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# Phase 6 — day-0 admin bootstrap * internal/auth/bootstrap/ (new package): Strategy interface + EnvTokenStrategy with constant-time compare, one-shot consumption via sync.Mutex, optional admin-existence probe. Bundle 2's OIDC- first-admin will plug in alongside as an alternate Strategy. * BootstrapService.ValidateAndMint: validates the operator's CERTCTL_BOOTSTRAP_TOKEN, mints a 32-byte (64-hex-char) random API key value, persists the SHA-256 hash to api_keys, grants r-admin via actor_roles, AddHashed's the runtime keystore so the just- minted key authenticates the next request without restart, and records bootstrap.consume to the audit trail with category=auth. * internal/auth/keystore.go (new): KeyStore interface + StaticKeyStore (immutable env-var-only path) + MutableKeyStore (env-var keys + DB-loaded api_keys + runtime AddHashed). The auth middleware now consumes a KeyStore so the bootstrap path can extend the lookup table at runtime. * migrations/000031_api_keys.up/down.sql: api_keys table with (id, name UNIQUE, key_hash UNIQUE, tenant_id, admin, created_by, created_at, expires_at, last_used_at). Idempotent. * /v1/auth/bootstrap GET (probe) + POST (mint) — auth-exempt. Both routes documented in api/openapi.yaml + AuthExemptRouterRoutes allowlist updated. The token never leaves internal/auth/bootstrap; the minted plaintext key flows only into the HTTP response body. * Startup warning emitted when CERTCTL_BOOTSTRAP_TOKEN is set AND admin actors already exist (config drift signal). * Tests: 4 strategy invariants (empty token born disabled, wrong token=ErrInvalidToken without consumption, one-shot consumption, admin-exists closes path), 5 service tests (happy path + actor- name validation + propagation of strategy errors + nil-deps guard + 32-byte entropy budget), 8 HTTP-handler tests (status 201/410/401/400 mapping + token-leak hygiene scan of slog + audit details + Location header). Token-leak test redirects slog.Default to a buffer for the test scope. # Phase 7 — API-key migration + scope-down CLI * GET /v1/auth/keys handler + service method ListKeys backed by ActorRoleRepository.ListDistinctActors. Returns one row per (actor_id, actor_type) pair with the slice of role IDs they hold. Permission: auth.role.list. * internal/cli/auth_scope_down.go: AuthListKeys, AuthScopeDown (interactive), AuthScopeDownNonInteractive (JSON config), AuthScopeDownSuggest (--suggest with optional --apply). The synthetic actor-demo-anon is filtered out of every interactive / bulk path; non-interactive flow logs and skips it explicitly. * SuggestRoleFromAuditEvents (pure function): walks 30 days of audit events per actor and returns the narrowest matching role (admin / mcp / viewer / agent / operator) plus a one-line reason. Classification: any admin-shaped action wins; otherwise all-MCP → mcp; all-read-only → viewer; all-agent-shaped → agent; otherwise operator. Test table pins all six classifications. * CLI subcommand tree extended: 'auth keys list' + 'auth keys scope-down [--non-interactive <cfg>] [--suggest [--apply]]'. * CHANGELOG.md leads v2.1.0 with the SECURITY: AUDIT YOUR API KEYS call-out + four flow examples. # Phase 8 — auditor role + event_category column * migrations/000032_audit_category.up/down.sql: ALTER TABLE audit_events ADD COLUMN event_category TEXT NOT NULL DEFAULT 'cert_lifecycle' + CHECK constraint (cert_lifecycle/auth/config) + (event_category) and (event_category, timestamp DESC) indexes for the auditor-filter query path. WORM trigger from migration 000018 continues to enforce append-only at the DB layer (DDL is not blocked). * domain.AuditEvent gains EventCategory string (omitempty); domain.EventCategoryCertLifecycle / Auth / Config constants. * AuditService.RecordEventWithCategory sibling of RecordEvent; legacy callers stay on RecordEvent (defaults to cert_lifecycle). Auth callers (RoleService, ActorRoleService, BootstrapService) switched to RecordEventWithCategory(..., 'auth', ...). * GET /v1/audit?category=<cat>: handler accepts the optional query param, validates against the enum (400 on invalid value), dispatches through ListAuditEventsByCategory. OpenAPI updated with the new query param + AuditEvent.event_category schema. * Postgres AuditRepository.Create now writes event_category; AuditRepository.List filters on it; AuditFilter.EventCategory gates the WHERE clause. * Tests: 5 audit-category-filter HTTP tests (dispatch routing, back-compat fallback, 400 for invalid values, all 3 enum values accepted, page+category combine, JSON output surfaces the field). 3 auditor-role invariants (auditor holds exactly audit.read+audit.export, no mutating perms, disjoint from viewer except audit.read). # Cross-phase wiring * HandlerRegistry.Bootstrap field added; cmd/server/main.go wires the bootstrap service ahead of RegisterHandlers (extracted assembleNamedAPIKeys helper into auth_backfill.go, moved the keystore + bootstrap construction up alongside the auth repos). * AuthCheckResolver / AuthActorRoleService extended with ListKeys to satisfy the Phase 7 surface; existing fakes updated. * fakeAudit + mockAuditService stubs in tests gain RecordEventWithCategory + ListAuditEventsByCategory; existing tests untouched. # Verifications * gofmt -l: clean across every modified file. * go vet ./...: clean. * staticcheck across internal/auth + handler + router + cli + service + repository + cmd + domain: clean. * go test -short -count=1: green across every Bundle-1-touched package — internal/auth (incl. bootstrap), internal/api/handler, internal/api/router, internal/cli, internal/service/auth, internal/service, internal/domain/auth, internal/repository/postgres, cmd/server, cmd/cli, plus internal/scheduler, internal/api/middleware, cmd/agent, internal/mcp.
