chore: centre the search dialog

chore: title case headings on ui
feat(eks): inject IRSA credentials into pods of annotated ServiceAccounts (#1396 )
2026-11-02 01:09:48 +00:00 · 2026-11-02 10:47:56 +10:00 · 2026-11-02 10:45:25 +10:00 · 2026-11-02 10:42:38 +10:00 · 2026-11-02 10:29:02 +10:00 · 2026-11-01 18:28:05 -06:00
603 changed files with 18427 additions and 11023 deletions
@@ -104,7 +104,7 @@ jobs:

      - name: Build microVM artifacts (lb-agent + kernel + initramfs + qboot + SQS store and worker images)
        if: steps.version.outputs.exists != 'true'
-        run: cd spinifex && make build-microvm-image build-sqs-store-microvm-image build-sqs-worker-microvm-image
+        run: cd spinifex && make build-microvm-image build-sqs-worker-microvm-image

      - name: Build amd64 Tarball
        if: steps.version.outputs.exists != 'true'
@@ -1203,6 +1203,16 @@ jobs:
          sleep 2
          rm -f "$TMPDIR"/tmp.*.qcow2 "$TMPDIR"/tmp.*.log "$TMPDIR"/tmp.*-node.log

+      # The ISO build runs as root inside the workspace, and the next job on
+      # this runner, from any workflow, cannot remove what it leaves there.
+      - name: Release the workspace
+        if: always()
+        run: |
+          sudo umount -R -l "$GITHUB_WORKSPACE"/mulga/scripts/iso-builder/.cache/rootfs 2>/dev/null || true
+          sudo rm -rf --one-file-system "$GITHUB_WORKSPACE"/mulga/scripts/iso-builder/.cache \
+              "$GITHUB_WORKSPACE"/mulga/scripts/iso-builder/dist
+          sudo chown -R "$(id -u):$(id -g)" "$GITHUB_WORKSPACE"
+
  iso-multi:
    name: cell-22 (iso/dhcp/three-node)
    # After cell-21 rather than beside it: same concurrency group, and running
@@ -1354,6 +1364,16 @@ jobs:
          rm -rf /tmp/cell22-artifacts-$GITHUB_RUN_ID /tmp/cell22-$GITHUB_RUN_ID.log \
                 "$WORK_DIR"

+      # The ISO build runs as root inside the workspace, and the next job on
+      # this runner, from any workflow, cannot remove what it leaves there.
+      - name: Release the workspace
+        if: always()
+        run: |
+          sudo umount -R -l "$GITHUB_WORKSPACE"/mulga/scripts/iso-builder/.cache/rootfs 2>/dev/null || true
+          sudo rm -rf --one-file-system "$GITHUB_WORKSPACE"/mulga/scripts/iso-builder/.cache \
+              "$GITHUB_WORKSPACE"/mulga/scripts/iso-builder/dist
+          sudo chown -R "$(id -u):$(id -g)" "$GITHUB_WORKSPACE"
+
  # Predastore throughput ("cell 23"). Predastore has no runners of its own and
  # spinifex depends on it, so the benchmark lives here and checks predastore
  # out as a sibling.
@@ -58,7 +58,7 @@ jobs:
          cache: false

      - name: Build microVM artifacts (lb-agent + kernel + initramfs + qboot + SQS store and worker images)
-        run: cd spinifex && make build-microvm-image build-sqs-store-microvm-image build-sqs-worker-microvm-image
+        run: cd spinifex && make build-microvm-image build-sqs-worker-microvm-image

      - name: Build amd64 Tarball
        env:
@@ -21,9 +21,6 @@ build/microvm/vmlinuz
 build/microvm/initramfs.cpio.gz
 build/microvm/qboot.rom
 build/microvm/qboot.LICENSE
-build/microvm/sqs-store/vmlinuz
-build/microvm/sqs-store/initramfs.cpio.gz
-build/microvm/sqs-store/.stage.*/
 build/microvm/sqs-worker/vmlinuz
 build/microvm/sqs-worker/initramfs.cpio.gz
 build/microvm/sqs-worker/.stage.*/
@@ -153,37 +153,32 @@ $(MICROVM_ARTIFACTS) &: $(MICROVM_INPUTS)
 bin/lb-agent:
 	$(MAKE) build-lb-agent

-# The SQS store microVM image: a separate artifact from the LB image above, not
-# installed or released by any target yet.
-SQS_STORE_MICROVM_OUT_DIR := $(MICROVM_OUT_DIR)/sqs-store
-SQS_STORE_MICROVM_ARTIFACTS := $(SQS_STORE_MICROVM_OUT_DIR)/vmlinuz $(SQS_STORE_MICROVM_OUT_DIR)/initramfs.cpio.gz
-SQS_STORE_MICROVM_INPUTS := scripts/build-sqs-store-microvm-image.sh scripts/lib/sqs-store-microvm-publish.sh $(SQS_STORE_MICROVM_OUT_DIR)/init.sh $(SQS_STORE_MICROVM_OUT_DIR)/inittab $(addprefix $(SQS_STORE_MICROVM_OUT_DIR)/,sqs-store-lib.sh sqs-store-prepare sqs-store-run sqs-store-stop) bin/nats-server
-
-$(SQS_STORE_MICROVM_ARTIFACTS) &: $(SQS_STORE_MICROVM_INPUTS)
-	./scripts/build-sqs-store-microvm-image.sh
-
-# The dedicated SQS store server, built from the go.mod-pinned module so the
-# image ships exactly the reviewed version. Static for the musl guest.
+# The dedicated SQS server, built from the go.mod-pinned module so the image
+# ships exactly the reviewed version. Static for the musl guest.
 bin/nats-server: go.mod go.sum
 	@mkdir -p bin
 	GOWORK=off CGO_ENABLED=0 GOOS=linux GOARCH=amd64 go build -trimpath -ldflags '-s -w' -o $@ github.com/nats-io/nats-server/v2

-build-sqs-store-microvm-image: $(SQS_STORE_MICROVM_ARTIFACTS) ## Build the SQS store microVM kernel and initramfs
+# go_local_srcs lists the main module package dirs and files guest package $(1)
+# links, scanned with the guest build settings; a dir's mtime catches a deleted
+# or renamed file. A failed scan names a missing prerequisite, so make stops.
+go_local_srcs = $(shell GOWORK=off CGO_ENABLED=0 GOOS=linux GOARCH=amd64 go list -deps -f '{{if and .Module .Module.Main}}{{.Dir}} {{range .GoFiles}}{{$$.Dir}}/{{.}} {{end}}{{range .EmbedFiles}}{{$$.Dir}}/{{.}} {{end}}{{end}}' $(1) || echo go-list-failed-for-$(1))
+.SECONDEXPANSION:

-# The shared SQS worker microVM image: the store image's /init and kernel with
-# the worker binary instead of nats-server. Not installed or released yet.
+# The SQS microVM image: one guest running its own SQS nats-server and the SQS
+# worker as separate processes. A separate artifact from the LB image above.
 SQS_WORKER_MICROVM_OUT_DIR := $(MICROVM_OUT_DIR)/sqs-worker
 SQS_WORKER_MICROVM_ARTIFACTS := $(SQS_WORKER_MICROVM_OUT_DIR)/vmlinuz $(SQS_WORKER_MICROVM_OUT_DIR)/initramfs.cpio.gz
-SQS_WORKER_MICROVM_INPUTS := scripts/build-sqs-store-microvm-image.sh scripts/lib/sqs-store-microvm-publish.sh $(SQS_STORE_MICROVM_OUT_DIR)/init.sh $(SQS_WORKER_MICROVM_OUT_DIR)/inittab $(addprefix $(SQS_WORKER_MICROVM_OUT_DIR)/,sqs-worker-lib.sh sqs-worker-prepare sqs-worker-ready sqs-worker-stop) bin/sqs-worker
+SQS_WORKER_MICROVM_INPUTS := scripts/build-sqs-store-microvm-image.sh scripts/lib/sqs-store-microvm-publish.sh $(SQS_WORKER_MICROVM_OUT_DIR)/init.sh $(SQS_WORKER_MICROVM_OUT_DIR)/inittab $(addprefix $(SQS_WORKER_MICROVM_OUT_DIR)/,sqs-worker-lib.sh sqs-worker-prepare sqs-worker-store sqs-worker-ready sqs-worker-stop) bin/nats-server bin/sqs-worker

 $(SQS_WORKER_MICROVM_ARTIFACTS) &: $(SQS_WORKER_MICROVM_INPUTS)
-	SQS_MICROVM_PROFILE=worker ./scripts/build-sqs-store-microvm-image.sh
+	./scripts/build-sqs-store-microvm-image.sh

-bin/sqs-worker: go.mod go.sum $(shell find cmd/sqs-worker spinifex/agents/sqs -name '*.go' ! -name '*_test.go')
+bin/sqs-worker: go.mod go.sum $$(call go_local_srcs,./cmd/sqs-worker)
 	@mkdir -p bin
 	GOWORK=off CGO_ENABLED=0 GOOS=linux GOARCH=amd64 go build -trimpath -ldflags '-s -w' -o $@ ./cmd/sqs-worker

-build-sqs-worker-microvm-image: $(SQS_WORKER_MICROVM_ARTIFACTS) ## Build the shared SQS worker microVM kernel and initramfs
+build-sqs-worker-microvm-image: $(SQS_WORKER_MICROVM_ARTIFACTS) ## Build the SQS microVM kernel and initramfs

 # qboot is the microvm firmware. The source tarball ships with each release
 # because qboot is GPL-2.0.
@@ -196,13 +191,7 @@ $(QBOOT_ARTIFACTS) &: scripts/build-qboot.sh

 build-microvm-image: $(MICROVM_ARTIFACTS) $(QBOOT_ARTIFACTS) ## Build microVM kernel, initramfs and qboot firmware (incremental — skips when up to date)

-install-sqs-store-microvm: $(SQS_STORE_MICROVM_ARTIFACTS) ## Install the SQS store microVM image to /usr/share/spinifex/microvm/sqs-store/
-	sudo install -d /usr/share/spinifex/microvm/sqs-store
-	sudo rm -f /usr/share/spinifex/microvm/sqs-store/initramfs.cpio.gz
-	sudo install -m 0644 $(SQS_STORE_MICROVM_OUT_DIR)/vmlinuz /usr/share/spinifex/microvm/sqs-store/vmlinuz
-	sudo install -m 0644 $(SQS_STORE_MICROVM_OUT_DIR)/initramfs.cpio.gz /usr/share/spinifex/microvm/sqs-store/initramfs.cpio.gz
-
-install-sqs-worker-microvm: $(SQS_WORKER_MICROVM_ARTIFACTS) ## Install the SQS worker microVM image to /usr/share/spinifex/microvm/sqs-worker/
+install-sqs-worker-microvm: $(SQS_WORKER_MICROVM_ARTIFACTS) ## Install the SQS microVM image to /usr/share/spinifex/microvm/sqs-worker/
 	sudo install -d /usr/share/spinifex/microvm/sqs-worker
 	sudo rm -f /usr/share/spinifex/microvm/sqs-worker/initramfs.cpio.gz
 	sudo install -m 0644 $(SQS_WORKER_MICROVM_OUT_DIR)/vmlinuz /usr/share/spinifex/microvm/sqs-worker/vmlinuz
@@ -514,7 +503,6 @@ distro-amd64:
 		echo "[distro-amd64] WARNING: microvm artifacts missing — tarball will not include them"; \
 		echo "[distro-amd64]          run 'make build-microvm-image' before 'make distro-amd64'"; \
 	fi
-	./scripts/lib/stage-sqs-store-microvm.sh $(SQS_STORE_MICROVM_OUT_DIR) dist/amd64
 	./scripts/lib/stage-sqs-store-microvm.sh $(SQS_WORKER_MICROVM_OUT_DIR) dist/amd64 sqs-worker
 	tar -czf dist/spinifex-$(VERSION)-linux-amd64.tar.gz -C dist/amd64 .
 	sha256sum dist/spinifex-$(VERSION)-linux-amd64.tar.gz > dist/spinifex-$(VERSION)-linux-amd64.tar.gz.sha256
@@ -534,7 +522,7 @@ distro-arm64:
 distro-clean:
 	rm -rf dist/

-.PHONY: test-package-check build build-ui test-ui-e2e ui-e2e-container ui-baselines build-installer build-lb-agent build-ecs-agent build-system-image build-eks-node-image import-eks-node-image publish-eks-node-image build-ecs-node-image import-ecs-node-image build-rds-postgres-image import-rds-postgres-image build-rds-mariadb-image import-rds-mariadb-image build-microvm-image build-sqs-store-microvm-image build-sqs-worker-microvm-image install-microvm install-sqs-store-microvm install-sqs-worker-microvm go_build preflight test test-cover test-race diff-coverage bench fuzz test-actions test-images test-build-scripts test-harness test-integration generate-aws-model-coverage aws-model-coverage test-segscan-oracle \
+.PHONY: test-package-check build build-ui test-ui-e2e ui-e2e-container ui-baselines build-installer build-lb-agent build-ecs-agent build-system-image build-eks-node-image import-eks-node-image publish-eks-node-image build-ecs-node-image import-ecs-node-image build-rds-postgres-image import-rds-postgres-image build-rds-mariadb-image import-rds-mariadb-image build-microvm-image build-sqs-worker-microvm-image install-microvm install-sqs-worker-microvm go_build preflight test test-cover test-race diff-coverage bench fuzz test-actions test-images test-build-scripts test-harness test-integration generate-aws-model-coverage aws-model-coverage test-segscan-oracle \
 	deploy reinstall clean \
 	install-system install-go install-aws quickinstall \
 	lint fix govulncheck nilaway \
@@ -38,6 +38,7 @@ var allowlist = []allowance{
 	{From: "cmd/aws-model-coverage", To: "domains/ecs/awsapi", Debt: "cmd/aws-model-coverage", Reason: "reads declared service inventories; named exception, must not construct a registration"},
 	{From: "cmd/aws-model-coverage", To: "domains/eks/awsapi", Debt: "cmd/aws-model-coverage", Reason: "reads declared service inventories; named exception, must not construct a registration"},
 	{From: "cmd/aws-model-coverage", To: "domains/iam/awsapi", Debt: "cmd/aws-model-coverage", Reason: "reads declared service inventories; named exception, must not construct a registration"},
+	{From: "cmd/aws-model-coverage", To: "domains/sqs/awsapi", Debt: "cmd/aws-model-coverage", Reason: "reads declared service inventories; named exception, must not construct a registration"},
 	{From: "cmd/aws-model-coverage", To: "domains/sts/awsapi", Debt: "cmd/aws-model-coverage", Reason: "reads declared service inventories; named exception, must not construct a registration"},

 	{From: "runtime/daemon", To: "domains/ec2/awsapi/instance", Debt: "Instance adapter consumers outside EC2", Reason: "runtime/daemon/eks_cp_control.go and rds_deps.go call the instance adapter; needs an EC2 capability"},
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 ARG VERSION=dev

-FROM golang:1.27.3-bookworm@sha256:972b4110ba0f47539a975c31e52c64765e1ff19f2d74469ae4a595c6676e80a5 AS builder
+FROM golang:1.27.3-bookworm@sha256:d9b6a1beb9474adc2a1ce842573639b44b2a0dd49b6669f51d3821baf9ec37c9 AS builder

 ARG VERSION

@@ -1,10 +0,0 @@
-# The power button loads here, not in /init: busybox init has its SIGUSR2
-# (poweroff) handler installed before sysinit runs, so a press can never reach
-# the pre-exec shell PID 1. A press before this line is lost; the host re-sends.
-::sysinit:/sbin/modprobe tiny_power_button power_signal=12
-::sysinit:/usr/local/lib/sqs-store/sqs-store-prepare
-::respawn:/usr/local/lib/sqs-store/sqs-store-run
-::ctrlaltdel:/sbin/reboot
-# One action: the store stops and its disk unmounts first, and the generic
-# umount -a -r runs only if the store is gone.
-::shutdown:/usr/local/lib/sqs-store/sqs-store-stop
@@ -1,224 +0,0 @@
-# sqs-store-lib.sh — shared by the SQS store guest's prepare, run and stop
-# steps. Sourced, never executed. Every path and command is overridable so the
-# host test can drive the same code against a fake fw_cfg, sysfs and tools.
-#
-# Guest contract, read from fw_cfg under opt/spinifex/sqs-store/:
-#   data-serial  virtio-blk serial of the already-formatted ext4 data disk
-#   listen-addr  IPv4 address on a configured guest NIC; the only listener
-#   client-nkey  NATS user NKey public key allowed to connect; never a seed
-# Anything absent, malformed or ambiguous refuses the store. Nothing formats.
-
-SQS_FWCFG=${SQS_FWCFG:-/sys/firmware/qemu_fw_cfg/by_name/opt/spinifex/sqs-store}
-SQS_SYSBLOCK=${SQS_SYSBLOCK:-/sys/block}
-SQS_DEVDIR=${SQS_DEVDIR:-/dev}
-# The host test cannot create block nodes, so it relaxes this to -e.
-SQS_NODE_TEST=${SQS_NODE_TEST:--b}
-SQS_RUN=${SQS_RUN:-/run/sqs-store}
-SQS_DATA=${SQS_DATA:-/data}
-SQS_CONSOLE=${SQS_CONSOLE:-/dev/console}
-SQS_MOUNTS=${SQS_MOUNTS:-/proc/mounts}
-SQS_PORT=${SQS_PORT:-4222}
-SQS_STOP_BUDGET_TENTHS=${SQS_STOP_BUDGET_TENTHS:-120}
-NATS_BIN=${NATS_BIN:-/usr/local/bin/nats-server}
-E2FSCK=${E2FSCK:-e2fsck}
-MOUNT=${MOUNT:-mount}
-UMOUNT=${UMOUNT:-umount}
-IP=${IP:-ip}
-
-sqs_log() { echo "[sqs-store] $*" >> "$SQS_CONSOLE"; }
-sqs_fatal() { sqs_log "FATAL: $*"; return 1; }
-
-# sqs_fwcfg <name>: print one fw_cfg value, refusing a missing, empty, oversized
-# or multi-token file. The value is not echoed on failure.
-sqs_fwcfg() {
-    f="$SQS_FWCFG/$1/raw"
-    [ -f "$f" ] || { sqs_fatal "fw_cfg $1 not supplied"; return 1; }
-    [ "$(wc -c < "$f")" -le 128 ] || { sqs_fatal "fw_cfg $1 is oversized"; return 1; }
-    v=$(cat "$f")
-    case "$v" in
-        "" | *[[:space:]]*) sqs_fatal "fw_cfg $1 must be exactly one value"; return 1 ;;
-    esac
-    printf '%s' "$v"
-}
-
-# A volume serial is the volume ID with dashes stripped: vol + 17 hex.
-sqs_valid_serial() {
-    [ "${#1}" -eq 20 ] || return 1
-    case "$1" in vol*) ;; *) return 1 ;; esac
-    case "${1#vol}" in *[!0-9a-f]*) return 1 ;; esac
-}
-
-# A NATS user public NKey: "U" then 55 base32 characters. The checksum is
-# left to the pinned server's own config test.
-sqs_valid_user_nkey() {
-    [ "${#1}" -eq 56 ] || return 1
-    case "$1" in U*) ;; *) return 1 ;; esac
-    case "$1" in *[!A-Z2-7]*) return 1 ;; esac
-}
-
-sqs_valid_ipv4() {
-    case "$1" in *[!0-9.]* | .* | *. | *..*) return 1 ;; esac
-    old_ifs=$IFS; IFS=.
-    # shellcheck disable=SC2086 # split on dots on purpose
-    set -- $1
-    IFS=$old_ifs
-    [ "$#" -eq 4 ] || return 1
-    for o in "$@"; do
-        [ "${#o}" -le 3 ] && [ "$o" -le 255 ] || return 1
-        case "$o" in 0?*) return 1 ;; esac
-    done
-}
-
-# sqs_find_disk <serial>: print the /dev node of the one block device whose
-# sysfs serial matches exactly. Zero or several matches refuse.
-sqs_find_disk() {
-    found="" n=0
-    for b in "$SQS_SYSBLOCK"/*; do
-        [ -r "$b/serial" ] || continue
-        [ "$(cat "$b/serial")" = "$1" ] || continue
-        found=${b##*/}
-        n=$((n + 1))
-    done
-    [ "$n" -eq 1 ] || { sqs_fatal "expected one disk with serial $1, found $n"; return 1; }
-    test "$SQS_NODE_TEST" "$SQS_DEVDIR/$found" || { sqs_fatal "disk $found has no block device node"; return 1; }
-    printf '%s' "$SQS_DEVDIR/$found"
-}
-
-# sqs_has_addr <ipv4>: the address is assigned to a non-loopback interface.
-sqs_has_addr() {
-    "$IP" -o -4 addr show 2>/dev/null \
-        | awk -v a="$1" '$2 != "lo" { split($4, p, "/"); if (p[1] == a) f = 1 } END { exit !f }'
-}
-
-# sqs_alive <pid>: running or stopped, not exited (a zombie counts as exited).
-sqs_alive() { [ -r "/proc/$1/status" ] && ! grep -q '^State:[[:space:]]*Z' "/proc/$1/status" 2>/dev/null; }
-
-# sqs_starttime <pid>: kernel start time (stat field 22). It survives exec, and
-# pairing it with the pid reduces PID-reuse risk; without a pidfd the check and
-# the signal stay separate steps, so it is not an absolute guarantee.
-sqs_starttime() { sed 's/.*) //' "/proc/$1/stat" 2>/dev/null | cut -d' ' -f20; }
-
-# sqs_same <pid> <starttime>: the recorded process is still alive.
-sqs_same() { [ -n "$2" ] && sqs_alive "$1" && [ "$(sqs_starttime "$1")" = "$2" ]; }
-
-# sqs_write_config <addr> <nkey> <file>: the dedicated server's config. Its
-# max_payload admits a 1 MiB SQS message with its headers (ADR-0011:S4); the
-# 1MB NATS default does not.
-sqs_write_config() {
-    cat > "$3" <<EOF
-listen: "$1:$SQS_PORT"
-server_name: "sqs-store"
-max_payload: 2MiB
-jetstream {
-  store_dir: "$SQS_DATA"
-  sync_interval: always
-}
-authorization {
-  users = [ { nkey: "$2" } ]
-}
-EOF
-}
-
-# sqs_prepare: validate the contract, check and mount the data disk, write the
-# server config and mark the store ready. Returns non-zero, unready, on any refusal.
-sqs_prepare() {
-    rm -f "$SQS_RUN/ready"
-    mkdir -p "$SQS_RUN"
-    serial=$(sqs_fwcfg data-serial) || return 1
-    sqs_valid_serial "$serial" || { sqs_fatal "data-serial is not a volume serial"; return 1; }
-    addr=$(sqs_fwcfg listen-addr) || return 1
-    sqs_valid_ipv4 "$addr" || { sqs_fatal "listen-addr is not an IPv4 address"; return 1; }
-    nkey=$(sqs_fwcfg client-nkey) || return 1
-    sqs_valid_user_nkey "$nkey" || { sqs_fatal "client-nkey is not a user public NKey"; return 1; }
-    sqs_has_addr "$addr" || { sqs_fatal "listen-addr $addr is not on any guest NIC"; return 1; }
-
-    # The server checks the config, including the NKey checksum, before the
-    # disk is touched.
-    umask 077
-    sqs_write_config "$addr" "$nkey" "$SQS_RUN/nats.conf" || return 1
-    if ! "$NATS_BIN" -t -c "$SQS_RUN/nats.conf" > "$SQS_RUN/config-test.out" 2>&1; then
-        sqs_fatal "server config test failed: $(sed 's/U[A-Z2-7]\{55\}/<nkey>/g' "$SQS_RUN/config-test.out" | tr '\n' ' ')"
-        return 1
-    fi
-
-    dev=$(sqs_find_disk "$serial") || return 1
-    rc=0
-    "$E2FSCK" -p "$dev" > "$SQS_RUN/fsck.out" 2>&1 || rc=$?
-    sqs_log "e2fsck -p $dev rc=$rc"
-    # 0 clean, 1 corrected: proceed. Anything higher, including a disk that is
-    # not ext4 at all, refuses; the guest never formats.
-    [ "$rc" -le 1 ] || { sqs_fatal "e2fsck refused $dev: $(tr '\n' ' ' < "$SQS_RUN/fsck.out")"; return 1; }
-    mkdir -p "$SQS_DATA"
-    "$MOUNT" -t ext4 -o nodev,nosuid,noexec "$dev" "$SQS_DATA" || { sqs_fatal "mount $dev failed"; return 1; }
-    : > "$SQS_RUN/ready"
-    sqs_log "prepared: $dev mounted at $SQS_DATA, config written for $addr:$SQS_PORT; server not started yet"
-}
-
-# sqs_run: the respawned supervisor body. Its identity is recorded before the
-# stopping check: a stop that misses it set stopping first, so this parks; a
-# stop that reads it signals this process whether or not it has exec'd yet.
-sqs_run() {
-    mkdir -p "$SQS_RUN"
-    echo "$$ $(sqs_starttime $$)" > "$SQS_RUN/pid"
-    if [ -e "$SQS_RUN/stopping" ]; then
-        sqs_log "run: shutdown in progress, not starting"
-        return 2
-    fi
-    if [ ! -e "$SQS_RUN/ready" ]; then
-        sqs_log "run: store not prepared, not starting"
-        return 2
-    fi
-    sqs_log "run: starting pid=$$"
-    # ADR-0011:S11 bounds the store's Go heap; the guest must be larger.
-    GOMEMLIMIT=512MiB exec "$NATS_BIN" -c "$SQS_RUN/nats.conf"
-}
-
-# sqs_stop: first shutdown action. Block any respawn, SIGTERM the recorded run
-# process (a server, or a start not yet exec'd), SIGKILL only after the budget,
-# then sync and unmount. Each signal rechecks the identity; a survivor keeps the disk mounted.
-sqs_stop() {
-    mkdir -p "$SQS_RUN"
-    : > "$SQS_RUN/stopping"
-    sqs_log "stop: begin"
-    rec=$(cat "$SQS_RUN/pid" 2>/dev/null || true)
-    pid=${rec%% *} st=${rec#* }
-    [ "$st" != "$rec" ] || st=""
-    if [ -n "$pid" ] && sqs_same "$pid" "$st"; then
-        kill -TERM "$pid" 2>/dev/null || true
-        sqs_log "stop: SIGTERM sent to run pid=$pid"
-        i=0
-        while sqs_same "$pid" "$st" && [ "$i" -lt "$SQS_STOP_BUDGET_TENTHS" ]; do sleep 0.1; i=$((i + 1)); done
-        if sqs_same "$pid" "$st"; then
-            sqs_log "stop: run pid=$pid still running after $((SQS_STOP_BUDGET_TENTHS / 10))s, SIGKILL"
-            kill -KILL "$pid" 2>/dev/null || true
-            j=0
-            while sqs_same "$pid" "$st" && [ "$j" -lt 30 ]; do sleep 0.1; j=$((j + 1)); done
-        fi
-        if sqs_same "$pid" "$st"; then
-            sqs_log "stop: run pid=$pid STILL ALIVE, leaving $SQS_DATA mounted"
-            return 1
-        fi
-        sqs_log "stop: store exited after $((i / 10)).$((i % 10))s"
-    else
-        sqs_log "stop: no running store"
-    fi
-    sync
-    if grep -q " $SQS_DATA " "$SQS_MOUNTS" 2>/dev/null; then
-        rc=0
-        "$UMOUNT" "$SQS_DATA" || rc=$?
-        sqs_log "stop: umount $SQS_DATA rc=$rc"
-    fi
-}
-
-# sqs_shutdown: the only shutdown action. The generic read-only remount runs
-# only after the store stopped; a surviving writer keeps every mount as it is.
-sqs_shutdown() {
-    if ! sqs_stop; then
-        sync
-        sqs_log "shutdown: store survived, skipping umount -a -r"
-        return 1
-    fi
-    rc=0
-    "$UMOUNT" -a -r || rc=$?
-    echo "[init] shutdown: umount -a -r rc=$rc" >> "$SQS_CONSOLE"
-}
@@ -1,9 +0,0 @@
-#!/bin/sh
-# sysinit: load the disk drivers, then validate the guest contract, check and
-# mount the data disk and write the server config. A refusal leaves the store
-# unprepared, so the run step never starts it.
-. /usr/local/lib/sqs-store/sqs-store-lib.sh
-modprobe virtio_blk 2>/dev/null || true
-modprobe ext4 2>/dev/null || true
-sqs_prepare || sqs_log "store refused; it will not start"
-exit 0
@@ -1,6 +0,0 @@
-#!/bin/sh
-# Respawned by init. A store that must not run parks here instead of exiting,
-# so init does not respawn it in a tight loop.
-. /usr/local/lib/sqs-store/sqs-store-lib.sh
-sqs_run
-exec sleep 2147483647
@@ -1,5 +0,0 @@
-#!/bin/sh
-# The only shutdown action: stop the store and unmount its disk, then run the
-# generic read-only remount only if the store is gone.
-. /usr/local/lib/sqs-store/sqs-store-lib.sh
-sqs_shutdown
@@ -33,6 +33,10 @@ load_mod failover || true
 load_mod net_failover || true
 load_mod virtio_net || true

+# The guest's SQS store listens on 127.0.0.1 and the worker dials it there;
+# the kernel leaves lo down, so bring it up before init starts either.
+ip link set lo up
+
 NETCFG=/sys/firmware/qemu_fw_cfg/by_name/opt/spinifex/netcfg/raw
 i=0
 while [ "$i" -lt 25 ]; do
@@ -87,8 +91,8 @@ for n in 0 1 2 3 4 5; do
    [ -n "$rdst" ] && [ -n "$rvia" ] && ip route add "$rdst" via "$rvia" dev "$iface"
 done

-# The store image takes no lb-agent environment. A CA bundle is optional here:
-# nothing in this image dials out yet.
+# The image takes no lb-agent environment. The worker reads the cluster CA
+# from fw_cfg itself; this copy only serves other tools in the guest.
 CA_CERT=/sys/firmware/qemu_fw_cfg/by_name/opt/spinifex/ca-cert/raw
 mkdir -p /etc/ssl/certs
 [ -f "$CA_CERT" ] && cp "$CA_CERT" /etc/ssl/certs/ca-certificates.crt
@@ -3,6 +3,7 @@
 # the pre-exec shell PID 1. A press before this line is lost; the host re-sends.
 ::sysinit:/sbin/modprobe tiny_power_button power_signal=12
 ::sysinit:/usr/local/lib/sqs-worker/sqs-worker-prepare
+::respawn:/usr/local/lib/sqs-worker/sqs-worker-store
 ::respawn:/usr/local/lib/sqs-worker/sqs-worker-ready
 ::ctrlaltdel:/sbin/reboot
 ::shutdown:/usr/local/lib/sqs-worker/sqs-worker-stop
@@ -1,19 +1,23 @@
-# sqs-worker-lib.sh — shared by the SQS worker guest's readiness and stop
+# sqs-worker-lib.sh — shared by the SQS guest's store, readiness and stop
 # steps. Sourced, never executed. Every path and command is overridable so the
 # host test can drive the same code against test-owned processes and stub tools.
 #
-# store-ready exists only while the running watcher's last check passed. A
-# check proves the store accepted the worker key, not the store server's
-# identity, and a store failure is noticed up to one interval plus call time late.
+# The guest runs its own SQS nats-server on loopback and the worker beside it.
+# The server starts only after boot settled the receipt key; store-ready exists
+# only while the running watcher's last check of that server passed.

 SQSW_RUN=${SQSW_RUN:-/run/sqs-worker}
 SQSW_DATA=${SQSW_DATA:-/data}
 SQSW_CONSOLE=${SQSW_CONSOLE:-/dev/console}
 SQSW_MOUNTS=${SQSW_MOUNTS:-/proc/mounts}
 SQSW_BIN=${SQSW_BIN:-/usr/local/bin/sqs-worker}
+SQSW_LIB=${SQSW_LIB:-/usr/local/lib/sqs-worker/sqs-worker-lib.sh}
+SQSW_NATS_BIN=${SQSW_NATS_BIN:-/usr/local/bin/nats-server}
+SQSW_STORE_PORT=${SQSW_STORE_PORT:-4222}
 SQSW_STOP_BUDGET_TENTHS=${SQSW_STOP_BUDGET_TENTHS:-100}
 SQSW_RESPAWN_GAP=${SQSW_RESPAWN_GAP:-5}
-SQSW_PARK_INTERVAL=${SQSW_PARK_INTERVAL:-30}
+SQSW_PARK=${SQSW_PARK:-sleep 2147483647}
+SQSW_BOOT_RETRY=${SQSW_BOOT_RETRY:-30}
 UMOUNT=${UMOUNT:-umount}

 sqsw_log() { echo "[sqs-worker] $*" >> "$SQSW_CONSOLE"; }
@@ -28,28 +32,102 @@ sqsw_starttime() { sed 's/.*) //' "/proc/$1/stat" 2>/dev/null | cut -d' ' -f20;
 # sqsw_same <pid> <starttime>: the recorded process is still alive.
 sqsw_same() { [ -n "$2" ] && sqsw_alive "$1" && [ "$(sqsw_starttime "$1")" = "$2" ]; }

+# sqsw_write_config <file>: the guest's own server. It listens only on
+# loopback, with no monitor, route or cluster listener. Its max_payload admits
+# a 1 MiB SQS message with its headers (ADR-0011:S4); the 1MB default does not.
+sqsw_write_config() {
+    cat > "$1" <<CONF
+listen: "127.0.0.1:$SQSW_STORE_PORT"
+server_name: "sqs-store"
+max_payload: 2MiB
+jetstream {
+  store_dir: "$SQSW_DATA/jetstream"
+  sync_interval: always
+}
+CONF
+}
+
+# sqsw_prepare_store: write and test the server config once boot has settled
+# the receipt key. Returns non-zero, leaving the store unstarted, otherwise.
+sqsw_prepare_store() {
+    rm -f "$SQSW_RUN/store.conf"
+    [ -s "$SQSW_RUN/receipt-ready" ] || { sqsw_log "store: receipt key not settled, store not prepared"; return 1; }
+    umask 077
+    sqsw_write_config "$SQSW_RUN/store.conf.new" || return 1
+    if ! "$SQSW_NATS_BIN" -t -c "$SQSW_RUN/store.conf.new" > "$SQSW_RUN/config-test.out" 2>&1; then
+        sqsw_log "store: FATAL: server config test failed: $(tr '\n' ' ' < "$SQSW_RUN/config-test.out")"
+        return 1
+    fi
+    mv "$SQSW_RUN/store.conf.new" "$SQSW_RUN/store.conf"
+    sqsw_log "store: config written for 127.0.0.1:$SQSW_STORE_PORT; server not started yet"
+}
+
+# sqsw_park <why>: init respawns a step that exits, so a step that must not run
+# logs once and waits for shutdown instead of looping.
+sqsw_park() {
+    sqsw_log "$1"
+    exec $SQSW_PARK
+}
+
+# sqsw_record <name>: record this process's identity before the stopping
+# check, so a stop that misses the record has already set stopping.
+sqsw_record() { echo "$$ $(sqsw_starttime $$)" > "$SQSW_RUN/$1.pid"; }
+
+# sqsw_boot: settle the disk and receipt key once per guest boot. A transient
+# failure (exit 75) waits and exits so init runs it again; boot never remounts
+# a disk already mounted. Any other failure is final for this guest boot.
+sqsw_boot() {
+    [ ! -e "$SQSW_RUN/boot-refused" ] || sqsw_park "store: boot refused, not starting"
+    [ -s "$SQSW_RUN/receipt-ready" ] && return 0
+    # The boot child records itself before its stopping check, as the other
+    # steps do, so shutdown either sees its record or it never starts.
+    SQSW_RUN="$SQSW_RUN" SQSW_BIN="$SQSW_BIN" sh -c '. "$1"; sqsw_record boot; [ ! -e "$SQSW_RUN/stopping" ] || exit 75; exec "$SQSW_BIN" boot' \
+        sh "$SQSW_LIB" >> "$SQSW_CONSOLE" 2>&1 &
+    child=$!
+    rc=0
+    wait "$child" || rc=$?
+    rm -f "$SQSW_RUN/boot.pid"
+    [ ! -e "$SQSW_RUN/stopping" ] || sqsw_park "store: shutdown during boot, not starting"
+    case "$rc" in
+        0) return 0 ;;
+        75) sqsw_log "store: boot not settled, retrying in ${SQSW_BOOT_RETRY}s"
+            sleep "$SQSW_BOOT_RETRY"
+            exit 1 ;;
+        *) : > "$SQSW_RUN/boot-refused"
+           sqsw_park "store: boot refused (rc=$rc), not starting" ;;
+    esac
+}
+
+# sqsw_store: the respawned server body. It starts only on a prepared config.
+sqsw_store() {
+    mkdir -p "$SQSW_RUN"
+    sqsw_record store
+    [ ! -e "$SQSW_RUN/stopping" ] || sqsw_park "store: shutdown in progress, not starting"
+    sqsw_boot
+    if [ ! -s "$SQSW_RUN/store.conf" ] && ! sqsw_prepare_store; then
+        : > "$SQSW_RUN/boot-refused"
+        sqsw_park "store: not prepared, not starting"
+    fi
+    sqsw_log "store: starting pid=$$"
+    # ADR-0011:S11 bounds the store's Go heap; the guest must be larger.
+    GOMEMLIMIT=512MiB exec "$SQSW_NATS_BIN" -c "$SQSW_RUN/store.conf"
+}
+
 # sqsw_run: the respawned readiness body. A predecessor that was killed or
-# crashed could not remove its marker, so every start removes it first. Its
-# identity is recorded before the stopping check, as the store's run step does.
+# crashed could not remove its marker, so every start removes it first.
 sqsw_run() {
    mkdir -p "$SQSW_RUN"
-    echo "$$ $(sqsw_starttime $$)" > "$SQSW_RUN/ready.pid"
+    sqsw_record ready
    if [ -e "$SQSW_RUN/store-ready" ]; then
        rm -f "$SQSW_RUN/store-ready"
        sqsw_log "ready: removed a store-ready marker left by an earlier watcher"
    fi
-    # Returning here would make init respawn and log at once, forever. Park
-    # instead, logging once: shutdown stops this recorded process, and a key
-    # that appears later lets the watcher start.
-    if [ -e "$SQSW_RUN/stopping" ] || [ ! -s "$SQSW_RUN/public-key" ]; then
-        if [ -e "$SQSW_RUN/stopping" ]; then
-            sqsw_log "ready: shutdown in progress, not starting"
-        else
-            sqsw_log "ready: no worker key; readiness not started, waiting"
-        fi
-        while [ -e "$SQSW_RUN/stopping" ] || [ ! -s "$SQSW_RUN/public-key" ]; do
-            sleep "$SQSW_PARK_INTERVAL"
-        done
+    [ ! -e "$SQSW_RUN/stopping" ] || sqsw_park "ready: shutdown in progress, not starting"
+    [ ! -e "$SQSW_RUN/boot-refused" ] || sqsw_park "ready: boot refused, readiness not started"
+    # Boot may still be retrying; check again after a gap rather than parking.
+    if [ ! -s "$SQSW_RUN/store.conf" ]; then
+        sleep "$SQSW_RESPAWN_GAP"
+        exit 0
    fi
    # Init respawns at once; a watcher that keeps exiting restarts at most
    # once per gap instead of in a tight loop.
@@ -62,37 +140,47 @@ sqsw_run() {
    exec "$SQSW_BIN" ready >> "$SQSW_CONSOLE" 2>&1
 }

-# sqsw_stop: block any respawn, drop the marker, SIGTERM the recorded watcher,
-# SIGKILL only after the budget, and unmount the worker disk only once the
-# watcher is confirmed gone. A survivor keeps the disk mounted.
+# sqsw_end <name>: SIGTERM the recorded process, SIGKILL only after the
+# budget. Returns non-zero while it is still alive.
+sqsw_end() {
+    rec=$(cat "$SQSW_RUN/$1.pid" 2>/dev/null || true)
+    pid=${rec%% *} st=${rec#* }
+    [ "$st" != "$rec" ] || st=""
+    if [ -z "$pid" ] || ! sqsw_same "$pid" "$st"; then
+        sqsw_log "stop: no running $1"
+        return 0
+    fi
+    kill -TERM "$pid" 2>/dev/null || true
+    sqsw_log "stop: SIGTERM sent to $1 pid=$pid"
+    i=0
+    while sqsw_same "$pid" "$st" && [ "$i" -lt "$SQSW_STOP_BUDGET_TENTHS" ]; do sleep 0.1; i=$((i + 1)); done
+    if sqsw_same "$pid" "$st"; then
+        sqsw_log "stop: $1 pid=$pid still running after $((SQSW_STOP_BUDGET_TENTHS / 10))s, SIGKILL"
+        kill -KILL "$pid" 2>/dev/null || true
+        j=0
+        while sqsw_same "$pid" "$st" && [ "$j" -lt 30 ]; do sleep 0.1; j=$((j + 1)); done
+    fi
+    if sqsw_same "$pid" "$st"; then
+        sqsw_log "stop: $1 pid=$pid STILL ALIVE"
+        return 1
+    fi
+    sqsw_log "stop: $1 pid=$pid exited"
+    rm -f "$SQSW_RUN/$1.pid"
+}
+
+# sqsw_stop: block any respawn, drop the marker, stop the watcher, the server
+# and any boot in progress, and unmount the disk only once all are confirmed
+# gone. A survivor keeps the disk mounted.
 sqsw_stop() {
    mkdir -p "$SQSW_RUN"
    : > "$SQSW_RUN/stopping"
    rm -f "$SQSW_RUN/store-ready"
-    rec=$(cat "$SQSW_RUN/ready.pid" 2>/dev/null || true)
-    pid=${rec%% *} st=${rec#* }
-    [ "$st" != "$rec" ] || st=""
-    if [ -n "$pid" ] && sqsw_same "$pid" "$st"; then
-        kill -TERM "$pid" 2>/dev/null || true
-        sqsw_log "stop: SIGTERM sent to readiness watcher pid=$pid"
-        i=0
-        while sqsw_same "$pid" "$st" && [ "$i" -lt "$SQSW_STOP_BUDGET_TENTHS" ]; do sleep 0.1; i=$((i + 1)); done
-        if sqsw_same "$pid" "$st"; then
-            sqsw_log "stop: readiness watcher pid=$pid still running after $((SQSW_STOP_BUDGET_TENTHS / 10))s, SIGKILL"
-            kill -KILL "$pid" 2>/dev/null || true
-            j=0
-            while sqsw_same "$pid" "$st" && [ "$j" -lt 30 ]; do sleep 0.1; j=$((j + 1)); done
-        fi
-        if sqsw_same "$pid" "$st"; then
-            rm -f "$SQSW_RUN/store-ready"
-            sqsw_log "stop: readiness watcher pid=$pid STILL ALIVE, leaving $SQSW_DATA mounted"
-            return 1
-        fi
-        sqsw_log "stop: readiness watcher pid=$pid exited"
-    else
-        sqsw_log "stop: no running readiness watcher"
+    if ! sqsw_end ready || ! sqsw_end store || ! sqsw_end boot; then
+        rm -f "$SQSW_RUN/store-ready"
+        sqsw_log "stop: leaving $SQSW_DATA mounted"
+        return 1
    fi
-    rm -f "$SQSW_RUN/store-ready" "$SQSW_RUN/ready.pid"
+    rm -f "$SQSW_RUN/store-ready"
    sync
    if grep -q " $SQSW_DATA " "$SQSW_MOUNTS" 2>/dev/null; then
        rc=0
@@ -102,11 +190,11 @@ sqsw_stop() {
 }

 # sqsw_shutdown: the only shutdown action. The generic read-only remount runs
-# only after the watcher stopped; a survivor keeps every mount as it is.
+# only after both processes stopped; a survivor keeps every mount as it is.
 sqsw_shutdown() {
    if ! sqsw_stop; then
        sync
-        sqsw_log "shutdown: readiness watcher survived, skipping umount -a -r"
+        sqsw_log "shutdown: a guest process survived, skipping umount -a -r"
        return 1
    fi
    rc=0
@@ -1,8 +1,9 @@
 #!/bin/sh
-# sysinit: load the disk drivers, then select, check and mount the worker disk
-# and load or create the worker's store key on it. Any refusal is logged; the
-# key is never read or created on a disk that is not proven mounted.
+# sysinit: load the disk drivers and clear this boot's markers. The respawned
+# store step mounts the disk, settles the receipt key and starts the store.
+. /usr/local/lib/sqs-worker/sqs-worker-lib.sh
 modprobe virtio_blk 2>/dev/null || true
 modprobe ext4 2>/dev/null || true
-/usr/local/bin/sqs-worker boot >> /dev/console 2>&1 || echo "[sqs-worker] boot refused" >> /dev/console
+mkdir -p "$SQSW_RUN"
+rm -f "$SQSW_RUN/receipt-ready" "$SQSW_RUN/store.conf" "$SQSW_RUN/boot-refused"
 exit 0
@@ -1,6 +1,5 @@
 #!/bin/sh
-# Respawned by init. A watcher that must not run parks here instead of exiting,
-# so init does not respawn it in a tight loop.
+# Respawned by init: the worker, reporting ready only while the local store
+# answers. A watcher that must not run parks instead of exiting.
 . /usr/local/lib/sqs-worker/sqs-worker-lib.sh
 sqsw_run
-exec sleep 2147483647
@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
 #!/bin/sh
-# The only shutdown action: stop the readiness watcher and unmount the worker
-# disk, then run the generic read-only remount only if the watcher is gone.
+# The only shutdown action: stop the worker, then the store, and unmount the
+# data disk, then run the generic read-only remount only if both are gone.
 . /usr/local/lib/sqs-worker/sqs-worker-lib.sh
 sqsw_shutdown
@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
+#!/bin/sh
+# Respawned by init: the guest's own SQS nats-server, started only on a
+# prepared config. A store that must not run parks instead of exiting.
+. /usr/local/lib/sqs-worker/sqs-worker-lib.sh
+sqsw_store
@@ -17,6 +17,7 @@ import (
 	iamawsapi "github.com/mulgadc/spinifex/spinifex/domains/iam/awsapi"
 	rdsawsapi "github.com/mulgadc/spinifex/spinifex/domains/rds/awsapi"
 	route53awsapi "github.com/mulgadc/spinifex/spinifex/domains/route53/awsapi"
+	sqsawsapi "github.com/mulgadc/spinifex/spinifex/domains/sqs/awsapi"
 	stsawsapi "github.com/mulgadc/spinifex/spinifex/domains/sts/awsapi"
 	"github.com/mulgadc/spinifex/spinifex/ingress/aws/dispatch"

@@ -66,6 +67,7 @@ func compareAll() ([]awsmodel.OperationCoverage, error) {
 		ecsawsapi.ServiceName:     ecsawsapi.OperationInventory(),
 		eksawsapi.ServiceName:     eksawsapi.OperationInventory(),
 		iamawsapi.ServiceName:     iamawsapi.OperationInventory(),
+		sqsawsapi.ServiceName:     sqsawsapi.OperationInventory(),
 		stsawsapi.ServiceName:     stsawsapi.OperationInventory(),
 	})
 	// The loop below walks the embedded models, so a served service with no
@@ -6,6 +6,7 @@
 //
 //	eks-gateway-fetch -resource addons   # GET /clusters/{cluster}/internal-addons/{accountId}
 //	eks-gateway-fetch -resource recovery -instance-id i-… # GET /clusters/{cluster}/internal-recovery/{accountId}/{instanceId}
+//	eks-gateway-fetch -resource workers  # GET /clusters/{cluster}/internal-workers/{accountId}
 //
 // Flags default to environment variables seeded by cloud-init:
 // EKS_GATEWAY_URL, EKS_GATEWAY_CA, EKS_ACCESS_KEY, EKS_SECRET_KEY, EKS_REGION,
@@ -33,7 +34,7 @@ func main() {
 	flag.StringVar(&cfg.AccountID, "account-id", os.Getenv("EKS_ACCOUNT_ID"), "Cluster account ID")
 	flag.StringVar(&cfg.ClusterName, "cluster", os.Getenv("EKS_CLUSTER_NAME"), "Cluster name")
 	flag.StringVar(&cfg.InstanceID, "instance-id", os.Getenv("EKS_INSTANCE_ID"), "This member's EC2 instance ID (recovery resource)")
-	flag.StringVar(&cfg.Resource, "resource", "addons", "Resource to fetch: addons | recovery")
+	flag.StringVar(&cfg.Resource, "resource", "addons", "Resource to fetch: addons | recovery | workers")
 	flag.Parse()

 	if err := gatewayfetch.Run(context.Background(), cfg); err != nil {
@@ -0,0 +1,32 @@
+// Command eks-pod-identity-webhook is the IRSA mutating admission webhook run
+// on every EKS control-plane server; the implementation is in
+// agents/eks/podidentity. It listens on loopback only and is called by the
+// local kube-apiserver.
+package main
+
+import (
+	"context"
+	"log/slog"
+	"os"
+	"os/signal"
+	"syscall"
+
+	_ "github.com/mulgadc/bluebottle/pkg/fipsboot"
+
+	"github.com/mulgadc/spinifex/spinifex/agents/eks/podidentity"
+)
+
+func main() {
+	log := slog.New(slog.NewTextHandler(os.Stderr, nil))
+	cfg, err := podidentity.ParseServiceConfig(os.Args[1:], os.Getenv, os.Stderr)
+	if err != nil {
+		log.Error("invalid configuration", "error", err)
+		os.Exit(2)
+	}
+	ctx, stop := signal.NotifyContext(context.Background(), syscall.SIGINT, syscall.SIGTERM)
+	defer stop()
+	if err := podidentity.Run(ctx, cfg, log); err != nil {
+		log.Error("pod identity webhook stopped", "error", err)
+		os.Exit(1)
+	}
+}
@@ -1,17 +1,22 @@
-// sqs-worker runs inside the shared SQS worker microVM.
+// sqs-worker runs inside the SQS microVM, next to its own SQS NATS server.
 //
 // Usage:
 //
 //	sqs-worker boot
 //	sqs-worker ready
 //
-// boot selects and mounts the worker's data disk named by fw_cfg, asks the
-// gateway for its current first-store decision with its instance-role
-// credentials, then loads or creates the store key on that disk and
-// publishes only the public key. ready then keeps checking the bound store's
-// JetStream with that key until it is stopped, keeping a readiness marker only
-// while the check passes; it proves the store accepted the worker key, not
-// the store server's identity.
+// boot selects and mounts the guest's data disk named by fw_cfg, asks the
+// gateway for its receipt key decision with its instance-role credentials,
+// then loads the recorded key, or creates one on a new volume and records its
+// fingerprint, before the guest's SQS store first starts on that disk. ready
+// then keeps checking the guest's own loopback JetStream, keeping a readiness
+// marker only while it answers, and serves SQS owner calls against it, pulling
+// them from the gateway with the same credentials.
+//
+// Serving is refused unless the gateway reports a single-node host cluster.
+// A disk whose receipt key is missing or does not match the recorded one
+// refuses to serve; recovering it needs a procedure not yet designed, and
+// nothing deletes or replaces the volume.
 package main

 import (
@@ -23,10 +28,14 @@ import (
 	"syscall"
 	"time"

+	"github.com/nats-io/nats.go/jetstream"
+
 	"github.com/mulgadc/spinifex/internal/gwsign"
 	"github.com/mulgadc/spinifex/internal/sqsworkergw"
 	"github.com/mulgadc/spinifex/spinifex/agents/sqs/workerboot"
 	"github.com/mulgadc/spinifex/spinifex/agents/sqs/workerkey"
+	"github.com/mulgadc/spinifex/spinifex/domains/sqs/workerserve"
+	"github.com/mulgadc/spinifex/spinifex/foundation/state/clustersize"
 )

 // The cluster CA the daemon supplies; the only root the client trusts.
@@ -36,7 +45,11 @@ const caPath = "/sys/firmware/qemu_fw_cfg/by_name/opt/spinifex/ca-cert/raw"
 // no static-key fallback.
 func newClaimer() workerboot.NewClaimer {
 	return func(region, gatewayURL string) (workerkey.Claimer, error) {
-		return newClient(region, gatewayURL)
+		c, err := newClient(region, gatewayURL)
+		if err != nil {
+			return nil, err
+		}
+		return workerboot.GatewayClaimer{Client: c}, nil
 	}
 }

@@ -48,13 +61,6 @@ func newClient(region, gatewayURL string) (*sqsworkergw.Client, error) {
 	return sqsworkergw.New(gatewayURL, region, ca, gwsign.NewInstanceRole())
 }

-type describer struct{ c *sqsworkergw.Client }
-
-func (d describer) DescribeStore(ctx context.Context) (workerboot.Store, error) {
-	st, err := d.c.DescribeStore(ctx)
-	return workerboot.Store(st), err
-}
-
 func main() {
 	if len(os.Args) != 2 || (os.Args[1] != "boot" && os.Args[1] != "ready") {
 		fmt.Fprintln(os.Stderr, "usage: sqs-worker boot|ready")
@@ -66,11 +72,18 @@ func main() {
 		run = ready
 	}
 	if err := run(logf); err != nil {
+		if os.Args[1] == "boot" && workerboot.Transient(err) {
+			logf("boot not settled, will retry: " + err.Error())
+			os.Exit(exitTransient)
+		}
 		logf("FATAL: " + err.Error())
 		os.Exit(1)
 	}
 }

+// exitTransient tells the guest's supervisor that boot may be run again.
+const exitTransient = 75
+
 func config(logf func(string)) workerboot.Config {
 	return workerboot.Config{
 		FwCfgDir:      "/sys/firmware/qemu_fw_cfg/by_name/opt/spinifex/sqs-worker",
@@ -99,19 +112,26 @@ func boot(logf func(string)) error {
 func ready(logf func(string)) error {
 	ctx, cancel := signal.NotifyContext(context.Background(), syscall.SIGTERM, syscall.SIGINT)
 	defer cancel()
+	// The store is one guest, so its streams and buckets are R1.
+	if err := clustersize.Declare(1); err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
 	err := workerboot.Watch(ctx, workerboot.ReadyConfig{
-		Config: config(logf),
-		NewDescriber: func(region, gatewayURL string) (workerboot.StoreDescriber, error) {
-			c, err := newClient(region, gatewayURL)
-			if err != nil {
-				return nil, err
-			}
-			return describer{c}, nil
-		},
+		Config:      config(logf),
 		Checker:     workerboot.NATSChecker{},
 		CallTimeout: 30 * time.Second,
 		Refresh:     30 * time.Second,
 		Refused:     5 * time.Minute,
+		Serve: &workerboot.ServeConfig{
+			Connector: workerboot.NATSConnector{},
+			Run: func(ctx context.Context, region, gatewayURL string, js jetstream.JetStream, receiptKey []byte) error {
+				c, err := newClient(region, gatewayURL)
+				if err != nil {
+					return err
+				}
+				return workerserve.Run(ctx, c, js, receiptKey, logf)
+			},
+		},
 	})
 	if errors.Is(err, context.Canceled) {
 		return nil
@@ -10,7 +10,7 @@ quota state.
 a request/reply route on which a gateway, in the `awsgw-quota-seal` queue
 group, irreversibly seals one account's quota override record.
 `domains/admission/quota` owns it: `awsgw` serves it.
-`accountteardown` is the consumer: it calls this subject to fence every
+`operator/accountlifecycle` is the consumer: it calls this subject to fence every
 override writer at the quota owner before the account record is removed.

 The request names the account in its body (`account_id`) and may carry an
@@ -31,10 +31,20 @@ Any current gateway may answer; the leader-accepted revision is the evidence
 whichever one does, and the override bucket is opened at seal time even on a
 gateway whose quotas were disabled at startup.

+## Seal-quota-override capability
+
+`AccountQuotaOverrideSealCapabilitySubject(node)` (`admission.v1.AccountQuotaOverrideSealCapability.<node>`) is a per-node, read-only request/reply route on which `operator/accountlifecycle` asks one configured gateway whether it supports the quota override seal, immediately before every seal attempt.
+The quota owner (`domains/admission/quota`) owns it: `awsgw` serves it with no queue group, so a request addressed to one node reaches only subscribers configured as that node, and two gateways sharing a node ID both answer.
+The consumer's quota seal reaper probes every configured node that runs `awsgw` and sends no seal request unless every one answers compatible.
+
+`AccountQuotaOverrideSealCapabilityVersion` is a claim about the whole binary's writers, not about the responder: version 1 means every quota override writer in the binary is revision-guarded and refuses a sealed record, and the binary serves the seal subject.
+A gateway binary without this responder has no subscriber, so the probe for that node reads as incomplete (`no-reply`), the same as a stopped or partitioned node.
+The reply proves nothing beyond the moment it was sent: a gateway downgraded or replaced after a successful probe is outside the guarantee.
+
 ### Compatibility boundary

-The subject name carries the contract major; `account_quota_seal_test.go`
-preserves the version-1 JSON shape.
+The subject name carries the contract major; `account_quota_seal_test.go` and `account_quota_seal_capability_test.go`
+preserve the version-1 JSON shapes and the subject builder.
 Producer and consumer are in the coordinated Spinifex release, so the window
 is N and N-1.
 A gateway that predates the subject has no subscription, so the request gets
@@ -0,0 +1,39 @@
+package admissionv1
+
+import "strings"
+
+// AccountQuotaOverrideSealCapabilityVersion is the version this binary reports.
+// Version 1: every quota override writer in the binary is revision-guarded and
+// refuses a sealed record, and the seal subject is served.
+const AccountQuotaOverrideSealCapabilityVersion = 1
+
+// AccountQuotaOverrideSealCapabilitySubject is one gateway's read-only
+// seal-capability route, addressed per node so a probe reaches exactly the
+// node it asks about.
+func AccountQuotaOverrideSealCapabilitySubject(node string) string {
+	return "admission.v1.AccountQuotaOverrideSealCapability." + node
+}
+
+// ValidSealCapabilityNode reports whether node is exactly one NATS subject
+// token. Responder and probe both check it before building a subject, so
+// neither can address a wildcard or another node's route.
+func ValidSealCapabilityNode(node string) bool {
+	return node != "" && !strings.ContainsAny(node, ".*>\t\n\r ")
+}
+
+// AccountQuotaOverrideSealCapabilityRequest asks node whether it supports the
+// quota override seal. CorrelationRef is an opaque caller reference echoed for
+// logs; it grants nothing and is never a fence or authority to write.
+type AccountQuotaOverrideSealCapabilityRequest struct {
+	Node           string `json:"node"`
+	CorrelationRef string `json:"correlation_ref,omitempty"`
+}
+
+// AccountQuotaOverrideSealCapabilityReply reports the responding node's
+// capability version. It carries no account data and proves nothing beyond
+// the moment it was sent.
+type AccountQuotaOverrideSealCapabilityReply struct {
+	Node              string `json:"node"`
+	CapabilityVersion int    `json:"capability_version"`
+	CorrelationRef    string `json:"correlation_ref,omitempty"`
+}
@@ -0,0 +1,43 @@
+package admissionv1
+
+import (
+	"encoding/json"
+	"testing"
+
+	"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
+)
+
+func TestAccountQuotaOverrideSealCapabilitySubject(t *testing.T) {
+	require.Equal(t, "admission.v1.AccountQuotaOverrideSealCapability.node-1", AccountQuotaOverrideSealCapabilitySubject("node-1"))
+	require.Equal(t, "admission.v1.AccountQuotaOverrideSealCapability.node-2", AccountQuotaOverrideSealCapabilitySubject("node-2"))
+}
+
+func TestAccountQuotaOverrideSealCapabilityRequestJSONContract(t *testing.T) {
+	data, err := json.Marshal(AccountQuotaOverrideSealCapabilityRequest{Node: "node-1", CorrelationRef: "req-1"})
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+	require.JSONEq(t, `{"node":"node-1","correlation_ref":"req-1"}`, string(data))
+
+	data, err = json.Marshal(AccountQuotaOverrideSealCapabilityRequest{Node: "node-1"})
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+	require.JSONEq(t, `{"node":"node-1"}`, string(data))
+}
+
+func TestAccountQuotaOverrideSealCapabilityReplyJSONContract(t *testing.T) {
+	reply := AccountQuotaOverrideSealCapabilityReply{Node: "node-1", CapabilityVersion: 1, CorrelationRef: "req-1"}
+	data, err := json.Marshal(reply)
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+	require.JSONEq(t, `{"node":"node-1","capability_version":1,"correlation_ref":"req-1"}`, string(data))
+
+	data, err = json.Marshal(AccountQuotaOverrideSealCapabilityReply{Node: "node-1", CapabilityVersion: 1})
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+	require.JSONEq(t, `{"node":"node-1","capability_version":1}`, string(data))
+}
+
+func TestValidSealCapabilityNode(t *testing.T) {
+	for _, node := range []string{"node-1", "node_2", "n3"} {
+		require.True(t, ValidSealCapabilityNode(node), node)
+	}
+	for _, node := range []string{"", "a.b", "*", ">", "node-*", "node >", "node\t1", "node\n1"} {
+		require.False(t, ValidSealCapabilityNode(node), "%q", node)
+	}
+}
@@ -155,7 +155,7 @@ Operational commands for inspecting cluster state. These fan out NATS requests t
 | `spx admin account list --remote` | `--endpoint` (default: this node's AWS gateway), `--region` (default: this node's region), `--ca-bundle` (default: this node's CA) | Same listing read through `POST /admin/ListAccounts` over SigV4 instead of NATS, so an off-cluster operator or the load-test harness sees its tenants without SSH access to a node. Credentials come from the standard AWS chain; the caller must be an IAM user in the super-admin account holding `spinifex:ListAccounts`. |
 | `spx admin account quota get <account-id>` | `--endpoint` (default: this node's AWS gateway), `--region` (default: this node's region), `--ca-bundle` (default: this node's CA) | Reads the limits in force for one account through `POST /admin/GetAccountQuota` over SigV4, and reports for each dimension whether it came from the `[quota]` block in `awsgw.toml` (`config`) or from an override stored against the account (`override`). Credentials come from the standard AWS chain; the caller must be an IAM user in the super-admin account holding `spinifex:GetAccountQuota`. |
 | `spx admin account quota set <account-id>` | `--vcpus`, `--vpcs`, `--subnets`, `--eips`, `--volumes`, `--volumes-gib`, `--rds-instances`, `--load-balancers`, `--clear`, plus `--endpoint`, `--region`, `--ca-bundle` | Overrides individual limits for one account through `POST /admin/PutAccountQuota`, leaving every dimension not named inheriting the configured baseline. `-1` uncaps a dimension; `0` is a real limit that denies every request on it. `--clear` removes the whole override record and cannot be combined with a limit flag. The account must already exist. Prints the resulting limits, so a caller never has to guess what it applied. The caller must hold `spinifex:PutAccountQuota`. |
-| `spx admin account delete <account-id>` | `--dry-run`, `--force`, `--yes` (requires `--name`), `--name` (account name, must match the stored record) | Prints the inventory it is about to remove → confirms the account name (prompted unless `--name` is given) → marks the account `TERMINATING`, which blocks its credentials cluster-wide → deletes its resources in dependency order (compute, attachments, storage, network, platform, identity, account), waiting for each stage to actually drain before starting the next → releases the name reservation and quota counter → deletes the account record. Anything that will not delete is reported as **stuck** with the reason, and the account stays `TERMINATING` so the residue keeps an owner. `000000000000` and `000000000001` are refused. `--dry-run` lists and changes nothing. The compute stage reaps ECS clusters, EKS nodegroups and clusters, and RDS instances before it reaps plain instances, because their backing VMs belong to the system account and a tenant-scoped instance listing cannot see them. The storage stage reaps the account's S3 buckets: uploads in flight are aborted, then the objects are removed a page at a time, then the bucket. Only buckets the account owns are ever listed, so the shared platform buckets are out of reach rather than filtered out. Platform-managed serving endpoints are reaped ahead of instances, because only their own delete releases the ENI and attached data volume alongside the VM, and spot instance requests are cancelled first so a live request cannot launch a replacement for something already terminated. The network stage reaps load balancers, then target groups, then NAT gateways and egress-only internet gateways before the subnets, security groups and addresses they hold. The platform stage reaps ACM certificates. |
+| `spx admin account delete <account-id>` | `--dry-run`, `--force`, `--yes` (requires `--name`), `--name` (account name, must match the stored record) | Prints the inventory it is about to remove → confirms the account name (prompted unless `--name` is given) → marks the account `TERMINATING`, which blocks its credentials cluster-wide → deletes its resources in dependency order (compute, attachments, storage, network, platform, identity, account), waiting for each stage to actually drain before starting the next → seals the account's quota override record so no later write can recreate it, which needs every gateway node the cluster configures to answer a read-only probe first (otherwise nothing is sealed and the account stays `TERMINATING`) → releases the name reservation and quota counter → deletes the account record. Anything that will not delete is reported as **stuck** with the reason, and the account stays `TERMINATING` so the residue keeps an owner. `000000000000` and `000000000001` are refused. `--dry-run` lists and changes nothing. The compute stage reaps ECS clusters, EKS nodegroups and clusters, and RDS instances before it reaps plain instances, because their backing VMs belong to the system account and a tenant-scoped instance listing cannot see them. The storage stage reaps the account's S3 buckets: uploads in flight are aborted, then the objects are removed a page at a time, then the bucket. Only buckets the account owns are ever listed, so the shared platform buckets are out of reach rather than filtered out. Platform-managed serving endpoints are reaped ahead of instances, because only their own delete releases the ENI and attached data volume alongside the VM, and spot instance requests are cancelled first so a live request cannot launch a replacement for something already terminated. The network stage reaps load balancers, then target groups, then NAT gateways and egress-only internet gateways before the subnets, security groups and addresses they hold. The platform stage reaps ACM certificates. |
 | `spx admin account delete --force` | as above | Escalates only for resources the ordinary API refuses: it clears a volume attachment in the control plane without the guest's cooperation (`ec2.ForceDetachVolume`), hard-destroys after a graceful attempt times out, and treats an already-missing resource as deleted. It never reorders the stages and never widens scope beyond the account. Use it once the guest is being destroyed — this is the escape from a volume stuck attached to an instance that will not terminate, where neither can otherwise be deleted. |
 | `spx admin account delete --remote` | as above, plus `--endpoint`, `--region`, `--ca-bundle`, `--client-token` | Same teardown driven through `POST /admin/DeleteAccount` over SigV4 instead of NATS, then follows `DescribeAccountDeletion` to completion, printing each stage as it lands. Credentials come from the standard AWS chain; the caller must be an IAM user in the super-admin account holding `spinifex:DeleteAccount` and `spinifex:DescribeAccountDeletion`. |
 | `spx admin principal create <name>` | `--grant` (repeatable or comma-separated; default: every admin method — `CreateAccount`, `DeleteAccount`, `DescribeAccountDeletion`, `GetAccountQuota`, `ListAccounts`, `PutAccountQuota`) | Creates an IAM user in the super-admin account with an inline `spx-admin-methods` policy allowing the requested methods, revokes any access key left from a previous run, and mints one new key. Each method is named rather than granted as `spinifex:*`, so a later addition to the admin surface is not authorised by an existing key. The principal's grants are exactly that one policy: re-running with fewer `--grant` values narrows it, and any other inline policy on the user is removed, so a rename cannot leave a wider grant behind. The secret is printed once; store it in a secret manager or an AWS profile, never in a config file. `admin` is refused as a name — it is the account's own administrator and rotating its key would revoke the bootstrap credential. |
@@ -194,18 +194,32 @@ Operational commands for inspecting cluster state. These fan out NATS requests t

 ### SQS System Instances

-These commands start the first SQS system instances on one node. They do not serve the SQS API, and a bound VM is not a ready service.
+These commands enable SQS on a single-node cluster and start its one system VM.
+A bound VM is not a ready service: `spx admin sqs status` reports readiness.

