Files
certctl/internal/auth/bootstrap/service_test.go
T
shankar0123 3ef45e2ad4 auth-bundle-1 Phase 6-7-8: bootstrap path + scope-down CLI + auditor-role split
# Phase 6 — day-0 admin bootstrap

* internal/auth/bootstrap/ (new package): Strategy interface +
  EnvTokenStrategy with constant-time compare, one-shot consumption
  via sync.Mutex, optional admin-existence probe. Bundle 2's OIDC-
  first-admin will plug in alongside as an alternate Strategy.
* BootstrapService.ValidateAndMint: validates the operator's
  CERTCTL_BOOTSTRAP_TOKEN, mints a 32-byte (64-hex-char) random API
  key value, persists the SHA-256 hash to api_keys, grants r-admin
  via actor_roles, AddHashed's the runtime keystore so the just-
  minted key authenticates the next request without restart, and
  records bootstrap.consume to the audit trail with category=auth.
* internal/auth/keystore.go (new): KeyStore interface +
  StaticKeyStore (immutable env-var-only path) + MutableKeyStore
  (env-var keys + DB-loaded api_keys + runtime AddHashed). The auth
  middleware now consumes a KeyStore so the bootstrap path can
  extend the lookup table at runtime.
* migrations/000031_api_keys.up/down.sql: api_keys table with
  (id, name UNIQUE, key_hash UNIQUE, tenant_id, admin, created_by,
  created_at, expires_at, last_used_at). Idempotent.
* /v1/auth/bootstrap GET (probe) + POST (mint) — auth-exempt. Both
  routes documented in api/openapi.yaml + AuthExemptRouterRoutes
  allowlist updated. The token never leaves internal/auth/bootstrap;
  the minted plaintext key flows only into the HTTP response body.
* Startup warning emitted when CERTCTL_BOOTSTRAP_TOKEN is set AND
  admin actors already exist (config drift signal).
* Tests: 4 strategy invariants (empty token born disabled, wrong
  token=ErrInvalidToken without consumption, one-shot consumption,
  admin-exists closes path), 5 service tests (happy path + actor-
  name validation + propagation of strategy errors + nil-deps
  guard + 32-byte entropy budget), 8 HTTP-handler tests (status
  201/410/401/400 mapping + token-leak hygiene scan of slog +
  audit details + Location header). Token-leak test redirects
  slog.Default to a buffer for the test scope.

# Phase 7 — API-key migration + scope-down CLI

* GET /v1/auth/keys handler + service method ListKeys backed by
  ActorRoleRepository.ListDistinctActors. Returns one row per
  (actor_id, actor_type) pair with the slice of role IDs they hold.
  Permission: auth.role.list.
* internal/cli/auth_scope_down.go: AuthListKeys, AuthScopeDown
  (interactive), AuthScopeDownNonInteractive (JSON config),
  AuthScopeDownSuggest (--suggest with optional --apply). The
  synthetic actor-demo-anon is filtered out of every interactive /
  bulk path; non-interactive flow logs and skips it explicitly.
* SuggestRoleFromAuditEvents (pure function): walks 30 days of
  audit events per actor and returns the narrowest matching role
  (admin / mcp / viewer / agent / operator) plus a one-line reason.
  Classification: any admin-shaped action wins; otherwise all-MCP
  → mcp; all-read-only → viewer; all-agent-shaped → agent;
  otherwise operator. Test table pins all six classifications.
* CLI subcommand tree extended: 'auth keys list' + 'auth keys
  scope-down [--non-interactive <cfg>] [--suggest [--apply]]'.
* CHANGELOG.md leads v2.1.0 with the SECURITY: AUDIT YOUR API KEYS
  call-out + four flow examples.

# Phase 8 — auditor role + event_category column

* migrations/000032_audit_category.up/down.sql: ALTER TABLE
  audit_events ADD COLUMN event_category TEXT NOT NULL DEFAULT
  'cert_lifecycle' + CHECK constraint (cert_lifecycle/auth/config)
  + (event_category) and (event_category, timestamp DESC) indexes
  for the auditor-filter query path. WORM trigger from migration
  000018 continues to enforce append-only at the DB layer (DDL is
  not blocked).
* domain.AuditEvent gains EventCategory string (omitempty);
  domain.EventCategoryCertLifecycle / Auth / Config constants.
* AuditService.RecordEventWithCategory sibling of RecordEvent;
  legacy callers stay on RecordEvent (defaults to cert_lifecycle).
  Auth callers (RoleService, ActorRoleService, BootstrapService)
  switched to RecordEventWithCategory(..., 'auth', ...).
* GET /v1/audit?category=<cat>: handler accepts the optional query
  param, validates against the enum (400 on invalid value),
  dispatches through ListAuditEventsByCategory. OpenAPI updated
  with the new query param + AuditEvent.event_category schema.
* Postgres AuditRepository.Create now writes event_category;
  AuditRepository.List filters on it; AuditFilter.EventCategory
  gates the WHERE clause.
* Tests: 5 audit-category-filter HTTP tests (dispatch routing,
  back-compat fallback, 400 for invalid values, all 3 enum values
  accepted, page+category combine, JSON output surfaces the
  field). 3 auditor-role invariants (auditor holds exactly
  audit.read+audit.export, no mutating perms, disjoint from
  viewer except audit.read).