209 lines
6.9 KiB
Go
209 lines
6.9 KiB
Go
package auth
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import (
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"context"
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"fmt"
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"github.com/certctl-io/certctl/internal/domain"
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authdomain "github.com/certctl-io/certctl/internal/domain/auth"
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"github.com/certctl-io/certctl/internal/repository"
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)
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// RoleService manages roles + role-permission grants.
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type RoleService struct {
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repo repository.RoleRepository
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permRepo repository.PermissionRepository
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authorizer *Authorizer
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audit AuditService
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}
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// NewRoleService constructs a RoleService.
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func NewRoleService(repo repository.RoleRepository, permRepo repository.PermissionRepository, authorizer *Authorizer, audit AuditService) *RoleService {
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return &RoleService{
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repo: repo,
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permRepo: permRepo,
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authorizer: authorizer,
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audit: audit,
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}
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}
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// List returns every role in the caller's tenant. Requires
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// `auth.role.list`.
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func (s *RoleService) List(ctx context.Context, caller *Caller) ([]*authdomain.Role, error) {
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if err := s.requirePermission(ctx, caller, "auth.role.list"); err != nil {
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return nil, err
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}
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tenantID := caller.TenantID
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if tenantID == "" {
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tenantID = authdomain.DefaultTenantID
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}
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return s.repo.List(ctx, tenantID)
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}
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// Get returns the role with the given ID. Requires `auth.role.list`.
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func (s *RoleService) Get(ctx context.Context, caller *Caller, id string) (*authdomain.Role, error) {
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if err := s.requirePermission(ctx, caller, "auth.role.list"); err != nil {
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return nil, err
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}
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return s.repo.Get(ctx, id)
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}
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// Create stores a new role. Requires `auth.role.create`.
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func (s *RoleService) Create(ctx context.Context, caller *Caller, role *authdomain.Role) error {
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if err := s.requirePermission(ctx, caller, "auth.role.create"); err != nil {
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return err
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}
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if role.TenantID == "" {
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role.TenantID = authdomain.DefaultTenantID
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}
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if err := s.repo.Create(ctx, role); err != nil {
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return err
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}
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s.recordAudit(ctx, caller, "role.create", "role", role.ID, map[string]interface{}{"name": role.Name, "tenant_id": role.TenantID})
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return nil
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}
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// Update modifies an existing role. Requires `auth.role.edit`.
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func (s *RoleService) Update(ctx context.Context, caller *Caller, role *authdomain.Role) error {
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if err := s.requirePermission(ctx, caller, "auth.role.edit"); err != nil {
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return err
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}
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if err := s.repo.Update(ctx, role); err != nil {
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return err
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}
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s.recordAudit(ctx, caller, "role.update", "role", role.ID, map[string]interface{}{"name": role.Name})
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return nil
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}
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// Delete removes a role. Requires `auth.role.delete`. Returns
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// repository.ErrAuthRoleInUse when active actor_roles still reference
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// the role (FK ON DELETE RESTRICT).
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func (s *RoleService) Delete(ctx context.Context, caller *Caller, id string) error {
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if err := s.requirePermission(ctx, caller, "auth.role.delete"); err != nil {
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return err
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}
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if err := s.repo.Delete(ctx, id); err != nil {
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return err
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}
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s.recordAudit(ctx, caller, "role.delete", "role", id, nil)
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return nil
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}
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// ListPermissions returns the (permission, scope) grants on the role.