-Both send a signed `spinifex` admin action (`EnsureSQSWorker`, `EnsureSQSStore`) to the AWS gateway using the standard AWS credential chain, for example `AWS_PROFILE=spinifex`. The caller must be in the super-admin account (`000000000001`) and hold `spinifex:<Action>`. The VMs, volumes, private VPC and ENIs belong to the system account (`000000000000`). `--endpoint`, `--region` and `--ca-bundle` default to this node's gateway, region and `config/ca.pem`; off a node, `--endpoint` and `--region` are required. Each call waits up to 11 minutes.
+The SQS VM runs two processes on one encrypted data volume: the Region's dedicated SQS NATS server, which listens only on the guest's loopback address and is separate from platform NATS, and the worker, which serves SQS owner calls from that local store. The worker starts serving only after the local store answers and the receipt-signing key on the volume matches the fingerprint the platform recorded.
+
+SQS supports only a fresh single-node install. A worker record without a supported launch contract, or any record of the separate SQS store VM from an earlier dev build, cannot be upgraded: `enable` refuses it, and any existing volume is kept, not inspected, emptied or replaced. An existing separate store VM is refused on relaunch with its volume kept, and an existing worker VM is not restarted into a supported mode; upgrading such an install is unsupported.
+
+**Do not put tenant production data in SQS.** SQS-managed per-message encryption is not implemented: `GetQueueAttributes` reports `SqsManagedSseEnabled=false`, and a request to enable SSE-SQS or SSE-KMS is rejected.
+The SQS data volume must be encrypted, which is a separate layer under every queue and not SSE.
+There is no `DeleteQueue` or `PurgeQueue`, so a queue and its unexpired messages cannot be removed once created.
+Retention is checked when a message is received, against the queue's retention at that moment, and nothing deletes an expired message: the store drops a body only at its age backstop of 14 days and 1 hour.
+So a message past a short retention can be delivered again if `MessageRetentionPeriod` is later raised while its body is still stored.
+Account termination does not yet remove SQS queues or messages, and there is no disable: the VM's volume, receipt key and data are kept.
+
+Each sends a signed `spinifex` admin action (`EnableSQS`, `DescribeSQS`, `EnsureSQSWorker`) to the AWS gateway using the standard AWS credential chain, for example `AWS_PROFILE=spinifex`. The caller must be in the super-admin account (`000000000001`) and hold `spinifex:<Action>`. The VM, volume, private VPC and ENI belong to the system account (`000000000000`). `--endpoint`, `--region` and `--ca-bundle` default to this node's gateway, region and `config/ca.pem`; off a node, `--endpoint` and `--region` are required. `ensure-worker` and `enable` wait up to 11 minutes, and `status` up to 1 minute.

 | Command | Flags | Description |
 |---------|-------|-------------|
-| `spx admin sqs ensure-worker` | `--node` (required), `--instance-type` (required), `--endpoint`, `--region`, `--ca-bundle` | Launches the Region's one SQS worker VM on `--node`, or reports the VM already bound there: node, region, instance, instance type and generation. The worker is pinned to its first node; another node is refused with `InvalidParameterValue`, and there is no takeover. It gets a private system VPC with one /24 subnet and no internet gateway, NAT or Elastic IP, and an encrypted 1 GiB system-account data volume on which the guest generates its own store key. The platform records only the public key. A different `--instance-type` is accepted only while no volume, network interface or launch step has been attempted; once any has, it is `IncorrectState`, whether or not the step completed. |
-| `spx admin sqs ensure-store` | `--node` (required, the worker's node), `--instance-type` (required, more than 512 MiB memory), `--volume-size-gib` (required, 1–16384), `--endpoint`, `--region`, `--ca-bundle` | Launches the Region's SQS store VM on the worker's node with an encrypted system-account data volume, or reports the VM already bound there: node, region, instance, instance type and address. Needs the worker bound with its public key recorded, else `IncorrectState`. The store accepts only that key. A different size, type or key than the first call is `IncorrectState`. |
+| `spx admin sqs enable` | `--node` (required), `--instance-type` (required, more than 512 MiB memory), `--volume-size-gib` (required, 1–16384), `--endpoint`, `--region`, `--ca-bundle` | Records SQS as enabled for the Region, pinned to `--node`, then launches or reports the SQS VM there. The desired state is recorded first, so rerunning the command resumes an interrupted enable. More than one node in the cluster is refused before anything is recorded. A worker record with a missing or unsupported launch contract, or a record of the separate store VM, is also refused before anything is recorded or launched; any existing volume is kept, and upgrading it is not supported. |
+| `spx admin sqs status` | `--endpoint`, `--region`, `--ca-bundle` | Shows the requested state, node, generation, VM state, receipt key state, whether a worker is polling this gateway, whether this gateway serves the SQS API, and `Ready`, which is true only when all of them hold. `Unsupported` names a record whose missing or unsupported launch contract blocks enable. |
+| `spx admin sqs ensure-worker` | `--node` (required), `--instance-type` (required, more than 512 MiB memory), `--volume-size-gib` (required, 1–16384), `--endpoint`, `--region`, `--ca-bundle` | Launches the Region's one SQS VM on `--node`, or reports the VM already bound there: node, region, instance, instance type and generation. The VM is pinned to its first node; another node is refused with `InvalidParameterValue`, and there is no takeover. It gets a private system VPC with one /24 subnet and no internet gateway, NAT or Elastic IP, and an encrypted system-account data volume of `--volume-size-gib` that holds the queue data and the receipt-signing key the guest creates on first boot. The platform records only the key's fingerprint. A different `--instance-type` is accepted only while no volume, network interface or launch step has been attempted; once any has, it is `IncorrectState`, whether or not the step completed. A different `--volume-size-gib` than the recorded one is `IncorrectState`. |

 `ServiceUnavailable` never proves that no SQS resources exist, because an earlier attempt may already have created some. Its message says what it does establish. When no node serves the subject, this request was not delivered. When a volume create was not sent, that particular create did not happen. When the node cannot boot the guest yet or its launcher lacks a capability, this request stopped before allocating or recording anything. When the gateway times out waiting for the node's reply, nothing is known: the launch may still be running, so never assume it created nothing. In every case, call the command again with the same arguments. A retry first checks the durable record of the attempt and continues only when that is safe; it can proceed to the first launch after a create that was proven unsent, and otherwise reports the recorded outcome as bound or `IncorrectState`, or returns `ServiceUnavailable` again. `IncorrectState` from a volume, network interface or launch step means that step was recorded as sent but its outcome was never observed. It is never resent, the message names the volume when its ID is known, and no tool reconciles it yet: recovery is manual.

-`bound` says only that the VM was launched for the current record. The worker decides store readiness itself, by checking that the store is bound to its own public key and that a NATS connection with that key succeeds; nothing reports that readiness to the operator. The worker-to-store connection does not authenticate the store server. Real VPC routing, IMDS and gateway TLS from the guest, and worker-to-store traffic on a real interface have not been tested.
+`bound` says only that the VM was launched for the current record. The worker is ready only when the guest's local store answers, and it serves only while its receipt key matches the recorded fingerprint; a missing or different key once one is recorded refuses serving and is never replaced.
+Real VPC routing, IMDS and gateway TLS from the guest have not been tested on a live host.

 ## Private Admin API

@@ -203,12 +203,14 @@ Viperblock responds with an NBD URI that QEMU uses to access the block device.

 A direct-boot microVM keeps the launcher's saved `vm.Config` as a clean base, and `startQEMU` adds data volumes only to a launch-only copy of it (`runtime/compute/vm/lifecycle.go`).
 At each start the daemon takes one snapshot of the instance's already-mounted data requests, probes each NBD or host block export from that snapshot, and builds the command from the same snapshot, so the launched endpoint is the one that was checked and is never written back into the saved base.
-Each data volume becomes a `virtio-blk-device` on the MMIO bus with the same id, node name, I/O thread, serial and `werror=stop,rerror=stop` policy as the PCI device, and takes no PCIe hot-plug port.
+The microVM boots with `pcie=on`, so its NICs are `virtio-net-pci` devices with MSI-X interrupts instead of `virtio-net-device` MMIO devices.
+Each data volume becomes a `virtio-blk-pci` device on the default PCIe bus with the same id, node name, I/O thread, serial and `werror=stop,rerror=stop` policy as the q35 device, and takes no PCIe hot-plug port.
+A microVM started without `pcie=on` keeps the `virtio-*-device` MMIO transports.

 Boot and EFI requests are rejected on this path, and a direct-boot instance with no data requests launches its base unchanged.
 Disk-boot (q35) instances keep the existing PCI hot-plug path.

-Hot-attaching a volume to a running direct-boot microVM is not supported, because the MMIO bus has no PCIe root port to plug into.
+Hot-attaching a volume to a running direct-boot microVM is not supported, because the microVM has no PCIe hot-plug root port to plug into.
 `AttachVolume` refuses it before mounting the volume or changing any instance or volume state, and the EC2 API returns `UnsupportedOperation`.

 This covers only requests that are already mounted when the instance starts; nothing yet supplies data volumes to a system instance, and the path is verified with fake-QEMU unit tests, not with a real EBS volume in a guest.
@@ -276,8 +278,8 @@ storage-provider contract.
 ### SQS message store (internal)

 `domains/sqs/message` defines the store-neutral interface the SQS domain reaches its message store through (ADR-0011:S6), with a JetStream adapter in `domains/sqs/message/jetstream` and a shared conformance suite in `domains/sqs/message/conformance`.
-It is an internal primitive: nothing outside the SQS domain uses it, no daemon or service is wired to it, and it does not itself deliver an SQS API.
-The dedicated JetStream server ADR-0011 describes is not deployed by this code, and Spinifex ships no host service, unit, user or firewall rule for it; the guest that could run it is described under *SQS store system instance (not wired)*.
+It is used only by the SQS worker inside the SQS system instance and does not itself deliver an SQS API.
+Spinifex ships no host service, unit, user or firewall rule for the dedicated JetStream server; the system instance that runs it is described under *SQS system instance (operator-launched)*.

 The interface covers durable and idempotent append, body and metadata reads, conditional state writes and deletes, per-namespace counts, namespace enumeration, an ordered change feed, a bounded paginated scan, namespace deletion and a sweep of tombstoned bodies.
 A namespace carries an immutable message-shard and state-shard allocation chosen when the queue is created, so a later change in shard counts never moves an existing queue.
@@ -296,124 +298,36 @@ If that consumer delivers nothing for about two seconds while the stream holds a

 Coverage is unit and conformance tests on in-process R1 and R3 servers; there is no end-to-end or multi-host validation of this code, and earlier multi-host evidence predates the final feed.

-### SQS store system instance (not wired)
+### SQS system instance (operator-launched)

-Spinifex can build, install, launch, restart and give storage to a dedicated SQS store microVM, but nothing calls any of it.
-No SQS API, domain service, admin command or daemon start-up path creates a store, so none of this is in production use.
+One system-owned microVM per Region runs both the SQS store and the SQS worker as separate processes, on one encrypted data volume pinned to one node (ADR-0011 Amendment 5, ADR-0012 Amendment 6).
+Only an operator activates it with the super-admin `EnsureSQSWorker` or `EnableSQS` actions; nothing starts it at daemon startup, and platform NATS is neither used nor changed for SQS data.
+This first profile is fresh single-node only: a host cluster of more than one node is refused before anything is recorded or allocated, and there is no disable.

-The guest image is built by `make build-sqs-store-microvm-image`, separate from the load balancer image, and bundles the `nats-server` version pinned in `go.mod` plus the ext4 tools.
-Release tarballs carry it as `microvm-sqs-store/`, and `setup.sh` installs it to `/usr/share/spinifex/microvm/sqs-store/`.
-A release without a complete image removes any previously installed one, so a launch is then refused rather than booting a stale image.
+`make build-sqs-worker-microvm-image` builds the one `sqs-worker` image: the static `sqs-worker` binary, the pinned `nats-server`, the ext4 tools and a network `/init`; releases ship it as `microvm-sqs-worker`, which `setup.sh` installs to `/usr/share/spinifex/microvm/sqs-worker`.
+At boot the guest reads three firmware config values under `opt/spinifex/sqs-worker/` (the data disk's serial, its Region and the gateway URL on this node's mgmt bridge) and refuses before touching any disk if one is missing or malformed.
+It selects exactly one disk with that serial, runs `e2fsck -p`, mounts it at `/data` and confirms from `/proc/self/mountinfo` that the whole disk is what is mounted; the guest never formats.

-At boot the guest reads three firmware config values: the data disk's serial, an IPv4 address on one of its interfaces, and one NATS user NKey public key.
-It mounts exactly one matching disk at `/data` after `e2fsck -p`, refuses a missing, duplicate, unformatted or unrepairable disk, and never formats.
-JetStream keeps its data on `/data` with `sync_interval: always` (ADR-0011:S3), `max_payload: 2MiB` admits a full 1 MiB SQS message with its headers (ADR-0011:S4), and the server listens only on that address and accepts only that key.
-On shutdown the store is stopped before `/data` is unmounted; a store that survives SIGKILL leaves every mount in place.
+The store is a dedicated `nats-server` listening only on `127.0.0.1`, with its JetStream directory at `/data/jetstream` and `GOMEMLIMIT=512MiB` (ADR-0011:S11), so nothing outside the VM can reach it and it needs no network identity of its own.
+The store starts only after the receipt key is settled, and the worker connects only after the store answers JetStream account info, so an unavailable store never appears ready.

-A launch uses the versioned subject `system.LaunchSQSStore.v1`, which a daemon without this code does not serve, so it fails with no responder instead of booting another guest.
-The legacy `system.LaunchInstance` path refuses the store kind on both send and receive.
-Every input check runs before capacity is reserved, and the data volume must be an available system-account volume.
-It is mounted through the normal EBS path and detached, never deleted, on terminate, which is the protection standard EBS gives today and nothing stronger.
-CPU mitigations stay enabled for the store, unlike the load balancer.
-A successful launch means the VM is running, not that NATS is ready.
+The receipt-signing key lives on the data disk under `/data/sqs-worker-key`, written to a temporary file, synced, renamed and its directory synced before its fingerprint is recorded.
+`domains/sqs/workerident` holds the platform's receipt-key state on the worker's identity record, beside its generation, claim, pinned node and volume: `pending` is set only when the record first creates its volume, and `recorded` holds the fingerprint.
+Under `pending` the guest may create a key, or reuse a valid key it already wrote before a crash, only while no `/data/jetstream` directory exists; any store data under `pending` refuses, because it proves the volume is not new.
+Under `recorded` a missing, unreadable or different key refuses the boot and is never regenerated; a record with no receipt-key state is refused as not proven new.
+`RecordReceiptKey` writes the fingerprint by compare-and-swap that re-checks the current instance, generation, claim and volume, and a lost reply is answered by reading the record again, never by a new key.
+A replacement worker reuses the pinned volume and keeps its predecessor's receipt-key state.

-The instance record keeps the store's non-secret guest settings so a restart on the node that launched it rewrites the firmware config files.
-A relaunch on any other node is refused, and cross-node recovery never claims a store.
-Both checks exist only in daemons with this code: an older daemon can still claim and relaunch a store elsewhere, and an explicit start served by another node claims the instance before its relaunch is refused.
+The worker reaches the gateway over TLS 1.3 trusting only the cluster CA, signing with instance-role credentials from the metadata service only.
+The internal `spinifex-sqs` actions are `ClaimReceiptKey`, `RecordReceiptKey`, `PollWork` and `CompleteWork`; the gateway admits only an assumed-role session of `sqsWorkerRole` in the system account and resolves the instance through `workerident.Authorize`, a point-in-time check against the current bound record.
+The worker pulls tenant work from its own node's gateway relay and posts results back, so no SQS payload crosses platform NATS; the relay holds a bounded, in-memory set of waiting requests and answers `ServiceUnavailable` when it is full or no worker is polling.

-`domains/sqs/storevolume` prepares a fresh data volume, because the guest never formats.
-It checks for `mkfs.ext4` and `qemu-img` before allocating, creates the volume in `creating`, writes an empty ext4 image to it over NBD on the local node, unpublishes it, and only then makes it `available`.
-While a volume is `creating`, attach, delete, modify, force-detach and snapshot are refused.
-A volume is deleted only after a confirmed unpublish; any publish error, an unconfirmed unpublish or a failed release keeps it and reports its ID, with its state reported as unknown after a failed release.
+`EnsureSQSWorker` takes a `NodeId`, an `InstanceType` and a `VolumeSizeGiB`; the instance type's memory must exceed the store's 512 MiB limit, and a later request for a different type or size is refused as `IncorrectState`.
+`EnableSQS` records the Region's desired state, pinned to one node, and then ensures the worker; `status` reports it ready only when the worker is bound, polling and the tenant API is registered.
+A store launch record or VM from the earlier separate-store design, or a worker record without a supported launch contract, is refused with its volume kept: enable stops before recording anything, and a relaunch of an old store VM is marked failed rather than started.

-Evidence is local only: unit tests, real QEMU boots against disposable scratch disks, and one run of the preparer against the `qemunbdd` provider whose volume kept acknowledged writes across a reboot.
-Viperblock, volume encryption, the EC2 volume record path, multiple nodes and host reachability of the guest address are not tested.
-Credential issuance and rotation, store placement and NATS readiness checks do not exist, and there is no failover: a lost node leaves its store unavailable.
-
-### SQS worker guest (operator-launched)
-
-The shared SQS worker guest holds the SQS store's client credential, so that no platform component does (ADR-0011:S2).
-Only an operator activates it, with the super-admin `EnsureSQSWorker` action described below; nothing starts it at daemon startup, and no worker service runs after boot.
-
-`make build-sqs-worker-microvm-image` builds it with the store image's script and network `/init` under `SQS_MICROVM_PROFILE=worker`; it carries the static `sqs-worker` binary and the ext4 tools, no `nats-server`, and an empty `/data` mountpoint.
-Releases build it beside the store image and ship it as `microvm-sqs-worker`, which `setup.sh` installs to `/usr/share/spinifex/microvm/sqs-worker` with the store image's rules: a release without it removes an earlier one, and an incomplete one is refused.
-At boot `sqs-worker boot` reads three firmware config values under `opt/spinifex/sqs-worker/`: the worker disk's serial, its Region and the gateway URL; none is a first-store decision, because a static value survives a guest reset.
-A missing, empty or malformed value refuses before any disk is touched.
-
-It selects exactly one disk with that serial, runs `e2fsck -p`, mounts it at `/data` and then confirms from `/proc/self/mountinfo` that this disk, as a whole ext4 filesystem, is what is mounted there; an empty mountpoint, a foreign mount or a failed check or mount refuses, and the guest never formats.
-Only then does it ask the gateway for the current decision with `ClaimFirstStore`, signed by `internal/sqsworkergw` with credentials from the instance metadata service only (`gwsign.NewInstanceRole`, no environment, profile or static-key fallback), over TLS 1.3 that trusts only the cluster CA from `opt/spinifex/ca-cert` and never follows a redirect.
-Under that decision `workerkey.Acquire` creates the key on `/data/sqs-worker-key`, owner-only and synced, records only its public key and then uses it, or loads the recorded key; a missing or different key once one is recorded refuses and is never replaced.
-The VM can start before its launch binds the instance, so its first calls are legitimately `AccessDenied`; that denial creates nothing and is asked again, as are a lost reply and a `ServiceUnavailable` or `Throttling` refusal, all within one bound (60 attempts 5 seconds apart), after which a worker that was never bound, or was replaced, refuses the boot.
-A signature or other refusal, or an answer that is neither "create" nor one valid public key, refuses the boot at once.
-
-`domains/sqs/firststore` is the SQS domain's first-store decision: one record per Region in the `spinifex-sqs-first-store` KV bucket moves from `claimed` to `key-recorded` to `launch-intent` under compare-and-swap, bound to the worker's instance ID, claim ID and generation.
-A claim authorizes key creation only while no public key is recorded; once one is, every claim returns only that key, and a store launch intent needs it recorded first.
-An older generation, a different identity at the same generation or an unreadable record authorizes nothing, and the record holds no private key material.
-Reads are stream message gets answered by the stream leader, never direct gets a lagging replica can answer, and every authorizing answer is also confirmed by a compare-and-swap at the revision it read, so a stale or unavailable read authorizes nothing.
-The authenticated caller that will carry this decision must derive the worker's instance ID and generation from authoritative instance state; a generation supplied in a request cannot itself authorize a takeover.
-
-`domains/sqs/workerident` is that authoritative instance state: one record per Region in the `spinifex-sqs-worker-identity` KV bucket holds a monotonic generation, claim ID, pinned node and encrypted data volume, and moves from `launching` to `bound` to `stopped`, or from `launching` to `failed`, under compare-and-swap.
-A launch intent is refused while the previous attempt is `launching` or `bound`, including one whose outcome is unknown, so only one caller ever holds an intent to start a VM on the pinned volume.
-A replacement takes the next generation only after `FailLaunch` or `RecordStopped` records that nothing holds the volume, and each request names the generation it supersedes, so a replayed request cannot take a generation it never observed; there is no automatic takeover.
-The launch path then raises the first-store fence to the successor's generation with `firststore.Fence` before `BeginLaunch`, which refuses a replacement until a leader read shows that fence; the fence only rises, and `firststore` refuses every call from a generation below it.
-Only the current claim ID is recorded, so claim IDs are minted fresh per attempt and a VM launch must be idempotent on generation and claim together.
-Binding writes the instance's index entry first and then binds the record to that instance.
-The index is only a lookup: `Authorize` accepts an instance only while the Region's record is `bound` to exactly that instance, generation and claim, confirmed by a compare-and-swap at the leader-read revision, so an old, orphaned, rewritten or unbound entry authorizes nothing.
-A same-instance reboot keeps its instance ID and identity; a replacement takes a new generation, and the first cut refuses another node or data volume and an unencrypted volume, although the encryption flag is the caller's claim and the launch wiring must verify it from the volume's metadata.
-Both buckets are opened through `OpenDurableKV`, which refuses an existing bucket whose effective stream configuration could expire, evict, lose, lag or refuse records: non-limits retention, an age, per-message or delete-marker TTL, memory storage, asynchronous flush, a size, count or message-size cap, a discard policy other than discard-new, unacknowledged writes, a sealed stream, a mirror or sources, or fewer replicas than the cluster needs.
-`workerkey.Acquire` drives that decision: it syncs a new key to disk, records its public key and only then returns it, so a crash before recording reuses the key already on disk.
-
-`domains/sqs/awsapi/worker` carries the decision to the worker as `ClaimFirstStore` and `RecordWorkerPublicKey`, served under the internal `spinifex-sqs` signing service, which no AWS SDK signs for; the public AmazonSQS action inventory is untouched.
-The gateway admits only an assumed-role session of `sqsWorkerRole` in the system account, then the role's policy, and only then resolves the session name, the instance ID STS set, through `workerident.Authorize`; the request carries no identity, and any parameter beyond the action's own is refused.
-The first-store identity is the current record's instance, claim and generation, and a worker bound to another Region is refused.
-A request that passed `Authorize` just before a confirmed stop and replacement still carries the old generation; the fence was raised before the successor began, so `firststore` refuses it whether or not the successor has claimed yet.
-The adapter never logs a caller-chosen parameter name, because one could carry a secret.
-`RecordWorkerPublicKey` accepts only a valid public user key, so a seed is refused without being recorded, logged or echoed.
-The gateway binds both buckets per request and never creates them, so it provisions nothing and answers `ServiceUnavailable` until a worker launch has created them; the worker launch below ensures the role.
-The private key stays on the worker disk; the guest logs and publishes only the public key to `/run/sqs-worker/public-key`.
-
-`domains/sqs/workerlaunch` realizes the worker on the node it runs on, its only node: a bound record is returned as is; otherwise it takes the intent, then on the first launch marks the intent's one volume create, prepares the volume and records its ID, reads the volume's own record and refuses it unless encrypted, ensures the role, finds or creates the network for the claim and reads the recorded store key, and marks the intent dispatched before launching.
-A dispatched launch is never sent again: a lost reply or error leaves the intent `launching` and dispatched, and every later call returns `ErrOutcomeUnknown` until the outcome is reconciled, since the launch path is not idempotent.
-A failure before dispatch leaves an undispatched intent that the next call resumes with the same claim; a confirmed stop or failure is replaced only after `firststore.Fence` excludes the old generation, reusing the pinned volume.
-The launch passes no store decision or key: the guest asks the gateway at boot.
-The intent exists before any volume, so concurrent first launches allocate nothing for the losers. A Prepare proven to have sent no create withdraws the mark and returns `ServiceUnavailable`, or `UnsupportedOperation` when the cluster storage key is not configured, and a retry may prepare the volume; a create that may have applied is never sent again, and every later call returns `IncorrectState` until it is reconciled. A volume the call knows of but cannot use is reported with its ID in a `VolumeError` and left in place, never deleted. An intent that has sent no create may be re-typed; one that has keeps its type until replaced. The worker role is created with EC2-only trust, and an existing role is checked for that trust before any policy is granted; the instance profile must carry exactly the worker role, and one holding any other role is refused unchanged.
-The daemon's `LaunchSQSWorkerInstance` boots the `sqs-worker` image through the same direct-boot path as the store, with the data volume attached at boot and kept on terminate, a required instance profile, and a required mgmt NIC; it re-reads the volume's own record and refuses one that is not available and encrypted, before anything is allocated.
-Its firmware config adds the gateway URL on this node's mgmt bridge and the cluster CA from the daemon's own trust store; the caller cannot supply either, and no value written is secret.
-A relaunch rebuilds that config from the VM record on the node that launched it and is refused anywhere else, and membership takeover already skips SQS-managed instances.
-`sqsWorkerRole` is ensured in the system account granting exactly `spinifex-sqs:ClaimFirstStore` and `spinifex-sqs:RecordWorkerPublicKey`, from the `domains/sqs/workerrole` contract the gateway gate also reads; an existing role whose trust admits more than the EC2 service is refused.
-
-Evidence is local only: unit tests with a fake firmware config, sysfs and mount table, tests running the boot through the real client against the real `spinifex-sqs` registration and records, and QEMU boots of the built image against disposable scratch disks and a host-side test gateway and metadata service, showing the first boot creates the key, reboots reuse it, a key lost after recording is never replaced, and the seed reaches no log or request.
-The worker's network is a private SQS system VPC per Region, built by `systemvpc.EnsurePrivate` from the `[sqs]` supernet (default `10.240.0.0/14`): one VPC and one /24 subnet, with no internet gateway, NAT gateway, EIP, route table or daemon-to-store node port. Each launch claim gets one ENI in that subnet, in the VPC default security group, found again by its claim on a retry; two ENIs for one claim are refused. The launch intent is marked before the one create is sent, so a create whose ENI is not yet visible is never sent again: the launch fails closed with `IncorrectState` until the ENI appears or the outcome is reconciled. Worker-to-store TCP and the guest's route to the metadata service are not yet proven by any traffic test.
-The super-admin `EnsureSQSWorker` action on the internal `spinifex` operator service takes a `NodeId`, which must be a node of this cluster and a single subject token, and an `InstanceType`, and sends a request to `sqs.worker.Ensure.v1.<node>` with no queue group, so only that node answers and the worker stays pinned.
-That node's daemon re-checks the node the request names and the instance type, and refuses as `ServiceUnavailable` before allocating a volume or network or recording an intent unless the worker image's kernel and initramfs are non-empty files, its mgmt bridge exists and the cluster CA is readable; a call after the image is installed then launches.
-It then runs its one composed launcher for its own Region, one launch at a time, in the daemon's own context with a 30-minute bound, so a caller's timeout does not cancel it.
-A reply lost to that timeout is reported as `ServiceUnavailable`; calling again reports the bound worker, or `IncorrectState` for a dispatched launch whose outcome is unknown, which is never resent; a Region pinned to another node is refused as `InvalidParameterValue`.
-The reply names the bound VM's node, Region, instance ID and generation; bound is not ready, and it says nothing about the guest's boot, its key or the store.
-Stop/detach evidence for `RecordStopped` is not wired, the guest's metadata route and gateway TLS on a real ENI and worker-to-store TCP are unproven, and Viperblock's at-rest key is held by the platform.
-
-The worker identity record holds the instance type of its generation; a request for another type is refused as `IncorrectState`, before dispatch and after binding, the reply names the recorded type, and only a replacement after a confirmed stop may change it.
-Operators call both actions with `spx admin sqs ensure-worker --node --instance-type` and `spx admin sqs ensure-store --node --instance-type --volume-size-gib`, signed for the `spinifex` service with the standard AWS credential chain like the other `spx admin` gateway commands.
-Each command refuses missing inputs before sending anything and reports only the bound VM; a bound VM is not a ready worker or store.
-The super-admin `EnsureSQSStore` action takes a `NodeId`, an `InstanceType` and a `VolumeSizeGiB` and sends a request to `sqs.store.Ensure.v1.<node>` with no queue group; only the node the Region's worker is bound to can launch the store.
-That node refuses an instance type whose memory does not exceed 512 MiB, the store's `GOMEMLIMIT` under ADR-0011:S11; this is a floor, not a validated size, and no type is defaulted.
-It refuses before recording or allocating anything unless the store image and the cluster storage key are present, the worker is bound on this node, and that worker's identity has recorded its public key in the first-store decision, which it then advances to a launch intent.
-The store's own launch record in `spinifex-sqs-store-launch` holds only that public key, the claim, the node and the operator's instance type and size, and marks each step before its uncertain create: the volume, the ENI in the worker's private subnet, and the launch.
-A later request for a different instance type or size is refused as `IncorrectState`, before dispatch and after binding, and the reply names the type the store was launched with.
-A volume preparation that failed before sending any create, such as a missing `mkfs.ext4` or a scratch or format failure, withdraws its mark and returns `ServiceUnavailable`, so a retry may try again once the host is fixed.
-Any other marked step whose result is not visible is reported as `IncorrectState` and never resent; a volume that is not encrypted by its own record is refused as `UnsupportedOperation` with its ID kept, and the daemon re-checks the volume's encryption and the guest's size at launch.
-The daemon never receives the worker's seed; the store's NATS server accepts only that public key, and the reply's bound VM and address are not readiness, which only the worker can check.
-
-After boot, the worker's long-running `sqs-worker ready` step mounts and verifies its disk again and calls the internal `spinifex-sqs` `DescribeStore` action, which admits only the current worker and returns the bound store's address and recorded public key, or pending.
-It loads its key only if it matches that public key, then connects to the store's NATS on port 4222 with it and asks JetStream for account info, each pass bounded to 30 seconds.
-The step runs until shutdown with no overall deadline, so a store the operator launches at any time is picked up: it asks again every 5 seconds while the store is pending, not answering or the reply was lost, and re-checks a ready store every 30 seconds.
-A pass writes only the address and public key to `/run/sqs-worker/store-ready`; any failed pass removes that file, and so does the step's own exit.
-A start that finds shutdown in progress or no worker key logs once and waits in place rather than exiting, so init does not respawn it in a loop; shutdown stops it like a running watcher.
-Init respawns the step, at most once every 5 seconds, and every start removes a marker left by a watcher that was killed or crashed before the new watcher runs.
-A ready store that fails is noticed up to one re-check interval plus one bounded call later, so the marker can be up to about a minute stale.
-Shutdown blocks further respawns, removes the marker, and stops the watcher by its recorded PID and start time, escalating to SIGKILL after a budget; it unmounts the worker disk only once the watcher is confirmed gone, and a survivor leaves every mount in place.
-A mismatched key, a store that refuses the key, a key missing from the disk or an unclassified gateway refusal is asked again only every 5 minutes, so it never spins and still recovers if the operator fixes it; a missing key is never replaced.
-The NKey authenticates the worker to the store, but nothing authenticates the store to the worker: there is no TLS, so a pass means only that something at that address accepted the key.
-This is store readiness for the worker alone; there is no SQS API, and no production sizing or support is claimed.
+Evidence is local: unit tests, the guest shell test and an AWS SDK test that creates a queue and sends, receives and deletes a message through the real worker loop against a real local JetStream store and a restart.
+A real guest boot, its metadata route on a real ENI and the signed path on a live node are unproven, Viperblock's at-rest key is held by the platform, and SQS-managed message encryption is not implemented, so the profile must not hold tenant production data.

 ## Configuration

@@ -60,7 +60,7 @@ intact; ADR-0001 explicitly defers that design.

 | Current path | Standing | Target ownership | Rule |
 |---|---|---|---|
-| `cmd/aws-model-coverage` | Qualification generator | Thin main; reusable code in `internal/tooling` | Produces the dispatch-versus-model inventory; never imported by product packages. |
+| `cmd/aws-model-coverage` | Qualification generator | Thin main; reusable code in `internal/tooling` | Produces the dispatch-versus-model inventory; never imported by product packages. Debt: it reads each domain's declared `OperationInventory` from `domains/<service>/awsapi` (ACM, EC2, ECR, ECS, EKS, ELBv2, IAM, RDS, Route 53, SQS, STS) and never constructs a registration. |
 | `cmd/dhcptest` | Development diagnostic | Thin main; reusable code in `internal/tooling` if extraction is useful | It is a DHCP probe, not a supported `spx admin` command. |
 | `cmd/spx-loadgen` | Qualification/load tool | Thin main; reusable code in `internal/testkit` | It drives test load and is not shipped to nodes. |
 | `tests/e2e/*/cmd/*`, `tests/bench/*/cmd/*` | Test and benchmark-private tools | Remain test-private | They are invoked by a test or benchmark harness, not a product process. |
@@ -369,8 +369,9 @@ while the branch is in flight; they do not describe the umbrella repository's
 | `spinifex#1355` | `spinifex/gateway/ec2.go` (`EC2_Request` in production, the legacy service switch, its `supportedServices` and JSON tables) and the `Quota` field of `GatewayConfig` | `spinifex/domains/ec2/awsapi` (`NewRegistration`, `OperationInventory`, `ServiceName`), composed by `spinifex/runtime/roles/awsgw` (`ec2.go`: `newEC2Registration`, `advertisedEndpoint`; `ec2quota`) | Slice 9b of the EC2 move: EC2 registers through the ADR-0002 seam as service `ec2` and the legacy gateway switch is empty. The EC2 query-protocol error envelope is kept through `ErrorEnvelopeXML`, and the policy denial match is now `*dispatch.PolicyDenialError`. The characterisation tests committed first also pin the Authorize service name and action, the trace span and audit action, the throttle key (account plus action) and the cluster-unavailable gate, which runs before policy and action lookup for gateway-local and NATS-backed actions alike. They and the 9a tests pass unchanged apart from setup: STS and EC2 test setups now register the services they sign as, and the two tests that claimed a legacy service name are removed because no legacy name remains. `EC2_Request` survives only as a test shim. Allowlist changes are two deletions (the `gateway` to `domains/ec2/awsapi` and `domains/ec2/awsapi/instance` rows) and one addition, the per-service model-coverage row `cmd/aws-model-coverage` to `domains/ec2/awsapi`. `startInstanceStatus` stays in `awsgw.go` because ADR-0007:S6 records the raw instance-state uses by file. No change to `dispatch.Actor` or `dispatch.Invocation`. Live on env14: DescribeRegions, DescribeAvailabilityZones and DescribeAccountAttributes, an idempotent CreateVolume replay and its parameter mismatch, the DryRun and InvalidVolume.NotFound errors, a no-policy user refused with UnauthorizedOperation (including on the gateway-local DescribeRegions), an assumed-role session allowed and refused per its policy, and one RunInstances to running then terminated. The gateway request logs carry `service=ec2` and the per-action label. Not exercised live: a throttled request (the default limits are not reachable from one client; the throttle key is pinned by the characterisation tests) and an agent-signed EC2 call. |
 | `spinifex#1363` | `spinifex/gateway` context keys (`ctxService`, `ctxRegion`, `ctxAction`, the principal and access key id keys, and the unread `ctxQueryArgs`), the duplicate `callerPrincipal` and `principalContext` types, `gateway/caller_arn.go` (`buildCallerARN`), and the direct `policyauth`, `accountadmission` and NATS-connection reads in the auth pipeline | `spinifex/ingress/aws/reqctx` (the request record), `credverify.CallerARN`, and the gateway-consumed capabilities `PolicyEvaluator`, `AccountAdmission` and `Readiness`, composed by `spinifex/runtime/roles/awsgw` (`clusterready`) | Slice 11a of the gateway removal: the request-context record and the ADR-0002:S8 capabilities, with no behaviour change. The record is a copy-on-write value under one context key; the principal is sealed once and a second `WithPrincipal` keeps the first caller. The layering rule `S7_RequestRecordPrivateToIngress` lets only `gateway` and `ingress/aws/*` import `reqctx`, with a fault-injection test, and slice 11c moves the package to `ingress/aws/internal/reqctx` and drops the rule. The caller ARN is built once in `credverify` (root cases kept) and filled on `Principal.CallerARN`. The policy evaluator, account admission (`credential.ErrAccountNotActive`, with `accountadmission.ErrNotActive` an alias) and cluster readiness (`Available() bool`) are interfaces the gateway consumes and fails closed on when nil. The step 1 characterisation tests (throttle against both readiness gates and the policy gate for ECS and IAM, `/admin` skipping `GetService` and the second gate, the nil-connection difference between the two gates, five error writers each minting a request id that differs from the audit record, and the credential-scope region reaching only the span) pass unchanged apart from setup. No allowlist rows change, and there is no change to `dispatch.Actor` or `dispatch.Invocation`. Debt for slice 11c: the test-only `defaultCapabilities` seam (a package variable set by a test `init` so about 60 gateway test files can build a config from `IAMService` alone), the nil-connection case of the early readiness gate, the remaining `NATSConn` readers (`DiscoverActiveNodes` and the field that `awsgw` and the integration harness set), and the `IAMService`, `STSService`, `Config`, `RootCAs` and `InternalSuffix` fields of `GatewayConfig`, which no production code reads. Live on env14: DescribeRegions, DescribeAvailabilityZones and DescribeAccountAttributes, an idempotent CreateVolume replay and its parameter mismatch, the DryRun and InvalidVolume.NotFound errors, a bad access key refused with InvalidClientTokenId on a Query service and InvalidClientTokenIdException on a JSON service, a no-policy user refused with UnauthorizedOperation, and an assumed-role session allowed and refused per its policy. Not exercised live: a suspended-account refusal, a throttled request and the NATS-down 503, which the step 1 tests pin. |
 | `spinifex#1378` | `spinifex/gateway` `oidc_discovery.go` and `registry.go` (the `/oidc/eks` routes and the `/v2` mount), the `DiscoverActiveNodes` method and its cache, and the `GatewayConfig` fields `Config`, `RootCAs`, `InternalSuffix`, `Version`, `Commit`, `IAMService`, `STSService`, `NATSConn` and `ExpectedNodes` | `spinifex/runtime/roles/awsgw` (`PublicRoutes`, `NodeDiscovery.ActiveNodes`, `composeGateway`); the gateway keeps one `PublicRoutes` mount hook and the `Admin` registration name supplied by the role |
-| `spinifex#TBD` | `spinifex/gateway` (`GatewayConfig`, the SigV4 and policy middleware, `Request`, the admin dispatch, `AWSOperationInventory`) | `spinifex/ingress/aws/pipeline` (`Config`) and `spinifex/ingress/aws/dispatch` (`AWSOperationInventory`); the gateway layering rows are retired and R2 binds the pipeline |
+| `spinifex#1384` | `spinifex/gateway` (`GatewayConfig`, the SigV4 and policy middleware, `Request`, the admin dispatch, `AWSOperationInventory`) | `spinifex/ingress/aws/pipeline` (`Config`) and `spinifex/ingress/aws/dispatch` (`AWSOperationInventory`); the gateway layering rows are retired and R2 binds the pipeline |
 | `spinifex#1334` | `spinifex/gateway/oidc_discovery.go` (`eksAccountKV`, the discovery-document and JWKS read and construction) | `spinifex/domains/eks/cluster` (`OIDCPublisher`, `OIDCDiscoveryDocument`), composed by `spinifex/runtime/roles/awsgw` | The EKS domain now reads its own account bucket and builds the per-cluster discovery document and JWKS responses (ADR-0005:S4), and the gateway only maps the unauthenticated `/oidc/eks/...` routes onto an `OIDCPublisher` interface it is handed. Responses are byte-identical, pinned by `oidc_discovery_current_behaviour_test.go`, whose assertions are unchanged. The gateway no longer imports `domains/eks/cluster` in production code. `STS` keeps its own `ClusterJWKSResolver` (`OIDCJWKSReader`), untouched. Recorded debt, not repaired here: a stored JWKS is served verbatim with 200 even when it is not valid JSON. |
+| `spinifex#1245`, `spinifex#1390` | — | `contracts/admission/v1` | The quota override seal route (`admission.v1.SealAccountQuotaOverride`, served by `awsgw`) and the per-gateway read-only capability probe (`admission.v1.AccountQuotaOverrideSealCapability.<node>`) are an explicit versioned cross-process contract between the quota owner and `operator/accountlifecycle`. The consumer wiring is new: `NewClusterEngine` takes a `ClusterNodes` value with separate daemon and gateway node sets, `ClusterConfig.NodesRunning` is the single definition of which nodes run a service, and the seal reaper runs in `StageAccount` after the EC2 settings seal. A termination whose gateway probe is incomplete seals nothing and leaves the account `TERMINATING`. Contract, responder, probe and reaper tests pin the subjects, JSON shapes and fail-closed cases; `TestAccountTermination_QuotaOverrideEndsSealed` replaces the former characterization that overrides survive teardown. |
 The EC2 contract row is intentionally different from the directory moves: it creates
 a compatibility boundary. `ec2.cmd.*` retains its deployed one-token NATS
 subscription and permission shape, while callers use
@@ -488,8 +489,8 @@ Enforcement: the owner decided the layering test is blocking now, with a ratchet
 - `domains/rds/instance` → `domains/rds/parametergroup` (legacy edges): `parameterGroupReferences` binds `Dependants` by scanning instance records; this clears when the RDS instance gains its own owner and answers `Dependants` from it. `tags.go` writes the meta record through its generic tag registry; this clears when tagging invokes a parameter-group-owned tag mutation capability, and moving the tagging adapter to `domains/rds/awsapi` alone does not clear it. The Modify handler still calls `propagateParameterGroup` after the owner's write; propagation is instance-side realization and stays legacy until it is designed as asynchronous realization (group generation, instance staleness, retry). `parameterGroupValues` returns the persisted `Record` and overrides to instance code; when the instance owner is extracted, replace them with a consumer-owned resolved-parameters projection.
 - `domains/ecs` → `domains/ecs/taskdefinition` (owner bypass): `tags.go` reads and writes the revision record through its generic tag registry; this clears when ECS tagging invokes an owner-provided tag mutation capability, and moving `tags.go` to `domains/ecs/awsapi` alone does not clear it. `taskDefinitionResolver` returns the persisted `Record` to task and service launch code; when the task and service owners are extracted, replace the record crossing that boundary with a consumer-owned resolved task-definition (launch-spec) projection. Moving packages has not made the record private.
 - `domains/ecs/taskdefinition` (deliberate duplication, not debt): private `getJSON`, `putJSON` and `keysWithPrefix` copy the raw-KV helpers in `domains/ecs` so the extraction keeps ECS's get/put/list error and recovery semantics. Revisit only if a later, tested state abstraction proves it preserves those semantics; do not migrate ECS to `kvstore` merely to remove them.
- `domains/eks/cluster` → `domains/eks/access` (legacy edges): `ResolveTokenReview` opens the EKS bucket in the gateway process and reads records through the exported `access.Get`; this clears when token review asks the owner across a contract rather than opening the bucket itself. `DeleteClusterPrefix` erases access-entry keys as part of its blanket cluster sweep; this clears when cluster delete invokes an owner-provided removal of the cluster's entries. The owner returns the persisted `Record` to the AWS adapter and token review; replace it with consumer-owned projections when those consumers are extracted.
- `domains/eks/cluster` → `domains/eks/addon` (legacy edges): `DeleteClusterPrefix` erases add-on records and manifests in its blanket cluster sweep; this clears when cluster delete invokes an add-on-owned teardown capability. `stageGPUDeviceAddon` is a temporary node-group-to-add-on orchestration edge: best-effort, errors logged and swallowed, never undone on node-group delete; it clears when the node-group owner is extracted and the dependency is designed. `ClusterReconciler` hosts the add-on status subscription; it clears when add-on delivery observation has its own host under the lifecycle correction. Cluster existence is checked in the handler, not through an owner-declared capability; it moves into the owner when cluster admission is defined (today status is ignored). Guest wire types (`AddonStatusReport`, `AddonDeliveryPhase`, `AddonStatusSubject`, `StagedAddonManifest`, `InternalAddonsResponse`) are owned by `contracts/eks/v1`, which `domains/eks/cluster`, `gateway/eks` and `agents/eks/gatewayfetch` import directly.
+- `domains/eks/cluster` → `domains/eks/access` (legacy edges): `ResolveTokenReview` opens the EKS bucket in the gateway process and reads records through the exported `access.Get`; this clears when token review asks the owner across a contract rather than opening the bucket itself. `DeleteClusterChildren` erases access-entry keys as part of its blanket cluster sweep; this clears when cluster delete invokes an owner-provided removal of the cluster's entries. The owner returns the persisted `Record` to the AWS adapter and token review; replace it with consumer-owned projections when those consumers are extracted.
+- `domains/eks/cluster` → `domains/eks/addon` (legacy edges): `DeleteClusterChildren` erases add-on records and manifests in its blanket cluster sweep; this clears when cluster delete invokes an add-on-owned teardown capability. `stageGPUDeviceAddon` is a temporary node-group-to-add-on orchestration edge: best-effort, errors logged and swallowed, never undone on node-group delete; it clears when the node-group owner is extracted and the dependency is designed. `ClusterReconciler` hosts the add-on status subscription; it clears when add-on delivery observation has its own host under the lifecycle correction. Cluster existence is checked in the handler, not through an owner-declared capability; it moves into the owner when cluster admission is defined (today status is ignored). Guest wire types (`AddonStatusReport`, `AddonDeliveryPhase`, `AddonStatusSubject`, `StagedAddonManifest`, `InternalAddonsResponse`) are owned by `contracts/eks/v1`, which `domains/eks/cluster`, `gateway/eks` and `agents/eks/gatewayfetch` import directly.
 - `domains/eks/cluster` and `domains/eks/awsapi` → `domains/eks/addon` (further edges): the AWS adapter reads the persisted `Record` through `addon.Get`/`addon.List`; this clears when the owner returns a view and the add-on adapter moves to `domains/eks/awsapi`. The guest route reaches the owner through the `handlers_eks` NATS RPC (`ListStagedAddonManifests`); this clears with per-resource commands behind EKS registration. The add-on ARN is derived in both the owner and `domains/eks/awsapi/authz.go`; this clears when authorization obtains the ARN from the owner, which an incarnation suffix would require. The owner's `Manifest`/`Report` beside the `contracts/eks/v1` types is deliberate duplication, not debt.
 - `agents/rds/agent` (dependency, narrowed): engine metadata now arrives through the agent-declared `EngineCatalog`, but the agent still imports `domains/rds/instance` for the command protocol, wire and record types (`Command*`, `Parameter`, `EngineHealth*`, `BootstrapMode*`) and API output types. This clears when those move behind a guest/controller wire contract.
 - `domains/rds/awsapi` → `domains/rds/instance` (`InstanceSizing`): the gateway obtains its `Sizing` through the RDS handler package's adapter rather than its own composition root. This clears when the gateway's RDS composition moves to `runtime/roles/awsgw` and builds `Sizing` there.
@@ -688,7 +689,7 @@ series above; "needs decision" is open.
 | `handlers/rds` | — | Done. The remaining RDS instance resource moved to `domains/rds/instance` (package `instance`) in `spinifex#1251` with no API, NATS subject, storage or behaviour change, fulfilling ADR-0001's organise-by-resource condition alongside the already-extracted subnet group, parameter group and engine catalogue. The ADR-0004 blocked-dependency imports (quota admission, the duplicated expected-node fan-out, the IAM ensurer and the Bluebottle master key) remain dependency-rule debt, with their allowlist entries now sourced from `domains/rds/instance`. |
 | `handlers/elbv2` | — | Done. The implementation moved to `domains/elbv2` (package `elbv2`) with no API, NATS subject, storage or behaviour change. Q-30's data-plane boundary remains deferred debt; the amended ADR-0001 row makes it not a relocation prerequisite. Its cross-domain, IAM and `agents/elbv2` imports remain dependency-rule debt, with their allowlist entries now sourced from `domains/elbv2`. |
 | `handlers/iam/mock` | — | Done. Moved with the implementation to `domains/iam/mock`. |
-| `gateway` (root) | Generic HTTP route assembly, SigV4 authentication, the policy gate, request-audit middleware and request-context keys. | Done and deleted. The request pipeline moved into `ingress/aws/pipeline` (as `pipeline.Config`) and the operation inventory into `ingress/aws/dispatch` in `spinifex#TBD`; the `/oidc`, `/v2` and node-discovery code had already moved to `runtime/roles/awsgw` in `spinifex#1378`. The layering test binds the pipeline with R2 and `gateway` is a retired legacy root. |
+| `gateway` (root) | Generic HTTP route assembly, SigV4 authentication, the policy gate, request-audit middleware and request-context keys. | Done and deleted. The request pipeline moved into `ingress/aws/pipeline` (as `pipeline.Config`) and the operation inventory into `ingress/aws/dispatch` in `spinifex#1384`; the `/oidc`, `/v2` and node-discovery code had already moved to `runtime/roles/awsgw` in `spinifex#1378`. The layering test binds the pipeline with R2 and `gateway` is a retired legacy root. |
 | `gateway/bedrock` | — | Done. The whole package moved into `domains/ochre` in `spinifex#1266` with its package-private core and tests intact and no behaviour change. Separating the action adapters into `domains/ochre/awsapi` remains deferred, recorded as `domains/ochre` (action adapters) debt above. The action adapters then moved to `domains/ochre/awsapi` behind one ADR-0002 registration in `spinifex#1351`. |
 | `gateway/{iam,sts,eks,rds}` | — | Done. The action adapters moved to `domains/{iam,sts,eks,rds}/awsapi` in `spinifex#1265` with no API, NATS subject, storage or behaviour change. ADR-0001 does not make ADR-0002 registration a prerequisite for relocating a domain's adapters, as the EC2 adapter moves already showed; the root `gateway` dispatch that still imports them is recorded `gateway` (service registration) debt. |
 | `gateway/{ecs,elbv2}` | — | Done. The action adapters moved to `domains/{ecs,elbv2}/awsapi` in `spinifex#1273` with no API, NATS subject, storage or behaviour change; the root `gateway` dispatch that still imports them is recorded `gateway` (service registration) debt. |
@@ -96,6 +96,53 @@ Limits:
  The load balancer VM reports target health through its own host's gateway, so while that gateway is down the unhealthy control plane stays in rotation.
 - Not measured: more than one control plane per host, a physical-node failure instead of a stopped gateway, and the target health state as `DescribeTargetHealth` reports it, because the load balancer and control-plane VMs belong to the system account.

+### IAM roles for service accounts in your workloads
+
+A pod gets an IAM role by running under a ServiceAccount that carries the role ARN in an annotation.
+No pod-spec wiring is needed.
+
+```yaml
+apiVersion: v1
+kind: ServiceAccount
+metadata:
+  name: app
+  annotations:
+    eks.amazonaws.com/role-arn: arn:aws:iam::123456789012:role/app-role
+```
+
+Every control plane runs a mutating webhook that acts on pod creation.
+When the pod's ServiceAccount has the annotation, the webhook adds these to each container and init container:
+
+- `AWS_ROLE_ARN` and `AWS_WEB_IDENTITY_TOKEN_FILE`, with a projected token volume named `aws-iam-token` mounted at `/var/run/secrets/eks.amazonaws.com/serviceaccount`.
+- `AWS_REGION`, `AWS_DEFAULT_REGION` and `AWS_STS_REGIONAL_ENDPOINTS`.
+- `AWS_ENDPOINT_URL_STS`, so the SDK calls the Spinifex STS endpoint.
+- `AWS_CA_BUNDLE`, pointing at `/etc/spinifex/ca-bundle/ca.pem`, a ConfigMap named `spinifex-ca-bundle` that is created in every namespace and holds the system roots plus the gateway CA.
+- `SSL_CERT_FILE` with the same path, only when the container does not set it. Clients such as the AWS Load Balancer Controller read this variable instead of `AWS_CA_BUNDLE`.
+
+Your workload still sets `AWS_ENDPOINT_URL` (or the per-service variable) for every service other than STS.
+
+The token audience defaults to `sts.amazonaws.com`.
+The expiry defaults to a value between 79200 and 86400 seconds and is clamped to 600 to 86400 seconds.
+Set them with the `eks.amazonaws.com/audience` and `eks.amazonaws.com/token-expiration` annotations on the ServiceAccount.
+The `token-expiration` annotation on the pod wins over the ServiceAccount.
+
+A container is left alone when it already has the role, region and regional STS settings, which is how the managed add-ons and your own explicit wiring are skipped.
+When some are present, the missing ones and the mount are added.
+Containers named in the pod's `eks.amazonaws.com/skip-containers` annotation (comma separated) are not touched.
+A pod whose ServiceAccount has no role annotation is not changed.
+
+The webhook fails open: if it cannot decide, the pod is created without injection.
+Each injection, skip and failure is logged with the namespace, pod and reason in the control-plane console log.
+Because it fails open, a pod that needs a role but starts without credentials is the symptom to look for, and the console log says why.
+
+The webhook listens on `127.0.0.1:8445` of each control plane, and each API server calls its own.
+Port 8444 is a different listener, the readiness check described above.
+
+Existing clusters get the webhook only when their control planes are replaced by the current `eks-node` image.
+No user-facing operation replaces a control plane, and automatic replacement does not currently work when the replacement reuses the failed member's IP.
+Recreate the cluster to adopt it.
+User-workload injection through a cluster created with an older image is not measured.
+
 ## Prerequisites

 > [!IMPORTANT]
@@ -3978,6 +3978,86 @@
        "extra": []
      }
    },
+    {
+      "service": "sqs",
+      "api_version": "2012-11-05",
+      "opaque": false,
+      "note": "",
+      "operations": {
+        "modelled": [
+          "AddPermission",
+          "CancelMessageMoveTask",
+          "ChangeMessageVisibility",
+          "ChangeMessageVisibilityBatch",
+          "CreateQueue",
+          "DeleteMessage",
+          "DeleteMessageBatch",
+          "DeleteQueue",
+          "GetQueueAttributes",
+          "GetQueueUrl",
+          "ListDeadLetterSourceQueues",
+          "ListMessageMoveTasks",
+          "ListQueueTags",
+          "ListQueues",
+          "PurgeQueue",
+          "ReceiveMessage",
+          "RemovePermission",
+          "SendMessage",
+          "SendMessageBatch",
+          "SetQueueAttributes",
+          "StartMessageMoveTask",
+          "TagQueue",
+          "UntagQueue"
+        ],
+        "registered": [
+          "ChangeMessageVisibility",
+          "ChangeMessageVisibilityBatch",
+          "CreateQueue",
+          "DeleteMessage",
+          "DeleteMessageBatch",
+          "GetQueueAttributes",
+          "GetQueueUrl",
+          "ListQueueTags",
+          "ListQueues",
+          "ReceiveMessage",
+          "SendMessage",
+          "SendMessageBatch",
+          "SetQueueAttributes",
+          "TagQueue",
+          "UntagQueue"
+        ],
+        "implemented": [
+          "ChangeMessageVisibility",
+          "ChangeMessageVisibilityBatch",
+          "CreateQueue",
+          "DeleteMessage",
+          "DeleteMessageBatch",
+          "GetQueueAttributes",
+          "GetQueueUrl",
+          "ListQueueTags",
+          "ListQueues",
+          "ReceiveMessage",
+          "SendMessage",
+          "SendMessageBatch",
+          "SetQueueAttributes",
+          "TagQueue",
+          "UntagQueue"
+        ],
+        "stubbed": [],
+        "unsupported": [],
+        "missing": [
+          "AddPermission",
+          "CancelMessageMoveTask",
+          "DeleteQueue",
+          "ListDeadLetterSourceQueues",
+          "ListMessageMoveTasks",
+          "PurgeQueue",
+          "RemovePermission",
+          "StartMessageMoveTask"
+        ],
+        "extra": []
+      }
+    },
    {
      "service": "sts",
      "api_version": "2011-06-15",
@@ -1441,6 +1441,21 @@ request-payment: Requester Pays shifts transfer charges to the caller, which nee
 - `GetBucketRequestPayment`
 - `PutBucketRequestPayment`

+## sqs
+
+`2012-11-05` — 15 of 23 modelled operations implemented (65.2%), 0 stubbed, 0 not applicable, 0 registered outside the pinned model.
+
+### Not implemented
+
+- `AddPermission`
+- `CancelMessageMoveTask`
+- `DeleteQueue`
+- `ListDeadLetterSourceQueues`
+- `ListMessageMoveTasks`
+- `PurgeQueue`
+- `RemovePermission`
+- `StartMessageMoveTask`
+
 ## sts

 `2011-06-15` — 5 of 11 modelled operations implemented (45.5%), 0 stubbed, 0 not applicable, 0 registered outside the pinned model.
@@ -164,7 +164,7 @@ On Oracle Linux the installer makes these changes, which Debian hosts do not nee
 - **Repositories.** It enables `ol10_UEKR8` and `ol10_kvm_utils`, and adds `qemu-kvm*` and `qemu-img*` to the `excludepkgs` of `ol10_appstream`, keeping any excludes already set, so a later AppStream build can never replace the KVM Utilities QEMU.
 - **NFV SIG.** It writes `/etc/yum.repos.d/spinifex-nfv-sig.repo` with an `includepkgs=` list of the OVS and OVN packages, and imports the SIG key to `/etc/pki/rpm-gpg/RPM-GPG-KEY-CentOS-SIG-NFV` only when its fingerprint is `35154228174901BEFA8E69A621465E289D2A76A7`.
 - **OVS and OVN user.** Both run as root, as on Debian, through `OVS_USER_ID` and `OVN_USER_ID` in `/etc/sysconfig/openvswitch` and `/etc/sysconfig/ovn`.
- **DNS.** Where systemd-resolved is installed but not running, it saves `/etc/resolv.conf` to `/var/lib/spinifex-reset/resolv.conf.orig`, starts resolved behind NetworkManager and links `/etc/resolv.conf` to the resolved stub. It then checks that names still resolve and stops, printing the commands that put DNS back, if they do not.
+- **DNS.** Where systemd-resolved is installed but not running, it saves `/etc/resolv.conf` to `/var/lib/spinifex-reset/resolv.conf.orig`, starts resolved behind NetworkManager, tells NetworkManager in `/etc/NetworkManager/conf.d/90-spinifex-dns.conf` to leave `/etc/resolv.conf` alone, and links `/etc/resolv.conf` to the resolved stub. It then checks that names still resolve and stops, printing the commands that put DNS back, if they do not.
 - **chrony.** It appends `confdir /etc/chrony.d` to `/etc/chrony.conf` once, and writes its step policy to `/etc/chrony.d/spinifex.conf`.
 - **`spx` under `sudo`.** Oracle Linux's `sudo` path leaves out `/usr/local/bin`, so the installer links `/usr/bin/spx` to `/usr/local/bin/spx`.

@@ -16,16 +16,16 @@ Create, update, delete and policy association complete synchronously within the
 |---|---|---|
 | Identity | Cluster name plus principal ARN. Key and ARN suffix use `sha256hex(principalARN)` (`domains/eks/access/store.go` `PrincipalARNHash`). ARN `arn:aws:eks:{region}:{account}:access-entry/{cluster}/{hash}` (`foundation/aws/arn/eks.go`); the AWS ARN shape differs and is not verified. | `handlers/eks/service_impl_test.go` `TestAccessEntry_CreateDescribeListDelete`, `domains/eks/access/store_test.go` `TestKeyPaths`, `gateway/eks/authz_test.go` `TestResourceARNsAccessEntryMatchesHandler` |
 | Scope | Account and Region, within one cluster: keys live under `clusters/{cluster}/access-entries/` in the `eks-account-{account}` bucket. | `handlers/eks/access_lifecycle_test.go` `TestAccessEntryPersistedLayout_TopLevelAndNestedFieldNames`, `TestAccessEntryRecord_DecodesHandWrittenJSON`, `handlers/eks/create_cluster_test.go` `TestCreateCluster_SeedsCreatorAdminAccessEntry` |
-| Durable owner and record | `domains/eks/access` (`Owner`) is the only writer of `Record` with nested `AssociatedPolicy` and `Scope`: Create, SeedCreatorAdmin (cluster launch), Update, Associate, Disassociate and Delete. Keys and field names are unchanged by the move. `DeleteClusterPrefix` (`handlers/eks/cluster_state.go`) still erases entries with the cluster, and the gateway process reads records through the exported `access.Get` in `ResolveTokenReview` (`handlers/eks/token_review.go`). | `handlers/eks/access_lifecycle_test.go` `TestAccessEntryPersistedLayout_TopLevelAndNestedFieldNames`, `TestAccessEntryRecord_DecodesHandWrittenJSON`, `domains/eks/access/owner_test.go`, `domains/eks/access/store_test.go`, `handlers/eks/create_cluster_test.go` `TestCreateCluster_SeedsCreatorAdminAccessEntry` |
+| Durable owner and record | `domains/eks/access` (`Owner`) is the only writer of `Record` with nested `AssociatedPolicy` and `Scope`: Create, SeedCreatorAdmin (cluster launch), Update, Associate, Disassociate and Delete. Keys and field names are unchanged by the move. `DeleteClusterChildren` (`domains/eks/cluster/cluster_state.go`) still erases entries with the cluster, and the gateway process reads records through the exported `access.Get` in `ResolveTokenReview` (`handlers/eks/token_review.go`). | `handlers/eks/access_lifecycle_test.go` `TestAccessEntryPersistedLayout_TopLevelAndNestedFieldNames`, `TestAccessEntryRecord_DecodesHandWrittenJSON`, `domains/eks/access/owner_test.go`, `domains/eks/access/store_test.go`, `handlers/eks/create_cluster_test.go` `TestCreateCluster_SeedsCreatorAdminAccessEntry` |
 | AWS adapter | `handlers/eks` keeps request validation (entry type, supported policy, scope), the cluster existence check (`acctKVForCluster`), awserrors mapping and the AWS projection. `gateway/eks/authz.go` uses `access.PrincipalARNHash`. | `handlers/eks/service_impl_test.go` access cases, `gateway/eks/authz_test.go` `TestResourceARNsAccessEntryMatchesHandler` |
 | Desired state | Principal, Kubernetes username and groups, type (`STANDARD` only), tags (set at create only) and cluster-scoped access policy associations. | `handlers/eks/service_impl_test.go` `TestAccessEntry_RejectsNodeType`, `TestAccessPolicy_AssociateRejectsUnsupportedPolicyAndScope`, `TestAccessPolicy_AssociateRejectsNamespaceScope`, `handlers/eks/access_lifecycle_test.go` `TestAccessEntry_UpdateWithNoFieldsKeepsUsernameAndGroups` |
 | Generation | None. Update, associate and disassociate retry against the KV revision; create and delete do not. | |
 | Observed state | Not tracked; the record is the only state. | |
 | Readiness | Usable by token review as soon as the write returns. | `handlers/eks/token_review_test.go` `TestResolveTokenReview_AuthenticatesViaVerifyAndKV`, `TestResolveTokenReview_NoAccessEntryDenies`, `handlers/eks/service_impl_test.go` `TestAccessPolicy_DisassociateRemovesProjectedGroup` |
 | Idempotency | `clientRequestToken` is ignored. Update always advances `modifiedAt`, even when nothing changes. A duplicate create returns `ResourceInUseException`; a repeated delete returns `ResourceNotFoundException`; disassociating an unbound policy succeeds without change. Internal NATS redelivery of create returns `ResourceInUseException` to the redelivered request. | `handlers/eks/service_impl_test.go` `TestAccessEntry_CreateDescribeListDelete`, `TestAccessEntry_DescribeDeleteMissingIsNotFound`, `handlers/eks/access_lifecycle_test.go` `TestAccessPolicy_DisassociateUnassociatedLeavesRecordUnchanged`, `TestAccessPolicy_AssociateWithNoEntryIsNotFound` |
-| Dependencies | Every action requires only that the cluster's meta record exists (`acctKVForCluster`); cluster status is not read, so actions succeed on a `CREATING`, `FAILED` or `DELETING` cluster. Token review does not check the cluster at all. The principal is not checked against IAM. | `handlers/eks/service_impl_test.go` `TestAccessEntry_UnknownClusterIsNotFound`, `handlers/eks/access_lifecycle_test.go` `TestAccessEntryActionsIgnoreClusterLifecycleStatus`, `TestResolveTokenReview_AuthenticatesWithoutClusterMeta` |
+| Dependencies | Every action requires that the cluster's meta record exists (`acctKVForCluster`). `CreateAccessEntry` also refuses a `DELETING` cluster with `ResourceInUseException`, since a recorded delete admits no new dependant; no other status is read, so actions succeed on a `CREATING` or `FAILED` cluster. Token review does not check the cluster at all. The principal is not checked against IAM. | `handlers/eks/service_impl_test.go` `TestAccessEntry_UnknownClusterIsNotFound`, `handlers/eks/access_lifecycle_test.go` `TestAccessEntryActionsIgnoreFailedClusterStatus`, `delete_cluster_async_test.go` `TestS2_EKSDeletingClusterAdmitsNoNewDependants`, `TestResolveTokenReview_AuthenticatesWithoutClusterMeta` |
 | Authorization | Gateway authz derives the access-entry ARN with `PrincipalARNHash` (`gateway/eks/authz.go`). No `iam:PassRole`. The STS step of token review is the existing `eks.VerifyToken` NATS contract served by awsgw. | `gateway/eks/authz_test.go` `TestResourceARNsAccessEntryMatchesHandler` |
-| Deletion ordering | Delete is get-then-delete, not conditional. Cluster delete erases entries in the prefix purge only after all infrastructure teardown succeeds; on failure they survive while the cluster stays `DELETING`. | `handlers/eks/access_lifecycle_test.go` `TestDeleteClusterPrefix_SweepsAccessEntriesScopedToCluster` |
+| Deletion ordering | Delete is get-then-delete, not conditional. Cluster delete erases entries with the cluster's other child records, before the meta, only after all infrastructure teardown succeeds; on failure they survive while the cluster stays `DELETING`. | `handlers/eks/access_lifecycle_test.go` `TestDeleteClusterChildren_SweepsAccessEntriesScopedToCluster` |
 | Restart and interruption | The prefix purge deletes keys in listing order; an interruption after the meta key is gone leaves entries that a new cluster of the same name inherits. Reclaiming a `FAILED` cluster and a failed launch purge with the meta kept, so the recreated cluster inherits the failed attempt's entries. | none |
 | End-to-end | `tests/e2e/eks/eks_test.go` `AccessEntry` and `GetToken`; `tests/integration/cross_tenant_test.go`. No Terraform apply/destroy evidence for `aws_eks_access_entry` or `aws_eks_access_policy_association`. | |

@@ -33,7 +33,7 @@ Create, update, delete and policy association complete synchronously within the

