoleID], g)
|
||||
return nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
func (f *fakeRoleRepo) RemovePermission(_ context.Context, g *authdomain.RolePermission) error {
|
||||
out := f.rolePerms[g.RoleID][:0]
|
||||
for _, x := range f.rolePerms[g.RoleID] {
|
||||
if x.PermissionID != g.PermissionID || x.ScopeType != g.ScopeType {
|
||||
out = append(out, x)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
f.rolePerms[g.RoleID] = out
|
||||
return nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
type fakePermissionRepo struct {
|
||||
byName map[string]*authdomain.Permission
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func newFakePermissionRepo() *fakePermissionRepo {
|
||||
r := &fakePermissionRepo{byName: map[string]*authdomain.Permission{}}
|
||||
for _, p := range authdomain.CanonicalPermissions {
|
||||
r.byName[p] = &authdomain.Permission{
|
||||
ID: "p-" + p,
|
||||
Name: p,
|
||||
Namespace: p,
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
return r
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func (f *fakePermissionRepo) List(_ context.Context) ([]*authdomain.Permission, error) {
|
||||
out := make([]*authdomain.Permission, 0, len(f.byName))
|
||||
for _, p := range f.byName {
|
||||
out = append(out, p)
|
||||
}
|
||||
return out, nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
func (f *fakePermissionRepo) GetByName(_ context.Context, name string) (*authdomain.Permission, error) {
|
||||
p, ok := f.byName[name]
|
||||
if !ok {
|
||||
return nil, repository.ErrAuthNotFound
|
||||
}
|
||||
return p, nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
func (f *fakePermissionRepo) IsCanonical(name string) bool {
|
||||
_, ok := f.byName[name]
|
||||
return ok
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// fakeActorRoleRepo mocks the actor_roles repository plus the
|
||||
// EffectivePermissions JOIN. Tests configure perms[(actorID,actorType)]
|
||||
// to return a specific permission set.
|
||||
type fakeActorRoleRepo struct {
|
||||
grants []*authdomain.ActorRole
|
||||
perms map[string][]repository.EffectivePermission
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func newFakeActorRoleRepo() *fakeActorRoleRepo {
|
||||
return &fakeActorRoleRepo{
|
||||
perms: map[string][]repository.EffectivePermission{},
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
func actorKey(id string, t authdomain.ActorTypeValue) string {
|
||||
return string(t) + ":" + id
|
||||
}
|
||||
func (f *fakeActorRoleRepo) ListByActor(_ context.Context, actorID string, actorType authdomain.ActorTypeValue, _ string) ([]*authdomain.ActorRole, error) {
|
||||
var out []*authdomain.ActorRole
|
||||
for _, g := range f.grants {
|
||||
if g.ActorID == actorID && g.ActorType == actorType {
|
||||
out = append(out, g)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
return out, nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
func (f *fakeActorRoleRepo) ListByRole(_ context.Context, roleID string) ([]*authdomain.ActorRole, error) {
|
||||
var out []*authdomain.ActorRole
|
||||
for _, g := range f.grants {
|
||||
if g.RoleID == roleID {
|
||||
out = append(out, g)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
return out, nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
func (f *fakeActorRoleRepo) Grant(_ context.Context, ar *authdomain.ActorRole) error {
|
||||
f.grants = append(f.grants, ar)
|
||||
return nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
func (f *fakeActorRoleRepo) Revoke(_ context.Context, actorID string, actorType authdomain.ActorTypeValue, roleID, _ string) error {
|
||||
out := f.grants[:0]
|
||||
for _, g := range f.grants {
|
||||
if g.ActorID == actorID && g.ActorType == actorType && g.RoleID == roleID {
|
||||
continue
|
||||
}
|
||||
out = append(out, g)
|
||||
}
|
||||
f.grants = out
|
||||
return nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
func (f *fakeActorRoleRepo) AdminExists(_ context.Context, _ string) (bool, error) {
|
||||
for _, g := range f.grants {
|
||||
if g.RoleID == authdomain.RoleIDAdmin && g.ActorID != authdomain.DemoAnonActorID {
|
||||
return true, nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
return false, nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
func (f *fakeActorRoleRepo) ListDistinctActors(_ context.Context, _ string) ([]repository.ActorWithRoles, error) {
|
||||
seen := map[string]*repository.ActorWithRoles{}
|
||||
for _, g := range f.grants {
