The SHA-256 check proves the ZIP is the one version.json names, but that
manifest lives in the same container as the ZIP: it cannot outlive a
compromise of the download host. The expected publisher travels inside this
script, which the loader verified before running it, so the chain from the
file an administrator assigns to the process that starts is publisher-anchored
end to end.
Install-AutopilotMonitor.ps1 v2.4 -> v2.5:
- Get-UnverifiedAgentBinaries checks every AutopilotMonitor.*.exe/.dll in the
extracted payload for status Valid and the same subject pin the loader
carries; the gate runs immediately before --install and throws on any
rejection, exactly like the hash check.
- Third-party assemblies keep their own publisher's signature and are not
checked: System.Management.Automation.dll ships unsigned, so a gate over all
files would refuse the live payload.
- An extracted folder with no binary of ours is a rejection, not a pass.
- The SHA-256 manifest check is unchanged and still runs first: it proves the
bytes, the signature proves the author.
Verified against the live payload 2.0.1454 (all five of our PEs Valid and
glueckkanja AG, gate passes); appending one byte to AutopilotMonitor.Shared.dll
makes it reject. Pester 55/55.
The portal privacy and about pages carried the pre-signing wording and are
corrected in the same change.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
A quiet third line in the panel header ("Latest agent version 2.0.1452",
faint, the number monospaced) reads from the existing config/latest-versions
endpoint. The monospaced string is the same one the session list shows in its
"Agent Version" column, so a reader can tell at a glance whether their fleet
runs the latest agent.
Portal and signed-in only: the endpoint is AuthenticatedUser, and the public
site has no session list to compare against. The gate sits on the mount of the
small component, so the landing page never even issues the request; a missing
version renders nothing.
A tag is a mutable pointer owned by the action's publisher. These jobs are not
ordinary CI: they hold the code-signing Key Vault token (D-223), the federated
storage credentials (D-222), and combine-rules.yml holds a contents:write token
that pushes to main. Whoever could repoint v7 would run code with all of that.
azure/login and Azure/functions-action were already pinned; the actions/* and
github/codeql-action references were not, on the usual argument that GitHub owns
them and shares the runner's trust boundary. That argument does not survive the
fact that they run in the same jobs as the signing identity. All seven are now
pinned by SHA with the version in a trailing comment -- the comment is what keeps
the line reviewable, and Dependabot rewrites both together.
action-pins.yml is the guard: pins nobody enforces rot, and no review reliably
catches one @v4 added to a 200-line workflow. It lives in its own workflow because
ci.yml deliberately ignores changes to the other workflow files, so a job placed
there would stay silent for exactly the commits it must inspect. Like CI it reports
rather than blocks -- main is unprotected; making it binding would mean adding it
as a required status check, which is a branch-protection decision.
Verified both directions: 49 references pass against the repo, and a fixture with
@v7, @main and a bare SHA fails with three annotations while the local reusable
workflow refs are skipped.
Two floating tool versions closed while here. wix went from the range 5.* to 5.0.2
-- it writes the bytes of the MSI customers install, where AzureSignTool only signs
them. ajv was the worse one: unpinned, and npm runs lifecycle scripts at install,
so a hijacked release would have executed with the push token before a single rule
was validated; now exact versions with --ignore-scripts.
Line endings: sed -i rewrote the workflow files as LF. Git normalises on commit, so
the content diff is unaffected and indexnow-notify.yml carries no change at all.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
The portal showed the two-stage bootstrap output ending in ...[truncated]. That marker
comes from the agent, not from the web view: the stdout is cut at capture time, so no
amount of UI space brings the rest back.
Measured over 1,486 script outputs in the fleet (2026-08-25..09-08): median 39, p90 644,
max 1,501 chars, and the 2,048 cap had never been hit -- the maximum was our own
one-stage bootstrap. The loader preamble of ~460 chars pushed exactly that output over
the edge, i.e. this is a consequence of D-224 and it hit the one output an operator
actually reads.