 1. Create is get-then-put with no exclusive create, so concurrent creates for one principal both succeed and the later write wins.
 2. The creator-admin seed at cluster launch is an unconditional put after the cluster meta is final, so it replaces an entry for the same principal created while the cluster was `CREATING`, including its policy associations.
-3. Access actions do not check cluster status (see dependencies row), and opening the bucket creates it for an account that has none.
+3. Access actions other than `CreateAccessEntry` do not check cluster status (see dependencies row), and opening the bucket creates it for an account that has none.
 4. Entries can outlive their cluster (interrupted prefix purge) or carry over to a recreated cluster (reclaim and failed launch keep the meta and do not purge entries separately).
 5. Token review authenticates against an entry without checking the cluster exists or its status.
 6. `ResolveTokenReview` opens the EKS bucket and reads the record in the gateway process through the exported `access.Get`, outside the owner.
@@ -16,9 +16,9 @@ There is no generation, so the record mixes desired fields with the latest obser
 | Item | Present behaviour | Evidence |
 |---|---|---|
 | Identity | Cluster name plus add-on name; one add-on per name per cluster. ARN `arn:aws:eks:{region}:{account}:addon/{cluster}/{addon}` (`foundation/aws/arn/eks.go` `FormatEKSAddon`), deterministic by name, with no per-incarnation suffix. The gateway authorizer derives the same ARN (`domains/eks/awsapi/authz.go` `addonARN`). | `handlers/eks/addon_lifecycle_test.go` `TestAddonPersistedLayout_RecordAndManifestKeysAndFieldNames`, `domains/eks/awsapi/authz_test.go` `TestResourceARNsFidelity` |
-| Scope | Account and Region, within one cluster: keys live under `clusters/{cluster}/addons/` in the `eks-account-{account}` bucket. | `TestAddonPersistedLayout_RecordAndManifestKeysAndFieldNames`, `TestDeleteClusterPrefix_SweepsAddonRecordsAndManifestsScopedToCluster` |
+| Scope | Account and Region, within one cluster: keys live under `clusters/{cluster}/addons/` in the `eks-account-{account}` bucket. | `TestAddonPersistedLayout_RecordAndManifestKeysAndFieldNames`, `TestDeleteClusterChildren_SweepsAddonRecordsAndManifestsScopedToCluster` |
 | Durable record | `clusters/{cluster}/addons/{addon}` holds `Record` (`domains/eks/addon/record.go`): `addonName`, `addonVersion`, `status`, `serviceAccountRoleArn`, `configurationValues`, `health`, `arn`, `tags`, `createdAt`, `modifiedAt` (the optional ones `omitempty`). `clusters/{cluster}/addons/{addon}/manifest` holds `Manifest` (`domains/eks/addon/record.go`): `addonName`, `addonVersion`, `serviceAccountRoleArn`, `configurationValues`. Listing skips the manifest sub-key by segment count. | `TestAddonPersistedLayout_RecordAndManifestKeysAndFieldNames`, `TestAddonRecord_DecodesHandWrittenJSON`, `domains/eks/addon/store_test.go` `TestRecord_RoundTrip`, `TestList_SkipsManifestSubKeys` |
-| Writers | Record: the owner in `domains/eks/addon/owner.go`, reached from the `CreateAddon`, `UpdateAddon` and `DeleteAddon` handlers, the cluster reconciler's report relay and the GPU node group launch: `Owner.Create` (unconditional put), `Owner.Update` and its failure marking (revision CAS), `Owner.Delete` (get then delete), `Owner.ApplyReport` (revision CAS), `Owner.EnsureGPUDevicePlugin` through `Owner.Create`; and the cluster prefix purge (`DeleteClusterPrefix`). Manifest: `StagingInstaller.Install` (unconditional put on create and update), `StagingInstaller.Uninstall` (`domains/eks/addon/delivery.go`), `Owner.Delete` and the prefix purge. | `TestAddonPersistedLayout_RecordAndManifestKeysAndFieldNames`, `TestUpdateAddon_ReportsSuccessfulWhileRecordIsUpdating`, `TestDeleteAddon_ReturnsDeletingAfterErasingRecordAndManifest`, `TestDeleteClusterPrefix_SweepsAddonRecordsAndManifestsScopedToCluster`, `domains/eks/addon/store_test.go` `TestCasUpdate`, `TestDeleteRecord_RemovesRecordAndManifest` |
+| Writers | Record: the owner in `domains/eks/addon/owner.go`, reached from the `CreateAddon`, `UpdateAddon` and `DeleteAddon` handlers, the cluster reconciler's report relay and the GPU node group launch: `Owner.Create` (unconditional put), `Owner.Update` and its failure marking (revision CAS), `Owner.Delete` (get then delete), `Owner.ApplyReport` (revision CAS), `Owner.EnsureGPUDevicePlugin` through `Owner.Create`; and the cluster prefix purge (`DeleteClusterChildren`). Manifest: `StagingInstaller.Install` (unconditional put on create and update), `StagingInstaller.Uninstall` (`domains/eks/addon/delivery.go`), `Owner.Delete` and the prefix purge. | `TestAddonPersistedLayout_RecordAndManifestKeysAndFieldNames`, `TestUpdateAddon_ReportsSuccessfulWhileRecordIsUpdating`, `TestDeleteAddon_ReturnsDeletingAfterErasingRecordAndManifest`, `TestDeleteClusterChildren_SweepsAddonRecordsAndManifestsScopedToCluster`, `domains/eks/addon/store_test.go` `TestCasUpdate`, `TestDeleteRecord_RemovesRecordAndManifest` |
 | Readers | `ListAddons`, `DescribeAddon`, `CreateAddon` (existence check) and the reconciler read the record. `ListStagedAddonManifests` reads every `/manifest` key for the cluster (`addon.ListManifests`); it is served on `eks.ListStagedAddonManifests` (`daemon/daemon.go`) and reached only through the gateway's internal-addons route. | `handlers/eks/addons_test.go` `TestAddon_DescribeListDelete`, `TestListStagedAddonManifests` |
 | Catalogue | Static in-binary catalogue (`domains/eks/addon/catalog.go`): `aws-load-balancer-controller`, `argocd`, `aws-ebs-csi-driver`, and hidden-but-creatable `nvidia-device-plugin` and `spinifex-noop`; one version each, the first being the default. Create and update reject unknown names and versions with `InvalidParameterValue`. | `domains/eks/addon/catalog_test.go`, `handlers/eks/addons_test.go` `TestDescribeAddonVersions_ReturnsCatalog`, `TestCreateAddon_UnknownAddonRejected`, `TestCreateAddon_UnknownVersionRejected`, `TestUpdateAddon_UnknownVersionRejected` |
 | Desired state | Version, `serviceAccountRoleArn`, `configurationValues` and create-time tags. `resolveConflicts`, `podIdentityAssociations` and `clientRequestToken` are accepted and dropped; `preserve` on delete is ignored. `configurationValues` reaches the guest but the agent discards it (`mulga-eks-addon-sync.sh` `sync_once`), so it has no effect. | `TestAddonPersistedLayout_RecordAndManifestKeysAndFieldNames`, `TestDeleteAddon_ReturnsDeletingAfterErasingRecordAndManifest` |
@@ -37,9 +37,9 @@ There is no generation, so the record mixes desired fields with the latest obser
 | Cross-resource dependency | A GPU node group's launch calls `stageGPUDeviceAddon`, which checks the cluster exists and calls `Owner.EnsureGPUDevicePlugin` for `nvidia-device-plugin`; an existing record is a no-op and every other error is logged only. Deleting the node group never unstages it, and an existing record in any status, including `CREATE_FAILED`, blocks re-staging. | `handlers/eks/nodegroup_test.go` `TestCreateNodegroup_GPUNodegroupStagesDevicePluginAddon`, `domains/eks/addon/owner_test.go` `TestOwnerEnsureGPUDevicePlugin_StagesDefaultVersionOnceAndKeepsAnyExistingRecord`, `TestCreateNodegroup_NonGPUNodegroupDoesNotStageDevicePluginAddon`, `tests/e2e/gpu/eks_gpu_test.go` `TestEKSGPUPodExposure` |
 | Idempotency | `clientRequestToken` is ignored. A duplicate create, including an SDK retry with the same token, returns `ResourceInUseException`. A repeated update re-stages and returns another `Successful` with the same id. A repeated delete returns `ResourceNotFoundException`. | `TestCreateAddon_RepeatedClientRequestTokenIsResourceInUse`, `TestUpdateAddon_ReportsSuccessfulWhileRecordIsUpdating`, `TestDeleteAddon_ReturnsDeletingAfterErasingRecordAndManifest`, `handlers/eks/addons_test.go` `TestCreateAddon_CreatesStagingAndDefaultsVersion` |
 | Absent resource | An unknown cluster returns `ResourceNotFoundException` for every action, including the internal manifest listing. A missing add-on returns `ResourceNotFoundException` from describe, update and delete. | `handlers/eks/addons_test.go` `TestCreateAddon_UnknownClusterIsNotFound`, `TestDescribeDeleteAddon_MissingIsNotFound`, `TestUpdateAddon_MissingIsNotFound`, `TestListStagedAddonManifests` |
-| Dependencies | Only the cluster meta's existence is checked; cluster status is not read, so add-ons can be created on a `DELETING` cluster. | `TestAddonActionsIgnoreClusterLifecycleStatus` |
+| Dependencies | `CreateAddon` checks the cluster meta exists and refuses a `DELETING` cluster with `ResourceInUseException`, since a recorded delete admits no new dependant; other statuses are not read. | `TestCreateAddonRefusesOnlyADeletingCluster` |
 | Authorization | Gateway policy uses the add-on ARN above. `serviceAccountRoleArn` requires `iam:PassRole` on `CreateAddon` and `UpdateAddon` (`domains/eks/awsapi/passrole.go`), the same check `CreateCluster`/`CreateNodegroup` apply, including that the role exists. Tag actions on an add-on ARN return `NotImplemented`. | `domains/eks/awsapi/gateway_wire_test.go` `TestPassedRoleARNs_AddonServiceAccountRoleIsChecked`, `domains/eks/awsapi/gateway_passrole_test.go` `TestEKSCreateAddon_PassRole`, `TestEKSUpdateAddon_PassRole`, `domains/eks/awsapi/authz_test.go` `TestResourceARNsFidelity` |
-| Cluster deletion | Add-on records and manifests are erased only by the cluster prefix purge, after the cluster's infrastructure teardown succeeds; there is no per-add-on delete. Reclaiming a failed cluster keeps the meta and does not purge, so the recreated cluster inherits the add-ons. | `TestDeleteClusterPrefix_SweepsAddonRecordsAndManifestsScopedToCluster`, `handlers/eks/cluster_state_test.go` `TestDeleteClusterPrefix_SweepsEveryKey` |
+| Cluster deletion | Add-on records and manifests are erased only by the cluster prefix purge, after the cluster's infrastructure teardown succeeds; there is no per-add-on delete. Reclaiming a failed cluster keeps the meta and does not purge, so the recreated cluster inherits the add-ons. | `TestDeleteClusterChildren_SweepsAddonRecordsAndManifestsScopedToCluster`, `handlers/eks/cluster_state_test.go` `TestDeleteClusterChildren_SweepsEveryKey` |
 | Restart and interruption | Create interrupted between the record put and staging leaves a `CREATING` record with no manifest that nothing re-stages and that blocks a retry. Delete interrupted after unstaging leaves a record in its previous status while the guest removes the software. An update interrupted after the CAS leaves `UPDATING` with the previous manifest. A daemon restart loses nothing durable, but reports sent while no reconciler runs are lost until the next tick. | none |
 | End-to-end | `tests/e2e/eks/eks_test.go` `TestEKS/AddonDelivery` (create to `ACTIVE`, objects present, delete removes the namespace) and `tests/e2e/gpu/eks_gpu_test.go` `TestEKSGPUPodExposure`; `tests/integration/cross_tenant_test.go` `TestCrossTenant_EveryScopedActionIsAccountedFor`. No E2E for update, failure, configuration or the role. No Terraform apply/destroy evidence for `aws_eks_addon`. | |

@@ -0,0 +1,42 @@
+# EKS cluster: delete lifecycle contract
+
+Contract under ADR-0003 S1 for the delete half of an EKS cluster's lifecycle, the half ADR-0003 S8 constrains.
+Create, update and the control-plane reconciler are out of its scope and keep the observed gaps recorded elsewhere.
+Paths are relative to `spinifex/` unless they start with `tests/`, which is relative to the spinifex repo root.
+Test names without a path are in `domains/eks/cluster/`.
+
+## Scope
+
+A cluster is a composite resource: its record at `clusters/{name}/meta` in the `eks-account-{account}` bucket names the dependants a delete must remove.
+In the system account those are the control-plane VMs and their root volumes, the endpoint load balancer with its target groups, the managed control-plane VPC and its network, and the spread placement group.
+In the customer account they are the egress address, the private-endpoint interface and security group, the cluster security groups, a cluster-owned internet gateway, and load balancers the in-cluster controller created.
+Node group workers and CSI-provisioned EBS volumes are never removed by a cluster delete.
+
+## Contract
+
+| Item | Behaviour | Evidence |
+|---|---|---|
+| Request | `DeleteCluster` validates, answers `ResourceNotFoundException` for an absent cluster, answers a `DELETING` cluster from its record, refuses a cluster with node groups with `ResourceInUseException`, records `DELETING` and returns. It waits for no teardown step. | `TestS8_EKSDeleteClusterReturnsBeforeTheTeardownCompletes`, `TestRLC1_EKSDeleteClusterNotFoundOnAbsent`, `TestS8_EKSDeleteClusterRefusesWhileNodegroupsExist`, `tests/e2e/eks` `TestEKS/DeleteCluster` |
+| Obligation | `DELETING` with `DeletingSince` on the record is the tenant's decision. No status writer moves a record off it, and a create launch still running adds its refs to it instead of overwriting it. | `TestS2_EKSDeletingIsStickyForStatusWriters`, `TestS2_EKSLaunchWriteAfterDeleteNeitherRevertsNorRecreates` |
+| Retry | A repeat delete answers `DELETING` from the record and starts nothing. | `TestS8_EKSSecondDeleteAnswersFromTheRecordWithoutASecondTeardown` |
+| Convergence | `convergeClusterDeletion` (`domains/eks/cluster/cluster_teardown.go`), started by the request and backed by `EKSDeletingReaper`, runs under a per-cluster in-process gate and the cross-node teardown lease, renewed on the service context. It acts only on a record that is `DELETING` when re-read. | `TestS8_EKSKickAndSameNodeSweepRunOneTeardown`, `TestS8_EKSTeardownLeaseOutlivesTheRequest`, `TestS7_EKSTeardownActsOnlyOnARecordedDelete` |
+| Retained cleanup | A failed step keeps the record `DELETING` with its refs and the error. The record is removed last, after its child records, and only if no ref appeared that the pass did not tear down. A record with a node group is never removed; a record that is not `DELETING` is refused before anything else is checked. | `TestRLC2_EKSBillableTeardownBeforeKVSweep`, `TestS2_EKSTeardownRemovesTheMetaLast`, `TestS2_EKSTeardownDoesNotSweepARecordChangedDuringTeardown`, `TestS7_EKSTeardownNeverRemovesAClusterWithNodegroupWorkers` |
+| Recovery | A teardown interrupted by a crash or a lost lease is finished by the reaper on any node. Failed passes back off from 90 s, doubling to a 30 min cap, and are never abandoned; `DeleteReapExhausted` only flags a long failure for an operator. | `TestS2_EKSTeardownResumesAfterAnInterruptedConverge`, `TestRLC4_DeletingReaperReDrivesWedgedTeardown`, `TestDeletingReaper_KeepsRetryingPastTheOldAttemptLimit`, `TestDeletingReaper_ResumesAnAlreadyExhaustedRecord` |
+| Visibility | `DescribeCluster` and `ListClusters` show the cluster `DELETING` until the record is removed, then `ResourceNotFoundException`. A failed pass shows one `INTERNAL_FAILURE` health issue naming the step, never the internal error. | `TestDescribeCluster_StuckDeleteShowsTheStepNotTheError`, `TestRLC2_EKSBillableTeardownBeforeKVSweep` |
+| New dependants | `CreateNodegroup` requires `ACTIVE`; `CreateAddon` and `CreateAccessEntry` refuse a `DELETING` cluster with `ResourceInUseException`. | `TestCreateAddonRefusesOnlyADeletingCluster`, `TestS2_EKSDeletingClusterAdmitsNoNewDependants` |
+| Subject budgets | Every `eks.*` request subject is classified by its handler's work in `eksSubjects` (`domains/eks/cluster/service_nats.go`) and keeps the 30 s budget; `eks.DeleteCluster` is request-scaled. A subject the gateway sends or the daemon serves that is not classified fails the table. | `TestS8_EKSSubjectBudgets` |
+| Late child records | No child record outlives the cluster or leaks into a later one of the same name. The teardown sweeps child keys again after removing the meta and stops the cluster's bootstrap subscriber, bootstrap refuses to write into a record that is gone or `DELETING`, the launch re-checks its record around seeding the creator's access entry, and a fresh claim clears whatever an earlier cluster left under the name. | `TestS2_EKSLaunchOvertakenByDeleteLeavesNoChildRecords`, `TestS2_EKSBootstrapWritesNothingIntoADeletingCluster`, `TestS2_EKSFreshClaimInheritsNoStaleChildRecords` |
+| Launch generation | The create launch's writes are fenced on the record's generation (`CreatedAt` and ARN). An overtaken launch never writes a newer cluster of the same name and releases only the instances it started, by ID. One whose record was swept recreates it as `DELETING` with its refs, so the teardown and reaper own the release. One whose record was marked `FAILED` merges its refs and releases what it built. | `TestS2_EKSOvertakenLaunchNeverWritesANewerClusterOfTheSameName`, `TestS2_EKSOvertakenLaunchHandsItsInfraToTheTeardown`, `TestS2_EKSLaunchMarkedFailedReleasesWhatItBuilt` |
+| Running launch | A create launch heartbeats its owner and time on the record (`LaunchOwner`, `LaunchHeartbeat`). The teardown keeps the record while that heartbeat is fresh, so the cluster reads `DELETING` throughout and never `ResourceNotFoundException` then `DELETING` again; the launch hands its refs over at its next write and starts the teardown when it returns. A heartbeat older than 90 s is taken as a crashed launch and no longer waited for, and recreating a swept record stays as the backstop. The launch's OIDC keypair writes are fenced on the record's generation. | `TestS2_EKSDeletedClusterNeverReadsMissingWhileItsLaunchRuns`, `TestS2_EKSCrashedLaunchDoesNotPinTheDelete`, `TestS2_EKSOvertakenLaunchCannotReplaceANewerClustersSigningKey` |
+| Bounded passes | One converger run is bounded at 15 minutes, so a hung step cannot hold the gate and lease; the timed-out pass is recorded and backed off. Waiting on node groups is not counted as a failed pass, and deleting the last node group resumes the delete. | `TestS8_EKSHungTeardownStepReleasesTheGate`, `TestS2_EKSLastNodegroupDeletedResumesTheClusterDelete` |
+| FAILED reclaim | Re-creating a `FAILED` cluster's name tears the old attempt down under the same gate and lease as a delete, and answers `ResourceInUseException` while another holder has it; the per-node teardown bound does not apply to it. | `TestS2_EKSFailedClusterReclaimRunsUnderTheTeardownLease`, `TestS2_EKSFailedClusterReclaimIsNotRefusedForCapacity` |
+| Tenant data | The teardown never deletes a CSI-provisioned volume or terminates a node group worker. | `TestS7_EKSTeardownNeverDeletesCSIVolumesOrWorkers`, `TestS7_EKSTeardownNeverRemovesAClusterWithNodegroupWorkers` |
+
+## Gaps
+
+1. Four `eks.*` handlers still hold their request for work that grows with the resource, and the subject table names them as not conformant: `CreateCluster` (reclaiming a `FAILED` cluster of the same name tears its infra down inline), `DeleteNodegroup` (one awaited terminate per worker), `UpdateNodegroupConfig` (one awaited launch or terminate per worker added or removed) and `RestoreSnapshot` (launches a control-plane VM and fences the old one inline).
+2. AWS's answer to a repeat delete on a `DELETING` cluster has not been observed; `DELETING` from the record is the chosen behaviour.
+3. Control-plane, load balancer and VPC resources in the system account are keyed by the bare cluster name, so a teardown by name can reach another tenant's same-named cluster.
+4. The teardown deletes load balancers the in-cluster controller created in the customer account, which AWS leaves behind.
+5. An overtaken launch's late write can still land under a newer cluster of the same name in the instant between that cluster's claim sweep and the old launch's generation check; it is bounded by one write, since the old launch stops at its next fenced write.
+6. The `FAILED`-name reclaim purge still runs inside the `CreateCluster` request (gap 1).
@@ -4,13 +4,13 @@
 # distroless base (no shell, no package manager) for a small, production-shaped
 # image suitable for pushing to ECR and pulling onto EKS workers.

-FROM golang:1.27.3-alpine@sha256:f2c872bcee949b7be9c490efd02b48a8a2fbf947cdf533f1c58525ec9d8170fd AS build
+FROM golang:1.27.3-alpine@sha256:d200d2dd76b03a99b52651fd1325aff7dcd35422c35c01bac56571b0507f3deb AS build
 WORKDIR /src
 COPY go.mod ./
 COPY main.go ./
 RUN CGO_ENABLED=0 GOOS=linux go build -trimpath -ldflags="-s -w" -o /out/spinifex-demo .

-FROM gcr.io/distroless/static:nonroot@sha256:18f4cc26c9ffa7f20a359298be7deadac5c607c8e03a02b8119f1a5fc2f82c99
+FROM gcr.io/distroless/static:nonroot@sha256:25ac8f0c3b2334a9eb05452266bd4697864a8c8ef0ef71e5e6480d7f92868329
 COPY --from=build /out/spinifex-demo /spinifex-demo
 EXPOSE 8080
 USER nonroot:nonroot
@@ -123,9 +123,13 @@ Internal and internet-facing ALB and NLB, HTTPS listeners, listener rules, `Modi
 Unhealthy-target routing: an NLB with an HTTP health check on a TCP target group stops sending traffic to a target that fails it while still accepting TCP, sends traffic again once it recovers, and fails open when every target is unhealthy.
 An ALB whose targets all fail their health check keeps serving from them instead of answering 503.

+`TestInternalALBPrivateSubnet` launches an internal ALB in a private subnet of a non-default VPC with no internet gateway and no public route.
+The load balancer must reach active with a healthy target, which needs the owner stamp on its ENI to resolve, and a client inside the VPC must be served by it on every request.
+The client reports on its serial console because the runner has no route into the VPC.
+
 ### `eks`, `ecs`, `ecr` — container services

-`eks`: cluster create/delete, access entries, addon delivery, `GetToken`, kubeconfig artifacts, the EBS CSI volume path, an IRSA web-identity exchange under the stock AWS trust policy (`StringEquals` on the issuer host-path `:sub`/`:aud`, a mismatched `:sub` denied with `AccessDenied`, a `StringLike` `:sub` granted), and an IRSA pod wired with a projected SA token. Worker IMDS is covered too: a managed nodegroup worker reports IMDSv2 required with hop limit 2, a pod with no IRSA resolves to the node role through IMDS, and a nodegroup built from a launch template takes the template's metadata options. Control-plane isolation is covered as well: no control-plane host registers as a Node, a DaemonSet tolerating every taint runs on workers only, metrics-server is Ready, and logs work for every kube-system pod. `ecs`: clusters, container instances, the three network modes (`awsvpc`, `bridge`, `host`), task-role credentials fetched from the container credentials endpoint, a service behind an ELB, and ENI release on terminate. `ecr`: control-plane CRUD plus a real OCI data plane — docker login/build/push/pull round trips, multi-layer images, and raw blob HTTP.
+`eks`: cluster create/delete, access entries, addon delivery, `GetToken`, kubeconfig artifacts, the EBS CSI volume path, an IRSA web-identity exchange under the stock AWS trust policy (`StringEquals` on the issuer host-path `:sub`/`:aud`, a mismatched `:sub` denied with `AccessDenied`, a `StringLike` `:sub` granted), and an IRSA pod whose spec names only a ServiceAccount with the role-arn annotation, where the pod-identity webhook injects the token volume, `AWS_*` environment, STS endpoint and CA bundle and the pod assumes the role, while a pod of an unannotated ServiceAccount is left untouched. The unmodified aws-load-balancer-controller chart 1.11.0 installs with the values an AWS user passes plus the gateway endpoint override, the Shield and WAF switches and the single-subnet feature gate, and reconciles an Ingress into an active ALB. Worker IMDS is covered too: a managed nodegroup worker reports IMDSv2 required with hop limit 2, a pod with no IRSA resolves to the node role through IMDS, and a nodegroup built from a launch template takes the template's metadata options. Control-plane isolation is covered as well: no control-plane host registers as a Node, a DaemonSet tolerating every taint runs on workers only, metrics-server is Ready, and logs work for every kube-system pod. `ecs`: clusters, container instances, the three network modes (`awsvpc`, `bridge`, `host`), task-role credentials fetched from the container credentials endpoint, a service behind an ELB, and ENI release on terminate. `ecr`: control-plane CRUD plus a real OCI data plane — docker login/build/push/pull round trips, multi-layer images, and raw blob HTTP.

 ### `rds` — managed databases

@@ -4,15 +4,15 @@ go 1.27.3

 require (
 	github.com/aws/aws-sdk-go v1.55.8
-	github.com/aws/aws-sdk-go-v2 v1.47.4
-	github.com/aws/aws-sdk-go-v2/aws/protocol/eventstream v1.7.24
-	github.com/aws/aws-sdk-go-v2/config v1.33.9
-	github.com/aws/aws-sdk-go-v2/credentials v1.20.9
-	github.com/aws/aws-sdk-go-v2/feature/ec2/imds v1.20.3
-	github.com/aws/aws-sdk-go-v2/service/lambda v1.113.3
-	github.com/aws/aws-sdk-go-v2/service/s3 v1.114.4
-	github.com/aws/aws-sdk-go-v2/service/sqs v1.52.6
-	github.com/aws/smithy-go v1.28.6
+	github.com/aws/aws-sdk-go-v2 v1.47.5
+	github.com/aws/aws-sdk-go-v2/aws/protocol/eventstream v1.7.25
+	github.com/aws/aws-sdk-go-v2/config v1.33.12
+	github.com/aws/aws-sdk-go-v2/credentials v1.20.12
+	github.com/aws/aws-sdk-go-v2/feature/ec2/imds v1.20.5
+	github.com/aws/aws-sdk-go-v2/service/lambda v1.113.4
+	github.com/aws/aws-sdk-go-v2/service/s3 v1.114.6
+	github.com/aws/aws-sdk-go-v2/service/sqs v1.52.7
+	github.com/aws/smithy-go v1.28.7
 	github.com/cenkalti/backoff/v4 v4.3.0
 	github.com/charmbracelet/bubbles v1.0.0
 	github.com/charmbracelet/bubbletea v1.3.10
@@ -31,8 +31,8 @@ require (
 	github.com/mulgadc/northstar v1.23.0
 	github.com/mulgadc/predastore v1.23.0
 	github.com/mulgadc/viperblock v1.23.0
-	github.com/nats-io/nats-server/v2 v2.15.1
-	github.com/nats-io/nats.go v1.54.0
+	github.com/nats-io/nats-server/v2 v2.15.2
+	github.com/nats-io/nats.go v1.55.0
 	github.com/nats-io/nkeys v0.4.16
 	github.com/opencontainers/runtime-spec v1.3.0
 	github.com/oracle/oci-go-sdk/v65 v65.128.0
@@ -43,9 +43,9 @@ require (
 	github.com/spf13/pflag v1.0.10
 	github.com/spf13/viper v1.21.0
 	github.com/stretchr/testify v1.12.1
-	go.etcd.io/etcd/api/v3 v3.5.35
-	go.etcd.io/etcd/client/pkg/v3 v3.5.35
-	go.etcd.io/etcd/client/v3 v3.5.35
+	go.etcd.io/etcd/api/v3 v3.7.3
+	go.etcd.io/etcd/client/pkg/v3 v3.7.3
+	go.etcd.io/etcd/client/v3 v3.7.3
 	go.opentelemetry.io/contrib/instrumentation/net/http/otelhttp v0.72.0
 	go.opentelemetry.io/otel v1.47.0
 	go.opentelemetry.io/otel/metric v1.47.0
@@ -53,14 +53,14 @@ require (
 	go.opentelemetry.io/otel/sdk/metric v1.47.0
 	go.opentelemetry.io/otel/trace v1.47.0
 	go.uber.org/goleak v1.3.1-0.20260602155401-5f791e3ef83b
-	go.yaml.in/yaml/v3 v3.0.5
+	go.yaml.in/yaml/v3 v3.0.6
 	golang.org/x/crypto v0.58.0
 	golang.org/x/sync v0.24.0
 	golang.org/x/sys v0.49.0
 	golang.org/x/term v0.47.0
 	golang.org/x/time v0.16.0
 	golang.org/x/tools v0.52.0
-	google.golang.org/grpc v1.83.2
+	google.golang.org/grpc v1.85.0
 	gopkg.in/ini.v1 v1.67.3
 )

@@ -72,17 +72,17 @@ require (
 	github.com/Microsoft/hcsshim v0.15.0-rc.4 // indirect
 	github.com/antithesishq/antithesis-sdk-go v0.8.0-default-no-op // indirect
 	github.com/atotto/clipboard v0.1.4 // indirect
-	github.com/aws/aws-sdk-go-v2/internal/configsources v1.5.7 // indirect
-	github.com/aws/aws-sdk-go-v2/internal/endpoints/v2 v2.8.7 // indirect
-	github.com/aws/aws-sdk-go-v2/internal/v4a v1.5.6 // indirect
-	github.com/aws/aws-sdk-go-v2/service/internal/accept-encoding v1.13.21 // indirect
-	github.com/aws/aws-sdk-go-v2/service/internal/checksum v1.11.7 // indirect
-	github.com/aws/aws-sdk-go-v2/service/internal/presigned-url v1.14.6 // indirect
-	github.com/aws/aws-sdk-go-v2/service/internal/s3shared v1.20.6 // indirect
-	github.com/aws/aws-sdk-go-v2/service/signin v1.10.4 // indirect
-	github.com/aws/aws-sdk-go-v2/service/sso v1.38.4 // indirect
-	github.com/aws/aws-sdk-go-v2/service/ssooidc v1.43.4 // indirect
-	github.com/aws/aws-sdk-go-v2/service/sts v1.51.4 // indirect
+	github.com/aws/aws-sdk-go-v2/internal/configsources v1.5.8 // indirect
+	github.com/aws/aws-sdk-go-v2/internal/endpoints/v2 v2.8.8 // indirect
+	github.com/aws/aws-sdk-go-v2/internal/v4a v1.5.8 // indirect
+	github.com/aws/aws-sdk-go-v2/service/internal/accept-encoding v1.13.23 // indirect
+	github.com/aws/aws-sdk-go-v2/service/internal/checksum v1.11.9 // indirect
+	github.com/aws/aws-sdk-go-v2/service/internal/presigned-url v1.14.8 // indirect
+	github.com/aws/aws-sdk-go-v2/service/internal/s3shared v1.20.8 // indirect
+	github.com/aws/aws-sdk-go-v2/service/signin v1.12.0 // indirect
+	github.com/aws/aws-sdk-go-v2/service/sso v1.39.0 // indirect
+	github.com/aws/aws-sdk-go-v2/service/ssooidc v1.44.0 // indirect
+	github.com/aws/aws-sdk-go-v2/service/sts v1.51.6 // indirect
 	github.com/aymanbagabas/go-osc52/v2 v2.0.1 // indirect
 	github.com/beorn7/perks v1.0.1 // indirect
 	github.com/boltdb/bolt v1.3.1 // indirect
@@ -111,7 +111,7 @@ require (
 	github.com/containerd/plugin v1.1.0 // indirect
 	github.com/containerd/ttrpc v1.2.9 // indirect
 	github.com/containerd/typeurl/v2 v2.3.0 // indirect
-	github.com/coreos/go-semver v0.3.0 // indirect
+	github.com/coreos/go-semver v0.3.1 // indirect
 	github.com/coreos/go-systemd/v22 v22.7.0 // indirect
 	github.com/dgraph-io/badger/v4 v4.9.6 // indirect
 	github.com/dgraph-io/ristretto/v2 v2.4.0 // indirect
@@ -128,7 +128,6 @@ require (
 	github.com/go-playground/validator/v10 v10.30.5 // indirect
 	github.com/go-viper/mapstructure/v2 v2.5.0 // indirect
 	github.com/gofrs/flock v0.10.0 // indirect
-	github.com/gogo/protobuf v1.3.2 // indirect
 	github.com/golang/protobuf v1.5.4 // indirect
 	github.com/google/flatbuffers v25.12.19+incompatible // indirect
 	github.com/google/go-tpm v0.9.8 // indirect
@@ -175,7 +174,6 @@ require (
 	github.com/opencontainers/image-spec v1.1.1 // indirect
 	github.com/pierrec/lz4/v4 v4.1.18 // indirect
 	github.com/pkg/errors v0.9.1 // indirect
-	github.com/pmezard/go-difflib v1.0.1-0.20181226105442-5d4384ee4fb2 // indirect
 	github.com/prometheus/client_golang v1.24.1 // indirect
 	github.com/prometheus/client_model v0.6.3 // indirect
 	github.com/prometheus/common v0.71.0 // indirect
@@ -203,10 +201,9 @@ require (
 	go.opentelemetry.io/otel/log v1.47.0 // indirect
 	go.opentelemetry.io/otel/sdk/log v1.47.0 // indirect
 	go.opentelemetry.io/proto/otlp v1.11.0 // indirect
-	go.uber.org/atomic v1.7.0 // indirect
-	go.uber.org/multierr v1.6.0 // indirect
+	go.uber.org/multierr v1.11.0 // indirect
 	go.uber.org/nilaway v0.0.0-20260721205819-4a0f7653488a // indirect
-	go.uber.org/zap v1.17.0 // indirect
+	go.uber.org/zap v1.27.1 // indirect
 	golang.org/x/exp/typeparams v0.0.0-20260611194520-c48552f49976 // indirect
 	golang.org/x/mod v0.42.0 // indirect
 	golang.org/x/net v0.61.0 // indirect
@@ -22,46 +22,46 @@ github.com/atotto/clipboard v0.1.4 h1:EH0zSVneZPSuFR11BlR9YppQTVDbh5+16AmcJi4g1z
 github.com/atotto/clipboard v0.1.4/go.mod h1:ZY9tmq7sm5xIbd9bOK4onWV4S6X0u6GY7Vn0Yu86PYI=
 github.com/aws/aws-sdk-go v1.55.8 h1:JRmEUbU52aJQZ2AjX4q4Wu7t4uZjOu71uyNmaWlUkJQ=
 github.com/aws/aws-sdk-go v1.55.8/go.mod h1:ZkViS9AqA6otK+JBBNH2++sx1sgxrPKcSzPPvQkUtXk=
-github.com/aws/aws-sdk-go-v2 v1.47.4 h1:bTvk6UdSSSvaQsfLVj1JRDEEqj/PDRwGf1KanaRzau0=
-github.com/aws/aws-sdk-go-v2 v1.47.4/go.mod h1:XkrjAZvr705Nytv6PkPUhoSB2W9+vVHBp5oAWpkh8Ak=
-github.com/aws/aws-sdk-go-v2/aws/protocol/eventstream v1.7.24 h1:t7FxqJ5KHDeKceyD4HtGaG6z7hMSeVGjs5/4c+L5ArM=
-github.com/aws/aws-sdk-go-v2/aws/protocol/eventstream v1.7.24/go.mod h1:5XK6NRVlK8s8yj4zKcM43HLluGA/rAz+azLLvWDMRr0=
-github.com/aws/aws-sdk-go-v2/config v1.33.9 h1:Hv6bcQUJVnmuWaKjqD6Ot8sE75NrWsWV20oGT5aWle0=
-github.com/aws/aws-sdk-go-v2/config v1.33.9/go.mod h1:ivowmrZNfBQLcg4QkaItgi5wae4Bzot9RzIdbY1hfTg=
-github.com/aws/aws-sdk-go-v2/credentials v1.20.9 h1:SNO55PnWhaDafsOcv16lCA0kdoFMl/YlegWoVsU02s0=
-github.com/aws/aws-sdk-go-v2/credentials v1.20.9/go.mod h1:+2reOTRtdD3VSBqpRDNwrZIYy8yMCYa7oK3WKTJ/I1I=
-github.com/aws/aws-sdk-go-v2/feature/ec2/imds v1.20.3 h1:gr3b87OLB29jymWPzp/CAyXwQRJVE+sC4Wm0qBIKHsk=
-github.com/aws/aws-sdk-go-v2/feature/ec2/imds v1.20.3/go.mod h1:BRjf4L/Yx2hY54o+ZibPbLJyMMeSwqYQXwcJfqW66a8=
-github.com/aws/aws-sdk-go-v2/internal/configsources v1.5.7 h1:fSNAt6hs4qLjb9tMZc6vj3PHlOCYGXK2JjJZ7AW2tf4=
-github.com/aws/aws-sdk-go-v2/internal/configsources v1.5.7/go.mod h1:TMav+EuXQu5kNpZZz/6rIC8xx4mCsW+6AKHrjvOSAsE=
-github.com/aws/aws-sdk-go-v2/internal/endpoints/v2 v2.8.7 h1:7NS6kqBjkWIN8P/AEdmtyq6eQGAhN1oHTZdzXclpH6Y=
-github.com/aws/aws-sdk-go-v2/internal/endpoints/v2 v2.8.7/go.mod h1:1PFqtAUsIgF1nEVojzRJSf/v88zjzqrGW+w+UAtkXyQ=
-github.com/aws/aws-sdk-go-v2/internal/v4a v1.5.6 h1:Qmn60RWuk9+bd2ddvJJqwf3Cpac3VvGMOdbGemtUhX4=
-github.com/aws/aws-sdk-go-v2/internal/v4a v1.5.6/go.mod h1:h/YJhe4AVyQxEUMluph10iqV7mjajH7A9L+BHF5ppis=
-github.com/aws/aws-sdk-go-v2/service/internal/accept-encoding v1.13.21 h1:e6YW5uME30TkrElR+4/xcY7NB6CCj2dcv7vtmGXhfhQ=
-github.com/aws/aws-sdk-go-v2/service/internal/accept-encoding v1.13.21/go.mod h1:obpHAMP693+f3/A8PkLhIqfK1C+NWWn8zXzqD3OH520=
-github.com/aws/aws-sdk-go-v2/service/internal/checksum v1.11.7 h1:CwvFlKw0uUScfgOMflXSRZa+ayXgOf6wk7lhyMemQYU=
-github.com/aws/aws-sdk-go-v2/service/internal/checksum v1.11.7/go.mod h1:4SbD8BB+p+QEnG0aX6DoWwrtk9SufyYXRsUv0nve8LE=
-github.com/aws/aws-sdk-go-v2/service/internal/presigned-url v1.14.6 h1:LHHdobjo5le1sjJdolitV7uVvYg3wkaeM1Ju2fDgeZQ=
-github.com/aws/aws-sdk-go-v2/service/internal/presigned-url v1.14.6/go.mod h1:CBGB0evAiaMD3Lk4wPO7LQCcCZLuhzL5Qf/wfEUHQ5w=
-github.com/aws/aws-sdk-go-v2/service/internal/s3shared v1.20.6 h1:mYViDr2azcgxOpRrObZOl631bvavqILoE/L+Kxgbwys=
-github.com/aws/aws-sdk-go-v2/service/internal/s3shared v1.20.6/go.mod h1:OXVdAo9jNhggB+hJRGOyy7WolGTKB6Rg7IIulDeSzPM=
-github.com/aws/aws-sdk-go-v2/service/lambda v1.113.3 h1:oSHldse7GDHpdq81XeAJnhIbsdDKP9bMIt00G8W6uXI=
-github.com/aws/aws-sdk-go-v2/service/lambda v1.113.3/go.mod h1:Y//K046w4uhiR3o77beo/y52Jv2uEY13iJ+3+jicLO8=
-github.com/aws/aws-sdk-go-v2/service/s3 v1.114.4 h1:MrkWRB58Qw5TEkb51QVooVLjlM3IevO2iVXEz74B8pg=
-github.com/aws/aws-sdk-go-v2/service/s3 v1.114.4/go.mod h1:yfIxaKRHasvfy6tNEm3/LpqKsupMzQjMaWj9Y0jMVbo=
-github.com/aws/aws-sdk-go-v2/service/signin v1.10.4 h1:tvpDjuUvgKURf3Yk4hOaGbZ4QdY+070OWcA5d6LUv2A=
-github.com/aws/aws-sdk-go-v2/service/signin v1.10.4/go.mod h1:3ibVKg5Ng82Zby8++jELTD2nHxiPk2DJRLEeW/LKp8M=
-github.com/aws/aws-sdk-go-v2/service/sqs v1.52.6 h1:Suq1LNhMBpsmShEv3vO+J3H8HEeK+GwYMJDYLE4IJSs=
-github.com/aws/aws-sdk-go-v2/service/sqs v1.52.6/go.mod h1:rHGuzFg4AfVnWZa3/533tn5GQd1LzVkTXI9WMT8LqAc=
-github.com/aws/aws-sdk-go-v2/service/sso v1.38.4 h1:ChCtagixSFOxltv0o6E3NT8F7ksvZtZGPwUBynO5Nmk=
-github.com/aws/aws-sdk-go-v2/service/sso v1.38.4/go.mod h1:+FEO9jrVMpc9oN3CdAxJbtlQEu3z8UddDPSedpeM3PY=
-github.com/aws/aws-sdk-go-v2/service/ssooidc v1.43.4 h1:j6c+HA4AoS0EBEjArPjavFEBrucJEryfrQU0TffmACk=
-github.com/aws/aws-sdk-go-v2/service/ssooidc v1.43.4/go.mod h1:RhghaXUk9q66VtOQUX1FdPddQuHnqQZzbB0fEYXmPRA=
-github.com/aws/aws-sdk-go-v2/service/sts v1.51.4 h1:OKEfbf2tcfsF2pBk/S9QqNpo6alaAtiBs4hysCsBjPw=
-github.com/aws/aws-sdk-go-v2/service/sts v1.51.4/go.mod h1:mCd6qGo9b8hTtfjgsmNkFlzwjyce4owd7HDVFnCLXhM=
-github.com/aws/smithy-go v1.28.6 h1:Pj+/sUviNYjow8ELRtNwKHZ9ECeF+7pATX3+shjLIrw=
-github.com/aws/smithy-go v1.28.6/go.mod h1:YE2RhdIuDbA5E5bTdciG9KrW3+TiEONeUWCqxX9i1Fc=
+github.com/aws/aws-sdk-go-v2 v1.47.5 h1:5yA+A+BiXbDq1ZLbYwPViwhEGDMdR0MEhL8Jh2LnLS4=
+github.com/aws/aws-sdk-go-v2 v1.47.5/go.mod h1:iNIkogrRvFwm+1OQIUOP2lPBtlXZboOIUWiCa+pHEMw=
+github.com/aws/aws-sdk-go-v2/aws/protocol/eventstream v1.7.25 h1:MW0Iql1SOTgQPj8mCxrU/eH/K/AIDWi08ItOsXaWRLU=
+github.com/aws/aws-sdk-go-v2/aws/protocol/eventstream v1.7.25/go.mod h1:+ucVYmHYB3JqVueY0E1RHahdXAnKQbIHqybSbvOUbOM=
+github.com/aws/aws-sdk-go-v2/config v1.33.12 h1:IV1YARaXahwCqUIyP8IlWsP85Lil+5ozTozDQXPumRk=
+github.com/aws/aws-sdk-go-v2/config v1.33.12/go.mod h1:h51R06bzMVwNBRZOX5ylHhNDnkB/azZeq/LvxM6q2pQ=
+github.com/aws/aws-sdk-go-v2/credentials v1.20.12 h1:6P7Q7yH/GIwHg6MLKv3ySsBqaCoE1z+C0OTzYMenhEY=
+github.com/aws/aws-sdk-go-v2/credentials v1.20.12/go.mod h1:Kw/SaoW/wc7IqJErqXJIzKo8b7Aelxfbuc6XlbrRnsc=
+github.com/aws/aws-sdk-go-v2/feature/ec2/imds v1.20.5 h1:iXjy2SFhGYNB1jWZBhQqq8HbhsbPF23w+/zbMvPXsTg=
+github.com/aws/aws-sdk-go-v2/feature/ec2/imds v1.20.5/go.mod h1:k0RUiBnyXU0AXRJ9tJmY2jQke6XUIX2PNVnWtvgaPtc=
+github.com/aws/aws-sdk-go-v2/internal/configsources v1.5.8 h1:gzIWc3DTPfPbWKrQnmL6BV6WD7NPD1htxzgdk/bQ/Z4=
+github.com/aws/aws-sdk-go-v2/internal/configsources v1.5.8/go.mod h1:vvUA5cDAZWGo4R14FZPZfXfJCmgsafOWEq78Kg0D+ug=
+github.com/aws/aws-sdk-go-v2/internal/endpoints/v2 v2.8.8 h1:PWv+vG8aCLS8qd+HPdYhK7Vees90aKHWFFQ1AGYD/8E=
+github.com/aws/aws-sdk-go-v2/internal/endpoints/v2 v2.8.8/go.mod h1:xxPZEpflYHJA12366ZGyq66z9dHPCoeCIu99Jck+MPw=
+github.com/aws/aws-sdk-go-v2/internal/v4a v1.5.8 h1:WOp5De9iWdEHDPh2Kb0tBP3vGBm/dVAuRGh4a4tqduo=
+github.com/aws/aws-sdk-go-v2/internal/v4a v1.5.8/go.mod h1:z8W8YgfhbWl62XqcTtK+CxPrE+iHGRVUOtrrbIOp7ZY=
+github.com/aws/aws-sdk-go-v2/service/internal/accept-encoding v1.13.23 h1:MCIR6iZaCKO4UE0hUvoWWLI6JVjppopV64JfAJaMjng=
+github.com/aws/aws-sdk-go-v2/service/internal/accept-encoding v1.13.23/go.mod h1:pphWFS+z0MmIPivj8c/6bATd1Z+Av7Ust75DPdEFsPA=
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@@ -128,8 +128,8 @@ github.com/containerd/ttrpc v1.2.9 h1:ha0ak962T0s3CA/RoZ6S6xiWZQF24GrBaEpiGX1uih
 github.com/containerd/ttrpc v1.2.9/go.mod h1:jjtQRwXm4DL3KsHKW8vDiUOV6wO0hi6IPhmJhxU7aEs=
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@@ -181,8 +181,6 @@ github.com/go-viper/mapstructure/v2 v2.5.0 h1:vM5IJoUAy3d7zRSVtIwQgBj7BiWtMPfmPE
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-github.com/gogo/protobuf v1.3.2 h1:Ov1cvc58UF3b5XjBnZv7+opcTcQFZebYjWzi34vdm4Q=
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@@ -249,8 +247,6 @@ github.com/josharian/native v1.1.0 h1:uuaP0hAbW7Y4l0ZRQ6C9zfb7Mg1mbFKry/xzDAfmtL
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@@ -317,10 +313,10 @@ github.com/munnerz/goautoneg v0.0.0-20191010083416-a7dc8b61c822 h1:C3w9PqII01/Oq
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@@ -340,7 +336,6 @@ github.com/pelletier/go-toml/v2 v2.4.3/go.mod h1:2gIqNv+qfxSVS7cM2xJQKtLSTLUE9V8
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@@ -409,17 +404,15 @@ github.com/xo/terminfo v0.0.0-20220910002029-abceb7e1c41e h1:JVG44RsyaB9T2KIHavM
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-go.etcd.io/etcd/api/v3 v3.5.35 h1:lB//Av9mFrkljv94XDNAY+qiyQA9W6S/TTA2Uwx2jsI=
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+go.etcd.io/etcd/client/v3 v3.7.3 h1:UrXcetgkuSEocaBlQlulQRJlXLEnUAHuBRbHh0lue1Q=
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@@ -456,26 +449,22 @@ go.opentelemetry.io/otel/trace v1.47.0 h1:JOjX/Oci8K94QHddo+bbfya/Ai/nf6/dt9ZfrF
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 golang.org/x/crypto v0.0.0-20210921155107-089bfa567519/go.mod h1:GvvjBRRGRdwPK5ydBHafDWAxML/pGHZbMvKqRZ5+Abc=
 golang.org/x/crypto v0.58.0 h1:COkYLr4k7nDI4r6QtMML2AfzeIswWHAJthLS6K/M/54=
 golang.org/x/crypto v0.58.0/go.mod h1:Xh+kl5A+M0gMiWDytH2Hhr5Z7WbNCpv/eB/EFgfSk+w=
@@ -483,33 +472,24 @@ golang.org/x/exp v0.0.0-20241108190413-2d47ceb2692f h1:XdNn9LlyWAhLVp6P/i8QYBW+h
 golang.org/x/exp v0.0.0-20241108190413-2d47ceb2692f/go.mod h1:D5SMRVC3C2/4+F/DB1wZsLRnSNimn2Sp/NPsCrsv8ak=
 golang.org/x/exp/typeparams v0.0.0-20260611194520-c48552f49976 h1:GTD/WuaexTazIG/SxLOz4rEKZPDVilmVVC2nz4xhwfE=
 golang.org/x/exp/typeparams v0.0.0-20260611194520-c48552f49976/go.mod h1:PqrXSW65cXDZH0k4IeUbhmg/bcAZDbzNz3byBpKCsXo=
-golang.org/x/mod v0.2.0/go.mod h1:s0Qsj1ACt9ePp/hMypM3fl4fZqREWJwdYDEqhRiZZUA=
-golang.org/x/mod v0.3.0/go.mod h1:s0Qsj1ACt9ePp/hMypM3fl4fZqREWJwdYDEqhRiZZUA=
 golang.org/x/mod v0.6.0-dev.0.20220419223038-86c51ed26bb4/go.mod h1:jJ57K6gSWd91VN4djpZkiMVwK6gcyfeH4XE8wZrZaV4=
 golang.org/x/mod v0.8.0/go.mod h1:iBbtSCu2XBx23ZKBPSOrRkjjQPZFPuis4dIYUhu/chs=
 golang.org/x/mod v0.42.0 h1:ICeL3t2L30ljSPHHxDnR4fqVcBt/zR2zJAb9juavmQg=
 golang.org/x/mod v0.42.0/go.mod h1:u5fzIrRInkL8MaO1cbRkUHT64v303YIT5KEqpNr7jRs=
-golang.org/x/net v0.0.0-20190404232315-eb5bcb51f2a3/go.mod h1:t9HGtf8HONx5eT2rtn7q6eTqICYqUVnKs3thJo3Qplg=
 golang.org/x/net v0.0.0-20190620200207-3b0461eec859/go.mod h1:z5CRVTTTmAJ677TzLLGU+0bjPO0LkuOLi4/5GtJWs/s=
-golang.org/x/net v0.0.0-20200226121028-0de0cce0169b/go.mod h1:z5CRVTTTmAJ677TzLLGU+0bjPO0LkuOLi4/5GtJWs/s=
-golang.org/x/net v0.0.0-20201021035429-f5854403a974/go.mod h1:sp8m0HH+o8qH0wwXwYZr8TS3Oi6o0r6Gce1SSxlDquU=
 golang.org/x/net v0.0.0-20210226172049-e18ecbb05110/go.mod h1:m0MpNAwzfU5UDzcl9v0D8zg8gWTRqZa9RBIspLL5mdg=
 golang.org/x/net v0.0.0-20220722155237-a158d28d115b/go.mod h1:XRhObCWvk6IyKnWLug+ECip1KBveYUHfp+8e9klMJ9c=
 golang.org/x/net v0.6.0/go.mod h1:2Tu9+aMcznHK/AK1HMvgo6xiTLG5rD5rZLDS+rp2Bjs=
 golang.org/x/net v0.61.0 h1:RR+6j/BTBCrggOLugxa+66R8FvoN6MHlzDlZIbN9YFw=
 golang.org/x/net v0.61.0/go.mod h1:WgDCOTH8iwtB66T4/GfI94AHo/hhdb7Hah9NDseQfiI=
 golang.org/x/sync v0.0.0-20190423024810-112230192c58/go.mod h1:RxMgew5VJxzue5/jJTE5uejpjVlOe/izrB70Jof72aM=
-golang.org/x/sync v0.0.0-20190911185100-cd5d95a43a6e/go.mod h1:RxMgew5VJxzue5/jJTE5uejpjVlOe/izrB70Jof72aM=
-golang.org/x/sync v0.0.0-20201020160332-67f06af15bc9/go.mod h1:RxMgew5VJxzue5/jJTE5uejpjVlOe/izrB70Jof72aM=
 golang.org/x/sync v0.0.0-20220722155255-886fb9371eb4/go.mod h1:RxMgew5VJxzue5/jJTE5uejpjVlOe/izrB70Jof72aM=
 golang.org/x/sync v0.1.0/go.mod h1:RxMgew5VJxzue5/jJTE5uejpjVlOe/izrB70Jof72aM=
 golang.org/x/sync v0.24.0 h1:iqiDrGoDgyuvAKrhLQthUEzU/R378N78gXbBjxed7oA=
 golang.org/x/sync v0.24.0/go.mod h1:sUUOizhqBxiL6pEWpqNLUiaJn1ShEbZ6BBqskPbjZm0=
 golang.org/x/sys v0.0.0-20190215142949-d0b11bdaac8a/go.mod h1:STP8DvDyc/dI5b8T5hshtkjS+E42TnysNCUPdjciGhY=
-golang.org/x/sys v0.0.0-20190412213103-97732733099d/go.mod h1:h1NjWce9XRLGQEsW7wpKNCjG9DtNlClVuFLEZdDNbEs=
 golang.org/x/sys v0.0.0-20200116001909-b77594299b42/go.mod h1:h1NjWce9XRLGQEsW7wpKNCjG9DtNlClVuFLEZdDNbEs=
 golang.org/x/sys v0.0.0-20200223170610-d5e6a3e2c0ae/go.mod h1:h1NjWce9XRLGQEsW7wpKNCjG9DtNlClVuFLEZdDNbEs=
-golang.org/x/sys v0.0.0-20200930185726-fdedc70b468f/go.mod h1:h1NjWce9XRLGQEsW7wpKNCjG9DtNlClVuFLEZdDNbEs=
 golang.org/x/sys v0.0.0-20201119102817-f84b799fce68/go.mod h1:h1NjWce9XRLGQEsW7wpKNCjG9DtNlClVuFLEZdDNbEs=
 golang.org/x/sys v0.0.0-20210615035016-665e8c7367d1/go.mod h1:oPkhp1MJrh7nUepCBck5+mAzfO9JrbApNNgaTdGDITg=
 golang.org/x/sys v0.0.0-20210630005230-0f9fa26af87c/go.mod h1:oPkhp1MJrh7nUepCBck5+mAzfO9JrbApNNgaTdGDITg=
@@ -542,8 +522,6 @@ golang.org/x/time v0.16.0 h1:vMb6ptszcQMkcwiRTAuNNU50gom6++Q/6gY2hDM6VDE=
 golang.org/x/time v0.16.0/go.mod h1:rVKOqvZeKvrDKTQiAHJ7wmwP0RzleSphoEA9RcdLA0s=
 golang.org/x/tools v0.0.0-20180917221912-90fa682c2a6e/go.mod h1:n7NCudcB/nEzxVGmLbDWY5pfWTLqBcC2KZ6jyYvM4mQ=
 golang.org/x/tools v0.0.0-20191119224855-298f0cb1881e/go.mod h1:b+2E5dAYhXwXZwtnZ6UAqBI28+e2cm9otk0dWdXHAEo=
-golang.org/x/tools v0.0.0-20200619180055-7c47624df98f/go.mod h1:EkVYQZoAsY45+roYkvgYkIh4xh/qjgUK9TdY2XT94GE=
-golang.org/x/tools v0.0.0-20210106214847-113979e3529a/go.mod h1:emZCQorbCU4vsT4fOWvOPXz4eW1wZW4PmDk9uLelYpA=
 golang.org/x/tools v0.1.12/go.mod h1:hNGJHUnrk76NpqgfD5Aqm5Crs+Hm0VOH/i9J2+nxYbc=
 golang.org/x/tools v0.6.0/go.mod h1:Xwgl3UAJ/d3gWutnCtw505GrjyAbvKui8lOU390QaIU=
 golang.org/x/tools v0.52.0 h1:ryxg4U63oaUYk7uOLTF37n43f4qgtGvqV4Ioit1BaEs=
@@ -555,17 +533,14 @@ golang.org/x/tools/go/packages/packagestest v0.1.1-deprecated/go.mod h1:RVAQXBGN
 golang.org/x/vuln v1.6.0 h1:FeMO9Rm/HwyduOztbvKcOw+zvDEPr4I4aQNSfevFcKY=
 golang.org/x/vuln v1.6.0/go.mod h1:bWlG2493/sjR7ksvicBgMrznH3eYQEyK8ifUYBrqUbg=
 golang.org/x/xerrors v0.0.0-20190717185122-a985d3407aa7/go.mod h1:I/5z698sn9Ka8TeJc9MKroUUfqBBauWjQqLJ2OPfmY0=
-golang.org/x/xerrors v0.0.0-20191011141410-1b5146add898/go.mod h1:I/5z698sn9Ka8TeJc9MKroUUfqBBauWjQqLJ2OPfmY0=
-golang.org/x/xerrors v0.0.0-20191204190536-9bdfabe68543/go.mod h1:I/5z698sn9Ka8TeJc9MKroUUfqBBauWjQqLJ2OPfmY0=
-golang.org/x/xerrors v0.0.0-20200804184101-5ec99f83aff1/go.mod h1:I/5z698sn9Ka8TeJc9MKroUUfqBBauWjQqLJ2OPfmY0=
 gonum.org/v1/gonum v0.17.0 h1:VbpOemQlsSMrYmn7T2OUvQ4dqxQXU+ouZFQsZOx50z4=
 gonum.org/v1/gonum v0.17.0/go.mod h1:El3tOrEuMpv2UdMrbNlKEh9vd86bmQ6vqIcDwxEOc1E=
 google.golang.org/genproto/googleapis/api v0.0.0-20260928230214-8a89bd6388cc h1:rZHRz0ogq4Pid1IKtA/ivHi8XONVF5tqUQXA2TtgpkE=
 google.golang.org/genproto/googleapis/api v0.0.0-20260928230214-8a89bd6388cc/go.mod h1:K/n0XLazCJHjD73YuMyNJsN38BPPy1kfFnKxUXaThFU=
 google.golang.org/genproto/googleapis/rpc v0.0.0-20260928230214-8a89bd6388cc h1:4bNTbnb44EqGVy9HaQxSY2jnafSUdgV3qHtedvNpDKg=
 google.golang.org/genproto/googleapis/rpc v0.0.0-20260928230214-8a89bd6388cc/go.mod h1:OaIUM3+LpYcK2GXM4FTmhWoIq371Owdr+Cc7/BsYHHc=
-google.golang.org/grpc v1.83.2 h1:EManeRomTObA0BU7I8vXgg/78uE5MJ9M8B39EX2WscU=
-google.golang.org/grpc v1.83.2/go.mod h1:YPI1hK3kDked6iHvgX3tR0y+nX/qpMFKhPgFsokw1S8=
+google.golang.org/grpc v1.85.0 h1:BPBCfuVRQ1qvBhKDOq9uvQllMvO59rKsYhXpp7Dd8vw=
+google.golang.org/grpc v1.85.0/go.mod h1:0rQrOD58yjal/0EaVbGBANindixsCZNQPDV3VKtaKuQ=
 google.golang.org/protobuf v1.36.12 h1:pJOKDDOyeXErUroCihFAd5LQuwXBSpVnKGrj5o/fwxc=
 google.golang.org/protobuf v1.36.12/go.mod h1:HTf+CrKn2C3g5S8VImy6tdcUvCska2kB7j23XfzDpco=
 gopkg.in/check.v1 v0.0.0-20161208181325-20d25e280405/go.mod h1:Co6ibVJAznAaIkqp8huTwlJQCZ016jof/cbN4VW5Yz0=
@@ -575,7 +550,7 @@ gopkg.in/yaml.v2 v2.2.8/go.mod h1:hI93XBmqTisBFMUTm0b8Fm+jr3Dg1NNxqwp+5A1VGuI=
 gopkg.in/yaml.v2 v2.4.0 h1:D8xgwECY7CYvx+Y2n4sBz93Jn9JRvxdiyyo8CTfuKaY=
 gopkg.in/yaml.v2 v2.4.0/go.mod h1:RDklbk79AGWmwhnvt/jBztapEOGDOx6ZbXqjP6csGnQ=
 gopkg.in/yaml.v3 v3.0.0-20200313102051-9f266ea9e77c/go.mod h1:K4uyk7z7BCEPqu6E+C64Yfv1cQ7kz7rIZviUmN+EgEM=
-gopkg.in/yaml.v3 v3.0.0-20210107192922-496545a6307b/go.mod h1:K4uyk7z7BCEPqu6E+C64Yfv1cQ7kz7rIZviUmN+EgEM=
+gopkg.in/yaml.v3 v3.0.1 h1:fxVm/GzAzEWqLHuvctI91KS9hhNmmWOoWu0XTYJS7CA=
 gopkg.in/yaml.v3 v3.0.1/go.mod h1:K4uyk7z7BCEPqu6E+C64Yfv1cQ7kz7rIZviUmN+EgEM=
 pgregory.net/rapid v1.3.0 h1:vBvO0VSqti75J1jjYqpgPNBLKMd1+gxa9fYo7vk/Exc=
 pgregory.net/rapid v1.3.0/go.mod h1:dPlE4OBBxgXPqkP79flB6sJL1dx5azpI7HQ9MY9Z7uk=
@@ -19,5 +19,6 @@ var modelFiles = map[Service]string{
 	RDS:                    "models/rds-2014-10-31.json.gz",
 	Route53:                "models/route-53-2013-04-01.json.gz",
 	S3:                     "models/s3-2006-03-01.json.gz",
+	SQS:                    "models/sqs-2012-11-05.json.gz",
 	STS:                    "models/sts-2011-06-15.json.gz",
 }
@@ -36,6 +36,7 @@ const (
 	RDS                    Service = "rds"
 	Route53                Service = "route53"
 	S3                     Service = "s3"
+	SQS                    Service = "sqs"
 	STS                    Service = "sts"
 )

@@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ import (
 )

 func TestServices(t *testing.T) {
-	want := []Service{ACM, EC2, ECR, ECS, EKS, ElasticLoadBalancingV2, IAM, RDS, Route53, S3, STS}
+	want := []Service{ACM, EC2, ECR, ECS, EKS, ElasticLoadBalancingV2, IAM, RDS, Route53, S3, SQS, STS}
 	if got := Services(); !reflect.DeepEqual(got, want) {
 		t.Fatalf("Services() = %v, want %v", got, want)
 	}
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 // Package sqsworkergw is the shared SQS worker guest's SigV4 client for the
 // gateway's internal spinifex-sqs service. It sends only public values: the
-// worker's identity is the signing session, and the store seed never leaves
+// worker's identity is the signing session, and the receipt key never leaves
 // the guest.
 package sqsworkergw

@@ -10,20 +10,21 @@ import (
 	"crypto/sha256"
 	"crypto/tls"
 	"crypto/x509"
+	"encoding/base64"
 	"encoding/hex"
+	"encoding/json"
 	"encoding/xml"
 	"errors"
 	"fmt"
 	"io"
 	"maps"
-	"net"
 	"net/http"
 	"net/url"
 	"strings"
 	"time"

 	"github.com/mulgadc/bluebottle/pkg/tlsconfig"
-	"github.com/nats-io/nkeys"
+	"github.com/mulgadc/spinifex/spinifex/domains/sqs/relay"
 )

 const (
@@ -33,9 +34,12 @@ const (
 	callTimeout    = 30 * time.Second
 	maxResponse    = 64 << 10

-	actionClaim    = "ClaimFirstStore"
-	actionDescribe = "DescribeStore"
-	actionRecord   = "RecordWorkerPublicKey"
+	actionClaim    = "ClaimReceiptKey"
+	actionRecord   = "RecordReceiptKey"
+	actionPoll     = "PollWork"
+	actionComplete = "CompleteWork"
+	// maxPollResponse fits the gateway's 16 MiB poll batch as base64 XML.
+	maxPollResponse = 32 << 20
 )

 // Signer signs a request in place for service and region.
@@ -43,7 +47,7 @@ type Signer interface {
 	Sign(r *http.Request, payloadHash, service, region string) error
 }

-// Client calls the internal first-store actions for this worker.
+// Client calls the internal SQS worker actions for this worker.
 type Client struct {
 	baseURL    string
 	region     string
@@ -114,80 +118,72 @@ func (e *TransientError) Error() string   { return e.Err.Error() }
 func (e *TransientError) Unwrap() error   { return e.Err }
 func (e *TransientError) Retryable() bool { return true }

-type claimResult struct {
-	CreateKey bool   `xml:"CreateKey"`
-	PublicKey string `xml:"PublicKey"`
+// ReceiptKey is the worker volume's receipt key initialization as the
+// gateway reports it: pending authorizes creating or resuming one, otherwise
+// Fingerprint names the key the disk must already hold.
+type ReceiptKey struct {
+	Pending     bool
+	Fingerprint string
+	// HostNodes is the gateway's declared cluster node count; a gateway
+	// that does not report one reads as zero.
+	HostNodes int
 }

-// Claim asks for this worker's current first-store decision. A decision
-// that is neither "create" nor one valid public key is refused here.
-func (c *Client) Claim(ctx context.Context) (bool, string, error) {
+type claimResult struct {
+	Pending     bool   `xml:"Pending"`
+	Fingerprint string `xml:"Fingerprint"`
+	HostNodes   int    `xml:"HostNodes"`
+}
+
+// ClaimReceiptKey asks for the receipt key decision. A reply that is neither
+// pending nor one valid fingerprint is refused here.
+func (c *Client) ClaimReceiptKey(ctx context.Context) (ReceiptKey, error) {
 	var res claimResult
 	if err := c.call(ctx, actionClaim, nil, &res); err != nil {
-		return false, "", err
+		return ReceiptKey{}, err
 	}
-	switch {
-	case res.CreateKey && res.PublicKey == "":
-		return true, "", nil
-	case !res.CreateKey && nkeys.IsValidPublicUserKey(res.PublicKey):
-		return false, res.PublicKey, nil
+	if res.Pending == (res.Fingerprint != "") || (res.Fingerprint != "" && !ValidFingerprint(res.Fingerprint)) {
+		return ReceiptKey{}, errors.New("spinifex-sqs ClaimReceiptKey: response is not a valid decision")
 	}
-	return false, "", errors.New("spinifex-sqs ClaimFirstStore: response is not a valid decision")
+	return ReceiptKey(res), nil
 }

-// Store is the Region's store launch as the gateway reports it. Bound means
-// a VM was launched for it, not that it is ready.
-type Store struct {
-	Bound     bool
-	Address   string
-	PublicKey string
-}
-
-type describeResult struct {
-	State     string `xml:"State"`
-	Address   string `xml:"Address"`
-	PublicKey string `xml:"PublicKey"`
-}
-
-// DescribeStore reports this worker's store. A bound reply must carry an
-// IPv4 address and a valid public key; a pending one must carry neither.
-func (c *Client) DescribeStore(ctx context.Context) (Store, error) {
-	var res describeResult
-	if err := c.call(ctx, actionDescribe, nil, &res); err != nil {
-		return Store{}, err
+// RecordReceiptKey records the key's fingerprint. Recording the same one
+// again succeeds, so a lost reply is safe to repeat.
+func (c *Client) RecordReceiptKey(ctx context.Context, fingerprint string) error {
+	if !ValidFingerprint(fingerprint) {
+		return errors.New("spinifex-sqs RecordReceiptKey: refusing to send a value that is not a fingerprint")
 	}
-	switch {
-	case res.State == "pending" && res.Address == "" && res.PublicKey == "":
-		return Store{}, nil
-	case res.State == "bound" && isIPv4(res.Address) && nkeys.IsValidPublicUserKey(res.PublicKey):
-		return Store{Bound: true, Address: res.Address, PublicKey: res.PublicKey}, nil
-	}
-	return Store{}, errors.New("spinifex-sqs DescribeStore: response is not a valid store state")
+	return c.call(ctx, actionRecord, url.Values{"Fingerprint": {fingerprint}}, nil)
 }

-func isIPv4(s string) bool {
-	ip := net.ParseIP(s)
-	return ip != nil && ip.To4() != nil && !strings.Contains(s, ":")
-}
-
-// RecordPublicKey records the worker's public key. Anything other than a
-// user public key is refused before it is sent.
-func (c *Client) RecordPublicKey(ctx context.Context, publicKey string) error {
-	if !nkeys.IsValidPublicUserKey(publicKey) {
-		return errors.New("spinifex-sqs RecordWorkerPublicKey: refusing to send a value that is not a user public key")
+// ValidFingerprint reports a lowercase hex SHA-256 fingerprint.
+func ValidFingerprint(s string) bool {
+	if len(s) != 2*sha256.Size || strings.ToLower(s) != s {
+		return false
 	}
-	return c.call(ctx, actionRecord, url.Values{"PublicKey": {publicKey}}, nil)
+	_, err := hex.DecodeString(s)
+	return err == nil
 }

 func (c *Client) call(ctx context.Context, action string, params url.Values, out any) error {
 	form := url.Values{"Action": {action}, "Version": {apiVersion}}
 	maps.Copy(form, params)
-	body := []byte(form.Encode())
-	req, err := http.NewRequestWithContext(ctx, http.MethodPost, c.baseURL+"/", bytes.NewReader(body))
+	return c.do(ctx, action, "", []byte(form.Encode()), "application/x-www-form-urlencoded; charset=utf-8", maxResponse, out)
+}
+
+// do signs and sends one request. rawQuery, when set, carries the action and
+// its arguments; the body hash is signed either way.
+func (c *Client) do(ctx context.Context, action, rawQuery string, body []byte, contentType string, limit int64, out any) error {
+	target := c.baseURL + "/"
+	if rawQuery != "" {
+		target += "?" + rawQuery
+	}
+	req, err := http.NewRequestWithContext(ctx, http.MethodPost, target, bytes.NewReader(body))
 	if err != nil {
 		return fmt.Errorf("spinifex-sqs %s: build request: %w", action, err)
 	}
-	req.Header.Set("Content-Type", "application/x-www-form-urlencoded; charset=utf-8")
+	req.Header.Set("Content-Type", contentType)
 	sum := sha256.Sum256(body)
 	if err := c.signer.Sign(req, hex.EncodeToString(sum[:]), signingService, c.region); err != nil {
 		return &TransientError{Err: fmt.Errorf("spinifex-sqs %s: sign: %w", action, err)}
@@ -197,7 +193,7 @@ func (c *Client) call(ctx context.Context, action string, params url.Values, out
 		return &TransientError{Err: fmt.Errorf("spinifex-sqs %s: send: %w", action, err)}
 	}
 	defer resp.Body.Close()
-	respBody, err := io.ReadAll(io.LimitReader(resp.Body, maxResponse))
+	respBody, err := io.ReadAll(io.LimitReader(resp.Body, limit))
 	if err != nil {
 		return &TransientError{Err: fmt.Errorf("spinifex-sqs %s: read response: %w", action, err)}
 	}
@@ -210,6 +206,44 @@ func (c *Client) call(ctx context.Context, action string, params url.Values, out
 	return decodeResult(action, respBody, out)
 }

+// PollWork long-polls the gateway for owner calls queued for this worker.
+// An empty list is a poll that found nothing.
+func (c *Client) PollWork(ctx context.Context) ([]relay.Work, error) {
+	var res struct {
+		Items []string `xml:"Items>member"`
+	}
+	if err := c.do(ctx, actionPoll, "", []byte(url.Values{"Action": {actionPoll}, "Version": {apiVersion}}.Encode()),
+		"application/x-www-form-urlencoded; charset=utf-8", maxPollResponse, &res); err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+	out := make([]relay.Work, 0, len(res.Items))
+	for _, item := range res.Items {
+		raw, err := base64.StdEncoding.DecodeString(item)
+		if err != nil {
+			return nil, errors.New("spinifex-sqs PollWork: item is not base64")
+		}
+		var w relay.Work
+		if err := json.Unmarshal(raw, &w); err != nil || w.ID == "" || w.Op == "" {
+			return nil, errors.New("spinifex-sqs PollWork: item is not a work item")
+		}
+		out = append(out, w)
+	}
+	return out, nil
+}
+
+// CompleteWork posts an encoded result for work item id and returns the
+// gateway's outcome name. Any error leaves delivery unknown.
+func (c *Client) CompleteWork(ctx context.Context, id string, result []byte) (string, error) {
+	q := url.Values{"Action": {actionComplete}, "Version": {apiVersion}, "WorkId": {id}}
+	var res struct {
+		Outcome string `xml:"Outcome"`
+	}
+	if err := c.do(ctx, actionComplete, q.Encode(), result, "application/json", maxResponse, &res); err != nil {
+		return "", err
+	}
+	return res.Outcome, nil
+}
+
 func decodeResult(action string, body []byte, out any) error {
 	want := action + "Result"
 	dec := xml.NewDecoder(bytes.NewReader(body))
@@ -10,8 +10,6 @@ import (
 	"strings"
 	"sync/atomic"
 	"testing"
-
-	"github.com/nats-io/nkeys"
 )

 type nopSigner struct{ err error }
@@ -24,15 +22,10 @@ func (s nopSigner) Sign(r *http.Request, _, service, region string) error {
 	return nil
 }

-func userKey(t *testing.T) (pub, seed string) {
-	t.Helper()
-	kp, err := nkeys.CreateUser()
-	if err != nil {
-		t.Fatal(err)
-	}
-	p, _ := kp.PublicKey()
-	s, _ := kp.Seed()
-	return p, string(s)
+var fp = strings.Repeat("ab", 32)
+
+func claimBody(inner string) string {
+	return `<ClaimReceiptKeyResponse><ClaimReceiptKeyResult>` + inner + `</ClaimReceiptKeyResult></ClaimReceiptKeyResponse>`
 }

 // server answers with body and status, counting and keeping requests.
@@ -73,63 +66,56 @@ func TestNew_RefusesWithoutHTTPSRegionCAOrSigner(t *testing.T) {
 }

 func TestClaim_SignsForTheInternalServiceAndRegion(t *testing.T) {
-	c, _, seen := server(t, 200, `<ClaimFirstStoreResponse><ClaimFirstStoreResult><CreateKey>true</CreateKey></ClaimFirstStoreResult></ClaimFirstStoreResponse>`)
-	create, pub, err := c.Claim(context.Background())
-	if err != nil || !create || pub != "" {
-		t.Fatalf("claim = %v %q %v", create, pub, err)
+	c, _, seen := server(t, 200, claimBody(`<Pending>true</Pending><HostNodes>1</HostNodes>`))
+	got, err := c.ClaimReceiptKey(context.Background())
+	if err != nil || !got.Pending || got.Fingerprint != "" || got.HostNodes != 1 {
+		t.Fatalf("claim = %+v %v", got, err)
 	}
-	if got := (*seen)[0]; !strings.HasPrefix(got, "test spinifex-sqs/ap-southeast-2|") || !strings.Contains(got, "Action=ClaimFirstStore") {
-		t.Fatalf("request = %q", got)
+	if req := (*seen)[0]; !strings.HasPrefix(req, "test spinifex-sqs/ap-southeast-2|") || !strings.Contains(req, "Action=ClaimReceiptKey") {
+		t.Fatalf("request = %q", req)
 	}
 }