|
||||
k := string(g.ActorType) + ":" + g.ActorID
|
||||
if seen[k] == nil {
|
||||
seen[k] = &repository.ActorWithRoles{
|
||||
ActorID: g.ActorID,
|
||||
ActorType: g.ActorType,
|
||||
TenantID: g.TenantID,
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
seen[k].RoleIDs = append(seen[k].RoleIDs, g.RoleID)
|
||||
}
|
||||
out := make([]repository.ActorWithRoles, 0, len(seen))
|
||||
for _, v := range seen {
|
||||
out = append(out, *v)
|
||||
}
|
||||
return out, nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
func (f *fakeActorRoleRepo) EffectivePermissions(_ context.Context, actorID string, actorType authdomain.ActorTypeValue, _ string) ([]repository.EffectivePermission, error) {
|
||||
return f.perms[actorKey(actorID, actorType)], nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
type fakeAudit struct {
|
||||
calls []struct {
|
||||
Actor, ActorType, Action, Category, ResourceID string
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func (f *fakeAudit) RecordEvent(_ context.Context, actor string, actorType domain.ActorType, action, resourceType, resourceID string, _ map[string]interface{}) error {
|
||||
f.calls = append(f.calls, struct{ Actor, ActorType, Action, Category, ResourceID string }{
|
||||
actor, string(actorType), action, "", resourceID,
|
||||
})
|
||||
return nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func (f *fakeAudit) RecordEventWithCategory(_ context.Context, actor string, actorType domain.ActorType, action, eventCategory, resourceType, resourceID string, _ map[string]interface{}) error {
|
||||
f.calls = append(f.calls, struct{ Actor, ActorType, Action, Category, ResourceID string }{
|
||||
actor, string(actorType), action, eventCategory, resourceID,
|
||||
})
|
||||
return nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// =============================================================================
|
||||
// Authorizer tests
|
||||
// =============================================================================
|
||||
|
||||
func TestAuthorizer_GlobalGrantBeatsSpecificScope(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
r := newFakeActorRoleRepo()
|
||||
r.perms[actorKey("alice", authdomain.ActorTypeValue(domain.ActorTypeAPIKey))] = []repository.EffectivePermission{
|
||||
{PermissionName: "cert.read", ScopeType: authdomain.ScopeTypeGlobal, ScopeID: nil},
|
||||
}
|
||||
az := NewAuthorizer(r)
|
||||
scopeID := "iss-foo"
|
||||
ok, err := az.CheckPermission(context.Background(), "alice", authdomain.ActorTypeValue(domain.ActorTypeAPIKey), authdomain.DefaultTenantID, "cert.read", authdomain.ScopeTypeIssuer, &scopeID)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("CheckPermission err: %v", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
if !ok {
|
||||
t.Errorf("global cert.read grant should match scoped request; got false")
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func TestAuthorizer_NoGrantReturnsFalse(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
r := newFakeActorRoleRepo()
|
||||
az := NewAuthorizer(r)
|
||||
ok, err := az.CheckPermission(context.Background(), "bob", authdomain.ActorTypeValue(domain.ActorTypeAPIKey), authdomain.DefaultTenantID, "cert.delete", authdomain.ScopeTypeGlobal, nil)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("err: %v", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
if ok {
|
||||
t.Errorf("actor with no grants should not pass any permission check")
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func TestAuthorizer_SpecificScopeMatchesExactID(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
r := newFakeActorRoleRepo()
|
||||
scope := "p-corp"
|
||||
r.perms[actorKey("alice", authdomain.ActorTypeValue(domain.ActorTypeAPIKey))] = []repository.EffectivePermission{
|
||||
{PermissionName: "profile.edit", ScopeType: authdomain.ScopeTypeProfile, ScopeID: &scope},
|
||||
}
|
||||
az := NewAuthorizer(r)
|
||||
matchID := "p-corp"
|
||||
wrongID := "p-other"
|
||||
ok, _ := az.CheckPermission(context.Background(), "alice", authdomain.ActorTypeValue(domain.ActorTypeAPIKey), authdomain.DefaultTenantID, "profile.edit", authdomain.ScopeTypeProfile, &matchID)
|
||||
if !ok {
|
||||
t.Errorf("scoped grant on p-corp should match request for p-corp")
|
||||
}
|
||||
ok, _ = az.CheckPermission(context.Background(), "alice", authdomain.ActorTypeValue(domain.ActorTypeAPIKey), authdomain.DefaultTenantID, "profile.edit", authdomain.ScopeTypeProfile, &wrongID)
