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# Phase 6 — day-0 admin bootstrap * internal/auth/bootstrap/ (new package): Strategy interface + EnvTokenStrategy with constant-time compare, one-shot consumption via sync.Mutex, optional admin-existence probe. Bundle 2's OIDC- first-admin will plug in alongside as an alternate Strategy. * BootstrapService.ValidateAndMint: validates the operator's CERTCTL_BOOTSTRAP_TOKEN, mints a 32-byte (64-hex-char) random API key value, persists the SHA-256 hash to api_keys, grants r-admin via actor_roles, AddHashed's the runtime keystore so the just- minted key authenticates the next request without restart, and records bootstrap.consume to the audit trail with category=auth. * internal/auth/keystore.go (new): KeyStore interface + StaticKeyStore (immutable env-var-only path) + MutableKeyStore (env-var keys + DB-loaded api_keys + runtime AddHashed). The auth middleware now consumes a KeyStore so the bootstrap path can extend the lookup table at runtime. * migrations/000031_api_keys.up/down.sql: api_keys table with (id, name UNIQUE, key_hash UNIQUE, tenant_id, admin, created_by, created_at, expires_at, last_used_at). Idempotent. * /v1/auth/bootstrap GET (probe) + POST (mint) — auth-exempt. Both routes documented in api/openapi.yaml + AuthExemptRouterRoutes allowlist updated. The token never leaves internal/auth/bootstrap; the minted plaintext key flows only into the HTTP response body. * Startup warning emitted when CERTCTL_BOOTSTRAP_TOKEN is set AND admin actors already exist (config drift signal). * Tests: 4 strategy invariants (empty token born disabled, wrong token=ErrInvalidToken without consumption, one-shot consumption, admin-exists closes path), 5 service tests (happy path + actor- name validation + propagation of strategy errors + nil-deps guard + 32-byte entropy budget), 8 HTTP-handler tests (status 201/410/401/400 mapping + token-leak hygiene scan of slog + audit details + Location header). Token-leak test redirects slog.Default to a buffer for the test scope. # Phase 7 — API-key migration + scope-down CLI * GET /v1/auth/keys handler + service method ListKeys backed by ActorRoleRepository.ListDistinctActors. Returns one row per (actor_id, actor_type) pair with the slice of role IDs they hold. Permission: auth.role.list. * internal/cli/auth_scope_down.go: AuthListKeys, AuthScopeDown (interactive), AuthScopeDownNonInteractive (JSON config), AuthScopeDownSuggest (--suggest with optional --apply). The synthetic actor-demo-anon is filtered out of every interactive / bulk path; non-interactive flow logs and skips it explicitly. * SuggestRoleFromAuditEvents (pure function): walks 30 days of audit events per actor and returns the narrowest matching role (admin / mcp / viewer / agent / operator) plus a one-line reason. Classification: any admin-shaped action wins; otherwise all-MCP → mcp; all-read-only → viewer; all-agent-shaped → agent; otherwise operator. Test table pins all six classifications. * CLI subcommand tree extended: 'auth keys list' + 'auth keys scope-down [--non-interactive <cfg>] [--suggest [--apply]]'. * CHANGELOG.md leads v2.1.0 with the SECURITY: AUDIT YOUR API KEYS call-out + four flow examples. # Phase 8 — auditor role + event_category column * migrations/000032_audit_category.up/down.sql: ALTER TABLE audit_events ADD COLUMN event_category TEXT NOT NULL DEFAULT 'cert_lifecycle' + CHECK constraint (cert_lifecycle/auth/config) + (event_category) and (event_category, timestamp DESC) indexes for the auditor-filter query path. WORM trigger from migration 000018 continues to enforce append-only at the DB layer (DDL is not blocked). * domain.AuditEvent gains EventCategory string (omitempty); domain.EventCategoryCertLifecycle / Auth / Config constants. * AuditService.RecordEventWithCategory sibling of RecordEvent; legacy callers stay on RecordEvent (defaults to cert_lifecycle). Auth callers (RoleService, ActorRoleService, BootstrapService) switched to RecordEventWithCategory(..., 'auth', ...). * GET /v1/audit?category=<cat>: handler accepts the optional query param, validates against the enum (400 on invalid value), dispatches through ListAuditEventsByCategory. OpenAPI updated with the new query param + AuditEvent.event_category schema. * Postgres AuditRepository.Create now writes event_category; AuditRepository.List filters on it; AuditFilter.EventCategory gates the WHERE clause. * Tests: 5 audit-category-filter HTTP tests (dispatch routing, back-compat fallback, 400 for invalid values, all 3 enum values accepted, page+category combine, JSON output surfaces the field). 3 auditor-role invariants (auditor holds exactly audit.read+audit.export, no mutating perms, disjoint from viewer except audit.read). # Cross-phase wiring * HandlerRegistry.Bootstrap field added; cmd/server/main.go wires the bootstrap service ahead of RegisterHandlers (extracted assembleNamedAPIKeys helper into auth_backfill.go, moved the keystore + bootstrap construction up alongside the auth repos). * AuthCheckResolver / AuthActorRoleService extended with ListKeys to satisfy the Phase 7 surface; existing fakes updated. * fakeAudit + mockAuditService stubs in tests gain RecordEventWithCategory + ListAuditEventsByCategory; existing tests untouched. # Verifications * gofmt -l: clean across every modified file. * go vet ./...: clean. * staticcheck across internal/auth + handler + router + cli + service + repository + cmd + domain: clean. * go test -short -count=1: green across every Bundle-1-touched package — internal/auth (incl. bootstrap), internal/api/handler, internal/api/router, internal/cli, internal/service/auth, internal/service, internal/domain/auth, internal/repository/postgres, cmd/server, cmd/cli, plus internal/scheduler, internal/api/middleware, cmd/agent, internal/mcp.