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// Requires `auth.role.list`.
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func (s *RoleService) ListPermissions(ctx context.Context, caller *Caller, roleID string) ([]*authdomain.RolePermission, error) {
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if err := s.requirePermission(ctx, caller, "auth.role.list"); err != nil {
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return nil, err
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}
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return s.repo.ListPermissions(ctx, roleID)
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}
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// AddPermission grants a permission to a role at the given scope.
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// Requires `auth.role.edit`. Returns ErrInvalidPermission if the
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// permission name is not in the canonical catalogue.
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func (s *RoleService) AddPermission(ctx context.Context, caller *Caller, roleID, permissionName string, scopeType authdomain.ScopeType, scopeID *string) error {
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if err := s.requirePermission(ctx, caller, "auth.role.edit"); err != nil {
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return err
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}
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if !s.permRepo.IsCanonical(permissionName) {
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return fmt.Errorf("%w: %q", ErrInvalidPermission, permissionName)
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}
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perm, err := s.permRepo.GetByName(ctx, permissionName)
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if err != nil {
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return err
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}
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grant := &authdomain.RolePermission{
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RoleID: roleID,
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PermissionID: perm.ID,
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ScopeType: scopeType,
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ScopeID: scopeID,
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}
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if err := s.repo.AddPermission(ctx, grant); err != nil {
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return err
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}
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details := map[string]interface{}{
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"role_id": roleID,
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"permission": permissionName,
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"scope_type": string(scopeType),
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}
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if scopeID != nil {
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details["scope_id"] = *scopeID
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}
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s.recordAudit(ctx, caller, "role.permission.add", "role", roleID, details)
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return nil
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}
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// RemovePermission revokes a previously-granted permission from a role.
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// Requires `auth.role.edit`.
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func (s *RoleService) RemovePermission(ctx context.Context, caller *Caller, roleID, permissionName string, scopeType authdomain.ScopeType, scopeID *string) error {
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if err := s.requirePermission(ctx, caller, "auth.role.edit"); err != nil {
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return err
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}
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perm, err := s.permRepo.GetByName(ctx, permissionName)
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if err != nil {
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return err
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}
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grant := &authdomain.RolePermission{
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RoleID: roleID,
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PermissionID: perm.ID,
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ScopeType: scopeType,
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ScopeID: scopeID,
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}
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if err := s.repo.RemovePermission(ctx, grant); err != nil {
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return err
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}
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details := map[string]interface{}{
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"role_id": roleID,
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"permission": permissionName,
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"scope_type": string(scopeType),
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}
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if scopeID != nil {
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details["scope_id"] = *scopeID
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}
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s.recordAudit(ctx, caller, "role.permission.remove", "role", roleID, details)
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return nil
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}
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// requirePermission is the gate every public method runs first. System
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// callers bypass; everyone else must hold the named permission globally.
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// Returns ErrUnauthenticated when caller is nil, ErrForbidden when the
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// caller exists but lacks the permission.
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func (s *RoleService) requirePermission(ctx context.Context, caller *Caller, perm string) error {
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if caller == nil {
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return ErrUnauthenticated
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}
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if caller.IsSystem {
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return nil
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}
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tenantID := caller.TenantID
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if tenantID == "" {
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tenantID = authdomain.DefaultTenantID
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}
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ok, err := s.authorizer.CheckPermission(ctx, caller.ActorID, authdomain.ActorTypeValue(caller.ActorType), tenantID, perm, authdomain.ScopeTypeGlobal, nil)
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if err != nil {
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return err
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}
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if !ok {
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return fmt.Errorf("%w: %q", ErrForbidden, perm)
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}
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return nil
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}
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// recordAudit emits an audit row tied to the caller. Best-effort: audit
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// failures are logged via panic-recover but do not fail the operation.
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//
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// Bundle 1 Phase 8: every role-mutation is an authentication /
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// authorization event. The auditor role queries
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// /v1/audit?category=auth to surface this slice.
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func (s *RoleService) recordAudit(ctx context.Context, caller *Caller, action, resourceType, resourceID string, details map[string]interface{}) {
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if s.audit == nil || caller == nil {
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return
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}
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_ = s.audit.RecordEventWithCategory(ctx, caller.ActorID, caller.ActorType, action, domain.EventCategoryAuth, resourceType, resourceID, details)
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}
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// Ensure the compile-time pin: domain.ActorType is convertible to
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// authdomain.ActorTypeValue via string equality. If the underlying
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// types ever diverge this won't compile.
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var _ authdomain.ActorTypeValue = authdomain.ActorTypeValue(domain.ActorTypeAPIKey)
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