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feat(oci): run Spinifex on Oracle Cloud, and fix the public-address and NAT gateway lifecycle (#1108)
* feat: ship uninstall-spx.sh and fix the OCI bring-up path
Adds scripts/uninstall-spx.sh, the inverse of setup.sh: it removes the
software where node-reset.sh clears state and leaves the node installed. An
operator who installed with `curl ... | bash` had no teardown path at all.
State teardown is delegated to node-reset.sh rather than reimplemented, and
setup.sh now ships both to /usr/local/share/spinifex so they are reachable
without a checkout.
It refuses on a multi-node cluster and --yes does not override that: a flag
meaning "don't ask me" must not also mean "ignore a safety property".
/var/lib/spinifex and every apt package are kept unless asked for, and both
opt-ins confirm separately even under --yes.
Proved by a full uninstall/reinstall round trip on dev-oci, which found two
bugs neither prod nor dev-prod can reach, because both are ISO-installed:
node-reset.sh exited 2, silently, at its last step and after the wipe.
setup.sh creates the spinifex *group* and the spinifex-* service users but
never a *user* named spinifex, so `getent passwd spinifex` exits 2 and
pipefail carried it into set -e.
The uninstaller broke openvswitch-switch on its first run by removing the
socket-perms helper while leaving the drop-in referencing it, failing the
unit at step EXEC with status 203. Fixed on both sides: the uninstaller
removes drop-ins it wrote into other units' namespaces and restarts anything
it failed, and setup-ovn.sh writes ExecStartPost=- so a missing helper can
never stop another package's daemon.
setup-ovn.sh also learns the shape OCI needs: when --wan-bridge names a Linux
bridge it links it to OVS with a veth pair instead of enslaving the NIC, so
the VNIC keeps its MAC identity and netplan keeps owning the addresses. It
now fails on OVS datapath errors instead of reporting success, and the
--management demotion guard keys on /etc/default/ovn-central rather than on
database presence, which the ovn-central package creates on every node.
Tests: scripts/uninstall-spx_test.sh, wired into make test-build-scripts
along with shellcheck over the four scripts that ship to every node.
* feat: allocate external IPs from the Oracle Cloud API
An OCI VNIC drops any packet whose source is not a registered private IP
object on it, so an external pool cannot be range math there — the address
has to be created through the provider before it exists at all. Add
source = "oci" and the allocator behind it.
One allocation is two OCI objects: a secondary private IP that rides the
wire, and a RESERVED public IP attached to it that the internet reaches.
Allocate returns the public address because that is what AWS semantics are
about, and records the pair so the host plumbing and release path can find
the private half.
The OCI objects are created before the binding is written, and dropped
after it on release — both orders chosen so a crash leaves a discoverable
leak rather than a record that lies. Reconcile squares the two on startup
and is required, not optional: a leaked reserved public IP bills and holds
one of the 50 per-region slots with nothing referencing it. It never
touches an object without our display-name prefix, because the reference
host carries operator-created secondaries on the same VNIC.
Resolve the VNIC from an interface name by MAC through IMDS rather than by
Oracle's VNIC ordering, which is not a documented contract.
Generalise ExternalIPAM.EnableDHCP into InstallAllocator so the OCI wiring
is not a second single-purpose installer.
* fix: refuse source = "oci" outside routed mode, and cover the SDK path
An OCI VNIC accepts exactly one MAC, its own, and delivers every inbound
frame to it regardless of which of its addresses the packet is for.
Measured on the reference host: an internet source reaches 10.200.0.144 as
router-MAC to VNIC-MAC, the public address never appears on the wire at
all, and every off-subnet destination resolves to the same next hop.
Pool mode puts a per-VPC gateway LRP MAC and a per-rule external NAT MAC on
the uplink and ARPs for the address, which policy.go:50 justifies with "the
Linux bridge learns the per-rule external MAC on the veth port like any
other MAC". An OCI VNIC does not learn MACs; it accepts one. So a pool-mode
guest's egress is dropped and its ingress never reaches OVN. Routed mode
keeps the address on the host, which already wears the VNIC's MAC.
Pinning every LRP to that MAC does not rescue pool mode: they share one
external logical switch and OVN resolves inbound frames by an L2 lookup on
it, so duplicate MACs work for one VPC and silently misroute past that.
The refusal names the MAC reason, because a refusal that only says "use nat
mode" reads as arbitrary and gets worked around.
Also test the SDK request shapes against a local endpoint. Two of them are
wrong in ways reading does not catch: pagination stopping early reports a
partial VNIC to reconcile, which then drops live bindings, and a nil
privateIpId on detach is omitted from the body entirely, so OCI reads the
update as a no-op, returns 200, and leaves the address attached and billing.
* fix: install host firewall rules where a distro's catch-all reject cannot precede them
Oracle's Ubuntu cloud image ships a catch-all REJECT in both INPUT and FORWARD.
Two Spinifex datapaths were silently dead behind it on any such host.
EnsureNATEgressRules probed with -C and appended with -A, so its ACCEPT rules
landed after the REJECT and never matched: 24113 packets on the reject, 0 on
both accepts, and guests had no egress. The comment named the case it did not
handle, anticipating a FORWARD policy of DROP — which an append does survive —
rather than an explicit REJECT rule, which it cannot. Insert at the head, and
drain existing copies first, because a rule an earlier build appended still
satisfies -C and would otherwise stay stranded across an upgrade.
Nothing opened INPUT for the IMDS endpoints at all. The responder binds .254
and .253 per instance on the ime- devices, so guest requests are locally
delivered and meet INPUT. Requests arrived and no reply ever left; cloud-init
spent 490s timing out and reported the endpoint as disabled. With one wildcarded
accept the same image boots in 18.6s and finds its datasource.
The natuplink e2e check had the same blind spot the code did, asserting -C and
therefore presence but never position. It now asserts the accepts precede the
first reject.
* feat: OCI address pairs, and an IMDS remap so the host keeps its own metadata
An OCI external address is two objects, not one: a RESERVED public IP that
OCI 1:1-NATs upstream and never puts on the wire, and a secondary private IP
on the VNIC that the wire actually carries. Every AWS-facing record holds the
public half; every datapath object must hold the private one.
The mapping goes in policy.natManager and nowhere else. AddEIP, DeleteEIP,
PruneOrphanEIPs and the HostEIPBinder all converge there, and reconcile
rebuilds the rule set from AWS-facing intent on every pass — so a correctly
mapped rule installed further upstream is swept on the next reconcile and
replaced with one matching an address that never arrives. The seam is a
DatapathResolver defaulting to identity, so every non-OCI deployment is
unchanged. A resolve failure is fatal: falling back to the public address
would install a rule that reads correctly in ovn-nbctl and blackholes.
ocinet.Lookup is the OCI side — read-only, KV-backed, no client and no
credentials, because vpcd is a different process from the daemon that owns
the allocator and the bindings record is all either would consult.
Two live bugs the in-memory test store was hiding, both found by making the
fake report ErrNotFound the way the real store does:
- KVStore.Mutate could not create, so every pool failed its own first
allocation after OCI had already created and billed the pair.
- Reconcile treated a missing record as a failure, aborting the one pass
that exists to find an object created before its binding was written.
Guest IMDS must stay on 169.254.169.254, which is also where a cloud host's
own metadata service lives — the first guest launch made it a local address
and took the host's metadata and DNS with it. The datapath is OpenFlow
steered, so the guest-facing addresses stay put and only the host-side
endpoint address moves, with a PREROUTING DNAT on ime-+ translating and
conntrack un-NATing the reply. Off by default; identity when unset.
The IMDS firewall rules move to vpcd. They are wildcarded over every
endpoint rather than per-launch work, and spinifex-daemon holds no iptables
grant and no CAP_NET_ADMIN by design, so attempting them aborted every
launch.
* fix: name the real constructor in the IMDS bind-address error, and mark the NAT datapath test in-package
The error string pointed at DefaultHostBindAddrs, which does not exist — a
caller following it would have looked for a symbol that was never written.
nat_datapath_test.go reuses nat_test.go's in-package fixtures, so it carries
the //test:in-package marker the package check asks for.
* docs: index what each e2e suite proves
Written because a datapath comment was read as an end-to-end behavioural claim
and the suite that already answered it was found only after the wrong answer
had been given. TestVPCEgressPaths/NATBaseline is the authority on private
subnet egress, and nothing pointed at it.
* fix: source-route an EIP's reply out the VNIC that holds it
An EIP's reply carries the EIP as its source. On a host that pins its
uplink with a policy rule, the reply took the main table instead and left
by the wrong interface — which a cloud VNIC drops, because the address is
registered on a different one. Ingress reached the guest and nothing came
back.
Every bind now mirrors the uplink's rule onto the EIP. The selector is the
rule rather than the interface: both OCI VNICs sit in one subnet, so "the
interface owning the EIP's subnet" names two of them, and two candidate
rules is a refusal rather than a guess. A host with no source routing gets
no rule and no change.
* docs: name the setup-ovn recipe routed mode actually needs on OCI
The OCI guide told operators to run `--wan-bridge=br-wan`, which is
mutually exclusive with `--nat-uplink` and deletes the spx-nat transit
veth routed mode runs on. The node then refuses to bring the uplink up,
with an error naming the flag the guide should have used.
Several messages also claimed routed mode is outbound-only with no
public IPs. That stopped being true when the routed EIP path landed, and
it reads as "what you are about to do cannot work" during the one init
the OCI path documents.
* feat: let routed NAT form a multi-node cluster, and carry every pool through formation
Lifts the --nodes >= 2 refusal on --external-mode=nat. The refusal carried no
technical justification -- it was a v1 scope decision -- but routed NAT is the
only datapath a cloud VNIC can carry, so "routed NAT is single-node" had become
"Spinifex on a cloud host is single-node".
It is not fixed by lifting it. Measured on three OCI nodes: the cluster forms,
all chassis register and guest-to-guest traffic runs at 7.1-7.7 Gbit/s, but
every node claims every EIP, nodes disagree on the VPC's gateway LRP, and only
the gateway chassis reaches its own guests. init now says so on stderr rather
than refusing, because the refusal made the defects unreachable and therefore
unfixable. Distributing the EIP datapath is the actual fix.
Lifting it exposed a second defect that stops formation outright. NetworkConfig
held nine flattened Pool* scalars and the init node set PoolName = "wan"
unconditionally; routed NAT renders two pools and the one that matters --
nat-transit, carrying the gateway-LRP range -- was dropped. Each joiner got a
single pool named "wan" holding the transit gateway and the detected WAN prefix,
and the leader re-rendered its own config from the same struct, so all three
nodes were wrong. Pools is now []admin.PoolData in render order, and PoolData
gains json tags because it is on the wire now rather than a template input.
* feat(install-node): add --external-mode so a cluster can be formed in routed NAT
install-node.sh could not express routed NAT at all. It required
--external-pool/--external-gateway/--external-prefix-len and passed
--external-mode=pool to every spx admin init unconditionally, so the only
supported way to form a routed-NAT cluster was by hand.
--external-mode nat refuses the three pool flags rather than ignoring them, and
threads --nat-uplink into setup-ovn.sh -- without it the WAN interface check
rejects a physical NIC during formation, which is correct in pool mode and
wrong in routed mode, where nothing is bridged.
* fix(ocinet): stop each node deleting its peers' OCI addresses on startup
Reconcile compares the binding record against the private IPs on one VNIC. The
record is one key per pool and therefore cluster-wide, so on more than one node
every peer's binding looks exactly like a binding whose objects OCI has lost.
Each node dropped them, and direction 1 on the owning node then collected the
now-unclaimed objects as leaks -- deleting the reserved public IP and private IP
of a running instance.
Observed on the three-node OCI cluster: node2's startup pass logged "collected a
leaked address" for an address it had allocated ten minutes earlier and "dropped
a stale binding" for one living on node3's VNIC.
The damage did not stop at the OCI objects. With the binding gone,
Lookup.DatapathIP returns the public address unchanged, so the OVN
dnat_and_snat row carries the public address instead of the private half. Guest
egress then leaves the VNIC sourced from a reserved public IP, which OCI drops
because it enforces the registered source per VNIC -- and EnsureEIPSourceRoute
no-ops too, since a public address shares no subnet with any host address. One
destroyed binding takes out both directions.
Binding.VNICID already exists for exactly this ("how a node that comes back from
the dead tells mine from moved on without me") and Reconcile never consulted it.
A binding is now only dropped when it names this node's VNIC; one naming no VNIC
cannot be attributed and is left alone rather than guessed at.
* fix(host): find the EIP's source-routing table when the uplink is held as a /32
uplinkSourceRuleFor identified the interface owning an EIP's subnet by finding
a host address configured with a prefix that contains it. On OCI both VNICs sit
in one subnet, so br-wan has to hold its address as a /32 -- a /23 there puts
the subnet's on-link route in the main table at metric 0 and takes the whole
subnet off the primary VNIC. A /32 contains nothing but itself, so no rule was
ever found, no source rule was installed, and the reply left by the primary
VNIC where OCI dropped it for carrying an unregistered source.