-// Only "create" or exactly one valid public key is a decision.
+// Only pending alone, or exactly one valid fingerprint, is a decision.
 func TestClaim_RefusesAnythingButOneDecision(t *testing.T) {
-	pub, seed := userKey(t)
-	cases := map[string]string{
-		"create with a key": `<CreateKey>true</CreateKey><PublicKey>` + pub + `</PublicKey>`,
-		"neither":           `<CreateKey>false</CreateKey>`,
-		"seed as key":       `<CreateKey>false</CreateKey><PublicKey>` + seed + `</PublicKey>`,
-		"no result":         ``,
-	}
-	for name, inner := range cases {
+	for name, inner := range map[string]string{
+		"pending with a key":  `<Pending>true</Pending><Fingerprint>` + fp + `</Fingerprint>`,
+		"neither":             `<Pending>false</Pending>`,
+		"uppercase key":       `<Pending>false</Pending><Fingerprint>` + strings.ToUpper(fp) + `</Fingerprint>`,
+		"short key":           `<Pending>false</Pending><Fingerprint>` + fp[:62] + `</Fingerprint>`,
+		"not the claim reply": "",
+	} {
 		t.Run(name, func(t *testing.T) {
-			body := `<ClaimFirstStoreResponse><ClaimFirstStoreResult>` + inner + `</ClaimFirstStoreResult></ClaimFirstStoreResponse>`
+			body := claimBody(inner)
 			if inner == "" {
 				body = `<Other/>`
 			}
 			c, _, _ := server(t, 200, body)
-			_, _, err := c.Claim(context.Background())
-			if err == nil {
+			if _, err := c.ClaimReceiptKey(context.Background()); err == nil {
 				t.Fatal("accepted a non-decision")
 			}
-			if strings.Contains(err.Error(), seed) {
-				t.Fatal("the error echoes a seed")
-			}
 		})
 	}
-	t.Run("existing", func(t *testing.T) {
-		c, _, _ := server(t, 200, `<ClaimFirstStoreResponse><ClaimFirstStoreResult><CreateKey>false</CreateKey><PublicKey>`+pub+`</PublicKey></ClaimFirstStoreResult></ClaimFirstStoreResponse>`)
-		create, got, err := c.Claim(context.Background())
-		if err != nil || create || got != pub {
-			t.Fatalf("claim = %v %q %v", create, got, err)
-		}
-	})
+	c, _, _ := server(t, 200, claimBody(`<Pending>false</Pending><Fingerprint>`+fp+`</Fingerprint>`))
+	got, err := c.ClaimReceiptKey(context.Background())
+	if err != nil || got.Pending || got.Fingerprint != fp {
+		t.Fatalf("recorded claim = %+v %v", got, err)
+	}
 }

-func TestRecordPublicKey_SendsOnlyAPublicKey(t *testing.T) {
-	pub, seed := userKey(t)
-	c, n, seen := server(t, 200, `<RecordWorkerPublicKeyResponse/>`)
-	if err := c.RecordPublicKey(context.Background(), seed); err == nil || strings.Contains(err.Error(), seed) {
-		t.Fatalf("seed err = %v", err)
+func TestRecordReceiptKey_SendsOnlyAFingerprint(t *testing.T) {
+	c, n, seen := server(t, 200, `<RecordReceiptKeyResponse/>`)
+	const raw = "not-a-fingerprint-and-maybe-key-material"
+	if err := c.RecordReceiptKey(context.Background(), raw); err == nil || strings.Contains(err.Error(), raw) {
+		t.Fatalf("invalid err = %v", err)
 	}
 	if n.Load() != 0 {
-		t.Fatal("a seed was sent")
+		t.Fatal("a non-fingerprint was sent")
 	}
-	if err := c.RecordPublicKey(context.Background(), pub); err != nil {
+	if err := c.RecordReceiptKey(context.Background(), fp); err != nil {
 		t.Fatal(err)
 	}
-	if !strings.Contains((*seen)[0], "PublicKey="+pub) {
+	if !strings.Contains((*seen)[0], "Fingerprint="+fp) {
 		t.Fatalf("request = %q", (*seen)[0])
 	}
 }
@@ -151,7 +137,7 @@ func TestErrors_ClassifiedWithoutEchoingTheBody(t *testing.T) {
 	}
 	for _, tc := range cases {
 		c, _, _ := server(t, tc.status, `<ErrorResponse><Error><Code>`+tc.code+`</Code><Message>secret-ish detail</Message></Error></ErrorResponse>`)
-		_, _, err := c.Claim(context.Background())
+		_, err := c.ClaimReceiptKey(context.Background())
 		api, ok := errors.AsType[*APIError](err)
 		if !ok || api.Code != tc.code || api.Retryable() != tc.retryable || api.Pending() != (tc.code == "AccessDenied") {
 			t.Fatalf("%s: err = %v", tc.code, err)
@@ -163,7 +149,7 @@ func TestErrors_ClassifiedWithoutEchoingTheBody(t *testing.T) {

 	c, _, _ := server(t, 200, "")
 	c.baseURL = "https://127.0.0.1:1"
-	_, _, err := c.Claim(context.Background())
+	_, err := c.ClaimReceiptKey(context.Background())
 	tr, ok := errors.AsType[*TransientError](err)
 	if !ok || !tr.Retryable() {
 		t.Fatalf("unreachable err = %v, want TransientError", err)
@@ -181,55 +167,10 @@ func TestCall_DoesNotFollowRedirects(t *testing.T) {
 	}))
 	t.Cleanup(srv.Close)
 	c.baseURL = srv.URL
-	if _, _, err := c.Claim(context.Background()); err == nil {
+	if _, err := c.ClaimReceiptKey(context.Background()); err == nil {
 		t.Fatal("a redirect was accepted as a decision")
 	}
 	if followed.Load() {
 		t.Fatal("the signed request followed a redirect")
 	}
 }
-
-// Only "pending" with nothing else, or "bound" with an IPv4 address and one
-// valid public key, is a store state.
-func TestDescribeStore_AcceptsOnlyAValidState(t *testing.T) {
-	pub, seed := userKey(t)
-	wrap := func(inner string) string {
-		return `<DescribeStoreResponse><DescribeStoreResult>` + inner + `</DescribeStoreResult></DescribeStoreResponse>`
-	}
-	t.Run("pending", func(t *testing.T) {
-		c, _, seen := server(t, 200, wrap(`<State>pending</State>`))
-		st, err := c.DescribeStore(context.Background())
-		if err != nil || st.Bound {
-			t.Fatalf("store = %+v %v", st, err)
-		}
-		if !strings.Contains((*seen)[0], "Action=DescribeStore") {
-			t.Fatalf("request = %q", (*seen)[0])
-		}
-	})
-	t.Run("bound", func(t *testing.T) {
-		c, _, _ := server(t, 200, wrap(`<State>bound</State><Address>10.240.0.9</Address><PublicKey>`+pub+`</PublicKey>`))
-		st, err := c.DescribeStore(context.Background())
-		if err != nil || !st.Bound || st.Address != "10.240.0.9" || st.PublicKey != pub {
-			t.Fatalf("store = %+v %v", st, err)
-		}
-	})
-	for name, inner := range map[string]string{
-		"pending with address": `<State>pending</State><Address>10.240.0.9</Address>`,
-		"bound without key":    `<State>bound</State><Address>10.240.0.9</Address>`,
-		"bound with seed":      `<State>bound</State><Address>10.240.0.9</Address><PublicKey>` + seed + `</PublicKey>`,
-		"bound with hostname":  `<State>bound</State><Address>store.example</Address><PublicKey>` + pub + `</PublicKey>`,
-		"bound with IPv6":      `<State>bound</State><Address>::ffff:10.240.0.9</Address><PublicKey>` + pub + `</PublicKey>`,
-		"unknown state":        `<State>ready</State>`,
-	} {
-		t.Run(name, func(t *testing.T) {
-			c, _, _ := server(t, 200, wrap(inner))
-			_, err := c.DescribeStore(context.Background())
-			if err == nil {
-				t.Fatal("accepted an invalid store state")
-			}
-			if strings.Contains(err.Error(), seed) {
-				t.Fatal("the error echoes a seed")
-			}
-		})
-	}
-}
@@ -0,0 +1,7 @@
+// Package deadpid gives tests a PID that no process can hold.
+package deadpid
+
+// PID is above the kernel's PID_MAX_LIMIT (4194304), so kill(2) on it always
+// fails with ESRCH. A plausible-looking literal such as 99999 is a real PID on
+// a busy host, and signalling it terminates whatever process holds it.
+const PID = 1 << 30
@@ -11,7 +11,6 @@ import (
 	"crypto/x509"
 	"crypto/x509/pkix"
 	"encoding/pem"
-	"errors"
 	"math/big"
 	"net"
 	"os"
@@ -70,7 +69,7 @@ func Start(t *testing.T, selfID uint64, members []Member) *Server {
 	})
 	s := &Server{Endpoint: "https://" + lis.Addr().String(), CertDir: dir, members: members, selfID: selfID}
 	gs := grpc.NewServer(grpc.Creds(creds))
-	pb.RegisterClusterServer(gs, &cluster{s})
+	pb.RegisterClusterServer(gs, &cluster{s: s})
 	pb.RegisterMaintenanceServer(gs, &maintenance{s: s})
 	go func() { _ = gs.Serve(lis) }()
 	t.Cleanup(gs.Stop)
@@ -91,7 +90,11 @@ func (s *Server) FailWith(err error) {
 	s.failAll = err
 }

-type cluster struct{ s *Server }
+type cluster struct {
+	pb.UnimplementedClusterServer
+
+	s *Server
+}

 func (c *cluster) MemberList(context.Context, *pb.MemberListRequest) (*pb.MemberListResponse, error) {
 	c.s.mu.Lock()
@@ -116,18 +119,6 @@ func (c *cluster) MemberRemove(_ context.Context, req *pb.MemberRemoveRequest) (
 	return &pb.MemberRemoveResponse{Header: &pb.ResponseHeader{MemberId: c.s.selfID}}, nil
 }

-func (c *cluster) MemberAdd(context.Context, *pb.MemberAddRequest) (*pb.MemberAddResponse, error) {
-	return nil, errors.New("not implemented")
-}
-
-func (c *cluster) MemberUpdate(context.Context, *pb.MemberUpdateRequest) (*pb.MemberUpdateResponse, error) {
-	return nil, errors.New("not implemented")
-}
-
-func (c *cluster) MemberPromote(context.Context, *pb.MemberPromoteRequest) (*pb.MemberPromoteResponse, error) {
-	return nil, errors.New("not implemented")
-}
-
 type maintenance struct {
 	pb.UnimplementedMaintenanceServer

@@ -0,0 +1,108 @@
+package testutil
+
+import (
+	"context"
+	"sync"
+
+	"github.com/nats-io/nats.go/jetstream"
+)
+
+// StaleReadKV wraps a bucket so that the first Get of a key after a write to it
+// returns the entry as it stood before that write, as a lagging replica does
+// when it answers a direct get. Later Gets see the current entry.
+type StaleReadKV struct {
+	jetstream.KeyValue
+
+	mu    sync.Mutex
+	stale map[string]jetstream.KeyValueEntry
+}
+
+var _ jetstream.KeyValue = (*StaleReadKV)(nil)
+
+// NewStaleReadKV wraps kv.
+func NewStaleReadKV(kv jetstream.KeyValue) *StaleReadKV {
+	return &StaleReadKV{KeyValue: kv, stale: map[string]jetstream.KeyValueEntry{}}
+}
+
+// remember captures the entry about to be overwritten.
+func (k *StaleReadKV) remember(ctx context.Context, key string) jetstream.KeyValueEntry {
+	prev, err := k.KeyValue.Get(ctx, key)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil
+	}
+	return prev
+}
+
+func (k *StaleReadKV) arm(key string, prev jetstream.KeyValueEntry) {
+	if prev == nil {
+		return
+	}
+	k.mu.Lock()
+	k.stale[key] = prev
+	k.mu.Unlock()
+}
+
+func (k *StaleReadKV) Get(ctx context.Context, key string) (jetstream.KeyValueEntry, error) {
+	k.mu.Lock()
+	prev, ok := k.stale[key]
+	delete(k.stale, key)
+	k.mu.Unlock()
+	if ok {
+		return prev, nil
+	}
+	return k.KeyValue.Get(ctx, key)
+}
+
+func (k *StaleReadKV) Update(ctx context.Context, key string, value []byte, last uint64) (uint64, error) {
+	prev := k.remember(ctx, key)
+	rev, err := k.KeyValue.Update(ctx, key, value, last)
+	if err == nil {
+		k.arm(key, prev)
+	}
+	return rev, err
+}
+
+func (k *StaleReadKV) Put(ctx context.Context, key string, value []byte) (uint64, error) {
+	prev := k.remember(ctx, key)
+	rev, err := k.KeyValue.Put(ctx, key, value)
+	if err == nil {
+		k.arm(key, prev)
+	}
+	return rev, err
+}
+
+// RejectingKV wraps a bucket so that writes for which reject returns an error
+// fail with it, and every other operation passes through.
+type RejectingKV struct {
+	jetstream.KeyValue
+
+	reject func(key string, value []byte) error
+}
+
+var _ jetstream.KeyValue = (*RejectingKV)(nil)
+
+// NewRejectingKV wraps kv. reject runs before each Put, Create and Update.
+func NewRejectingKV(kv jetstream.KeyValue, reject func(key string, value []byte) error) *RejectingKV {
+	return &RejectingKV{KeyValue: kv, reject: reject}
+}
+
+func (k *RejectingKV) Put(ctx context.Context, key string, value []byte) (uint64, error) {
+	if err := k.reject(key, value); err != nil {
+		return 0, err
+	}
+	return k.KeyValue.Put(ctx, key, value)
+}
+
+func (k *RejectingKV) Create(ctx context.Context, key string, value []byte, opts ...jetstream.KVCreateOpt) (uint64, error) {
+	if err := k.reject(key, value); err != nil {
+		return 0, err
+	}
+	return k.KeyValue.Create(ctx, key, value, opts...)
+}
+
+func (k *RejectingKV) Update(ctx context.Context, key string, value []byte, last uint64) (uint64, error) {
+	if err := k.reject(key, value); err != nil {
+		return 0, err
+	}
+	return k.KeyValue.Update(ctx, key, value, last)
+}
@@ -7,17 +7,14 @@ package pagedstore

 import (
 	"context"
-	"sort"
-	"strconv"

 	"github.com/aws/aws-sdk-go/aws"
 	"github.com/aws/aws-sdk-go/service/s3"
 	"github.com/mulgadc/spinifex/spinifex/providers/objectstore"
 )

-// Store wraps a MemoryObjectStore and splits ListObjectsV2's answer into
-// pages of at most PageSize objects, sorted by key so pagination is
-// deterministic across runs (MemoryObjectStore itself iterates a map).
+// Store wraps a MemoryObjectStore whose ListObjectsV2 pages like S3, capping
+// every page at PageSize entries so small fixtures span several pages.
 type Store struct {
 	*objectstore.MemoryObjectStore

@@ -28,51 +25,20 @@ type Store struct {
 	Calls int
 }

-// New returns a paging store with the given per-page object limit.
+// New returns an empty Store that serves at most pageSize entries per page.
 func New(pageSize int) *Store {
 	return &Store{MemoryObjectStore: objectstore.NewMemoryObjectStore(), PageSize: pageSize}
 }

 var _ objectstore.ObjectStore = (*Store)(nil)

-// ListObjectsV2 delegates to MemoryObjectStore for prefix/delimiter matching,
-// then slices the sorted result into one page per call, resuming from the
-// offset encoded in ContinuationToken.
+// ListObjectsV2 lowers the caller's MaxKeys to PageSize and lets the memory
+// store page, so tokens, ordering and common prefixes follow S3's rules.
 func (s *Store) ListObjectsV2(ctx context.Context, input *s3.ListObjectsV2Input) (*s3.ListObjectsV2Output, error) {
 	s.Calls++
-
-	full, err := s.MemoryObjectStore.ListObjectsV2(ctx, input)
-	if err != nil {
-		return nil, err
+	page := *input
+	if page.MaxKeys == nil || *page.MaxKeys > int64(s.PageSize) {
+		page.MaxKeys = aws.Int64(int64(s.PageSize))
 	}
-
-	sort.Slice(full.Contents, func(i, j int) bool {
-		return aws.StringValue(full.Contents[i].Key) < aws.StringValue(full.Contents[j].Key)
-	})
-
-	start := 0
-	if tok := aws.StringValue(input.ContinuationToken); tok != "" {
-		start, err = strconv.Atoi(tok)
-		if err != nil {
-			return nil, err
-		}
-	}
-	end := min(start+s.PageSize, len(full.Contents))
-	if start > end {
-		start = end
-	}
-
-	page := &s3.ListObjectsV2Output{
-		Contents:       full.Contents[start:end],
-		CommonPrefixes: full.CommonPrefixes,
-		Name:           input.Bucket,
-		KeyCount:       aws.Int64(int64(end - start)),
-	}
-	if end < len(full.Contents) {
-		page.IsTruncated = aws.Bool(true)
-		page.NextContinuationToken = aws.String(strconv.Itoa(end))
-	} else {
-		page.IsTruncated = aws.Bool(false)
-	}
-	return page, nil
+	return s.MemoryObjectStore.ListObjectsV2(ctx, &page)
 }
@@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ Node installation, dev-environment lifecycle, guest image builds, and verificati

 | Script | What it does |
 |---|---|
-| `setup.sh` | The production binary installer, served from `install.mulgadc.com`. Installs deps, users, sudoers, the host firewall policy, files, systemd units, logrotate and udev rules, and loads `openvswitch`, `geneve`, `vhost_net` and `tun`, listing them in `/etc/modules-load.d/spinifex.conf` for later boots. It masks firewalld wherever it is installed, since the Spinifex nftables policy is the only supported node firewall. It writes a needrestart drop-in so an apt upgrade never restarts the Spinifex, OVS or OVN units; restarting them after an upgrade is left to the operator. An unset `--firewall` keeps the mode recorded in `/etc/spinifex/firewall/mode`, and otherwise arms the policy when firewalld was active. Where systemd-resolved is installed but not running, resolvconf is absent and NetworkManager runs, it hands host DNS to resolved: it saves `/etc/resolv.conf` once to `/var/lib/spinifex-reset/resolv.conf.orig`, links `/etc/resolv.conf` to the resolved stub, and stops unless resolved has upstream servers and the package repository host still resolves. It links `/usr/bin/spx` to `/usr/local/bin/spx` where sudo's PATH leaves out `/usr/local/bin`, and takes the nbdkit plugin directory from `nbdkit --dump-config`, stopping when nbdkit cannot say. `SETUP_STAGES` runs a subset; `ISO_BUILD=1` runs it inside the ISO builder's chroot. |
+| `setup.sh` | The production binary installer, served from `install.mulgadc.com`. Installs deps, users, sudoers, the host firewall policy, files, systemd units, logrotate and udev rules, and loads `openvswitch`, `geneve`, `vhost_net` and `tun`, listing them in `/etc/modules-load.d/spinifex.conf` for later boots. It masks firewalld wherever it is installed, since the Spinifex nftables policy is the only supported node firewall. It writes a needrestart drop-in so an apt upgrade never restarts the Spinifex, OVS or OVN units; restarting them after an upgrade is left to the operator. An unset `--firewall` keeps the mode recorded in `/etc/spinifex/firewall/mode`, and otherwise arms the policy when firewalld was active. Where systemd-resolved is installed but not running, resolvconf is absent and NetworkManager runs, it hands host DNS to resolved: it saves `/etc/resolv.conf` once to `/var/lib/spinifex-reset/resolv.conf.orig`, writes `/etc/NetworkManager/conf.d/90-spinifex-dns.conf` (`dns=systemd-resolved`, `rc-manager=unmanaged`) so NetworkManager never rewrites `/etc/resolv.conf`, links `/etc/resolv.conf` to the resolved stub, and stops unless the link holds, resolved has upstream servers and the package repository host still resolves. A rerun after that handover adds a missing drop-in, reloads NetworkManager and relinks the stub. It links `/usr/bin/spx` to `/usr/local/bin/spx` where sudo's PATH leaves out `/usr/local/bin`, and takes the nbdkit plugin directory from `nbdkit --dump-config`, stopping when nbdkit cannot say. `SETUP_STAGES` runs a subset; `ISO_BUILD=1` runs it inside the ISO builder's chroot. |
 | `setup-ovn.sh` | Bootstraps a compute node for OVN VPC networking: installs OVN/OVS, creates `br-int`, configures the WAN bridge (bridged, DHCP, or routed-NAT uplink), sets the chassis identity, and applies overlay sysctls. It runs OVS and OVN as root, setting `OVS_USER_ID` and `OVN_USER_ID` where `/etc/sysconfig` holds them, and hooks the socket-permission helper onto `ovs-vswitchd`, `ovn-controller`, `openvswitch-ipsec` and, on EL, `ovn-northd`. `--management` also starts the OVN central services, writes their `ovn-ctl` flags to `/etc/default/ovn-central` (Debian) or `/etc/sysconfig/ovn-northd` (EL), and records the role in `/etc/spinifex/ovn-role`. With clustered databases it returns only once this node's NB and SB members are back in their RAFT clusters under a known leader, and fails after `OVN_RAFT_REJOIN_WAIT` seconds (default 60) otherwise, so reruns one node at a time never take two members of a cluster down. A later run without `--management` refuses while that file, or the `OVN_CTL_OPTS` line older nodes carry in `/etc/default/ovn-central`, records the role. It adds `maxsize 100M` to the OVS and OVN logrotate files, plus `rotate 5` where the file sets no count, and rotates as root, matching the daemons. On a host whose IPsec stack is libreswan it enables, stops and masks `openvswitch-ipsec.service` and `ipsec.service` for the daemon to unmask when IPsec is on, unless `openvswitch-ipsec.service` is already running; elsewhere it enables and starts `openvswitch-ipsec.service`, unless the daemon has masked it to keep IPsec off. The links it creates persist through systemd-networkd where that is enabled, and otherwise through `/etc/spinifex/hostnet.json`, which `spinifex-hostnet.service` (`spx admin hostnet apply`) replays at boot and on every OVS start, starting `ovn-controller` again when an OVS stop took it down; the first run records the choice in `/etc/spinifex/hostnet-backend`. Where NetworkManager runs, it leaves the links Spinifex owns unmanaged. |
 | `install-node.sh` | Forms a multi-node cluster across hosts that are already running Spinifex: rebuilds the OVN database in clustered form, runs `spx admin init` on the first host and `spx admin join` on the rest, then verifies. Before touching any host it refuses hosts of different OS families (`distro_os_family`) or `spx` versions, and `--ipsec on` when any host uses libreswan. The scripted form of [install-multi-node](../docs/install/install-multi-node/README.md). Destroys the joining nodes' logical network state and crypto — see its `--help`. |
 | `dev-install.sh` | Full local dev setup through the production installer: builds from source, packs a tarball, runs `setup.sh`, initialises the cluster, and starts services under systemd. |
@@ -1,22 +1,18 @@
 #!/bin/bash
-# build-sqs-store-microvm-image.sh — build the SQS store microVM kernel +
-# initramfs: the dedicated nats-server, ext4 support, the store's guest steps
-# and a clean power-down. The guest never formats a disk; build/microvm/
-# sqs-store/sqs-store-lib.sh states its fw_cfg contract. The LB image
-# (build-microvm-image.sh) is separate and unchanged.
-#
-# SQS_MICROVM_PROFILE=worker builds the shared SQS worker guest instead: the
-# same network /init and kernel, build/microvm/sqs-worker's steps and
-# $REPO_ROOT/bin/sqs-worker, with no nats-server.
+# build-sqs-store-microvm-image.sh — build the SQS microVM kernel + initramfs:
+# one guest running the dedicated SQS nats-server and the SQS worker as separate
+# processes, ext4 support, its guest steps and a clean power-down. The guest
+# never formats a disk. The LB image (build-microvm-image.sh) is separate.
 #
 # Inputs:
-#   $REPO_ROOT/build/microvm/sqs-store/init.sh, inittab
-#   $REPO_ROOT/build/microvm/sqs-store/sqs-store-{lib.sh,prepare,run,stop}
+#   $REPO_ROOT/build/microvm/sqs-worker/init.sh, inittab
+#   $REPO_ROOT/build/microvm/sqs-worker/sqs-worker-{lib.sh,prepare,ready,stop}
 #   $REPO_ROOT/bin/nats-server  (make bin/nats-server, the go.mod-pinned version)
+#   $REPO_ROOT/bin/sqs-worker
 #
 # Outputs:
-#   $REPO_ROOT/build/microvm/sqs-store/vmlinuz
-#   $REPO_ROOT/build/microvm/sqs-store/initramfs.cpio.gz
+#   $REPO_ROOT/build/microvm/sqs-worker/vmlinuz
+#   $REPO_ROOT/build/microvm/sqs-worker/initramfs.cpio.gz
 #
 # Rootfs strategy (first match wins):
 #   1. apk available on host → install directly into a temp chroot (Alpine CI/CD)
@@ -25,20 +21,16 @@
 set -euo pipefail

 REPO_ROOT="$(cd "$(dirname "$0")/.." && pwd)"
-BUILD_DIR="$REPO_ROOT/build/microvm/sqs-store"
+BUILD_DIR="$REPO_ROOT/build/microvm/sqs-worker"
 INIT_SH="$BUILD_DIR/init.sh"
 INITTAB="$BUILD_DIR/inittab"
 NATS_SERVER_BIN="$REPO_ROOT/bin/nats-server"
+SQS_WORKER_BIN="$REPO_ROOT/bin/sqs-worker"

-PROFILE="${SQS_MICROVM_PROFILE:-store}"
+PROFILE="${SQS_MICROVM_PROFILE:-worker}"
 case "$PROFILE" in
-    store) ;;
-    worker)
-        BUILD_DIR="$REPO_ROOT/build/microvm/sqs-worker"
-        INITTAB="$BUILD_DIR/inittab"
-        SQS_WORKER_BIN="$REPO_ROOT/bin/sqs-worker"
-        ;;
-    *) echo "ERROR: SQS_MICROVM_PROFILE must be store or worker, not $PROFILE" >&2; exit 1 ;;
+    worker) ;;
+    *) echo "ERROR: SQS_MICROVM_PROFILE must be worker, not $PROFILE" >&2; exit 1 ;;
 esac
 TAG="[build-sqs-$PROFILE-microvm-image]"

@@ -68,16 +60,14 @@ for tool in cpio gzip find fakeroot; do
    fi
 done

-if [ "$PROFILE" = worker ]; then
-    if [ ! -x "$SQS_WORKER_BIN" ]; then
-        echo "ERROR: $SQS_WORKER_BIN not found — run 'make bin/sqs-worker'" >&2
-        exit 1
-    fi
-    if ! file -b "$SQS_WORKER_BIN" | grep -q "statically linked"; then
-        echo "ERROR: $SQS_WORKER_BIN is not statically linked — it cannot run on the musl guest" >&2
-        exit 1
-    fi
-else
+if [ ! -x "$SQS_WORKER_BIN" ]; then
+    echo "ERROR: $SQS_WORKER_BIN not found — run 'make bin/sqs-worker'" >&2
+    exit 1
+fi
+if ! file -b "$SQS_WORKER_BIN" | grep -q "statically linked"; then
+    echo "ERROR: $SQS_WORKER_BIN is not statically linked — it cannot run on the musl guest" >&2
+    exit 1
+fi
 # --- Verify the dedicated nats-server is the go.mod-pinned build ---
 # A stale or host-installed binary would ship an unreviewed server version.
 NATS_SERVER_PIN=$(awk '$1 == "github.com/nats-io/nats-server/v2" { print $2; exit }' "$REPO_ROOT/go.mod")
@@ -99,7 +89,6 @@ if [ "$nats_server_version" != "$NATS_SERVER_PIN" ]; then
    exit 1
 fi
 echo "$TAG nats-server: $nats_server_version (matches go.mod)"
-fi

 # --- Create chroot ---
 CHROOT_DIR=$(mktemp -d)
@@ -213,39 +202,23 @@ fi
 echo "$TAG installing inittab..."
 install -m 0644 "$INITTAB" "$CHROOT_DIR/etc/inittab"

-if [ "$PROFILE" = worker ]; then
-    echo "$TAG installing worker guest steps..."
-    for step in sqs-worker-lib.sh sqs-worker-prepare sqs-worker-ready sqs-worker-stop; do
-        if [ ! -f "$BUILD_DIR/$step" ]; then
-            echo "ERROR: $BUILD_DIR/$step not found — cannot build initramfs" >&2
-            exit 1
-        fi
-    done
-    mkdir -p "$CHROOT_DIR/usr/local/lib/sqs-worker" "$CHROOT_DIR/usr/local/bin"
-    install -m 0755 "$BUILD_DIR/sqs-worker-lib.sh" "$BUILD_DIR/sqs-worker-prepare" "$BUILD_DIR/sqs-worker-ready" "$BUILD_DIR/sqs-worker-stop" \
-        "$CHROOT_DIR/usr/local/lib/sqs-worker/"
-    install -m 0755 "$SQS_WORKER_BIN" "$CHROOT_DIR/usr/local/bin/sqs-worker"
-    # The mountpoint ships empty; the worker proves its disk is mounted here.
-    mkdir -p "$CHROOT_DIR/data"
-else
-# --- Place the store's guest steps ---
-echo "$TAG installing store guest steps..."
-mkdir -p "$CHROOT_DIR/usr/local/lib/sqs-store"
-for step in sqs-store-lib.sh sqs-store-prepare sqs-store-run sqs-store-stop; do
+echo "$TAG installing worker guest steps..."
+for step in sqs-worker-lib.sh sqs-worker-prepare sqs-worker-store sqs-worker-ready sqs-worker-stop; do
    if [ ! -f "$BUILD_DIR/$step" ]; then
        echo "ERROR: $BUILD_DIR/$step not found — cannot build initramfs" >&2
        exit 1
    fi
 done
-install -m 0644 "$BUILD_DIR/sqs-store-lib.sh" "$CHROOT_DIR/usr/local/lib/sqs-store/"
-install -m 0755 "$BUILD_DIR/sqs-store-prepare" "$BUILD_DIR/sqs-store-run" "$BUILD_DIR/sqs-store-stop" \
-    "$CHROOT_DIR/usr/local/lib/sqs-store/"
-
+mkdir -p "$CHROOT_DIR/usr/local/lib/sqs-worker" "$CHROOT_DIR/usr/local/bin"
+install -m 0755 "$BUILD_DIR/sqs-worker-lib.sh" "$BUILD_DIR/sqs-worker-prepare" "$BUILD_DIR/sqs-worker-store" "$BUILD_DIR/sqs-worker-ready" "$BUILD_DIR/sqs-worker-stop" \
+    "$CHROOT_DIR/usr/local/lib/sqs-worker/"
+install -m 0755 "$SQS_WORKER_BIN" "$CHROOT_DIR/usr/local/bin/sqs-worker"
+# The mountpoint ships empty; the worker proves its disk is mounted here.
+mkdir -p "$CHROOT_DIR/data"
 # --- Copy nats-server binary ---
 echo "$TAG copying nats-server binary..."
 mkdir -p "$CHROOT_DIR/usr/local/bin"
 install -m 0755 "$NATS_SERVER_BIN" "$CHROOT_DIR/usr/local/bin/nats-server"
-fi

 # --- Create required directories for init ---
 mkdir -p \
@@ -11,12 +11,14 @@ set -eu
 # cron can branch without re-parsing, then disables itself so it runs exactly
 # once.
 #
-#   server      → eks-token-webhook, k3s (server), k3s-first-boot (bootstrap
-#                 publish), mulga-eks-state-report
+#   server      → eks-token-webhook, k3s (server), eks-pod-identity-webhook,
+#                 k3s-first-boot (bootstrap publish), mulga-eks-state-report,
+#                 mulga-eks-node-gc
 #   server-join → eks-token-webhook, k3s (server, joins the first server's etcd
-#                 quorum), mulga-eks-state-report. NO k3s-first-boot: the first
-#                 server already publishes the cluster-identical bootstrap
-#                 artifacts; a join re-publish only races the bootstrap bus.
+#                 quorum), eks-pod-identity-webhook, mulga-eks-state-report,
+#                 mulga-eks-node-gc. NO k3s-first-boot: the first server
+#                 already publishes the cluster-identical bootstrap artifacts;
+#                 a join re-publish only races the bootstrap bus.
 #   agent       → k3s-agent
 #
 # Paths are overridable via env so the selection logic is unit-testable (bats)
@@ -80,6 +82,14 @@ svc_start() {
    esac
 }

+# IRSA injector: every server runs one, called by its own apiserver. It is
+# optional (failurePolicy Ignore), so it goes last and a fault only costs
+# injection, never the control plane.
+svc_optional() {
+    svc_enable "$1" && svc_start "$1" ||
+        log "WARN: optional service $1 failed to enable or start; continuing without it"
+}
+
 svc_disable() {
    case "${INIT_SYSTEM}" in
        openrc) rc-update del "$1" default 2>/dev/null || true ;;
@@ -140,6 +150,7 @@ case "${ROLE}" in
        # writer owns. HA multi-server addon delivery is tracked separately
        # Server-join nodes do not run this setup.
        svc_enable mulga-eks-addon-sync
+        svc_enable mulga-eks-node-gc
        svc_start eks-token-webhook
        svc_start mulga-eks-k3s-recovery
        svc_start k3s
@@ -147,6 +158,8 @@ case "${ROLE}" in
        svc_start k3s-first-boot
        svc_start mulga-eks-state-report
        svc_start mulga-eks-addon-sync
+        svc_start mulga-eks-node-gc
+        svc_optional eks-pod-identity-webhook
        ;;
    server-join)
        log "configuring server-join role"
@@ -158,11 +171,14 @@ case "${ROLE}" in
        svc_enable k3s
        svc_enable konnectivity-server
        svc_enable mulga-eks-state-report
+        svc_enable mulga-eks-node-gc
        svc_start eks-token-webhook
        svc_start mulga-eks-k3s-recovery
        svc_start k3s
        svc_start konnectivity-server
        svc_start mulga-eks-state-report
+        svc_start mulga-eks-node-gc
+        svc_optional eks-pod-identity-webhook
        ;;
    agent)
        log "configuring agent role"
@@ -22,6 +22,7 @@ for tool in rc-update rc-service; do
    cat > "${STUB_OPENRC}/${tool}" <<EOF
 #!/bin/sh
 echo "${tool} \$*" >> "\${CALLS}"
+case "\$*" in *"\${STUB_FAIL:-@none@}"*) exit 1 ;; esac
 exit 0
 EOF
    chmod +x "${STUB_OPENRC}/${tool}"
@@ -32,6 +33,7 @@ mkdir -p "${STUB_SYSTEMD}"
 cat > "${STUB_SYSTEMD}/systemctl" <<'EOF'
 #!/bin/sh
 echo "systemctl $*" >> "${CALLS}"
+case "$*" in *"${STUB_FAIL:-@none@}"*) exit 1 ;; esac
 exit 0
 EOF
 chmod +x "${STUB_SYSTEMD}/systemctl"
@@ -129,6 +131,7 @@ for INIT in openrc systemd; do
    check "server(${INIT}): enables k3s-first-boot" "yes" "$(present "${CALLS}" "$(enable_cmd "${INIT}" k3s-first-boot)")"
    check "server(${INIT}): starts k3s" "yes" "$(present "${CALLS}" "$(start_cmd "${INIT}" k3s)")"
    check "server(${INIT}): enables konnectivity-server" "yes" "$(present "${CALLS}" "$(enable_cmd "${INIT}" konnectivity-server)")"
+    check "server(${INIT}): enables pod-identity-webhook" "yes" "$(present "${CALLS}" "$(enable_cmd "${INIT}" eks-pod-identity-webhook)")"
    check "server(${INIT}): enables k3s-recovery" "yes" "$(present "${CALLS}" "$(enable_cmd "${INIT}" mulga-eks-k3s-recovery)")"
    # Recovery is enabled (so it also runs pre-k3s on later boots) AND started
    # inline now — a restore-snapshot DR seed's directive must apply on this
@@ -141,8 +144,38 @@ for INIT in openrc systemd; do
            END { print (rn > 0 && kn > 0 && rn < kn) ? "yes" : "no" }
        ' "${CALLS}"
    )"
+    check "server(${INIT}): enables node-gc" "yes" "$(present "${CALLS}" "$(enable_cmd "${INIT}" mulga-eks-node-gc)")"
+    check "server(${INIT}): starts node-gc" "yes" "$(present "${CALLS}" "$(start_cmd "${INIT}" mulga-eks-node-gc)")"
    check "server(${INIT}): no k3s-agent" "no" "$(present "${CALLS}" "$(enable_cmd "${INIT}" k3s-agent)")"
    check "server(${INIT}): self-disables" "yes" "$(present "${CALLS}" "$(disable_cmd "${INIT}" eks-node-role)")"
+    check "server(${INIT}): pod-identity-webhook is the last call" "$(start_cmd "${INIT}" eks-pod-identity-webhook)" "$(grep -v "$(disable_cmd "${INIT}" eks-node-role)" "${CALLS}" | tail -n 1)"
+    check "server(${INIT}): pod-identity-webhook enabled after addon-sync start" "yes" "$(
+        awk -v a="$(start_cmd "${INIT}" mulga-eks-addon-sync)" -v w="$(enable_cmd "${INIT}" eks-pod-identity-webhook)" '
+            index($0, a) == 1 { an = NR }
+            index($0, w) == 1 { wn = NR }
+            END { print (an > 0 && wn > an) ? "yes" : "no" }
+        ' "${CALLS}"
+    )"
+
+    # A broken optional webhook must leave the control plane booting.
+    for FAILING in enable start; do
+        run_case "${INIT}" server_${FAILING}_fail
+        printf 'SPINIFEX_K3S_ROLE=server\nEKS_CLUSTER_NAME=alpha\n' > "${EKS_NODE_ENVFILE}"
+        if [ "${FAILING}" = enable ]; then
+            STUB_FAIL="$(enable_cmd "${INIT}" eks-pod-identity-webhook)"
+            export STUB_FAIL
+            STUB_FAIL="${STUB_FAIL#rc-update add }"; STUB_FAIL="${STUB_FAIL#systemctl enable }"
+        else
+            STUB_FAIL="$(start_cmd "${INIT}" eks-pod-identity-webhook)"
+            export STUB_FAIL
+            STUB_FAIL="${STUB_FAIL#rc-service }"; STUB_FAIL="${STUB_FAIL#systemctl start --no-block }"
+        fi
+        invoke
+        unset STUB_FAIL
+        check "server(${INIT}): webhook ${FAILING} failure still exits 0" 0 "${rc}"
+        check "server(${INIT}): webhook ${FAILING} failure still starts mulga-eks-addon-sync" "yes" "$(present "${CALLS}" "$(start_cmd "${INIT}" mulga-eks-addon-sync)")"
+        check "server(${INIT}): webhook ${FAILING} failure still self-disables" "yes" "$(present "${CALLS}" "$(disable_cmd "${INIT}" eks-node-role)")"
+    done

    # --- server-join ---
    run_case "${INIT}" server_join
@@ -153,12 +186,16 @@ for INIT in openrc systemd; do
    check "server-join(${INIT}): enables webhook" "yes" "$(present "${CALLS}" "$(enable_cmd "${INIT}" eks-token-webhook)")"
    check "server-join(${INIT}): enables k3s" "yes" "$(present "${CALLS}" "$(enable_cmd "${INIT}" k3s)")"
    check "server-join(${INIT}): enables state-report" "yes" "$(present "${CALLS}" "$(enable_cmd "${INIT}" mulga-eks-state-report)")"
+    check "server-join(${INIT}): enables node-gc" "yes" "$(present "${CALLS}" "$(enable_cmd "${INIT}" mulga-eks-node-gc)")"
+    check "server-join(${INIT}): starts node-gc" "yes" "$(present "${CALLS}" "$(start_cmd "${INIT}" mulga-eks-node-gc)")"
    check "server-join(${INIT}): enables konnectivity-server" "yes" "$(present "${CALLS}" "$(enable_cmd "${INIT}" konnectivity-server)")"
+    check "server-join(${INIT}): enables pod-identity-webhook" "yes" "$(present "${CALLS}" "$(enable_cmd "${INIT}" eks-pod-identity-webhook)")"
    check "server-join(${INIT}): enables k3s-recovery" "yes" "$(present "${CALLS}" "$(enable_cmd "${INIT}" mulga-eks-k3s-recovery)")"
    check "server-join(${INIT}): starts k3s-recovery" "yes" "$(present "${CALLS}" "$(start_cmd "${INIT}" mulga-eks-k3s-recovery)")"
    # Join servers must NOT re-publish bootstrap: the first server already
    # published the cluster-identical artifacts, and a join re-publish would
    # only race the bootstrap bus. This is deliberate, not an oversight.
+    check "server-join(${INIT}): pod-identity-webhook is the last call" "$(start_cmd "${INIT}" eks-pod-identity-webhook)" "$(grep -v "$(disable_cmd "${INIT}" eks-node-role)" "${CALLS}" | tail -n 1)"
    check "server-join(${INIT}): no k3s-first-boot" "yes" "$(absent_all "${CALLS}" "k3s-first-boot")"
    check "server-join(${INIT}): no k3s-agent" "yes" "$(absent_all "${CALLS}" "$(enable_cmd "${INIT}" k3s-agent)")"
    check "server-join(${INIT}): self-disables" "yes" "$(present "${CALLS}" "$(disable_cmd "${INIT}" eks-node-role)")"
@@ -170,7 +207,7 @@ for INIT in openrc systemd; do
    check "agent(${INIT}): exit 0" 0 "${rc}"
    check "agent(${INIT}): role file" "agent" "$(cat "${ROLE_FILE}")"
    check "agent(${INIT}): enables k3s-agent" "yes" "$(present "${CALLS}" "$(enable_cmd "${INIT}" k3s-agent)")"
-    check "agent(${INIT}): no server services" "yes" "$(absent_all "${CALLS}" "eks-token-webhook" "k3s-first-boot" "$(enable_cmd "${INIT}" k3s)")"
+    check "agent(${INIT}): no server services" "yes" "$(absent_all "${CALLS}" "eks-token-webhook" "eks-pod-identity-webhook" "k3s-first-boot" "mulga-eks-node-gc" "$(enable_cmd "${INIT}" k3s)")"

    # --- agent (inferred from agent.env, no explicit role) ---
    run_case "${INIT}" agent_inferred
@@ -0,0 +1,26 @@
+#!/sbin/openrc-run
+# eks-pod-identity-webhook — IRSA mutating admission webhook. Binds 127.0.0.1:8445
+# only; the local kube-apiserver is the sole client. Supervised and respawned so
+# it can wait out k3s writing its CAs without ever delaying k3s or the token
+# webhook: it exits until the CAs exist and supervise-daemon retries.
+
+description="EKS pod identity webhook (Mulga)"
+command="/usr/local/bin/eks-pod-identity-webhook"
+command_args="--addr=127.0.0.1:8445"
+pidfile="/run/eks-pod-identity-webhook.pid"
+supervisor="supervise-daemon"
+respawn_delay=5
+respawn_max=0
+output_log="/dev/console"
+error_log="/dev/console"
+
+if [ -f /etc/spinifex-eks/first-boot.env ]; then
+    # shellcheck disable=SC1091
+    . /etc/spinifex-eks/first-boot.env
+    export EKS_REGION EKS_ADDON_GATEWAY_URL EKS_GATEWAY_CA
+fi
+
+depend() {
+    need net
+    after k3s
+}
@@ -22,9 +22,9 @@ APK_PACKAGES="ca-certificates curl jq iptables ip6tables conntrack-tools cgroup-
 # at a pinned tag (its GitHub releases ship only container images, and its go.mod
 # carries replace directives that block `go install pkg@version`). The agent half
 # is the matching proxy-agent container image, pinned in k3s.initd.
-BUILD_COMMANDS="CGO_ENABLED=0 GOFIPS140=v1.0.0 go build -o bin/eks-token-webhook ./cmd/eks-token-webhook && CGO_ENABLED=0 GOFIPS140=v1.0.0 go build -o bin/eks-gateway-publish ./cmd/eks-gateway-publish && CGO_ENABLED=0 GOFIPS140=v1.0.0 go build -o bin/eks-gateway-fetch ./cmd/eks-gateway-fetch && CGO_ENABLED=0 GOFIPS140=v1.0.0 go build -o bin/eks-webhook-cert ./cmd/eks-webhook-cert && CGO_ENABLED=0 GOFIPS140=v1.0.0 go build -o bin/eks-konnectivity-cert ./cmd/eks-konnectivity-cert && CGO_ENABLED=0 GOFIPS140=v1.0.0 go build -o bin/eks-etcd-member ./cmd/eks-etcd-member && CGO_ENABLED=0 GOFIPS140=v1.0.0 go build -o bin/ecr-credential-provider ./cmd/ecr-credential-provider && rm -rf /tmp/anp-build && git clone --depth 1 --branch v0.30.3 https://github.com/kubernetes-sigs/apiserver-network-proxy /tmp/anp-build && ( cd /tmp/anp-build && CGO_ENABLED=0 GOFIPS140=v1.0.0 go build -o /tmp/anp-build/konnectivity-server ./cmd/server ) && cp /tmp/anp-build/konnectivity-server bin/konnectivity-server && rm -rf /tmp/anp-build"
+BUILD_COMMANDS="CGO_ENABLED=0 GOFIPS140=v1.0.0 go build -o bin/eks-token-webhook ./cmd/eks-token-webhook && CGO_ENABLED=0 GOFIPS140=v1.0.0 go build -o bin/eks-gateway-publish ./cmd/eks-gateway-publish && CGO_ENABLED=0 GOFIPS140=v1.0.0 go build -o bin/eks-gateway-fetch ./cmd/eks-gateway-fetch && CGO_ENABLED=0 GOFIPS140=v1.0.0 go build -o bin/eks-webhook-cert ./cmd/eks-webhook-cert && CGO_ENABLED=0 GOFIPS140=v1.0.0 go build -o bin/eks-konnectivity-cert ./cmd/eks-konnectivity-cert && CGO_ENABLED=0 GOFIPS140=v1.0.0 go build -o bin/eks-etcd-member ./cmd/eks-etcd-member && CGO_ENABLED=0 GOFIPS140=v1.0.0 go build -o bin/eks-pod-identity-webhook ./cmd/eks-pod-identity-webhook && CGO_ENABLED=0 GOFIPS140=v1.0.0 go build -o bin/ecr-credential-provider ./cmd/ecr-credential-provider && rm -rf /tmp/anp-build && git clone --depth 1 --branch v0.30.3 https://github.com/kubernetes-sigs/apiserver-network-proxy /tmp/anp-build && ( cd /tmp/anp-build && CGO_ENABLED=0 GOFIPS140=v1.0.0 go build -o /tmp/anp-build/konnectivity-server ./cmd/server ) && cp /tmp/anp-build/konnectivity-server bin/konnectivity-server && rm -rf /tmp/anp-build"

-INSTALL_BINARIES="bin/eks-token-webhook:/usr/local/bin/eks-token-webhook bin/eks-gateway-publish:/usr/local/bin/eks-gateway-publish bin/eks-gateway-fetch:/usr/local/bin/eks-gateway-fetch bin/eks-webhook-cert:/usr/local/bin/eks-webhook-cert bin/eks-konnectivity-cert:/usr/local/bin/eks-konnectivity-cert bin/eks-etcd-member:/usr/local/bin/eks-etcd-member bin/konnectivity-server:/usr/local/bin/konnectivity-server bin/ecr-credential-provider:/usr/local/bin/ecr-credential-provider"
+INSTALL_BINARIES="bin/eks-token-webhook:/usr/local/bin/eks-token-webhook bin/eks-gateway-publish:/usr/local/bin/eks-gateway-publish bin/eks-gateway-fetch:/usr/local/bin/eks-gateway-fetch bin/eks-webhook-cert:/usr/local/bin/eks-webhook-cert bin/eks-konnectivity-cert:/usr/local/bin/eks-konnectivity-cert bin/eks-etcd-member:/usr/local/bin/eks-etcd-member bin/eks-pod-identity-webhook:/usr/local/bin/eks-pod-identity-webhook bin/konnectivity-server:/usr/local/bin/konnectivity-server bin/ecr-credential-provider:/usr/local/bin/ecr-credential-provider"

 # All role services ship; none but the selector are enabled at bake time.
 # eks-node-role picks server vs agent at first boot and enables the rest.
@@ -36,12 +36,15 @@ scripts/images/eks-node/k3s-prestart.sh:/usr/local/sbin/k3s-prestart \
 scripts/images/eks-node/k3s-agent.initd:/etc/init.d/k3s-agent \
 scripts/images/eks-node/k3s-agent-prestart.sh:/usr/local/sbin/k3s-agent-prestart \
 scripts/images/eks-node/eks-token-webhook.initd:/etc/init.d/eks-token-webhook \
+scripts/images/eks-node/eks-pod-identity-webhook.initd:/etc/init.d/eks-pod-identity-webhook \
 scripts/images/eks-node/k3s-first-boot.initd:/etc/init.d/k3s-first-boot \
 scripts/images/eks-node/k3s-first-boot.sh:/usr/local/sbin/k3s-first-boot \
 scripts/images/eks-node/mulga-eks-state-report.initd:/etc/init.d/mulga-eks-state-report \
 scripts/images/eks-node/mulga-eks-state-report.sh:/usr/local/sbin/mulga-eks-state-report \
 scripts/images/eks-node/mulga-eks-addon-sync.initd:/etc/init.d/mulga-eks-addon-sync \
 scripts/images/eks-node/mulga-eks-addon-sync.sh:/usr/local/sbin/mulga-eks-addon-sync \
+scripts/images/eks-node/mulga-eks-node-gc.initd:/etc/init.d/mulga-eks-node-gc \
+scripts/images/eks-node/mulga-eks-node-gc.sh:/usr/local/sbin/mulga-eks-node-gc \
 scripts/images/eks-node/konnectivity-server.initd:/etc/init.d/konnectivity-server \
 scripts/images/eks-node/konnectivity-server-prestart.sh:/usr/local/sbin/konnectivity-server-prestart \
 scripts/images/eks-node/konnectivity/konnectivity-agent.yaml:/usr/share/spinifex-eks/konnectivity/konnectivity-agent.yaml \
@@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
+#!/sbin/openrc-run
+# mulga-eks-node-gc — server-role service that deletes the Node of every
+# nodegroup worker the nodegroup has terminated, every NODE_GC_INTERVAL
+# seconds. Enabled on every server role by eks-node-role.sh.
+
+description="Mulga EKS terminated-worker Node cleanup"
+command="/usr/local/sbin/mulga-eks-node-gc"
+command_background="yes"
+pidfile="/run/mulga-eks-node-gc.pid"
+output_log="/var/log/mulga-eks-node-gc.log"
+error_log="/var/log/mulga-eks-node-gc.log"
+
+# A Node goes NotReady about 40s after its worker stops, so 30s deletes it
+# within a couple of minutes of the terminate.
+export NODE_GC_INTERVAL="${NODE_GC_INTERVAL:-30}"
+
+depend() {
+    need net
+    after k3s
+}
+
+start_pre() {
+    if [ ! -f /etc/spinifex-eks/first-boot.env ]; then
+        eerror "/etc/spinifex-eks/first-boot.env not present — cloud-init did not seed gateway creds"
+        return 1
+    fi
+}
@@ -0,0 +1,89 @@
+#!/bin/sh
+set -eu
+
+# mulga-eks-node-gc — deletes the Node of a nodegroup worker whose instance the
+# nodegroup has terminated (DeleteNodegroup, scale-down, reclaim), as the AWS
+# cloud controller deletes a Node whose instance no longer exists. K3s runs no
+# AWS cloud provider: its own reports every instance as existing, so without
+# this a terminated worker stays a NotReady Node forever, its pods stay bound to
+# it, and once most Nodes are NotReady the node lifecycle controller stops
+# evicting at all.
+#
+# Pull (host→VM): GET /clusters/{cluster}/internal-workers/{accountId}, the
+# instance ID of every worker the cluster's nodegroups still own.
+#
+# A Node is deleted only when all of these hold, so a live worker is never
+# touched: it carries the eks.amazonaws.com/nodegroup label, its providerID is
+# aws:///<az>/<instance-id>, it is not Ready, and its instance is not in the
+# fetched set. A failed fetch deletes nothing.
+#
+# Runs on every server; deletes are idempotent. Loops every NODE_GC_INTERVAL
+# seconds in service mode, one-shot otherwise.
+
+ENVFILE=${ENVFILE:-/etc/spinifex-eks/first-boot.env}
+[ -f "${ENVFILE}" ] || { logger -t mulga-eks-node-gc "${ENVFILE} missing — exiting"; exit 0; }
+# set -a so the sourced creds are exported to the eks-gateway-fetch child.
+set -a
+# shellcheck disable=SC1090
+. "${ENVFILE}"
+set +a
+
+: "${EKS_GATEWAY_URL:?}"
+: "${EKS_ACCOUNT_ID:?}"
+: "${EKS_CLUSTER_NAME:?}"
+
+KUBECONFIG=${KUBECONFIG:-/etc/rancher/k3s/k3s.yaml}
+export KUBECONFIG
+
+# One "name|providerID|nodegroup|Ready" row per Node.
+NODE_ROWS='jsonpath={range .items[*]}{.metadata.name}{"|"}{.spec.providerID}{"|"}{.metadata.labels.eks\.amazonaws\.com/nodegroup}{"|"}{.status.conditions[?(@.type=="Ready")].status}{"\n"}{end}'
+
+log() {
+    logger -t mulga-eks-node-gc "$*"
+    echo "[mulga-eks-node-gc] $*" > "${CONSOLE:-/dev/console}" 2>/dev/null || true
+}
+
+# stale_nodes LIVE_FILE — reads Node rows on stdin and prints the name of each
+# Node to delete: a nodegroup worker, not Ready, whose instance is not listed
+# in LIVE_FILE.
+stale_nodes() {
+    awk -F'|' -v live="$1" '
+        BEGIN { while ((getline id < live) > 0) keep[id] = 1 }
+        $3 == "" || $4 == "True" { next }
+        $2 !~ /^aws:\/\/\/[^\/]+\/i-[0-9a-f]+$/ { next }
+        { n = split($2, p, "/"); if (!(p[n] in keep)) print $1 }
+    '
+}
+
+sync_once() {
+    # Nodes are listed before the workers are fetched. A worker is recorded on
+    # its nodegroup before it boots, so every Node listed here is already in a
+    # set fetched after.
+    if ! rows=$(kubectl get nodes -o "${NODE_ROWS}" 2>/dev/null); then
+        log "kubectl get nodes failed; skipping this pass"
+        return 0
+    fi
+    live=$(mktemp)
+    if ! eks-gateway-fetch -resource workers > "${live}" 2>/dev/null; then
+        log "fetch of the cluster's nodegroup workers failed; deleting nothing"
+        rm -f "${live}"
+        return 0
+    fi
+    printf '%s\n' "${rows}" | stale_nodes "${live}" | while read -r node; do
+        if kubectl delete node "${node}" --ignore-not-found --wait=false >/dev/null 2>&1; then
+            log "deleted Node ${node}: its instance is no longer a nodegroup worker"
+        else
+            log "delete of Node ${node} failed; retrying next pass"
+        fi
+    done
+    rm -f "${live}"
+}
+
+if [ -n "${NODE_GC_INTERVAL:-}" ] && [ "${NODE_GC_INTERVAL}" -gt 0 ] 2>/dev/null; then
+    while true; do
+        sync_once
+        sleep "${NODE_GC_INTERVAL}"
+    done
+else
+    sync_once
+fi
@@ -0,0 +1,107 @@
+#!/bin/sh
+# Self-contained POSIX test for mulga-eks-node-gc.sh. kubectl, eks-gateway-fetch
+# and logger are stubbed on PATH: kubectl serves canned Node rows and records
+# every delete, and eks-gateway-fetch serves a canned worker set or fails.
+#
+# Run: sh scripts/images/eks-node/mulga-eks-node-gc_test.sh
+set -eu
+
+SCRIPT_DIR=$(cd "$(dirname "$0")" && pwd)
+AGENT="${SCRIPT_DIR}/mulga-eks-node-gc.sh"
+WORK=$(mktemp -d)
+trap 'rm -rf "${WORK}"' EXIT
+
+STUBBIN="${WORK}/bin"
+mkdir -p "${STUBBIN}"
+
+cat > "${STUBBIN}/kubectl" <<'EOF'
+#!/bin/sh
+case "$1 $2" in
+    "get nodes")
+        [ "${NODES_RC:-0}" -eq 0 ] || exit "${NODES_RC}"
+        printf '%s\n' "${NODES_BODY:-}" ;;
+    "delete node") echo "$3" >> "${DELETED}" ;;
+esac
+EOF
+
+cat > "${STUBBIN}/eks-gateway-fetch" <<'EOF'
+#!/bin/sh
+echo "$*" >> "${FETCHED}"
+[ "${FETCH_RC:-0}" -eq 0 ] || exit "${FETCH_RC}"
+printf '%s' "${LIVE_BODY:-}"
+EOF
+
+cat > "${STUBBIN}/logger" <<'EOF'
+#!/bin/sh
+:
+EOF
+
+chmod +x "${STUBBIN}"/*
+PATH="${STUBBIN}:${PATH}"
+export PATH
+
+ENVFILE="${WORK}/first-boot.env"
+cat > "${ENVFILE}" <<'EOF'
+EKS_GATEWAY_URL=https://gw.invalid:9999
+EKS_ACCOUNT_ID=000000000001
+EKS_CLUSTER_NAME=demo3
+EOF
+CONSOLE="${WORK}/console"
+DELETED="${WORK}/deleted"
+FETCHED="${WORK}/fetched"
+export ENVFILE CONSOLE DELETED FETCHED
+
+PASS=0
+FAIL=0
+check() {
+    if [ "$2" = "$3" ]; then
+        PASS=$((PASS + 1))
+    else
+        FAIL=$((FAIL + 1))
+        printf 'FAIL: %s\n  want: %s\n  got:  %s\n' "$1" "$2" "$3"
+    fi
+}
+
+run_agent() {
+    : > "${DELETED}"
+    : > "${FETCHED}"
+    sh "${AGENT}"
+}
+
+deleted() { tr '\n' ' ' < "${DELETED}" | sed 's/ $//'; }
+
+# Every way a Node can look: only a NotReady nodegroup worker whose instance the
+# cluster's nodegroups no longer own is deleted.
+NODES_BODY='live|aws:///z1/i-0aaa|ng1|True
+gone|aws:///z1/i-0bbb|ng1|Unknown
+gone-never-reported|aws:///z1/i-0ddd|ng2|
+owned-notready|aws:///z1/i-0ccc|ng1|False
+gone-but-ready|aws:///z1/i-0eee|ng1|True
+self-managed|aws:///z1/i-0fff||Unknown
+k3s-provider|k3s://k3s-node|ng1|Unknown'
+LIVE_BODY='i-0aaa
+i-0ccc
+'
+export NODES_BODY LIVE_BODY
+
+run_agent
+check "deletes only NotReady nodegroup Nodes whose instance is gone" "gone gone-never-reported" "$(deleted)"
+check "fetches the workers resource" "-resource workers" "$(cat "${FETCHED}")"
+
+# A cluster with no nodegroups left: every NotReady nodegroup Node goes.
+LIVE_BODY='' run_agent
+check "empty worker set deletes every NotReady nodegroup Node" "gone gone-never-reported owned-notready" "$(deleted)"
+
+# A failed fetch is not an empty set: nothing is deleted.
+FETCH_RC=1 run_agent
+check "failed fetch deletes nothing" "" "$(deleted)"
+
+# Without a Node listing the workers are not fetched, so a set fetched before a
+# Node registered can never be compared against it.
+NODES_RC=1 run_agent
+check "failed node listing deletes nothing" "" "$(deleted)"
+check "failed node listing does not fetch" "" "$(cat "${FETCHED}")"
+
+echo "---"
+echo "PASS=${PASS} FAIL=${FAIL}"
+[ "${FAIL}" -eq 0 ]
@@ -44,9 +44,11 @@ ln -sf /usr/local/bin/k3s /usr/local/bin/ctr
 # role's services are baked; the selector enables the right ones at first boot.
 chmod 0755 /etc/init.d/eks-node-role /etc/init.d/k3s /etc/init.d/k3s-agent \
    /etc/init.d/eks-token-webhook /etc/init.d/k3s-first-boot /etc/init.d/mulga-eks-state-report \
-    /etc/init.d/mulga-eks-addon-sync /etc/init.d/konnectivity-server
+    /etc/init.d/mulga-eks-addon-sync /etc/init.d/mulga-eks-node-gc /etc/init.d/konnectivity-server \
+    /etc/init.d/eks-pod-identity-webhook
 chmod 0755 /usr/local/sbin/eks-node-role /usr/local/sbin/k3s-first-boot \
-    /usr/local/sbin/mulga-eks-state-report /usr/local/sbin/mulga-eks-addon-sync
+    /usr/local/sbin/mulga-eks-state-report /usr/local/sbin/mulga-eks-addon-sync \
+    /usr/local/sbin/mulga-eks-node-gc
 # start_pre helpers shared with the systemd wrappers that will eventually
 # replace these runscripts.
 chmod 0755 /usr/local/sbin/k3s-prestart /usr/local/sbin/k3s-agent-prestart \
@@ -0,0 +1,25 @@
+#!/bin/sh
+# Every /etc/init.d script that INSTALL_FILES ships at 0644 must be chmod'd
+# 0755 by setup.sh, or OpenRC refuses to enable it ("is not executable") and
+# eks-node-role, running under set -eu, aborts before k3s starts.
+#
+# Run: sh scripts/images/eks-node/setup_initd_test.sh
+set -eu
+
+SCRIPT_DIR=$(cd "$(dirname "$0")" && pwd)
+MANIFEST="${SCRIPT_DIR}/manifest.conf"
+SETUP="${SETUP_SH:-${SCRIPT_DIR}/setup.sh}"
+
+fail=0
+for dst in $(grep -o ':/etc/init\.d/[A-Za-z0-9._-]*' "${MANIFEST}" | cut -d: -f2); do
+    if ! grep -E '^[[:space:]]*(chmod 0755 )?.*'"${dst}"'([[:space:]\\]|$)' "${SETUP}" \
+        | grep -q . ; then
+        echo "FAIL: ${dst} is installed 0644 and never chmod'd 0755 in setup.sh"
+        fail=1
+    fi
+done
+
+if [ "${fail}" -ne 0 ]; then
+    exit 1
+fi
+echo "PASS: every shipped init script is chmod'd 0755"
@@ -1,293 +0,0 @@
-#!/bin/sh
-# sqs-store-guest_test.sh — the SQS store guest steps start the store only on
-# a valid contract and one checked, mounted disk, never format, and stop the
-# store before unmounting it.
-#
-# Drives build/microvm/sqs-store/sqs-store-lib.sh against a fake fw_cfg, sysfs
-# and stub tools. The stop cases signal only test-owned children.
-# The case settings below are read by the sourced library, not by this file.
-# shellcheck disable=SC2034
-set -eu
-
-ROOT=$(CDPATH='' cd -- "$(dirname -- "$0")/../.." && pwd)
-LIB=${SQS_GUEST_LIB:-"$ROOT/build/microvm/sqs-store/sqs-store-lib.sh"}
-TMP=$(mktemp -d)
-CHILDREN=""
-cleanup() {
-    for p in $CHILDREN; do kill -KILL "$p" 2>/dev/null || true; done
-    rm -rf "$TMP"
-}
-trap cleanup EXIT
-
-fails=0
-pass() { echo "  ok   - $1"; }
-fail() { echo "  FAIL - $1"; fails=$((fails + 1)); }
-check() { if eval "$2"; then pass "$1"; else fail "$1"; fi; }
-
-echo "-- build/microvm/sqs-store/sqs-store-lib.sh"
-
-SERIAL=vol0123456789abcdef0
-NKEY=UAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAB
-ADDR=10.11.12.13
-
-# Stub tools record each call to calls.log; their exit codes come from files.
-mkdir -p "$TMP/bin"
-cat > "$TMP/bin/e2fsck" <<'EOF'
-#!/bin/sh
-echo "e2fsck $*" >> "$T/calls.log"
-exit "$(cat "$T/fsck.rc")"
-EOF
-cat > "$TMP/bin/mount" <<'EOF'
-#!/bin/sh
-echo "mount $*" >> "$T/calls.log"
-exit "$(cat "$T/mount.rc")"
-EOF
-cat > "$TMP/bin/umount" <<'EOF'
-#!/bin/sh
-echo "umount $*" >> "$T/calls.log"
-EOF
-for f in mkfs mkfs.ext4 mke2fs; do
-    printf '#!/bin/sh\necho "mkfs %s $*" >> "$T/calls.log"\n' "$f" > "$TMP/bin/$f"
-done
-cat > "$TMP/bin/ip" <<'EOF'
-#!/bin/sh
-cat "$T/ip.out"
-EOF
-cat > "$TMP/bin/nats-server" <<'EOF'
-#!/bin/sh
-echo "nats-server $*" >> "$T/calls.log"
-[ "$1" = -t ] || echo "GOMEMLIMIT=${GOMEMLIMIT:-unset}" >> "$T/env.log"
-[ "$1" = -t ] && exit "$(cat "$T/configtest.rc")"
-exit 0
-EOF
-chmod +x "$TMP/bin"/*
-
-# fresh <name>: a case directory with a valid contract and one matching disk
-# among others. Callers then break one thing.
-fresh() {
-    T="$TMP/$1"
-    export T
-    mkdir -p "$T/fwcfg" "$T/sys" "$T/dev" "$T/run" "$T/data"
-    for k in data-serial listen-addr client-nkey; do mkdir -p "$T/fwcfg/$k"; done
-    printf '%s\n' "$SERIAL" > "$T/fwcfg/data-serial/raw"
-    printf '%s\n' "$ADDR" > "$T/fwcfg/listen-addr/raw"
-    printf '%s\n' "$NKEY" > "$T/fwcfg/client-nkey/raw"
-    disk vda vol00000000000000000
-    disk vdb "$SERIAL"
-    echo 0 > "$T/fsck.rc"
-    echo 0 > "$T/mount.rc"
-    echo 0 > "$T/configtest.rc"
-    : > "$T/calls.log"
-    : > "$T/console"
-    printf '1: lo    inet 127.0.0.1/8 scope host lo\n2: eth0    inet %s/24 brd 10.11.12.255 scope global eth0\n' "$ADDR" > "$T/ip.out"
-}
-disk() { mkdir -p "$T/sys/$1"; printf '%s\n' "$2" > "$T/sys/$1/serial"; : > "$T/dev/$1"; }
-
-# prepare: run sqs_prepare in a subshell with every path pointed at the case.
-prepare() {
-    (
-        SQS_FWCFG="$T/fwcfg" SQS_SYSBLOCK="$T/sys" SQS_DEVDIR="$T/dev" SQS_NODE_TEST=-e
-        SQS_RUN="$T/run" SQS_DATA="$T/data" SQS_CONSOLE="$T/console"
-        E2FSCK="$TMP/bin/e2fsck" MOUNT="$TMP/bin/mount" IP="$TMP/bin/ip" NATS_BIN="$TMP/bin/nats-server"
-        PATH="$TMP/bin:$PATH"
-        export PATH
-        # shellcheck source=../../build/microvm/sqs-store/sqs-store-lib.sh
-        . "$LIB"
-        sqs_prepare
-    ) > /dev/null 2>&1
-}
-refused() { [ ! -e "$T/run/ready" ] && grep -q FATAL "$T/console"; }
-never_mounted() { ! grep -q '^mount ' "$T/calls.log"; }
-never_formatted() { ! grep -q '^mkfs ' "$T/calls.log"; }
-never_checked() { ! grep -q '^e2fsck ' "$T/calls.log"; }
-
-# --- A valid contract prepares the store ---
-fresh valid
-check "valid contract is prepared" 'prepare && [ -e "$T/run/ready" ]'
-check "the matching disk is checked, then mounted at the data dir" \
-    'grep -qx "e2fsck -p $T/dev/vdb" "$T/calls.log" && grep -qx "mount -t ext4 -o nodev,nosuid,noexec $T/dev/vdb $T/data" "$T/calls.log"'
-check "config listens only on the supplied address" \
-    'grep -c "listen" "$T/run/nats.conf" | grep -qx 1 && grep -qx "listen: \"$ADDR:4222\"" "$T/run/nats.conf"'
-check "config admits only the supplied user NKey" 'grep -q "users = \[ { nkey: \"$NKEY\" } \]" "$T/run/nats.conf"'
-check "config syncs JetStream on the data disk" \
-    'grep -q "store_dir: \"$T/data\"" "$T/run/nats.conf" && grep -q "sync_interval: always" "$T/run/nats.conf"'
-check "config admits a full SQS message (2MiB max_payload)" \
-    'grep -c "max_payload" "$T/run/nats.conf" | grep -qx 1 && grep -qx "max_payload: 2MiB" "$T/run/nats.conf"'
-check "config is tested by the server before ready" 'grep -qx "nats-server -t -c $T/run/nats.conf" "$T/calls.log"'
-check "no auth material on the console" '! grep -q "$NKEY" "$T/console"'
-check "prepare reports the disk and config, not a listener" 'grep -q "prepared: $T/dev/vdb mounted" "$T/console" && ! grep -qi "listening" "$T/console"'
-
-fresh fsck-corrected; echo 1 > "$T/fsck.rc"
-check "e2fsck exit 1 (corrected) proceeds" 'prepare && [ -e "$T/run/ready" ]'
-
-# --- Disk refusals: nothing mounted, nothing formatted ---
-fresh no-disk; rm -rf "$T/sys/vdb"
-check "missing disk is refused before any check or mount" '! prepare && refused && never_checked && never_mounted'
-
-fresh wrong-disk; printf 'vol0fffffffffffffff0\n' > "$T/fwcfg/data-serial/raw"
-check "disk with another serial is refused" '! prepare && refused && never_checked && never_mounted'
-
-fresh two-disks; disk vdc "$SERIAL"
-check "two disks with the serial are refused" '! prepare && refused && never_checked && never_mounted'
-
-fresh bad-serial; printf 'vol-0123456789abcdef\n' > "$T/fwcfg/data-serial/raw"
-check "malformed serial is refused" '! prepare && refused && never_mounted'
-
-fresh no-node; rm -f "$T/dev/vdb"
-check "disk without a device node is refused" '! prepare && refused && never_mounted'
-
-for rc in 2 4 8; do
-    fresh "fsck-$rc"; echo "$rc" > "$T/fsck.rc"
-    check "e2fsck exit $rc is refused without mount or format" '! prepare && refused && never_mounted && never_formatted'
-done
-
-fresh mount-fail; echo 32 > "$T/mount.rc"
-check "failed mount is refused" '! prepare && refused'
-
-# --- Auth and listener refusals happen before the disk is touched ---
-fresh no-nkey; rm -rf "$T/fwcfg/client-nkey"
-check "missing NKey is refused before the disk" '! prepare && refused && never_checked && never_mounted'
-
-for bad in seed lower short two empty; do
-    fresh "nkey-$bad"
-    case $bad in
-        seed) v=SUAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA ;;
-        lower) v=uaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaab ;;
-        short) v=UAAAA ;;
-        two) v="$NKEY
-$NKEY" ;;
-        empty) v="" ;;
-    esac
-    printf '%s\n' "$v" > "$T/fwcfg/client-nkey/raw"
-    check "NKey ($bad) is refused before the disk, without echoing it" \
-        '! prepare && refused && never_checked && { [ -z "$v" ] || ! grep -qF "$v" "$T/console"; }'
-done
-
-fresh nkey-checksum; echo 1 > "$T/configtest.rc"
-check "NKey the server rejects is refused before the disk" '! prepare && refused && never_checked && never_mounted'
-
-fresh no-addr; rm -rf "$T/fwcfg/listen-addr"
-check "missing listen address is refused" '! prepare && refused && never_mounted'
-
-fresh addr-absent; printf '1: lo    inet 127.0.0.1/8 scope host lo\n2: eth0    inet 10.11.12.99/24 scope global eth0\n' > "$T/ip.out"
-check "listen address not on a guest NIC is refused" '! prepare && refused && never_mounted'
-
-fresh addr-loopback; printf '127.0.0.1\n' > "$T/fwcfg/listen-addr/raw"
-check "loopback listen address is refused" '! prepare && refused && never_mounted'
-
-for bad in 0.0.0.0x 1.2.3 1.2.3.256 01.2.3.4; do
-    fresh "addr-$bad"; printf '%s\n' "$bad" > "$T/fwcfg/listen-addr/raw"
-    check "malformed listen address $bad is refused" '! prepare && refused && never_mounted'
-done
-
-# --- Run: the store starts only when prepared and not stopping ---
-run_step() {
-    (
-        SQS_RUN="$T/run" SQS_CONSOLE="$T/console" NATS_BIN="$TMP/bin/nats-server"
-        # shellcheck source=../../build/microvm/sqs-store/sqs-store-lib.sh
-        . "$LIB"
-        sqs_run
-    ) > /dev/null 2>&1
-}
-fresh run-ready; prepare; : > "$T/calls.log"
-check "a prepared store starts the server" 'run_step && grep -qx "nats-server -c $T/run/nats.conf" "$T/calls.log"'
-fresh run-memlimit; prepare; : > "$T/env.log"
-check "the server runs under the ADR-0011:S11 heap limit" 'run_step && grep -qx "GOMEMLIMIT=512MiB" "$T/env.log"'
-fresh run-unready
-check "an unprepared store never starts the server" '! run_step && ! grep -q "^nats-server" "$T/calls.log"'
-fresh run-stopping; prepare; : > "$T/calls.log"; : > "$T/run/stopping"
-check "a stopping store never starts the server" '! run_step && ! grep -q "^nats-server" "$T/calls.log"'
-
-# --- Stop: SIGTERM the verified store, then unmount ---
-STORE="$TMP/bin/fake-store"
-cp "$(command -v sleep)" "$STORE"
-stop_step() {
-    (
-        SQS_RUN="$T/run" SQS_DATA="$T/data" SQS_CONSOLE="$T/console" SQS_MOUNTS="$T/mounts"
-        UMOUNT="$TMP/bin/umount" NATS_BIN="$STORE" SQS_STOP_BUDGET_TENTHS=10
-        # shellcheck source=../../build/microvm/sqs-store/sqs-store-lib.sh
-        . "$LIB"
-        sqs_stop
-    ) > /dev/null 2>&1
-}
-gone() { [ ! -r "/proc/$1/status" ] || grep -q '^State:[[:space:]]*Z' "/proc/$1/status"; }
-# record <pid>: write the identity sqs_run would record for that process.
-# shellcheck source=../../build/microvm/sqs-store/sqs-store-lib.sh
-record() { echo "$1 $( . "$LIB"; sqs_starttime "$1" )" > "$T/run/pid"; }
-
-fresh stop-orderly; echo "dev $T/data ext4 rw 0 0" > "$T/mounts"
-"$STORE" 60 & pid=$!; CHILDREN="$CHILDREN $pid"; record "$pid"
-stop_step
-check "stop sends SIGTERM and the store exits" 'gone "$pid" && grep -q "SIGTERM sent" "$T/console" && ! grep -q SIGKILL "$T/console"'
-check "stop blocks respawn and unmounts after the store exits" \
-    '[ -e "$T/run/stopping" ] && grep -qx "umount $T/data" "$T/calls.log"'
-
-fresh stop-hung; echo "dev $T/data ext4 rw 0 0" > "$T/mounts"
-(trap '' TERM; exec "$STORE" 60) & pid=$!; CHILDREN="$CHILDREN $pid"; record "$pid"
-stop_step
-check "store ignoring SIGTERM is killed after the budget, then unmounted" \
-    'gone "$pid" && grep -q SIGKILL "$T/console" && grep -qx "umount $T/data" "$T/calls.log"'
-
-fresh stop-reused; echo "dev $T/data ext4 rw 0 0" > "$T/mounts"
-"$STORE" 60 & pid=$!; CHILDREN="$CHILDREN $pid"; echo "$pid 1" > "$T/run/pid"
-stop_step
-check "a recorded PID with another start time is never signalled" '! gone "$pid" && grep -q "no running store" "$T/console"'
-kill -KILL "$pid"
-
-# A start held after its stopping check and before its exec: the run step
-# blocks writing "run: starting" to a FIFO console until the test reads it.
-fresh stop-pending-start; echo "dev $T/data ext4 rw 0 0" > "$T/mounts"
-: > "$T/run/ready"
-mkfifo "$T/run-console"
-printf '#!/bin/sh\n: > "%s/started"\nexec "%s" 60\n' "$T" "$STORE" > "$TMP/bin/pending-nats"
-chmod +x "$TMP/bin/pending-nats"
-SQS_RUN="$T/run" SQS_CONSOLE="$T/run-console" NATS_BIN="$TMP/bin/pending-nats" \
-    sh -c '. "$1"; sqs_run' sh "$LIB" & pid=$!; CHILDREN="$CHILDREN $pid"
-i=0
-while [ "$i" -lt 100 ] && ! grep -q "^$pid " "$T/run/pid" 2>/dev/null; do i=$((i + 1)); sleep 0.05; done
-check "pending start is held before its exec" 'grep -q "^$pid " "$T/run/pid" && ! gone "$pid" && [ ! -e "$T/started" ]'
-stop_step
-# Release the FIFO: a start that survived the stop would exec the server now.
-cat "$T/run-console" > /dev/null 2>&1 &
-reader=$!; CHILDREN="$CHILDREN $reader"
-i=0
-while [ "$i" -lt 20 ] && ! gone "$pid"; do i=$((i + 1)); sleep 0.05; done
-check "stop ends a pending start before it can exec the server" 'gone "$pid" && [ ! -e "$T/started" ]'
-check "stop unmounts only after the pending start is gone" \
-    'grep -q "store exited" "$T/console" && grep -qx "umount $T/data" "$T/calls.log"'
-kill -KILL "$reader" 2>/dev/null || true
-
-# --- Shutdown: the generic remount runs only once the store is gone ---
-# shutdown_step [survivor-pid]: with a pid, that process is reported alive
-# whatever happens to it, as a writer stuck past SIGKILL would be.
-shutdown_step() {
-    (
-        SQS_RUN="$T/run" SQS_DATA="$T/data" SQS_CONSOLE="$T/console" SQS_MOUNTS="$T/mounts"
-        UMOUNT="$TMP/bin/umount" SQS_STOP_BUDGET_TENTHS=5
-        # shellcheck source=../../build/microvm/sqs-store/sqs-store-lib.sh
-        . "$LIB"
-        if [ -n "${1:-}" ]; then sqs_same() { [ "$1" = "$survivor" ]; }; survivor=$1; fi
-        sqs_shutdown
-    ) > /dev/null 2>&1
-}
-
-fresh shutdown-orderly; echo "dev $T/data ext4 rw 0 0" > "$T/mounts"
-"$STORE" 60 & pid=$!; CHILDREN="$CHILDREN $pid"; record "$pid"
-check "orderly shutdown succeeds" 'shutdown_step'
-check "orderly shutdown unmounts the data disk, then runs umount -a -r" \
-    '[ "$(grep "^umount" "$T/calls.log" | tr "\n" "|")" = "umount $T/data|umount -a -r|" ]'
-
-fresh shutdown-survivor; echo "dev $T/data ext4 rw 0 0" > "$T/mounts"
-"$STORE" 60 & pid=$!; CHILDREN="$CHILDREN $pid"; record "$pid"
-check "shutdown with a surviving store reports failure" '! shutdown_step "$pid"'
-check "a surviving store leaves the data disk and every other mount alone" \
-    '! grep -q "^umount" "$T/calls.log" && grep -q "STILL ALIVE" "$T/console" && grep -q "skipping umount -a -r" "$T/console"'
-
-fresh stop-unmounted; : > "$T/mounts"
-stop_step
-check "stop with no data mount does not unmount" '! grep -q "^umount" "$T/calls.log"'
-
-if [ "$fails" -ne 0 ]; then
-    echo "  $fails failure(s)"
-    exit 1
-fi
@@ -11,13 +11,11 @@ STAGE_DIR="${1:?usage: sqs-store-microvm-publish.sh STAGE_DIR OUT_DIR}"
 OUT_DIR="${2:?usage: sqs-store-microvm-publish.sh STAGE_DIR OUT_DIR}"
 VMLINUZ="$STAGE_DIR/vmlinuz"
 INITRAMFS="$STAGE_DIR/initramfs.cpio.gz"
-PROFILE="${3:-store}"
+PROFILE="${3:-worker}"
 case "$PROFILE" in
-    store)
-        payload="usr/local/bin/nats-server usr/local/lib/sqs-store/sqs-store-lib.sh usr/local/lib/sqs-store/sqs-store-prepare usr/local/lib/sqs-store/sqs-store-run usr/local/lib/sqs-store/sqs-store-stop" ;;
    worker)
-        payload="usr/local/bin/sqs-worker usr/local/lib/sqs-worker/sqs-worker-lib.sh usr/local/lib/sqs-worker/sqs-worker-prepare usr/local/lib/sqs-worker/sqs-worker-ready usr/local/lib/sqs-worker/sqs-worker-stop data" ;;
-    *) echo "ERROR: profile must be store or worker, not $PROFILE" >&2; exit 1 ;;
+        payload="usr/local/bin/nats-server usr/local/bin/sqs-worker usr/local/lib/sqs-worker/sqs-worker-lib.sh usr/local/lib/sqs-worker/sqs-worker-prepare usr/local/lib/sqs-worker/sqs-worker-store usr/local/lib/sqs-worker/sqs-worker-ready usr/local/lib/sqs-worker/sqs-worker-stop data" ;;
+    *) echo "ERROR: profile must be worker, not $PROFILE" >&2; exit 1 ;;
 esac
 tag="[build-sqs-$PROFILE-microvm-image]"