216 lines
7.0 KiB
Go
216 lines
7.0 KiB
Go
package bootstrap
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import (
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"context"
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"crypto/sha256"
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"encoding/hex"
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"errors"
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"strings"
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"testing"
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"github.com/certctl-io/certctl/internal/domain"
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authdomain "github.com/certctl-io/certctl/internal/domain/auth"
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)
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type fakeMinter struct {
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created []*authdomain.APIKey
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createErr error
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}
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func (f *fakeMinter) Create(_ context.Context, k *authdomain.APIKey) error {
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if f.createErr != nil {
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return f.createErr
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}
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f.created = append(f.created, k)
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return nil
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}
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func (f *fakeMinter) GetByName(_ context.Context, _ string) (*authdomain.APIKey, error) {
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return nil, errors.New("not implemented for these tests")
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}
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type fakeGranter struct {
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grants []*authdomain.ActorRole
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err error
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}
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func (f *fakeGranter) Grant(_ context.Context, ar *authdomain.ActorRole) error {
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f.grants = append(f.grants, ar)
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return f.err
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}
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type fakeAudit struct {
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calls []map[string]interface{}
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category string
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}
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func (f *fakeAudit) RecordEventWithCategory(_ context.Context, _ string, _ domain.ActorType, _ string, eventCategory, _ string, _ string, details map[string]interface{}) error {
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f.calls = append(f.calls, details)
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f.category = eventCategory
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return nil
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}
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type fakeKeyStore struct {
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added []addedEntry
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}
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type addedEntry struct {
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name string
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hash string
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admin bool
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}
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func (f *fakeKeyStore) AddHashed(name, hash string, admin bool) {
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f.added = append(f.added, addedEntry{name: name, hash: hash, admin: admin})
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}
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func sha(s string) string {
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h := sha256.Sum256([]byte(s))
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return hex.EncodeToString(h[:])
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}
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// TestService_ValidateAndMint_HappyPath pins the load-bearing flow:
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// valid token → strategy consumed → api_keys row created → admin role
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// granted → keystore updated → audit row recorded → result carries the
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// plaintext key + the persisted APIKey row.
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func TestService_ValidateAndMint_HappyPath(t *testing.T) {
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strategy := NewEnvTokenStrategy("the-token", nil)
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minter := &fakeMinter{}
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granter := &fakeGranter{}
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audit := &fakeAudit{}
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store := &fakeKeyStore{}
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svc := NewService(strategy, minter, granter, audit, store, sha)
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result, err := svc.ValidateAndMint(context.Background(), "the-token", "first-admin")
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if err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("ValidateAndMint err = %v", err)
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}
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if result == nil || result.KeyValue == "" {
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t.Fatalf("result.KeyValue empty")
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}
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if len(result.KeyValue) < 32 {
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t.Errorf("KeyValue length = %d, want >= 32 (entropy budget)", len(result.KeyValue))
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}
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if !strategy.IsConsumed() {
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t.Errorf("strategy not consumed after successful mint")
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}
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if len(minter.created) != 1 {
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t.Fatalf("minter.Create call count = %d, want 1", len(minter.created))
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}
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apiKey := minter.created[0]
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if apiKey.Name != "first-admin" || !apiKey.Admin || apiKey.CreatedBy != "bootstrap" {
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t.Errorf("api_key wrong fields: %+v", apiKey)
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}
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if apiKey.KeyHash != sha(result.KeyValue) {
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t.Errorf("KeyHash != sha(KeyValue); persistence shape is wrong")
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}
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if len(granter.grants) != 1 {
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t.Fatalf("granter.Grant call count = %d, want 1", len(granter.grants))
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}
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if granter.grants[0].RoleID != authdomain.RoleIDAdmin {
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t.Errorf("granted role = %q, want %q", granter.grants[0].RoleID, authdomain.RoleIDAdmin)
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}
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if granter.grants[0].ActorID != "first-admin" {
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t.Errorf("granted actor = %q, want first-admin", granter.grants[0].ActorID)
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}
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if granter.grants[0].GrantedBy != "bootstrap" {
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t.Errorf("GrantedBy = %q, want bootstrap", granter.grants[0].GrantedBy)
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}
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if len(store.added) != 1 || store.added[0].name != "first-admin" || !store.added[0].admin {
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t.Errorf("keystore.AddHashed not called with first-admin/admin=true: %+v", store.added)
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}
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if store.added[0].hash != apiKey.KeyHash {
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t.Errorf("keystore hash != api_key hash; runtime auth would fail")
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}
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if len(audit.calls) != 1 {
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t.Fatalf("audit RecordEventWithCategory calls = %d, want 1", len(audit.calls))
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}
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if audit.calls[0]["actor_name"] != "first-admin" {
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t.Errorf("audit details lost actor_name: %+v", audit.calls[0])
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}
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if audit.category != "auth" {
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t.Errorf("audit category = %q, want auth", audit.category)
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}
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}
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// TestService_ValidateAndMint_RejectsInvalidActorName pins the
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// ErrInvalidActorName mapping (HTTP 400). Strict charset prevents
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// log-injection / lookalike actor names.