The address is not the only record of who owns the subnet. The rule names a
table, and that table holds the on-link route. Consulted as a fallback, only
when the address prefixes matched nobody, so a host that already resolved this
the direct way keeps its existing answer -- prod and dev-prod are unaffected.
Only scope-link routes count. A default route covers every address and would
make every source-routing table an equally good answer.
* docs(oci): correct the multi-node story and name the oci_vnic_id constraint
The nat-mode warning said EIPs and default egress were both broken on more
than one node. Default egress is fine: delete a guest's dnat_and_snat row and
it reaches 1.1.1.1 in 2.3 ms from a guest on any of three nodes. Only the
public-IP path was broken, and the three defects behind it are now fixed.
What remains is not a bug but the shape of the datapath: routed NAT centralises
the EIP path on the VPC's gateway chassis, ext-shared is a localnet so the other
nodes cannot reach it, and OCI drops any frame whose source is not registered on
the VNIC it leaves by. So every node's pool must pin oci_vnic_id to the gateway
chassis's VNIC rather than resolving its own. Say so in §5.3, where an operator
writing the pool will read it, and in §9, where the cost is that a gateway
change kills every public IP until the pools are repointed.
The single-node cap itself is gone from the doc: a three-node cluster has been
formed and measured, and the warning proceeds rather than refusing.
* feat(nat): distribute the routed-NAT EIP path so it works on more than one node
Routed NAT processed every EIP on the VPC's gateway chassis, and ext-shared is
a localnet, so the transit segment a /32 route pointed into existed only on
that one node. Measured on three nodes: all three claimed all three EIPs, the
nodes disagreed on the gateway LRP, and only guests on the gateway chassis were
reachable.
The mechanism to fix it is not new. Pool mode already distributes EIPs by
putting external_mac and logical_port on the dnat_and_snat row and letting
OVN's ARP responder answer for the external IP on the external segment. Routed
mode has an external segment too, the spx-nat veth pair, and it being per node
is the distribution: only the node running the instance can answer ARP on it.
So a routed rule is now distributed on the same terms as a pool one, and its
host route becomes on-link on the transit veth instead of via a gateway LRP
that may be on another chassis. bindHostEIP stops demanding that address for a
distributed rule, which is what previously failed the bind on every node but
one. vpcd plumbs only the ENIs local OVS reports as its own, asked of OVS
rather than the Southbound DB because the question is about this host.
The gateway LRP keeps its transit-pool address. Default egress routes through
it and works across three nodes today, so making it link-local as pool mode
does would break a working path to fix one distribution has already fixed.
Pool and static are unmoved, and a test asserts that against the same input
rather than leaving it to inspection. A rule with no MAC stays centralised, so
a cluster part-way through an upgrade is never in a state neither shape handles.
Beads: mulga-opyl7, mulga-la0pe
* fix(nat): make routed-EIP host plumbing work on every node
Three guests on three OCI nodes, one guest per node: only one was
reachable. Two defects, both invisible on a single node.
The transit veth took a random MAC per node, but OVN holds one MAC
binding for the transit nexthop across the whole cluster — so every
chassis addressed its egress to whichever node seeded the binding, and
the other kernels dropped it at L2. The pair is node-local, so one
locally-administered address everywhere is unambiguous; setup-ovn.sh
pins it at creation and in the netdev unit, and EnsureUplinkPort repairs
a veth made before that.
Host routes and proxy-ARP also rode the leader-gated reconcile pass, so
a node that never won the lease never plumbed its own guests' EIPs.
BindHostEIPs does that half on its own loop on every node; Bind already
leaves alone an EIP whose ENI is elsewhere, so two nodes never contend.
An unresolvable address skips the sweep rather than shrinking it.
Pool and static are untouched: the new pass is a no-op outside routed
mode, and a test asserts it.
Also adds --teardown and --dry-run to setup-ovn.sh, for re-running it on
a node that is already tangled. It deliberately spares the NB/SB
databases, /etc/spinifex, the system-id and the packages, and refuses to
del-br a Linux bridge.
* fix(nat): assert the transit MAC where vpcd actually runs it
EnsureUplinkPort is never called in production — host.Wiring is
constructed nowhere — so the repair landed in a path the deployed
daemon does not take, and three nodes came back with three different
MACs. vpcd re-asserts it beside the NAT egress rules instead, which is
the routed-NAT branch that does run on every start.
* fix(vpcd): make uplink-mode detection say what it saw, and check it
detectBridgeMode logged only the branch it took, so a node detected as
veth when it was wired for nat looked identical to one that was right.
It now reports both probes every time, errors when a node carries both
uplink veths (set up twice, and --teardown is the way out), and errors
when external_mode and the wiring disagree — the datapath follows the
wiring, so the config silently loses that argument. An explicitly
configured bridge_mode gets the same cross-check, since nothing else
ever compared it against the wiring.
The vpc-networking doc now opens nat with "start with pool unless one
of these applies" and gains a section on nat across more than one node;
the admin warning for --external-mode=nat on two or more nodes says
what was verified by hand and what is still uncovered.
* test(nat): prove routed NAT delivers each node's own guests, on a cluster
natuplink ran single-node only, which is exactly where the two defects
that broke three nodes are invisible. It now admits ModeMultinode, and
phase 9 takes a second shape there: a guest per node in a spread
placement group, and for each one — its public IP plumbed by the node
running it and by no other node, the route on-link with proxy-ARP
answered there, a dnat_and_snat row carrying external_mac and
logical_port, a TCP handshake in from another node, and the guest's own
console verdict for egress. Every node's transit veth is checked
against the one cluster-wide MAC before any guest boots.
Single-node phase 9 gains the same row and on-link assertions, so the
shape is held on both topologies.
Two gates come from what three OCI nodes actually do: every node holds
a gateway_chassis row for every VPC (the active one is the highest
priority) and every node installs the VPC ingress route, so only phase
7 needs gating — it runs where the gateway port and the guest are both
local, and logs which one is missing otherwise.
Cell 20 is real-multi x nat with its own nightly step, leaving the
permutation cells' suite set alone.
* test(nat): run the VPC egress paths in nat mode, not pool mode only
The single suite gated TestVPCEgressPaths and TestWANEgressSMTPBlock on
external_mode = "pool", with a comment saying nat clusters have no
EIP/NAT-GW support. They have had EIPs since the routed path landed, so
the gate now asks whether the cluster can allocate public addresses at
all — pool, or nat with a non-transit pool configured.
The nat-single cell runs TestVPCEgressPaths beside natuplink, which is
the only nightly coverage of a private subnet's isolation and its NAT
gateway in routed mode. natuplink never creates a private subnet.
* docs(config): list nat among external_mode values
* fix(ci): renumber the multi-node nat cell off the bare-metal job
Cell 20 is already the bare-metal single-node job, gated on the same
cells input but declared in the workflow rather than e2e-cells.json.
A matrix entry with the same number runs two unrelated jobs under one
name, and naming 20 in a dispatch selects both.
* feat(images): add Oracle Linux 10.1 and 9.8, and pin their catalog digests
Oracle publishes its qcow2 checksums inline on an HTML page and ships no
sums file, so the four new entries carry the expected digest in the catalog
rather than a URL to fetch one from. Images gains ChecksumDigest for that,
and the catalog import path verifies against it and says which of the two
sources it used, so a recorded digest never reads as a fetched sums file.
Pinning is safe here and only here: each URL names an immutable build
(b291, b293, b178, b182) and never moves. aarch64 has a -kvm-cloud- build
alongside the plain -kvm- one; the cloud build is the cloud-init image and
is the one that matches x86_64's -kvm-.
TestImageCatalogReachable HEADs every URL in the catalog from the general
single-node suite. These artifacts live on hosts nobody here controls, so
an upstream that retires a build breaks `spx admin images import` for a
customer and nothing else in the suite would notice. It also asserts that
every entry sets exactly one checksum source, and that no pinned entry
points at a "latest" URL whose bytes would change under it.
* fix(formation): carry bridge_mode onto the leader and every joiner
applyNetworkConfig copied external_mode, external_interface and the pools
out of the formation NetworkConfig but never bridge_mode, so a multi-node
cluster wrote a spinifex.toml without the key while single-node init wrote
it. Every node then fell back to autodetecting a mode that init had pinned.
Nightly cell 30 caught it: TestNATUplink failed at the config phase on a
spinifex.toml that did not contain bridge_mode = "nat". Deriving it from
the mode rather than adding a NetworkConfig field keeps the leader and the
joiners on the same rule single-node init already uses.
* feat(ui): show how to ssh into an instance, and which user to use
An instance detail page gave the addresses and the key pair name but never
the login user, which is the one part of the command nobody can derive. It
belongs to the AMI, not to Spinifex: nothing in the launch path creates or
renames an account, so stock cloud-init applies the distro's own
default_user. Oracle Linux is cloud-user, Debian is debian, Ubuntu is
ubuntu, and guessing from the distro name gets two of those three wrong.
The card resolves the user from the AMI's name and description, and an
unrecognised image yields a placeholder rather than a guess, because a
wrong username in a copy-paste command is worse than an honest gap. A
private-only instance is called out as reachable from inside the VPC only,
rather than presented as a command that will simply time out.
* fix(nat): plumb host state for a NAT gateway's public address
AddNATGateway installed the OVN snat row and stopped there. On a routed-NAT
node the host is what delivers a public address, so an egressing private guest
left with a source the host held no route back to, and the masquerade rule —
which matches the transit 100.127.0.0/24 alone — never saw the packet. The
gateway's address needs the same /32 route into OVN, proxy-ARP and FORWARD
accepts an EIP gets.
hostBindSpecs unions floatingIPSpecs with one deduped spec per NAT gateway
address and feeds BindHostEIPs. It is kept apart from floatingIPSpecs
deliberately: pruneOrphanEIPs and addLive read that set as the complete list of
addresses allowed to hold a dnat_and_snat, and a gateway holds an snat, so
widening it would stop the sweep reclaiming a stale row on an address later
reused as a gateway's.
AddNATGateway also binds directly, on both the create and idempotent-skip
paths, so a fresh gateway is not dark for up to 30s waiting on the host EIP
pass — and so a reboot that keeps the OVN row still replays the volatile half.
Documents NAT gateways in nat mode in vpc-networking, and says at the head of
that section that nat is a supported mode covered by nightly cells 19 and 30.
* docs(oci): document Oracle Linux as a guest image, and that its user is cloud-user
Four catalog entries, all UEFI. The login user is the one that catches
people: opc is the default on the images Oracle publishes into OCI itself,
while these are the generic KVM cloud images from yum.oracle.com, whose
cloud-init default_user is cloud-user. Verified on 10.1 and 9.8 — opc, oracle
and ec2-user are all refused.
Also records why these four pin a checksum digest inline (Oracle ships no sums
file, and each URL names an immutable build), why arm64 takes the -kvm-cloud-
build, and that SELinux ships enforcing.
* fix(reconcile): stop reading an unreadable intent as an empty one
A wedged JetStream KV returned no keys for the ENI bucket while writes were
still landing. loadPorts mapped that to an empty port map, pruneOrphanPorts
read every guest LSP as an orphan against it, and every guest on the node lost
DHCP and IMDS while the API kept answering and the instances stayed "running".
The existing re-read guard did not help: it re-reads through the same path.
Three defences, because no single one covers every shape of the fault.
A failed kv.Get now fails the pass instead of dropping the record. Dropping one
VPC narrows localVPCs, which filters out every ENI in it, which the sweep reads
as permission to delete every guest port in that VPC — one failed read, same
outcome, and it needs no exotic KV state. Unmarshal failures stay skips: that
is a poison record rather than an unhealthy store, and failing on it would
wedge reconcile forever.
The port sweep now asks local OVS which taps are plugged in here and never
deletes a port that has one. A running guest's port cannot be an orphan
whatever intent says, and OVS is the one liveness signal that does not come
through the KV read path the sweep is otherwise entirely driven by. Wired from
vpcd; unwired callers fall back to the guard below. An unreadable OVS skips the
sweep rather than deciding on intent alone.
Each sweep also refuses outright when the keep set it would delete against
holds nothing at all — no ENIs, no SGs, or no ports and no external IPs. That
is the case local taps cannot cover, because the drift sweep is leader-gated
and lists NB cluster-wide, so the leader holds no tap for another node's guest.
The cost is real: a genuinely orphaned row now survives until one live record
of its class exists. Leaking a stale row is the recoverable half.
Three existing prune tests drove their fixtures to a wholly empty intent, which
is now the refusal case; they keep one live record of the class so they still
prove the prune. The Get-failure path has no unit test — there is no
jetstream.JetStream fake in the tree and an embedded server cannot be made to
list a key it will then refuse.
* docs(oci): separate the two address quotas, and the principal that can read them
The regional reserved-public-IP ceiling is tenancy-wide and does not grow with
node count, so a cluster hits it before the per-VNIC 64, which does. Records
the commands that read both, and that a detached reserved public IP still
bills.
Reading limits or usage needs a tenancy-level grant, which cannot be
compartment-scoped the way the node's policy is. That is a second, read-only
principal kept off every node, not an addition to SpinifexOperators.