8,192 covers the realistic worst case (download retries plus relax logging, ~2,700) and
stays 4x below the 32K-char Table Storage property limit that bounds the event
downstream. Other scripts are unaffected in practice: p90 is 644 chars.
Reaches the fleet with the next agent release.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
The blobs carry Content-Type: text/plain and no Content-Disposition, so every browser
renders them inline -- the documented "download the bootstrapper script" step turns into
"select this text and save it yourself", with whatever the editor then does to the line
endings and the signature block.
x-ms-blob-content-disposition makes the link a download in every browser, which is a
server-side fact rather than a per-browser hint in the docs. Command-line clients (the
loader, the MSI runner, curl) ignore the header, so nothing on the device path changes.
Metadata only: the script bytes are untouched, so no version bump and the bump guard
still sees the published copies as current.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
The full subject of an EV certificate is a line of street address and registration
numbers and pushed the useful part of the log line off the screen. The CN answers the
question the log has to answer. The full subject is still logged in the one case where it
is the finding itself: a valid signature from a publisher that is not us.
Loader 1.1 -> 1.2; a Pester case pins the short form. Suite on PS 5.1: 45/45.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
bootstrap-loader.log is new with the two-stage bootstrap and told the diag tooling
nothing so far. Names which channel a device was assigned: the loader logs there when
assigned directly, and to bootstrap-msi.log when it runs from the MDM-LOB MSI.
Takes effect with the next MCP deploy.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Invoke-BootstrapDownload.ps1 and Start-AutopilotMonitor.ps1 had become the same script:
download the current installer, run it, log, always exit 0. The MSI copy additionally
downloaded and executed WITHOUT verifying what it got, which is exactly the gap the loader
was written to close. The MSI is now packaging only -- it installs and runs the same file
that is assigned directly in Intune, and both delivery channels get publisher verification
from one implementation.
Dropped from the MSI path: its own Deployed-marker check. That guard lives in stage 2 and
runs there anyway, so the only cost is one download on a device that is already deployed.
Kept: the log file name. bootstrap-msi.log is what the diagnostics tooling keys on to tell
the MDM-LOB channel apart from the Intune script channel, so the loader takes -LogFileName
(default bootstrap-loader.log) and the custom action passes bootstrap-msi.log. A Pester
test now pins that contract across the two files -- renaming the parameter on either side
would leave the MSI channel logging under the wrong name.
Package version 1.0.2 -> 1.1.0 so Intune LOB update detection sees the new payload, and a
new component GUID because the key path file changed.
Loader 1.0 -> 1.1. Bootstrap suite on Windows PowerShell 5.1: 44/44.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
scripts/ at the repo root is the customer surface: everything under
Bootstrap/ and CustomerSetup/ is published to the download container by
Publish-BootstrapScripts.ps1, Authenticode-signed and version-gated. The
error-code generator is a maintainer tool no workflow runs, so it diluted
that invariant. .github/scripts/ was not the alternative -- it holds only
helpers a workflow step invokes, and unlike guardrails-in-sync and
shared-manifests-in-sync the catalog has no CI drift gate (the generator
needs IME_ENUMS_JSON from operator tooling and live MS Learn fetches).
REPO_ROOT stays ../.. at the new depth, so only the documented path moved:
the generator header and README, the C# and TypeScript comments, the test
summary, and the description header of error-codes.json together with the
generator literal that emits it (the two must stay identical or the next
regeneration diffs). The web sync re-ran clean at 607 entries with no
change to utils/error-codes.json, which drops the header.
MSI carries an Authenticode signature like any PE, so the same identity and the same
ordering rules apply: signing identity logs in first and only for the Key Vault token,
the storage login stays last, and no environment: on the job.