@@ -56,12 +54,7 @@ for want_ko in ext4 tiny_power_button; do
    fi
 done
 if grep -qE '(^|/)(lb-agent|haproxy|nginx)$' <<< "$archive_list"; then
-    echo "ERROR: LB data-plane binaries found in the SQS store image" >&2
-    exit 1
-fi
-# The worker holds the store client key; it must never carry the store server.
-if [ "$PROFILE" = worker ] && grep -qE '(^|/)nats-server$' <<< "$archive_list"; then
-    echo "ERROR: nats-server found in the SQS worker image" >&2
+    echo "ERROR: LB data-plane binaries found in the SQS image" >&2
    exit 1
 fi
 echo "$tag content gate: PASS"
@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
 #!/bin/sh
-# sqs-store-microvm-publish_test.sh — a staged SQS store microVM pair reaches
+# sqs-store-microvm-publish_test.sh — a staged SQS microVM pair reaches
 # the output directory only when every gate passes, and a failed build cannot
 # leave a pair that make then takes as up to date.
 #
@@ -28,9 +28,10 @@ done
 stage() {
    dir=$1 omit=${2:-}
    root="$TMP/root.$$.$(date +%s%N)"
-    for p in init etc/inittab usr/local/bin/nats-server sbin/mkfs.ext4 sbin/e2fsck \
-        usr/local/lib/sqs-store/sqs-store-lib.sh usr/local/lib/sqs-store/sqs-store-prepare \
-        usr/local/lib/sqs-store/sqs-store-run usr/local/lib/sqs-store/sqs-store-stop \
+    for p in init etc/inittab usr/local/bin/nats-server usr/local/bin/sqs-worker data sbin/mkfs.ext4 sbin/e2fsck \
+        usr/local/lib/sqs-worker/sqs-worker-lib.sh usr/local/lib/sqs-worker/sqs-worker-prepare \
+        usr/local/lib/sqs-worker/sqs-worker-store usr/local/lib/sqs-worker/sqs-worker-ready \
+        usr/local/lib/sqs-worker/sqs-worker-stop \
        dev/console dev/null lib/modules/6.12-virt/kernel/fs/ext4/ext4.ko \
        lib/modules/6.12-virt/kernel/drivers/acpi/tiny-power-button.ko; do
        [ "$p" = "$omit" ] && continue
@@ -78,7 +79,7 @@ else
 fi

 # --- Each failing gate keeps the previous valid pair exactly ---
-for case in nats-server store-stop ext4 size; do
+for case in nats-server worker-store ext4 size; do
    d="$TMP/keep-$case"
    stage "$d/prev"
    bash "$PUBLISH" "$d/prev" "$d/out" >/dev/null 2>&1
@@ -86,7 +87,7 @@ for case in nats-server store-stop ext4 size; do
    max=50
    case $case in
        nats-server) stage "$d/stage" usr/local/bin/nats-server ;;
-        store-stop) stage "$d/stage" usr/local/lib/sqs-store/sqs-store-stop ;;
+        worker-store) stage "$d/stage" usr/local/lib/sqs-worker/sqs-worker-store ;;
        ext4) stage "$d/stage" lib/modules/6.12-virt/kernel/fs/ext4/ext4.ko ;;
        size) stage "$d/stage"; max=0 ;;
    esac
@@ -1,7 +1,8 @@
 #!/bin/sh
-# sqs-worker-guest_test.sh — the SQS worker guest's readiness watcher is
-# supervised by init, never leaves a store-ready marker behind a dead watcher,
-# and shutdown unmounts the worker disk only once the watcher is gone.
+# sqs-worker-guest_test.sh — the SQS guest's store starts only on a config
+# prepared after the receipt key settled, its readiness watcher never leaves a
+# store-ready marker behind a dead watcher, and shutdown unmounts the data disk
+# only once both the watcher and the store are gone.
 #
 # Drives build/microvm/sqs-worker/sqs-worker-lib.sh with test-owned processes
 # and a stub umount. Every signal goes only to this test's own children.
@@ -12,6 +13,7 @@ set -eu
 ROOT=$(CDPATH='' cd -- "$(dirname -- "$0")/../.." && pwd)
 LIB=${SQSW_GUEST_LIB:-"$ROOT/build/microvm/sqs-worker/sqs-worker-lib.sh"}
 INITTAB="$ROOT/build/microvm/sqs-worker/inittab"
+GUEST_INIT="$ROOT/build/microvm/sqs-worker/init.sh"
 TMP=$(mktemp -d)
 CHILDREN=""
 cleanup() {
@@ -41,26 +43,56 @@ echo "$$" >> "$T/watchers"
 echo "10.0.0.5 UPUB" > "$T/run/store-ready"
 exec sleep 60
 EOF
+# The fake server checks its config, or notes how it was started and stays.
+cat > "$TMP/bin/nats" <<'EOF'
+#!/bin/sh
+if [ "$1" = -t ]; then [ -z "${NATS_BAD:-}" ]; exit; fi
+echo "$GOMEMLIMIT $*" >> "$T/servers"
+exec sleep 60
+EOF
+# The fake boot takes its exit codes in order from $T/boot-rcs, and like the
+# real one writes the receipt marker only on success; "hold" blocks like a slow call.
+cat > "$TMP/bin/boot" <<'EOF'
+#!/bin/sh
+echo "$*" >> "$T/boots"
+rc=$(head -n1 "$T/boot-rcs"); sed -i 1d "$T/boot-rcs"
+if [ "$rc" = hold ]; then echo "$$" > "$T/boot-child"; exec sleep 60; fi
+[ "$rc" != 0 ] || echo FP > "$T/run/receipt-ready"
+exit "$rc"
+EOF
 chmod +x "$TMP/bin"/*

 fresh() {
    T="$TMP/$1"
    export T
    mkdir -p "$T/run" "$T/data"
-    echo UPUBLICKEY > "$T/run/public-key"
+    echo FP > "$T/run/receipt-ready"
+    echo "listen: 127.0.0.1:4222" > "$T/run/store.conf"
    for f in calls.log console mounts; do : > "$T/$f"; done
 }
 gone() { [ ! -r "/proc/$1/status" ] || grep -q '^State:[[:space:]]*Z' "/proc/$1/status" 2>/dev/null; }
 waitfor() { i=0; while [ "$i" -lt 100 ] && ! eval "$1"; do i=$((i + 1)); sleep 0.05; done; eval "$1"; }
 # start_run: one init respawn of the readiness step, in the background.
 start_run() {
-    SQSW_RUN="$T/run" SQSW_CONSOLE="$T/console" SQSW_BIN="$TMP/bin/watcher" SQSW_RESPAWN_GAP="${GAP:-0}" SQSW_PARK_INTERVAL="${PARK:-30}" \
+    SQSW_RUN="$T/run" SQSW_CONSOLE="$T/console" SQSW_BIN="$TMP/bin/watcher" SQSW_RESPAWN_GAP="${GAP:-0}" SQSW_PARK="sleep 60" \
        sh -c '. "$1"; sqsw_run' sh "$LIB" & pid=$!
    CHILDREN="$CHILDREN $pid"
 }
+# start_store: one init respawn of the store step, in the background.
+start_store() {
+    SQSW_RUN="$T/run" SQSW_DATA="$T/data" SQSW_CONSOLE="$T/console" SQSW_NATS_BIN="$TMP/bin/nats" \
+        SQSW_BIN="$TMP/bin/boot" SQSW_BOOT_RETRY=0 SQSW_PARK="sleep 60" SQSW_LIB="$LIB" \
+        sh -c '. "$1"; sqsw_store' sh "$LIB" & spid=$!
+    CHILDREN="$CHILDREN $spid"
+}
+# prepare_store: the sysinit step's store preparation, after boot.
+prepare_store() {
+    SQSW_RUN="$T/run" SQSW_DATA="$T/data" SQSW_CONSOLE="$T/console" SQSW_NATS_BIN="$TMP/bin/nats" \
+        sh -c '. "$1"; sqsw_prepare_store' sh "$LIB"
+}
 # record <pid>: write the identity sqs_run would record for that process.
 # shellcheck source=../../build/microvm/sqs-worker/sqs-worker-lib.sh
-record() { echo "$1 $( . "$LIB"; sqsw_starttime "$1" )" > "$T/run/ready.pid"; }
+record() { echo "$1 $( . "$LIB"; sqsw_starttime "$1" )" > "$T/run/${2:-ready}.pid"; }
 # shutdown_step [survivor-pid]: with a pid, that process is reported alive
 # whatever happens to it, as a watcher stuck past SIGKILL would be.
 shutdown_step() {
@@ -74,8 +106,86 @@ shutdown_step() {
    ) > /dev/null 2>&1
 }

-check "init respawns the readiness step rather than running it once" \
-    'grep -qx "::respawn:/usr/local/lib/sqs-worker/sqs-worker-ready" "$INITTAB" && ! grep -q "::once:" "$INITTAB"'
+check "init respawns the store and readiness steps rather than running them once" \
+    'grep -qx "::respawn:/usr/local/lib/sqs-worker/sqs-worker-store" "$INITTAB" &&
+     grep -qx "::respawn:/usr/local/lib/sqs-worker/sqs-worker-ready" "$INITTAB" && ! grep -q "::once:" "$INITTAB"'
+# The store binds 127.0.0.1, which a fresh guest kernel leaves down.
+lo_at=$(grep -n -x "ip link set lo up" "$GUEST_INIT" | cut -d: -f1 | head -n 1)
+init_at=$(grep -n -x "exec /sbin/init" "$GUEST_INIT" | cut -d: -f1 | head -n 1)
+check "guest init brings loopback up before init starts the store" \
+    '[ -n "$lo_at" ] && [ -n "$init_at" ] && [ "$lo_at" -lt "$init_at" ]'
+
+# --- The store is prepared only after boot settled the receipt key ---
+fresh prepare-ok; rm -f "$T/run/store.conf"
+check "a settled receipt key prepares the store" 'prepare_store && [ -s "$T/run/store.conf" ]'
+check "the store listens only on loopback, with no auth, monitor, route or cluster listener" \
+    'grep -qx "listen: \"127.0.0.1:4222\"" "$T/run/store.conf" && grep -qx "  store_dir: \"$T/data/jetstream\"" "$T/run/store.conf" &&
+     ! grep -Eq "authorization|http|monitor|cluster|routes|leafnodes|websocket|mqtt" "$T/run/store.conf"'
+fresh prepare-no-key; rm -f "$T/run/store.conf" "$T/run/receipt-ready"
+check "a receipt key boot did not settle leaves the store unprepared" '! prepare_store && [ ! -e "$T/run/store.conf" ]'
+fresh prepare-bad; rm -f "$T/run/store.conf"
+check "a config the server rejects leaves the store unprepared" '! NATS_BAD=1 prepare_store && [ ! -e "$T/run/store.conf" ]'
+
+# --- The store step starts the server only on a prepared config ---
+fresh store-run
+start_store
+check "a prepared store starts the dedicated server with its heap bound" \
+    'waitfor "[ -s \"\$T/servers\" ]" && grep -qx "512MiB -c $T/run/store.conf" "$T/servers"'
+kill -KILL "$spid" 2>/dev/null || true
+fresh store-refused; : > "$T/run/boot-refused"
+start_store; waitfor "grep -q 'store: boot refused' \"\$T/console\"" || true
+check "a store whose boot was refused parks instead of starting or respawning" \
+    '! gone "$spid" && [ ! -e "$T/servers" ] && [ ! -e "$T/boots" ]'
+kill -KILL "$spid" 2>/dev/null || true
+
+# --- Boot is supervised: a transient failure is retried, a refusal is final ---
+fresh boot-transient; rm -f "$T/run/store.conf" "$T/run/receipt-ready"; printf '75\n0\n' > "$T/boot-rcs"
+start_store
+check "a transient boot failure exits so init runs the step again, starting nothing" \
+    'waitfor "gone $spid" && [ ! -e "$T/servers" ] && [ ! -e "$T/run/boot-refused" ]'
+start_store
+check "the respawn after recovery boots again and starts the store" \
+    'waitfor "[ -s \"\$T/servers\" ]" && [ "$(wc -l < "$T/boots")" -eq 2 ] && [ -s "$T/run/store.conf" ]'
+kill -KILL "$spid" 2>/dev/null || true
+fresh boot-final; rm -f "$T/run/store.conf" "$T/run/receipt-ready"; printf '1\n0\n' > "$T/boot-rcs"
+start_store; waitfor "grep -q 'boot refused (rc=1)' \"\$T/console\"" || true
+check "a final boot refusal parks the store and records the refusal" \
+    '! gone "$spid" && [ -e "$T/run/boot-refused" ] && [ ! -e "$T/servers" ]'
+kill -KILL "$spid" 2>/dev/null || true
+start_store; waitfor "grep -q 'store: boot refused, not starting' \"\$T/console\"" || true
+check "a later respawn never boots again after a final refusal" '[ "$(wc -l < "$T/boots")" -eq 1 ]'
+kill -KILL "$spid" 2>/dev/null || true
+fresh boot-settled; rm -f "$T/run/store.conf"; : > "$T/boot-rcs"
+start_store
+check "a respawn after the key settled starts the store without booting again" \
+    'waitfor "[ -s \"\$T/servers\" ]" && [ ! -e "$T/boots" ]'
+kill -KILL "$spid" 2>/dev/null || true
+fresh boot-held; rm -f "$T/run/store.conf" "$T/run/receipt-ready"; echo hold > "$T/boot-rcs"
+echo "/dev/vdb $T/data ext4 rw 0 0" > "$T/mounts"
+start_store; waitfor '[ -s "$T/boot-child" ]' || true
+bchild=$(cat "$T/boot-child" 2>/dev/null); CHILDREN="$CHILDREN $bchild"
+shutdown_step
+check "shutdown stops a boot still in progress before it unmounts the disk" \
+    'waitfor "gone $bchild" && grep -q "umount $T/data" "$T/calls.log"'
+kill -KILL "$spid" "$bchild" 2>/dev/null || true
+fresh boot-held-survivor; rm -f "$T/run/store.conf" "$T/run/receipt-ready"; echo hold > "$T/boot-rcs"
+echo "/dev/vdb $T/data ext4 rw 0 0" > "$T/mounts"
+start_store; waitfor '[ -s "$T/boot-child" ]' || true
+bchild=$(cat "$T/boot-child" 2>/dev/null); CHILDREN="$CHILDREN $bchild"
+check "a boot that survives SIGKILL fails shutdown and keeps the disk mounted" \
+    '! shutdown_step "$bchild" && ! grep -q umount "$T/calls.log" && grep -q "boot pid=$bchild STILL ALIVE" "$T/console"'
+kill -KILL "$spid" "$bchild" 2>/dev/null || true
+# Shutdown sets stopping after the store's own check but before the boot child
+# runs: the child must still record itself and never start sqs-worker boot.
+fresh boot-window; rm -f "$T/run/store.conf" "$T/run/receipt-ready"; echo 0 > "$T/boot-rcs"
+: > "$T/run/stopping"
+SQSW_RUN="$T/run" SQSW_CONSOLE="$T/console" SQSW_BIN="$TMP/bin/boot" SQSW_BOOT_RETRY=0 SQSW_PARK="sleep 60" SQSW_LIB="$LIB" \
+    sh -c '. "$1"; sqsw_boot' sh "$LIB" & wpid=$!
+CHILDREN="$CHILDREN $wpid"
+waitfor "grep -q 'shutdown during boot' \"\$T/console\"" || true
+check "a boot child started after shutdown began never runs boot" \
+    'grep -q "shutdown during boot" "$T/console" && [ ! -e "$T/boots" ] && [ ! -e "$T/run/boot-refused" ]'
+kill -KILL "$wpid" 2>/dev/null || true

 # --- A watcher killed after readiness: its marker must not outlive it ---
 fresh killed-after-ready
@@ -103,8 +213,7 @@ kill -KILL "$pid" 2>/dev/null || true
 # A run that cannot start parks rather than exiting, so init does not respawn
 # it in a loop; a second is many park intervals, and it must log only once.
 fresh run-stopping; : > "$T/run/stopping"; echo stale > "$T/run/store-ready"
-PARK=0.05 start_run; waitfor "grep -q 'shutdown in progress' \"\$T/console\"" || true
-sleep 1
+start_run; waitfor "grep -q 'shutdown in progress' \"\$T/console\"" || true
 check "a start during shutdown parks instead of exiting and respawning" '! gone "$pid"'
 check "a parked start during shutdown starts no watcher and removes the marker" \
    '[ ! -e "$T/watchers" ] && [ ! -e "$T/run/store-ready" ]'
@@ -112,26 +221,24 @@ check "a parked start during shutdown logs once" '[ "$(grep -c "shutdown in prog
 shutdown_step
 check "shutdown stops the parked start" 'waitfor "gone $pid"'

-fresh run-no-key; rm -f "$T/run/public-key"
-PARK=0.05 start_run; waitfor "grep -q 'no worker key' \"\$T/console\"" || true
-sleep 1
-check "a guest without a worker key parks instead of exiting and respawning" '! gone "$pid" && [ ! -e "$T/watchers" ]'
-check "a parked guest without a worker key logs once" '[ "$(grep -c "no worker key" "$T/console")" -eq 1 ]'
-echo UPUBLICKEY > "$T/run/public-key"
-check "a key that appears later starts the watcher" 'waitfor "[ -s \"\$T/watchers\" ]"'
-kill -KILL "$pid" 2>/dev/null || true
-
-fresh run-no-key-stop; rm -f "$T/run/public-key"
-PARK=0.05 start_run; waitfor "grep -q 'no worker key' \"\$T/console\"" || true
+fresh run-unprepared; rm -f "$T/run/store.conf"
+start_run
+check "a watcher whose store is not prepared yet exits to be respawned and never reports ready" \
+    'waitfor "gone $pid" && [ ! -e "$T/watchers" ] && [ ! -e "$T/run/store-ready" ]'
+fresh run-refused; rm -f "$T/run/store.conf"; : > "$T/run/boot-refused"
+start_run; waitfor "grep -q 'ready: boot refused' \"\$T/console\"" || true
+check "a guest whose boot was refused parks its watcher and never reports ready" \
+    '! gone "$pid" && [ ! -e "$T/watchers" ] && [ ! -e "$T/run/store-ready" ]'
 shutdown_step
-check "shutdown stops a start parked for a missing key" 'waitfor "gone $pid" && [ ! -e "$T/watchers" ]'
+check "shutdown stops a watcher parked after a refused boot" 'waitfor "gone $pid" && [ ! -e "$T/watchers" ]'

-# --- Shutdown: unmount only once the watcher is confirmed gone ---
+# --- Shutdown: unmount only once the watcher and the store are gone ---
 fresh shutdown-orderly; echo "dev $T/data ext4 rw 0 0" > "$T/mounts"
-start_run; waitfor "[ -s \"\$T/run/store-ready\" ]"
+start_store; start_run; waitfor "[ -s \"\$T/run/store-ready\" ]"; waitfor "[ -s \"\$T/servers\" ]"
 check "orderly shutdown succeeds" 'shutdown_step'
-check "orderly shutdown confirms the watcher exited, removes the marker, then unmounts" \
-    'gone "$pid" && grep -q "readiness watcher pid=$pid exited" "$T/console" && [ ! -e "$T/run/store-ready" ] &&
+check "orderly shutdown stops the watcher, then the store, removes the marker, then unmounts" \
+    'gone "$pid" && gone "$spid" && [ ! -e "$T/run/store-ready" ] &&
+     [ "$(grep "exited" "$T/console" | sed "s/.*stop: \([a-z]*\) pid.*/\1/" | tr "\n" "|")" = "ready|store|" ] &&
     [ "$(grep "^umount" "$T/calls.log" | tr "\n" "|")" = "umount $T/data|umount -a -r|" ]'
 check "shutdown blocks any later respawn" '[ -e "$T/run/stopping" ]'

@@ -151,10 +258,16 @@ check "a surviving watcher leaves every mount alone and is never reported stoppe
 check "a surviving watcher still leaves no readiness marker" '[ ! -e "$T/run/store-ready" ]'
 kill -KILL "$pid" 2>/dev/null || true

+fresh shutdown-store-survivor; echo "dev $T/data ext4 rw 0 0" > "$T/mounts"
+(trap '' TERM; exec sleep 60) & pid=$!; CHILDREN="$CHILDREN $pid"; record "$pid" store
+check "shutdown with a surviving store reports failure and leaves every mount alone" \
+    '! shutdown_step "$pid" && ! grep -q "^umount" "$T/calls.log" && grep -q "store pid=$pid STILL ALIVE" "$T/console"'
+kill -KILL "$pid" 2>/dev/null || true
+
 fresh shutdown-reused; echo "dev $T/data ext4 rw 0 0" > "$T/mounts"
 (exec sleep 60) & pid=$!; CHILDREN="$CHILDREN $pid"; echo "$pid 1" > "$T/run/ready.pid"
 shutdown_step
-check "a recorded PID with another start time is never signalled" '! gone "$pid" && grep -q "no running readiness watcher" "$T/console"'
+check "a recorded PID with another start time is never signalled" '! gone "$pid" && grep -q "no running ready" "$T/console"'
 kill -KILL "$pid" 2>/dev/null || true

 if [ "$fails" -ne 0 ]; then
@@ -1,11 +1,10 @@
 #!/bin/sh
-# stage-sqs-store-microvm.sh <image-dir> <dist-root> [sqs-store|sqs-worker]:
-# copy a built SQS microVM image into a release tree as <dist-root>/microvm-<name>.
+# stage-sqs-store-microvm.sh <image-dir> <dist-root> [sqs-worker]: copy the
+# built SQS microVM image into a release tree as <dist-root>/microvm-sqs-worker.
 # Without a complete image it stages nothing and says so, as the LB image does.
 set -eu
-src=$1 name=${3:-sqs-store}
+src=$1 name=${3:-sqs-worker}
 case "$name" in
-    sqs-store) label="SQS store" ;;
    sqs-worker) label="SQS worker" ;;
    *) echo "[distro] unknown SQS microVM image '$name'" >&2; exit 2 ;;
 esac
@@ -100,7 +100,8 @@ profile_binaries() {
 ./cmd/eks-gateway-fetch:usr/local/bin/eks-gateway-fetch \
 ./cmd/eks-webhook-cert:usr/local/bin/eks-webhook-cert \
 ./cmd/eks-konnectivity-cert:usr/local/bin/eks-konnectivity-cert \
-./cmd/eks-etcd-member:usr/local/bin/eks-etcd-member"
+./cmd/eks-etcd-member:usr/local/bin/eks-etcd-member \
+./cmd/eks-pod-identity-webhook:usr/local/bin/eks-pod-identity-webhook"
            ;;
        ecs) echo "./cmd/ecs-agent:usr/local/bin/ecs-agent" ;;
        *)   echo "" ;;
@@ -7,7 +7,7 @@
 # Debian is the build host regardless of what is being built — mkosi bootstraps
 # the target distribution from its own archive, so an Ubuntu image builds fine
 # from here (see ubuntu-keyring below).
-FROM debian:trixie-slim@sha256:62bd423aeee912639ca8ee681c2b762cb3e25137e0a92b20be455898a9f034ad
+FROM debian:trixie-slim@sha256:f6b08b09a05725f9431502d3b5714f5c4576e82c1a84fa1debe0c24a7e0c3ec4

 # The runner user is uid 1000; matching it keeps bind-mounted build output
 # owned by the invoking user instead of root.
@@ -1014,6 +1014,9 @@ RESOLV_CONF="${SPINIFEX_RESOLV_CONF:-/etc/resolv.conf}"
 RESOLVED_STUB=/run/systemd/resolve/stub-resolv.conf
 # node-reset.sh keeps /var/lib/spinifex-reset, so the copy survives until uninstall.
 RESOLV_CONF_SAVED="${SPINIFEX_RESOLV_CONF_SAVED:-/var/lib/spinifex-reset/resolv.conf.orig}"
+# NetworkManager started while resolv.conf is a plain file rewrites it on its
+# next DNS update, replacing the stub link; this drop-in stops that.
+NM_DNS_DROPIN="${SPINIFEX_NM_DNS_DROPIN:-/etc/NetworkManager/conf.d/90-spinifex-dns.conf}"

 # systemd-resolved ships resolvconf as a link to resolvectl, which only works
 # while resolved runs, so that one is not a resolvconf backend.
@@ -1066,10 +1069,52 @@ dns_handover_failed() {
    fatal "Host DNS through systemd-resolved does not work: $1.
    To put host DNS back as it was before this installer:
      sudo systemctl disable --now systemd-resolved
+      sudo rm -f $NM_DNS_DROPIN
      sudo cp -a --remove-destination $RESOLV_CONF_SAVED $RESOLV_CONF
      sudo systemctl restart NetworkManager"
 }

+# Prints the rc-manager NetworkManager would use if it is not unmanaged, which
+# means a file read after the Spinifex drop-in overrides it.
+nm_rc_manager_override() {
+    local config
+    config=$($SUDO NetworkManager --print-config) || return 1
+    printf '%s\n' "$config" | awk -F= '
+        /^\[/ { main = ($0 == "[main]"); next }
+        main && $1 == "rc-manager" { rc = $2 }
+        END { if (rc != "unmanaged") print "rc-manager=" (rc == "" ? "symlink" : rc) }'
+}
+
+# Writes the NetworkManager drop-in and checks nothing overrides it. Returns 1
+# when it was already in place.
+install_nm_dns_dropin() {
+    local want override changed=1
+    want=$(printf '[main]\ndns=systemd-resolved\nrc-manager=unmanaged')
+    if [ "$(cat "$NM_DNS_DROPIN" 2>/dev/null)" != "$want" ]; then
+        $SUDO mkdir -p "$(dirname "$NM_DNS_DROPIN")"
+        printf '%s\n' "$want" | $SUDO tee "$NM_DNS_DROPIN" > /dev/null || dns_handover_failed "cannot write $NM_DNS_DROPIN"
+        info "  $NM_DNS_DROPIN: NetworkManager leaves $RESOLV_CONF alone"
+        changed=0
+    fi
+    override=$(nm_rc_manager_override) || dns_handover_failed "cannot read NetworkManager's configuration with 'NetworkManager --print-config'"
+    if [ -n "$override" ]; then
+        dns_handover_failed "NetworkManager reads $override from a file after $NM_DNS_DROPIN, so it would replace the $RESOLV_CONF link. Remove that setting ('NetworkManager --print-config' shows the files it reads) and re-run this installer"
+    fi
+    return "$changed"
+}
+
+# Links the stub and checks the link is still there a second later, relinking a
+# bounded number of times in case a write NetworkManager had queued lands first.
+link_resolved_stub() {
+    local i
+    for i in 1 2 3 4 5; do
+        $SUDO ln -sfn "$RESOLVED_STUB" "$RESOLV_CONF"
+        sleep 1
+        [ "$(readlink "$RESOLV_CONF")" = "$RESOLVED_STUB" ] && return 0
+    done
+    dns_handover_failed "$RESOLV_CONF is not a link to $RESOLVED_STUB 5 seconds after linking it, so something keeps rewriting it"
+}
+
 # Checks resolved has upstream servers and still resolves the package
 # repository host, the one name this host is known to have resolved.
 check_resolved_dns() {
@@ -1103,8 +1148,13 @@ hand_dns_to_resolved() {
    [ "${ISO_BUILD:-0}" = "1" ] && return 0

    if systemctl is-active --quiet systemd-resolved.service; then
-        # A handover made by an earlier run is checked again on every run.
+        # A handover made by an earlier run is checked again, and repaired, on
+        # every run: installs before the drop-in could lose the link.
        if [ -e "$RESOLV_CONF_SAVED" ] || [ -L "$RESOLV_CONF_SAVED" ]; then
+            if install_nm_dns_dropin && systemctl is-active --quiet NetworkManager.service; then
+                $SUDO systemctl reload NetworkManager.service || dns_handover_failed "NetworkManager did not reload"
+            fi
+            [ "$(readlink "$RESOLV_CONF")" = "$RESOLVED_STUB" ] || link_resolved_stub
            check_resolved_dns
        fi
        return 0
@@ -1131,10 +1181,15 @@ hand_dns_to_resolved() {
        $SUDO cp -a "$RESOLV_CONF" "$RESOLV_CONF_SAVED" || fatal "Cannot save $RESOLV_CONF to $RESOLV_CONF_SAVED"
        info "  saved $RESOLV_CONF to $RESOLV_CONF_SAVED"
    fi
+    install_nm_dns_dropin || true
    $SUDO systemctl enable --now systemd-resolved.service > /dev/null 2>&1 \
        || dns_handover_failed "systemd-resolved did not start"
    $SUDO systemctl restart NetworkManager.service || dns_handover_failed "NetworkManager did not restart"
-    $SUDO ln -sfn "$RESOLVED_STUB" "$RESOLV_CONF"
+    # Best effort: a link with no DHCP server can hold startup past the timeout.
+    if command -v nm-online > /dev/null; then
+        nm-online -s -q --timeout=15 || true
+    fi
+    link_resolved_stub
    check_resolved_dns
    info "  $RESOLV_CONF -> $RESOLVED_STUB"
 }
@@ -1624,13 +1679,12 @@ install_files() {
        $SUDO cp "$EXTRACT_DIR/microvm/"* /usr/share/spinifex/microvm/
        info "  /usr/share/spinifex/microvm/*"
    fi
-    install_sqs_store_image
    install_sqs_worker_image
 }

-# The SQS images ship beside the load balancer's, not inside it: an older
-# installer copies microvm/* without -r and would stop at a subdirectory.
-install_sqs_store_image() { install_sqs_microvm_image sqs-store "SQS store"; }
+# The SQS image ships beside the load balancer's, not inside it: an older
+# installer copies microvm/* without -r and would stop at a subdirectory. A
+# store image left by an earlier install is not touched: nothing boots it.
 install_sqs_worker_image() { install_sqs_microvm_image sqs-worker "SQS worker"; }

 # install_sqs_microvm_image <name> <label>
@@ -20,9 +20,10 @@ fail() { echo "  FAIL - $1"; fails=$((fails + 1)); }
 echo "-- setup.sh host DNS, chrony, needrestart and nbdkit"

 mkdir -p "$TMP/sys"
-for tool in bash awk sed grep readlink basename dirname cp ln mkdir cat head tail wc tee rm chmod install; do
+for tool in bash awk sed grep readlink basename dirname cp ln mkdir cat head tail wc tee rm chmod install mv; do
    ln -s "$(command -v "$tool")" "$TMP/sys/$tool"
 done
+ln -s "$(command -v sleep)" "$TMP/sys/realsleep"

 # stub <name> <body> — a stub command; $S is the fixture's state directory.
 stub() {
@@ -30,10 +31,17 @@ stub() {
    chmod +x "$TMP/bin/$1"
 }

+# nm_settle — waits for the fixture's NetworkManager to finish writing.
+nm_settle() {
+    n=0
+    while [ -e "$TMP/state/nm-pending" ] && [ $n -lt 500 ]; do "$TMP/sys/realsleep" 0.01; n=$((n + 1)); done
+}
+
 # host — a fresh fixture: resolved installed and inactive, resolvconf the
 # resolvectl link, NetworkManager running with no DNS settings, a dnf host
 # whose first enabled repository is yum.oracle.com.
 host() {
+    nm_settle
    rm -rf "${TMP:?}/state" "${TMP:?}/root" "${TMP:?}/bin"
    mkdir -p "$TMP/state/active" "$TMP/root/etc" "$TMP/root/usr/lib/systemd/system" "$TMP/bin"
    : > "$TMP/root/usr/lib/systemd/system/systemd-resolved.service"
@@ -42,11 +50,28 @@ host() {
    printf '[main]\n# dns=default\nconfigure-and-quit=no\n' > "$TMP/state/nm-config"
    printf 'Global:\nLink 2 (br-wan): 192.168.1.1\n' > "$TMP/state/resolvectl-dns"
    printf '[ol10_UEKR8]\nbaseurl = https://mirror.example/uek/\nenabled = 0\n[ol10_baseos_latest]\nbaseurl = https://yum.oracle.com/repo/OracleLinux/OL10/baseos/latest/x86_64/\nenabled = 1\n' > "$TMP/state/dnf-dump"
+    # A (re)started NetworkManager whose rc-manager is not unmanaged writes
+    # resolv.conf as a plain file on its first DNS update, which can land just
+    # after the installer links the stub.
    stub systemctl '[ "$1" = is-active ] && { [ -e "$S/active/$3" ]; exit; }
 echo "$*" >> "$S/calls"
 [ "$1 $2" = "enable --now" ] && : > "$S/active/$3"
+case "$1 $2" in
+    "restart NetworkManager.service" | "reload NetworkManager.service")
+        NetworkManager --print-config | grep -qx rc-manager=unmanaged && exit 0
+        : > "$S/nm-pending"
+        (
+            n=0
+            while [ ! -L "$S/../root/etc/resolv.conf" ] && [ $n -lt 300 ]; do realsleep 0.01; n=$((n + 1)); done
+            printf "nameserver 192.168.1.1\n" > "$S/nm-resolv.conf"
+            mv -f "$S/nm-resolv.conf" "$S/../root/etc/resolv.conf"
+            rm -f "$S/nm-pending"
+        ) > /dev/null 2>&1 &
+        ;;
+esac
 exit 0'
-    stub NetworkManager 'cat "$S/nm-config"'
+    stub NetworkManager 'cat "$S/nm-config"; cat "$S/../root/nm/90-spinifex-dns.conf" "$S/nm-config-late" 2>/dev/null; :'
+    stub nm-online ':'
    stub resolvectl '[ "$1" = dns ] && cat "$S/resolvectl-dns"'
    stub resolvectl-real ':'
    ln -s resolvectl "$TMP/bin/resolvconf"
@@ -60,10 +85,17 @@ run() {
    RC=0
    OUT=$(PATH="$TMP/bin:$TMP/sys" DISTRO_ROOT="$TMP/root" \
        SPINIFEX_RESOLV_CONF="$TMP/root/etc/resolv.conf" SPINIFEX_RESOLV_CONF_SAVED="$TMP/root/saved/resolv.conf.orig" \
+        SPINIFEX_NM_DNS_DROPIN="$TMP/root/nm/90-spinifex-dns.conf" \
        INSTALL_SPINIFEX_LIB_ONLY=1 bash -c '. "$1"; shift; for f in "$@"; do $f; done' _ "$SETUP" "$@" 2>&1) || RC=$?
 }

 calls() { cat "$TMP/state/calls" 2>/dev/null || true; }
+# linked — whether resolv.conf is still the stub link once NetworkManager settles.
+linked() {
+    nm_settle
+    [ "$(readlink "$TMP/root/etc/resolv.conf")" = /run/systemd/resolve/stub-resolv.conf ]
+}
+dropin() { cat "$TMP/root/nm/90-spinifex-dns.conf" 2>/dev/null || echo "<none>"; }
 saved() { cat "$TMP/root/saved/resolv.conf.orig" 2>/dev/null || echo "<none>"; }
 expect_untouched() {
    if [ "$RC" = 0 ] && [ -z "$(calls)" ] && [ ! -L "$TMP/root/etc/resolv.conf" ] && [ "$(saved)" = "<none>" ]; then
@@ -86,7 +118,7 @@ expect_fatal() { # expect_fatal <desc> <text>...
 # --------------------------------------------------------------------------
 host
 run hand_dns_to_resolved
-if [ "$RC" = 0 ] && [ "$(readlink "$TMP/root/etc/resolv.conf")" = /run/systemd/resolve/stub-resolv.conf ] \
+if [ "$RC" = 0 ] && linked \
    && [ "$(saved)" = "$(printf 'nameserver 192.168.1.1\nsearch example.lan')" ] \
    && [ "$(calls)" = "$(printf 'enable --now systemd-resolved.service\nrestart NetworkManager.service')" ] \
    && [ "$(cat "$TMP/state/looked-up")" = yum.oracle.com ]; then
@@ -98,12 +130,44 @@ fi
 : > "$TMP/state/calls"
 rm -f "$TMP/state/looked-up"
 run hand_dns_to_resolved
-if [ "$RC" = 0 ] && [ -z "$(calls)" ] && [ "$(cat "$TMP/state/looked-up")" = yum.oracle.com ]; then
+if [ "$RC" = 0 ] && [ -z "$(calls)" ] && linked && [ "$(cat "$TMP/state/looked-up")" = yum.oracle.com ]; then
    pass "a rerun after a handover checks DNS again and changes nothing"
 else
    fail "rerun after handover: rc=$RC calls='$(calls)': $OUT"
 fi

+if [ "$(dropin)" = "$(printf '[main]\ndns=systemd-resolved\nrc-manager=unmanaged')" ]; then
+    pass "the handover tells NetworkManager to send DNS to resolved and leave resolv.conf alone"
+else
+    fail "NetworkManager drop-in: '$(dropin)'"
+fi
+
+# An install made before the drop-in, whose NetworkManager replaced the link.
+host
+mkdir -p "$TMP/root/saved"
+echo "the original" > "$TMP/root/saved/resolv.conf.orig"
+: > "$TMP/state/active/systemd-resolved.service"
+run hand_dns_to_resolved
+if [ "$RC" = 0 ] && linked && [ "$(calls)" = "reload NetworkManager.service" ] \
+    && [ "$(dropin)" = "$(printf '[main]\ndns=systemd-resolved\nrc-manager=unmanaged')" ]; then
+    pass "a rerun after a handover whose link NetworkManager replaced adds the drop-in, reloads NM and relinks the stub"
+else
+    fail "rerun repair: rc=$RC calls='$(calls)' link='$(readlink "$TMP/root/etc/resolv.conf")' dropin='$(dropin)': $OUT"
+fi
+
+host
+printf '[main]\nrc-manager=symlink\n' > "$TMP/state/nm-config-late"
+run hand_dns_to_resolved
+expect_fatal "a NetworkManager file read after the drop-in that sets rc-manager stops the install, naming it" \
+    "rc-manager=symlink" "rm -f $TMP/root/nm/90-spinifex-dns.conf"
+case "$(calls)" in *"restart NetworkManager"*) fail "rc-manager override: restarted NetworkManager first: $(calls)" ;; esac
+
+host
+stub ln ':'
+run hand_dns_to_resolved
+expect_fatal "a resolv.conf that will not stay linked to the stub stops the install" \
+    "is not a link to /run/systemd/resolve/stub-resolv.conf"
+
 host
 mkdir -p "$TMP/root/saved"
 echo "the original" > "$TMP/root/saved/resolv.conf.orig"
@@ -155,7 +219,8 @@ host
 printf 'Global:\nLink 2 (br-wan):\n' > "$TMP/state/resolvectl-dns"
 run hand_dns_to_resolved
 expect_fatal "no upstream servers stops the install, naming the check and printing the restore" \
-    "'resolvectl dns' lists no DNS servers" "systemctl disable --now systemd-resolved" "cp -a --remove-destination $TMP/root/saved/resolv.conf.orig"
+    "'resolvectl dns' lists no DNS servers" "systemctl disable --now systemd-resolved" "cp -a --remove-destination $TMP/root/saved/resolv.conf.orig" \
+    "rm -f $TMP/root/nm/90-spinifex-dns.conf"

 host
 : > "$TMP/state/getent-fail"
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 #!/bin/sh
-# setup_sqs_store_image_test.sh — tests for shipping the SQS store and worker
-# microVM images: staging them into a release tree and installing with setup.sh.
+# setup_sqs_worker_image_test.sh — tests for shipping the SQS microVM
+# image: staging it into a release tree and installing with setup.sh.
 #
 # setup.sh is sourced with INSTALL_SPINIFEX_LIB_ONLY=1 so main never runs, and
 # installs into a temporary SPINIFEX_MICROVM_DIR with SUDO cleared.
@@ -16,7 +16,7 @@ fails=0
 pass() { echo "  ok   - $1"; }
 fail() { echo "  FAIL - $1"; fails=$((fails + 1)); }

-echo "-- SQS store and worker microVM image release and install"
+echo "-- SQS microVM image release and install"

 # image <dir> <tag>: a fake built image whose bytes name its tag.
 image() {
@@ -35,11 +35,11 @@ release() {
 }

 # install_image <extract-dir> <microvm-dir> [path-prefix]: runs
-# install_sqs_store_image and sets RC and OUT.
+# install_sqs_worker_image and sets RC and OUT.
 install_image() {
    RC=0
    OUT=$(PATH="${3:-}$PATH" EXTRACT_DIR="$1" SPINIFEX_MICROVM_DIR="$2" INSTALL_SPINIFEX_LIB_ONLY=1 \
-        bash -c '. "$1"; SUDO=""; install_sqs_store_image' _ "$SETUP" 2>&1) || RC=$?
+        bash -c '. "$1"; SUDO=""; install_sqs_worker_image' _ "$SETUP" 2>&1) || RC=$?
 }

 same() { cmp -s "$1" "$2"; }
@@ -48,13 +48,13 @@ same() { cmp -s "$1" "$2"; }
 image "$TMP/built" v1
 release "$TMP/rel"
 sh "$STAGE" "$TMP/built" "$TMP/rel" > "$TMP/stage.out"
-if same "$TMP/built/vmlinuz" "$TMP/rel/microvm-sqs-store/vmlinuz" \
-    && same "$TMP/built/initramfs.cpio.gz" "$TMP/rel/microvm-sqs-store/initramfs.cpio.gz"; then
+if same "$TMP/built/vmlinuz" "$TMP/rel/microvm-sqs-worker/vmlinuz" \
+    && same "$TMP/built/initramfs.cpio.gz" "$TMP/rel/microvm-sqs-worker/initramfs.cpio.gz"; then
    pass "stages the built image beside the load balancer's"
 else
    fail "staged image differs from the build"
 fi
-if [ ! -e "$TMP/rel/microvm/sqs-store" ] && [ "$(ls "$TMP/rel/microvm" | wc -l)" -eq 3 ]; then
+if [ ! -e "$TMP/rel/microvm/sqs-worker" ] && [ "$(ls "$TMP/rel/microvm" | wc -l)" -eq 3 ]; then
    pass "leaves the load balancer's microvm directory as it was"
 else
    fail "load balancer directory changed: $(ls "$TMP/rel/microvm")"
@@ -63,21 +63,21 @@ fi
 release "$TMP/rel-none"
 mkdir -p "$TMP/half"; printf 'k\n' > "$TMP/half/vmlinuz"
 OUT=$(sh "$STAGE" "$TMP/half" "$TMP/rel-none")
-if [ ! -e "$TMP/rel-none/microvm-sqs-store" ] && echo "$OUT" | grep -q 'WARNING: SQS store microVM image missing'; then
+if [ ! -e "$TMP/rel-none/microvm-sqs-worker" ] && echo "$OUT" | grep -q 'WARNING: SQS worker microVM image missing'; then
    pass "stages nothing from an incomplete build, and says so"
 else
    fail "incomplete build staged or unannounced: $OUT"
 fi

-# --- an older installer meets a release that carries the store image ---
+# --- an older installer meets a release that carries the SQS image ---
 # It copies microvm/* without -r; the sibling directory must not reach it.
 mkdir -p "$TMP/old-dest"
-if cp "$TMP/rel/microvm/"* "$TMP/old-dest/" 2> "$TMP/old.err" && [ ! -e "$TMP/old-dest/sqs-store" ]; then
-    pass "an older installer's copy still succeeds and ignores the store image"
+if cp "$TMP/rel/microvm/"* "$TMP/old-dest/" 2> "$TMP/old.err" && [ ! -e "$TMP/old-dest/sqs-worker" ]; then
+    pass "an older installer's copy still succeeds and ignores the SQS image"
 else
    fail "older installer copy failed: $(cat "$TMP/old.err")"
 fi
-mkdir -p "$TMP/nested/microvm/sqs-store" "$TMP/nested-dest"
+mkdir -p "$TMP/nested/microvm/sqs-worker" "$TMP/nested-dest"
 printf 'x\n' > "$TMP/nested/microvm/vmlinuz"
 if cp "$TMP/nested/microvm/"* "$TMP/nested-dest/" 2> /dev/null; then
    fail "control: a nested directory did not break the older copy, so the test proves nothing"
@@ -87,58 +87,58 @@ fi

 # --- install ---
 install_image "$TMP/rel" "$TMP/mv"
-if [ "$RC" = 0 ] && same "$TMP/built/vmlinuz" "$TMP/mv/sqs-store/vmlinuz" \
-    && same "$TMP/built/initramfs.cpio.gz" "$TMP/mv/sqs-store/initramfs.cpio.gz"; then
+if [ "$RC" = 0 ] && same "$TMP/built/vmlinuz" "$TMP/mv/sqs-worker/vmlinuz" \
+    && same "$TMP/built/initramfs.cpio.gz" "$TMP/mv/sqs-worker/initramfs.cpio.gz"; then
    pass "installs the staged image where the daemon looks"
 else
    fail "install rc=$RC: $OUT"
 fi
-mode=$(stat -c '%a' "$TMP/mv/sqs-store/initramfs.cpio.gz" 2> /dev/null || echo none)
+mode=$(stat -c '%a' "$TMP/mv/sqs-worker/initramfs.cpio.gz" 2> /dev/null || echo none)
 if [ "$mode" = 644 ]; then pass "installs the image 0644"; else fail "initramfs mode $mode"; fi

 image "$TMP/built2" v2
 release "$TMP/rel2"
 sh "$STAGE" "$TMP/built2" "$TMP/rel2" > /dev/null
 install_image "$TMP/rel2" "$TMP/mv"
-if [ "$RC" = 0 ] && same "$TMP/built2/vmlinuz" "$TMP/mv/sqs-store/vmlinuz" \
-    && same "$TMP/built2/initramfs.cpio.gz" "$TMP/mv/sqs-store/initramfs.cpio.gz"; then
+if [ "$RC" = 0 ] && same "$TMP/built2/vmlinuz" "$TMP/mv/sqs-worker/vmlinuz" \
+    && same "$TMP/built2/initramfs.cpio.gz" "$TMP/mv/sqs-worker/initramfs.cpio.gz"; then
    pass "an upgrade replaces both files"
 else
    fail "upgrade rc=$RC: $OUT"
 fi

-# A release without the store image: nothing installed, and a clear warning.
+# A release without the SQS image: nothing installed, and a clear warning.
 install_image "$TMP/rel-none" "$TMP/mv-none"
-if [ "$RC" = 0 ] && [ ! -e "$TMP/mv-none/sqs-store" ] && echo "$OUT" | grep -q 'no SQS store microVM image; SQS store launches will be refused'; then
+if [ "$RC" = 0 ] && [ ! -e "$TMP/mv-none/sqs-worker" ] && echo "$OUT" | grep -q 'no SQS worker microVM image; SQS worker launches will be refused'; then
    pass "a release without the image installs nothing and warns"
 else
-    fail "release without image: rc=$RC exists=$([ -e "$TMP/mv-none/sqs-store" ] && echo yes || echo no) $OUT"
+    fail "release without image: rc=$RC exists=$([ -e "$TMP/mv-none/sqs-worker" ] && echo yes || echo no) $OUT"
 fi

-# installed <dir>: a store image from an earlier install, plus an unrelated file.
+# installed <dir>: an SQS image from an earlier install, plus an unrelated file.
 installed() {
-    image "$1/sqs-store" old
-    printf 'keep\n' > "$1/sqs-store/operator-note"
+    image "$1/sqs-worker" old
+    printf 'keep\n' > "$1/sqs-worker/operator-note"
 }
-gone() { [ ! -e "$1/sqs-store/vmlinuz" ] && [ ! -e "$1/sqs-store/initramfs.cpio.gz" ]; }
-kept() { [ "$(cat "$1/sqs-store/operator-note" 2> /dev/null)" = keep ]; }
+gone() { [ ! -e "$1/sqs-worker/vmlinuz" ] && [ ! -e "$1/sqs-worker/initramfs.cpio.gz" ]; }
+kept() { [ "$(cat "$1/sqs-worker/operator-note" 2> /dev/null)" = keep ]; }

 # Upgrading to a release without the image must not leave the old one usable.
 installed "$TMP/mv-up"
 install_image "$TMP/rel-none" "$TMP/mv-up"
 if [ "$RC" = 0 ] && gone "$TMP/mv-up" && kept "$TMP/mv-up" \
-    && echo "$OUT" | grep -q 'Removed the SQS store microVM image left by an earlier install' \
-    && echo "$OUT" | grep -q 'SQS store launches will be refused'; then
+    && echo "$OUT" | grep -q 'Removed the SQS worker microVM image left by an earlier install' \
+    && echo "$OUT" | grep -q 'SQS worker launches will be refused'; then
    pass "a release without the image removes the earlier one, keeps other files, and warns"
 else
    fail "release without image over an installed one: rc=$RC $OUT"
 fi

-# An incomplete store image refuses and removes the earlier pair, because the
+# An incomplete SQS image refuses and removes the earlier pair, because the
 # binaries this release installed before it would otherwise boot the old one.
 installed "$TMP/mv-bad"
 cp -r "$TMP/rel2" "$TMP/rel-bad"
-rm "$TMP/rel-bad/microvm-sqs-store/initramfs.cpio.gz"
+rm "$TMP/rel-bad/microvm-sqs-worker/initramfs.cpio.gz"
 install_image "$TMP/rel-bad" "$TMP/mv-bad"
 if [ "$RC" != 0 ] && echo "$OUT" | grep -q 'incomplete: initramfs.cpio.gz is missing' \
    && gone "$TMP/mv-bad" && kept "$TMP/mv-bad"; then
@@ -154,17 +154,17 @@ for case in missing incomplete; do
    sh "$STAGE" "$TMP/built" "$TMP/rel-$case" > /dev/null
    if [ "$case" = missing ]; then rm -r "$TMP/built-$case"; else rm "$TMP/built-$case/initramfs.cpio.gz"; fi
    OUT=$(sh "$STAGE" "$TMP/built-$case" "$TMP/rel-$case")
-    if [ ! -e "$TMP/rel-$case/microvm-sqs-store" ] && echo "$OUT" | grep -q 'tarball will not include it'; then
+    if [ ! -e "$TMP/rel-$case/microvm-sqs-worker" ] && echo "$OUT" | grep -q 'tarball will not include it'; then
        pass "restaging from a $case build ships no earlier image"
    else
-        fail "restaging from a $case build left: $(ls -R "$TMP/rel-$case/microvm-sqs-store" 2> /dev/null)"
+        fail "restaging from a $case build left: $(ls -R "$TMP/rel-$case/microvm-sqs-worker" 2> /dev/null)"
    fi
 done
-mkdir -p "$TMP/rel-other/microvm-sqs-store"
-image "$TMP/rel-other/microvm-sqs-store" old
-printf 'keep\n' > "$TMP/rel-other/microvm-sqs-store/note"
+mkdir -p "$TMP/rel-other/microvm-sqs-worker"
+image "$TMP/rel-other/microvm-sqs-worker" old
+printf 'keep\n' > "$TMP/rel-other/microvm-sqs-worker/note"
 sh "$STAGE" "$TMP/no-such-build" "$TMP/rel-other" > /dev/null
-if [ ! -e "$TMP/rel-other/microvm-sqs-store/vmlinuz" ] && [ "$(cat "$TMP/rel-other/microvm-sqs-store/note")" = keep ]; then
+if [ ! -e "$TMP/rel-other/microvm-sqs-worker/vmlinuz" ] && [ "$(cat "$TMP/rel-other/microvm-sqs-worker/note")" = keep ]; then
    pass "restaging removes only the image files"
 else
    fail "restaging touched more than the image files"
@@ -180,65 +180,25 @@ exec /usr/bin/install "$@"
 EOF
 chmod +x "$TMP/bin/install"
 install_image "$TMP/rel" "$TMP/mv" "$TMP/bin:"
-if [ "$RC" != 0 ] && same "$TMP/built/vmlinuz" "$TMP/mv/sqs-store/vmlinuz" && [ ! -e "$TMP/mv/sqs-store/initramfs.cpio.gz" ]; then
+if [ "$RC" != 0 ] && same "$TMP/built/vmlinuz" "$TMP/mv/sqs-worker/vmlinuz" && [ ! -e "$TMP/mv/sqs-worker/initramfs.cpio.gz" ]; then
    pass "an interrupted install leaves the initramfs missing, not mismatched"
 else
-    fail "interrupted install: rc=$RC initramfs=$([ -e "$TMP/mv/sqs-store/initramfs.cpio.gz" ] && echo present || echo missing)"
+    fail "interrupted install: rc=$RC initramfs=$([ -e "$TMP/mv/sqs-worker/initramfs.cpio.gz" ] && echo present || echo missing)"
 fi

-# --- SQS worker image: same staging and install path, its own directory ---
-install_worker() {
-    RC=0
-    OUT=$(EXTRACT_DIR="$1" SPINIFEX_MICROVM_DIR="$2" INSTALL_SPINIFEX_LIB_ONLY=1 \
-        bash -c '. "$1"; SUDO=""; install_sqs_worker_image' _ "$SETUP" 2>&1) || RC=$?
-}
-image "$TMP/wbuilt" w1
-release "$TMP/wrel"
-sh "$STAGE" "$TMP/built" "$TMP/wrel" > /dev/null
-sh "$STAGE" "$TMP/wbuilt" "$TMP/wrel" sqs-worker > /dev/null
-if same "$TMP/wbuilt/vmlinuz" "$TMP/wrel/microvm-sqs-worker/vmlinuz" \
-    && same "$TMP/wbuilt/initramfs.cpio.gz" "$TMP/wrel/microvm-sqs-worker/initramfs.cpio.gz" \
-    && same "$TMP/built/vmlinuz" "$TMP/wrel/microvm-sqs-store/vmlinuz"; then
-    pass "the worker image stages beside the store image"
+image "$TMP/keep/sqs-store" old-store
+install_image "$TMP/rel" "$TMP/keep"
+if [ "$RC" = 0 ] && [ "$(cat "$TMP/keep/sqs-store/vmlinuz")" = kernel-old-store ] \
+    && [ "$(cat "$TMP/keep/sqs-store/initramfs.cpio.gz")" = initramfs-old-store ]; then
+    pass "an install leaves a separate store image from an earlier install untouched"
 else
-    fail "worker staging: $(ls -R "$TMP/wrel")"
+    fail "earlier store image: rc=$RC $(ls -R "$TMP/keep")"
 fi
-install_worker "$TMP/wrel" "$TMP/wmv"
-if [ "$RC" = 0 ] && same "$TMP/wbuilt/initramfs.cpio.gz" "$TMP/wmv/sqs-worker/initramfs.cpio.gz" \
-    && [ ! -e "$TMP/wmv/sqs-store" ]; then
-    pass "the worker image installs into its own directory only"
+if OUT=$(sh "$STAGE" "$TMP/built" "$TMP/rel" sqs-store 2>&1); then
+    fail "the separate store image was staged"
 else
-    fail "worker install: rc=$RC $OUT"
-fi
-release "$TMP/wrel-none"
-OUT=$(sh "$STAGE" "$TMP/no-such-build" "$TMP/wrel-none" sqs-worker)
-if [ ! -e "$TMP/wrel-none/microvm-sqs-worker" ] && echo "$OUT" | grep -q 'SQS worker microVM image missing'; then
-    pass "a missing worker build stages nothing and says so"
-else
-    fail "missing worker build: $OUT"
-fi
-install_worker "$TMP/wrel-none" "$TMP/wmv"
-if [ "$RC" = 0 ] && [ ! -e "$TMP/wmv/sqs-worker/vmlinuz" ] && [ ! -e "$TMP/wmv/sqs-worker/initramfs.cpio.gz" ] \
-    && echo "$OUT" | grep -q 'no SQS worker microVM image; SQS worker launches will be refused'; then
-    pass "a release without the worker image removes the earlier one and warns"
-else
-    fail "release without worker image: rc=$RC $OUT"
-fi
-cp -r "$TMP/wrel" "$TMP/wrel-bad"
-rm "$TMP/wrel-bad/microvm-sqs-worker/vmlinuz"
-install_worker "$TMP/wrel" "$TMP/wmv"
-install_worker "$TMP/wrel-bad" "$TMP/wmv"
-if [ "$RC" != 0 ] && echo "$OUT" | grep -q 'SQS worker microVM image in this release is incomplete: vmlinuz is missing' \
-    && [ ! -e "$TMP/wmv/sqs-worker/initramfs.cpio.gz" ]; then
-    pass "an incomplete worker image is refused and the earlier pair is removed"
-else
-    fail "incomplete worker image: rc=$RC $OUT"
-fi
-if OUT=$(sh "$STAGE" "$TMP/wbuilt" "$TMP/wrel" lb 2>&1); then
-    fail "an unknown image name was staged"
-else
-    pass "an unknown image name is refused"
+    pass "the separate store image is no longer staged"
 fi

 [ "$fails" = 0 ] || { echo "FAIL: $fails"; exit 1; }
-echo "  setup_sqs_store_image_test ok"
+echo "  setup_sqs_worker_image_test ok"
@@ -29,6 +29,7 @@ MODELS=(
    rds/2014-10-31
    route-53/2013-04-01
    s3/2006-03-01
+    sqs/2012-11-05
    sts/2011-06-15
 )

@@ -83,10 +83,10 @@ func (a *Agent) reconcile(ctx context.Context) map[string]bool {
 		statuses := make([]ecsv1.ContainerStatus, 0, len(t.running))
 		for _, c := range t.running {
 			name := c.Labels[labelContainerName]
-			go a.waitContainer(ctx, t.as, name, c.ID)
 			statuses = append(statuses, ecsv1.ContainerStatus{Name: name, Status: ecsv1.TaskStatusRunning, ContainerID: c.ID})
 		}
 		a.reportTaskState(t.as, ecsv1.TaskStatusRunning, "", statuses)
+		a.waitContainers(ctx, t.as, statuses)
 		adopted[taskID] = true
 		slog.Info("ecs-agent: re-adopted running task", "task", taskID, "containers", len(t.running))
 	}
@@ -191,6 +191,7 @@ func (a *Agent) runTask(ctx context.Context, as *ecsv1.Assign) {
 			slog.Error("ecs-agent: pull failed", "task", as.TaskID, "image", c.Image, "err", err)
 			a.teardownTaskNetns(as)
 			a.reportTaskState(as, ecsv1.TaskStatusStopped, "image pull failed: "+err.Error(), statuses)
+			a.waitContainers(ctx, as, statuses)
 			return
 		}

@@ -223,18 +224,28 @@ func (a *Agent) runTask(ctx context.Context, as *ecsv1.Assign) {
 			slog.Error("ecs-agent: run failed", "task", as.TaskID, "container", c.Name, "err", err)
 			a.teardownTaskNetns(as)
 			a.reportTaskState(as, ecsv1.TaskStatusStopped, "container start failed: "+err.Error(), statuses)
+			a.waitContainers(ctx, as, statuses)
 			return
 		}
 		statuses = append(statuses, ecsv1.ContainerStatus{
 			Name: c.Name, Status: ecsv1.TaskStatusRunning, ContainerID: id, GPUIDs: gpuIDs,
 		})
-		go a.waitContainer(ctx, as, c.Name, id)
 	}

 	a.reportTaskState(as, ecsv1.TaskStatusRunning, "", statuses)
+	a.waitContainers(ctx, as, statuses)
 	slog.Info("ecs-agent: task running", "task", as.TaskID, "containers", len(statuses))
 }