* docs(oci): give quotas their own troubleshooting section, and say we enforce none
Spinifex hardcodes no address ceiling: it attempts the allocation and maps
OCI's own refusal to InsufficientAddressCapacity. So a quota is raised with
Oracle and nothing here is reconfigured or restarted — which is what an
operator needs to know before it bites, not after.
Separates the two quotas by how they scale: the regional reserved-public-IP
default is tenancy-wide and raisable by ticket, the per-VNIC 64 is per node and
is not.
* fix(oci): follow a guest to its new node when its EIP moves
OCI delivers a public address to whichever VNIC holds the private IP behind
it, and nothing ever moved that private IP. Binding.VNICID was written once at
allocate time, as the VNIC of whichever queue-group daemon happened to serve
the AWS request, and never updated — so an address landed on the right node
only by chance, and a guest that stopped and started elsewhere went dark while
every OVN row, host route and firewall rule on the new node was correct.
ClaimLocalAddresses closes the gap from the node that should hold the address.
Local OVS decides ownership, the same authority the host EIP binder already
trusts for the same question, and UpdatePrivateIp with a new VnicId does the
move in one server-side call. The private IP OCID survives it, so the reserved
public IP attached to it follows without being touched and the customer's
address never changes.
A loop per node, not leader-gated: the question is about this host's guests,
and a node that never wins the reconcile lease would otherwise never claim the
addresses of the instances it is running.
* fix(oci): record which ENI an EIP is associated with
An EIP is allocated bare and attached by a later AssociateAddress, so the OCI
binding written at allocate time named no ENI and nothing ever filled it in.
The address then stayed on whichever node happened to serve the allocation:
the affinity pass could follow an auto-assigned address, which is allocated
with its ENI, but never an EIP — the case customers actually use.
BindOwner is on an optional OwnerTracker interface rather than Allocator,
because only OCI has a notion of an address being delivered to one node. A
static or DHCP address is on the wire everywhere its node can reach, those
allocators do not implement it, and ExternalIPAM treats a pool that does not
as a success with nothing to do.
The same gap made the release owner guard inert for EIPs: it compares against
a binding ENI that was always empty, so a stale teardown could free an address
already handed to another instance.
* fix(ec2): report the address an instance is actually reachable on
Three faults kept DescribeInstances answering with the address launch assigned,
whatever happened afterwards.
The launch-time stamp lives on the stored ec2.Instance, and the stopped path
only declined to add an address rather than removing one, so a stopped instance
went on advertising an address it had released and that may already belong to
someone else. The projection now clears it, and the NIC association with it,
working on its copy so a restart can still report the address.
The running path filled the public address only when it was nil, which the
stamp never is, so an EIP could not be reported however correctly it was
recorded. The runtime address now wins.
And nothing told the rest of the system about an association: AssociateAddress
wrote neither the ENI record, which is what IMDS and the network reconcile
read, nor the instance record, which is what a describe answers from. The ENI
write is direct; the instance write is a fan-out, because the queue-group
worker that serves AssociateAddress is rarely the node running the instance.
* fix(net): take the host EIP plumbing off a node its guest has left
Bind refuses an EIP whose ENI is on another chassis; the prune beside it kept
anything still wanted cluster-wide. A guest that moved therefore left the old
node holding the /32 route into OVN and the proxy-ARP entry on the uplink, with
nothing that would ever remove them. On a shared segment that node goes on
answering ARP for an address another node is now serving.
The two halves now ask the same question by the same authority, in the loop
that already runs per node. An unreadable local OVS is not a yes: tearing down
a live address on a guess would fire everywhere at once, so it keeps the
binding and the next pass tries again. A binder with no chassis test behaves
exactly as before, and a centralised EIP is exempt because it hairpins through
the gateway chassis and every node plumbs it legitimately.
* fix(net): refuse to free an Elastic IP on behalf of a departing interface
Releasing an instance's public address on teardown releases it by address,
scoped to the ENI holding it. Since an association now writes the EIP onto the
instance record, that address is the EIP — so terminating an instance gave a
customer's Elastic IP back to the pool while describe-addresses still reported
it as theirs, free to be handed to another guest.
The existing ownership guard cannot catch this. It only fires when the stored
allocation already names an ENI, and an EIP is allocated bare and associated
later, so the stored ENI is empty and the guard passes straight through.
The distinction that holds is who is asking. ReleaseAddress is the address's own
owner and names no interface; instance teardown names the interface it is tearing
down. So a release that names an owner may free an auto-assigned address and
never an EIP, which is enforced in each of the three allocators.
DHCP needed the scope carried on the wire, since it releases by address and
resolves the lease afterwards. Absent on an older caller, which reads as false
and keeps the previous behaviour.
Worst on the two providers where it is not recoverable: on DHCP the lease is the
only thing holding the address and the server promises nothing about handing it
back, and on OCI the address is a reserved public IP object that the release
destroys outright.
* test(e2e): prove an Elastic IP survives a stop and start
Instance teardown releases the public address by value, and since the
association writes the EIP onto the instance record, that release aims
straight at the customer's Elastic IP. The allocator guards now refuse it,
but nothing end to end proved the address comes back on a restart.
The step goes inside EIPFlip, which already runs last on the shared public
guest for the same reason a stop is safe there: the address the guest
returns on is the allocation's, not the pool's. It runs on the static
cells and the DHCP ones alike, and on DHCP it doubles as the only outside
view of the lease still renewing while the guest is down.
* feat: release an auto-assigned public address on stop, take a new one on start
AWS lends an instance a public address for as long as it runs and gives it a
different one on the next start. Spinifex kept the address across a stop, which
holds a pool slot for a stopped instance and, on a DHCP pool, keeps renewing a
lease nothing is using.
A stop now offers the address back through the instance cleaner, which refuses
anything an Elastic IP is behind — the EIP association record answers that, the
same question an ENI delete already asks — and records on the VM that the start
owes it a new one. A host drain keeps the address: Restore relaunches the guest
on the next boot, and changing its address under it is an outage nobody asked
for.
The start allocates before the launch, so an exhausted pool refuses the start
rather than booting a guest the customer cannot reach, adopts an Elastic IP
associated while the instance was stopped instead of assigning a second address
beside it, and hands the address back if the launch then fails.
e2e: a StopStartAddress stage on the public guest asserts a stopped instance
reports no address and comes back on a different one from a static pool, and a
StopStartKeepsTheEIP step asserts the opposite for an Elastic IP.
* docs: restructure the OCI guide around two deployment paths, with diagrams
The guide had grown into a numbered wall with no shape: no frontmatter, no
contents, and a reader with an OCI account had no way to tell where to start.
It now follows the multi-node install template — overview, prerequisites, then
the deployment path — and splits that path in two: Terraform for one node or
three, which is the preferred route, and a manual single-node walkthrough for
an instance that already exists. Both meet at one shared configuration section
rather than repeating it.
Two ASCII diagrams carry what the prose could not: one OCI instance with the
whole AWS surface inside it, and three nodes with the same surface distributed,
showing which plane each VNIC carries and how an address follows a guest that
moves.
The limits section was materially out of date and said so in the places that
mattered most. Multi-node is no longer experimental, public addresses are no
longer pinned to one node — each allocates on its own VNIC and the affinity
pass moves the private half to wherever the guest is — and an auto-assigned
address is now returned to OCI on stop, so a stopped fleet stops paying for
addresses. What changed is recorded rather than quietly edited.
The Terraform configuration moves in from the monorepo as
scripts/terraform/oci-spx, so the guide points at something in this repository.
Also marks the two new lifecycle test files in-package, with the reason each
one needs to be: both substitute unexported dependencies.
* docs: rework the OCI guide — SVG diagrams, Terraform variables, iSCSI and br-wan
Replaces the two ASCII diagrams with SVGs in the house style, one for a
single node and one for three. Renames the two deployment sections to
Terraform deployment and Manual deployment, documents what the Terraform
builds per node and every variable worth setting, and explains that the
data volume is an iSCSI attachment rather than a disk.
The manual path now covers the iSCSI login, the fstab entry and the
netplan source routing that Terraform writes, and states what br-wan is
for on a routed-NAT node: it names the VNIC for the OCI allocator and
holds the registered addresses, but is never bridged into OVS.
Opens with what Spinifex is and why OCI is worth running it on.
* fix: make gateway convergence work on a multi-node routed-NAT cluster
Three defects each stopped a multi-node cluster from ever attaching an
internet gateway, and all three produced the same uninformative symptom:
`terraform apply` sitting on `aws_internet_gateway.igw: Still creating...`
forever while every service reported healthy.
ovn-northd was given only its local OVSDB socket as a client connection.
A RAFT follower does not forward writes -- it answers "not cluster leader,
trying another server" -- so with one entry in the list, northd stops
translating Northbound intent into Southbound flows the moment database
leadership moves to another node. Measured on the OCI cluster:
SB_Global.nb_cfg seventeen transactions behind NB_Global.nb_cfg, with no
chassisredirect port for any VPC created after leadership moved.
setup-ovn.sh wrote the member list only when the caller passed
--ovn-remote, which only install-node.sh did; it now derives the list from
the live RAFT membership otherwise, and says so when it finds a single
member, because that node needs a second pass once the others join.
The gateway datapath probe ran wherever the reconcile lease landed rather
than on the chassis owning the port. Both probes leave from the local
uplink, and under routed NAT the transit subnet exists identically on every
node, so a remote probe reported a healthy gateway as dead and aimed a
repair at a datapath the node does not own. GatewayPortLocal gates it.
On OCI the probe then ARPed the tenant-visible public IP, which the cloud
NATs and which appears on no interface anywhere. The reconciler now maps
the address through the same DatapathResolver the NAT rules are built from.
Also adds DescribeVpcEndpoints, which the AWS provider calls on every VPC
delete to sweep GuardDuty-managed endpoints; an InvalidAction there failed
the destroy and stranded the VPC.
The OCI guide gains a Terraform section recording which shipped workbooks
were validated against a three-node OCI cluster and which are still open.
* docs: record the validated Terraform workbook results for the three-node OCI cluster
Six of the seven workbooks run against the OCI cluster pass, including the
three the section exists to prove: RDS, ECS and EKS. Records nginx-alb and the
clean eks-quickstart re-run, and names the two lifecycle gaps that bit during
the run so an operator recognises them rather than reading them as a broken
workbook.
* fix: route the NAT gateway's SNAT source through the datapath resolver
AddNATGateway was the one NAT path that did not map its external address to
the one that rides the wire. Where the public half of an allocation is NAT'd by
the cloud it is on no interface anywhere, so every private-subnet guest egressed
with a source that was dropped, while the gateway reported available and DNS
kept working because the VPC resolver is host-local.
The unmapped address also failed the host EIP sweep, which works in resolved
addresses, so the bind was pruned as foreign on the next pass and reinstalled on
the one after. The public half now survives as an external ID instead.
Also restructures the OCI guide around numbered steps through to running
Terraform, and moves the cloud-init and metadata sections into troubleshooting
where they are read when something is wrong rather than followed when it is not.
* fix: place a NAT gateway's OCI address on the node that forwards for it
OCI drops a packet whose source is not a registered private IP on the VNIC it
leaves from, so a NAT gateway's SNAT source has to be on the gateway chassis.
Two independent placements decided those and nothing reconciled them: the
address was created by whichever worker served AllocateAddress, while the
chassis is a fixed ordering the reconcile pass asserts. On a three-node cluster
that made private-subnet egress a coin flip, and the same Terraform passed or
died depending on which node answered.
The affinity pass already solves this for guests, by asking local OVS where the
tap is. A NAT gateway has no tap, and it skipped anything with no ENI — which
is exactly and only this address. The equivalent local fact is the VPC's
chassisredirect binding, so ownership now has two answers rather than one, and
an address that is neither a guest's nor a gateway's is still left alone.
The VPC is recorded from the reconcile pass rather than from CreateNatGateway,
because the answer is the gateway chassis and reconcile is what decides it.
* fix: plumb a NAT gateway's host ingress only on its gateway chassis
A NAT gateway's address has no ENI, so neither the bind's locality test nor
the prune's could ever fire for it and every node installed its /32 route into
OVN. Latent on bare metal, where pool addresses are disjoint from the node
subnet; on a cloud that hands out the address from the nodes' own subnet it
outranks the connected route and swallows node-to-node traffic.
Give that address the same second authority the ocinet affinity pass has: the
VPC's chassisredirect binding, read from the local ovn-controller. An
unanswerable question still leaves the binding alone, so a single node whose
gateway port is not yet claimed behaves exactly as before.
The orphan EIP prune built its live set from ENI and user EIPs alone while also
sweeping host ingress, so every drift pass tore down the ingress of every live
NAT gateway and left it dark until the next host EIP tick.
* fix: ask the gateway chassis only about a NAT gateway's address
gatewayElsewhere skipped the NAT gateway marker it was named for and answered
for every spec, so on a node that is not the VPC's gateway chassis every EIP —
including a guest's, whose locality is its own port — was left unplumbed. Two
of three nodes bound nothing.