|
||||
if ok {
|
||||
t.Errorf("scoped grant on p-corp should NOT match request for p-other")
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// =============================================================================
|
||||
// RoleService tests
|
||||
// =============================================================================
|
||||
|
||||
func newRoleServiceWithFakes() (*RoleService, *fakeAudit, *fakeActorRoleRepo) {
|
||||
roleRepo := newFakeRoleRepo()
|
||||
permRepo := newFakePermissionRepo()
|
||||
actorRepo := newFakeActorRoleRepo()
|
||||
audit := &fakeAudit{}
|
||||
az := NewAuthorizer(actorRepo)
|
||||
return NewRoleService(roleRepo, permRepo, az, audit), audit, actorRepo
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func TestRoleService_NoCallerReturnsUnauthenticated(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
rs, _, _ := newRoleServiceWithFakes()
|
||||
_, err := rs.List(context.Background(), nil)
|
||||
if !errors.Is(err, ErrUnauthenticated) {
|
||||
t.Errorf("nil caller should return ErrUnauthenticated, got %v", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func TestRoleService_CallerWithoutPermissionForbidden(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
rs, _, _ := newRoleServiceWithFakes()
|
||||
caller := &Caller{ActorID: "bob", ActorType: domain.ActorTypeAPIKey}
|
||||
_, err := rs.List(context.Background(), caller)
|
||||
if !errors.Is(err, ErrForbidden) {
|
||||
t.Errorf("caller without auth.role.list should be forbidden; got %v", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func TestRoleService_SystemCallerBypassesGate(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
rs, audit, _ := newRoleServiceWithFakes()
|
||||
role := &authdomain.Role{ID: "r-x", Name: "x", Description: "test"}
|
||||
if err := rs.Create(context.Background(), AsSystemCaller(), role); err != nil {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("system caller should bypass auth.role.create gate; got %v", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
if len(audit.calls) != 1 || audit.calls[0].Action != "role.create" {
|
||||
t.Errorf("expected one role.create audit row, got %+v", audit.calls)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func TestRoleService_AddPermissionRejectsNonCanonical(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
rs, _, _ := newRoleServiceWithFakes()
|
||||
err := rs.AddPermission(context.Background(), AsSystemCaller(), "r-admin", "fake.permission", authdomain.ScopeTypeGlobal, nil)
|
||||
if !errors.Is(err, ErrInvalidPermission) {
|
||||
t.Errorf("non-canonical permission should be rejected; got %v", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// =============================================================================
|
||||
// ActorRoleService tests — privilege-escalation guard
|
||||
// =============================================================================
|
||||
|
||||
func newActorRoleServiceWithFakes() (*ActorRoleService, *fakeActorRoleRepo, *fakeAudit) {
|
||||
roleRepo := newFakeRoleRepo()
|
||||
actorRepo := newFakeActorRoleRepo()
|
||||
audit := &fakeAudit{}
|
||||
az := NewAuthorizer(actorRepo)
|
||||
return NewActorRoleService(actorRepo, roleRepo, az, audit), actorRepo, audit
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func TestActorRoleService_GrantRequiresAuthRoleAssign(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
svc, repo, _ := newActorRoleServiceWithFakes()
|
||||
// Caller bob has cert.read but NOT auth.role.assign.
|
||||
repo.perms[actorKey("bob", authdomain.ActorTypeValue(domain.ActorTypeAPIKey))] = []repository.EffectivePermission{
|
||||
{PermissionName: "cert.read", ScopeType: authdomain.ScopeTypeGlobal, ScopeID: nil},
|
||||
}
|
||||
caller := &Caller{ActorID: "bob", ActorType: domain.ActorTypeAPIKey}
|
||||
err := svc.Grant(context.Background(), caller, &authdomain.ActorRole{
|
||||
ActorID: "carol", ActorType: authdomain.ActorTypeValue(domain.ActorTypeAPIKey), RoleID: "r-admin",
|
||||
})
|
||||
if !errors.Is(err, ErrSelfRoleAssignment) {
|
||||
t.Errorf("Grant without auth.role.assign should fail with ErrSelfRoleAssignment; got %v", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func TestActorRoleService_GrantSucceedsWithAuthRoleAssign(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
svc, repo, audit := newActorRoleServiceWithFakes()
|
||||
// Caller alice holds auth.role.assign globally.