+// waitContainers starts one exit-wait per started container. Callers start
+// them only after the report that precedes STOPPED is sent, so a container
+// that exits at once can never have its STOPPED overtaken by that report.
+func (a *Agent) waitContainers(ctx context.Context, as *ecsv1.Assign, started []ecsv1.ContainerStatus) {
+	for _, c := range started {
+		go a.waitContainer(ctx, as, c.Name, c.ContainerID)
+	}
+}
+
 // waitContainer blocks until a container exits, then reports the task STOPPED
 // with the exit code. v1 stops the whole task when its first container exits.
 func (a *Agent) waitContainer(ctx context.Context, as *ecsv1.Assign, name, containerID string) {
@@ -4,6 +4,7 @@ import (
 	"context"
 	"errors"
 	"slices"
+	"sync/atomic"
 	"testing"
 	"time"

@@ -823,3 +824,87 @@ func TestPullResolver(t *testing.T) {
 		t.Fatalf("execution role + cred endpoint: want distinct exec-role resolver, got %v", got)
 	}
 }
+
+// orderingCP fails the run if a container exit-wait starts before the RUNNING
+// report is sent: an instant exit's STOPPED could then be overtaken by RUNNING.
+type orderingCP struct {
+	*fakeCP
+
+	waitStarted chan struct{}
+	early       atomic.Bool
+}
+
+func newOrderingCP(rt *ctrruntime.FakePuller) *orderingCP {
+	cp := &orderingCP{fakeCP: &fakeCP{}, waitStarted: make(chan struct{}, 8)}
+	rt.OnWait = func(string) { cp.waitStarted <- struct{}{} }
+	return cp
+}
+
+func (c *orderingCP) SubmitTaskState(st ecsv1.TaskState) error {
+	if st.LastStatus == ecsv1.TaskStatusRunning {
+		// A wait launched before this report is scheduled well within the window.
+		select {
+		case <-c.waitStarted:
+			c.early.Store(true)
+		case <-time.After(100 * time.Millisecond):
+		}
+	}
+	return c.fakeCP.SubmitTaskState(st)
+}
+
+func waitStopped(t *testing.T, cp *orderingCP, taskID string) {
+	t.Helper()
+	deadline := time.After(5 * time.Second)
+	for countStatus(cp.taskStates(), taskID, ecsv1.TaskStatusStopped) == 0 {
+		select {
+		case <-deadline:
+			t.Fatalf("task %s never reported STOPPED; states %+v", taskID, cp.taskStates())
+		case <-time.After(time.Millisecond):
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+func assertRunningThenStopped(t *testing.T, cp *orderingCP, taskID string) {
+	t.Helper()
+	if cp.early.Load() {
+		t.Fatalf("exit-wait started before the RUNNING report; states %+v", cp.taskStates())
+	}
+	var seq []string
+	for _, st := range cp.taskStates() {
+		if st.TaskID == taskID {
+			seq = append(seq, st.LastStatus)
+		}
+	}
+	if !slices.Equal(seq, []string{ecsv1.TaskStatusRunning, ecsv1.TaskStatusStopped}) {
+		t.Fatalf("task %s reported %v, want [RUNNING STOPPED]", taskID, seq)
+	}
+}
+
+// A container that exits the instant it starts must not let RUNNING be
+// reported after its STOPPED: the gateway would revive a dead task.
+func TestRunTask_InstantExitStoppedNeverPrecedesRunning(t *testing.T) {
+	rt := &ctrruntime.FakePuller{WaitCode: 7}
+	cp := newOrderingCP(rt)
+	a := newRunAgent(cp, rt)
+	a.runTask(context.Background(), testAssign())
+
+	waitStopped(t, cp, "t-001")
+	assertRunningThenStopped(t, cp, "t-001")
+}
+
+// The re-adopt path has the same ordering rule for a container that exits
+// right after the agent re-attaches to it.
+func TestReconcile_InstantExitStoppedNeverPrecedesRunning(t *testing.T) {
+	rt := &ctrruntime.FakePuller{
+		Containers: []ctrruntime.Container{
+			adoptedContainer("t-live", "web", "default", "t-live", testTaskRole, "", true),
+		},
+	}
+	cp := newOrderingCP(rt)
+	a := newAgent(Config{}, testIdentity(), cp, rt, nil)
+	a.cred = newCredEndpoint(nil, "us-east-1", "https://gw", "", "127.0.0.1", 0, nil)
+	a.reconcile(context.Background())
+
+	waitStopped(t, cp, "t-live")
+	assertRunningThenStopped(t, cp, "t-live")
+}
@@ -26,6 +26,7 @@ type FakePuller struct {
 	Waited   []string
 	Removed  []string
 	OnRun    func(string, RunSpec) (string, error)
+	OnWait   func(containerID string) // called, unlocked, before Wait returns

 	// Stop bookkeeping: StopTimeouts pairs the container ID with the timeout it
 	// was stopped with, in call order, so a test can assert both the target and
@@ -105,7 +106,11 @@ func (f *FakePuller) Run(_ context.Context, id string, spec RunSpec) (string, er
 func (f *FakePuller) Wait(_ context.Context, containerID string) (RunStatus, error) {
 	f.mu.Lock()
 	f.Waited = append(f.Waited, containerID)
+	onWait := f.OnWait
 	f.mu.Unlock()
+	if onWait != nil {
+		onWait(containerID)
+	}
 	return RunStatus{ExitCode: f.WaitCode}, f.WaitErr
 }

@@ -16,6 +16,9 @@
 //
 // The recovery resource returns a single epoch\taction\tsnapshot line the on-VM
 // k3s-recovery agent applies before k3s starts (etcd cluster-reset / wipe-rejoin).
+//
+// The workers resource returns one instance ID per line: every worker the
+// cluster's nodegroups still own, which the on-VM node-gc agent keeps Nodes for.
 package gatewayfetch

 import (
@@ -46,7 +49,7 @@ type Config struct {
 	Region      string
 	AccountID   string
 	ClusterName string
-	// Resource is "addons" or "recovery".
+	// Resource is "addons", "recovery" or "workers".
 	Resource   string
 	InstanceID string
 	// Out receives the rendered TSV.
@@ -61,8 +64,8 @@ func Run(ctx context.Context, cfg Config) error {
 		return errors.New("--account-id is required (or set EKS_ACCOUNT_ID)")
 	case cfg.ClusterName == "":
 		return errors.New("--cluster is required (or set EKS_CLUSTER_NAME)")
-	case cfg.Resource != "addons" && cfg.Resource != "recovery":
-		return errors.New("--resource must be addons or recovery")
+	case cfg.Resource != "addons" && cfg.Resource != "recovery" && cfg.Resource != "workers":
+		return errors.New("--resource must be addons, recovery or workers")
 	case cfg.Resource == "recovery" && cfg.InstanceID == "":
 		return errors.New("--instance-id is required for --resource recovery (or set EKS_INSTANCE_ID)")
 	}
@@ -80,6 +83,9 @@ func Run(ctx context.Context, cfg Config) error {
 	case "recovery":
 		path = "/clusters/" + cfg.ClusterName + "/internal-recovery/" + cfg.AccountID + "/" + cfg.InstanceID
 		emit = emitRecoveryTSV
+	case "workers":
+		path = "/clusters/" + cfg.ClusterName + "/internal-workers/" + cfg.AccountID
+		emit = emitWorkers
 	default:
 		path = "/clusters/" + cfg.ClusterName + "/internal-addons/" + cfg.AccountID
 		emit = emitAddonsTSV
@@ -163,3 +169,24 @@ func emitRecoveryTSV(out io.Writer, body []byte) error {
 	}
 	return nil
 }
+
+type internalWorkersResponse struct {
+	InstanceIDs []string `json:"instanceIds"`
+}
+
+// emitWorkers writes one managed-worker instance ID per line. An empty set
+// writes nothing, which the node-gc agent tells apart from a failed fetch by
+// this command's exit status, never by the output being empty.
+func emitWorkers(out io.Writer, body []byte) error {
+	var resp internalWorkersResponse
+	if err := json.Unmarshal(body, &resp); err != nil {
+		return fmt.Errorf("unmarshal internal-workers response: %w", err)
+	}
+	w := bufio.NewWriter(out)
+	for _, id := range resp.InstanceIDs {
+		if _, err := fmt.Fprintln(w, id); err != nil {
+			return err
+		}
+	}
+	return w.Flush()
+}
@@ -49,7 +49,7 @@ func TestRun_RejectsBeforeContactingGateway(t *testing.T) {
 	}{
 		{"account", func(c *Config) { c.AccountID = "" }, "--account-id is required (or set EKS_ACCOUNT_ID)"},
 		{"cluster", func(c *Config) { c.ClusterName = "" }, "--cluster is required (or set EKS_CLUSTER_NAME)"},
-		{"resource", func(c *Config) { c.Resource = "secrets" }, "--resource must be addons or recovery"},
+		{"resource", func(c *Config) { c.Resource = "secrets" }, "--resource must be addons, recovery or workers"},
 		{"recovery instance", func(c *Config) { c.Resource = "recovery" }, "--instance-id is required for --resource recovery (or set EKS_INSTANCE_ID)"},
 		{"gateway client", func(c *Config) { c.GatewayURL = "" }, "build gateway client: eksgw: baseURL is required"},
 	}
@@ -92,6 +92,26 @@ func TestRun_RendersRecoveryDirective(t *testing.T) {
 	}
 }

+// The gateway's restjson marshaler names the field InstanceIDs; both that and
+// the json-tag spelling decode, so the agent reads either.
+func TestRun_RendersManagedWorkers(t *testing.T) {
+	for _, body := range []string{
+		`{"InstanceIDs":["i-0aaa","i-0bbb"]}`,
+		`{"instanceIds":["i-0aaa","i-0bbb"]}`,
+	} {
+		var hits atomic.Int32
+		cfg, out := gateway(t, "/clusters/demo/internal-workers/123456789012", http.StatusOK, body, &hits)
+		cfg.Resource = "workers"
+
+		if err := Run(context.Background(), cfg); err != nil {
+			t.Fatalf("Run: %v", err)
+		}
+		if got, want := out.String(), "i-0aaa\ni-0bbb\n"; got != want {
+			t.Fatalf("stdout = %q, want %q", got, want)
+		}
+	}
+}
+
 func TestRun_RenderFailureIsNotRetried(t *testing.T) {
 	var hits atomic.Int32
 	cfg, _ := gateway(t, "/clusters/demo/internal-addons/123456789012", http.StatusOK, `{not-json`, &hits)
@@ -76,7 +76,7 @@ func ensureCert(dir, caCertPath, caKeyPath, cn string, dns []string, ips []net.I
 		return certPath, keyPath, nil
 	}

-	caCert, caKey, err := loadCA(caCertPath, caKeyPath)
+	caCert, caKey, err := LoadCA(caCertPath, caKeyPath)
 	if err != nil {
 		return "", "", err
 	}
@@ -135,8 +135,8 @@ func certCoversSANs(certPath, keyPath string, dns []string, ips []net.IP) bool {
 	return true
 }