The embedded Invoke-BootstrapDownload.ps1 is signed BEFORE wix build -- wix embeds the
file as it finds it, so signing afterwards would leave the copy inside the MSI unsigned,
and a device under an AllSigned policy needs the runner to carry its own signature.
The MSI is signed after the build and before the hash and the upload, then both files are
verified (Valid, timestamped, optional publisher pin) while nothing is published yet.
The provenance attestation now also skips runs that upload nothing.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Public repo: keep the reasoning that a later change could break -- signing must precede
the release hashes, the job must never carry an environment, the timestamp is not
optional -- and drop the rest. Comments only, no behaviour change.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
The ',' operator elsewhere in this file exists because PowerShell unrolls an array
RETURNED from a function; a property assignment does not unroll, so it wrapped the
byte[] in an Object[] of length 1 and the upload failed converting it back. Signing
itself was fine -- run 34253331703 signed all six scripts and uploaded none, so nothing
reached the download alias.
Added the invariant that would have caught it: signed bytes must be longer than the
unsigned form, since a signature only ever adds.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Start-AutopilotMonitor.ps1 is the new stage 1 -- the file an administrator assigns in
Intune. It carries no enrollment logic: it downloads the published installer, verifies its
Authenticode signature, and runs it in the same process, passing through every remaining
argument. Assigning the installer directly stays supported and unchanged.
The point of the split is that the customer-held artifact stops changing. Today every
bootstrap change forces customers to replace their Intune copy, so the fleet runs a
distribution of script versions we do not control. It is also what makes script signing
worth doing: signing a file that gets swapped by hand each release is a one-off gain,
signing a loader that never changes is permanent.
The loader is deliberately minimal, because it is the one piece that cannot be fixed
remotely -- every guard placed in it would be frozen for years. All guards stay in stage 2.
Verification pins the certificate SUBJECT, never a thumbprint: certificates get renewed and
a deployed loader cannot be, so a thumbprint pin would strand the fleet at the next
renewal. A hash oracle was rejected for a different reason -- it would have to be fetched
from the same host as the script, so it could not survive a compromise of that host, while
the expected publisher travels inside the loader.
Fail-closed on verification, fail-soft on exit: nothing runs without a valid signature from
us (running unverified code as SYSTEM is the risk being removed here), but the loader still
exits 0, because a device without monitoring is acceptable and a failed enrollment step is
not. The accepted cost is that a device which can never fetch or verify stays silent.
Publisher changes:
- every published script is signed (loader, installer, both -Dev renders,
Test-ShouldBootstrapAgent, Grant-AutopilotMonitorAddOn), and signing is the LAST
transformation: it covers exactly the CRLF/UTF-8 bytes Get-PublishBytes produced, so
nothing may normalise or re-encode them afterwards.
- signing is mandatory for a real publish. Only -DryRun may run unsigned, because the PR
gate executes the publisher without any Azure login.
- comparisons against a published copy strip the signature block first. A timestamped
signature differs on every run, so without stripping the version-bump guard and the
drift check would report a change for every unchanged script.
- the bump guard became Assert-VersionBump and now covers the loader as well.
- version.json gains loaderVersion. Additive, no consumer yet: stage 2 is current by
construction, so only stage 1's version says anything about a customer's Intune copy.
- -SignedOutputDir writes the exact uploaded bytes for the CI artifact, in a dry run too --
that is how a signed script gets inspected before it reaches anyone.
publish-scripts.yml logs in with the signing identity first and only to fetch the Key Vault
token (azure/login sets the default az account and the storage login has to be the one that
stays), then publishes and offers the signed scripts as an artifact. build-agent.yml passes
the same parameters on a stable cutover.
Tests: 14 new Pester cases, including that a validly signed script from a FOREIGN publisher
is refused -- that is what an attacker with any code-signing certificate can produce. Full
bootstrap suite on Windows PowerShell 5.1: 43/43.