|
||||
repo.perms[actorKey("alice", authdomain.ActorTypeValue(domain.ActorTypeAPIKey))] = []repository.EffectivePermission{
|
||||
{PermissionName: "auth.role.assign", ScopeType: authdomain.ScopeTypeGlobal, ScopeID: nil},
|
||||
}
|
||||
caller := &Caller{ActorID: "alice", ActorType: domain.ActorTypeAPIKey}
|
||||
err := svc.Grant(context.Background(), caller, &authdomain.ActorRole{
|
||||
ActorID: "carol", ActorType: authdomain.ActorTypeValue(domain.ActorTypeAPIKey), RoleID: "r-viewer",
|
||||
})
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("Grant should succeed when caller holds auth.role.assign; got %v", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
if len(audit.calls) != 1 || audit.calls[0].Action != "actor_role.grant" {
|
||||
t.Errorf("expected one actor_role.grant audit row; got %+v", audit.calls)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func TestActorRoleService_GrantRejectsReservedDemoActor(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
svc, _, _ := newActorRoleServiceWithFakes()
|
||||
err := svc.Grant(context.Background(), AsSystemCaller(), &authdomain.ActorRole{
|
||||
ActorID: authdomain.DemoAnonActorID,
|
||||
RoleID: "r-viewer",
|
||||
})
|
||||
if !errors.Is(err, repository.ErrAuthReservedActor) {
|
||||
t.Errorf("Grant against actor-demo-anon should be rejected; got %v", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func TestActorRoleService_RevokeRejectsReservedDemoActor(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
svc, _, _ := newActorRoleServiceWithFakes()
|
||||
err := svc.Revoke(context.Background(), AsSystemCaller(), authdomain.DemoAnonActorID, domain.ActorTypeAnonymous, "r-admin")
|
||||
if !errors.Is(err, repository.ErrAuthReservedActor) {
|
||||
t.Errorf("Revoke against actor-demo-anon should be rejected; got %v", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// =============================================================================
|
||||
// PermissionService tests
|
||||
// =============================================================================
|
||||
|
||||
func TestPermissionService_IsRegistered(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
repo := newFakePermissionRepo()
|
||||
ps := NewPermissionService(repo)
|
||||
if !ps.IsRegistered("cert.read") {
|
||||
t.Errorf("cert.read should be in canonical catalogue")
|
||||
}
|
||||
if ps.IsRegistered("not.a.real.permission") {
|
||||
t.Errorf("non-canonical permission should NOT be registered")
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// =============================================================================
|
||||
// CallerFromContext returns ErrUnauthenticated until Phase 3 wires the
|
||||
// middleware; pin the contract here so the upgrade is observable.
|
||||
// =============================================================================
|
||||
|
||||
func TestCallerFromContext_Phase2ReturnsUnauthenticated(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
_, err := CallerFromContext(context.Background())
|
||||
if !errors.Is(err, ErrUnauthenticated) {
|
||||
t.Errorf("Phase 2 stub should return ErrUnauthenticated; got %v. Phase 3 wires the middleware-context bridge.", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// =============================================================================
|
||||
// Bundle 1 Phase 12 — additional negative-test paths from the prompt list:
|
||||
// #9: role delete with actors assigned → ErrAuthRoleInUse (HTTP 409).
|
||||
// The Authorizer wrong-scope path is already covered by
|
||||
// TestAuthorizer_SpecificScopeMatchesExactID (the wrongID arm asserts
|
||||
// false). The ErrInvalidPermission path is covered by
|
||||
// TestRoleService_AddPermissionRejectsNonCanonical.
|
||||
// =============================================================================
|
||||
|
||||
// TestRoleService_DeleteWithActorsAssignedReturns409 pins the
|
||||
// repository sentinel pass-through: when the FK ON DELETE RESTRICT
|
||||
// trips at the postgres layer, the repo returns
|
||||
// repository.ErrAuthRoleInUse; the service surfaces that verbatim so
|
||||
// the handler can map to HTTP 409.
|
||||
func TestRoleService_DeleteWithActorsAssignedReturns409(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
rs, _, _ := newRoleServiceWithFakes()
|
||||
// Pin the repo to surface ErrAuthRoleInUse on Delete (simulates
|
||||
// the FK guard tripping in postgres).
|
||||
rs.repo.(*fakeRoleRepo).deleteFail = repository.ErrAuthRoleInUse
|
||||
err := rs.Delete(context.Background(), AsSystemCaller(), "r-operator")
|
||||
if !errors.Is(err, repository.ErrAuthRoleInUse) {
|
||||
t.Errorf("Delete err = %v, want repository.ErrAuthRoleInUse (handler maps to 409)", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -191,7 +191,7 @@ func (s *IssuerService) Create(ctx context.Context, iss *domain.Issuer, actor st
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if s.auditService != nil {
|
||||
if auditErr := s.auditService.RecordEvent(ctx, actor, domain.ActorTypeUser, "create_issuer", "issuer", iss.ID, nil); auditErr != nil {
|
||||