* test: assert the two private-subnet EKS workbooks in the tofu harness
eks-https-ingress and eks-gitops-argocd put their workers in private subnets
behind a NAT gateway, so a worker only registers Ready if its egress to the
cluster endpoint and to ECR survives that path. That makes them the workbooks
that catch a NAT gateway fault, and neither had an assertion, so neither could
be run at all — run_workbook calls assert_<name> by construction.
Both share eks-quickstart's readiness check, extracted unchanged. They also
name the worker size node_instance_type rather than instance_type, and tofu
rejects a -var for an undeclared variable outright, so the name is read from
the config instead of kept in a list here.
* test: count agents, not every node, when asserting EKS workers Ready
The control plane is three K3s servers, so an unfiltered node count reaches a
one-worker cluster's desired size before any worker joins — the assertion
passed on exactly the failure it exists to catch, reporting "4/1 workers
Ready". Filtering on the control-plane role label makes it 1/1, which is the
number that says a node-group worker registered.
Matters most for the two private-subnet workbooks, where the worker joining is
the whole proof that egress through the NAT gateway works.
* docs: record the two private-subnet EKS workbooks passing on OCI
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225bf65a8e |
feat: EBS export tunables, teardown reapers, fan-out and OVN fixes (#800)
Merges `feat/ebs-export-tunables` (83 commits) into dev. The branch could not be rebase-merged because it carries five merges from dev, so it lands as a squash. ## What is in it - **EBS export tunables** and the nbdkit/viperblock export path they configure. - **Teardown reapers and backoff** for S3 buckets, load balancers, gateways, spot requests, certificates, endpoints, elastic IPs and network interfaces, so a dependent that keeps failing is backed off rather than retried hot. - **Retry and tolerance paths**: ECS IAM service init, ECR signing keys deleted between the list and the read, an unreadable signing key at awsgw startup, and an ECS instance-profile policy attach converging on a stale read. - **Key pair validation reads the material by name** instead of listing the account, closing the `InvalidKeyPair.NotFound` race that a single-replica LIST could produce. - **Concurrency and fan-out**: concurrent metadata document fetches, bounded metadata reads for describes, and the node-discovery timeout removed from every fan-out call. - **OVN correctness against the configured NB cluster**: the flows barrier, nexthop MAC binding, and stopping a compute node from running the package's standalone database. - **nats-js-watchdog can re-arm itself.** The escalation check ran above the probe loop while the only line that cleared the counter sat below it, so a latched watchdog could never observe a recovery. It now probes first and decides second, and says so once per latch rather than once per tick. - **CI**: 19 commits of nightly and build-pipeline work. ## Verification `make preflight` green locally. Build and Test, Integration Tests, Race Detection, and Lint and Security all green on `c2da0385`. ## Known red, not introduced here Two nightly cells fail on this branch and are pre-existing: - **cell-10** — a partial OVN IPsec enable leaves `NB_Global ipsec=true` asserted cluster-wide while two of three chassis failed their local reconcile, black-holing cross-chassis guest traffic for roughly 5.5 minutes while every health signal stays green. - **cell-19** — a total layer-3 egress blackhole below a correctly and promptly programmed NAT/EIP datapath, aggravated by a natuplink probe whose retry budget outlives the test's own wait, so it can never emit its FAIL verdict. Both are filed separately and should be weighed before a release is cut. |
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42d87d7a5a |
feat: EBS export tunables, plus blob-read fault isolation for ebsmetadata (#799)
* feat(ebs): make nbdkit thread count and per-volume read cache configurable Both numbers that set a volume's export concurrency and memory were hard-coded: nbdkit ran on its own default of 16 threads per connection because no -t was ever passed, and the read cache was a 128 MiB literal in the mount path. Neither could be changed without a recompile, and neither was visible in the logs or the process argv. Add default_threads and cache_size_mb to [nodes.<node>.ebs]. Defaults are unchanged, so a config that does not set them behaves exactly as before. CacheSizeMB is a pointer so an explicit 0 (cache disabled) stays distinguishable from an unset key, matching how ViperblockConfig treats its own toggles. -efi volumes stay uncached regardless. Validation is a range check only. Both are operator tunables applied per nbdkit process, and there is one of those per volume, so the host cost is the value times the volume count -- left for the operator to weigh rather than second-guessed here. * feat(security): arm the firewall by install path and sync the clock at firstboot The host firewall armed itself from a code default, so a curl-to-bash install onto an existing Debian or Ubuntu machine applied a default-deny INPUT policy seconds after bootstrap. Anything the operator was already running that is not on the allow list stopped accepting connections, with nothing logged and no config key to set beforehand — no template writes firewall_enabled, so every install fell through to the default. Arming is now the install path's decision. setup.sh takes --firewall=on|off and records it in /etc/spinifex/firewall/mode, defaulting on under ISO_BUILD and off everywhere else: the ISO is an appliance on hardware we define, a package install is a guest on a machine that was already doing something. firewall_enabled becomes a three-state *bool so "unset" and "explicitly false" stay distinguishable. Flipping the default to false instead would have torn down a working policy on every existing node, because false is an instruction to disable rather than an absence. Resolution is config, then mode file, then on, so a node installed before any of this keeps what it has. The ISO had the opposite problem. setup.sh is the only place that enables spinifex-firewall.service and it returns before that line under ISO_BUILD, with no systemd in the chroot to talk to. Nothing else enabled it, so after a reboot the ruleset — runtime state — was gone, and ReconcileFirewall short-circuited on an unchanged peer file and never put it back. An ISO node was firewalled until its first reboot and open permanently after. firstboot now enables the unit, and the reconcile checks the table is loaded rather than treating an unchanged peer set as proof the policy is applied. Two policy changes: 443 is held for the nginx TLS edge so that rollout needs no per-node firewall change, and the SSH port is read from sshd_config and its Include drop-ins instead of being hardcoded to 22 — a host on Port 2222 was allowed exactly one port that was not the one it uses, and ct state established kept the operator's session alive until they disconnected. 53 stays open on every node, now with a comment saying so: northstar serves public authoritative DNS. Clock: firstboot steps and waits for sync before spx admin init mints credentials, since a certificate issued against a wrong RTC carries a NotBefore that outlives the correction. Bounded to 60s and non-fatal so an air-gapped install still completes, and once is enough because rtcsync writes the corrected time back. A chrony drop-in replaces Debian's makestep 1 3, which stops stepping after three updates and then slews at roughly 7 seconds a day — a node that burned those before the network came up never visibly converged. * fix(security): let a node join a cluster whose firewall is already armed Expanding a single-node ISO install into a cluster could not succeed. Two independent blockers, both from the same root: the peer set is derived from converged cluster state, but the ports needed to reach convergence are gated on that same set. The formation port is peer-scoped, and a node dialling in to join is not a peer yet, so the handshake was dropped rather than refused and the joiner retried in silence until it timed out. It cannot simply move to the public rule: outside formation the same port carries the daemon cluster manager, whose /health and /local/* routes report node topology, service inventory and running instances unauthenticated. So it is opened for the formation window only, by spx admin init, and closed again on every exit path. The reconcile then deadlocked. Holding out for the full chassis list is right on a node with no policy loaded, but on one armed for a smaller cluster the ports a joining node needs in order to register its chassis are exactly the ones the stale set blocks, so the list can never complete. Widen the peer set on the tunnel set already loaded, and report the partial state so the caller retries sooner than the steady-state interval. A converged cluster whose Southbound DB is briefly unreadable is still left untouched. * docs(install): explain the firewall around cluster formation An ISO-installed server is a cluster of one, and its firewall admits internal cluster traffic only from members it recognises. Forming a cluster out of such servers therefore needs the firewall off first: step 3 of the multi-node guide has each server dial node 1's OVN database on the raft ports, and those are peer-scoped like everything else on the cluster plane. Neither guide said so, and the failure is a silent drop that looks like a network fault. Both guides now walk the off / form / on sequence, and the multi-node guide gains a reference section covering which ports are public, how arming differs between the ISO and the binary installer, and how to verify membership landed. Re-enable the boot-time unit whenever the daemon arms the policy. Disabling the firewall to form a cluster also disables that unit, so re-arming used to look complete while leaving the node bare after its next reboot. * fix: make the ISO-to-cluster conversion path work end to end Forming a cluster from four ISO-imaged servers surfaced a run of bugs that share a starting state CI never exercises: the ISO delivers an initialized, armed, running node, while the conversion path was written against the binary installer's unconfigured one. - install-node.sh never disarmed the host firewall, so nodes 2 and 3 could not dial the first node on the OVN raft ports and formation could not proceed. It now owns the whole lifecycle: disarm, form, re-arm, then verify the loaded policy against the expected peer set. - spx admin init left the admin access key and secret empty on the preserve path. The pair cannot be read back, and the IAM store is rebuilt by formation, so the empty strings reached every joiner's bootstrap.json and crash-looped awsgw. It is reissued instead, and IAM seeding now skips an empty admin block rather than taking the gateway down on every restart. - node-reset.sh left /etc/default/ovn-central behind. Raft membership lives in that file, not in the databases the reset deletes, so ovn-central recreated the database as a cluster member dialling a peer that had itself been wiped. - node-reset.sh also destroyed the installed firewall policy, which nothing regenerates. set-peers then failed on every attempt and the node stayed open permanently and silently. The arming mode is read before the wipe and the stage regenerated after it. - spinifex-firewall-apply rejected every verb when the policy file was missing, including disable. Turning the firewall off is the recovery path, so that left a node that could be neither armed nor disarmed. - viperblock exited 0 on a fatal startup error, so Restart=on-failure never fired. During formation its JetStream bucket has no leader yet, so the EBS provider died for good and every volume request failed with no responders. predastore and qemunbd had the same bug. - spx admin images import created image directories at 0700, so the first sudo import locked group members out of a tree deliberately made group-writable. Three of these hid behind checks that cannot succeed: ovn-sbctl show against a clustered database, and the OVN northbound and southbound waits in setup-ovn.sh. All three failed to stderr and let the run continue, so a check that could never pass was indistinguishable from one that was merely slow. The USB install guide claimed the ISO leaves Spinifex unconfigured and told the operator to run spx admin init. firstboot has always done that itself, so the guide now describes what the ISO actually produces and how to start using it. * fix: let spread placement launch across every node A spread placement group reserved four distinct nodes correctly and then failed the launch with ServerInternal, having started only two or three of them. The scheduler was never at fault; two faults downstream stopped the instances following the reservation. vpcd subscribes to vpc.add-nat with QueueSubscribe, which delivers one message at a time, and the handler holds its reply across the OVN flows barrier. The 45s caller deadline was sized against a single 30s barrier, which is right for one instance and wrong for the N a spread launch issues at once — the third request waits behind two full barriers and times out. That one subscription now overlaps its handlers under a bounded semaphore. Each barrier still syncs after its own write, so the guarantee is unchanged while N barriers collapse into roughly one. With the requests overlapping, every barrier still ran to its alarm. install-node.sh computed OVN_REMOTE after building the database nodes and gave it only to compute nodes, so the database nodes were configured without --ovn-remote. setup-ovn.sh writes ovn-northd's NB/SB connections from that list and skips it on the localhost default, and it already documents what follows: a northd dialling only its local member stops advancing nb_cfg once raft leadership moves, wedging ovn-nbctl --wait=hv. The list is knowable before any node is touched, so it is computed first and passed to the database nodes too. Nothing reported an OVN fault while this was happening. Every chassis was registered, ovn-controller and IPsec were up, and the raft cluster was healthy. The only signal was the barrier logging that it had overrun and was continuing without confirmation — which reads like slowness and was a permanent wedge. * feat: sweep block sizes in the disk benchmark and add an iperf3 network benchmark * fix: use iperf 2 with CSV output and report why a remote start failed * fix: stop pkill matching its own shell and verify the iperf server is listening * ci: run the predastore throughput benchmark at the end of the nightly * ci: boot the ISO in the nightly, single-node and three-node * ci: use the existing CI node password secret in the ISO cells * ci: report free space before the benchmark instead of failing inside warp * ci: keep the benchmarks and node disks off tmpfs * ci: export the work directories from RUNNER_TEMP rather than job env * ci: run the ISO and benchmark workloads from