Not covered: the MSI runner still downloads stage 2 without verifying it, and the customer
docs still describe the direct assignment only.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
A dispatch with upload_blob=false and create_release=false publishes nothing, so the
Sigstore attestation would write a permanent public transparency-log entry for bytes
nobody ever receives. The step now runs only when the run actually ships something.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Every assembly we author -- AutopilotMonitor.Agent.exe, AutopilotMonitor.SummaryDialog.exe
and the three AutopilotMonitor.*.dll beside them -- is signed with AzureSignTool (pinned
7.0.1) against a certificate in the corporate code-signing Key Vault, SHA-256 file digest
plus an RFC-3161 timestamp. Third-party assemblies keep their own publisher's signature.
The position of the step is load-bearing: signing rewrites the PE file, so it has to run
before the staging copy, the ZIP and every SHA-256 in "Create release artifact". Those
hashes are the bootstrap's integrity oracle (version.json, AdminConfiguration) -- signing
after hashing would publish hashes that no downloaded file can ever match.
The signing identity is a SECOND federated principal in the same tenant and logs in FIRST,
only to fetch a Key Vault token; the storage login of D-222 follows and owns the az context
from there, because azure/login sets the default account and the last login wins. Both
federated credentials carry the subject repo:okieselbach/AutopilotMonitor:ref:refs/heads/main,
so this job must never be given a GitHub 'environment:' -- that rewrites the OIDC subject
claim and would break BOTH logins at once.
No unsigned fallback and no dispatch input to skip signing: a missing repository variable,
a Key Vault failure or a non-zero azuresigntool exit code fails the run before anything is
published. azuresigntool is a native tool, so $LASTEXITCODE is checked explicitly --
PowerShell does not throw on a non-zero exit, and a silently unsigned release is exactly
the outcome signing exists to prevent.
Verification runs against the STAGED bytes, not the build output: every AutopilotMonitor.*
PE in the ZIP must be Valid, must carry a timestamp (without one the signature dies with
the certificate) and all of them must share one signing certificate. Setting the optional
repository variable CODE_SIGN_EXPECTED_SUBJECT additionally pins the publisher, so the gate
proves "signed by us" instead of "signed by someone trusted".
The build provenance attestation now covers the ZIP and both EXEs, so an extracted binary
can be verified without the ZIP. Authenticode and the attestation answer different
questions and both stay: who published this binary (offline, what Windows, SmartScreen and
WDAC evaluate) versus which build produced these exact bytes (gh attestation verify).
Not covered here: the customer bootstrap script (its signature block changes the published
bytes and must follow the dev render; see B-57c, the two-stage loader), the bootstrap MSI,
and the local build.ps1 path, which from now on produces unsigned bits.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Every storage write against autopilotmonitoreu -- build-counter CAS, agent ZIP and MSI,
version manifests, customer bootstrap scripts, the AdminConfiguration hash oracle -- now
rides on the existing federated credential (subject repo:.../ref:refs/heads/main) instead
of a long-lived SAS in repo secrets.
The REST calls themselves are unchanged: '?<sas>' became an Authorization header, so the
ETag-CAS of the counters, Content-MD5 and the no-cache contract survive verbatim. That is
also why this is not a rewrite onto 'az storage blob upload' -- it cannot express If-Match,
and two concurrent builds could then mint the same build number.
.github/scripts/Get-StorageAuthHeaders.ps1 is the single place that knows the resource id,
the az invocation and the service version. x-ms-version is mandatory for Entra-authorized
requests (>= 2017-11-09) and for any Table request without a SAS; 2021-08-06 was verified
live against both the blob and the table endpoint of this account.
azure/login added to build-agent, build-msi, publish-scripts (plus id-token: write) and
deploy-web; deploy-backend and deploy-mcp already had it. Publish-BootstrapScripts.ps1
-DryRun acquires NO token: the PR gate runs it without any Azure login, and that must
stay true.
The AdminConfiguration merge lost its "secret not configured" skip branch -- a failure
there now surfaces instead of silently leaving the hash oracle pointing at an older build.