if auditErr := s.auditService.RecordEventWithCategory(ctx, actor, domain.ActorTypeUser, "create_issuer", domain.EventCategoryConfig, "issuer", iss.ID, nil); auditErr != nil {
|
||||
s.logger.Error("failed to record audit event", "error", auditErr)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -232,7 +232,7 @@ func (s *IssuerService) Update(ctx context.Context, id string, iss *domain.Issue
|
||||
s.rebuildRegistryQuiet(ctx)
|
||||
|
||||
if s.auditService != nil {
|
||||
if auditErr := s.auditService.RecordEvent(ctx, actor, domain.ActorTypeUser, "update_issuer", "issuer", id, nil); auditErr != nil {
|
||||
if auditErr := s.auditService.RecordEventWithCategory(ctx, actor, domain.ActorTypeUser, "update_issuer", domain.EventCategoryConfig, "issuer", id, nil); auditErr != nil {
|
||||
s.logger.Error("failed to record audit event", "error", auditErr)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -252,7 +252,7 @@ func (s *IssuerService) Delete(ctx context.Context, id string, actor string) err
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if s.auditService != nil {
|
||||
if auditErr := s.auditService.RecordEvent(ctx, actor, domain.ActorTypeUser, "delete_issuer", "issuer", id, nil); auditErr != nil {
|
||||
if auditErr := s.auditService.RecordEventWithCategory(ctx, actor, domain.ActorTypeUser, "delete_issuer", domain.EventCategoryConfig, "issuer", id, nil); auditErr != nil {
|
||||
s.logger.Error("failed to record audit event", "error", auditErr)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -2,18 +2,37 @@ package service
|
||||
|
||||
import (
|
||||
"context"
|
||||
"encoding/json"
|
||||
"errors"
|
||||
"fmt"
|
||||
"log/slog"
|
||||
"time"
|
||||
|
||||
"github.com/certctl-io/certctl/internal/auth"
|
||||
"github.com/certctl-io/certctl/internal/domain"
|
||||
"github.com/certctl-io/certctl/internal/repository"
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
// ErrProfileEditPendingApproval (Bundle 1 Phase 9) is returned by
|
||||
// UpdateProfile when the live profile (or the proposed update) carries
|
||||
// RequiresApproval=true. The handler maps this to HTTP 202 Accepted +
|
||||
// {pending_approval_id} so the operator knows to chase a second-admin
|
||||
// approve. See docs/reference/profiles.md.
|
||||
var ErrProfileEditPendingApproval = errors.New("profile edit gated by approval workflow")
|
||||
|
||||
// ProfileEditApprovalRequester is the slice of ApprovalService the
|
||||
// ProfileService consumes when a profile edit triggers the gate.
|
||||
// Pulled out as a small interface so unit tests can drive the gate
|
||||
// without the full ApprovalService dependency tree.
|
||||
type ProfileEditApprovalRequester interface {
|
||||
RequestProfileEditApproval(ctx context.Context, profileID, requestedBy string, payload []byte) (string, error)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// ProfileService provides business logic for certificate profile management.
|
||||
type ProfileService struct {
|
||||
profileRepo repository.CertificateProfileRepository
|
||||
auditService *AuditService
|
||||
approvalService ProfileEditApprovalRequester // Bundle 1 Phase 9; nil disables the gate
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// NewProfileService creates a new profile service.
|
||||
@@ -27,6 +46,14 @@ func NewProfileService(
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// SetApprovalService wires the Bundle 1 Phase 9 gate. cmd/server/main.go
|
||||
// calls this after both ProfileService and ApprovalService are
|
||||
// constructed. nil disables the gate (preserving pre-Phase-9 behaviour
|
||||
// for any test fixture or alternate boot path that doesn't wire it).
|
||||
func (s *ProfileService) SetApprovalService(a ProfileEditApprovalRequester) {
|
||||
s.approvalService = a
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// ListProfiles returns all profiles (handler interface method).
|
||||
func (s *ProfileService) ListProfiles(ctx context.Context, page, perPage int) ([]domain.CertificateProfile, int64, error) {
|
||||
// Bundle E / Audit L-020: page/perPage are unused; the underlying repo
|
||||
@@ -97,12 +124,59 @@ func (s *ProfileService) CreateProfile(ctx context.Context, profile domain.Certi
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// UpdateProfile modifies an existing profile (handler interface method).
|
||||
//
|
||||
// Bundle 1 Phase 9 (approval-bypass closure): if the LIVE profile has
|
||||
// RequiresApproval=true OR the proposed update would set it true, the
|
||||
// edit is NOT applied directly. Instead it is serialized to a pending
|
||||
// ApprovalRequest with Kind=profile_edit and the caller receives
|
||||
// ErrProfileEditPendingApproval. The handler maps this to HTTP 202 +
|
||||
// the new approval ID. A non-requester admin then approves via the
|
||||
// existing /v1/approvals/{id}/approve endpoint, which deserializes
|
||||
// the payload and persists the diff via the profile-edit-apply
|
||||
// callback registered in main.go. This closes the flip-flop loophole
|
||||
// where an admin could disable RequiresApproval, mutate, re-enable.
|
||||
//
|
||||
// SetApprovalService(nil) disables the gate (test fixtures); the
|
||||
// pre-Phase-9 direct-apply path is preserved.