-// loadCA parses the PEM CA cert + EC/PKCS8 private key used to sign the leaf.
-func loadCA(certPath, keyPath string) (*x509.Certificate, *ecdsa.PrivateKey, error) {
+// LoadCA parses the PEM CA cert + EC/PKCS8 private key used to sign the leaf.
+func LoadCA(certPath, keyPath string) (*x509.Certificate, *ecdsa.PrivateKey, error) {
 	certPEM, err := os.ReadFile(certPath)
 	if err != nil {
 		return nil, nil, fmt.Errorf("read ca cert %s: %w", certPath, err)
@@ -0,0 +1,196 @@
+package podidentity
+
+import (
+	"crypto/ecdsa"
+	"crypto/elliptic"
+	"crypto/rand"
+	"crypto/tls"
+	"crypto/x509"
+	"crypto/x509/pkix"
+	"encoding/pem"
+	"fmt"
+	"math/big"
+	"net"
+	"os"
+	"path/filepath"
+	"time"
+
+	"github.com/mulgadc/spinifex/spinifex/agents/eks/konnectivitycert"
+)
+
+const (
+	// ClientCN is the identity the webhook presents to the API server; the
+	// ClusterRoleBinding names this user.
+	ClientCN = "spinifex:eks-pod-identity-webhook"
+
+	servingCertFile = "serving.crt"
+	servingKeyFile  = "serving.key"
+	clientCertFile  = "client.crt"
+	clientKeyFile   = "client.key"
+	certRenewWindow = 30 * 24 * time.Hour
+	certValidity    = 365 * 24 * time.Hour
+)
+
+// CertConfig names the k3s CAs that sign the webhook's two certificates and
+// the directory they are cached in.
+type CertConfig struct {
+	Dir          string
+	ServerCACert string
+	ServerCAKey  string
+	ClientCACert string
+	ClientCAKey  string
+}
+
+// Certs are the paths of the cached certificate and key pairs.
+type Certs struct {
+	ServingCert, ServingKey string
+	ClientCert, ClientKey   string
+}
+
+// EnsureCerts mints, or reuses while still valid and signed by the current CA,
+// a serving certificate for 127.0.0.1 signed by the k3s server CA and a client
+// certificate signed by the k3s client CA. Keys are written 0600.
+func EnsureCerts(c CertConfig) (Certs, error) {
+	out := Certs{
+		ServingCert: filepath.Join(c.Dir, servingCertFile), ServingKey: filepath.Join(c.Dir, servingKeyFile),
+		ClientCert: filepath.Join(c.Dir, clientCertFile), ClientKey: filepath.Join(c.Dir, clientKeyFile),
+	}
+	if err := os.MkdirAll(c.Dir, 0o700); err != nil {
+		return Certs{}, fmt.Errorf("mkdir %s: %w", c.Dir, err)
+	}
+	serving := leafSpec{cn: "pod-identity-webhook", usage: x509.ExtKeyUsageServerAuth, ips: []net.IP{net.IPv4(127, 0, 0, 1)}}
+	if err := ensureLeaf(out.ServingCert, out.ServingKey, c.ServerCACert, c.ServerCAKey, serving); err != nil {
+		return Certs{}, fmt.Errorf("serving certificate: %w", err)
+	}
+	client := leafSpec{cn: ClientCN, usage: x509.ExtKeyUsageClientAuth}
+	if err := ensureLeaf(out.ClientCert, out.ClientKey, c.ClientCACert, c.ClientCAKey, client); err != nil {
+		return Certs{}, fmt.Errorf("client certificate: %w", err)
+	}
+	return out, nil
+}
+
+type leafSpec struct {
+	cn    string
+	usage x509.ExtKeyUsage
+	ips   []net.IP
+}
+
+func ensureLeaf(certPath, keyPath, caCertPath, caKeyPath string, spec leafSpec) error {
+	ca, caKey, err := konnectivitycert.LoadCA(caCertPath, caKeyPath)
+	if err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+	if leafCurrent(certPath, keyPath, ca, spec) {
+		return nil
+	}
+	priv, err := ecdsa.GenerateKey(elliptic.P256(), rand.Reader)
+	if err != nil {
+		return fmt.Errorf("generate key: %w", err)
+	}
+	serial, err := rand.Int(rand.Reader, new(big.Int).Lsh(big.NewInt(1), 128))
+	if err != nil {
+		return fmt.Errorf("serial: %w", err)
+	}
+	now := time.Now().UTC()
+	tmpl := x509.Certificate{
+		SerialNumber:          serial,
+		Subject:               pkix.Name{CommonName: spec.cn},
+		NotBefore:             now.Add(-time.Hour),
+		NotAfter:              now.Add(certValidity),
+		KeyUsage:              x509.KeyUsageDigitalSignature,
+		ExtKeyUsage:           []x509.ExtKeyUsage{spec.usage},
+		BasicConstraintsValid: true,
+		IPAddresses:           spec.ips,
+	}
+	der, err := x509.CreateCertificate(rand.Reader, &tmpl, ca, &priv.PublicKey, caKey)
+	if err != nil {
+		return fmt.Errorf("create certificate: %w", err)
+	}
+	keyDER, err := x509.MarshalECPrivateKey(priv)
+	if err != nil {
+		return fmt.Errorf("marshal key: %w", err)
+	}
+	// Key first: a cert without its key is never published.
+	if err := writeAtomic(keyPath, pem.EncodeToMemory(&pem.Block{Type: "EC PRIVATE KEY", Bytes: keyDER}), 0o600); err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+	return writeAtomic(certPath, pem.EncodeToMemory(&pem.Block{Type: "CERTIFICATE", Bytes: der}), 0o644)
+}
+
+// leafCurrent reports whether the cached pair loads, matches, was signed by ca,
+// has the wanted usage and SANs, and is not near expiry.
+func leafCurrent(certPath, keyPath string, ca *x509.Certificate, spec leafSpec) bool {
+	pair, err := tls.LoadX509KeyPair(certPath, keyPath)
+	if err != nil || len(pair.Certificate) == 0 {
+		return false
+	}
+	crt, err := x509.ParseCertificate(pair.Certificate[0])
+	if err != nil || crt.CheckSignatureFrom(ca) != nil {
+		return false
+	}
+	if inRenewWindow(crt, time.Now()) || crt.Subject.CommonName != spec.cn {
+		return false
+	}
+	if len(crt.ExtKeyUsage) != 1 || crt.ExtKeyUsage[0] != spec.usage {
+		return false
+	}
+	for _, ip := range spec.ips {
+		found := false
+		for _, have := range crt.IPAddresses {
+			found = found || have.Equal(ip)
+		}
+		if !found {
+			return false
+		}
+	}
+	return true
+}
+
+func writeAtomic(path string, data []byte, mode os.FileMode) error {
+	tmp, err := os.CreateTemp(filepath.Dir(path), ".tmp-*")
+	if err != nil {
+		return fmt.Errorf("create temp for %s: %w", path, err)
+	}
+	defer func() { _ = os.Remove(tmp.Name()) }()
+	if err := tmp.Chmod(mode); err != nil {
+		_ = tmp.Close()
+		return fmt.Errorf("chmod %s: %w", path, err)
+	}
+	if _, err := tmp.Write(data); err != nil {
+		_ = tmp.Close()
+		return fmt.Errorf("write %s: %w", path, err)
+	}
+	if err := tmp.Close(); err != nil {
+		return fmt.Errorf("close %s: %w", path, err)
+	}
+	if err := os.Rename(tmp.Name(), path); err != nil {
+		return fmt.Errorf("rename %s: %w", path, err)
+	}
+	return nil
+}
+
+// inRenewWindow reports whether crt expires within the renew window at now.
+func inRenewWindow(crt *x509.Certificate, now time.Time) bool {
+	return crt.NotAfter.Sub(now) < certRenewWindow
+}
+
+// NeedsRenewal reports whether either cached certificate is inside its renew
+// window at now. A running process exits when this is true so the supervisor
+// restarts it and EnsureCerts reissues; an unreadable certificate also counts.
+func NeedsRenewal(c Certs, now time.Time) bool {
+	for _, path := range []string{c.ServingCert, c.ClientCert} {
+		b, err := os.ReadFile(path)
+		if err != nil {
+			return true
+		}
+		blk, _ := pem.Decode(b)
+		if blk == nil {
+			return true
+		}
+		crt, err := x509.ParseCertificate(blk.Bytes)
+		if err != nil || inRenewWindow(crt, now) {
+			return true
+		}
+	}
+	return false
+}
@@ -0,0 +1,263 @@
+package podidentity
+
+import (
+	"bytes"
+	"context"
+	"crypto/tls"
+	"crypto/x509"
+	"encoding/json"
+	"errors"
+	"fmt"
+	"io"
+	"net/http"
+	"net/url"
+	"os"
+	"strings"
+	"time"
+)
+
+const (
+	kubeCallTimeout = 15 * time.Second
+	watchRetryDelay = 2 * time.Second
+	maxKubeBody     = 4 << 20
+)
+
+// KubeClient reaches the Kubernetes API with plain REST. It implements
+// ServiceAccountGetter, ConfigMapStore and NamespaceSource using only the
+// calls the webhook's ClusterRole grants.
+type KubeClient struct {
+	base string
+	http *http.Client
+}
+
+var (
+	_ ServiceAccountGetter = (*KubeClient)(nil)
+	_ ConfigMapStore       = (*KubeClient)(nil)
+	_ NamespaceSource      = (*KubeClient)(nil)
+)
+
+// NewKubeClient returns a client for apiServer that trusts caFile and presents
+// the client certificate in certFile and keyFile. The pair is re-read on every
+// handshake, so a re-issued certificate is used without a restart.
+func NewKubeClient(apiServer, caFile, certFile, keyFile string) (*KubeClient, error) {
+	ca, err := os.ReadFile(caFile)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("read api server ca: %w", err)
+	}
+	pool := x509.NewCertPool()
+	if !pool.AppendCertsFromPEM(ca) {
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("api server ca %s holds no certificate", caFile)
+	}
+	if _, err := tls.LoadX509KeyPair(certFile, keyFile); err != nil {
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("load client certificate: %w", err)
+	}
+	tr := &http.Transport{TLSClientConfig: &tls.Config{
+		RootCAs:    pool,
+		MinVersion: tls.VersionTLS12,
+		GetClientCertificate: func(*tls.CertificateRequestInfo) (*tls.Certificate, error) {
+			c, err := tls.LoadX509KeyPair(certFile, keyFile)
+			return &c, err
+		},
+	}}
+	return &KubeClient{base: strings.TrimSuffix(apiServer, "/"), http: &http.Client{Transport: tr}}, nil
+}
+
+type kubeObject struct {
+	APIVersion string `json:"apiVersion,omitempty"`
+	Kind       string `json:"kind,omitempty"`
+	Metadata   struct {
+		Name            string            `json:"name,omitempty"`
+		Namespace       string            `json:"namespace,omitempty"`
+		ResourceVersion string            `json:"resourceVersion,omitempty"`
+		Annotations     map[string]string `json:"annotations,omitempty"`
+	} `json:"metadata"`
+	Data map[string]string `json:"data,omitempty"`
+}
+
+// do sends one request and returns the status. A non-2xx status is returned
+// without an error so callers can map the codes they expect.
+func (k *KubeClient) do(ctx context.Context, method, path string, body, out any) (int, error) {
+	ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(ctx, kubeCallTimeout)
+	defer cancel()
+	var rd io.Reader
+	if body != nil {
+		b, err := json.Marshal(body)
+		if err != nil {
+			return 0, err
+		}
+		rd = bytes.NewReader(b)
+	}
+	req, err := http.NewRequestWithContext(ctx, method, k.base+path, rd)
+	if err != nil {
+		return 0, err
+	}
+	req.Header.Set("Accept", "application/json")
+	if body != nil {
+		req.Header.Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
+	}
+	resp, err := k.http.Do(req)
+	if err != nil {
+		return 0, err
+	}
+	defer func() { _ = resp.Body.Close() }()
+	raw, err := io.ReadAll(io.LimitReader(resp.Body, maxKubeBody))
+	if err != nil {
+		return resp.StatusCode, err
+	}
+	if resp.StatusCode/100 == 2 && out != nil {
+		if err := json.Unmarshal(raw, out); err != nil {
+			return resp.StatusCode, fmt.Errorf("decode %s %s: %w", method, path, err)
+		}
+	}
+	return resp.StatusCode, nil
+}
+
+func statusErr(method, path string, code int) error {
+	return fmt.Errorf("%s %s: unexpected status %d", method, path, code)
+}
+
+// GetServiceAccount implements ServiceAccountGetter.
+func (k *KubeClient) GetServiceAccount(ctx context.Context, namespace, name string) (*ServiceAccount, error) {
+	path := "/api/v1/namespaces/" + url.PathEscape(namespace) + "/serviceaccounts/" + url.PathEscape(name)
+	var o kubeObject
+	switch code, err := k.do(ctx, http.MethodGet, path, nil, &o); {
+	case err != nil:
+		return nil, err
+	case code == http.StatusNotFound:
+		return nil, ErrServiceAccountNotFound
+	case code != http.StatusOK:
+		return nil, statusErr(http.MethodGet, path, code)
+	}
+	return &ServiceAccount{Annotations: o.Metadata.Annotations}, nil
+}
+
+func cmPath(namespace, name string) string {
+	p := "/api/v1/namespaces/" + url.PathEscape(namespace) + "/configmaps"
+	if name != "" {
+		p += "/" + url.PathEscape(name)
+	}
+	return p
+}
+
+func cmBody(cm ConfigMap) kubeObject {
+	o := kubeObject{APIVersion: "v1", Kind: "ConfigMap", Data: cm.Data}
+	o.Metadata.Name, o.Metadata.Namespace, o.Metadata.ResourceVersion = cm.Name, cm.Namespace, cm.ResourceVersion
+	return o
+}
+
+// Get implements ConfigMapStore.
+func (k *KubeClient) Get(ctx context.Context, namespace, name string) (*ConfigMap, error) {
+	path := cmPath(namespace, name)
+	var o kubeObject
+	switch code, err := k.do(ctx, http.MethodGet, path, nil, &o); {
+	case err != nil:
+		return nil, err
+	case code == http.StatusNotFound:
+		return nil, ErrNotFound
+	case code != http.StatusOK:
+		return nil, statusErr(http.MethodGet, path, code)
+	}
+	return &ConfigMap{Namespace: namespace, Name: name, Data: o.Data, ResourceVersion: o.Metadata.ResourceVersion}, nil
+}
+
+// Create implements ConfigMapStore.
+func (k *KubeClient) Create(ctx context.Context, cm ConfigMap) error {
+	path := cmPath(cm.Namespace, "")
+	switch code, err := k.do(ctx, http.MethodPost, path, cmBody(cm), nil); {
+	case err != nil:
+		return err
+	case code == http.StatusConflict:
+		return ErrAlreadyExists
+	case code/100 != 2:
+		return statusErr(http.MethodPost, path, code)
+	}
+	return nil
+}
+
+// Update implements ConfigMapStore.
+func (k *KubeClient) Update(ctx context.Context, cm ConfigMap) error {
+	path := cmPath(cm.Namespace, cm.Name)
+	switch code, err := k.do(ctx, http.MethodPut, path, cmBody(cm), nil); {
+	case err != nil:
+		return err
+	case code == http.StatusConflict:
+		return ErrConflict
+	case code == http.StatusNotFound:
+		return ErrNotFound
+	case code/100 != 2:
+		return statusErr(http.MethodPut, path, code)
+	}
+	return nil
+}
+
+// List implements NamespaceSource.
+func (k *KubeClient) List(ctx context.Context) ([]string, error) {
+	const path = "/api/v1/namespaces"
+	var l struct {
+		Items []kubeObject `json:"items"`
+	}
+	if code, err := k.do(ctx, http.MethodGet, path, nil, &l); err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	} else if code != http.StatusOK {
+		return nil, statusErr(http.MethodGet, path, code)
+	}
+	names := make([]string, 0, len(l.Items))
+	for _, it := range l.Items {
+		names = append(names, it.Metadata.Name)
+	}
+	return names, nil
+}
+
+// Watch implements NamespaceSource. The stream replays existing namespaces as
+// ADDED first, which is harmless, and is re-opened when the server ends it.
+// The channel closes only when ctx ends.
+func (k *KubeClient) Watch(ctx context.Context) (<-chan string, error) {
+	out := make(chan string, 16)
+	go func() {
+		defer close(out)
+		for ctx.Err() == nil {
+			k.watchOnce(ctx, out)
+			select {
+			case <-ctx.Done():
+			case <-time.After(watchRetryDelay):
+			}
+		}
+	}()
+	return out, nil
+}
+
+func (k *KubeClient) watchOnce(ctx context.Context, out chan<- string) {
+	req, err := http.NewRequestWithContext(ctx, http.MethodGet, k.base+"/api/v1/namespaces?watch=true&timeoutSeconds=300", nil)
+	if err != nil {
+		return
+	}
+	resp, err := k.http.Do(req)
+	if err != nil {
+		return
+	}
+	defer func() { _ = resp.Body.Close() }()
+	if resp.StatusCode != http.StatusOK {
+		return
+	}
+	dec := json.NewDecoder(resp.Body)
+	for {
+		var ev struct {
+			Type   string     `json:"type"`
+			Object kubeObject `json:"object"`
+		}
+		if err := dec.Decode(&ev); err != nil {
+			if !errors.Is(err, io.EOF) && ctx.Err() == nil {
+				return
+			}
+			return
+		}
+		if ev.Type != "ADDED" || ev.Object.Metadata.Name == "" {
+			continue
+		}
+		select {
+		case out <- ev.Object.Metadata.Name:
+		case <-ctx.Done():
+			return
+		}
+	}
+}
@@ -0,0 +1,191 @@
+package podidentity
+
+import (
+	"context"
+	"crypto/tls"
+	"encoding/json"
+	"encoding/pem"
+	"net/http"
+	"net/http/httptest"
+	"os"
+	"path/filepath"
+	"testing"
+	"time"
+
+	"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
+	"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
+)
+
+// fakeAPI is a TLS API server that requires the webhook's client certificate.
+type fakeAPI struct {
+	srv     *httptest.Server
+	handler http.HandlerFunc
+	seenCN  string
+}
+
+func newFakeAPI(t *testing.T) (*fakeAPI, *KubeClient) {
+	t.Helper()
+	f := &fakeAPI{}
+	f.srv = httptest.NewUnstartedServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
+		f.seenCN = r.TLS.PeerCertificates[0].Subject.CommonName
+		f.handler(w, r)
+	}))
+	f.srv.TLS = &tls.Config{ClientAuth: tls.RequireAnyClientCert, MinVersion: tls.VersionTLS12}
+	f.srv.StartTLS()
+	t.Cleanup(f.srv.Close)
+
+	cfg, _ := certTestConfig(t)
+	certs, err := EnsureCerts(cfg)
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+	ca := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "ca.crt")
+	require.NoError(t, os.WriteFile(ca, pem.EncodeToMemory(&pem.Block{Type: "CERTIFICATE", Bytes: f.srv.Certificate().Raw}), 0o644))
+	k, err := NewKubeClient(f.srv.URL+"/", ca, certs.ClientCert, certs.ClientKey)
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+	return f, k
+}
+
+func reply(w http.ResponseWriter, code int, body any) {
+	w.WriteHeader(code)
+	if body != nil {
+		_ = json.NewEncoder(w).Encode(body)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestKubeClient_PresentsTheClientCertificate(t *testing.T) {
+	f, k := newFakeAPI(t)
+	f.handler = func(w http.ResponseWriter, _ *http.Request) {
+		reply(w, 200, map[string]any{"metadata": map[string]any{}})
+	}
+	_, err := k.GetServiceAccount(context.Background(), "app", "sa")
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+	assert.Equal(t, ClientCN, f.seenCN)
+}
+
+func TestKubeClient_GetServiceAccount(t *testing.T) {
+	f, k := newFakeAPI(t)
+	f.handler = func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
+		switch r.URL.Path {
+		case "/api/v1/namespaces/app/serviceaccounts/sa":
+			reply(w, 200, map[string]any{"metadata": map[string]any{"annotations": map[string]string{"a": "b"}}})
+		case "/api/v1/namespaces/app/serviceaccounts/gone":
+			reply(w, 404, nil)
+		default:
+			reply(w, 500, nil)
+		}
+	}
+	sa, err := k.GetServiceAccount(context.Background(), "app", "sa")
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+	assert.Equal(t, map[string]string{"a": "b"}, sa.Annotations)
+
+	_, err = k.GetServiceAccount(context.Background(), "app", "gone")
+	assert.ErrorIs(t, err, ErrServiceAccountNotFound)
+	_, err = k.GetServiceAccount(context.Background(), "app", "boom")
+	assert.Error(t, err)
+	assert.NotErrorIs(t, err, ErrServiceAccountNotFound)
+}
+
+func TestKubeClient_ConfigMapCalls(t *testing.T) {
+	f, k := newFakeAPI(t)
+	var gotBody kubeObject
+	f.handler = func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
+		switch {
+		case r.Method == http.MethodGet && r.URL.Path == "/api/v1/namespaces/app/configmaps/ca":
+			reply(w, 200, map[string]any{"metadata": map[string]any{"resourceVersion": "7"}, "data": map[string]string{"k": "v"}})
+		case r.Method == http.MethodGet:
+			reply(w, 404, nil)
+		case r.Method == http.MethodPost && r.URL.Path == "/api/v1/namespaces/dup/configmaps":
+			reply(w, 409, nil)
+		case r.Method == http.MethodPost:
+			_ = json.NewDecoder(r.Body).Decode(&gotBody)
+			reply(w, 201, nil)
+		case r.Method == http.MethodPut && r.URL.Path == "/api/v1/namespaces/stale/configmaps/ca":
+			reply(w, 409, nil)
+		case r.Method == http.MethodPut && r.URL.Path == "/api/v1/namespaces/gone/configmaps/ca":
+			reply(w, 404, nil)
+		case r.Method == http.MethodPut && r.URL.Path == "/api/v1/namespaces/bad/configmaps/ca":
+			reply(w, 500, nil)
+		default:
+			reply(w, 200, nil)
+		}
+	}
+	ctx := context.Background()
+
+	cm, err := k.Get(ctx, "app", "ca")
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+	assert.Equal(t, "7", cm.ResourceVersion)
+	assert.Equal(t, "v", cm.Data["k"])
+	_, err = k.Get(ctx, "app", "missing")
+	assert.ErrorIs(t, err, ErrNotFound)
+
+	require.NoError(t, k.Create(ctx, ConfigMap{Namespace: "app", Name: "ca", Data: map[string]string{"x": "y"}}))
+	assert.Equal(t, "ca", gotBody.Metadata.Name)
+	assert.Equal(t, "y", gotBody.Data["x"])
+	assert.ErrorIs(t, k.Create(ctx, ConfigMap{Namespace: "dup", Name: "ca"}), ErrAlreadyExists)
+
+	require.NoError(t, k.Update(ctx, ConfigMap{Namespace: "app", Name: "ca"}))
+	assert.ErrorIs(t, k.Update(ctx, ConfigMap{Namespace: "stale", Name: "ca"}), ErrConflict)
+	assert.ErrorIs(t, k.Update(ctx, ConfigMap{Namespace: "gone", Name: "ca"}), ErrNotFound)
+	err = k.Update(ctx, ConfigMap{Namespace: "bad", Name: "ca"})
+	assert.Error(t, err)
+	assert.NotErrorIs(t, err, ErrConflict)
+}
+
+func TestKubeClient_ListNamespaces(t *testing.T) {
+	f, k := newFakeAPI(t)
+	ok := true
+	f.handler = func(w http.ResponseWriter, _ *http.Request) {
+		if !ok {
+			reply(w, 500, nil)
+			return
+		}
+		reply(w, 200, map[string]any{"items": []map[string]any{{"metadata": map[string]string{"name": "a"}}, {"metadata": map[string]string{"name": "b"}}}})
+	}
+	names, err := k.List(context.Background())
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+	assert.Equal(t, []string{"a", "b"}, names)
+	ok = false
+	_, err = k.List(context.Background())
+	assert.Error(t, err)
+}
+
+func TestKubeClient_WatchEmitsAddedNamespacesOnly(t *testing.T) {
+	f, k := newFakeAPI(t)
+	f.handler = func(w http.ResponseWriter, _ *http.Request) {
+		enc := json.NewEncoder(w)
+		for _, ev := range []struct{ t, n string }{{"ADDED", "one"}, {"MODIFIED", "two"}, {"DELETED", "three"}, {"ADDED", "four"}} {
+			_ = enc.Encode(map[string]any{"type": ev.t, "object": map[string]any{"metadata": map[string]string{"name": ev.n}}})
+		}
+	}
+	ctx, cancel := context.WithCancel(context.Background())
+	defer cancel()
+	ch, err := k.Watch(ctx)
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+
+	got := []string{<-ch, <-ch}
+	assert.Equal(t, []string{"one", "four"}, got)
+	cancel()
+	require.Eventually(t, func() bool {
+		select {
+		case _, open := <-ch:
+			return !open
+		default:
+			return false
+		}
+	}, 5*time.Second, 10*time.Millisecond, "the channel closes when the context ends")
+}
+
+func TestNewKubeClient_RejectsBadInputs(t *testing.T) {
+	cfg, _ := certTestConfig(t)
+	certs, err := EnsureCerts(cfg)
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+	dir := t.TempDir()
+	empty := filepath.Join(dir, "empty.crt")
+	require.NoError(t, os.WriteFile(empty, []byte("not pem"), 0o644))
+
+	_, err = NewKubeClient("https://x", filepath.Join(dir, "absent.crt"), certs.ClientCert, certs.ClientKey)
+	assert.Error(t, err)
+	_, err = NewKubeClient("https://x", empty, certs.ClientCert, certs.ClientKey)
+	assert.Error(t, err)
+	_, err = NewKubeClient("https://x", cfg.ServerCACert, filepath.Join(dir, "no.crt"), certs.ClientKey)
+	assert.Error(t, err)
+}
@@ -0,0 +1,52 @@
+package podidentity
+
+import (
+	"bytes"
+	"encoding/json"
+)
+
+// ClusterRoleName names the ClusterRole and ClusterRoleBinding the webhook runs as.
+const ClusterRoleName = "spinifex:eks-pod-identity-webhook"
+
+// RenderManifests returns the cluster objects the webhook needs, as JSON
+// documents separated by "---" (valid YAML for the k3s manifest deployer): its
+// least-privilege ClusterRole, the binding to its client-certificate user, and
+// the MutatingWebhookConfiguration. The output is deterministic so every server
+// writes the same bytes.
+func RenderManifests(webhook WebhookConfig) ([]byte, error) {
+	cfg, err := RenderWebhookConfiguration(webhook)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+	role := map[string]any{
+		"apiVersion": "rbac.authorization.k8s.io/v1",
+		"kind":       "ClusterRole",
+		"metadata":   map[string]any{"name": ClusterRoleName},
+		"rules": []map[string]any{
+			{"apiGroups": []string{""}, "resources": []string{"serviceaccounts"}, "verbs": []string{"get"}},
+			{"apiGroups": []string{""}, "resources": []string{"namespaces"}, "verbs": []string{"list", "watch"}},
+			{"apiGroups": []string{""}, "resources": []string{"configmaps"}, "verbs": []string{"create"}},
+			{"apiGroups": []string{""}, "resources": []string{"configmaps"}, "resourceNames": []string{CAConfigMapName}, "verbs": []string{"get", "update"}},
+		},
+	}
+	binding := map[string]any{
+		"apiVersion": "rbac.authorization.k8s.io/v1",
+		"kind":       "ClusterRoleBinding",
+		"metadata":   map[string]any{"name": ClusterRoleName},
+		"roleRef":    map[string]any{"apiGroup": "rbac.authorization.k8s.io", "kind": "ClusterRole", "name": ClusterRoleName},
+		"subjects":   []map[string]any{{"apiGroup": "rbac.authorization.k8s.io", "kind": "User", "name": ClientCN}},
+	}
+	var out bytes.Buffer
+	for i, doc := range []any{role, binding, json.RawMessage(cfg)} {
+		b, err := json.MarshalIndent(doc, "", "  ")
+		if err != nil {
+			return nil, err
+		}
+		if i > 0 {
+			out.WriteString("---\n")
+		}
+		out.Write(b)
+		out.WriteByte('\n')
+	}
+	return out.Bytes(), nil
+}
@@ -0,0 +1,307 @@
+package podidentity
+
+import (
+	"cmp"
+	"context"
+	"encoding/base64"
+	"encoding/json"
+	"errors"
+	"fmt"
+	"io"
+	"log/slog"
+	"math/rand/v2"
+	"net/http"
+	"strconv"
+	"strings"
+)
+
+const (
+	envRoleARN    = "AWS_ROLE_ARN"
+	envTokenFile  = "AWS_WEB_IDENTITY_TOKEN_FILE" //nolint:gosec // variable name, not a credential
+	envRegion     = "AWS_REGION"
+	envDefRegion  = "AWS_DEFAULT_REGION"
+	envRegionalS  = "AWS_STS_REGIONAL_ENDPOINTS"
+	envSTSURL     = "AWS_ENDPOINT_URL_STS"
+	envCABundle   = "AWS_CA_BUNDLE"
+	envSSLCert    = "SSL_CERT_FILE"
+	maxReviewSize = 8 << 20
+)
+
+type podObject struct {
+	Metadata struct {
+		Name         string            `json:"name"`
+		GenerateName string            `json:"generateName"`
+		Namespace    string            `json:"namespace"`
+		Annotations  map[string]string `json:"annotations"`
+	} `json:"metadata"`
+	Spec struct {
+		ServiceAccountName string            `json:"serviceAccountName"`
+		ServiceAccount     string            `json:"serviceAccount"`
+		Containers         []containerObject `json:"containers"`
+		InitContainers     []containerObject `json:"initContainers"`
+		Volumes            []nameOnly        `json:"volumes"`
+	} `json:"spec"`
+}
+
+type nameOnly struct {
+	Name string `json:"name"`
+}
+
+type containerObject struct {
+	Name         string     `json:"name"`
+	Env          []nameOnly `json:"env"`
+	VolumeMounts []nameOnly `json:"volumeMounts"`
+}
+
+type envVar struct {
+	Name  string `json:"name"`
+	Value string `json:"value"`
+}
+
+type volumeMount struct {
+	Name      string `json:"name"`
+	MountPath string `json:"mountPath"`
+	ReadOnly  bool   `json:"readOnly"`
+}
+
+// injection is what one pod gets, computed from its ServiceAccount and annotations.
+type injection struct {
+	roleARN  string
+	regional bool
+	skip     map[string]bool
+}
+
+// Mutate returns the patch for one pod creation request. It never denies a pod.
+func (m *Mutator) Mutate(ctx context.Context, req AdmissionRequest) AdmissionResponse {
+	resp := AdmissionResponse{UID: req.UID, Allowed: true}
+	if req.Operation != "CREATE" {
+		return resp
+	}
+	var pod podObject
+	if err := json.Unmarshal(req.Object, &pod); err != nil {
+		m.note(ctx, slog.LevelWarn, req.Namespace, "", ReasonDecode, "error", err)
+		return resp
+	}
+	ns := cmp.Or(req.Namespace, pod.Metadata.Namespace)
+	name := cmp.Or(pod.Metadata.Name, pod.Metadata.GenerateName)
+
+	saName := cmp.Or(pod.Spec.ServiceAccountName, pod.Spec.ServiceAccount, "default")
+	sa, err := m.sas.GetServiceAccount(ctx, ns, saName)
+	if err != nil {
+		if errors.Is(err, ErrServiceAccountNotFound) {
+			m.note(ctx, slog.LevelInfo, ns, name, ReasonServiceAccountMissing, "serviceaccount", saName)
+		} else {
+			m.note(ctx, slog.LevelWarn, ns, name, ReasonServiceAccountLookup, "serviceaccount", saName, "error", err)
+		}
+		return resp
+	}
+	dom := cmp.Or(m.cfg.AnnotationDomain, DefaultAnnotationDomain)
+	roleARN := sa.Annotations[dom+"/role-arn"]
+	if roleARN == "" {
+		return resp
+	}
+
+	in := injection{
+		roleARN:  roleARN,
+		regional: sa.Annotations[dom+"/sts-regional-endpoints"] == "true",
+		skip:     map[string]bool{},
+	}
+	for c := range strings.SplitSeq(pod.Metadata.Annotations[dom+"/skip-containers"], ",") {
+		if c = strings.TrimSpace(c); c != "" {
+			in.skip[c] = true
+		}
+	}
+
+	var ops []PatchOp
+	patched := 0
+	for _, set := range []struct {
+		field string
+		list  []containerObject
+	}{{"containers", pod.Spec.Containers}, {"initContainers", pod.Spec.InitContainers}} {
+		for i, c := range set.list {
+			if in.skip[c.Name] {
+				m.note(ctx, slog.LevelInfo, ns, name, ReasonSkipContainer, "container", c.Name)
+				continue
+			}
+			cops := m.containerOps(fmt.Sprintf("/spec/%s/%d", set.field, i), c, in)
+			if cops == nil {
+				m.note(ctx, slog.LevelInfo, ns, name, ReasonAlreadyConfigured, "container", c.Name)
+				continue
+			}
+			ops = append(ops, cops...)
+			patched++
+		}
+	}
+	if patched == 0 {
+		return resp
+	}
+
+	ops = append(ops, volumeOps(pod, tokenExpiry(sa, pod.Metadata.Annotations, dom), cmp.Or(sa.Annotations[dom+"/audience"], DefaultAudience))...)
+	resp.Patch = ops
+	m.log.InfoContext(ctx, "pod identity injected", "namespace", ns, "pod", name, "serviceaccount", saName, "containers", patched)
+	return resp
+}
+
+// note logs a skip or failure with every attribute inline, not on a derived logger.
+func (m *Mutator) note(ctx context.Context, lvl slog.Level, ns, pod, reason string, kv ...any) {
+	attrs := append([]any{"namespace", ns, "pod", pod, "reason", reason}, kv...)
+	m.log.Log(ctx, lvl, "pod identity skipped", attrs...)
+}
+
+// containerOps patches one container, or returns nil when it already carries
+// the role, region and regional STS settings.
+func (m *Mutator) containerOps(path string, c containerObject, in injection) []PatchOp {
+	has := map[string]bool{}
+	for _, e := range c.Env {
+		has[e.Name] = true
+	}
+	hasRole := has[envRoleARN] || has[envTokenFile]
+	hasRegion := m.cfg.Region == "" || has[envRegion] || has[envDefRegion]
+	hasSTS := has[envRegionalS]
+	if hasRole && hasRegion && hasSTS {
+		return nil
+	}
+
+	var vars []envVar
+	add := func(name, value string) { vars = append(vars, envVar{name, value}) }
+	if !hasRole {
+		add(envRoleARN, in.roleARN)
+		add(envTokenFile, TokenMountPath+"/"+TokenPath)
+	}
+	if !hasSTS && in.regional {
+		add(envRegionalS, "regional")
+	}
+	if !hasRegion {
+		add(envRegion, m.cfg.Region)
+		add(envDefRegion, m.cfg.Region)
+	}
+	caPath := CAMountPath + "/" + CABundleKey
+	for _, x := range []struct{ name, value string }{
+		{envSTSURL, m.cfg.STSEndpoint}, {envCABundle, caPath}, {envSSLCert, caPath},
+	} {
+		if x.value != "" && !has[x.name] {
+			add(x.name, x.value)
+		}
+	}
+
+	mounted := map[string]bool{}
+	for _, v := range c.VolumeMounts {
+		mounted[v.Name] = true
+	}
+	var mounts []volumeMount
+	if !mounted[TokenVolumeName] {
+		mounts = append(mounts, volumeMount{TokenVolumeName, TokenMountPath, true})
+	}
+	if !mounted[CAVolumeName] {
+		mounts = append(mounts, volumeMount{CAVolumeName, CAMountPath, true})
+	}
+
+	ops := appendOps(nil, path+"/env", len(c.Env) > 0, vars)
+	ops = appendOps(ops, path+"/volumeMounts", len(c.VolumeMounts) > 0, mounts)
+	if ops == nil {
+		ops = []PatchOp{}
+	}
+	return ops
+}
+
+// appendOps adds items to an array, creating the array first when it is absent
+// (an add to "/-" on a missing array is not a valid JSON patch).
+func appendOps[T any](ops []PatchOp, path string, exists bool, items []T) []PatchOp {
+	switch {
+	case len(items) == 0:
+		return ops
+	case !exists:
+		return append(ops, PatchOp{Op: "add", Path: path, Value: items})
+	}
+	for _, it := range items {
+		ops = append(ops, PatchOp{Op: "add", Path: path + "/-", Value: it})
+	}
+	return ops
+}
+
+func volumeOps(pod podObject, expiry int64, audience string) []PatchOp {
+	have := map[string]bool{}
+	for _, v := range pod.Spec.Volumes {
+		have[v.Name] = true
+	}
+	var vols []map[string]any
+	if !have[TokenVolumeName] {
+		vols = append(vols, map[string]any{
+			"name": TokenVolumeName,
+			"projected": map[string]any{"sources": []map[string]any{{
+				"serviceAccountToken": map[string]any{"audience": audience, "expirationSeconds": expiry, "path": TokenPath},
+			}}},
+		})
+	}
+	if !have[CAVolumeName] {
+		vols = append(vols, map[string]any{"name": CAVolumeName, "configMap": map[string]any{"name": CAConfigMapName}})
+	}
+	return appendOps(nil, "/spec/volumes", len(pod.Spec.Volumes) > 0, vols)
+}
+
+// tokenExpiry takes the pod annotation over the ServiceAccount's, clamps it to
+// the allowed range and jitters the default so tokens do not all expire together.
+func tokenExpiry(sa *ServiceAccount, podAnn map[string]string, dom string) int64 {
+	key := dom + "/token-expiration"
+	for _, raw := range []string{podAnn[key], sa.Annotations[key]} {
+		if raw == "" {
+			continue
+		}
+		if n, err := strconv.ParseInt(raw, 10, 64); err == nil {
+			return min(max(n, MinTokenExpiration), MaxTokenExpiration)
+		}
+	}
+	return DefaultMinTokenExpiration + rand.Int64N(MaxTokenExpiration-DefaultMinTokenExpiration+1) //nolint:gosec // jitter, not security
+}
+
+type admissionReview struct {
+	APIVersion string             `json:"apiVersion"`
+	Kind       string             `json:"kind"`
+	Request    *AdmissionRequest  `json:"request,omitempty"`
+	Response   *admissionResponse `json:"response,omitempty"`
+}
+
+type admissionResponse struct {
+	UID       string `json:"uid"`
+	Allowed   bool   `json:"allowed"`
+	PatchType string `json:"patchType,omitempty"`
+	Patch     string `json:"patch,omitempty"`
+}
+
+// ServeHTTP serves an AdmissionReview v1 request.
+func (m *Mutator) ServeHTTP(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
+	if r.Method != http.MethodPost {
+		http.Error(w, "POST required", http.StatusMethodNotAllowed)
+		return
+	}
+	body, err := io.ReadAll(http.MaxBytesReader(w, r.Body, maxReviewSize))
+	if err != nil {
+		http.Error(w, "read body", http.StatusBadRequest)
+		return
+	}
+	var in admissionReview
+	if err := json.Unmarshal(body, &in); err != nil || in.Request == nil {
+		http.Error(w, "not an AdmissionReview", http.StatusBadRequest)
+		return
+	}
+
+	res := m.Mutate(r.Context(), *in.Request)
+	out := admissionReview{
+		APIVersion: "admission.k8s.io/v1",
+		Kind:       "AdmissionReview",
+		Response:   &admissionResponse{UID: res.UID, Allowed: res.Allowed},
+	}
+	if len(res.Patch) > 0 {
+		patch, err := json.Marshal(res.Patch)
+		if err != nil {
+			http.Error(w, "encode patch", http.StatusInternalServerError)
+			return
+		}
+		out.Response.PatchType = "JSONPatch"
+		out.Response.Patch = base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString(patch)
+	}
+	w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
+	if err := json.NewEncoder(w).Encode(out); err != nil {
+		m.log.Warn("pod identity response write failed", "error", err)
+	}
+}
@@ -0,0 +1,630 @@
+package podidentity
+
+import (
+	"bytes"
+	"context"
+	"encoding/base64"
+	"encoding/json"
+	"errors"
+	"fmt"
+	"log/slog"
+	"maps"
+	"net/http"
+	"net/http/httptest"
+	"strconv"
+	"strings"
+	"sync"
+	"testing"
+
+	"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
+	"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
+)
+
+const (
+	testRoleARN  = "arn:aws:iam::000000000001:role/app"
+	testRegion   = "ap-southeast-2"
+	testSTS      = "https://sts.cluster.example:9999"
+	annRole      = "eks.amazonaws.com/role-arn"
+	annAudience  = "eks.amazonaws.com/audience"
+	annExpiry    = "eks.amazonaws.com/token-expiration"
+	annRegionalS = "eks.amazonaws.com/sts-regional-endpoints"
+	annSkip      = "eks.amazonaws.com/skip-containers"
+)
+
+type fakeSAs struct {
+	sas map[string]*ServiceAccount
+	err error
+}
+
+func (f *fakeSAs) GetServiceAccount(_ context.Context, ns, name string) (*ServiceAccount, error) {
+	if f.err != nil {
+		return nil, f.err
+	}
+	if sa, ok := f.sas[ns+"/"+name]; ok {
+		return sa, nil
+	}
+	return nil, ErrServiceAccountNotFound
+}
+
+// logRecords captures slog records for assertions.
+type logRecords struct {
+	mu   sync.Mutex
+	recs []map[string]string
+}
+
+func (l *logRecords) Enabled(context.Context, slog.Level) bool { return true }
+func (l *logRecords) WithAttrs([]slog.Attr) slog.Handler       { return l }
+func (l *logRecords) WithGroup(string) slog.Handler            { return l }
+func (l *logRecords) Handle(_ context.Context, r slog.Record) error {
+	m := map[string]string{"msg": r.Message, "level": r.Level.String()}
+	r.Attrs(func(a slog.Attr) bool {
+		m[a.Key] = fmt.Sprint(a.Value.Any())
+		return true
+	})
+	l.mu.Lock()
+	l.recs = append(l.recs, m)
+	l.mu.Unlock()
+	return nil
+}
+
+// withReason returns the records at warn level or above that carry reason.
+func (l *logRecords) withReason(reason string) []map[string]string {
+	l.mu.Lock()
+	defer l.mu.Unlock()
+	var out []map[string]string
+	for _, r := range l.recs {
+		if r["reason"] == reason {
+			out = append(out, r)
+		}
+	}
+	return out
+}
+
+func newMutator(sas ...*ServiceAccount) (*Mutator, *logRecords, *fakeSAs) {
+	f := &fakeSAs{sas: map[string]*ServiceAccount{}}
+	for i, sa := range sas {
+		f.sas[fmt.Sprintf("app/sa%d", i)] = sa
+	}
+	rec := &logRecords{}
+	return NewMutator(Config{Region: testRegion, STSEndpoint: testSTS}, f, slog.New(rec)), rec, f
+}
+
+func roleSA(extra map[string]string) *ServiceAccount {
+	ann := map[string]string{annRole: testRoleARN}
+	maps.Copy(ann, extra)
+	return &ServiceAccount{Annotations: ann}
+}
+
+type env struct {
+	Name  string `json:"name"`
+	Value string `json:"value"`
+}
+
+func ctr(name string, envs ...env) map[string]any {
+	c := map[string]any{"name": name, "image": "registry.example/app:1"}
+	if len(envs) > 0 {
+		var e []map[string]any
+		for _, v := range envs {
+			e = append(e, map[string]any{"name": v.Name, "value": v.Value})
+		}
+		c["env"] = e
+	}
+	return c
+}
+
+func podOf(sa string, ann map[string]string, containers ...map[string]any) map[string]any {
+	spec := map[string]any{"containers": containers}
+	if sa != "" {
+		spec["serviceAccountName"] = sa
+	}
+	meta := map[string]any{"name": "web-1", "namespace": "app"}
+	if ann != nil {
+		meta["annotations"] = ann
+	}
+	return map[string]any{"apiVersion": "v1", "kind": "Pod", "metadata": meta, "spec": spec}
+}
+
+// The pod after the patch, decoded for assertions.
+type outPod struct {
+	Spec struct {
+		Containers     []outCtr `json:"containers"`
+		InitContainers []outCtr `json:"initContainers"`
+		Volumes        []struct {
+			Name      string `json:"name"`
+			Projected *struct {
+				Sources []struct {
+					SAT *struct {
+						Audience          string `json:"audience"`
+						ExpirationSeconds int64  `json:"expirationSeconds"`
+						Path              string `json:"path"`
+					} `json:"serviceAccountToken"`
+				} `json:"sources"`
+			} `json:"projected"`
+			ConfigMap *struct {
+				Name string `json:"name"`
+			} `json:"configMap"`
+		} `json:"volumes"`
+	} `json:"spec"`
+}
+
+type outCtr struct {
+	Name string `json:"name"`
+	Env  []env  `json:"env"`
+	VM   []struct {
+		Name      string `json:"name"`
+		MountPath string `json:"mountPath"`
+		ReadOnly  bool   `json:"readOnly"`
+	} `json:"volumeMounts"`
+}
+
+func (c outCtr) envMap() map[string]string {
+	m := map[string]string{}
+	for _, e := range c.Env {
+		m[e.Name] = e.Value
+	}
+	return m
+}
+
+func (c outCtr) mounts(name string) int {
+	n := 0
+	for _, v := range c.VM {
+		if v.Name == name {
+			n++
+		}
+	}
+	return n
+}
+
+func (p outPod) volumes(name string) int {
+	n := 0
+	for _, v := range p.Spec.Volumes {
+		if v.Name == name {
+			n++
+		}
+	}
+	return n
+}
+
+func (p outPod) tokenExpiry(t *testing.T) (aud string, exp int64) {
+	t.Helper()
+	for _, v := range p.Spec.Volumes {
+		if v.Name == TokenVolumeName && v.Projected != nil && len(v.Projected.Sources) == 1 && v.Projected.Sources[0].SAT != nil {
+			s := v.Projected.Sources[0].SAT
+			assert.Equal(t, TokenPath, s.Path)
+			return s.Audience, s.ExpirationSeconds
+		}
+	}
+	require.Failf(t, "no projected token volume", "volumes: %+v", p.Spec.Volumes)
+	return "", 0
+}
+
+// run mutates pod in namespace app and returns the patched pod and the response.
+func run(t *testing.T, m *Mutator, pod map[string]any) (outPod, AdmissionResponse) {
+	t.Helper()
+	raw, err := json.Marshal(pod)
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+	resp := m.Mutate(context.Background(), AdmissionRequest{UID: "u1", Operation: "CREATE", Namespace: "app", Object: raw})
+	require.True(t, resp.Allowed, "the mutator must never deny a pod")
+	assert.Equal(t, "u1", resp.UID)
+	patched := applyPatch(t, raw, resp.Patch)
+	var out outPod
+	require.NoError(t, json.Unmarshal(patched, &out))
+	return out, resp
+}
+
+func TestMutate_InjectsTheAWSSetAndTheSpinifexExtras(t *testing.T) {
+	m, _, _ := newMutator(roleSA(map[string]string{annRegionalS: "true"}))
+	out, _ := run(t, m, podOf("sa0", nil, ctr("app")))
+
+	aud, exp := out.tokenExpiry(t)
+	assert.Equal(t, "sts.amazonaws.com", aud)
+	assert.GreaterOrEqual(t, exp, DefaultMinTokenExpiration)
+	assert.LessOrEqual(t, exp, MaxTokenExpiration)
+
+	require.Len(t, out.Spec.Containers, 1)
+	c := out.Spec.Containers[0]
+	assert.Equal(t, map[string]string{
+		"AWS_ROLE_ARN":                testRoleARN,
+		"AWS_WEB_IDENTITY_TOKEN_FILE": TokenMountPath + "/" + TokenPath,
+		"AWS_STS_REGIONAL_ENDPOINTS":  "regional",
+		"AWS_REGION":                  testRegion,
+		"AWS_DEFAULT_REGION":          testRegion,
+		"AWS_ENDPOINT_URL_STS":        testSTS,
+		"AWS_CA_BUNDLE":               CAMountPath + "/" + CABundleKey,
+		"SSL_CERT_FILE":               CAMountPath + "/" + CABundleKey,
+	}, c.envMap())
+
+	assert.Equal(t, 1, c.mounts(TokenVolumeName))
+	assert.Equal(t, 1, c.mounts(CAVolumeName))
+	for _, v := range c.VM {
+		assert.True(t, v.ReadOnly, "mount %s must be read-only", v.Name)
+		switch v.Name {
+		case TokenVolumeName:
+			assert.Equal(t, TokenMountPath, v.MountPath)
+		case CAVolumeName:
+			assert.Equal(t, CAMountPath, v.MountPath)
+		}
+	}
+	assert.Equal(t, 1, out.volumes(CAVolumeName))
+	for _, v := range out.Spec.Volumes {
+		if v.Name == CAVolumeName {
+			require.NotNil(t, v.ConfigMap)
+			assert.Equal(t, CAConfigMapName, v.ConfigMap.Name)
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+func TestMutate_RegionalSTSOnlyWhenTheServiceAccountAsksForIt(t *testing.T) {
+	m, _, _ := newMutator(roleSA(nil), roleSA(map[string]string{annRegionalS: "false"}))
+	for _, sa := range []string{"sa0", "sa1"} {
+		out, _ := run(t, m, podOf(sa, nil, ctr("app")))
+		require.Len(t, out.Spec.Containers, 1, sa)
+		assert.NotContains(t, out.Spec.Containers[0].envMap(), "AWS_STS_REGIONAL_ENDPOINTS", sa)
+		assert.Equal(t, testRoleARN, out.Spec.Containers[0].envMap()["AWS_ROLE_ARN"], sa)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestMutate_KeepsACallersOwnTrustSettings(t *testing.T) {
+	m, _, _ := newMutator(roleSA(nil))
+	out, _ := run(t, m, podOf("sa0", nil,
+		ctr("a", env{"SSL_CERT_FILE", "/etc/ssl/own.pem"}),
+		ctr("b", env{"AWS_CA_BUNDLE", "/etc/ssl/own-aws.pem"}, env{"AWS_ENDPOINT_URL_STS", "https://own"})))
+
+	a := out.Spec.Containers[0].envMap()
+	assert.Equal(t, "/etc/ssl/own.pem", a["SSL_CERT_FILE"], "an existing SSL_CERT_FILE replaces the image trust store and must be left alone")
+	assert.Equal(t, CAMountPath+"/"+CABundleKey, a["AWS_CA_BUNDLE"])
+	b := out.Spec.Containers[1].envMap()
+	assert.Equal(t, "/etc/ssl/own-aws.pem", b["AWS_CA_BUNDLE"])
+	assert.Equal(t, "https://own", b["AWS_ENDPOINT_URL_STS"])
+	assert.Equal(t, testRoleARN, b["AWS_ROLE_ARN"])
+}
+
+func TestMutate_InjectsInitContainersToo(t *testing.T) {
+	m, _, _ := newMutator(roleSA(nil))
+	pod := podOf("sa0", nil, ctr("app"))
+	pod["spec"].(map[string]any)["initContainers"] = []map[string]any{ctr("setup")}
+	out, _ := run(t, m, pod)
+
+	require.Len(t, out.Spec.InitContainers, 1)
+	assert.Equal(t, testRoleARN, out.Spec.InitContainers[0].envMap()["AWS_ROLE_ARN"])
+	assert.Equal(t, 1, out.Spec.InitContainers[0].mounts(TokenVolumeName))
+}
+
+func TestMutate_LeavesAContainerWithAllThreeKeySetsUntouched(t *testing.T) {
+	m, rec, _ := newMutator(roleSA(nil))
+	complete := ctr("done",
+		env{"AWS_ROLE_ARN", "arn:aws:iam::000000000001:role/own"},
+		env{"AWS_WEB_IDENTITY_TOKEN_FILE", "/own/token"},
+		env{"AWS_REGION", "us-east-1"},
+		env{"AWS_STS_REGIONAL_ENDPOINTS", "legacy"})
+	out, _ := run(t, m, podOf("sa0", nil, complete, ctr("plain")))
+
+	got := out.Spec.Containers[0]
+	assert.Len(t, got.Env, 4, "a complete container must not gain variables")
+	assert.Zero(t, got.mounts(TokenVolumeName)+got.mounts(CAVolumeName))
+	assert.Equal(t, testRoleARN, out.Spec.Containers[1].envMap()["AWS_ROLE_ARN"], "its neighbour is still injected")
+	assert.NotEmpty(t, rec.withReason(ReasonAlreadyConfigured))
+}
+
+func TestMutate_AddsOnlyTheMissingKeysToAPartiallyConfiguredContainer(t *testing.T) {
+	m, _, _ := newMutator(roleSA(map[string]string{annRegionalS: "true"}))
+	partial := ctr("partial", env{"AWS_ROLE_ARN", "arn:aws:iam::000000000001:role/own"})
+	out, _ := run(t, m, podOf("sa0", nil, partial))
+
+	e := out.Spec.Containers[0].envMap()
+	assert.Equal(t, "arn:aws:iam::000000000001:role/own", e["AWS_ROLE_ARN"], "the caller's role is kept")
+	assert.NotContains(t, e, "AWS_WEB_IDENTITY_TOKEN_FILE", "role keys already defined are not completed")
+	assert.Equal(t, testRegion, e["AWS_REGION"])
+	assert.Equal(t, testRegion, e["AWS_DEFAULT_REGION"])
+	assert.Equal(t, "regional", e["AWS_STS_REGIONAL_ENDPOINTS"])
+	assert.Equal(t, 1, out.Spec.Containers[0].mounts(TokenVolumeName))
+	count := 0
+	for _, kv := range out.Spec.Containers[0].Env {
+		if kv.Name == "AWS_ROLE_ARN" {
+			count++
+		}
+	}
+	assert.Equal(t, 1, count)
+}
+
+func TestMutate_DoesNotDuplicateAnExistingTokenVolume(t *testing.T) {
+	m, _, _ := newMutator(roleSA(nil))
+	pod := podOf("sa0", nil, ctr("app"))
+	pod["spec"].(map[string]any)["volumes"] = []map[string]any{{
+		"name": TokenVolumeName,
+		"projected": map[string]any{"sources": []map[string]any{{
+			"serviceAccountToken": map[string]any{"audience": "own", "expirationSeconds": 7200, "path": "token"},
+		}}},
+	}}
+	out, _ := run(t, m, pod)
+
+	assert.Equal(t, 1, out.volumes(TokenVolumeName))
+	aud, exp := out.tokenExpiry(t)
+	assert.Equal(t, "own", aud, "the caller's volume is kept")
+	assert.Equal(t, int64(7200), exp)
+	assert.Equal(t, 1, out.Spec.Containers[0].mounts(TokenVolumeName))
+}
+
+func TestMutate_AudienceAndExpiry(t *testing.T) {
+	cases := []struct {
+		name    string
+		saAnn   map[string]string
+		podAnn  map[string]string
+		wantAud string
+		wantExp int64
+	}{
+		{"service account audience", map[string]string{annAudience: "custom.example"}, nil, "custom.example", 0},
+		{"service account expiry", map[string]string{annExpiry: "7200"}, nil, "sts.amazonaws.com", 7200},
+		{"pod expiry wins over service account", map[string]string{annExpiry: "7200"}, map[string]string{annExpiry: "1200"}, "sts.amazonaws.com", 1200},
+		{"below the minimum is raised to 600", nil, map[string]string{annExpiry: "100"}, "sts.amazonaws.com", 600},
+		{"above the maximum is lowered to 86400", map[string]string{annExpiry: "999999"}, nil, "sts.amazonaws.com", 86400},
+		{"invalid expiry falls back to the default", map[string]string{annExpiry: "soon"}, nil, "sts.amazonaws.com", 0},
+	}
+	for _, tc := range cases {
+		t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
+			m, _, _ := newMutator(roleSA(tc.saAnn))
+			out, _ := run(t, m, podOf("sa0", tc.podAnn, ctr("app")))
+			aud, exp := out.tokenExpiry(t)
+			assert.Equal(t, tc.wantAud, aud)
+			if tc.wantExp != 0 {
+				assert.Equal(t, tc.wantExp, exp)
+				return
+			}
+			assert.GreaterOrEqual(t, exp, MaxTokenExpiration-7200)
+			assert.LessOrEqual(t, exp, MaxTokenExpiration)
+		})
+	}
+}
+
+func TestMutate_DefaultExpiryIsJitteredWithinTwoHours(t *testing.T) {
+	m, _, _ := newMutator(roleSA(nil))
+	seen := map[int64]bool{}
+	for range 60 {
+		out, _ := run(t, m, podOf("sa0", nil, ctr("app")))
+		_, exp := out.tokenExpiry(t)
+		require.GreaterOrEqual(t, exp, DefaultMinTokenExpiration)
+		require.LessOrEqual(t, exp, MaxTokenExpiration)
+		seen[exp] = true
+	}
+	assert.Greater(t, len(seen), 1, "60 pods all got the same default expiry; it is not jittered")
+}
+
+func TestMutate_SkipContainersAnnotation(t *testing.T) {
+	m, rec, _ := newMutator(roleSA(nil))
+	out, _ := run(t, m, podOf("sa0", map[string]string{annSkip: "sidecar, mesh"},
+		ctr("app"), ctr("sidecar"), ctr("mesh")))
+
+	assert.Equal(t, testRoleARN, out.Spec.Containers[0].envMap()["AWS_ROLE_ARN"])
+	for _, i := range []int{1, 2} {
+		c := out.Spec.Containers[i]
+		assert.Empty(t, c.Env, c.Name)
+		assert.Zero(t, c.mounts(TokenVolumeName), c.Name)
+	}
+	assert.Len(t, rec.withReason(ReasonSkipContainer), 2)
+}
+
+func TestMutate_LeavesPodsOfUnannotatedServiceAccountsAlone(t *testing.T) {
+	m, _, f := newMutator(&ServiceAccount{Annotations: map[string]string{"other": "x"}}, &ServiceAccount{})
+	f.sas["app/default"] = &ServiceAccount{}
+	for _, sa := range []string{"sa0", "sa1", ""} {
+		_, resp := run(t, m, podOf(sa, nil, ctr("app")))
+		assert.Empty(t, resp.Patch, "service account %q", sa)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestMutate_UsesTheDefaultServiceAccountWhenThePodNamesNone(t *testing.T) {
+	m, _, f := newMutator()
+	f.sas["app/default"] = roleSA(nil)
+	out, _ := run(t, m, podOf("", nil, ctr("app")))
+	assert.Equal(t, testRoleARN, out.Spec.Containers[0].envMap()["AWS_ROLE_ARN"])
+}
+
+// A pod of a managed add-on as render_addon writes it: the web identity,
+// region and regional sts settings, the token volume and the gateway CA.
+func TestMutate_LeavesARenderedManagedAddonPodUnchanged(t *testing.T) {
+	m, _, _ := newMutator(roleSA(map[string]string{annRegionalS: "true"}))
+	c := ctr("controller",
+		env{"AWS_ROLE_ARN", testRoleARN},
+		env{"AWS_WEB_IDENTITY_TOKEN_FILE", TokenMountPath + "/token"},
+		env{"AWS_STS_REGIONAL_ENDPOINTS", "regional"},
+		env{"AWS_REGION", testRegion},
+		env{"AWS_DEFAULT_REGION", testRegion},
+		env{"AWS_ENDPOINT_URL_STS", testSTS},
+		env{"AWS_CA_BUNDLE", "/etc/spinifex/gateway-ca/ca.pem"},
+		env{"SSL_CERT_FILE", "/etc/spinifex/gateway-ca/ca.pem"})
+	c["volumeMounts"] = []map[string]any{
+		{"name": TokenVolumeName, "mountPath": TokenMountPath, "readOnly": true},
+		{"name": "spinifex-gateway-ca", "mountPath": "/etc/spinifex/gateway-ca", "readOnly": true},
+	}
+	pod := podOf("sa0", nil, c)
+	pod["spec"].(map[string]any)["volumes"] = []map[string]any{
+		{"name": TokenVolumeName, "projected": map[string]any{"sources": []map[string]any{{
+			"serviceAccountToken": map[string]any{"audience": "sts.amazonaws.com", "expirationSeconds": 86400, "path": "token"}}}}},
+		{"name": "spinifex-gateway-ca", "secret": map[string]any{"secretName": "spinifex-gateway-ca"}},
+	}
+	_, resp := run(t, m, pod)
+	assert.Empty(t, resp.Patch, "a managed add-on pod must come out byte for byte as it went in")
+}
+
+func TestMutate_OnlyActsOnPodCreation(t *testing.T) {
+	m, _, _ := newMutator(roleSA(nil))
+	raw, err := json.Marshal(podOf("sa0", nil, ctr("app")))
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+	resp := m.Mutate(context.Background(), AdmissionRequest{UID: "u", Operation: "UPDATE", Namespace: "app", Object: raw})
+	assert.True(t, resp.Allowed)
+	assert.Empty(t, resp.Patch)
+}
+
+func TestMutate_LogsEverySkipAndFailureWithNamespacePodAndReason(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Run("lookup failure fails open", func(t *testing.T) {
+		m, rec, f := newMutator(roleSA(nil))
+		f.err = errors.New("apiserver unavailable")
+		_, resp := run(t, m, podOf("sa0", nil, ctr("app")))
+		assert.Empty(t, resp.Patch)
+		got := rec.withReason(ReasonServiceAccountLookup)
+		require.Len(t, got, 1)
+		assert.Equal(t, "app", got[0]["namespace"])
+		assert.Equal(t, "web-1", got[0]["pod"])
+		assert.Contains(t, got[0]["error"], "apiserver unavailable")
+	})
+	t.Run("missing service account", func(t *testing.T) {
+		m, rec, _ := newMutator()
+		_, resp := run(t, m, podOf("ghost", nil, ctr("app")))
+		assert.Empty(t, resp.Patch)
+		require.Len(t, rec.withReason(ReasonServiceAccountMissing), 1)
+	})
+	t.Run("undecodable object", func(t *testing.T) {
+		m, rec, _ := newMutator()
+		resp := m.Mutate(context.Background(), AdmissionRequest{UID: "u", Operation: "CREATE", Namespace: "app", Object: json.RawMessage(`{"spec":`)})
+		assert.True(t, resp.Allowed)
+		assert.Empty(t, resp.Patch)
+		got := rec.withReason(ReasonDecode)
+		require.Len(t, got, 1)
+		assert.Equal(t, "app", got[0]["namespace"])
+	})
+	t.Run("a pod with only generateName is named by it", func(t *testing.T) {
+		m, rec, _ := newMutator(roleSA(nil))
+		pod := podOf("sa0", map[string]string{annSkip: "app"}, ctr("app"))
+		meta := pod["metadata"].(map[string]any)
+		delete(meta, "name")
+		meta["generateName"] = "web-"
+		run(t, m, pod)
+		got := rec.withReason(ReasonSkipContainer)
+		require.Len(t, got, 1)
+		assert.True(t, strings.HasPrefix(got[0]["pod"], "web-"), "pod attr %q", got[0]["pod"])
+	})
+	t.Run("an unannotated pod is not a skip worth logging", func(t *testing.T) {
+		m, rec, _ := newMutator(&ServiceAccount{})
+		run(t, m, podOf("sa0", nil, ctr("app")))
+		for _, r := range rec.recs {
+			assert.NotEqual(t, "WARN", r["level"], "%v", r)
+			assert.NotEqual(t, "ERROR", r["level"], "%v", r)
+		}
+	})
+}
+
+func TestServeHTTP_AnswersAnAdmissionReview(t *testing.T) {
+	m, _, _ := newMutator(roleSA(nil))
+	obj, err := json.Marshal(podOf("sa0", nil, ctr("app")))
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+	body, err := json.Marshal(map[string]any{
+		"apiVersion": "admission.k8s.io/v1", "kind": "AdmissionReview",
+		"request": map[string]any{"uid": "abc-123", "operation": "CREATE", "namespace": "app", "object": json.RawMessage(obj)},
+	})
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+
+	rr := httptest.NewRecorder()
+	m.ServeHTTP(rr, httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodPost, "/mutate", bytes.NewReader(body)))
+	require.Equal(t, http.StatusOK, rr.Code)
+
+	var review struct {
+		APIVersion string `json:"apiVersion"`
+		Kind       string `json:"kind"`
+		Response   struct {
+			UID       string `json:"uid"`
+			Allowed   bool   `json:"allowed"`
+			PatchType string `json:"patchType"`
+			Patch     string `json:"patch"`
+		} `json:"response"`
+	}
+	require.NoError(t, json.Unmarshal(rr.Body.Bytes(), &review))
+	assert.Equal(t, "admission.k8s.io/v1", review.APIVersion)
+	assert.Equal(t, "AdmissionReview", review.Kind)
+	assert.Equal(t, "abc-123", review.Response.UID)
+	assert.True(t, review.Response.Allowed)
+	assert.Equal(t, "JSONPatch", review.Response.PatchType)
+	patch, err := base64.StdEncoding.DecodeString(review.Response.Patch)
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+	assert.Contains(t, string(patch), "AWS_ROLE_ARN")
+}
+
+// applyPatch applies add, replace and remove operations to raw.
+func applyPatch(t *testing.T, raw []byte, ops []PatchOp) []byte {
+	t.Helper()
+	var doc any
+	require.NoError(t, json.Unmarshal(raw, &doc))
+	for _, op := range ops {
+		parts := strings.Split(strings.TrimPrefix(op.Path, "/"), "/")
+		for i := range parts {
+			parts[i] = strings.ReplaceAll(strings.ReplaceAll(parts[i], "~1", "/"), "~0", "~")
+		}
+		var val any
+		if op.Value != nil {
+			b, err := json.Marshal(op.Value)
+			require.NoError(t, err)
+			require.NoError(t, json.Unmarshal(b, &val))
+		}
+		doc = patchAt(t, doc, parts, op.Op, val)
+	}
+	out, err := json.Marshal(doc)
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+	return out
+}
+
+func patchAt(t *testing.T, node any, parts []string, op string, val any) any {
+	t.Helper()
+	if len(parts) == 1 {
+		key := parts[0]
+		switch n := node.(type) {
+		case map[string]any:
+			switch op {
+			case "add", "replace":
+				n[key] = val
+			case "remove":
+				delete(n, key)
+			default:
+				require.Failf(t, "unsupported op", "%s", op)
+			}
+			return n
+		case []any:
+			if key == "-" {
+				return append(n, val)
+			}
+			i, err := strconv.Atoi(key)
+			require.NoError(t, err)
+			switch op {
+			case "add":
+				n = append(n, nil)
+				copy(n[i+1:], n[i:])
+				n[i] = val
+			case "replace":
+				n[i] = val
+			case "remove":
+				n = append(n[:i], n[i+1:]...)
+			}
+			return n
+		}
+		require.Fail(t, "patch parent is neither object nor array")
+	}
+	switch n := node.(type) {
+	case map[string]any:
+		child, ok := n[parts[0]]
+		require.True(t, ok, "patch path parent %q missing", parts[0])
+		n[parts[0]] = patchAt(t, child, parts[1:], op, val)
+		return n
+	case []any:
+		i, err := strconv.Atoi(parts[0])
+		require.NoError(t, err)
+		n[i] = patchAt(t, n[i], parts[1:], op, val)
+		return n
+	}
+	require.Fail(t, "patch path crosses a scalar")
+	return nil
+}
+
+// Upstream skips a container only when the regional STS key is present too: a
+// container with role and region but no STS key, on a ServiceAccount that does
+// not ask for regional endpoints, still gets the mounts but no new STS variable.
+func TestMutate_RoleAndRegionWithoutSTSKeyStillGetsMountsNotSTSEnv(t *testing.T) {
+	m, _, _ := newMutator(roleSA(nil))
+	c := ctr("app",
+		env{"AWS_ROLE_ARN", "arn:aws:iam::000000000001:role/own"},
+		env{"AWS_WEB_IDENTITY_TOKEN_FILE", "/own/token"},
+		env{"AWS_REGION", "us-east-1"})
+	out, _ := run(t, m, podOf("sa0", nil, c))
+
+	got := out.Spec.Containers[0]
+	assert.Equal(t, 1, got.mounts(TokenVolumeName))
+	assert.NotContains(t, got.envMap(), "AWS_STS_REGIONAL_ENDPOINTS")
+	assert.Equal(t, "arn:aws:iam::000000000001:role/own", got.envMap()["AWS_ROLE_ARN"])
+}
@@ -0,0 +1,166 @@
+// Package podidentity injects IRSA credentials into pods of annotated
+// ServiceAccounts like the AWS pod identity webhook, plus the Spinifex STS
+// endpoint and gateway CA. It uses no Kubernetes client; the cluster is reached through interfaces.
+package podidentity
+
+import (
+	"context"
+	"encoding/json"
+	"errors"
+	"log/slog"
+)
+
+const (
+	// DefaultAnnotationDomain is the annotation domain AWS uses.
+	DefaultAnnotationDomain = "eks.amazonaws.com"
+	// TokenVolumeName and TokenMountPath are where AWS mounts the projected token.
+	TokenVolumeName = "aws-iam-token"                                     //nolint:gosec // volume name, not a credential
+	TokenMountPath  = "/var/run/secrets/eks.amazonaws.com/serviceaccount" //nolint:gosec // mount path, not a credential
+	TokenPath       = "token"
+	// DefaultAudience is the token audience when the ServiceAccount sets none.
+	DefaultAudience = "sts.amazonaws.com"
+	// MinTokenExpiration and MaxTokenExpiration bound a requested expiry in seconds.
+	MinTokenExpiration int64 = 600
+	MaxTokenExpiration int64 = 86400
+	// DefaultMinTokenExpiration is the low end of the jittered default expiry.
+	DefaultMinTokenExpiration int64 = 79200
+
+	// CAVolumeName, CAMountPath and CABundleKey describe the CA bundle ConfigMap
+	// mount; CAConfigMapName is the ConfigMap published into every namespace.
+	CAConfigMapName = "spinifex-ca-bundle"
+	CAVolumeName    = "spinifex-ca-bundle"
+	CAMountPath     = "/etc/spinifex/ca-bundle"
+	CABundleKey     = "ca.pem"
+)
+
+// Reasons logged, with the namespace and pod, when injection is skipped or fails.
+const (
+	ReasonDecode                = "admission object could not be decoded"
+	ReasonServiceAccountLookup  = "serviceaccount lookup failed"
+	ReasonServiceAccountMissing = "serviceaccount not found"
+	ReasonAlreadyConfigured     = "container already has web identity, region and regional sts settings"
+	ReasonSkipContainer         = "container named in skip-containers annotation"
+)
+
+var (
+	// ErrServiceAccountNotFound is returned by a ServiceAccountGetter when the
+	// ServiceAccount does not exist.
+	ErrServiceAccountNotFound = errors.New("serviceaccount not found")
+	// ErrNotFound, ErrAlreadyExists and ErrConflict are the ConfigMapStore errors.
+	ErrNotFound      = errors.New("not found")
+	ErrAlreadyExists = errors.New("already exists")
+	ErrConflict      = errors.New("conflict")
+)
+
+// Config is the mutator's configuration.
+type Config struct {
+	// Region is injected as AWS_REGION and AWS_DEFAULT_REGION when non-empty.
+	Region string
+	// STSEndpoint is injected as AWS_ENDPOINT_URL_STS when non-empty.
+	STSEndpoint string
+	// AnnotationDomain defaults to DefaultAnnotationDomain.
+	AnnotationDomain string
+}
+
+// ServiceAccount is the part of a ServiceAccount the mutator reads.
+type ServiceAccount struct {
+	Annotations map[string]string
+}
+
+// ServiceAccountGetter looks up a ServiceAccount.
+type ServiceAccountGetter interface {
+	GetServiceAccount(ctx context.Context, namespace, name string) (*ServiceAccount, error)
+}
+
+// AdmissionRequest is the part of an AdmissionReview request the mutator reads.
+type AdmissionRequest struct {
+	UID       string          `json:"uid"`
+	Operation string          `json:"operation"`
+	Namespace string          `json:"namespace"`
+	Object    json.RawMessage `json:"object"`
+}
+
+// PatchOp is one RFC 6902 operation.
+type PatchOp struct {
+	Op    string `json:"op"`
+	Path  string `json:"path"`
+	Value any    `json:"value,omitempty"`
+}
+
+// AdmissionResponse is the mutator's answer. Patch is empty when the pod is
+// left unchanged. The mutator never denies a pod.
+type AdmissionResponse struct {
+	UID     string
+	Allowed bool
+	Patch   []PatchOp
+}
+
+// Mutator injects IRSA credentials into pods.
+type Mutator struct {
+	cfg Config
+	sas ServiceAccountGetter
+	log *slog.Logger
+}
+
+// NewMutator returns a Mutator. A nil log uses slog.Default.
+func NewMutator(cfg Config, sas ServiceAccountGetter, log *slog.Logger) *Mutator {
+	if log == nil {
+		log = slog.Default()
+	}
+	return &Mutator{cfg: cfg, sas: sas, log: log}
+}
+
+// ConfigMap is the part of a ConfigMap the publisher manages.
+type ConfigMap struct {
+	Namespace string
+	Name      string
+	Data      map[string]string
+	// ResourceVersion is opaque and set by the store.
+	ResourceVersion string
+}
+
+// ConfigMapStore reads and writes ConfigMaps. Get returns ErrNotFound, Create
+// returns ErrAlreadyExists, and Update returns ErrConflict or ErrNotFound.
+type ConfigMapStore interface {
+	Get(ctx context.Context, namespace, name string) (*ConfigMap, error)
+	Create(ctx context.Context, cm ConfigMap) error
+	Update(ctx context.Context, cm ConfigMap) error
+}
+
+// NamespaceSource lists namespaces and reports ones created later.
+type NamespaceSource interface {
+	List(ctx context.Context) ([]string, error)
+	// Watch sends the name of every namespace created after the call until ctx ends.
+	Watch(ctx context.Context) (<-chan string, error)
+}
+
+// PublisherConfig configures a Publisher.
+type PublisherConfig struct {
+	// Bundle is the CA bundle published to every namespace as CABundleKey.
+	Bundle []byte
+}
+
+// Publisher keeps the CA bundle ConfigMap present in every namespace.
+type Publisher struct {
+	cfg PublisherConfig
+	ns  NamespaceSource
+	cms ConfigMapStore
+	log *slog.Logger
+}
+
+// NewPublisher returns a Publisher. A nil log uses slog.Default.
+func NewPublisher(cfg PublisherConfig, ns NamespaceSource, cms ConfigMapStore, log *slog.Logger) *Publisher {
+	if log == nil {
+		log = slog.Default()
+	}
+	return &Publisher{cfg: cfg, ns: ns, cms: cms, log: log}
+}
+
+// WebhookConfig describes the MutatingWebhookConfiguration to render.
+type WebhookConfig struct {
+	Name string
+	// URL is the https URL the API server calls, on 127.0.0.1.
+	URL string
+	// CA is the PEM the API server trusts for URL.
+	CA []byte
+}
@@ -0,0 +1,107 @@
+package podidentity
+
+import (
+	"context"
+	"errors"
+	"maps"
+	"time"
+)
+
+const (
+	defaultResync     = 5 * time.Minute
+	reconcileAttempts = 3
+)
+
+// Reconcile makes the CA bundle ConfigMap in one namespace match the bundle.
+// Losing a create or update race to another publisher is not an error.
+func (p *Publisher) Reconcile(ctx context.Context, namespace string) error {
+	want := string(p.cfg.Bundle)
+	var err error
+	for range reconcileAttempts {
+		var cm *ConfigMap
+		cm, err = p.cms.Get(ctx, namespace, CAConfigMapName)
+		switch {
+		case errors.Is(err, ErrNotFound):
+			err = p.cms.Create(ctx, ConfigMap{Namespace: namespace, Name: CAConfigMapName, Data: map[string]string{CABundleKey: want}})
+			if err == nil {
+				return nil
+			}
+			if !errors.Is(err, ErrAlreadyExists) {
+				return err
+			}
+			continue
+		case err != nil:
+			return err
+		case cm.Data[CABundleKey] == want:
+			return nil
+		}
+
+		data := maps.Clone(cm.Data)
+		if data == nil {
+			data = map[string]string{}
+		}
+		data[CABundleKey] = want
+		err = p.cms.Update(ctx, ConfigMap{Namespace: namespace, Name: CAConfigMapName, Data: data, ResourceVersion: cm.ResourceVersion})
+		if err == nil {
+			return nil
+		}
+		if !errors.Is(err, ErrConflict) && !errors.Is(err, ErrNotFound) {
+			return err
+		}
+	}
+	return err
+}
+
+// Run publishes to every existing namespace, then to each new one, and
+// re-checks every namespace each resync interval until ctx ends.
+func (p *Publisher) Run(ctx context.Context, resync time.Duration) error {
+	if resync <= 0 {
+		resync = defaultResync
+	}
+	created, err := p.ns.Watch(ctx)
+	if err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+	p.reconcileAll(ctx)
+
+	tick := time.NewTicker(resync)
+	defer tick.Stop()
+	for {
+		select {
+		case <-ctx.Done():
+			return nil
+		case ns, ok := <-created:
+			if !ok {
+				created = nil
+				continue
+			}
+			p.reconcileOne(ctx, ns)
+		case <-tick.C:
+			if created == nil {
+				if ch, err := p.ns.Watch(ctx); err != nil {
+					p.log.Warn("namespace watch restart failed", "error", err)
+				} else {
+					created = ch
+				}
+			}
+			p.reconcileAll(ctx)
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+func (p *Publisher) reconcileAll(ctx context.Context) {
+	names, err := p.ns.List(ctx)
+	if err != nil {
+		p.log.Warn("namespace list failed", "error", err)
+		return
+	}
+	for _, ns := range names {
+		p.reconcileOne(ctx, ns)
+	}
+}
+
+func (p *Publisher) reconcileOne(ctx context.Context, ns string) {
+	if err := p.Reconcile(ctx, ns); err != nil && ctx.Err() == nil {
+		p.log.Warn("ca bundle publish failed", "namespace", ns, "error", err)
+	}
+}
@@ -0,0 +1,321 @@
+package podidentity
+
+import (
+	"context"
+	"crypto/ecdsa"
+	"crypto/elliptic"
+	"crypto/rand"
+	"crypto/x509"
+	"crypto/x509/pkix"
+	"encoding/base64"
+	"encoding/json"
+	"encoding/pem"
+	"math/big"
+	"strconv"
+	"strings"
+	"sync"
+	"testing"
+	"time"
+
+	"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
+	"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
+)
+
+// memStore is an in-memory ConfigMapStore with the API server's create and
+// update semantics: Create fails if present, Update needs the current version.
+type memStore struct {
+	mu      sync.Mutex
+	cms     map[string]ConfigMap
+	version int
+	creates int
+	updates int
+}
+
+func newMemStore() *memStore { return &memStore{cms: map[string]ConfigMap{}} }
+
+func (s *memStore) Get(_ context.Context, ns, name string) (*ConfigMap, error) {
+	s.mu.Lock()
+	defer s.mu.Unlock()
+	cm, ok := s.cms[ns+"/"+name]
+	if !ok {
+		return nil, ErrNotFound
+	}
+	return &cm, nil
+}
+
+func (s *memStore) Create(_ context.Context, cm ConfigMap) error {
+	s.mu.Lock()
+	defer s.mu.Unlock()
+	if _, ok := s.cms[cm.Namespace+"/"+cm.Name]; ok {
+		return ErrAlreadyExists
+	}
+	s.version++
+	cm.ResourceVersion = strconv.Itoa(s.version)
+	s.cms[cm.Namespace+"/"+cm.Name] = cm
+	s.creates++
+	return nil
+}
+
+func (s *memStore) Update(_ context.Context, cm ConfigMap) error {
+	s.mu.Lock()
+	defer s.mu.Unlock()
+	cur, ok := s.cms[cm.Namespace+"/"+cm.Name]
+	if !ok {
+		return ErrNotFound
+	}
+	if cur.ResourceVersion != cm.ResourceVersion {
+		return ErrConflict
+	}
+	s.version++
+	cm.ResourceVersion = strconv.Itoa(s.version)
+	s.cms[cm.Namespace+"/"+cm.Name] = cm
+	s.updates++
+	return nil
+}
+
+func (s *memStore) remove(ns, name string) {
+	s.mu.Lock()
+	delete(s.cms, ns+"/"+name)
+	s.mu.Unlock()
+}
+
+func (s *memStore) get(ns string) (ConfigMap, bool) {
+	s.mu.Lock()
+	defer s.mu.Unlock()
+	cm, ok := s.cms[ns+"/"+CAConfigMapName]
+	return cm, ok
+}
+
+// fakeNamespaces lists a fixed set and replays created ones on Watch.
+type fakeNamespaces struct {
+	mu      sync.Mutex
+	names   []string
+	watcher chan string
+}
+
+func (f *fakeNamespaces) List(context.Context) ([]string, error) {
+	f.mu.Lock()
+	defer f.mu.Unlock()
+	return append([]string(nil), f.names...), nil
+}
+
+func (f *fakeNamespaces) Watch(context.Context) (<-chan string, error) {
+	f.mu.Lock()
+	defer f.mu.Unlock()
+	f.watcher = make(chan string, 8)
+	return f.watcher, nil
+}
+
+func (f *fakeNamespaces) create(name string) {
+	f.mu.Lock()
+	f.names = append(f.names, name)
+	w := f.watcher
+	f.mu.Unlock()
+	if w != nil {
+		w <- name
+	}
+}
+
+var testBundle = []byte("-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----\nQUJD\n-----END CERTIFICATE-----\n")
+
+func TestPublisher_ReconcileCreatesTheBundleConfigMap(t *testing.T) {
+	st := newMemStore()
+	p := NewPublisher(PublisherConfig{Bundle: testBundle}, &fakeNamespaces{}, st, nil)
+
+	require.NoError(t, p.Reconcile(context.Background(), "team-a"))
+
+	cm, ok := st.get("team-a")
+	require.True(t, ok, "no %s ConfigMap in team-a", CAConfigMapName)
+	assert.Equal(t, string(testBundle), cm.Data[CABundleKey])
+}
+
+func TestPublisher_ReconcileIsIdempotentAndRepairsDrift(t *testing.T) {
+	st := newMemStore()
+	p := NewPublisher(PublisherConfig{Bundle: testBundle}, &fakeNamespaces{}, st, nil)
+	ctx := context.Background()
+
+	require.NoError(t, p.Reconcile(ctx, "team-a"))
+	require.NoError(t, p.Reconcile(ctx, "team-a"))
+	assert.Equal(t, 1, st.creates)
+	assert.Zero(t, st.updates, "an up-to-date ConfigMap must not be rewritten")
+
+	require.NoError(t, st.Update(ctx, ConfigMap{Namespace: "team-a", Name: CAConfigMapName,
+		Data: map[string]string{CABundleKey: "tampered"}, ResourceVersion: "1"}))
+	require.NoError(t, p.Reconcile(ctx, "team-a"))
+	cm, _ := st.get("team-a")
+	assert.Equal(t, string(testBundle), cm.Data[CABundleKey])
+}
+
+func TestPublisher_RunPublishesToEveryNamespaceIncludingLaterOnes(t *testing.T) {
+	st := newMemStore()
+	nss := &fakeNamespaces{names: []string{"default", "kube-system", "team-a"}}
+	p := NewPublisher(PublisherConfig{Bundle: testBundle}, nss, st, nil)
+
+	ctx, cancel := context.WithCancel(context.Background())
+	defer cancel()
+	done := make(chan error, 1)
+	go func() { done <- p.Run(ctx, time.Hour) }()
+
+	for _, ns := range []string{"default", "kube-system", "team-a"} {
+		require.Eventually(t, func() bool { _, ok := st.get(ns); return ok }, 3*time.Second, 10*time.Millisecond, "namespace %s", ns)
+	}
+	nss.create("created-later")
+	require.Eventually(t, func() bool { _, ok := st.get("created-later"); return ok }, 3*time.Second, 10*time.Millisecond)
+
+	cancel()
+	select {
+	case err := <-done:
+		assert.NoError(t, err)
+	case <-time.After(3 * time.Second):
+		t.Fatal("Run did not return after its context ended")
+	}
+}
+
+func TestPublisher_RunRecreatesADeletedConfigMap(t *testing.T) {
+	st := newMemStore()
+	nss := &fakeNamespaces{names: []string{"team-a"}}
+	p := NewPublisher(PublisherConfig{Bundle: testBundle}, nss, st, nil)
+
+	ctx := t.Context()
+	go func() { _ = p.Run(ctx, 20*time.Millisecond) }()
+
+	require.Eventually(t, func() bool { _, ok := st.get("team-a"); return ok }, 3*time.Second, 10*time.Millisecond)
+	st.remove("team-a", CAConfigMapName)
+	require.Eventually(t, func() bool { _, ok := st.get("team-a"); return ok }, 3*time.Second, 10*time.Millisecond,
+		"the ConfigMap stayed deleted; pods created now would hang on the missing volume")
+}
+
+// All three control-plane servers run a publisher, so racing is the normal case.
+func TestPublisher_ConcurrentPublishersDoNotFight(t *testing.T) {
+	st := newMemStore()
+	var wg sync.WaitGroup
+	errs := make(chan error, 12)
+	for range 3 {
+		p := NewPublisher(PublisherConfig{Bundle: testBundle}, &fakeNamespaces{}, st, nil)
+		for range 4 {
+			wg.Go(func() {
+				errs <- p.Reconcile(context.Background(), "team-a")
+			})
+		}
+	}
+	wg.Wait()
+	close(errs)
+	for err := range errs {
+		assert.NoError(t, err, "losing a create race is not an error")
+	}
+	cm, ok := st.get("team-a")
+	require.True(t, ok)
+	assert.Equal(t, string(testBundle), cm.Data[CABundleKey])
+	assert.Equal(t, 1, st.creates)
+	assert.Zero(t, st.updates, "publishers with the same bundle must not rewrite each other's ConfigMap")
+}
+
+func certPEM(t *testing.T, cn string) []byte {
+	t.Helper()
+	key, err := ecdsa.GenerateKey(elliptic.P256(), rand.Reader)
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+	tmpl := &x509.Certificate{
+		SerialNumber:          big.NewInt(time.Now().UnixNano()),
+		Subject:               pkix.Name{CommonName: cn},
+		NotBefore:             time.Now().Add(-time.Hour),
+		NotAfter:              time.Now().Add(time.Hour),
+		IsCA:                  true,
+		BasicConstraintsValid: true,
+		KeyUsage:              x509.KeyUsageCertSign,
+	}
+	der, err := x509.CreateCertificate(rand.Reader, tmpl, tmpl, &key.PublicKey, key)
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+	return pem.EncodeToMemory(&pem.Block{Type: "CERTIFICATE", Bytes: der})
+}
+
+func subjects(t *testing.T, bundle []byte) []string {
+	t.Helper()
+	var out []string
+	for rest := bundle; ; {
+		var b *pem.Block
+		b, rest = pem.Decode(rest)
+		if b == nil {
+			return out
+		}
+		c, err := x509.ParseCertificate(b.Bytes)
+		require.NoError(t, err)
+		out = append(out, c.Subject.CommonName)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestBuildCABundle_HoldsTheSystemRootsAndTheGatewayCAOnce(t *testing.T) {
+	root1, root2, gw := certPEM(t, "root-1"), certPEM(t, "root-2"), certPEM(t, "gateway")
+	system := append(append([]byte{}, root1...), root2...)
+
+	got := subjects(t, BuildCABundle(system, gw))
+	assert.ElementsMatch(t, []string{"root-1", "root-2", "gateway"}, got)
+
+	again := subjects(t, BuildCABundle(append(append([]byte{}, system...), gw...), gw))
+	assert.ElementsMatch(t, []string{"root-1", "root-2", "gateway"}, again, "a certificate in both inputs is listed once")
+}
+
+func TestRenderWebhookConfiguration(t *testing.T) {
+	ca := certPEM(t, "k3s-server-ca")
+	raw, err := RenderWebhookConfiguration(WebhookConfig{
+		Name: "spinifex-pod-identity",
+		URL:  "https://127.0.0.1:8445/mutate",
+		CA:   ca,
+	})
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+
+	var cfg struct {
+		APIVersion string `json:"apiVersion"`
+		Kind       string `json:"kind"`
+		Metadata   struct {
+			Name string `json:"name"`
+		} `json:"metadata"`
+		Webhooks []struct {
+			Name                    string   `json:"name"`
+			FailurePolicy           string   `json:"failurePolicy"`
+			SideEffects             string   `json:"sideEffects"`
+			AdmissionReviewVersions []string `json:"admissionReviewVersions"`
+			ClientConfig            struct {
+				URL      string `json:"url"`
+				Service  any    `json:"service"`
+				CABundle string `json:"caBundle"`
+			} `json:"clientConfig"`
+			Rules []struct {
+				Operations []string `json:"operations"`
+				Resources  []string `json:"resources"`
+			} `json:"rules"`
+		} `json:"webhooks"`
+	}
+	require.NoError(t, json.Unmarshal(raw, &cfg))
+	assert.Equal(t, "admissionregistration.k8s.io/v1", cfg.APIVersion)
+	assert.Equal(t, "MutatingWebhookConfiguration", cfg.Kind)
+	assert.Equal(t, "spinifex-pod-identity", cfg.Metadata.Name)
+
+	require.Len(t, cfg.Webhooks, 1)
+	w := cfg.Webhooks[0]
+	assert.Equal(t, "Ignore", w.FailurePolicy, "an unreachable injector must never block pod creation")
+	assert.Equal(t, "None", w.SideEffects)
+	assert.Contains(t, w.AdmissionReviewVersions, "v1")
+	assert.Nil(t, w.ClientConfig.Service, "a Service reference cannot be routed from the control plane")
+	assert.True(t, strings.HasPrefix(w.ClientConfig.URL, "https://127.0.0.1:"), "url %q", w.ClientConfig.URL)
+	got, err := base64.StdEncoding.DecodeString(w.ClientConfig.CABundle)
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+	assert.Equal(t, string(ca), string(got), "caBundle must be the k3s server CA")
+	require.Len(t, w.Rules, 1)
+	assert.Equal(t, []string{"CREATE"}, w.Rules[0].Operations)
+	assert.Equal(t, []string{"pods"}, w.Rules[0].Resources)
+}
+
+func TestRenderWebhookConfiguration_RejectsAURLThatIsNotLoopbackHTTPS(t *testing.T) {
+	ca := certPEM(t, "k3s-server-ca")
+	for _, url := range []string{
+		"http://127.0.0.1:8445/mutate",
+		"https://10.0.0.5:8445/mutate",
+		"https://webhook.kube-system.svc/mutate",
+		"",
+	} {
+		_, err := RenderWebhookConfiguration(WebhookConfig{Name: "n", URL: url, CA: ca})
+		assert.Error(t, err, "url %q", url)
+	}
+	_, err := RenderWebhookConfiguration(WebhookConfig{Name: "n", URL: "https://127.0.0.1:8445/mutate"})
+	assert.Error(t, err, "a missing CA must not render a webhook the API server cannot verify")
+}
@@ -0,0 +1,110 @@
+package podidentity
+
+import (
+	"context"
+	"crypto/tls"
+	"crypto/x509"
+	"encoding/pem"
+	"io"
+	"log/slog"
+	"net"
+	"net/http"
+	"net/http/httptest"
+	"os"
+	"path/filepath"
+	"testing"
+	"time"
+
+	"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
+	"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
+)
+
+func freeAddr(t *testing.T) string {
+	t.Helper()
+	l, err := net.Listen("tcp", "127.0.0.1:0")
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+	defer func() { _ = l.Close() }()
+	return l.Addr().String()
+}
+
+// startAPI serves a fake kube-apiserver whose certificate is signed by the k3s
+// server CA, as the real one is.
+func startAPI(t *testing.T, cfg CertConfig) *httptest.Server {
+	t.Helper()
+	other := cfg
+	other.Dir = t.TempDir()
+	certs, err := EnsureCerts(other)
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+	pair, err := tls.LoadX509KeyPair(certs.ServingCert, certs.ServingKey)
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+	api := httptest.NewUnstartedServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
+		if r.URL.Query().Get("watch") != "" {
+			return
+		}
+		_, _ = io.WriteString(w, `{"items":[]}`)
+	}))
+	api.TLS = &tls.Config{Certificates: []tls.Certificate{pair}, ClientAuth: tls.RequireAnyClientCert, MinVersion: tls.VersionTLS12}
+	api.StartTLS()
+	t.Cleanup(api.Close)
+	return api
+}
+
+func TestRun_ServesTheWebhookStagesManifestsAndStopsOnCancel(t *testing.T) {
+	cfg, tlsDir := certTestConfig(t)
+	api := startAPI(t, cfg)
+	dir := t.TempDir()
+	roots := filepath.Join(dir, "roots.pem")
+	require.NoError(t, os.WriteFile(roots, pem.EncodeToMemory(&pem.Block{Type: "CERTIFICATE", Bytes: api.Certificate().Raw}), 0o644))
+	c := ServiceConfig{
+		Addr: freeAddr(t), Dir: cfg.Dir, TLSDir: tlsDir, APIServer: api.URL,
+		Region: "ap-southeast-2", STSEndpoint: "https://gw:9999",
+		SystemRoots: roots, ManifestDir: filepath.Join(dir, "manifests"), Resync: time.Hour,
+	}
+	require.NoError(t, os.MkdirAll(c.ManifestDir, 0o755))
+
+	ctx, cancel := context.WithCancel(context.Background())
+	done := make(chan error, 1)
+	go func() { done <- Run(ctx, c, slog.New(slog.DiscardHandler)) }()
+
+	// The API server calls the webhook over TLS, trusting only the server CA.
+	caPEM, err := os.ReadFile(filepath.Join(tlsDir, "server-ca.crt"))
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+	pool := x509.NewCertPool()
+	require.True(t, pool.AppendCertsFromPEM(caPEM))
+	client := &http.Client{Transport: &http.Transport{TLSClientConfig: &tls.Config{RootCAs: pool, MinVersion: tls.VersionTLS12}}}
+	require.Eventually(t, func() bool {
+		resp, err := client.Get("https://" + c.Addr + "/healthz")
+		if err != nil {
+			return false
+		}
+		_ = resp.Body.Close()
+		return resp.StatusCode == http.StatusOK
+	}, 10*time.Second, 50*time.Millisecond)
+
+	_, err = os.Stat(filepath.Join(c.ManifestDir, manifestFile))
+	assert.NoError(t, err, "the RBAC and webhook configuration are staged for k3s")
+
+	cancel()
+	select {
+	case err := <-done:
+		assert.NoError(t, err)
+	case <-time.After(10 * time.Second):
+		t.Fatal("Run did not stop after cancel")
+	}
+}
+
+func TestRun_FailsWhenTheServerCAIsMissing(t *testing.T) {
+	cfg, tlsDir := certTestConfig(t)
+	require.NoError(t, os.Remove(filepath.Join(tlsDir, "server-ca.key")))
+	c := ServiceConfig{
+		Addr: freeAddr(t), Dir: cfg.Dir, TLSDir: tlsDir, APIServer: "https://127.0.0.1:1",
+		Region: "r", STSEndpoint: "https://gw", SystemRoots: filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "none"), ManifestDir: t.TempDir(),
+	}
+	err := Run(context.Background(), c, slog.New(slog.DiscardHandler))
+	assert.Error(t, err, "the process exits so the supervisor retries until k3s has written its CAs")
+}
+
+func TestRun_RejectsANonLoopbackAddress(t *testing.T) {
+	err := Run(context.Background(), ServiceConfig{Addr: "0.0.0.0:8445", Region: "r", STSEndpoint: "s"}, slog.New(slog.DiscardHandler))
+	assert.Error(t, err)
+}
@@ -0,0 +1,212 @@
+package podidentity
+
+import (
+	"bytes"
+	"context"
+	"crypto/tls"
+	"errors"
+	"flag"
+	"fmt"
+	"io"
+	"log/slog"
+	"net"
+	"net/http"
+	"os"
+	"time"
+)
+
+const (
+	// DefaultAddr is the loopback listener; 8443 belongs to eks-token-webhook.
+	DefaultAddr = "127.0.0.1:8445"
+	// MutatePath is the URL path the API server calls.
+	MutatePath = "/mutate"
+
+	defaultStateDir   = "/var/lib/spinifex-eks/pod-identity"
+	defaultTLSDir     = "/var/lib/rancher/k3s/server/tls"
+	defaultAPIServer  = "https://127.0.0.1:6443"
+	defaultSystemRoot = "/etc/ssl/certs/ca-certificates.crt"
+	defaultManifests  = "/var/lib/rancher/k3s/server/manifests"
+
+	manifestFile = "eks-pod-identity-webhook.yaml"
+
+	certCheckEvery = 24 * time.Hour
+)
+
+// ErrCertRenewal is returned by Run when a certificate entered its renew window.
+// The process exits non-zero so the supervisor restarts it and EnsureCerts reissues.
+var ErrCertRenewal = errors.New("certificate inside renew window")
+
+// ServiceConfig is everything the webhook process needs.
+type ServiceConfig struct {
+	Addr          string
+	Dir           string
+	TLSDir        string
+	APIServer     string
+	Region        string
+	STSEndpoint   string
+	GatewayCAFile string
+	SystemRoots   string
+	ManifestDir   string
+	Resync        time.Duration
+}
+
+// ParseServiceConfig reads flags, defaulting region, STS endpoint and gateway
+// CA from the environment the node already has (the cloud-init first-boot env
+// that mulga-eks-addon-sync renders the managed add-ons from).
+func ParseServiceConfig(args []string, getenv func(string) string, errOut io.Writer) (ServiceConfig, error) {
+	var c ServiceConfig
+	fs := flag.NewFlagSet("eks-pod-identity-webhook", flag.ContinueOnError)
+	fs.SetOutput(errOut)
+	fs.StringVar(&c.Addr, "addr", DefaultAddr, "loopback listen address")
+	fs.StringVar(&c.Dir, "dir", defaultStateDir, "directory holding the webhook's certificates")
+	fs.StringVar(&c.TLSDir, "k3s-tls-dir", defaultTLSDir, "k3s server tls directory")
+	fs.StringVar(&c.APIServer, "apiserver", defaultAPIServer, "kube-apiserver URL")
+	fs.StringVar(&c.Region, "region", getenv("EKS_REGION"), "region injected as AWS_REGION")
+	fs.StringVar(&c.STSEndpoint, "sts-endpoint", getenv("EKS_ADDON_GATEWAY_URL"), "endpoint injected as AWS_ENDPOINT_URL_STS")
+	fs.StringVar(&c.GatewayCAFile, "gateway-ca", getenv("EKS_GATEWAY_CA"), "gateway CA PEM added to the published bundle")
+	fs.StringVar(&c.SystemRoots, "system-roots", defaultSystemRoot, "system root certificates PEM")
+	fs.StringVar(&c.ManifestDir, "manifest-dir", defaultManifests, "k3s auto-deploy manifests directory")
+	fs.DurationVar(&c.Resync, "resync", 5*time.Minute, "how often every namespace's CA ConfigMap is re-checked")
+	if err := fs.Parse(args); err != nil {
+		return ServiceConfig{}, err
+	}
+	return c, c.Validate()
+}
+
+// Validate rejects a configuration that would expose the webhook beyond the
+// node or run it with nothing to inject.
+func (c ServiceConfig) Validate() error {
+	host, _, err := net.SplitHostPort(c.Addr)
+	if err != nil {
+		return fmt.Errorf("addr %q: %w", c.Addr, err)
+	}
+	if ip := net.ParseIP(host); ip == nil || !ip.IsLoopback() {
+		return fmt.Errorf("addr %q must be a loopback IP: only the local kube-apiserver may call the webhook", c.Addr)
+	}
+	if c.Region == "" || c.STSEndpoint == "" {
+		return errors.New("region and sts endpoint are required (EKS_REGION, EKS_ADDON_GATEWAY_URL)")
+	}
+	return nil
+}
+
+// CertConfig returns the certificate settings that follow from the k3s tls directory.
+func (c ServiceConfig) CertConfig() CertConfig {
+	return CertConfig{
+		Dir:          c.Dir,
+		ServerCACert: c.TLSDir + "/server-ca.crt", ServerCAKey: c.TLSDir + "/server-ca.key",
+		ClientCACert: c.TLSDir + "/client-ca.crt", ClientCAKey: c.TLSDir + "/client-ca.key",
+	}
+}
+
+// Run serves the webhook on the loopback address and keeps the CA ConfigMaps
+// published until ctx ends.
+func Run(ctx context.Context, c ServiceConfig, log *slog.Logger) error {
+	if err := c.Validate(); err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+	certs, err := EnsureCerts(c.CertConfig())
+	if err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+	bundle, err := c.caBundle()
+	if err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+	if err := c.stageManifests(); err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+	kube, err := NewKubeClient(c.APIServer, c.TLSDir+"/server-ca.crt", certs.ClientCert, certs.ClientKey)
+	if err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+	pair, err := tls.LoadX509KeyPair(certs.ServingCert, certs.ServingKey)
+	if err != nil {
+		return fmt.Errorf("load serving certificate: %w", err)
+	}
+
+	mux := http.NewServeMux()
+	mux.Handle(MutatePath, NewMutator(Config{Region: c.Region, STSEndpoint: c.STSEndpoint}, kube, log))
+	mux.HandleFunc("/healthz", func(w http.ResponseWriter, _ *http.Request) { _, _ = io.WriteString(w, "ok") })
+	srv := &http.Server{
+		Handler:           mux,
+		TLSConfig:         &tls.Config{Certificates: []tls.Certificate{pair}, MinVersion: tls.VersionTLS12},
+		ReadHeaderTimeout: 5 * time.Second,
+		ReadTimeout:       10 * time.Second,
+		WriteTimeout:      10 * time.Second,
+	}
+	ln, err := net.Listen("tcp", c.Addr)
+	if err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+
+	errc := make(chan error, 1)
+	go func() { errc <- srv.ServeTLS(ln, "", "") }()
+	go func() {
+		if err := NewPublisher(PublisherConfig{Bundle: bundle}, kube, kube, log).Run(ctx, c.Resync); err != nil {
+			log.Error("ca bundle publisher stopped", "error", err)
+		}
+	}()
+	log.Info("pod identity webhook listening", "addr", c.Addr)
+
+	renew := time.NewTicker(certCheckEvery)
+	defer renew.Stop()
+	for {
+		select {
+		case <-renew.C:
+			if !NeedsRenewal(certs, time.Now()) {
+				continue
+			}
+			log.Info("certificate inside renew window; exiting so the supervisor restarts and reissues")
+			shutdown, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 5*time.Second)
+			defer cancel()
+			_ = srv.Shutdown(shutdown)
+			return ErrCertRenewal
+		case <-ctx.Done():
+			shutdown, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 5*time.Second)
+			defer cancel()
+			return srv.Shutdown(shutdown)
+		case err := <-errc:
+			return err
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+// caBundle is the system roots plus the gateway CA, so a client that trusts only
+// this bundle still reaches public endpoints as well as the gateway.
+func (c ServiceConfig) caBundle() ([]byte, error) {
+	roots, err := os.ReadFile(c.SystemRoots)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("read system roots: %w", err)
+	}
+	var gw []byte
+	if c.GatewayCAFile != "" {
+		if gw, err = os.ReadFile(c.GatewayCAFile); err != nil {
+			return nil, fmt.Errorf("read gateway ca: %w", err)
+		}
+	}
+	b := BuildCABundle(roots, gw)
+	if len(b) == 0 {
+		return nil, errors.New("ca bundle is empty")
+	}
+	return b, nil
+}
+
+// stageManifests writes the RBAC and webhook configuration into the k3s
+// auto-deploy directory. Every server renders the same bytes (the CA is shared),
+// and the file is only replaced when its content changes, so k3s re-applies it
+// only on a real change.
+func (c ServiceConfig) stageManifests() error {
+	ca, err := os.ReadFile(c.TLSDir + "/server-ca.crt")
+	if err != nil {
+		return fmt.Errorf("read server ca: %w", err)
+	}
+	body, err := RenderManifests(WebhookConfig{Name: WebhookName, URL: "https://" + c.Addr + MutatePath, CA: ca})
+	if err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+	path := c.ManifestDir + "/" + manifestFile
+	if cur, err := os.ReadFile(path); err == nil && bytes.Equal(cur, body) {
+		return nil
+	}
+	return writeAtomic(path, body, 0o600)
+}
@@ -0,0 +1,305 @@
+package podidentity
+
+import (
+	"bytes"
+	"crypto/ecdsa"
+	"crypto/elliptic"
+	"crypto/rand"
+	"crypto/x509"
+	"crypto/x509/pkix"
+	"encoding/base64"
+	"encoding/json"
+	"encoding/pem"
+	"math/big"
+	"net"
+	"os"
+	"path/filepath"
+	"strings"
+	"testing"
+	"time"
+
+	"github.com/mulgadc/spinifex/spinifex/agents/eks/konnectivitycert"
+	"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
+	"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
+)
+
+// writeCA writes a self-signed CA cert and key as <name>.crt and <name>.key.
+func writeCA(t *testing.T, dir, name string) *x509.Certificate {
+	t.Helper()
+	key, err := ecdsa.GenerateKey(elliptic.P256(), rand.Reader)
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+	tmpl := x509.Certificate{
+		SerialNumber: big.NewInt(1), Subject: pkix.Name{CommonName: name},
+		NotBefore: time.Now().Add(-time.Hour), NotAfter: time.Now().AddDate(10, 0, 0),
+		IsCA: true, BasicConstraintsValid: true, KeyUsage: x509.KeyUsageCertSign,
+	}
+	der, err := x509.CreateCertificate(rand.Reader, &tmpl, &tmpl, &key.PublicKey, key)
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+	kd, err := x509.MarshalECPrivateKey(key)
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+	require.NoError(t, os.WriteFile(filepath.Join(dir, name+".crt"), pem.EncodeToMemory(&pem.Block{Type: "CERTIFICATE", Bytes: der}), 0o644))
+	require.NoError(t, os.WriteFile(filepath.Join(dir, name+".key"), pem.EncodeToMemory(&pem.Block{Type: "EC PRIVATE KEY", Bytes: kd}), 0o600))
+	ca, err := x509.ParseCertificate(der)
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+	return ca
+}
+
+func certTestConfig(t *testing.T) (CertConfig, string) {
+	t.Helper()
+	tls := t.TempDir()
+	writeCA(t, tls, "server-ca")
+	writeCA(t, tls, "client-ca")
+	return CertConfig{
+		Dir:          filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "state"),
+		ServerCACert: filepath.Join(tls, "server-ca.crt"), ServerCAKey: filepath.Join(tls, "server-ca.key"),
+		ClientCACert: filepath.Join(tls, "client-ca.crt"), ClientCAKey: filepath.Join(tls, "client-ca.key"),
+	}, tls
+}
+
+func parseCert(t *testing.T, path string) *x509.Certificate {
+	t.Helper()
+	b, err := os.ReadFile(path)
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+	blk, _ := pem.Decode(b)
+	require.NotNil(t, blk)
+	c, err := x509.ParseCertificate(blk.Bytes)
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+	return c
+}
+
+func TestEnsureCerts_ServingCertIsForLoopbackAndSignedByTheServerCA(t *testing.T) {
+	cfg, _ := certTestConfig(t)
+	out, err := EnsureCerts(cfg)
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+
+	serverCA := parseCert(t, cfg.ServerCACert)
+	serving := parseCert(t, out.ServingCert)
+	require.NoError(t, serving.CheckSignatureFrom(serverCA))
+	require.Len(t, serving.IPAddresses, 1)
+	assert.True(t, serving.IPAddresses[0].IsLoopback())
+	assert.Equal(t, []x509.ExtKeyUsage{x509.ExtKeyUsageServerAuth}, serving.ExtKeyUsage)
+
+	roots := x509.NewCertPool()
+	roots.AddCert(serverCA)
+	_, err = serving.Verify(x509.VerifyOptions{Roots: roots, DNSName: "127.0.0.1"})
+	assert.NoError(t, err, "the caBundle (server CA) must validate the serving cert for 127.0.0.1")
+}
+
+func TestEnsureCerts_ClientCertIsSignedByTheClientCAWithTheWebhookIdentity(t *testing.T) {
+	cfg, _ := certTestConfig(t)
+	out, err := EnsureCerts(cfg)
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+
+	client := parseCert(t, out.ClientCert)
+	require.NoError(t, client.CheckSignatureFrom(parseCert(t, cfg.ClientCACert)))
+	assert.Equal(t, ClientCN, client.Subject.CommonName)
+	assert.Equal(t, []x509.ExtKeyUsage{x509.ExtKeyUsageClientAuth}, client.ExtKeyUsage)
+}
+
+func TestEnsureCerts_KeysAreOwnerOnly(t *testing.T) {
+	cfg, _ := certTestConfig(t)
+	out, err := EnsureCerts(cfg)
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+	for _, k := range []string{out.ServingKey, out.ClientKey} {
+		st, err := os.Stat(k)
+		require.NoError(t, err)
+		assert.Equal(t, os.FileMode(0o600), st.Mode().Perm(), k)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestEnsureCerts_ReusesValidCertsAndReissuesWhenTheCAChanges(t *testing.T) {
+	cfg, tls := certTestConfig(t)
+	first, err := EnsureCerts(cfg)
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+	before, err := os.ReadFile(first.ServingCert)
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+
+	_, err = EnsureCerts(cfg)
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+	same, err := os.ReadFile(first.ServingCert)
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+	assert.True(t, bytes.Equal(before, same), "a valid cert must be reused so restarts do not churn it")
+
+	writeCA(t, tls, "server-ca") // the cluster CA is replaced
+	_, err = EnsureCerts(cfg)
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+	after, err := os.ReadFile(first.ServingCert)
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+	assert.False(t, bytes.Equal(before, after), "a cert signed by a retired CA must be reissued")
+	require.NoError(t, parseCert(t, first.ServingCert).CheckSignatureFrom(parseCert(t, cfg.ServerCACert)))
+}
+
+func TestEnsureCerts_MissingCAFails(t *testing.T) {
+	cfg, _ := certTestConfig(t)
+	cfg.ServerCACert = filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "absent.crt")
+	_, err := EnsureCerts(cfg)
+	assert.Error(t, err)
+}
+
+func TestRenderManifests_GrantsLeastPrivilegeAndEmbedsTheWebhook(t *testing.T) {
+	out, err := RenderManifests(WebhookConfig{Name: "n", URL: "https://127.0.0.1:8445/mutate", CA: []byte("ca")})
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+	docs := strings.Split(string(out), "---\n")
+	require.Len(t, docs, 3)
+
+	var role struct {
+		Rules []struct {
+			Resources     []string `json:"resources"`
+			ResourceNames []string `json:"resourceNames"`
+			Verbs         []string `json:"verbs"`
+		} `json:"rules"`
+	}
+	require.NoError(t, json.Unmarshal([]byte(docs[0]), &role))
+	got := map[string][]string{}
+	for _, r := range role.Rules {
+		for _, res := range r.Resources {
+			key := res
+			if len(r.ResourceNames) > 0 {
+				key += "/named"
+			}
+			got[key] = append(got[key], r.Verbs...)
+		}
+		assert.NotContains(t, r.Verbs, "*")
+		assert.NotContains(t, r.Verbs, "delete")
+	}
+	assert.Equal(t, map[string][]string{
+		"serviceaccounts":  {"get"},
+		"namespaces":       {"list", "watch"},
+		"configmaps":       {"create"},
+		"configmaps/named": {"get", "update"},
+	}, got)
+
+	var binding struct {
+		Subjects []struct {
+			Name string `json:"name"`
+		} `json:"subjects"`
+	}
+	require.NoError(t, json.Unmarshal([]byte(docs[1]), &binding))
+	assert.Equal(t, ClientCN, binding.Subjects[0].Name)
+
+	assert.Contains(t, docs[2], `"failurePolicy": "Ignore"`)
+}
+
+func TestRenderManifests_IsDeterministic(t *testing.T) {
+	w := WebhookConfig{Name: "n", URL: "https://127.0.0.1:8445/mutate", CA: []byte("ca")}
+	a, err := RenderManifests(w)
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+	b, err := RenderManifests(w)
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+	assert.Equal(t, a, b)
+}
+
+func TestParseServiceConfig_DefaultsFromTheNodeEnvironment(t *testing.T) {
+	env := map[string]string{"EKS_REGION": "ap-southeast-2", "EKS_ADDON_GATEWAY_URL": "https://gw:9999", "EKS_GATEWAY_CA": "/etc/gw.pem"}
+	c, err := ParseServiceConfig(nil, func(k string) string { return env[k] }, &bytes.Buffer{})
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+	assert.Equal(t, "ap-southeast-2", c.Region)
+	assert.Equal(t, "https://gw:9999", c.STSEndpoint)
+	assert.Equal(t, "/etc/gw.pem", c.GatewayCAFile)
+	assert.Equal(t, DefaultAddr, c.Addr)
+}
+
+func TestParseServiceConfig_RejectsANonLoopbackListener(t *testing.T) {
+	vars := map[string]string{"EKS_REGION": "r", "EKS_ADDON_GATEWAY_URL": "https://gw"}
+	env := func(k string) string { return vars[k] }
+	for _, addr := range []string{"0.0.0.0:8445", ":8445", "10.0.0.5:8445", "somehost:8445"} {
+		_, err := ParseServiceConfig([]string{"--addr=" + addr}, env, &bytes.Buffer{})
+		assert.Error(t, err, addr)
+	}
+	_, err := ParseServiceConfig([]string{"--addr=127.0.0.1:9000"}, env, &bytes.Buffer{})
+	assert.NoError(t, err)
+}
+
+func TestParseServiceConfig_RequiresRegionAndSTSEndpoint(t *testing.T) {
+	_, err := ParseServiceConfig(nil, func(string) string { return "" }, &bytes.Buffer{})
+	assert.Error(t, err)
+}
+
+func TestStageManifests_WritesTheServerCAAndIsIdempotent(t *testing.T) {
+	cfg, tls := certTestConfig(t)
+	c := ServiceConfig{Addr: DefaultAddr, TLSDir: tls, ManifestDir: t.TempDir()}
+	require.NoError(t, c.stageManifests())
+
+	path := filepath.Join(c.ManifestDir, manifestFile)
+	first, err := os.ReadFile(path)
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+	ca, err := os.ReadFile(cfg.ServerCACert)
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+	assert.Contains(t, string(first), base64Of(ca), "caBundle must be the k3s server CA")
+	assert.Contains(t, string(first), "https://127.0.0.1:8445/mutate")
+
+	st1, err := os.Stat(path)
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+	require.NoError(t, c.stageManifests())
+	st2, err := os.Stat(path)
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+	assert.True(t, st1.ModTime().Equal(st2.ModTime()), "an unchanged manifest must not be rewritten")
+}
+
+func TestCABundle_IsSystemRootsPlusGatewayCA(t *testing.T) {
+	dir := t.TempDir()
+	writeCA(t, dir, "sys")
+	writeCA(t, dir, "gw")
+	c := ServiceConfig{SystemRoots: filepath.Join(dir, "sys.crt"), GatewayCAFile: filepath.Join(dir, "gw.crt")}
+	b, err := c.caBundle()
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+	pool := x509.NewCertPool()
+	require.True(t, pool.AppendCertsFromPEM(b))
+	assert.Len(t, pool.Subjects(), 2) //nolint:staticcheck // counting entries only
+}
+
+func base64Of(b []byte) string { return base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString(b) }
+
+func TestEnsureCerts_AreValidForOneYear(t *testing.T) {
+	cfg, _ := certTestConfig(t)
+	out, err := EnsureCerts(cfg)
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+	for _, p := range []string{out.ServingCert, out.ClientCert} {
+		c := parseCert(t, p)
+		assert.InDelta(t, 365*24, c.NotAfter.Sub(c.NotBefore).Hours()-1, 24, p)
+		assert.Less(t, time.Until(c.NotAfter), 366*24*time.Hour, p)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestNeedsRenewal(t *testing.T) {
+	cfg, _ := certTestConfig(t)
+	out, err := EnsureCerts(cfg)
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+	now := time.Now()
+
+	assert.False(t, NeedsRenewal(out, now), "fresh certs are outside the window")
+	assert.False(t, NeedsRenewal(out, now.Add(300*24*time.Hour)))
+	assert.True(t, NeedsRenewal(out, now.Add(340*24*time.Hour)), "inside 30 days of expiry")
+	assert.True(t, NeedsRenewal(out, now.Add(400*24*time.Hour)), "already expired")
+
+	require.NoError(t, os.Remove(out.ClientCert))
+	assert.True(t, NeedsRenewal(out, now), "an unreadable certificate needs renewal")
+}
+
+func TestEnsureCerts_ReissuesACertInsideTheRenewWindow(t *testing.T) {
+	cfg, _ := certTestConfig(t)
+	out, err := EnsureCerts(cfg)
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+	// Replace the serving cert with one that expires in 10 days.
+	ca, caKey, err := konnectivitycert.LoadCA(cfg.ServerCACert, cfg.ServerCAKey)
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+	key, err := ecdsa.GenerateKey(elliptic.P256(), rand.Reader)
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+	tmpl := x509.Certificate{
+		SerialNumber: big.NewInt(7), Subject: pkix.Name{CommonName: "pod-identity-webhook"},
+		NotBefore: time.Now().Add(-time.Hour), NotAfter: time.Now().Add(10 * 24 * time.Hour),
+		KeyUsage: x509.KeyUsageDigitalSignature, ExtKeyUsage: []x509.ExtKeyUsage{x509.ExtKeyUsageServerAuth},
+		IPAddresses: []net.IP{net.IPv4(127, 0, 0, 1)},
+	}
+	der, err := x509.CreateCertificate(rand.Reader, &tmpl, ca, &key.PublicKey, caKey)
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+	kd, err := x509.MarshalECPrivateKey(key)
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+	require.NoError(t, os.WriteFile(out.ServingKey, pem.EncodeToMemory(&pem.Block{Type: "EC PRIVATE KEY", Bytes: kd}), 0o600))
+	require.NoError(t, os.WriteFile(out.ServingCert, pem.EncodeToMemory(&pem.Block{Type: "CERTIFICATE", Bytes: der}), 0o644))
+	require.True(t, NeedsRenewal(out, time.Now()))
+
+	_, err = EnsureCerts(cfg)
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+	assert.False(t, NeedsRenewal(out, time.Now()), "the restart path must leave certs outside the window")
+}
@@ -0,0 +1,80 @@
+package podidentity
+
+import (
+	"crypto/sha256"
+	"encoding/base64"
+	"encoding/json"
+	"encoding/pem"
+	"errors"
+	"fmt"
+	"net/url"
+)
+
+// WebhookName is the fully qualified name of the webhook entry.
+const WebhookName = "pod-identity.spinifex.mulgadc.com"
+
+// RenderWebhookConfiguration returns the MutatingWebhookConfiguration as JSON.
+// The URL must be https on 127.0.0.1: each API server calls its own webhook, and
+// failurePolicy Ignore keeps an unreachable injector from blocking pod creation.
+func RenderWebhookConfiguration(c WebhookConfig) ([]byte, error) {
+	if c.Name == "" {
+		return nil, errors.New("webhook configuration needs a name")
+	}
+	u, err := url.Parse(c.URL)
+	if err != nil || u.Scheme != "https" || u.Hostname() != "127.0.0.1" {
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("webhook url %q must be https on 127.0.0.1", c.URL)
+	}
+	if len(c.CA) == 0 {
+		return nil, errors.New("webhook configuration needs a CA bundle")
+	}
+	cfg := map[string]any{
+		"apiVersion": "admissionregistration.k8s.io/v1",
+		"kind":       "MutatingWebhookConfiguration",
+		"metadata":   map[string]any{"name": c.Name},
+		"webhooks": []map[string]any{{
+			"name": WebhookName,
+			"clientConfig": map[string]any{
+				"url":      c.URL,
+				"caBundle": base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString(c.CA),
+			},
+			"rules": []map[string]any{{
+				"operations":  []string{"CREATE"},
+				"apiGroups":   []string{""},
+				"apiVersions": []string{"v1"},
+				"resources":   []string{"pods"},
+				"scope":       "Namespaced",
+			}},
+			"failurePolicy":           "Ignore",
+			"sideEffects":             "None",
+			"timeoutSeconds":          5,
+			"admissionReviewVersions": []string{"v1"},
+		}},
+	}
+	return json.Marshal(cfg)
+}
+
+// BuildCABundle returns the system roots plus the gateway CA as one PEM bundle,
+// without duplicate certificates.
+func BuildCABundle(system, gateway []byte) []byte {
+	seen := map[[sha256.Size]byte]bool{}
+	var out []byte
+	for _, src := range [][]byte{system, gateway} {
+		for rest := src; ; {
+			var b *pem.Block
+			b, rest = pem.Decode(rest)
+			if b == nil {
+				break
+			}
+			if b.Type != "CERTIFICATE" {
+				continue
+			}
+			sum := sha256.Sum256(b.Bytes)
+			if seen[sum] {
+				continue
+			}
+			seen[sum] = true
+			out = append(out, pem.EncodeToMemory(&pem.Block{Type: "CERTIFICATE", Bytes: b.Bytes})...)
+		}
+	}
+	return out
+}
@@ -0,0 +1,22 @@
+package workerboot
+
+import (
+	"context"
+
+	"github.com/mulgadc/spinifex/internal/sqsworkergw"
+	"github.com/mulgadc/spinifex/spinifex/agents/sqs/workerkey"
+)
+
+// GatewayClaimer adapts the signed gateway client to the receipt key decision.
+type GatewayClaimer struct{ Client *sqsworkergw.Client }
+
+var _ workerkey.Claimer = GatewayClaimer{}
+
+func (c GatewayClaimer) Claim(ctx context.Context) (workerkey.Decision, error) {
+	k, err := c.Client.ClaimReceiptKey(ctx)
+	return workerkey.Decision{Pending: k.Pending, Fingerprint: k.Fingerprint, HostNodes: k.HostNodes}, err
+}
+
+func (c GatewayClaimer) RecordFingerprint(ctx context.Context, fingerprint string) error {
+	return c.Client.RecordReceiptKey(ctx, fingerprint)
+}
@@ -3,22 +3,14 @@ package workerboot
 import (
 	"bytes"
 	"context"
-	"crypto/ecdsa"
-	"crypto/elliptic"
-	"crypto/rand"
 	"crypto/sha256"
-	"crypto/x509"
-	"crypto/x509/pkix"
 	"encoding/hex"
 	"encoding/pem"
-	"errors"
 	"fmt"
 	"io"
 	"maps"
-	"math/big"
 	"net/http"
 	"net/http/httptest"
-	"os"
 	"slices"
 	"strings"
 	"sync"
@@ -33,20 +25,16 @@ import (
 	testutil "github.com/mulgadc/spinifex/internal/testkit"
 	"github.com/mulgadc/spinifex/spinifex/agents/sqs/workerkey"
 	sqsworkerapi "github.com/mulgadc/spinifex/spinifex/domains/sqs/awsapi/worker"
-	"github.com/mulgadc/spinifex/spinifex/domains/sqs/firststore"
-	"github.com/mulgadc/spinifex/spinifex/domains/sqs/storelaunch"
 	"github.com/mulgadc/spinifex/spinifex/domains/sqs/workerident"
 	"github.com/mulgadc/spinifex/spinifex/domains/sqs/workerrole"
 	awsidentifiers "github.com/mulgadc/spinifex/spinifex/foundation/aws/identifiers"
 	"github.com/mulgadc/spinifex/spinifex/foundation/state/clustersize"
 	"github.com/mulgadc/spinifex/spinifex/ingress/aws/dispatch"
-	"github.com/nats-io/nkeys"
 )

 const (
-	gwInstance  = "i-0abc12345def67890"
-	gwSuccessor = "i-0fedcba9876543210"
-	gwVolume    = "vol-0a1b2c3d4e5f60718"
+	gwInstance = "i-0abc12345def67890"
+	gwVolume   = "vol-0a1b2c3d4e5f60718"
 )

 // session is one instance-role credential: its secret and the instance ID
@@ -230,58 +218,55 @@ func (g *localGateway) reply(code string) {
 	}
 }

-func (g *localGateway) sentBodies() []string {
-	g.mu.Lock()
-	defer g.mu.Unlock()
-	return slices.Clone(g.bodies)
-}
-
-// gwCluster is the domain's real worker-identity and first-store records.
+// gwCluster is the domain's real worker-identity record behind the gateway.
 type gwCluster struct {
-	ids    workerident.Store
-	fence  firststore.Store
-	stores storelaunch.Records
-	gw     *localGateway
+	ids workerident.Store
+	gw  *localGateway
 }

-func newGWCluster(t *testing.T) gwCluster {
+// newGWCluster hands the gateway's work actions to work and has it report
+// hostNodes as its cluster size; nil hostNodes is the declared size.
+func newGWCluster(t *testing.T, work sqsworkerapi.Work, hostNodes func() int) gwCluster {
 	t.Helper()
 	clustersize.DeclareForTest(t, 1)
 	_, _, js := testutil.StartTestJetStream(t)
-	ctx := context.Background()
-	ids, err := workerident.Open(ctx, js)
+	ids, err := workerident.Open(context.Background(), js)
 	if err != nil {
 		t.Fatal(err)
 	}
-	fence, err := firststore.Open(ctx, js)
-	if err != nil {
-		t.Fatal(err)
-	}
-	stores, err := storelaunch.Open(ctx, js)
-	if err != nil {
-		t.Fatal(err)
-	}
-	return gwCluster{ids: ids, fence: fence, stores: stores, gw: newLocalGateway(t, sqsworkerapi.JetStreamDeps(js))}
+	deps := sqsworkerapi.JetStreamDeps(js)
+	deps.Work = work
+	deps.HostNodes = hostNodes
+	return gwCluster{ids: ids, gw: newLocalGateway(t, deps)}
 }

-func (c gwCluster) launch(t *testing.T, claim string, supersedes uint64, inst string) workerident.Intent {
+// launch records a worker on a newly created volume, so its receipt key is
+// pending, and binds it to inst.
+func (c gwCluster) launch(t *testing.T, inst string) workerident.Intent {
 	t.Helper()
 	ctx := context.Background()
-	in, err := c.ids.BeginLaunch(ctx, testRegion, workerident.LaunchRequest{InstanceType: "t3.small",
-		ClaimID: claim, Supersedes: supersedes, NodeID: "node-a", DataVolumeID: gwVolume, DataVolumeEncrypted: true,
+	in, err := c.ids.BeginLaunch(ctx, testRegion, workerident.LaunchRequest{
+		InstanceType: "t3.small", ClaimID: "claim-0001", NodeID: "node-a", DataVolumeEncrypted: true, SizeGiB: 8,
 	})
 	if err != nil {
 		t.Fatal(err)
 	}
-	if err := c.ids.BindInstance(ctx, in, inst); err != nil {
-		t.Fatal(err)
+	for _, step := range []func() error{
+		func() error { return c.ids.MarkVolumeAttempted(ctx, in) },
+		func() error { return c.ids.RecordVolume(ctx, in, gwVolume) },
+		func() error { return c.ids.MarkDispatched(ctx, in) },
+		func() error { return c.ids.BindInstance(ctx, in, inst) },
+	} {
+		if err := step(); err != nil {
+			t.Fatal(err)
+		}
 	}
 	return in
 }

 // guestFor points the fake guest's boot at the local gateway, signing with
 // the instance's own credential through the real client.
-func (c gwCluster) guestFor(t *testing.T, g *guest, accessKey, inst string) {
+func (c gwCluster) guestFor(t *testing.T, g *guest, accessKey, inst string) *gwsign.Signer {
 	t.Helper()
 	signer := c.gw.issue(accessKey, "secret-"+accessKey, inst)
 	g.fw("data-serial", testSerial)
@@ -289,388 +274,14 @@ func (c gwCluster) guestFor(t *testing.T, g *guest, accessKey, inst string) {
 	g.fw("gateway-url", c.gw.srv.URL)
 	g.cfg.Wait = 10 * time.Millisecond
 	g.cfg.NewClaimer = func(region, url string) (workerkey.Claimer, error) {
-		return sqsworkergw.New(url, region, c.gw.caPEM(), signer)
+		cl, err := sqsworkergw.New(url, region, c.gw.caPEM(), signer)
+		return GatewayClaimer{Client: cl}, err
 	}
+	return signer
 }