# Cross-phase wiring

* HandlerRegistry.Bootstrap field added; cmd/server/main.go wires
  the bootstrap service ahead of RegisterHandlers (extracted
  assembleNamedAPIKeys helper into auth_backfill.go, moved the
  keystore + bootstrap construction up alongside the auth repos).
* AuthCheckResolver / AuthActorRoleService extended with ListKeys
  to satisfy the Phase 7 surface; existing fakes updated.
* fakeAudit + mockAuditService stubs in tests gain
  RecordEventWithCategory + ListAuditEventsByCategory; existing
  tests untouched.

# Verifications

* gofmt -l: clean across every modified file.
* go vet ./...: clean.
* staticcheck across internal/auth + handler + router + cli +
  service + repository + cmd + domain: clean.
* go test -short -count=1: green across every Bundle-1-touched
  package — internal/auth (incl. bootstrap), internal/api/handler,
  internal/api/router, internal/cli, internal/service/auth,
  internal/service, internal/domain/auth, internal/repository/postgres,
  cmd/server, cmd/cli, plus internal/scheduler, internal/api/middleware,
  cmd/agent, internal/mcp.
2026-05-09 20:15:43 +00:00

216 lines
7.0 KiB
Go

package bootstrap
import (
"context"
"crypto/sha256"
"encoding/hex"
"errors"
"strings"
"testing"
"github.com/certctl-io/certctl/internal/domain"
authdomain "github.com/certctl-io/certctl/internal/domain/auth"
)
type fakeMinter struct {
created []*authdomain.APIKey
createErr error
}
func (f *fakeMinter) Create(_ context.Context, k *authdomain.APIKey) error {
if f.createErr != nil {
return f.createErr
}
f.created = append(f.created, k)
return nil
}
func (f *fakeMinter) GetByName(_ context.Context, _ string) (*authdomain.APIKey, error) {
return nil, errors.New("not implemented for these tests")
}
type fakeGranter struct {
grants []*authdomain.ActorRole
err error
}
func (f *fakeGranter) Grant(_ context.Context, ar *authdomain.ActorRole) error {
f.grants = append(f.grants, ar)
return f.err
}
type fakeAudit struct {
calls []map[string]interface{}
category string
}
func (f *fakeAudit) RecordEventWithCategory(_ context.Context, _ string, _ domain.ActorType, _ string, eventCategory, _ string, _ string, details map[string]interface{}) error {
f.calls = append(f.calls, details)
f.category = eventCategory
return nil
}
type fakeKeyStore struct {
added []addedEntry
}
type addedEntry struct {
name string
hash string
admin bool
}
func (f *fakeKeyStore) AddHashed(name, hash string, admin bool) {
f.added = append(f.added, addedEntry{name: name, hash: hash, admin: admin})
}
func sha(s string) string {
h := sha256.Sum256([]byte(s))
return hex.EncodeToString(h[:])
}
// TestService_ValidateAndMint_HappyPath pins the load-bearing flow:
// valid token → strategy consumed → api_keys row created → admin role
// granted → keystore updated → audit row recorded → result carries the
// plaintext key + the persisted APIKey row.
func TestService_ValidateAndMint_HappyPath(t *testing.T) {
strategy := NewEnvTokenStrategy("the-token", nil)
minter := &fakeMinter{}
granter := &fakeGranter{}
audit := &fakeAudit{}
store := &fakeKeyStore{}
svc := NewService(strategy, minter, granter, audit, store, sha)
result, err := svc.ValidateAndMint(context.Background(), "the-token", "first-admin")
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("ValidateAndMint err = %v", err)
}
if result == nil || result.KeyValue == "" {
t.Fatalf("result.KeyValue empty")
}
if len(result.KeyValue) < 32 {
t.Errorf("KeyValue length = %d, want >= 32 (entropy budget)", len(result.KeyValue))
}
if !strategy.IsConsumed() {
t.Errorf("strategy not consumed after successful mint")
}
if len(minter.created) != 1 {
t.Fatalf("minter.Create call count = %d, want 1", len(minter.created))
}
apiKey := minter.created[0]
if apiKey.Name != "first-admin" || !apiKey.Admin || apiKey.CreatedBy != "bootstrap" {
t.Errorf("api_key wrong fields: %+v", apiKey)
}
if apiKey.KeyHash != sha(result.KeyValue) {
t.Errorf("KeyHash != sha(KeyValue); persistence shape is wrong")
}
if len(granter.grants) != 1 {
t.Fatalf("granter.Grant call count = %d, want 1", len(granter.grants))