|
||||
func (s *ProfileService) UpdateProfile(ctx context.Context, id string, profile domain.CertificateProfile) (*domain.CertificateProfile, error) {
|
||||
if err := validateProfile(&profile); err != nil {
|
||||
return nil, err
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
profile.ID = id
|
||||
|
||||
if s.approvalService != nil {
|
||||
live, err := s.profileRepo.Get(ctx, id)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to load live profile: %w", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
// Gate when the live profile is approval-tier OR the edit
|
||||
// would flip it on. Both arms close the loophole: a flip-
|
||||
// flop attacker can't set false→mutate→true because every
|
||||
// transition through an approval-tier profile triggers the
|
||||
// gate.
|
||||
if (live != nil && live.RequiresApproval) || profile.RequiresApproval {
|
||||
payload, perr := json.Marshal(profile)
|
||||
if perr != nil {
|
||||
return nil, fmt.Errorf("marshal profile for approval payload: %w", perr)
|
||||
}
|
||||
requester := actorFromContext(ctx)
|
||||
approvalID, gerr := s.approvalService.RequestProfileEditApproval(ctx, id, requester, payload)
|
||||
if gerr != nil {
|
||||
return nil, fmt.Errorf("approval gate: %w", gerr)
|
||||
}
|
||||
if s.auditService != nil {
|
||||
_ = s.auditService.RecordEventWithCategory(
|
||||
context.WithoutCancel(ctx),
|
||||
requester, domain.ActorTypeUser,
|
||||
"profile.edit_request", domain.EventCategoryAuth,
|
||||
"certificate_profile", id,
|
||||
map[string]interface{}{"approval_id": approvalID},
|
||||
)
|
||||
}
|
||||
return nil, fmt.Errorf("%w: approval=%s", ErrProfileEditPendingApproval, approvalID)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if err := s.profileRepo.Update(ctx, &profile); err != nil {
|
||||
return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to update profile: %w", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -117,6 +191,23 @@ func (s *ProfileService) UpdateProfile(ctx context.Context, id string, profile d
|
||||
return &profile, nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// actorFromContext pulls the caller's actor ID from the
|
||||
// auth-middleware ActorIDKey populated by NewAuthWithKeyStore /
|
||||
// NewDemoModeAuth. Falls back to "api" so legacy test fixtures that
|
||||
// don't wire the auth context still record meaningful audit rows.
|
||||
func actorFromContext(ctx context.Context) string {
|
||||
if ctx == nil {
|
||||
return "api"
|
||||
}
|
||||
if id := auth.GetActorID(ctx); id != "" {
|
||||
return id
|
||||
}
|
||||
if id, ok := ctx.Value(auth.UserKey{}).(string); ok && id != "" {
|
||||
return id
|
||||
}
|
||||
return "api"
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// DeleteProfile removes a profile (handler interface method).
|
||||
func (s *ProfileService) DeleteProfile(ctx context.Context, id string) error {
|
||||
if err := s.profileRepo.Delete(ctx, id); err != nil {
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,212 @@
|
||||
package service
|
||||
|
||||
import (
|
||||
"context"
|
||||
"errors"
|
||||
"testing"
|
||||
|
||||
"github.com/certctl-io/certctl/internal/domain"
|
||||
"github.com/certctl-io/certctl/internal/repository"
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
// =============================================================================
|
||||
// Bundle 1 Phase 9 — approval-bypass closure regression tests.
|
||||
//
|
||||
// Ship a tiny in-memory profile-repo + approval-repo so the gate can
|
||||
// be exercised without testcontainers. The gate's invariant: any edit
|
||||
// to a profile that has RequiresApproval=true (or that would set
|
||||
// RequiresApproval=true) routes through ApprovalService and never
|
||||
// reaches profileRepo.Update directly.
|
||||
// =============================================================================
|
||||
|
||||
type fakeProfileRepo struct {
|
||||
rows map[string]*domain.CertificateProfile
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func newFakeProfileRepo() *fakeProfileRepo {
|
||||
return &fakeProfileRepo{rows: make(map[string]*domain.CertificateProfile)}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func (f *fakeProfileRepo) List(_ context.Context) ([]*domain.CertificateProfile, error) {
|
||||
out := make([]*domain.CertificateProfile, 0, len(f.rows))
|
||||
for _, p := range f.rows {
|
||||
out = append(out, p)
|
||||
}
|
||||
return out, nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
func (f *fakeProfileRepo) Get(_ context.Context, id string) (*domain.CertificateProfile, error) {
|
||||
p, ok := f.rows[id]
|
||||
if !ok {
|
||||
return nil, repository.ErrNotFound
|
||||
}
|
||||
cp := *p
|
||||
return &cp, nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
func (f *fakeProfileRepo) Create(_ context.Context, p *domain.CertificateProfile) error {
|
||||
cp := *p
|
||||
f.rows[p.ID] = &cp
|
||||
return nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
func (f *fakeProfileRepo) Update(_ context.Context, p *domain.CertificateProfile) error {
|
||||
if _, ok := f.rows[p.ID]; !ok {
|
||||
return repository.ErrNotFound
|
||||
}
|
||||
cp := *p
|
||||
f.rows[p.ID] = &cp
|
||||
return nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
func (f *fakeProfileRepo) Delete(_ context.Context, id string) error {
|
||||
delete(f.rows, id)
|
||||
return nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// fakeApprovalGate counts requests + lets the test inspect the
|
||||
// payload that was queued. Mirrors ProfileEditApprovalRequester.