the nvme scratch area * perf: run guest NICs on vhost-net with multiqueue Guest-to-guest VPC throughput measured 1.68 Gbit/s single-stream against 21.8 Gbit/s host-to-host on the same underlay, and did not improve with more streams. QEMU's -netdev tap defaults vhost to off, so the whole datapath ran in the main loop thread in userspace: that thread sat at 59-65% CPU while all four vCPU threads idled at ~4%. Every tap netdev now carries vhost=on, and VPC ENIs additionally run multiqueue at min(vCPUs, 8) queue pairs. Multiqueue needs all three of the tap, the netdev and the device to agree, so TapNetDev and NetDevice derive the netdev options and the 2N+2 MSI-X vector count from one queue figure rather than leaving callers to keep them in step. The QMP hot-plug path takes the same options as cold boot, with a test comparing it against the rendered cold-boot strings so the two cannot drift. MMIO machines stay single-queue: they have no MSI-X. * ci: check out the sibling repos the go workspace needs in the ISO cells * ci: skip cell-21 workload cleanup when the workload never ran * ci: size the cell-21 node at 8 GiB and keep its serial log * ci: keep the cell-21 node diagnostics alongside the serial log * fix: let the daemon open /dev/vhost-net and delete multi_queue taps Enabling vhost=on broke instance launch two ways. DevicePolicy=closed gates the cgroup device list before capabilities are consulted, so QEMU's open of /dev/vhost-net returned EPERM despite CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE; add the device to the allow list and bump the unit version. Separately, `ip tuntap del` re-opens the device with TUNSETIFF and fails with EINVAL on a multi_queue tap, leaking it on every teardown; route deletion through `ip link del`, which is flag-agnostic. * perf: default guest NICs to a single queue Multiqueue measured a net loss. Spreading one flow across queue pairs reorders packets and TCP reads that as loss: a 4-vCPU guest fell from 1.76 to 1.50 Gbit/s, with cwnd collapsing on spurious retransmits. The host overlay funnels a node pair onto one softirq core, so the extra queues have no headroom to win back what the reordering costs. Keep the plumbing and its tests behind MultiqueueNICs so re-enabling is one line once that funnel is fixed. vhost-net stays on unconditionally; it moves the datapath off the QEMU main loop, measured at 60% of a core under load against 3% with it. * fix: raise the UDP receive buffer for predastore's QUIC transport Predastore carries blob, meta and raft over QUIC and quic-go asks for a 7MiB receive buffer. Left at the kernel default of 208KiB it silently dropped datagrams under load: the four-node cluster had shed 80k-125k each, which failed shard writes, put raft into repeated elections, and ultimately handed guests an I/O error that cost two of them their root filesystems. Adds a sysctl stage writing /etc/sysctl.d/99-spinifex-net.conf, so the setting lands in the ISO image and on every node push rather than living in a runbook. * ci: give the cell-21 workload an identity the node accepts * feat: tie the guest MTU and NIC multiqueue to ipsec_enabled ESP costs 34 bytes on top of geneve's 58, so a cluster running the overlay in plaintext can advertise 1442 instead of 1408 — worth roughly 10% of guest throughput. Derive it from network.ipsec_enabled rather than hardcoding the conservative figure. Multiqueue moves with the same flag, because its sign depends on it. Behind IPsec it costs ~12%: ESP has no L4 ports, so RSS funnels a node pair onto one core and extra queues only reorder packets, which TCP reads as loss. Without IPsec the sending host's single vhost thread saturates first and queues are worth +54%. IPsec on with multiqueue on is the worst of the four combinations, so it stops being a standalone knob and becomes vm.Deps.MultiqueueNICs. The reconciler only ever created a subnet's DHCPOptions row and never revisited it, so the create-time MTU stuck for the life of the subnet and this change would have applied to new subnets only. Worse in the other direction: turning IPsec back on would have left subnets advertising 1442 over ESP, which drops large segments with no ICMP to recover from. applySubnets now diffs and updates in place. reconcile.Config takes IPSecDisabled rather than IPSecEnabled so the zero value is the conservative MTU — a caller that forgets it is merely slower. * docs: add an install-time performance tuning guide Measured on the four-node cluster rather than inferred: the UDP receive buffer sysctl, what IPsec actually costs and why, the multiqueue sign flip, the overlay MTU budget, and the jumbo-frame check that must precede enabling it. A starter doc — several sections end in an open question rather than a recommendation. * ci: keep the cell-21 node alive for the workload step * ci: collect the cell-21 qemu log and widen its timeout * feat: derive the guest MTU from the fabric, and deepen the virtio NIC config The overlay overhead is passed on to the guest rather than hidden from it. Hiding it means running the fabric far enough above 1500 that a standard guest MTU fits in the headroom, which is what the large public clouds do — but they own the switches. On a fabric we do not control, the honest figure is the one the path can carry, and a jumbo underlay should reach the guest: 9000 gives 8942, or 8908 with IPsec. network.underlay_mtu is the lever; SubnetMTU spends it. Configured rather than probed, because a node's own NIC MTU says nothing about the switch between it and its peers. host_mtu sets VIRTIO_NET_F_MTU so a guest that never takes a DHCP lease — statically addressed, or IPv6-only — still learns the ceiling. rx/tx_queue_size raise the virtio ring from QEMU's default 256. That default is a packet-rate ceiling rather than a memory saving: a vCPU preempted for a fraction of a millisecond fills all 256 slots and the overflow is dropped. ethtool is the only way to read NIC offload, ring and channel state, so a node without it cannot be diagnosed for throughput at all. * ci: give the cell-21 workload its own guest key * fix: set the guest MTU on the tap, not just in the guest The tap was created and brought up without an MTU, so it stayed at the kernel default of 1500 while DHCP and host_mtu told the guest something else. Harmless at 1442; it silently blackholed every large frame on a jumbo underlay, with no ICMP back because the drop is at the first hop. TapSpec.MTU comes from the same guest overlay MTU the DHCP option and host_mtu already use, and is applied in the bring-up call so a size the fabric cannot carry fails the launch instead of degrading quietly. * fix: stop setting tx_queue_size, which QEMU caps at 256 for tap QEMU only honours a tx_queue_size above 256 for vhost-user and vhost-vdpa backends. On a tap it rejects the value outright rather than clamping it, so every launch died with "must be a power of 2 between 256 and 256" and the instance went straight to terminated. rx_queue_size is unaffected and stays at 1024. A test pins the absence of tx_queue_size across machine types and queue counts. * docs: lead the tuning guide with the overlay segmentation finding The guide's headline was a 5.4x that came almost entirely from turning IPsec off, and it treated MTU and the fabric as the main levers. The host reaches 92.6 Gbit/s at MTU 1500 on the same NIC, so the fabric is not the constraint and the encrypted default is not the thing to tune away from. Adds the host-versus-guest comparison up front, documents network.underlay_mtu, and makes the missing segmentation offload the first open question. * ci: stop deselected matrix cells failing in teardown * docs: quantify what disabling overlay IPsec is worth The guide described the trade without the numbers an operator needs to make it. Adds the measured 4.9x, notes that the MTU and multiqueue changes follow ipsec_enabled rather than being separate knobs, and records two transition hazards: a stale wide MTU on running guests, and RunInstances failing while the OVN flows barrier catches up with the new SAs. * ci: collect and retain the e2e benchmark and cluster logs Cells 21 and 22 both copied two paths that only ever exist on the nodes, so the benchmark JSON was never uploaded and cell-22 collected nothing at all. Both now gather what they actually produce, and keep it for 90 days. * fix: quieten spx by installing an explicit CLI logger default spx never set a process logger, so it inherited whatever a linked package left behind — until now a JSON handler at Info on stdout, interleaving library log records with command output and breaking piped use. Execute() claims the default before any command runs: text on stderr, LevelError, so commands report failures through their own stderr writes and libraries stay quiet. --verbose/-v raises to info and SPX_LOG_LEVEL sets an arbitrary level, the flag winning over the environment. Service subcommands still call initTelemetry, which replaces the handler outright. No root --debug flag: viperblock, qemunbd, nats and awsgw each define their own --debug with a service-specific meaning, and a root persistent flag would shadow inconsistently depending on the command. The guard test samples the handler at package-init time rather than inside the test, because tests in this package start services that install their own logger legitimately. * feat: private /admin/CreateAccount for self-service tenant signup Add POST /admin/<Method> to the AWS gateway: SigV4-signed, JSON in and JSON out, callable only by an IAM user in the super-admin account holding spinifex:<Method>. CreateAccount is the one method, so a signup form can provision a tenant without an operator shell. No new service, port, unit or certificate — it mounts inside the gateway's existing authenticated group and inherits its auth, throttling and tracing. Provisioning is resumable rather than transactional, which fits stores that have no transaction. Two CAS creates carry the correctness: the client token admits one in-flight attempt and makes a lost response replayable for 24 hours, and the name reservation makes duplicate account names impossible. Every step after the account exists is create-if-absent, so a retry with the same token finishes the job instead of failing. The CLI and the endpoint share one provisioning helper, which closes a gap on both at once: CreateAccount never checked names, so running `spx admin account create` twice produced two accounts that differed only by ID. The response waits for the account's default VPC over a new ec2.EnsureDefaultVpc request/reply, rather than trusting the existing fire-and-forget iam.account.created publish — credentials for an account that cannot launch anything are worse than a slower call. [signup] max_accounts bounds how many accounts may exist; absent means uncapped, which is what every cluster does today. * fix: stop the awsgw template hardcoding one deployment's console URL console_url shipped as https://console.spx3.com, so every fresh install — including an on-premise cluster that will never run signup — was configured to point new accounts at our console. It is the only deployment-specific domain in any template. It now ships empty, and the gateway warns when it provisions an account without one, since a blank sign-in link is otherwise visible only to the customer who receives it. Extract the remote client from the command body while here. The signing, request shape and error decoding are the part a Cloudflare Worker mirrors, and as a function they are testable against a TLS test server rather than only by hand against a live cluster. * refactor: drop console_url from signup and default max_accounts to 128 The gateway never read console_url — it passed the value straight through to the response, and the idempotency record froze it for 24 hours so a corrected typo still replayed stale. The client that made the request already knows where it wants to send the new tenant. max_accounts is now a pointer in the parsed config so an absent [signup] section takes the 128 default while an explicit 0 still means uncapped. * feat: run the predastore fault-injection harness as cell-24 Cell-23 asks how fast predastore is when every node is healthy; cell-24 asks whether it survives one that is not. It runs after cell-23 rather than beside it: both want a quiet single runner, and a benchmark sharing a machine with a fault injection run measures the wrong thing. The port offset keeps the two clear of each other even so, and the job clears stale nodes on entry and exit, since a run killed before its cleanup trap leaves one holding ports that fail the next run somewhere unrelated. * ci: keep the throughput benchmark's output with its results The run log only existed in the job log, so the artifact it uploaded could not be read without going back to the run that produced it. * ci: keep the fault-injection run log with its results events.txt carries the timeline and the FAIL line, but not the build output or anything Warp wrote before the harness took over, so a failed cell could only be read from the job log it was printed into. * fix: serve the cluster region to the console instead of hardcoding it The console hardcoded ap-southeast-2 as its SigV4 region in seven files, so on any other cluster the credential scope was wrong and the gateway rejected every signed request. The SPA is embedded in the binary, so a build-time value would pin one binary to one region. The UI server now serves GET /api/config with the region, no-store so a proxy fronting several clusters cannot serve one the other's region, and the SPA loads it once before render. The region comes from the serving node's config because awsgw pins signature verification to that same field. Reading the cluster-wide [aws] region instead would let a cluster whose two keys disagree pass review and still fail to authenticate. Also relabels the login card as Spinifex credentials, since the fields are not AWS ones, and hides the CA install banner unless the console is reached directly: behind a proxy with a publicly trusted certificate there is nothing for the cluster CA to fix. * fix: say once when the host firewall will not be maintained Both quiet outcomes of the reconcile — no cluster config, and the policy switched off — return nil without logging, so a node that never arms is indistinguishable in the journal from one that armed on its first pass. * test: arm the host firewall before asserting on its peer set Only the ISO install arms the policy; every other path writes off to the mode file, so the daemon disables the firewall and never writes a peer set. The test read that file as its baseline, which it could never have. It now switches the mode on for its own duration and puts it back, waits for the peer set the way install-node.sh does, and on failure reports the mode, the node count and what the daemon said rather than just the missing file. * test: move the console region test to the external cmd package It was in package cmd, which test-package-check rejects, so preflight failed on the branch. The hook follows the pattern already in export_test.go. * test: make the reboot EIP