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func TestService_ValidateAndMint_RejectsInvalidActorName(t *testing.T) {
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svc := NewService(NewEnvTokenStrategy("t", nil), &fakeMinter{}, &fakeGranter{}, nil, nil, sha)
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cases := []string{
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"", // empty
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"AB", // too short
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"Has-Caps", // uppercase rejected
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"contains spaces", // space rejected
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strings.Repeat("a", 65), // 65 chars > 64 max
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"newline\nsuffix", // log injection
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"💀-evil", // non-ASCII
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}
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for _, name := range cases {
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_, err := svc.ValidateAndMint(context.Background(), "t", name)
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if !errors.Is(err, ErrInvalidActorName) {
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t.Errorf("name=%q err = %v, want ErrInvalidActorName", name, err)
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}
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}
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}
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// TestService_ValidateAndMint_PropagatesStrategyError pins that a
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// failed Validate (wrong token / disabled / probe error) propagates
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// without persisting anything.
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func TestService_ValidateAndMint_PropagatesStrategyError(t *testing.T) {
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strategy := NewEnvTokenStrategy("the-token", nil)
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minter := &fakeMinter{}
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granter := &fakeGranter{}
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store := &fakeKeyStore{}
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svc := NewService(strategy, minter, granter, nil, store, sha)
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_, err := svc.ValidateAndMint(context.Background(), "wrong-token", "first-admin")
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if !errors.Is(err, ErrInvalidToken) {
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t.Fatalf("err = %v, want ErrInvalidToken", err)
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}
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if len(minter.created) != 0 || len(granter.grants) != 0 || len(store.added) != 0 {
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t.Errorf("persistence side effects fired despite Validate failure: minter=%d grants=%d keystore=%d", len(minter.created), len(granter.grants), len(store.added))
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}
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}
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// TestService_ValidateAndMint_NilDepsReturnDisabled exercises the
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// no-strategy / no-repo guard. Returns ErrDisabled (handler maps to
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// 410). Belt-and-braces for partially-wired test or future call sites.
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func TestService_ValidateAndMint_NilDepsReturnDisabled(t *testing.T) {
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cases := []struct {
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name string
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svc *Service
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}{
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{"nil service", nil},
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{"nil strategy", NewService(nil, &fakeMinter{}, &fakeGranter{}, nil, nil, sha)},
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{"nil minter", NewService(NewEnvTokenStrategy("t", nil), nil, &fakeGranter{}, nil, nil, sha)},
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{"nil granter", NewService(NewEnvTokenStrategy("t", nil), &fakeMinter{}, nil, nil, nil, sha)},
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}
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for _, tc := range cases {
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_, err := tc.svc.ValidateAndMint(context.Background(), "t", "first-admin")
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if !errors.Is(err, ErrDisabled) {
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t.Errorf("%s: err = %v, want ErrDisabled", tc.name, err)
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}
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}
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}
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// TestService_GenerateAPIKey_HighEntropy pins the generated key shape:
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// 64 hex chars (32 random bytes). Belt-and-braces against future
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// refactors that might shrink the entropy budget.
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func TestService_GenerateAPIKey_HighEntropy(t *testing.T) {
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seen := map[string]bool{}
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for i := 0; i < 100; i++ {
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k, err := generateAPIKey()
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if err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("iter %d: %v", i, err)
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}
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if len(k) != 64 {
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t.Errorf("len = %d, want 64", len(k))
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}
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if seen[k] {
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t.Errorf("key collision in 100 iters — entropy budget regressed")
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}
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seen[k] = true
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}
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}
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