AZURE_BLOB_AGENT_SAS_TOKEN, AZURE_BLOB_VERSIONS_SAS_TOKEN and AZURE_TABLE_ADMIN_SAS_TOKEN
are retired once the first runs are green. AZURE_BLOB_AGENT_LEGACY_SAS_TOKEN stays: that
account lives in the pre-migration tenant, where this principal has no identity -- it dies
with the mirror, not before.
Requires on the SP: Storage Blob Data Contributor on the containers 'agent' and 'versions',
Storage Table Data Contributor on the table 'AdminConfiguration'. Granted 2026-09-08.
Title and trailing controls shared one non-wrapping flex row with the controls
marked flex-shrink-0. At 440px (iPhone 16 Pro Max) that squeezed the Operational
Events title into an 86px column and pushed the Refresh buttons of Agent Metrics
and the Tenant Config Report past the viewport, scrolling the whole page sideways.
SectionCardHeader now stacks below sm, which covers all 32 cards that use it.
A width sweep over the portal routes at 440px found two more real overflows, fixed
here as well: the audit From/To date pair, and Alert Rules, where the unbreakable
event-type names and a channel-name input without min-w-0 pushed the severity
selects 99px off screen.
Verified: every swept route now measures zero horizontal overflow at 440px, desktop
is unchanged at 1440px. The header test asserted "no trailing group" via the absence
of gap-3, which the wrapper itself now carries; it checks flex-wrap instead and pins
the stacking classes.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
The card composed its line from the backend's explanation ("did not answer within
3s - it scales to zero when idle ... ~20-30s"): probe mechanics nobody waiting on a
starting instance needs. It now writes its own one-liner and ignores check.message,
so the server's "warming" and a client-side probe timeout read identically and the
wording does not depend on a backend deploy. The backend message is shortened but
still carries the budget for direct API callers.
The re-poll budget of 8 x 5s (~40s) expired on a real cold start - Container Apps
activation has no upper bound we control - so it is now 12 x 5s (~60s), with a test
pinning that the stated seconds come from cadence x attempts.
Measured over 14 days, GET health/mcp answered in 4..148ms when warm and timed out at 30s
in 50 of 83 calls — the median call took 27,972ms. A cold start is 20-30s of Container Apps
activation (~98% KEDA plus image mount, ~500ms application), so no UI wait covers it and the
generous timeout only bought a long wall in front of the same answer. The browser's own
budget is the same 30s, so the backend's carefully worded warning never reached the user at
all: they saw a raw DOMException.
Backend: the budget drops to 3s, which sits in the widest observed latency gap
(2347ms..3930ms) so jitter cannot flip the verdict. Our own cancellation now reports the new
status "warming" at Information level (with minReplicas=0 a cold probe is the expected path,
and logging it as a warning poisons the ops signal); HttpRequestException is split out of
that catch and stays a real warning, still without the host in the message. The warm-hit
threshold drops to 750ms — ~5x the warm maximum, deliberately generous because every
measurement comes from a near-idle single-user system and warm latency will rise under
concurrency — and moves into McpReachableMessage so a test can pin the boundary. The XML doc
now describes the probe that exists rather than the wake-signal design the measurements
disproved.
"warming" is a new status value rather than an added DTO boolean because the backend deploys
before the web: an unknown value degrades to a grey card with a clean banner, whereas a
boolean would leave old web showing yellow and "Warnings detected" on every cold start.
HealthCheck.Status now documents the five-value vocabulary, which rides into both generated
TypeScript mirrors as JSDoc.