diagnostic capable of naming the drop The two ofproto/trace probes injected packets with no TTL, so OVN's router killed them at lr_in_ip_input and both traces ended early for a reason that had nothing to do with the failure under investigation. A keyword filter then stripped the table-match lines, hiding where each trace stopped. Traces now carry a TTL and are kept whole, the real datapath megaflows for the guest reply are dumped alongside them, and any drop matching the guest source is resolved from its OpenFlow cookie back to the Southbound logical flow that installed it. * fix: exempt an EIP instance from the subnet drop gate with allow, not reroute A subnet with no route of its own carries a priority-1100 drop policy, and an instance with an external IP is lifted above it by a priority-1200 policy. That policy rerouted to the pool gateway, which in distributed NAT is outside every logical router port subnet, because the gateway LRP is the link-local /30. The static default route survives that by naming an output port; a routing policy has no such field, so ovn-northd discarded all three of them and the drop gate below swallowed everything the instances sent. The effect was that every external IP answered inbound traffic and none of it came back: the SYN reached the guest, the guest replied, and the reply died in the router's policy stage. Guest-initiated egress was lost the same way. The policy only ever needed to lift the gate. The router's default route already points at the gateway, so allow leaves the routing decision intact and gives northd nothing to reject. * test: match the log the firewall quorum gate actually emits The assertion waited for "chassis encap addresses; not writing a partial peer set", which no code has ever logged. The reconcile reports a short chassis list as "OVN reports N of M chassis encap addresses" and the maintain loop carries that into its retry warning, so the wait could only ever time out. Arming the node in the previous commit got the test as far as this assertion for the first time, which is why it surfaced now. The failure also prints the journal tail and the same inputs the earlier wait reports. * fix: stop one unreadable volume document failing every volume listing A single volume document whose shards no longer reconstruct made DescribeVolumes, DescribeVolumeStatus and DescribeVolumesModifications fail for every account, because the listing returned the first fetch error rather than skipping the document. ListVolumes now skips a document it cannot read or decode and logs the skip, mirroring ListAMIs. Callers whose answer would be wrong rather than merely partial take ListVolumesStrict: the orphan scan and the snapshot in-use check both gate destructive work on a complete list. The tolerance covers fetch failures as well as decode failures. An object whose shards no longer join is as unusable as one whose bytes will not parse, and it was the fetch path that took the cluster down. |
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80faf59a43 |
fix(ovn): bind the NB/SB client listeners to loopback and the lan plane (#765)
setup-ovn.sh set the OVN Northbound and Southbound client remotes with a bare set-connection ptcp:6641 / ptcp:6642. The address-free ptcp: form binds every interface, so on a multi-plane node the unauthenticated, unencrypted OVSDB control plane was reachable from the public interface. Write access to the Southbound database is control of the whole tenant network fabric. ovsdb-server takes remotes from two additive sources: the Connection table, which RAFT replicates cluster-wide, and local ovn-ctl command-line flags. That split is what the fix uses. Loopback goes in the replicated row, because 127.0.0.1 is correct on every node, so replication is harmless and local clients keep working. The lan address goes on the per-node command line via --db-nb-addr and --db-nb-create-insecure-remote, which never replicates, so each node binds its own address without pushing it to its peers. A new --lan-addr flag carries that address, falling back to --db-cluster-local-addr so clustered nodes stay correct without caller changes. The standalone branch now writes /etc/default/ovn-central too, since a two-node install still has a remote ovn-controller that needs the lan listener. The guard on --db-nb-addr is load-bearing: it defaults to 0.0.0.0, so emitting create-insecure-remote without a resolved address would recreate the bug. install-node.sh passes the lan address on both branches and warns when the lan plane has collapsed onto the public address, since the listener then lands on the public interface and a firewall is the only remaining control. |
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2e09461080 | chore: cleanup code comments | ||
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b76aab8b50 | feat(installer): three-plane networking, ZFS root, distributed NAT and multi-node install (#663) | ||
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628fbbc0c3 |
fix: group-scope the OVS/OVN sockets and retire the vpcd sudoers grants (#609)
* fix: group-scope the OVS/OVN sockets and stop sudoing read-only probes The OVS DB socket and both sets of ctl sockets were chmod 0666 by setup-ovn.sh, with a systemd override re-applying it on every openvswitch-switch restart. Write access to db.sock is full control of the local datapath, so this handed the datapath to any account on the box. Both service users run with Group=spinifex, so the access is now 0660 root:spinifex, /var/run/ovn is 0750, and a shared helper re-applies it from ExecStartPost on openvswitch-switch and ovn-controller alike — the latter is new, and matters because the ovn-controller ctl socket name embeds the pid and is recreated on every start. That also fixes the health probe reporting ovn-controller as not_running on a healthy node. It shelled out to `sudo ovn-appctl`, which only spinifex-vpcd is granted; as spinifex-daemon sudo demanded a password and the swallowed error read as OVN being down. With the ctl socket group-owned the probe needs no privilege, so health.go moves to a non-escalating Runner rather than the alternative of granting the daemon a root-equivalent ovn-appctl rule to read a status. ListIMDSTaps ran `list-ports` plus one `get` per patch port on vpcd's 15s tick, so 1+N sudo invocations every tick, each one logging a pam_limits warning about the core rlimit the unit deliberately pins to 0. It now issues a single JSON query per pass, and the sudoers drop-in disables the PAM session for both service users, which also leaves sudo children inheriting the unit's rlimits. An absent iface-id on a patch port is now skipped with a warning instead of aborting the pass: it is the only record of the full ENI, so such a port cannot join the live set either way, and failing the pass stalled reconcile for every healthy port behind it. A transient query failure still aborts. * fix: group-own the OVS/OVN pidfiles too, and cover the ipsec ctl socket Group-owning the ctl sockets was not enough for `ovn-appctl -t ovn-controller`: it resolves the pid-named socket through the pidfile, and OVS opens that O_RDWR to test the fcntl liveness lock, so a group-readable pidfile still fails the probe with EACCES. The pidfiles now get the same 0660 root:spinifex, which also tightens them from the 0644 they ship with. openvswitch-ipsec joins the override list because setup-ovn.sh restarts it after the sweep runs, leaving its ctl socket as the one file still at the shipped mode. Verified on the dev node: every socket and pidfile is 0660 root:spinifex and survives a restart of all three units, an unprivileged user is refused, and /health reports ovn-controller ok where the sudo probe read not_running. * refactor: stop escalating the OVS/OVN socket clients Now that setup-ovn.sh group-owns the control sockets, ovs-vsctl, ovs-appctl, ovn-nbctl, ovn-sbctl, ovn-appctl and systemctl reach their daemons as the service user. utils.NeedsPrivilege carries that policy and both command builders consult it, so ip, iptables, dhcpcd, sysctl and arping still escalate while the socket clients no longer do. Their sudoers grants are removed: each took unrestricted args and all of them accept --log-file=PATH, so every one was a root-equivalent grant handed out to run a query. ovs-ofctl keeps its grant. It talks to a per-bridge <bridge>.mgmt socket that ovs-vswitchd creates when the bridge appears, including bridges spinifex creates at runtime, so the provisioning sweep cannot group-own it up front. The NB and SB database sockets join the sweep for ovn-nbctl and ovn-sbctl. vpcd carried its own sudoCommand copy that escalated unconditionally, bypassing the policy entirely. It survived only because the grants existed and broke the OVN flows-ready barrier the moment they were removed, so it now delegates to utils.SudoCommand. TestRG10_SudoOnlyThroughThePolicy fails the build if another package reintroduces a local copy. Verified on the dev node: an instance launches, IMDS is served, the flows-ready barrier completes, and no sudo denial appears anywhere in the journal. * refactor: drop every spinifex-vpcd sudoers grant for ambient capabilities vpcd held NOPASSWD grants for ip, iptables, sysctl and arping. The ip grant alone was root-equivalent: sudoers cannot constrain its arguments, so `sudo ip netns exec <ns> /bin/sh` was a root shell for the service account. The unit already grants CAP_NET_ADMIN and CAP_NET_RAW ambiently, and the kernel passes an ambient set to each child on exec, so those tools work as the service user with no escalation at all. Verified on a live node: all sixteen ip subcommands vpcd issues, plus iptables reads and writes, sysctl -w on the net.ipv4.neigh tree, and arping, all succeed under exactly the unit's ambient set. spinifex-vpcd now has no sudoers rules. NeedsPrivilege had to become capability-aware to do this. spx is one binary shared by both service units, and the daemon holds CAP_SYS_ADMIN and CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE but no CAP_NET_ADMIN, so a static tool list cannot express "vpcd runs ip directly, the daemon escalates it". The decision now reads CapAmb from /proc/self/status once and matches it against the capability each invocation needs. sysctl is resolved per key, since CAP_NET_ADMIN covers the net.* trees and nothing else. The dhcpcd grants go too: neither daemon invokes it. Only setup-ovn.sh, which runs as the provisioning user, and the in-guest ecs-agent. TestRG10_VPCDHoldsNoSudoersGrant pins both halves together, so a future grant cannot be re-added without also explaining why the capability stopped working. * chore: restore routeTree.gen.ts swept in by mistake * fix: probe ovn-controller with ovn-appctl, not ovs-appctl checkOVNController's first probe passed a bare -t ovn-controller to ovs-appctl, which resolves it against OVS_RUNDIR — /var/run/openvswitch. ovn-controller's socket and pidfile are in /var/run/ovn, so the probe could never succeed and logged "ovn-controller.pid: open: No such file or directory" on every check. Not a functional break: the next probe globs the full /var/run/ovn path and succeeds, so the function still returned nil. It cost an exec per check and made a healthy node look like it was failing an OVN liveness probe. ovn-appctl defaults OVS_RUNDIR to /var/run/ovn, so the common case now matches first. The glob and systemctl fallbacks stay for older layouts. |
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a0659ae7d0 |
fix: gate ovn-controller on SB RAFT readiness and force recompute (#599)
Single-node OVN RAFT bring-up gated only on the Northbound DB socket, then restarted ovn-controller without waiting for the Southbound RAFT to elect a leader, serve clients, and for northd to write the gateway logical flows. With no join step to absorb the boot window the controller attached mid-election, programmed a partial datapath (SNAT ct-commit without output/delivery) and never reconverged, so NAT-GW egress and EIP ingress intermittently black-holed on the single-node baremetal CI host. Add an SB readiness gate before ovn-controller starts (SB reachable and, when clustered, an elected leader), and after ovn-controller restart wait for its SB connection then force inc-engine/recompute to rebuild all OpenFlow from the converged Southbound. Applies to 1/2/3-node RAFT alike. |
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e1c4f85a36 |
feat: routed-NAT external mode with two-tier ingress (#475)
* feat(network): add routed uplink mode, Routed wiring, and NAT egress rule helper * feat(external): route gateway LRP over transit pool and install VPC SNAT in routed NAT mode * feat(vpcd): support bridge_mode=nat (routed uplink, transit pool, egress rules) * feat(daemon): register EIP handlers unconditionally with disabled-mode stub; seed default subnet per external mode * feat(admin): support --external-mode=nat and suggest it for non-bridgeable uplinks * feat(scripts): add --nat-uplink routed mode to setup-ovn.sh * test(e2e): add routed-NAT single-node natuplink suite Covers the external_mode=nat lane end to end on a nat-initialized node: host transit wiring (veth, br-ext port, ip_forward, iptables egress rules), spinifex.toml contents, disabled EIP surface (empty describe-addresses, UnsupportedOperation on allocate), default subnet MapPublicIpOnLaunch=false, OVN gateway LRP + VPC SNAT on the transit /24, guest outbound egress proven via a serial-console probe (nat mode has no inbound path), and unique transit gateway IPs across VPCs. Suite self-gates on external_mode=nat; registered as e2e-natuplink and in SUITES_BUILD so it compiles in CI. Manifest entry stays commented until CI can provision a nat-mode environment. * feat(ovn): Address_Set CRUD and NAT exempted_ext_ips column Adds the exempted_ext_ips column (optional strong Address_Set ref) to the nbdb NAT model, Address_Set ensure/get with wait-op create semantics, and an in-place SetNATExemptedExtIPs update on the client interface, live client, and mock. Test NB schema gains the column and covers insert-resolves-UUID, converge, clear, and missing-NAT paths. * feat(policy): exempt address set on routed SNAT/EIP rows Adds WithSNATExemptSet so routed mode stamps exempted_ext_ips (the spinifex_nat_exempt Address_Set: transit /24 plus operator extras) on IGW snat and EIP dnat_and_snat rows, keeping VM replies to host-initiated flows un-NATted. AddSNAT gains an idempotency guard keyed on (router, VPC CIDR) with stale-IP replacement, and both AddSNAT and the AddEIP idempotent-skip path patch the ref in place on pre-existing rows. The set is a singleton strong ref and is never deleted. Non-routed modes are unchanged. * feat(host): VPC ingress route primitives for routed-NAT mode EnsureVPCIngressRoute / RemoveVPCIngressRoute manage the host route that sends VPC-CIDR traffic into OVN via the gateway LRP transit IP on the spx-nat veth. Replace/del semantics keep both idempotent; a missing route on removal is not an error. * feat(external): routed ingress leg on IGW attach/detach, reconcile-safe AttachIGW's routed leg now also installs the host VPC ingress route via RoutedIngressHooks, and