|
||||
type fakeApprovalGate struct {
|
||||
requests []struct {
|
||||
ProfileID, RequestedBy string
|
||||
Payload []byte
|
||||
}
|
||||
err error
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func (f *fakeApprovalGate) RequestProfileEditApproval(_ context.Context, profileID, requestedBy string, payload []byte) (string, error) {
|
||||
if f.err != nil {
|
||||
return "", f.err
|
||||
}
|
||||
f.requests = append(f.requests, struct {
|
||||
ProfileID, RequestedBy string
|
||||
Payload []byte
|
||||
}{profileID, requestedBy, payload})
|
||||
return "ar-pending-" + profileID, nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// TestProfileEdit_RequiresApprovalLoopholeClosed pins the load-bearing
|
||||
// invariant: a profile with RequiresApproval=true cannot be mutated
|
||||
// in-place. The flip-flop loophole (set false → mutate → set true) is
|
||||
// closed because every call against an approval-tier profile routes
|
||||
// through ApprovalService BEFORE reaching profileRepo.Update.
|
||||
func TestProfileEdit_RequiresApprovalLoopholeClosed(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
repo := newFakeProfileRepo()
|
||||
repo.rows["prof-prod"] = &domain.CertificateProfile{
|
||||
ID: "prof-prod",
|
||||
Name: "production",
|
||||
RequiresApproval: true,
|
||||
}
|
||||
gate := &fakeApprovalGate{}
|
||||
svc := NewProfileService(repo, nil)
|
||||
svc.SetApprovalService(gate)
|
||||
|
||||
// Attempt 1 — admin tries to flip RequiresApproval off.
|
||||
flippedOff := domain.CertificateProfile{
|
||||
ID: "prof-prod",
|
||||
Name: "production",
|
||||
RequiresApproval: false, // bypass attempt
|
||||
}
|
||||
_, err := svc.UpdateProfile(context.Background(), "prof-prod", flippedOff)
|
||||
if !errors.Is(err, ErrProfileEditPendingApproval) {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("flip-off attempt err = %v, want ErrProfileEditPendingApproval", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
live, _ := repo.Get(context.Background(), "prof-prod")
|
||||
if !live.RequiresApproval {
|
||||
t.Errorf("flip-off attempt mutated live profile (RequiresApproval = false) — loophole NOT closed")
|
||||
}
|
||||
if len(gate.requests) != 1 {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("gate not called for flip-off attempt: %d requests", len(gate.requests))
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Attempt 2 — admin tries to mutate other fields (RequiresApproval still true).
|
||||
keptOn := domain.CertificateProfile{
|
||||
ID: "prof-prod",
|
||||
Name: "renamed",
|
||||
RequiresApproval: true,
|
||||
}
|
||||
_, err = svc.UpdateProfile(context.Background(), "prof-prod", keptOn)
|
||||
if !errors.Is(err, ErrProfileEditPendingApproval) {
|
||||
t.Errorf("kept-on attempt err = %v, want ErrProfileEditPendingApproval", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
live2, _ := repo.Get(context.Background(), "prof-prod")
|
||||
if live2.Name == "renamed" {
|
||||
t.Errorf("kept-on attempt mutated profile name without approval — loophole NOT closed")
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Attempt 3 — admin tries to flip a NON-approval profile to approval-tier.
|
||||
repo.rows["prof-staging"] = &domain.CertificateProfile{
|
||||
ID: "prof-staging",
|
||||
Name: "staging",
|
||||
RequiresApproval: false,
|
||||
}
|
||||
flippedOn := domain.CertificateProfile{
|
||||
ID: "prof-staging",
|
||||
Name: "staging",
|
||||
RequiresApproval: true, // operator wants to enable approvals
|
||||
}
|
||||
_, err = svc.UpdateProfile(context.Background(), "prof-staging", flippedOn)
|
||||
if !errors.Is(err, ErrProfileEditPendingApproval) {
|
||||
t.Errorf("flip-on attempt err = %v, want ErrProfileEditPendingApproval (gate fires when target state is approval-tier)", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
live3, _ := repo.Get(context.Background(), "prof-staging")
|
||||
if live3.RequiresApproval {
|
||||
t.Errorf("flip-on attempt enabled approval without an approval — gate must fire BEFORE the persistence")
|
||||
}
|
||||
if len(gate.requests) != 3 {
|
||||
t.Errorf("gate request count = %d, want 3 (one per attempt)", len(gate.requests))
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// TestProfileEdit_NonApprovalProfileApplyDirectly confirms the gate
|
||||
// is dormant for profiles that have RequiresApproval=false AND the
|
||||
// edit doesn't flip it on. Pre-Phase-9 behaviour preserved.