Web: resolveMcpCardState owns display, banner rating and the poll decision as a pure
function (the suite runs on node, so testable logic cannot live in JSX). A warming server
re-probes every 5s for up to 8 attempts and stays out of the overall banner exactly as
"unknown" already does — scaling from zero is expected behaviour, not a degraded platform —
and only becomes a real warning once the re-polls are spent. The card keeps showing
"warming" while the next probe is in flight so it cannot flicker, carries the blue
in-progress look instead of yellow, and was hoisted out of the healthResult guard: a failing
detailed check would otherwise hide a card that is still polling.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
The column showed high/medium/low under the header "Identification", which reads as a method rather than a rating. The wire field is `confidence` and the tooltip already says "identification confidence"; the header and legend now match. The analyzer toggle and its hover border were still emerald from before the section moved.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The portal hides Delete for owned (msp-{home}) groups, but DELETE global/tenant-groups/{groupId} accepts any id: a Global Admin deleting one ended Pro (MSP) for every member with no grace anchor, so a member that raised its retention under Pro was clamped to the Community cap at the next sweep. DeleteGroupCoreAsync now snapshots the owner and calls ProConferralService.RecordLossAsync(member, owner, "group-deleted") per member, owner excluded, independent of assignees. Two tests in RevokeEnforcementTests; internal docs list the fourth writer.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Act equals the KEV set by construction (CvePriority: KEV => act), so the KEV tile becomes the Act tile and Attend joins it instead of a duplicate count. The breakdown is counted in the backend over every CVE in the window, like the severity breakdown, because the list is top-N. Both panel consumers read the generated CveExposureSummary type; the MCP tool description names the new block. Wire types regenerated for web and MCP.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The caller-supplied X-MCP-Tool-Name header went verbatim into the UserUsageLog
row key ({yyyyMMdd}_{tool}:{endpoint}) and from there into the CAS-conflict
warning of TableCasRetry. EndpointNormalizer.ToolNameKey now strips CR/LF and
every other control character or line separator, replaces the characters Table
Storage rejects in keys (/ \ # ?) and caps the length at 64; an empty result
skips the prefix. Real tool names pass through unchanged, so existing usage
rows keep their keys. A header with an illegal key character previously made
every usage increment fail with 400 (fail-soft, counter never advanced).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The manifest committed with d5d1d7bf carried the types section of the previous HEAD, so
the ntpServer doc string still read "null = use agent default"; SharedManifestParityTests
compares byte-for-byte. Generated output only, no wire change. Bumps the internal gitlink
(plan review addendum).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The report still carried two hand copies after D-215: a typed map of C#
initializer defaults for the "custom" highlight, and a TypeScript mirror of
GetAgentConfigFunction's resolution rules for the runtime column.
Backend: the derivation moves verbatim into Services/AgentConfigResolver
(Build = pure, ResolveAsync loads tenant + admin config and the two rule
catalogs). GetAgentConfigFunction keeps the kill verdict, the migrate logging
and the device fields on top; ParseAgentMajor, ResolveDiagnosticsUploadEnabled,
MergeDiagnosticsLogPaths and ResolveMigrateTarget move with it (call sites and
tests retargeted; the QueryParams ratchet baseline shrinks by the file). New
GlobalAdminOnly route config/{tenantId}/effective-agent-config returns the same
AgentConfigResponse without a device (optional ?agentVersion=, default the V2
line). AgentConfigResolverTests pin the rules that used to live in the web:
upload 10, Hosted destination without SAS, SAS regardless of mode, unrestricted
only with entitlement + gate + toggle, operator knobs from AdminConfiguration,
analyzer defaults, hash line per major, migrate override and rejection.
Manifest: SharedManifestParityTests emits "defaults" next to "fields" for
TenantConfiguration and AdminConfiguration and an "agentConfig" section with
the AgentConfigResponse / CollectorConfiguration / AnalyzerConfiguration class
defaults (fresh-instance values; nested objects null). TenantConfiguration.
NtpServer gets the initializer "time.windows.com" the table read already
applies, so the manifest default and a stored row agree.