-func (c gwCluster) assertNoSeedSent(t *testing.T, seed string) {
-	t.Helper()
-	seed = strings.TrimSpace(seed)
-	for _, b := range c.gw.sentBodies() {
-		if strings.Contains(b, seed) {
-			t.Fatal("a request carried seed material")
-		}
-	}
-}
-
-// A bound worker boots: the gateway authorizes creation, the guest creates
-// its key on the mounted disk and records only the public key; reboots get
-// that same key back from the domain.
-func TestGateway_FirstBootCreatesKeyAndRebootsReuseIt(t *testing.T) {
-	c := newGWCluster(t)
-	c.launch(t, "claim-0001", 0, gwInstance)
-	g := newGuest(t)
-	c.guestFor(t, g, "ASIAWORKER1", gwInstance)
-
-	pub, err := g.boot()
-	if err != nil {
-		t.Fatal(err)
-	}
-	seed := g.seed()
-	for boot := 2; boot <= 3; boot++ {
-		g.resetMounts()
-		got, err := g.boot()
-		if err != nil || got != pub || g.seed() != seed {
-			t.Fatalf("reboot %d = %q, %v", boot, got, err)
-		}
-	}
-	records := 0
-	for _, b := range c.gw.sentBodies() {
-		if strings.Contains(b, "Action=RecordWorkerPublicKey") {
-			records++
-			if !strings.Contains(b, "PublicKey="+pub) {
-				t.Fatal("a record carried a different key")
-			}
-		}
-	}
-	if records != 1 {
-		t.Fatalf("records = %d, want 1", records)
-	}
-	c.assertNoSeedSent(t, seed)
-	g.assertNoSeedLeak(nil, seed)
-}
-
-// The record's reply is lost after it landed: the boot retries, the domain
-// answers with the recorded key, and the same key is used.
-func TestGateway_LostRecordReplyKeepsTheKey(t *testing.T) {
-	c := newGWCluster(t)
-	c.launch(t, "claim-0001", 0, gwInstance)
-	g := newGuest(t)
-	c.guestFor(t, g, "ASIAWORKER1", gwInstance)
-	var dropped bool
-	c.gw.dropReply = func(action string) bool {
-		if action == "RecordWorkerPublicKey" && !dropped {
-			dropped = true
-			return true
-		}
-		return false
-	}
-	pub, err := g.boot()
-	if err != nil || !dropped {
-		t.Fatalf("boot = %q, %v (dropped=%v)", pub, err, dropped)
-	}
-	g.resetMounts()
-	if again, err := g.boot(); err != nil || again != pub {
-		t.Fatalf("reboot = %q, %v", again, err)
-	}
-	c.assertNoSeedSent(t, g.seed())
-}
-
-// After the key is recorded, a lost guest copy fails closed: the domain
-// answers with the recorded key and no replacement is created or sent.
-func TestGateway_KeyLostAfterRecordingFailsClosed(t *testing.T) {
-	c := newGWCluster(t)
-	c.launch(t, "claim-0001", 0, gwInstance)
-	g := newGuest(t)
-	c.guestFor(t, g, "ASIAWORKER1", gwInstance)
-	if _, err := g.boot(); err != nil {
-		t.Fatal(err)
-	}
-	if err := os.Remove(g.keyFile()); err != nil {
-		t.Fatal(err)
-	}
-	before := len(c.gw.sentBodies())
-	g.resetMounts()
-	if _, err := g.boot(); !errors.Is(err, workerkey.ErrKeyMissing) {
-		t.Fatalf("err = %v, want ErrKeyMissing", err)
-	}
-	if _, err := os.Lstat(g.keyFile()); !errors.Is(err, os.ErrNotExist) {
-		t.Fatal("a replacement key was created")
-	}
-	for _, b := range c.gw.sentBodies()[before:] {
-		if strings.Contains(b, "RecordWorkerPublicKey") {
-			t.Fatal("a replacement key was offered")
-		}
-	}
-}
-
-// An instance the domain never bound, or one already replaced, is refused
-// at the first call and creates no key; AccessDenied is not retried.
-func TestGateway_UnboundOrReplacedInstanceIsRefused(t *testing.T) {
-	t.Run("unbound", func(t *testing.T) {
-		c := newGWCluster(t)
-		c.launch(t, "claim-0001", 0, gwInstance)
-		g := newGuest(t)
-		c.guestFor(t, g, "ASIAOTHER", gwSuccessor)
-		_, err := g.boot()
-		api, ok := errors.AsType[*sqsworkergw.APIError](err)
-		if !ok || api.Code != "AccessDenied" {
-			t.Fatalf("err = %v, want AccessDenied", err)
-		}
-		if n := len(c.gw.sentBodies()); n != g.cfg.Attempts {
-			t.Fatalf("calls = %d, want the %d attempts and no more", n, g.cfg.Attempts)
-		}
-		g.assertNoKey()
-	})
-	t.Run("replaced", func(t *testing.T) {
-		c := newGWCluster(t)
-		first := c.launch(t, "claim-0001", 0, gwInstance)
-		ctx := context.Background()
-		if err := c.ids.RecordStopped(ctx, first, gwInstance); err != nil {
-			t.Fatal(err)
-		}
-		if err := c.fence.Fence(ctx, testRegion, first.Generation+1); err != nil {
-			t.Fatal(err)
-		}
-		c.launch(t, "claim-0002", first.Generation, gwSuccessor)
-		g := newGuest(t)
-		c.guestFor(t, g, "ASIAOLD", gwInstance)
-		if _, err := g.boot(); err == nil {
-			t.Fatal("the replaced instance booted")
-		}
-		g.assertNoKey()
-	})
-}
-
-// A bad signature is refused before any decision, and creates no key.
-func TestGateway_BadSignatureCreatesNoKey(t *testing.T) {
-	c := newGWCluster(t)
-	c.launch(t, "claim-0001", 0, gwInstance)
-	g := newGuest(t)
-	c.guestFor(t, g, "ASIAWORKER1", gwInstance)
-	forged := gwsign.NewStatic("ASIAWORKER1", "not-the-secret")
-	g.cfg.NewClaimer = func(region, url string) (workerkey.Claimer, error) {
-		return sqsworkergw.New(url, region, c.gw.caPEM(), forged)
-	}
-	if _, err := g.boot(); err == nil {
-		t.Fatal("a forged signature booted")
-	}
-	g.assertNoKey()
-}
-
-// The client trusts only the cluster CA it was given: a gateway whose
-// certificate another CA signed is never sent a request.
-func TestGateway_UntrustedServerIsNotContacted(t *testing.T) {
-	c := newGWCluster(t)
-	c.launch(t, "claim-0001", 0, gwInstance)
-	g := newGuest(t)
-	c.guestFor(t, g, "ASIAWORKER1", gwInstance)
-	g.cfg.Attempts = 1
-	signer := c.gw.issue("ASIAWORKER1", "secret-ASIAWORKER1", gwInstance)
-	g.cfg.NewClaimer = func(region, url string) (workerkey.Claimer, error) {
-		return sqsworkergw.New(url, region, otherCA(t), signer)
-	}
-	if _, err := g.boot(); err == nil || !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "certificate") {
-		t.Fatalf("err = %v, want a TLS refusal", err)
-	}
-	if len(c.gw.sentBodies()) != 0 {
-		t.Fatal("a request reached a server outside the trusted CA")
-	}
-	g.assertNoKey()
-}
-
-// otherCA is a fresh self-signed CA unrelated to the test server's.
-func otherCA(t *testing.T) []byte {
-	t.Helper()
-	key, err := ecdsa.GenerateKey(elliptic.P256(), rand.Reader)
-	if err != nil {
-		t.Fatal(err)
-	}
-	tmpl := &x509.Certificate{
-		SerialNumber: big.NewInt(1), Subject: pkix.Name{CommonName: "other"},
-		NotBefore: time.Now().Add(-time.Hour), NotAfter: time.Now().Add(time.Hour),
-		IsCA: true, BasicConstraintsValid: true, KeyUsage: x509.KeyUsageCertSign,
-	}
-	der, err := x509.CreateCertificate(rand.Reader, tmpl, tmpl, &key.PublicKey, key)
-	if err != nil {
-		t.Fatal(err)
-	}
-	return pem.EncodeToMemory(&pem.Block{Type: "CERTIFICATE", Bytes: der})
-}
-
-// The worker VM starts before its launch binds the instance, so its first
-// calls are denied. It creates nothing while denied, and boots once bound.
-func TestGateway_BootBeforeBindSucceedsAfterBinding(t *testing.T) {
-	c := newGWCluster(t)
-	ctx := context.Background()
-	intent, err := c.ids.BeginLaunch(ctx, testRegion, workerident.LaunchRequest{InstanceType: "t3.small",
-		ClaimID: "claim-0001", NodeID: "node-a", DataVolumeID: gwVolume, DataVolumeEncrypted: true,
-	})
-	if err != nil {
-		t.Fatal(err)
-	}
-	g := newGuest(t)
-	c.guestFor(t, g, "ASIAWORKER1", gwInstance)
-	g.cfg.Attempts = 1000
-	c.gw.replied = make(chan string, 2000)
-
-	type result struct {
-		pub string
-		err error
-	}
-	done := make(chan result, 1)
-	go func() {
-		pub, err := g.boot()
-		done <- result{pub, err}
-	}()
-	if code := <-c.gw.replied; code != "AccessDenied" {
-		t.Fatalf("first reply = %q, want AccessDenied before binding", code)
-	}
-	g.assertNoKey()
-	if err := c.ids.BindInstance(ctx, intent, gwInstance); err != nil {
-		t.Fatal(err)
-	}
-	r := <-done
-	if r.err != nil || r.pub == "" {
-		t.Fatalf("boot after binding = %q, %v", r.pub, r.err)
-	}
-	if g.seed() == "" {
-		t.Fatal("booted without a key on the worker disk")
-	}
-}
-
-// A replaced worker is never bound again: it keeps being denied, creates
-// nothing and gives up within its attempts.
-func TestGateway_StaleWorkerGivesUpWithinTheBound(t *testing.T) {
-	c := newGWCluster(t)
-	ctx := context.Background()
-	first := c.launch(t, "claim-0001", 0, gwInstance)
-	if err := c.ids.RecordStopped(ctx, first, gwInstance); err != nil {
-		t.Fatal(err)
-	}
-	if err := c.fence.Fence(ctx, testRegion, first.Generation+1); err != nil {
-		t.Fatal(err)
-	}
-	c.launch(t, "claim-0002", first.Generation, gwSuccessor)
-	g := newGuest(t)
-	c.guestFor(t, g, "ASIAOLD", gwInstance)
-	g.cfg.Attempts = 5
-	_, err := g.boot()
-	if api, ok := errors.AsType[*sqsworkergw.APIError](err); !ok || !api.Pending() {
-		t.Fatalf("err = %v, want the denial", err)
-	}
-	if n := len(c.gw.sentBodies()); n != 5 {
-		t.Fatalf("calls = %d, want exactly the 5 attempts", n)
-	}
-	g.assertNoKey()
-}
-
-// bindStore runs the store launch record through to bound for pub at address,
-// as the operator's EnsureSQSStore would.
-func (c gwCluster) bindStore(t *testing.T, pub, address string) {
-	t.Helper()
-	ctx := context.Background()
-	const claim = "store-claim-0001"
-	steps := []func() error{
-		func() error { return c.stores.Begin(ctx, testRegion, claim, "node-a", pub, "t3.medium", 8) },
-		func() error { return c.stores.MarkVolumeAttempted(ctx, testRegion, claim) },
-		func() error { return c.stores.RecordVolume(ctx, testRegion, claim, "vol-0b1c2d3e4f5a60718") },
-		func() error { return c.stores.MarkNetworkAttempted(ctx, testRegion, claim) },
-		func() error { return c.stores.MarkDispatched(ctx, testRegion, claim) },
-		func() error { return c.stores.Bind(ctx, testRegion, claim, "i-0123456789abcdef0", address) },
-	}
-	for i, step := range steps {
-		if err := step(); err != nil {
-			t.Fatalf("store launch step %d: %v", i, err)
-		}
-	}
-}
-
-// readyFor points the guest's readiness at the local gateway and a store on port.
-func (c gwCluster) readyFor(g *guest, accessKey, inst string, port int) ReadyConfig {
-	signer := c.gw.issue(accessKey, "secret-"+accessKey, inst)
-	return ReadyConfig{
-		Config: g.cfg,
-		NewDescriber: func(region, url string) (StoreDescriber, error) {
-			cl, err := sqsworkergw.New(url, region, c.gw.caPEM(), signer)
-			if err != nil {
-				return nil, err
-			}
-			return gwDescriber{cl}, nil
-		},
-		Checker: NATSChecker{Port: port, Dial: time.Second},
-	}
-}
-
-type gwDescriber struct{ c *sqsworkergw.Client }
-
-func (d gwDescriber) DescribeStore(ctx context.Context) (Store, error) {
-	st, err := d.c.DescribeStore(ctx)
-	return Store(st), err
-}
-
-// The whole path with real components: the worker boots and records its key,
-// waits while the operator has not launched the store, then reaches the real
-// store's JetStream with its own key once the store is bound; after a reboot
-// it is ready again with the same key. No request carries the seed.
-func TestGateway_ReadyAfterADelayedStoreLaunch(t *testing.T) {
-	c := newGWCluster(t)
-	c.launch(t, "claim-0001", 0, gwInstance)
-	g := newGuest(t)
-	c.guestFor(t, g, "ASIAWORKER1", gwInstance)
-	pub, err := g.boot()
-	if err != nil {
-		t.Fatal(err)
-	}
-	port := storeServer(t, pub)
-	err = g.watch(c.readyFor(g, "ASIAWORKER1", gwInstance, port), func(call int, ready bool) bool {
-		if ready {
-			if call < 4 {
-				t.Fatalf("ready at call %d, before the store launch", call)
-			}
-			return true
-		}
-		if call == 3 {
-			c.bindStore(t, pub, "127.0.0.1")
-		}
-		return false
-	})
-	if !errors.Is(err, context.Canceled) {
-		t.Fatalf("watch = %v", err)
-	}
-	for boot := 1; boot <= 2; boot++ {
-		g.resetMounts()
-		if again, err := g.boot(); err != nil || again != pub {
-			t.Fatalf("reboot %d = %q %v", boot, again, err)
-		}
-		if err := g.watch(c.readyFor(g, "ASIAWORKER1", gwInstance, port), func(_ int, ready bool) bool { return ready }); !errors.Is(err, context.Canceled) {
-			t.Fatalf("ready after reboot %d: %v", boot, err)
-		}
-	}
-	c.assertNoSeedSent(t, g.seed())
-	g.assertNoSeedLeak(nil, g.seed())
-}
-
-// A store bound to a key other than this worker's is never checked, and a
-// replaced worker cannot read the store at all; neither is ever ready.
-func TestGateway_ReadyRefusesWrongKeyAndReplacedWorker(t *testing.T) {
-	c := newGWCluster(t)
-	first := c.launch(t, "claim-0001", 0, gwInstance)
-	g := newGuest(t)
-	c.guestFor(t, g, "ASIAWORKER1", gwInstance)
-	if _, err := g.boot(); err != nil {
-		t.Fatal(err)
-	}
-	other, _ := nkeys.CreateUser()
-	otherPub, _ := other.PublicKey()
-	c.bindStore(t, otherPub, "127.0.0.1")
-	port := storeServer(t, otherPub)
-	never := func(call int, ready bool) bool {
-		if ready {
-			t.Fatal("ready against a store for another key")
-		}
-		return call == 3
-	}
-	_ = g.watch(c.readyFor(g, "ASIAWORKER1", gwInstance, port), never)
-	if !slices.ContainsFunc(g.logs, func(l string) bool { return strings.Contains(l, ErrStoreKeyMismatch.Error()) }) {
-		t.Fatalf("no mismatch reported: %v", g.logs)
-	}
-
-	if err := c.ids.RecordStopped(context.Background(), first, gwInstance); err != nil {
-		t.Fatal(err)
-	}
-	_ = g.watch(c.readyFor(g, "ASIAWORKER1", gwInstance, port), never)
-	if !strings.Contains(g.logs[len(g.logs)-1], "AccessDenied") {
-		t.Fatalf("stopped worker: %v", g.logs[len(g.logs)-1])
-	}
+func (g *localGateway) sentBodies() []string {
+	g.mu.Lock()
+	defer g.mu.Unlock()
+	return slices.Clone(g.bodies)
 }
@@ -10,15 +10,14 @@ import (

 	"github.com/nats-io/nats.go"
 	"github.com/nats-io/nats.go/jetstream"
-	"github.com/nats-io/nkeys"
 )

-// StorePort is the port the store guest's NATS listens on.
+// StorePort is the port the guest's own SQS NATS server listens on, bound
+// to loopback only; nothing outside the guest can reach it.
 const StorePort = 4222

-// NATSChecker connects with the worker key and asks JetStream for its account
-// info. It authenticates the client only: there is no TLS, so a pass says
-// something answering at the address accepted the key.
+// NATSChecker asks the guest's loopback JetStream for its account info. A
+// pass says the local store is up and serving JetStream.
 type NATSChecker struct {
 	// Port overrides StorePort, for tests against a local server.
 	Port int
@@ -35,36 +34,22 @@ func (e *StoreUnreachableError) Error() string   { return "store not answering:
 func (e *StoreUnreachableError) Unwrap() error   { return e.Err }
 func (e *StoreUnreachableError) Retryable() bool { return true }

-// ErrStoreRefusedKey is a store that answered but refused the worker key.
-var ErrStoreRefusedKey = errors.New("the store refused the worker key")
-
-// Check passes once JetStream answers for the worker key.
-func (c NATSChecker) Check(ctx context.Context, address string, kp nkeys.KeyPair) error {
-	if ip := net.ParseIP(address); ip == nil || ip.To4() == nil {
-		return errors.New("store address is not an IPv4 address")
-	}
-	pub, err := kp.PublicKey()
-	if err != nil {
-		return fmt.Errorf("derive worker public key: %w", err)
-	}
-	port := c.Port
+func localURL(port int) string {
 	if port == 0 {
 		port = StorePort
 	}
+	return "nats://" + net.JoinHostPort("127.0.0.1", strconv.Itoa(port))
+}
+
+// Check passes once the local JetStream answers.
+func (c NATSChecker) Check(ctx context.Context) error {
 	dial := c.Dial
 	if dial == 0 {
 		dial = 5 * time.Second
 	}
-	nc, err := nats.Connect("nats://"+net.JoinHostPort(address, strconv.Itoa(port)),
-		nats.Nkey(pub, kp.Sign),
-		nats.Timeout(dial),
-		nats.NoReconnect(),
-		nats.Name("spinifex-sqs-worker-readiness"),
-	)
+	nc, err := nats.Connect(localURL(c.Port), nats.Timeout(dial), nats.NoReconnect(),
+		nats.Name("spinifex-sqs-worker-readiness"))
 	if err != nil {
-		if errors.Is(err, nats.ErrAuthorization) || errors.Is(err, nats.ErrAuthExpired) {
-			return fmt.Errorf("%w: %w", ErrStoreRefusedKey, err)
-		}
 		return &StoreUnreachableError{Err: err}
 	}
 	defer nc.Close()
@@ -79,3 +64,5 @@ func (c NATSChecker) Check(ctx context.Context, address string, kp nkeys.KeyPair
 	}
 	return nil
 }
+
+var errNoChecker = errors.New("no store checker is configured")
@@ -9,37 +9,19 @@ import (
 	"time"

 	"github.com/mulgadc/spinifex/spinifex/agents/sqs/workerkey"
-	"github.com/nats-io/nkeys"
 )

-// Store is the Region's store launch as the gateway reports it. Bound means a
-// VM was launched for the store, not that it serves.
-type Store struct {
-	Bound     bool
-	Address   string
-	PublicKey string
-}
-
-// StoreDescriber asks the gateway for this worker's store.
-type StoreDescriber interface {
-	DescribeStore(ctx context.Context) (Store, error)
-}
-
-// NewDescriber builds the gateway client the store's address comes from.
-type NewDescriber func(region, gatewayURL string) (StoreDescriber, error)
-
-// Checker proves the store's JetStream answers this worker's key at address.
-// Only an error with Retryable() true is asked again.
+// Checker proves the guest's local JetStream answers. Only an error with
+// Retryable() true is asked again.
 type Checker interface {
-	Check(ctx context.Context, address string, kp nkeys.KeyPair) error
+	Check(ctx context.Context) error
 }

 // ReadyConfig is Config plus the readiness capabilities and cadence.
 type ReadyConfig struct {
 	Config

-	NewDescriber NewDescriber
-	Checker      Checker
+	Checker Checker
 	// CallTimeout bounds one describe-and-check pass; zero is 30 seconds.
 	CallTimeout time.Duration
 	// Refresh is the wait after a pass before checking again; zero is 30s.
@@ -47,18 +29,15 @@ type ReadyConfig struct {
 	// Refused is the wait after a failure that cannot clear by itself, such
 	// as a refused or mismatched key; zero is five minutes.
 	Refused time.Duration
+	// Serve, when set, also serves SQS owner calls while Watch runs.
+	Serve *ServeConfig
 }

-// ErrStoreKeyMismatch is a bound store launched for a key other than the one
-// on this worker's disk; it is asked again only at the Refused cadence.
-var ErrStoreKeyMismatch = errors.New("the store was launched for a different worker key")
-
 const readyFile = "store-ready"

 // Watch keeps the readiness marker true until ctx ends: it re-proves the disk,
-// then checks the store with the worker's existing key every pass, writing the
-// marker on a pass and removing it on any failure and on return. It never
-// creates a key. NKey authenticates this client only, not the store server.
+// then checks the guest's local store every pass, writing the marker on a
+// pass and removing it on any failure and on return. It never creates a key.
 func Watch(ctx context.Context, cfg ReadyConfig) error {
 	marker := filepath.Join(cfg.RunDir, readyFile)
 	defer func() { _ = os.Remove(marker) }()
@@ -72,14 +51,19 @@ func Watch(ctx context.Context, cfg ReadyConfig) error {
 	if err := mountWorkerDisk(cfg.Config, c.serial); err != nil {
 		return err
 	}
-	if cfg.NewDescriber == nil || cfg.Checker == nil {
-		return errors.New("no gateway client or store checker is configured")
-	}
-	d, err := cfg.NewDescriber(c.region, c.gatewayURL)
-	if err != nil {
-		return fmt.Errorf("build gateway client: %w", err)
+	if cfg.Checker == nil {
+		return errNoChecker
 	}
 	keys := workerkey.Store{Dir: filepath.Join(cfg.DataDir, keyDirName)}
+	if cfg.Serve != nil {
+		done := make(chan struct{})
+		go func() {
+			defer close(done)
+			serve(ctx, cfg, c, keys)
+		}()
+		// Calls in flight finish before the marker is removed and Watch returns.
+		defer func() { <-done }()
+	}
 	callTimeout := orDefault(cfg.CallTimeout, 30*time.Second)
 	refresh := orDefault(cfg.Refresh, 30*time.Second)
 	refused := orDefault(cfg.Refused, 5*time.Minute)
@@ -87,21 +71,21 @@ func Watch(ctx context.Context, cfg ReadyConfig) error {
 	last := ""
 	for {
 		callCtx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(ctx, callTimeout)
-		st, err := readyOnce(callCtx, cfg, d, keys)
+		err := cfg.Checker.Check(callCtx)
 		cancel()
 		delay, state := refresh, ""
 		if err == nil {
-			err = writeReady(cfg.RunDir, st)
+			err = writeReady(cfg.RunDir)
 		}
 		switch {
 		case ctx.Err() != nil:
 			return ctx.Err()
 		case err == nil:
-			state = fmt.Sprintf("store at %s answered the worker key (client-authenticated only; the store server is not authenticated)", st.Address)
+			state = "local SQS store is serving JetStream"
 		default:
 			_ = os.Remove(marker)
 			delay = cfg.Wait
-			if !pending(err) && !retryable(err) && !errors.Is(err, errStorePending) {
+			if !pending(err) && !retryable(err) {
 				delay = refused
 			}
 			state = fmt.Sprintf("store not ready: %v", err)
@@ -126,37 +110,12 @@ func orDefault(d, def time.Duration) time.Duration {
 	return d
 }

-var errStorePending = errors.New("the store is not yet bound")
-
-func readyOnce(ctx context.Context, cfg ReadyConfig, d StoreDescriber, keys workerkey.Store) (Store, error) {
-	st, err := d.DescribeStore(ctx)
-	if err != nil {
-		return Store{}, err
-	}
-	if !st.Bound {
-		return Store{}, errStorePending
-	}
-	kp, err := keys.ForExistingStore(st.PublicKey)
-	if err != nil {
-		if errors.Is(err, workerkey.ErrKeyMismatch) {
-			return Store{}, fmt.Errorf("%w: %w", ErrStoreKeyMismatch, err)
-		}
-		return Store{}, err
-	}
-	defer kp.Wipe()
-	if err := cfg.Checker.Check(ctx, st.Address, kp); err != nil {
-		return Store{}, err
-	}
-	return st, nil
-}
-
-// writeReady publishes only the address and public key, never the seed.
-func writeReady(runDir string, st Store) error {
+// writeReady publishes that the local store answered; it holds no secret.
+func writeReady(runDir string) error {
 	if err := os.MkdirAll(runDir, 0o750); err != nil {
 		return fmt.Errorf("create %s: %w", runDir, err)
 	}
-	body := "address=" + st.Address + "\npublic=" + st.PublicKey + "\n"
-	if err := os.WriteFile(filepath.Join(runDir, readyFile), []byte(body), 0o600); err != nil {
+	if err := os.WriteFile(filepath.Join(runDir, readyFile), []byte("ready\n"), 0o600); err != nil {
 		return fmt.Errorf("publish store readiness: %w", err)
 	}
 	return nil
@@ -1,438 +0,0 @@
-package workerboot
-
-import (
-	"context"
-	"errors"
-	"net"
-	"os"
-	"path/filepath"
-	"slices"
-	"strings"
-	"testing"
-	"time"
-
-	"github.com/nats-io/nats-server/v2/server"
-	"github.com/nats-io/nkeys"
-)
-
-// describer is the gateway's DescribeStore, answering from a script.
-type describer struct {
-	answers []describeAnswer
-	calls   int
-}
-
-type describeAnswer struct {
-	st  Store
-	err error
-}
-
-func (d *describer) DescribeStore(context.Context) (Store, error) {
-	d.calls++
-	a := d.answers[min(d.calls, len(d.answers))-1]
-	return a.st, a.err
-}
-
-type checker struct {
-	errs  []error
-	calls int
-	seen  []string
-}
-
-func (c *checker) Check(_ context.Context, address string, kp nkeys.KeyPair) error {
-	c.calls++
-	pub, _ := kp.PublicKey()
-	c.seen = append(c.seen, address+"|"+pub)
-	if len(c.errs) > 0 {
-		err := c.errs[0]
-		c.errs = c.errs[1:]
-		return err
-	}
-	return nil
-}
-
-// bootedGuest has run the boot step, so its disk holds a recorded key.
-func bootedGuest(t *testing.T) (*guest, string) {
-	t.Helper()
-	g := newGuest(t)
-	g.contract()
-	pub, err := g.boot()
-	if err != nil {
-		t.Fatal(err)
-	}
-	return g, pub
-}
-
-func (g *guest) readyCfg(d StoreDescriber, c Checker) ReadyConfig {
-	return ReadyConfig{
-		Config:       g.cfg,
-		NewDescriber: func(string, string) (StoreDescriber, error) { return d, nil },
-		Checker:      c,
-	}
-}
-
-// hooked asks stop before each describe, after the previous pass has written
-// or removed the marker, and ends the watch when stop says so.
-type hooked struct {
-	d      StoreDescriber
-	marker string
-	stop   func(call int, ready bool) bool
-	cancel context.CancelFunc
-	calls  int
-}
-
-func (h *hooked) DescribeStore(ctx context.Context) (Store, error) {
-	h.calls++
-	_, err := os.Stat(h.marker)
-	if h.stop(h.calls, err == nil) {
-		h.cancel()
-		return Store{}, context.Canceled
-	}
-	return h.d.DescribeStore(ctx)
-}
-
-// watch runs Watch with millisecond cadences until stop ends it, then checks
-// the marker was removed on the way out.
-func (g *guest) watch(cfg ReadyConfig, stop func(call int, ready bool) bool) error {
-	g.t.Helper()
-	ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 20*time.Second)
-	defer cancel()
-	inner := cfg.NewDescriber
-	cfg.NewDescriber = func(region, url string) (StoreDescriber, error) {
-		d, err := inner(region, url)
-		if err != nil {
-			return nil, err
-		}
-		return &hooked{d: d, marker: filepath.Join(cfg.RunDir, readyFile), stop: stop, cancel: cancel}, nil
-	}
-	for _, p := range []*time.Duration{&cfg.Wait, &cfg.Refresh, &cfg.Refused} {
-		if *p == 0 {
-			*p = time.Millisecond
-		}
-	}
-	err := Watch(ctx, cfg)
-	if errors.Is(ctx.Err(), context.DeadlineExceeded) {
-		g.t.Fatal("the watch never reached its stop condition")
-	}
-	g.assertNotReady()
-	return err
-}
-
-func bound(pub string) describeAnswer {
-	return describeAnswer{st: Store{Bound: true, Address: "10.240.0.9", PublicKey: pub}}
-}
-
-func (g *guest) marker() string {
-	g.t.Helper()
-	b, _ := os.ReadFile(filepath.Join(g.cfg.RunDir, readyFile))
-	return string(b)
-}
-
-// A store launched long after the worker booted, far past the old 15-minute
-// bound of 180 attempts, still becomes ready; nothing is published before.
-func TestWatch_StoreLaunchedLateBecomesReady(t *testing.T) {
-	g, pub := bootedGuest(t)
-	answers := make([]describeAnswer, 201)
-	answers[200] = bound(pub)
-	d := &describer{answers: answers}
-	c := &checker{errs: []error{&StoreUnreachableError{Err: errors.New("connection refused")}}}
-	published := ""
-	err := g.watch(g.readyCfg(d, c), func(call int, ready bool) bool {
-		if ready {
-			published = g.marker()
-			return true
-		}
-		if call > 202 {
-			t.Fatalf("not ready by call %d", call)
-		}
-		return false
-	})
-	if !errors.Is(err, context.Canceled) {
-		t.Fatalf("watch = %v", err)
-	}
-	if d.calls != 202 || c.calls != 2 || c.seen[0] != "10.240.0.9|"+pub {
-		t.Fatalf("describe %d, check %d, seen %v", d.calls, c.calls, c.seen)
-	}
-	if published != "address=10.240.0.9\npublic="+pub+"\n" {
-		t.Fatalf("published %q", published)
-	}
-	notReady := 0
-	for _, l := range g.logs {
-		if strings.HasPrefix(l, "store not ready") {
-			notReady++
-		}
-	}
-	if notReady > 2 {
-		t.Fatalf("%d not-ready lines for two distinct states", notReady)
-	}
-}
-
-// After a pass, the marker goes as soon as a later check fails, and returns
-// once the store answers again.
-func TestWatch_LossAfterReadyRemovesTheMarker(t *testing.T) {
-	cases := map[string]func(pub string) (*describer, *checker){
-		"store stops answering": func(pub string) (*describer, *checker) {
-			return &describer{answers: []describeAnswer{bound(pub)}},
-				&checker{errs: []error{nil, &StoreUnreachableError{Err: errors.New("connection refused")}, nil}}
-		},
-		"gateway reply lost": func(pub string) (*describer, *checker) {
-			return &describer{answers: []describeAnswer{bound(pub), {err: transient{}}, bound(pub)}}, &checker{}
-		},
-		"store no longer bound": func(pub string) (*describer, *checker) {
-			return &describer{answers: []describeAnswer{bound(pub), {}, bound(pub)}}, &checker{}
-		},
-		"store now refuses the key": func(pub string) (*describer, *checker) {
-			return &describer{answers: []describeAnswer{bound(pub)}}, &checker{errs: []error{nil, ErrStoreRefusedKey, nil}}
-		},
-	}
-	for name, mk := range cases {
-		t.Run(name, func(t *testing.T) {
-			g, pub := bootedGuest(t)
-			d, c := mk(pub)
-			var seen []bool
-			if err := g.watch(g.readyCfg(d, c), func(call int, ready bool) bool {
-				seen = append(seen, ready)
-				return call == 4
-			}); !errors.Is(err, context.Canceled) {
-				t.Fatalf("watch = %v", err)
-			}
-			if want := []bool{false, true, false, true}; !slices.Equal(seen, want) {
-				t.Fatalf("marker before each pass = %v, want %v", seen, want)
-			}
-		})
-	}
-}
-
-// A marker left by an earlier run is cleared before the first pass.
-func TestWatch_ClearsAStaleMarker(t *testing.T) {
-	g, pub := bootedGuest(t)
-	mustWrite(t, filepath.Join(g.cfg.RunDir, readyFile), "address=10.0.0.1\n")
-	d := &describer{answers: []describeAnswer{{}}}
-	_ = g.watch(g.readyCfg(d, &checker{}), func(call int, ready bool) bool {
-		if call == 1 && ready {
-			t.Fatal("a stale marker survived into the first pass")
-		}
-		return call == 2
-	})
-	_ = pub
-}
-
-// Failures that cannot clear by themselves wait the Refused cadence: in the
-// window, each is tried once and never published.
-func TestWatch_FinalFailuresDoNotSpin(t *testing.T) {
-	other, _ := nkeys.CreateUser()
-	otherPub, _ := other.PublicKey()
-	cases := map[string]struct {
-		d      func(pub string) *describer
-		c      *checker
-		checks int
-	}{
-		"store refuses the key": {func(pub string) *describer { return &describer{answers: []describeAnswer{bound(pub)}} },
-			&checker{errs: []error{ErrStoreRefusedKey}}, 1},
-		"store launched for another key": {func(string) *describer { return &describer{answers: []describeAnswer{bound(otherPub)}} },
-			&checker{}, 0},
-		"unclassified gateway refusal": {func(string) *describer {
-			return &describer{answers: []describeAnswer{{err: errors.New("InvalidParameterValue")}}}
-		}, &checker{}, 0},
-	}
-	for name, tc := range cases {
-		t.Run(name, func(t *testing.T) {
-			g, pub := bootedGuest(t)
-			g.cfg.Wait = time.Millisecond
-			d := tc.d(pub)
-			cfg := g.readyCfg(d, tc.c)
-			cfg.Refresh, cfg.Refused = time.Millisecond, time.Hour
-			ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 300*time.Millisecond)
-			defer cancel()
-			if err := Watch(ctx, cfg); !errors.Is(err, context.DeadlineExceeded) {
-				t.Fatalf("watch = %v", err)
-			}
-			if d.calls != 1 || tc.c.calls != tc.checks {
-				t.Fatalf("describe %d, check %d in the window", d.calls, tc.c.calls)
-			}
-			g.assertNotReady()
-		})
-	}
-}
-
-// A mismatched store is asked again at the Refused cadence, so a store the
-// operator relaunches for this worker's key is picked up.
-func TestWatch_RecoversWhenTheStoreIsRelaunchedForThisKey(t *testing.T) {
-	g, pub := bootedGuest(t)
-	other, _ := nkeys.CreateUser()
-	otherPub, _ := other.PublicKey()
-	d := &describer{answers: []describeAnswer{bound(otherPub), bound(pub)}}
-	c := &checker{}
-	if err := g.watch(g.readyCfg(d, c), func(_ int, ready bool) bool { return ready }); !errors.Is(err, context.Canceled) {
-		t.Fatalf("watch = %v", err)
-	}
-	if d.calls != 2 || c.calls != 1 {
-		t.Fatalf("describe %d, check %d", d.calls, c.calls)
-	}
-}
-
-// A key missing from the disk is never replaced, however often it is asked.
-func TestWatch_LostKeyIsNeverReplaced(t *testing.T) {
-	g, pub := bootedGuest(t)
-	dir := filepath.Join(g.cfg.DataDir, keyDirName)
-	entries, _ := os.ReadDir(dir)
-	for _, e := range entries {
-		if err := os.Remove(filepath.Join(dir, e.Name())); err != nil {
-			t.Fatal(err)
-		}
-	}
-	d := &describer{answers: []describeAnswer{bound(pub)}}
-	c := &checker{}
-	_ = g.watch(g.readyCfg(d, c), func(call int, ready bool) bool {
-		if ready {
-			t.Fatal("ready without a key")
-		}
-		return call == 5
-	})
-	if c.calls != 0 {
-		t.Fatalf("checked %d times without a key", c.calls)
-	}
-	if after, _ := os.ReadDir(dir); len(after) != 0 {
-		t.Fatal("a replacement key was written")
-	}
-}
-
-// Readiness never runs on a disk that is not proven mounted.
-func TestWatch_RefusesWithoutTheMountedWorkerDisk(t *testing.T) {
-	g, pub := bootedGuest(t)
-	g.resetMounts()
-	g.disk.noopMount = true
-	d := &describer{answers: []describeAnswer{bound(pub)}}
-	if err := Watch(context.Background(), g.readyCfg(d, &checker{})); err == nil || d.calls != 0 {
-		t.Fatalf("err = %v, describe %d", err, d.calls)
-	}
-}
-
-// After a restart the same key reaches readiness again with no new key.
-func TestWatch_SurvivesARestart(t *testing.T) {
-	g, pub := bootedGuest(t)
-	for range 2 {
-		d := &describer{answers: []describeAnswer{bound(pub)}}
-		if err := g.watch(g.readyCfg(d, &checker{}), func(_ int, ready bool) bool { return ready }); !errors.Is(err, context.Canceled) {
-			t.Fatal(err)
-		}
-		g.resetMounts()
-		again, err := g.boot()
-		if err != nil || again != pub {
-			t.Fatalf("reboot = %q %v", again, err)
-		}
-	}
-}
-
-func (g *guest) assertNotReady() {
-	g.t.Helper()
-	if _, err := os.Stat(filepath.Join(g.cfg.RunDir, readyFile)); !os.IsNotExist(err) {
-		g.t.Fatalf("readiness was published: %v", err)
-	}
-}
-
-func startStore(t *testing.T, pub string, port int) *server.Server {
-	t.Helper()
-	opts := &server.Options{Host: "127.0.0.1", Port: port, JetStream: true, StoreDir: t.TempDir(), NoLog: true,
-		NoSigs: true, Nkeys: []*server.NkeyUser{{Nkey: pub}}}
-	ns, err := server.NewServer(opts)
-	if err != nil {
-		t.Fatal(err)
-	}
-	go ns.Start()
-	if !ns.ReadyForConnections(10 * time.Second) {
-		t.Fatal("store server did not start")
-	}
-	t.Cleanup(ns.Shutdown)
-	return ns
-}
-
-// End to end on the guest with a real store: not ready before it serves,
-// ready once it does, not ready again once it stops, and the marker never
-// holds the seed.
-func TestWatch_RealStoreStartsLateThenStops(t *testing.T) {
-	g, pub := bootedGuest(t)
-	seedFile, _ := os.ReadDir(filepath.Join(g.cfg.DataDir, keyDirName))
-	key, _ := os.ReadFile(filepath.Join(g.cfg.DataDir, keyDirName, seedFile[0].Name()))
-	l, _ := net.Listen("tcp", "127.0.0.1:0")
-	port := l.Addr().(*net.TCPAddr).Port
-	_ = l.Close()
-	d := &describer{answers: []describeAnswer{{st: Store{Bound: true, Address: "127.0.0.1", PublicKey: pub}}}}
-	cfg := g.readyCfg(d, NATSChecker{Port: port, Dial: time.Second})
-	var ns *server.Server
-	phase := 0
-	err := g.watch(cfg, func(call int, ready bool) bool {
-		switch {
-		case phase == 0 && call == 3:
-			if ready {
-				t.Fatal("ready before the store served")
-			}
-			ns, phase = startStore(t, pub, port), 1
-		case phase == 1 && ready:
-			if strings.Contains(g.marker(), strings.TrimSpace(string(key))) {
-				t.Fatal("the seed was published")
-			}
-			ns.Shutdown()
-			ns.WaitForShutdown()
-			phase = 2
-		case phase == 2:
-			if ready {
-				t.Fatal("still ready after the store stopped")
-			}
-			return true
-		}
-		return false
-	})
-	if !errors.Is(err, context.Canceled) || phase != 2 {
-		t.Fatalf("watch = %v, phase %d", err, phase)
-	}
-}
-
-// storeServer is a real NATS server with JetStream that admits only pub.
-func storeServer(t *testing.T, pub string) int {
-	t.Helper()
-	opts := &server.Options{
-		Host: "127.0.0.1", Port: -1, JetStream: true, StoreDir: t.TempDir(), NoLog: true, NoSigs: true,
-		Nkeys: []*server.NkeyUser{{Nkey: pub}},
-	}
-	ns, err := server.NewServer(opts)
-	if err != nil {
-		t.Fatal(err)
-	}
-	go ns.Start()
-	if !ns.ReadyForConnections(10 * time.Second) {
-		t.Fatal("store server did not start")
-	}
-	t.Cleanup(ns.Shutdown)
-	return ns.Addr().(*net.TCPAddr).Port
-}
-
-// The real checker passes only with the admitted key; a wrong key is refused
-// as final, and nothing listening is retryable.
-func TestNATSChecker_AgainstARealStore(t *testing.T) {
-	kp, _ := nkeys.CreateUser()
-	pub, _ := kp.PublicKey()
-	port := storeServer(t, pub)
-	c := NATSChecker{Port: port, Dial: 2 * time.Second}
-	if err := c.Check(context.Background(), "127.0.0.1", kp); err != nil {
-		t.Fatalf("admitted key: %v", err)
-	}
-	other, _ := nkeys.CreateUser()
-	err := c.Check(context.Background(), "127.0.0.1", other)
-	if !errors.Is(err, ErrStoreRefusedKey) || retryable(err) {
-		t.Fatalf("wrong key: %v", err)
-	}
-	seed, _ := kp.Seed()
-	if strings.Contains(err.Error(), string(seed)) {
-		t.Fatal("the error echoes a seed")
-	}
-	l, _ := net.Listen("tcp", "127.0.0.1:0")
-	closed := l.Addr().(*net.TCPAddr).Port
-	_ = l.Close()
-	err = NATSChecker{Port: closed, Dial: time.Second}.Check(context.Background(), "127.0.0.1", kp)
-	if !retryable(err) {
-		t.Fatalf("nothing listening: %v is not retryable", err)
-	}
-	if err := c.Check(context.Background(), "store.example", kp); err == nil || retryable(err) {
-		t.Fatalf("hostname accepted: %v", err)
-	}
-}
@@ -0,0 +1,114 @@
+package workerboot
+
+import (
+	"context"
+	"errors"
+	"fmt"
+	"time"
+
+	"github.com/nats-io/nats.go"
+	"github.com/nats-io/nats.go/jetstream"
+
+	"github.com/mulgadc/spinifex/spinifex/agents/sqs/workerkey"
+)
+
+// ServeConfig makes the ready step also serve SQS owner calls.
+type ServeConfig struct {
+	Connector Connector
+	// Run serves until ctx ends against the store's JetStream, with the
+	// receipt key from the worker disk; it must not retain the key.
+	Run func(ctx context.Context, region, gatewayURL string, js jetstream.JetStream, receiptKey []byte) error
+}
+
+// Connector opens the guest's local JetStream.
+type Connector interface {
+	Connect(ctx context.Context) (jetstream.JetStream, func(), error)
+}
+
+// NATSConnector connects to the guest's loopback SQS NATS server.
+type NATSConnector struct {
+	// Port overrides StorePort, for tests against a local server.
+	Port int
+}
+
+var _ Connector = NATSConnector{}
+
+// ErrUnsupportedTopology refuses serving, and so creating any store state,
+// unless the gateway reports a single-node host cluster.
+var ErrUnsupportedTopology = errors.New("SQS serving supports only a single-node host cluster")
+
+// ErrReceiptPending refuses serving while the platform has not recorded the
+// receipt key; the boot step records it before the store first starts.
+var ErrReceiptPending = errors.New("the receipt key is not yet recorded")
+
+func (c NATSConnector) Connect(_ context.Context) (jetstream.JetStream, func(), error) {
+	nc, err := nats.Connect(localURL(c.Port), nats.Timeout(5*time.Second), nats.MaxReconnects(-1),
+		nats.Name("spinifex-sqs-worker"))
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, nil, &StoreUnreachableError{Err: err}
+	}
+	js, err := jetstream.New(nc)
+	if err != nil {
+		nc.Close()
+		return nil, nil, &StoreUnreachableError{Err: err}
+	}
+	return js, nc.Close, nil
+}
+
+// serve runs the owners until ctx ends, starting again after any failure to
+// open them. It never creates a key: the receipt key must be on the disk.
+func serve(ctx context.Context, cfg ReadyConfig, c contract, keys workerkey.Store) {
+	last := ""
+	for ctx.Err() == nil {
+		err := serveOnce(ctx, cfg, c, keys)
+		if ctx.Err() != nil {
+			return
+		}
+		if state := fmt.Sprintf("SQS serving stopped: %v", err); state != last {
+			cfg.Log(state)
+			last = state
+		}
+		delay := cfg.Wait
+		if !pending(err) && !retryable(err) && !errors.Is(err, ErrReceiptPending) {
+			delay = orDefault(cfg.Refused, 5*time.Minute)
+		}
+		select {
+		case <-ctx.Done():
+		case <-time.After(max(delay, time.Millisecond)):
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+func serveOnce(ctx context.Context, cfg ReadyConfig, c contract, keys workerkey.Store) error {
+	callCtx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(ctx, orDefault(cfg.CallTimeout, 30*time.Second))
+	defer cancel()
+	if cfg.NewClaimer == nil {
+		return errors.New("no gateway client is configured")
+	}
+	claimer, err := cfg.NewClaimer(c.region, c.gatewayURL)
+	if err != nil {
+		return fmt.Errorf("build gateway client: %w", err)
+	}
+	d, err := claimer.Claim(callCtx)
+	if err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+	if d.HostNodes != 1 {
+		return fmt.Errorf("%w: the gateway reports %d host nodes", ErrUnsupportedTopology, d.HostNodes)
+	}
+	if d.Pending {
+		return ErrReceiptPending
+	}
+	receipt, err := keys.ForRecorded(d.Fingerprint)
+	if err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+	defer clear(receipt)
+	js, closeConn, err := cfg.Serve.Connector.Connect(callCtx)
+	if err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+	defer closeConn()
+	cfg.Log("serving SQS owner calls from the local store")
+	return cfg.Serve.Run(ctx, c.region, c.gatewayURL, js, receipt)
+}
@@ -0,0 +1,434 @@
+package workerboot
+
+import (
+	"context"
+	"errors"
+	"net"
+	"net/http"
+	"net/http/httptest"
+	"os"
+	"path/filepath"
+	"slices"
+	"strings"
+	"sync"
+	"testing"
+	"time"
+
+	"github.com/aws/aws-sdk-go-v2/aws"
+	"github.com/aws/aws-sdk-go-v2/service/sqs"
+	sqstypes "github.com/aws/aws-sdk-go-v2/service/sqs/types"
+	"github.com/mulgadc/bluebottle/pkg/iampolicy"
+	"github.com/nats-io/nats-server/v2/server"
+	"github.com/nats-io/nats.go/jetstream"
+
+	"github.com/mulgadc/spinifex/internal/gwsign"
+	"github.com/mulgadc/spinifex/internal/sqsworkergw"
+	"github.com/mulgadc/spinifex/spinifex/agents/sqs/workerkey"
+	"github.com/mulgadc/spinifex/spinifex/domains/sqs/awsapi"
+	"github.com/mulgadc/spinifex/spinifex/domains/sqs/relay"
+	"github.com/mulgadc/spinifex/spinifex/domains/sqs/workerident"
+	"github.com/mulgadc/spinifex/spinifex/domains/sqs/workerserve"
+	awserrors "github.com/mulgadc/spinifex/spinifex/foundation/aws/errors"
+	"github.com/mulgadc/spinifex/spinifex/ingress/aws/dispatch"
+	"github.com/mulgadc/spinifex/spinifex/ingress/aws/envelope"
+)
+
+const tenantAccount = "123456789012"
+
+// publicSQS serves the public SQS registration over the relay, as the
+// ingress would after authenticating the tenant; tenant SigV4 and IAM are
+// not under test here.
+func publicSQS(t *testing.T, r *relay.Relay) *sqs.Client {
+	t.Helper()
+	var reg dispatch.Registration
+	srv := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request) {
+		err := reg.Dispatch(w, dispatch.Invocation{
+			Request: req, AccountID: tenantAccount, Region: testRegion, Service: awsapi.ServiceName,
+			Authorize: func(string, string, []string, iampolicy.ConditionKeys) error { return nil },
+			Actor: func() (dispatch.Actor, error) {
+				return dispatch.Actor{UserID: "AIDAPOLLER", AccountID: tenantAccount}, nil
+			},
+		})
+		if err != nil {
+			code, msg, _ := awserrors.ResolveErrorDetail(err)
+			if code == "" {
+				code = err.Error()
+			}
+			meta := awserrors.LookupErrorMessage(awsapi.ServiceName, code)
+			if msg == "" {
+				msg = meta.Message
+			}
+			qc := code
+			if q, ok := reg.QueryErrorCodes[code]; ok {
+				qc = q
+			}
+			envelope.WriteJSON(w, envelope.ProtocolJSON10Query, envelope.JSONError{
+				Code: code, Verbatim: true, Message: msg, Status: meta.HTTPCode, Namespace: reg.ErrorNamespace, QueryCode: qc,
+			})
+		}
+	}))
+	t.Cleanup(srv.Close)
+	reg = awsapi.NewRegistration(awsapi.Deps{
+		Queues: r, Messages: r, Receives: r, Deletes: r, Visibility: r, Endpoint: srv.URL,
+	})
+	return sqs.New(sqs.Options{
+		BaseEndpoint: aws.String(srv.URL), Region: testRegion, RetryMaxAttempts: 1,
+		Credentials: aws.AnonymousCredentials{},
+	})
+}
+
+// localStore is the guest's own SQS NATS server: loopback only, no auth,
+// JetStream kept under the worker disk so a restart finds its data.
+func localStore(t *testing.T, g *guest, port int) *server.Server {
+	t.Helper()
+	if port == 0 {
+		port = -1
+	}
+	ns, err := server.NewServer(&server.Options{
+		Host: "127.0.0.1", Port: port, JetStream: true, StoreDir: g.cfg.DataDir, NoLog: true, NoSigs: true,
+	})
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	go ns.Start()
+	if !ns.ReadyForConnections(10 * time.Second) {
+		t.Fatal("store server did not start")
+	}
+	t.Cleanup(func() { ns.Shutdown(); ns.WaitForShutdown() })
+	return ns
+}
+
+func storePort(ns *server.Server) int { return ns.Addr().(*net.TCPAddr).Port }
+
+func freePort(t *testing.T) int {
+	t.Helper()
+	l, err := net.Listen("tcp", "127.0.0.1:0")
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	defer l.Close()
+	return l.Addr().(*net.TCPAddr).Port
+}
+
+// servingWorker is the guest's ready step serving through the local
+// gateway's signed work actions against the local store on port.
+type servingWorker struct {
+	cancel context.CancelFunc
+	done   chan struct{}
+	once   sync.Once
+	mu     sync.Mutex
+	logs   []string
+	g      *guest
+}
+
+func (w *servingWorker) log(msg string) {
+	w.mu.Lock()
+	defer w.mu.Unlock()
+	w.logs = append(w.logs, msg)
+}
+
+func (w *servingWorker) logged(substr string) bool {
+	w.mu.Lock()
+	defer w.mu.Unlock()
+	return slices.ContainsFunc(w.logs, func(l string) bool { return strings.Contains(l, substr) })
+}
+
+func (w *servingWorker) ready() bool {
+	_, err := os.Stat(filepath.Join(w.g.cfg.RunDir, readyFile))
+	return err == nil
+}
+
+func (c gwCluster) startServing(t *testing.T, g *guest, signer *gwsign.Signer, port int) *servingWorker {
+	t.Helper()
+	cfg := ReadyConfig{Config: g.cfg, Checker: NATSChecker{Port: port, Dial: time.Second}}
+	cfg.Serve = &ServeConfig{
+		Connector: NATSConnector{Port: port},
+		Run: func(ctx context.Context, region, url string, js jetstream.JetStream, receiptKey []byte) error {
+			gw, err := sqsworkergw.New(url, region, c.gw.caPEM(), signer)
+			if err != nil {
+				return err
+			}
+			return workerserve.Run(ctx, gw, js, receiptKey, cfg.Log)
+		},
+	}
+	cfg.Wait, cfg.Refresh, cfg.Refused, cfg.CallTimeout = 20*time.Millisecond, 50*time.Millisecond, 50*time.Millisecond, 5*time.Second
+	ctx, cancel := context.WithCancel(context.Background())
+	w := &servingWorker{cancel: cancel, done: make(chan struct{}), g: g}
+	cfg.Log = w.log
+	go func() {
+		defer close(w.done)
+		_ = Watch(ctx, cfg)
+	}()
+	t.Cleanup(w.stop)
+	return w
+}
+
+func (w *servingWorker) stop() {
+	w.once.Do(w.cancel)
+	<-w.done
+}
+
+// eventually repeats call until it succeeds.
+func eventually(t *testing.T, call func() error) {
+	t.Helper()
+	deadline := time.Now().Add(15 * time.Second)
+	for {
+		err := call()
+		if err == nil {
+			return
+		}
+		if time.Now().After(deadline) {
+			t.Fatalf("never succeeded: %v", err)
+		}
+		time.Sleep(20 * time.Millisecond)
+	}
+}
+
+// bootedWorker launches a worker on a new volume and boots its guest, which
+// creates and records the receipt key; it returns the guest and its signer.
+func (c gwCluster) bootedWorker(t *testing.T) (*guest, *gwsign.Signer, workerident.Intent) {
+	t.Helper()
+	in := c.launch(t, gwInstance)
+	g := newGuest(t)
+	signer := c.guestFor(t, g, "ASIAWORKER1", gwInstance)
+	if _, err := g.boot(); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	return g, signer, in
+}
+
+// The SDK path through one SQS VM: the worker serves create, send, receive
+// and delete from its local store; after the store and worker restart on the
+// same disk the queue is still there and an earlier handle still works.
+func TestServe_SDKPathThroughTheWorkerSurvivesRestart(t *testing.T) {
+	r := &relay.Relay{}
+	c := newGWCluster(t, r, nil)
+	g, signer, _ := c.bootedWorker(t)
+	ns := localStore(t, g, 0)
+	port := storePort(ns)
+	w := c.startServing(t, g, signer, port)
+	cl := publicSQS(t, r)
+	ctx := context.Background()
+
+	var url string
+	eventually(t, func() error {
+		out, err := cl.CreateQueue(ctx, &sqs.CreateQueueInput{QueueName: aws.String("orders")})
+		if err == nil {
+			url = aws.ToString(out.QueueUrl)
+		}
+		return err
+	})
+	body := strings.Repeat(`"quoted" \ body `, 4096)
+	sent, err := cl.SendMessage(ctx, &sqs.SendMessageInput{
+		QueueUrl: aws.String(url), MessageBody: aws.String(body),
+		MessageAttributes: map[string]sqstypes.MessageAttributeValue{
+			"kind": {DataType: aws.String("String"), StringValue: aws.String("new\norder")},
+			"blob": {DataType: aws.String("Binary"), BinaryValue: []byte{0, 1, 2, 255}},
+		},
+	})
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	got, err := cl.ReceiveMessage(ctx, &sqs.ReceiveMessageInput{
+		QueueUrl: aws.String(url), MaxNumberOfMessages: 10, WaitTimeSeconds: 2,
+		MessageAttributeNames: []string{"All"}, VisibilityTimeout: 60,
+	})
+	if err != nil || len(got.Messages) != 1 {
+		t.Fatalf("receive = %v, %v", got, err)
+	}
+	m := got.Messages[0]
+	if aws.ToString(m.MessageId) != aws.ToString(sent.MessageId) || aws.ToString(m.Body) != body ||
+		aws.ToString(m.MD5OfMessageAttributes) != aws.ToString(sent.MD5OfMessageAttributes) ||
+		aws.ToString(m.MessageAttributes["kind"].StringValue) != "new\norder" {
+		t.Fatalf("received a different message: %+v", m)
+	}
+	if _, err := cl.DeleteMessage(ctx, &sqs.DeleteMessageInput{QueueUrl: aws.String(url), ReceiptHandle: m.ReceiptHandle}); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if _, err := cl.SendMessage(ctx, &sqs.SendMessageInput{QueueUrl: aws.String(url), MessageBody: aws.String("second")}); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	held, err := cl.ReceiveMessage(ctx, &sqs.ReceiveMessageInput{QueueUrl: aws.String(url), WaitTimeSeconds: 2, VisibilityTimeout: 60})
+	if err != nil || len(held.Messages) != 1 {
+		t.Fatalf("receive before restart = %v, %v", held, err)
+	}
+
+	w.stop()
+	ns.Shutdown()
+	ns.WaitForShutdown()
+	g.resetMounts()
+	if _, err := g.boot(); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("reboot: %v", err)
+	}
+	localStore(t, g, port)
+	c.startServing(t, g, signer, port)
+	eventually(t, func() error {
+		_, err := cl.GetQueueUrl(ctx, &sqs.GetQueueUrlInput{QueueName: aws.String("orders")})
+		return err
+	})
+	if _, err := cl.DeleteMessage(ctx, &sqs.DeleteMessageInput{QueueUrl: aws.String(url), ReceiptHandle: held.Messages[0].ReceiptHandle}); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("handle from before the restart: %v", err)
+	}
+	empty, err := cl.ReceiveMessage(ctx, &sqs.ReceiveMessageInput{QueueUrl: aws.String(url)})
+	if err != nil || len(empty.Messages) != 0 {
+		t.Fatalf("queue after delete = %v, %v", empty, err)
+	}
+
+	key, err := workerkey.Store{Dir: g.keyDir()}.ReceiptKey()
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	for _, b := range c.gw.sentBodies() {
+		if strings.Contains(b, string(key)) {
+			t.Fatal("a request carried key material")
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+// The store comes up before the worker serves: while the local store is not
+// answering the guest is not ready and no call is served; once it starts,
+// readiness and serving follow.
+func TestServe_UnavailableStoreIsNeverReady(t *testing.T) {
+	r := &relay.Relay{CallLimit: time.Second, PollerStale: 200 * time.Millisecond}
+	c := newGWCluster(t, r, nil)
+	g, signer, _ := c.bootedWorker(t)
+	port := freePort(t)
+	w := c.startServing(t, g, signer, port)
+	cl := publicSQS(t, r)
+	ctx := context.Background()
+	eventually(t, func() error {
+		if !w.logged("store not ready") {
+			return errors.New("no failed check yet")
+		}
+		return nil
+	})
+	if w.ready() {
+		t.Fatal("ready without a store")
+	}
+	if _, err := cl.ListQueues(ctx, &sqs.ListQueuesInput{}); err == nil {
+		t.Fatal("a call was served without a store")
+	}
+	localStore(t, g, port)
+	eventually(t, func() error {
+		_, err := cl.ListQueues(ctx, &sqs.ListQueuesInput{})
+		return err
+	})
+	eventually(t, func() error {
+		if !w.ready() {
+			return errors.New("not ready")
+		}
+		return nil
+	})
+}
+
+// A worker whose recorded receipt key is gone, or replaced, never serves and
+// never makes a new key, so handles issued earlier are not invalidated.
+func TestServe_ReceiptKeyLossOrChangeNeverServes(t *testing.T) {
+	for _, tc := range []struct {
+		name   string
+		mutate func(t *testing.T, path string)
+		want   error
+	}{
+		{"missing", func(t *testing.T, path string) {
+			if err := os.Remove(path); err != nil {
+				t.Fatal(err)
+			}
+		}, workerkey.ErrReceiptKeyMissing},
+		{"changed", func(t *testing.T, path string) {
+			if err := os.WriteFile(path, []byte(strings.Repeat("k", workerkey.ReceiptKeyLen)), 0o600); err != nil {
+				t.Fatal(err)
+			}
+		}, workerkey.ErrKeyMismatch},
+	} {
+		t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
+			r := &relay.Relay{CallLimit: time.Second, PollerStale: 200 * time.Millisecond}
+			c := newGWCluster(t, r, nil)
+			g, signer, _ := c.bootedWorker(t)
+			port := storePort(localStore(t, g, 0))
+			w := c.startServing(t, g, signer, port)
+			cl := publicSQS(t, r)
+			eventually(t, func() error {
+				_, err := cl.ListQueues(context.Background(), &sqs.ListQueuesInput{})
+				return err
+			})
+			w.stop()
+
+			tc.mutate(t, g.keyFile())
+			again := c.startServing(t, g, signer, port)
+			eventually(t, func() error {
+				if again.logged(tc.want.Error()) {
+					return nil
+				}
+				return errors.New("refusal not logged yet")
+			})
+			if _, err := cl.ListQueues(context.Background(), &sqs.ListQueuesInput{}); err == nil {
+				t.Fatal("a call was served without the recorded receipt key")
+			}
+			g.resetMounts()
+			if _, err := g.boot(); !errors.Is(err, tc.want) {
+				t.Fatalf("reboot = %v, want %v", err, tc.want)
+			}
+			if tc.name == "missing" {
+				if _, err := os.Lstat(g.keyFile()); !errors.Is(err, os.ErrNotExist) {
+					t.Fatal("a replacement receipt key was created")
+				}
+			}
+		})
+	}
+}
+
+// A worker the domain has recorded as stopped cannot take work.
+func TestServe_StoppedWorkerTakesNoWork(t *testing.T) {
+	r := &relay.Relay{CallLimit: time.Second, PollerStale: 200 * time.Millisecond}
+	c := newGWCluster(t, r, nil)
+	g, signer, in := c.bootedWorker(t)
+	w := c.startServing(t, g, signer, storePort(localStore(t, g, 0)))
+	cl := publicSQS(t, r)
+	ctx := context.Background()
+	eventually(t, func() error {
+		_, err := cl.CreateQueue(ctx, &sqs.CreateQueueInput{QueueName: aws.String("orders")})
+		return err
+	})
+	if err := c.ids.RecordStopped(ctx, in, gwInstance); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	eventually(t, func() error {
+		if _, err := cl.ListQueues(ctx, &sqs.ListQueuesInput{}); err == nil {
+			return errors.New("still served")
+		}
+		return nil
+	})
+	if !w.logged("AccessDenied") {
+		t.Fatal("the worker's polls were not refused")
+	}
+}
+
+// A gateway reporting a multi-node host cluster is refused before the worker
+// opens its store, so no queue or marker state is created.
+func TestServe_MultiNodeHostCreatesNoStoreState(t *testing.T) {
+	c := newGWCluster(t, &relay.Relay{}, func() int { return 3 })
+	g, signer, _ := c.bootedWorker(t)
+	port := storePort(localStore(t, g, 0))
+	w := c.startServing(t, g, signer, port)
+	eventually(t, func() error {
+		if !w.logged(ErrUnsupportedTopology.Error()) {
+			return errors.New("not yet refused")
+		}
+		return nil
+	})
+	w.stop()
+
+	js, closeConn, err := NATSConnector{Port: port}.Connect(context.Background())
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	defer closeConn()
+	names := js.StreamNames(context.Background())
+	var got []string
+	for n := range names.Name() {
+		got = append(got, n)
+	}
+	if names.Err() != nil || len(got) != 0 {
+		t.Fatalf("store streams = %v, %v; want none", got, names.Err())
+	}
+}
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
-// Package workerboot prepares the shared SQS worker guest: it selects exactly
-// the expected data disk by serial, checks and mounts it, proves that disk is
-// what is mounted, and only then loads or creates the worker's store key on it
-// under the current first-store decision the gateway returns.
+// Package workerboot prepares the SQS guest: it selects exactly the expected
+// data disk by serial, checks and mounts it, proves that disk is what is
+// mounted, and only then settles the receipt key under the gateway's decision,
+// before the guest's own SQS store first starts on that disk.
 package workerboot

 import (
@@ -18,11 +18,10 @@ import (
 	"time"

 	"github.com/mulgadc/spinifex/spinifex/agents/sqs/workerkey"
-	"github.com/nats-io/nkeys"
 )

 // Guest contract, read from fw_cfg under opt/spinifex/sqs-worker/. None of it
-// is a decision: whether a store key may be created is asked of the gateway.
+// is a decision: whether a receipt key may be created is asked of the gateway.
 //
 //	data-serial   virtio-blk serial of the worker's own ext4 data disk
 //	region        the Region the worker signs its gateway calls for
@@ -30,11 +29,15 @@ import (
 const (
 	keyDirName = "sqs-worker-key"
 	maxFwCfg   = 128
+	// StoreDirName is the store's JetStream directory on the data disk. Its
+	// presence is SQS data, so a pending decision never creates a key there.
+	StoreDirName = "jetstream"
+	receiptReady = "receipt-ready"
 )

 var regionPattern = regexp.MustCompile(`^[a-z]{2}(-[a-z]+)+-[0-9]+$`)

-// NewClaimer builds the gateway client the first-store decision comes from.
+// NewClaimer builds the gateway client the receipt key decision comes from.
 type NewClaimer func(region, gatewayURL string) (workerkey.Claimer, error)

 // Disk checks and mounts the worker data disk. The guest never formats.
@@ -67,9 +70,9 @@ type contract struct {
 	serial, region, gatewayURL string
 }

-// Boot runs the boot step and returns the worker's public key. The key is
-// loaded or created only under the gateway's current decision; any missing,
-// malformed or ambiguous input or answer refuses.
+// Boot runs the boot step and returns the receipt key's fingerprint. The key
+// is loaded, or created on a new volume, only under the gateway's current
+// decision; any missing, malformed or ambiguous input or answer refuses.
 func Boot(ctx context.Context, cfg Config) (string, error) {
 	c, err := readContract(cfg.FwCfgDir)
 	if err != nil {
@@ -86,20 +89,26 @@ func Boot(ctx context.Context, cfg Config) (string, error) {
 	if err != nil {
 		return "", fmt.Errorf("build gateway client: %w", err)
 	}
-	kp, err := acquire(ctx, cfg, workerkey.Store{Dir: filepath.Join(cfg.DataDir, keyDirName)}, claimer)
+	key, err := acquire(ctx, cfg, workerkey.Store{Dir: filepath.Join(cfg.DataDir, keyDirName)}, claimer)
 	if err != nil {
 		return "", err
 	}
-	defer kp.Wipe()
-	pub, err := kp.PublicKey()
-	if err != nil {
-		return "", fmt.Errorf("derive worker public key: %w", err)
-	}
-	if err := writePublicKey(cfg.RunDir, pub); err != nil {
+	fp := workerkey.Fingerprint(key)
+	clear(key)
+	if err := writeMarker(cfg.RunDir, receiptReady, fp); err != nil {
 		return "", err
 	}
-	cfg.Log("store key ready: public=" + pub)
-	return pub, nil
+	cfg.Log("receipt key ready: fingerprint=" + fp)
+	return fp, nil
+}
+
+// hasStoreData reports whether the disk already holds the store's directory.
+func hasStoreData(dataDir string) (bool, error) {
+	_, err := os.Lstat(filepath.Join(dataDir, StoreDirName))
+	if errors.Is(err, fs.ErrNotExist) {
+		return false, nil
+	}
+	return err == nil, err
 }

 // mountWorkerDisk selects the disk with serial, checks and mounts it at
@@ -176,20 +185,21 @@ func readContract(dir string) (contract, error) {
 // acquire runs the decision and key step, repeating it only on an error that
 // says it is safe to repeat, including a denial a not-yet-bound worker gets.
 // A denial creates nothing, and each repeat re-asks the gateway.
-func acquire(ctx context.Context, cfg Config, store workerkey.Store, c workerkey.Claimer) (kp nkeys.KeyPair, err error) {
+func acquire(ctx context.Context, cfg Config, store workerkey.Store, c workerkey.Claimer) (key []byte, err error) {
 	attempts := max(cfg.Attempts, 1)
+	hasData := func() (bool, error) { return hasStoreData(cfg.DataDir) }
 	for i := range attempts {
-		kp, err = store.Acquire(ctx, c)
+		key, err = store.Acquire(ctx, c, hasData)
 		if err == nil || i == attempts-1 {
-			return kp, err
+			return key, err
 		}
 		switch {
 		case pending(err):
 			cfg.Log(fmt.Sprintf("worker not yet authorized, asking again: %v", err))
 		case retryable(err):
-			cfg.Log(fmt.Sprintf("first-store decision not settled, retrying: %v", err))
+			cfg.Log(fmt.Sprintf("receipt key decision not settled, retrying: %v", err))
 		default:
-			return kp, err
+			return key, err
 		}
 		select {
 		case <-ctx.Done():
@@ -200,6 +210,13 @@ func acquire(ctx context.Context, cfg Config, store workerkey.Store, c workerkey
 	return nil, err
 }

+// Transient reports whether a failed Boot may be run again: the decision was
+// still pending or retryable when its bound ran out. Every other refusal,
+// including a missing or different key, is final.
+func Transient(err error) bool {
+	return pending(err) || retryable(err) || errors.Is(err, context.DeadlineExceeded)
+}
+
 func pending(err error) bool {
 	p, ok := errors.AsType[interface {
 		error
@@ -333,29 +350,25 @@ func readTrimmed(path string) (string, error) {
 	return strings.TrimSpace(string(b)), nil
 }

-// writePublicKey publishes the public key for later reporting; it is not secret.
-func writePublicKey(runDir, pub string) error {
+// writeMarker publishes a non-secret value under runDir atomically.
+func writeMarker(runDir, name, value string) error {
 	if err := os.MkdirAll(runDir, 0o750); err != nil {
 		return fmt.Errorf("create %s: %w", runDir, err)
 	}
-	tmp, err := os.CreateTemp(runDir, ".public-key-*")
+	tmp, err := os.CreateTemp(runDir, "."+name+"-*")
 	if err != nil {
-		return fmt.Errorf("write public key: %w", err)
+		return fmt.Errorf("write %s: %w", name, err)
 	}
 	defer os.Remove(tmp.Name())
-	if _, err := tmp.WriteString(pub + "\n"); err != nil {
-		tmp.Close()
-		return fmt.Errorf("write public key: %w", err)
+	_, werr := tmp.WriteString(value + "\n")
+	if cerr := tmp.Close(); werr == nil {
+		werr = cerr
 	}
-	if err := tmp.Chmod(0o644); err != nil {
-		tmp.Close()
-		return fmt.Errorf("write public key: %w", err)
+	if werr != nil {
+		return fmt.Errorf("write %s: %w", name, werr)
 	}
-	if err := tmp.Close(); err != nil {
-		return fmt.Errorf("write public key: %w", err)
-	}
-	if err := os.Rename(tmp.Name(), filepath.Join(runDir, "public-key")); err != nil {
-		return fmt.Errorf("write public key: %w", err)
+	if err := os.Rename(tmp.Name(), filepath.Join(runDir, name)); err != nil {
+		return fmt.Errorf("write %s: %w", name, err)
 	}
 	return nil
 }
--- a/Show More
+++ b/Show More