}
if granter.grants[0].RoleID != authdomain.RoleIDAdmin {
t.Errorf("granted role = %q, want %q", granter.grants[0].RoleID, authdomain.RoleIDAdmin)
}
if granter.grants[0].ActorID != "first-admin" {
t.Errorf("granted actor = %q, want first-admin", granter.grants[0].ActorID)
}
if granter.grants[0].GrantedBy != "bootstrap" {
t.Errorf("GrantedBy = %q, want bootstrap", granter.grants[0].GrantedBy)
}
if len(store.added) != 1 || store.added[0].name != "first-admin" || !store.added[0].admin {
t.Errorf("keystore.AddHashed not called with first-admin/admin=true: %+v", store.added)
}
if store.added[0].hash != apiKey.KeyHash {
t.Errorf("keystore hash != api_key hash; runtime auth would fail")
}
if len(audit.calls) != 1 {
t.Fatalf("audit RecordEventWithCategory calls = %d, want 1", len(audit.calls))
}
if audit.calls[0]["actor_name"] != "first-admin" {
t.Errorf("audit details lost actor_name: %+v", audit.calls[0])
}
if audit.category != "auth" {
t.Errorf("audit category = %q, want auth", audit.category)
}
}
// TestService_ValidateAndMint_RejectsInvalidActorName pins the
// ErrInvalidActorName mapping (HTTP 400). Strict charset prevents
// log-injection / lookalike actor names.
func TestService_ValidateAndMint_RejectsInvalidActorName(t *testing.T) {
svc := NewService(NewEnvTokenStrategy("t", nil), &fakeMinter{}, &fakeGranter{}, nil, nil, sha)
cases := []string{
"", // empty
"AB", // too short
"Has-Caps", // uppercase rejected
"contains spaces", // space rejected
strings.Repeat("a", 65), // 65 chars > 64 max
"newline\nsuffix", // log injection
"💀-evil", // non-ASCII
}
for _, name := range cases {
_, err := svc.ValidateAndMint(context.Background(), "t", name)
if !errors.Is(err, ErrInvalidActorName) {
t.Errorf("name=%q err = %v, want ErrInvalidActorName", name, err)
}
}
}
// TestService_ValidateAndMint_PropagatesStrategyError pins that a
// failed Validate (wrong token / disabled / probe error) propagates
// without persisting anything.
func TestService_ValidateAndMint_PropagatesStrategyError(t *testing.T) {
strategy := NewEnvTokenStrategy("the-token", nil)
minter := &fakeMinter{}
granter := &fakeGranter{}
store := &fakeKeyStore{}
svc := NewService(strategy, minter, granter, nil, store, sha)
_, err := svc.ValidateAndMint(context.Background(), "wrong-token", "first-admin")
if !errors.Is(err, ErrInvalidToken) {
t.Fatalf("err = %v, want ErrInvalidToken", err)
}
if len(minter.created) != 0 || len(granter.grants) != 0 || len(store.added) != 0 {
t.Errorf("persistence side effects fired despite Validate failure: minter=%d grants=%d keystore=%d", len(minter.created), len(granter.grants), len(store.added))
}
}
// TestService_ValidateAndMint_NilDepsReturnDisabled exercises the
// no-strategy / no-repo guard. Returns ErrDisabled (handler maps to
// 410). Belt-and-braces for partially-wired test or future call sites.
func TestService_ValidateAndMint_NilDepsReturnDisabled(t *testing.T) {
cases := []struct {
name string
svc *Service
}{
{"nil service", nil},
{"nil strategy", NewService(nil, &fakeMinter{}, &fakeGranter{}, nil, nil, sha)},
{"nil minter", NewService(NewEnvTokenStrategy("t", nil), nil, &fakeGranter{}, nil, nil, sha)},
{"nil granter", NewService(NewEnvTokenStrategy("t", nil), &fakeMinter{}, nil, nil, nil, sha)},
}
for _, tc := range cases {
_, err := tc.svc.ValidateAndMint(context.Background(), "t", "first-admin")
if !errors.Is(err, ErrDisabled) {
t.Errorf("%s: err = %v, want ErrDisabled", tc.name, err)
}
}
}
// TestService_GenerateAPIKey_HighEntropy pins the generated key shape:
// 64 hex chars (32 random bytes). Belt-and-braces against future
// refactors that might shrink the entropy budget.
func TestService_GenerateAPIKey_HighEntropy(t *testing.T) {
seen := map[string]bool{}
for i := 0; i < 100; i++ {
k, err := generateAPIKey()
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("iter %d: %v", i, err)
}
if len(k) != 64 {
t.Errorf("len = %d, want 64", len(k))
}
if seen[k] {
t.Errorf("key collision in 100 iters — entropy budget regressed")
}
seen[k] = true
}
}