Web: the catalog rows lose value() and default; the runtime column renders
the endpoint's response, the highlight compares against the manifest defaults,
informational rows (reasons, timestamps, identities, secrets) never read as
custom. Previously excluded fields are visible (configVersion, catalog counts,
sealing pattern ids, hash oracle, migrate target); the collector class
defaults sit in a collapsed "Collector Internals" section. Fail-soft: while the
backend is not deployed the runtime column shows a notice.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The "Health by Device Model" link searched "{Manufacturer} {Model}" as one substring; the server's
free-text predicate tested it per field, so once the failed sessions were outside the loaded first
page the sweep returned nothing.
- lib/searchQueryTokens.ts: tokenizer shared by the timeline and the session search (terms, quotes,
leading minus, key=value / key:value qualifier when the separator precedes any quote)
- app/dashboard/utils/sessionSearchQuery.ts: 15 qualifiers = exactly the fields both sides search,
matcher over session fields + client-derived extra text, suggestion field lookup, link builder
- useDashboardFilters / SessionTable: filter and suggestions use the grammar; fuzzy only for a
single free term; session_searched gains a `qualifiers` count
- Helpers/SessionSearchQuery.cs: the same grammar for q= on /api/search/sessions (+ global), parsed
once per request; MatchesFreeText is a thin wrapper
- utils/session-search-syntax.cases.json: one case file run by vitest and by
SessionFreeTextSearchTests (parity proof)
- FleetModelHealth/FleetSlowModel/FleetFailingModel: manufacturer + model as stored plus label,
grouped on the pair; useFleetHealth uses the generated wire types; "Unknown" is not a link
- shared manifest + wire types regenerated for the three DTOs
Backend suite 6158/6159 (the one failure is SharedManifestParityTests against uncommitted WIP of a
parallel task), web vitest 1177/1177, build 0 warnings.
The progress portal placed the active step purely by the stored phase. After
whiteglove_complete the backend caps that phase at Apps (Device), so the end
user saw "Waiting for you to sign in" above a step list that still showed
"Installing apps (device)" as running at 43 % (customer report).
The seal detection the headline already used is now one helper,
isParkedAfterTechnicianPart (pre-provisioned, whiteglove_complete, no resumedAt
and no whiteglove_resumed), and resolveActiveStepIndex places such a session on
the first user step: every device step done, 57 %, Account setup current. A
stale Complete phase on older sessions can no longer push it past the sign-in;
once resumed the placement is phase-driven again.
Vitest 24/24, tsc and eslint clean. Backlog B-ydz carries the post-deploy check.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The report typed its own TenantConfig interface and drifted for five months: 31 stored
fields were missing (payingCustomer, the MSP overrides, three validation gates, the SLA
block, four analyzer flags, app-homing and trial bookkeeping) and three runtime values
were wrong (upload interval 30 instead of 10, diagnostics-enabled without the Hosted
destination, unrestricted mode without the entitlement).
tenantConfigReportCatalog.ts is Record<keyof TenantConfiguration> and
Record<keyof AgentConfigResponse | CollectorConfiguration | AnalyzerConfiguration>:
every key is rendered or excluded with a reason, so a new C# property fails tsc once the
wire type is regenerated. Runtime rows carry the GetAgentConfigFunction rule and a source
tag; entitlement values come from feature-flags, operator knobs from global/config.
A vitest pins the same parity against SHARED_MANIFEST.tenantConfiguration.fields and the
resolution rules (upload 10, Hosted destination, flags-driven unrestricted mode, admin
idle timeout, analyzer defaults). Empty strings count as unset for the custom highlight.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Parallel tool calls of one user hit the same (user, day, endpoint) row in the same instant; without backoff the losers stayed synchronised and 3 of 6 increments were lost. Both increments now use the one CAS helper (merge patch, AddEntity on 404, StorageCasConflict marker) with UsageCounterRetries = 8; the tenant counter's attribution columns travel in the merge patch. Tests pin the budget, the patch shape and the create path.
Oliver Kieselbach