|
||||
func TestProfileEdit_NonApprovalProfileApplyDirectly(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
repo := newFakeProfileRepo()
|
||||
repo.rows["prof-dev"] = &domain.CertificateProfile{
|
||||
ID: "prof-dev",
|
||||
Name: "development",
|
||||
RequiresApproval: false,
|
||||
}
|
||||
gate := &fakeApprovalGate{}
|
||||
svc := NewProfileService(repo, nil)
|
||||
svc.SetApprovalService(gate)
|
||||
|
||||
updated := domain.CertificateProfile{
|
||||
ID: "prof-dev",
|
||||
Name: "development-renamed",
|
||||
RequiresApproval: false,
|
||||
}
|
||||
got, err := svc.UpdateProfile(context.Background(), "prof-dev", updated)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("non-approval update err = %v", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
if got.Name != "development-renamed" {
|
||||
t.Errorf("name not updated; got %q", got.Name)
|
||||
}
|
||||
if len(gate.requests) != 0 {
|
||||
t.Errorf("gate fired for non-approval profile: %d requests", len(gate.requests))
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// TestProfileEdit_NilApprovalService_PreservesLegacyBehaviour confirms
|
||||
// that a nil-ApprovalService wiring (test fixtures, alternate boot
|
||||
// paths) preserves the pre-Phase-9 direct-apply path even on
|
||||
// approval-tier profiles. The gate is opt-in.
|
||||
func TestProfileEdit_NilApprovalService_PreservesLegacyBehaviour(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
repo := newFakeProfileRepo()
|
||||
repo.rows["prof-prod"] = &domain.CertificateProfile{
|
||||
ID: "prof-prod",
|
||||
Name: "production",
|
||||
RequiresApproval: true,
|
||||
}
|
||||
svc := NewProfileService(repo, nil) // approvalService not wired
|
||||
updated := domain.CertificateProfile{
|
||||
ID: "prof-prod",
|
||||
Name: "renamed",
|
||||
RequiresApproval: true,
|
||||
}
|
||||
if _, err := svc.UpdateProfile(context.Background(), "prof-prod", updated); err != nil {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("nil-gate err = %v", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
live, _ := repo.Get(context.Background(), "prof-prod")
|
||||
if live.Name != "renamed" {
|
||||
t.Errorf("nil-gate did not fall through to direct apply; got %q", live.Name)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -153,7 +153,7 @@ func (s *TargetService) Create(ctx context.Context, target *domain.DeploymentTar
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if s.auditService != nil {
|
||||
if auditErr := s.auditService.RecordEvent(ctx, actor, domain.ActorTypeUser, "create_target", "target", target.ID, nil); auditErr != nil {
|
||||
if auditErr := s.auditService.RecordEventWithCategory(ctx, actor, domain.ActorTypeUser, "create_target", domain.EventCategoryConfig, "target", target.ID, nil); auditErr != nil {
|
||||
s.logger.Error("failed to record audit event", "error", auditErr)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -191,7 +191,7 @@ func (s *TargetService) Update(ctx context.Context, id string, target *domain.De
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if s.auditService != nil {
|
||||
if auditErr := s.auditService.RecordEvent(ctx, actor, domain.ActorTypeUser, "update_target", "target", id, nil); auditErr != nil {
|
||||
if auditErr := s.auditService.RecordEventWithCategory(ctx, actor, domain.ActorTypeUser, "update_target", domain.EventCategoryConfig, "target", id, nil); auditErr != nil {
|
||||
s.logger.Error("failed to record audit event", "error", auditErr)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -206,7 +206,7 @@ func (s *TargetService) Delete(ctx context.Context, id string, actor string) err
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if s.auditService != nil {
|
||||
if auditErr := s.auditService.RecordEvent(ctx, actor, domain.ActorTypeUser, "delete_target", "target", id, nil); auditErr != nil {
|
||||
if auditErr := s.auditService.RecordEventWithCategory(ctx, actor, domain.ActorTypeUser, "delete_target", domain.EventCategoryConfig, "target", id, nil); auditErr != nil {
|
||||
s.logger.Error("failed to record audit event", "error", auditErr)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
Some files were not shown because too many files have changed in this diff Show More
Reference in New Issue
Block a user