re-runs on the already-attached path so the reconcile loop restores host routes (and patches legacy SNAT exempt refs) after a reboot — OVN state survives restarts but host routes do not. DetachIGW removes the route alongside the SNAT. vpcd wires the hooks and the spinifex_nat_exempt set (transit /24 + [network] nat_exempt_cidrs, validated nat-mode-only) exclusively in routed-NAT mode; pool/veth/direct pass nil hooks and are unchanged. * test(natuplink): Tier 1 host-ingress phase; docs for jumpbox pattern New Phase 7 asserts the automatic ingress tier: host route to the VPC CIDR via the gateway LRP transit IP, exempted_ext_ips ref on the SNAT row pointing at spinifex_nat_exempt (containing the transit /24), and — after opening the SG from the transit net (default-closed, AWS parity) — ping and an sshd TCP handshake against the instance private IP from the host, which proves the un-SNATted return path. Phase 8 additionally waits for the second VPC's ingress route to appear on IGW attach. vpc-networking README documents the jumpbox pattern, SG note, and nat_exempt_cidrs. * feat(config,admin): public wan pool alongside nat-transit Restructure admin config generation from single-pool scalars to a Pools slice so nat mode can emit both the transit pool and an optional public wan pool. nat mode now accepts --external-pool/--external-source (plus --external-bind-bridge/--gateway-ip when a public pool is requested), validated by the shared resolvePublicPoolFlags helper also used by pool mode. Transit pool always renders first so the IGW allocator picks it. Formation wire format unchanged (nat mode is single-node only). * feat(daemon): enable EIP service and auto-assign in nat mode with public pool External IPAM (and with it the real EIP service, RunInstances public IP auto-assign, and MapPublicIpOnLaunch on default subnets) now activates whenever public pools exist: pool mode as before, plus nat mode when a wan pool rides alongside the transit segment. The transit pool is filtered out of IPAM — its addresses are gateway-LRP plumbing, never allocatable EIPs. Transit-only nat configs keep the disabled EIP stub. * feat(host): per-EIP ingress primitives for routed-NAT mode DetectUplinkFor parses ip route get to find the interface and source IP facing the pool gateway (re-run per ensure: WiFi/cellular uplinks move). EnsureEIPIngress steers an EIP into OVN with a /32 route via the VPC gateway LRP transit IP (src-hinted so host-local traffic still DNATs), answers ARP for the EIP with a proxy neighbor entry (L3 only, same MAC, WiFi-safe), sends gratuitous ARP, and adds per-EIP FORWARD accepts for DROP-policy hosts. RemoveEIPIngress mirrors; missing state tolerated. * feat(policy,vpcd): host EIP binder option on NATManager WithHostEIPBinder injects routed-mode host plumbing hooks. AddEIP binds after priming on both the fresh-add and idempotent-skip paths (host routes and proxy-ARP are volatile even when the OVN row survives, so reconcile re-ensures them after reboot); DeleteEIP unbinds best-effort. The next hop comes from the new gatewayPortIP helper reading the gateway LRP's stamped spinifex:gateway_ip (Networks fallback), with the ext-ID key now an exported policy const shared with the external package. vpcd selects the IGW pool by name instead of index — with two pools in nat mode the gateway allocator must stay on the transit pool — and wires the binder over host.EnsureEIPIngress/RemoveEIPIngress when a public pool is present. EnsureEIPIngress gains an uplink hint so dhcp-sourced pools (gateway unknown until lease) proxy-ARP on their bind bridge. * feat(dhcp): interface-MAC lease variant with MAC-keyed-router detection dhcp_mac = "derived" (default) | "interface" on external pools. The interface variant leases with the bind interface's own MAC — WiFi/WWAN uplinks drop frames with foreign source MACs, so derived chaddr MACs never complete DORA there. Option 61 stays the lease discriminator. UseIfaceMAC threads AllocateRequest → NATS wire → nclient4 → lease and persists through KV so restart re-acquires repeat it. Routers that key leases on MAC and ignore client-id would hand every lease the same IP; the manager detects an ACK matching the interface's own address or another client-id's live lease, releases the colliding lease, and hard-errors advising a static range instead. admin init auto-writes dhcp_mac="interface" for nat-mode public dhcp pools bound to non-bridgeable uplinks (wlan/wwan/ppp). * test(natuplink)+docs: Tier 2 EIP ingress e2e phases and public-pool docs The natuplink suite now detects a public (non-transit) pool in spinifex.toml and switches lanes: Tier-1-only configs keep the EIP-disabled and no-public-IP assertions; public-pool configs assert the EIP surface is enabled, the default subnet has MapPublicIpOnLaunch=true, instances auto-assign public IPs, and a new Phase 9 exercises the full EIP ingress lifecycle — host /32 route via the gateway LRP, proxy-ARP on the uplink, per-EIP FORWARD accepts, exempt-stamped dnat_and_snat, TCP handshake to the EIP, reconcile replay across a vpcd restart, and teardown on disassociate. Docs: vpc-networking README gains a public-pool section for routed-NAT nodes (init flags, dhcp_mac=interface behaviour, host-to-EIP caveat) and an updated mode comparison; COMMANDS.md notes nat-mode EIP support behind a public pool. * fix(setup): whitelist iptables, neigh sysctl, and arping for spinifex-vpcd Routed-NAT mode shells out to iptables for the transit masquerade and per-EIP FORWARD accepts, tunes proxy_delay, and sends gratuitous ARP for host-delivered EIPs. Without these sudoers entries vpcd crash-loops with "command not allowed" on nat-mode nodes. * fix(ovn): scope DeleteStaticRoute prefix match to the target router Every VPC router carries a 0.0.0.0/0 static route, so an unscoped cache match could grab another router's row and fail with a referential integrity violation, wedging IGW attach on multi-VPC nodes. Match only rows referenced by the target router, mirroring FindStaticRoute. Mock updated to the same semantics, with a regression test covering drift replacement across two routers. * fix(reconcile): always replay AttachIGW so host ingress state is re-ensured applyIGWs skipped AttachIGW whenever the gateway switch port existed in actual state, so the already-attached re-ensure path never ran and routed-NAT host ingress routes lost on reboot were never reinstalled. AttachIGW is idempotent; run it unconditionally. * fix(vpcd): resolve duplicate-CIDR host ingress route collisions, bootstrap VPC wins Every account's default VPC shares 172.31.0.0/16, so Tier-1 host routes collide on the single host route table and the last IGW attach silently stole the route (route replace). Pass vpcID and the gateway LRP IP through RoutedIngressHooks; the bootstrap VPC always installs its route, other VPCs only install when the CIDR is free and only remove a route their own gateway IP holds. Adds host.VPCIngressRouteVia to read the current route holder. * ci(e2e): add nightly cell 19 for routed-NAT single-node suite Cell 19 bootstraps with --external-mode=nat plus the CI static pool as the public wan pool and runs the natuplink suite, covering the Tier-1 transit datapath and Tier-2 EIP ingress. The run step exits 0 when natuplink.test is absent from the tests tar so scheduled runs against branches predating the suite stay green. * fix(admin): nat-mode init summary reflects configured public pool The summary printed 'outbound-only — no public IPs/EIPs' even when --external-pool/--external-source configured a public wan pool. Print the pool range (or dhcp bind) and note EIPs are enabled. * fix(eip,vpc): thread ctx through disabled EIP stub and NAT call sites Reconcile the routed-NAT branch with dev's ctx-first service APIs after rebase: DisabledEIPService and its tests take ctx to satisfy the EIPService interface, the vm_adapters public-IP resolver asserts the ctx-signed AssociatedPublicIPForInstance, and the default-subnet mapping test threads ctx into DescribeSubnets. |
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da33e574d4 |
fix: OVN RAFT multi-node bring-up (northd member list, ExecStop, add-nat deadline) (#466)
* fix: repoint DB-node ovn-northd at RAFT member list; extend add-nat deadline Two related fixes for multi-node OVN clusters: - setup-ovn.sh (mulga-siv-504): in the clustered --management branch, point ovn-northd's client NB/SB connections at the full RAFT member list derived from OVN_REMOTE, so the active northd follows the leader instead of dialing its local member only. Without this, northd stops advancing SB_Global.nb_cfg once leadership moves off the node, wedging the ovn-nbctl --wait=hv barrier. Guarded on a real member list so the standalone single-DB-node path is unchanged. - utils/nats.go (mulga-js-206): raise the add-nat request deadline from 10s to 45s so the client no longer rolls back before the server-side --wait=hv flows barrier (30s) completes. * fix: stop ovn-northd restart from tearing down split NB/SB ovsdb servers The packaged ovn-northd.service ExecStop runs 'ovn-ctl stop_northd' without --ovn-manage-ovsdb=no, so restarting northd to apply OVN_CTL_OPTS also stops the separately-managed NB/SB ovsdb-server units. On a clean clustered bring-up this races the freshly-started DBs and kills them, so setup-ovn's wait for the NB socket times out and the RAFT create/join aborts. Install an ovn-northd.service drop-in overriding ExecStop with --ovn-manage-ovsdb=no so northd never touches the DB lifecycle (mulga-siv-504). |
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0823bf8c16 |
feat: OVN OVSDB RAFT clustering for multinode Spinifex (epic mulga-siv-486) (#458)
* feat: add OVSDB RAFT cluster primitives to setup-ovn.sh Add --db-cluster-local-addr / --db-cluster-remote-addr flags so a management node can run the OVN NB/SB databases as a native OVSDB RAFT cluster instead of a single non-clustered ovn-central. When a local addr is given, write a shared OVN_CTL_OPTS to /etc/default/ovn-central (NB RAFT 6643 / SB RAFT 6644) and restart the per-DB units directly, since the ovn-central aggregator is ExecStart=/bin/true and won't restart its children. Empty remote addr creates the cluster (init node); a set remote addr joins it. NB/SB client set-connection runs only on the create node (RAFT replicates it cluster-wide). The single-node --management path is unchanged when no cluster addrs are supplied, so dev boxes and existing single-node clusters keep working. --ovn-remote already passes through verbatim, so a comma-separated SB endpoint list works for compute nodes; documented in usage. * feat: OVN client multi-endpoint failover for RAFT clusters Accept a comma-separated OVN NB/SB endpoint list so vpcd can target a clustered DB. config.ParseEndpoints splits the list (trimming whitespace, dropping empties); live.go Connect passes one libovsdb WithEndpoint per endpoint, so the client tries them in order, fails over on disconnect, and follows RAFT leader redirects. Single-endpoint strings still yield one endpoint, so single-node dev is unchanged. ovn-sbctl --db= already accepts the raw comma list, so the SB CLI consumers (discoverChassis, gateway_claim) need no change. * feat: write clustered OVN NB/SB endpoints across the RAFT quorum spx admin init/join now emit comma-separated OVN NB/SB endpoint lists for the first three quorum nodes (formation.BuildOVNDBAddrs) instead of loopback or a single leader address, so vpcd fails over across the cluster. firstboot defers OVN bring-up to the provisioning controller when it owns formation (SkipFormation): a standalone single-node .db would otherwise block the controller's clustered create/join. * test: add multinode OVN RAFT cluster + failover e2e; document clustered topology ovn_raft_test.go asserts NB/SB cluster/status reports a 3-server quorum with one leader on every DB node, then stops the NB leader's ovn-central and proves an NB write still lands via a surviving endpoint. Docs: vpc-networking gains the multi-endpoint vpcd config and a RAFT cluster-status debugging section; network-connections lists the 6643/6644 RAFT ports. |
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fd3dc6b680 |
feat(network): ADR-0006 layer redesign + IPsec/OVN hardening (#255)
* refactor(vpcd): remove macvlan bridge mode
Macvlan was a single-NIC SSH-safe hack that predated veth mode and was
never selected by any active config path. Deletion is Phase 0 item 1 of
the network layer redesign (mulga-siv-125.1).
Removed:
- BridgeModeMacvlan const + setMacvlanMAC + ifaceIsMacvlan probe
- Macvlan MAC alignment block in launchService (only fired on dead path)
- Macvlan branch in detectBridgeMode + matching tests
- Macvlan duplicates of IGW/AddNAT centralized-NAT tests (veth versions
already cover the same path)
- --macvlan flag + macvlan case branch in setup-ovn.sh
Refactored:
- useCentralizedNAT() now == BridgeModeVeth (was != BridgeModeDirect);
verifyBridgeMode already rejects empty/unknown at startup
- Three IGW-pool tests now explicitly WithBridgeMode(BridgeModeVeth)
(previously relied on empty-mode defaulting to centralized)
Kept intentionally:
- Deprecation notes in docs/compute/vpc-networking/README.md
- Legacy macvlan-interface cleanup in reset-dev-env.sh + ansible
teardown role (migration for operator systems with stale spx-ext-*
interfaces from pre-veth installs)
* feat(vpcd): resolve external CIDR at startup with bounded retry
Block service start until the WAN bridge has an IPv4 address, with a 30s
retry window. Phase 0 item 2 of the network layer redesign
(mulga-siv-125.1). Guards the boot race where vpcd starts before
systemd-networkd finishes DHCP on br-wan, or before netplan applies a
static config.
Skipped when ExternalMode is empty (overlay-only deployments).
Forward-compatible with ADR-0006: the new resolveExternalCIDR /
externalCIDRFromBridge helpers become the backing implementation of
HostWiring.ExternalCIDR() once the network/host package lands in Phase 1.
Until then the resolved value is only used to fail-start on missing
uplink.
* fix(vpcd): cover external CIDR startup paths
Extract launchService's CIDR-resolve block to ensureExternalCIDRReady
helper so it's unit-testable, and add direct tests for
externalCIDRFromBridge (loopback + unknown-interface) to exercise the
original literal body. Closes the diff-coverage gap on Phase 0 commit
15b564d which left these paths unreachable from unit tests.
* refactor(network/ovn): extract L1 OVN client to network/ovn package
Move OVNClient interface, LiveOVNClient, ACLSpec, ErrNATNotFound and
namedUUID helper from services/vpcd to a new spinifex/network/ovn
package. The mock relocates to spinifex/network/ovn/mock as a
sub-package. Storage fields on the mock become exported so vpcd tests
can continue to seed/inspect state across the new package boundary.
services/vpcd retains thin type-alias and var-alias shims so existing
callers compile unchanged; Phase 2 removes those shims as vpcd is torn
down.
Adds -coverpkg=./spinifex/... to test-cover so cross-package test
exercise of mock methods continues to count toward coverage now that
the mock lives outside vpcd.
First sub-step of Phase 1 of docs/development/feature/spinifex-network-redesign.md
(bead mulga-siv-125.2). Pure refactor; no functional change. All
existing tests pass; preflight green.
* feat(network/topology): TopologyManager interface + vpcd adapter
Add spinifex/network/topology with Manager interface, VPC/Subnet/Port
specs, and OVN object naming helpers covering the L2 stable contract
(§7 of the redesign plan). Phase 1 keeps existing in-tree OVN names
(rtr-, ext-port-, sg_) and notes the §7.3 targets for a later
reconciliation migration.
TopologyHandler in services/vpcd grows EnsureVPC / DeleteVPC /
EnsureSubnet / DeleteSubnet / EnsurePort / DeletePort /
SetPortSecurityGroups methods that mirror the corresponding NATS
handlers' OVN ops with Spec inputs instead of nats.Msg envelopes,
satisfying topology.Manager via a compile-time check. Existing handlers
are unchanged; the duplication is short-lived (Phase 2 collapses them).
Smoke tests in topology_manager_test.go cover the idempotent create
path, delete cascade, and declarative SG membership move. Deliverable:
TopologyManager.EnsureVPC/Subnet/Port callable; all existing tests
green.
Second sub-step of Phase 1 of docs/development/feature/spinifex-network-redesign.md
(bead mulga-siv-125.2).
* feat(network/host): L0 HostWiring interface + physical/veth impls
Phase 1 deliverable for mulga-siv-125.2. Introduces network/host (L0 of
ADR-0006): UplinkMode enum, Wiring interface, and Physical/Veth
implementations with injectable Runner + InterfaceReader for testability.
Not yet wired into daemon/vpcd — Phase 2 replaces daemon.SetupComputeNode
and vpcd's resolveExternalCIDR with calls through this package.
* feat(network/policy): L3 SecurityGroup/NAT/Route managers
Introduce network/policy as the data-plane policy layer (ADR-0006 L3).
Three managers, all backed by network/ovn:
- SecurityGroupManager: clear+add ACL replacement on an existing port
group; port group lifecycle stays with L2 (topology.Manager).
- NATManager: bound to one NATMode at construction (derived from
host.UplinkMode). Distributed sets logical_port/external_mac on EIP
dnat_and_snat rules; centralised leaves them unset. Per-EIP, NAT GW,
and IGW-default SNAT entrypoints; all deletes idempotent.
- RouteManager: AddStaticRoute is read-then-decide so retries no longer
duplicate rows (closing the long-standing non-idempotency bug in
vpcd/topology.go's IGW default-route path).
ACL priority constants and infrastructure ACL builders move from
vpcd/{security,acl}.go into policy/acl.go with their semantics preserved
(default-deny 900/800 logged, DHCP-allow 1050, tenant 1000). No vpcd
wiring changes here — additive only; the reconciler (bead .3.2) and
network/external (bead .3.4) will consume these managers.
bead: mulga-siv-125.3.1
* feat(network/external): L5 IGW/EIP/NATGW managers
Pure additive — new package, no topology.Manager changes, no rewiring of
existing vpcd handlers. IGWManager builds the external switch + localnet +
gateway LRP + default route + chassis HA, with a flows barrier callers can
inject (production: ovn-nbctl --wait=hv sync). EIP/NATGW are thin L5
wrappers over policy.NATManager. GatewayIPAllocator interface lets the
DHCP-backed allocator stay in vpcd until the DHCP-mgr removal bead lands;
LinkLocalAllocator + StaticRangeAllocator ship here.
* feat(network/reconcile): L6 intent-actual reconciler replaces 5-pass startup
Build spinifex/spinifex/network/reconcile/ package per Phase 2.2 of the
network layer redesign. Reads desired state from NATS KV filtered by
vpc.AZ (with legacy empty-AZ matches-all rule), scans actual state from
OVN NB DB, diffs and applies with VPC → Subnet → Port → SG → IGW →
EIP/NATGW topological ordering.
Atomic port-group join via CreateLogicalSwitchPortInGroups closes the
racy gap the legacy scanENIPortMembership pass used to revive 30s later.
A 5-minute drift goroutine (leader-gated via JetStream KV CAS) replaces
the old 30s ReconcileSGsLoop.
Adds AZ field to VPCRecord stamped at create time. Empty AZ on pre-Phase
2.2 records matches every local AZ, so no migration pass is required.
Replaces and removes the 5-pass startup sequence in services/vpcd:
- Reconcile + ReconcileFromKV
- ReconcileSGsOnce + ReconcileSGsLoop
- RetrofitAllExternalLocalnetOptions
- RetrofitAllGatewayPortNetworks
IGW fresh-create continues to flow through the legacy NATS handler path
(handleIGWAttach) so the dhcpManager wiring stays intact until Phase
2.3; the reconciler only rebinds gateway-chassis on existing IGW
topology.
Closes mulga-siv-125.3.2.
* refactor(network/topology): promote live Manager impl to network/topology
Move the topology.Manager implementation out of services/vpcd/topology_manager.go
into network/topology/manager_live.go as a standalone liveManager constructed
via NewLiveManager(ovn.Client, opts...). Inputs that varied per-handler
(DNS server resolution from the external pool) are now passed as functional
options (WithDNSServer).
TopologyHandler still satisfies topology.Manager but its methods delegate
to a cached liveManager. The shim stays until the rest of mulga-siv-129
routes NATS subscribers through topology.Manager directly.
Also exports SubnetGatewayCIDR + FormatDNSServerList from network/topology
so the reconciler in network/reconcile can share helpers with the live
manager (audit pass to follow per plan §6).
Test cases ported one-for-one from services/vpcd/topology_manager_test.go
to network/topology/manager_live_test.go; the vpcd-side test file is
deleted. New WithDNSServer test asserts the option propagates into
DHCPOptions rows.
Refs mulga-siv-129 (Phase 2.6 vpcd subscriber migration, Slice 1 of N).
* refactor(vpcd): collapse SG subscribers onto network/{topology,policy} managers
Phase 2.6 / mulga-siv-129 slice 2. Rewrites the vpc.create-sg /
vpc.update-sg / vpc.delete-sg NATS subscribers in services/vpcd as
thin wrappers over topology.Manager (port group lifecycle) and
policy.SecurityGroupManager (ACL programming). Deletes the ~1000
lines of duplicated ACL builder and provisioning logic — its
authoritative copy lives in network/policy.
Surface additions:
- ovn.ErrPortGroupNotFound sentinel; mock + live GetPortGroup wrap
not-found via fmt.Errorf("%w: ...") so callers can use errors.Is.
- topology.Manager grows EnsureSGPortGroup / DeleteSGPortGroup
(resolves the apply.go TODO from §2.1 of the redesign plan).
liveManager implements them with GetPortGroup-then-Create /
GetPortGroup-then-Clear+Delete idempotency.
Behaviour delta: the old provisionSG rolled back the OVN port group
on AddACLs failure ("all-or-nothing"). The new path lets the port
group survive and relies on network/reconcile to retry EnsureSG on
its next sweep. The all-or-nothing fail-fast test cases are dropped;
ACL emission semantics are covered by network/policy/sg_test.go.
* refactor(vpcd): migrate VPC/Subnet/ENI subscribers to topology.Manager
Phase 2.6 / mulga-siv-129 slice 3. Rewrites vpc.create / vpc.delete /
vpc.create-subnet / vpc.delete-subnet / vpc.create-port /
vpc.delete-port / vpc.update-port-sgs NATS subscribers as thin
wrappers (≤30 lines each) over topology.Manager. Subscriber bodies
now: parse event → translate to spec → delegate to manager.
Deletes:
- vpcd.subnetGateway (and helpers_test.go + topology_test.go's
TestSubnetGateway block); parity coverage lives in
network/topology.TestSubnetGatewayCIDR.
- vpcd.reconcilePortSGs (the live manager already exposes the same
diff-then-transact via reconcilePortSGs on the L2 side).
- vpcd.TopologyHandler.dnsServer; lmDNSServer (passed via
topology.WithDNSServer to the live manager) is the live path.
Behaviour delta: handlers now strict-parse PrivateIpAddress /
MacAddress / CidrBlock at the NATS boundary and reject malformed
payloads instead of degrading to "no DHCP options". The reconciler
guarantees that field validity is upheld upstream of the publish.
* refactor(network/reconcile): drive SG port groups via topology.Manager
applySGs now calls topology.Manager.EnsureSGPortGroup /
DeleteSGPortGroupByName instead of reaching directly into the OVN client.
Reconcile.Config gains a Topology field (required); the production caller
in services/vpcd passes the TopologyHandler shim, the reconcile package
tests construct a fresh topology.NewLiveManager bound to the mock OVN
client.
DeleteSGPortGroupByName is added to the topology.Manager interface for the
reconciler's orphan-removal path, which iterates raw OVN port-group names
without a groupID round-trip. The existing DeleteSGPortGroup(groupID)
delegates to it.
Resolves the TODO at apply.go:137 carried over from slice 2 of
mulga-siv-129.
* feat(network/policy): add FlowsBarrier option to NATManager
NATManager.AddEIP needs to block on `ovn-nbctl --wait=hv sync` after
writing the dnat_and_snat row so the NATS reply only returns once every
chassis has the rewrite flow. The legacy vpc.add-nat handler does this at
the tail of handleAddNAT; the manager has lacked it since slice 2.1.
NewNATManager grows a functional-options tail (Option / WithFlowsBarrier).
Defaults to a no-op for tests; production wiring in services/vpcd passes
waitForFlowsHV. AddEIP now invokes the barrier after AddNAT, logging at
warn level on failure to match the legacy handler's _ = waitForFlowsHV()
swallowing semantics.
Pre-work for slice 4 of mulga-siv-129 — without the barrier the NAT EIP
subscriber migration would lose the post-write flow-install gate.
* refactor(vpcd): migrate NAT GW subscribers to policy.NATManager
handleAddNATGateway / handleDeleteNATGateway now decode the NATS event
and delegate to policy.NATManager.{AddNATGateway,DeleteNATGateway}. The
manager carries identical OVN logic — same snat type, same ExternalIDs
(spinifex:vpc_id + spinifex:nat_gateway_id) — so existing
TestTopologyHandler_AddNATGateway / DeleteNATGateway suites stay green.
Lazy-constructed NATManager added on TopologyHandler (natmOnce). Mode is
derived from the bridge mode (veth → centralized, direct → distributed)
and the FlowsBarrier is bound to waitForFlowsHV for parity with the
legacy EIP path's tail barrier (used by the next slice, vpc.add-nat).
Slice 4 of mulga-siv-129, sub-step b.
* refactor(vpcd): migrate EIP NAT subscribers to policy.NATManager
handleAddNAT / handleDeleteNAT now decode the NATS event and delegate to
policy.NATManager.{AddEIP,DeleteEIP}. The behavioural contract is
preserved end-to-end:
- Idempotency-skip on a matching dnat_and_snat row (same VPC + LogicalIP,
plus MAC + LogicalPort under distributed NAT) moves into AddEIP so
duplicate vpc.add-nat publishes never tear down the rule the previous
invocation just installed (mulga-siv-124).
- Stale-rule cleanup across every router stays in AddEIP.
- Post-write waitForFlowsHV barrier is now driven by the manager via the
FlowsBarrier option wired in services/vpcd (slice 4a).
- DeleteEIP returns nil on ErrNATNotFound, matching the handler's
fire-and-forget "already absent = success" semantic.
The vpcd "errors" import drops out with the inline error-comparison.
Slice 4 of mulga-siv-129, sub-step c.
* refactor(vpcd): migrate IGW subscribers to external.IGWManager (partial)
handleIGWAttach now branches at decode time:
- Centralised NAT + DHCP-sourced pool keeps using attachIGWLegacy because
the gateway-LRP IP comes from vpc.dhcp.acquire, and that DHCP client is
the vpcd-local manager that bead mulga-siv-125.3.3 will retire.
- All other shapes (distributed NAT, static-range pool, no pool)
delegate to external.IGWManager.AttachIGW. The manager mirrors every
step the legacy handler ran — external switch + localnet port +
gateway LRP + switch-side router peer + default route + chassis HA +
waitForFlowsHV tail barrier — so observable behaviour is unchanged.
handleIGWDetach drops its inline OVN walk entirely; both paths exit
through external.IGWManager.DetachIGW followed by releaseGatewayLRPLease.
The lease release stays in vpcd because the upstream client lives in
services/vpcd/dhcp; calling it after every detach is safe because the
upstream server expires unknown leases on its own.
Lazy-constructed IGWManager added on TopologyHandler (igwmOnce). Pool,
allocator (StaticRangeAllocator), chassis, NAT mode, NAT manager, route
manager, and FlowsBarrier are all derived from the existing
TopologyHandler state.
The DHCP-coupled legacy branch retains its full inline OVN logic; it
will disappear in slice-after-125.3.3 follow-on. Slice 4 of
mulga-siv-129, sub-step d.
* feat(ec2/instance): honor AssociatePublicIpAddress per-NIC override
RunInstances --network-interfaces "AssociatePublicIpAddress=true|false"
was silently ignored, only subnet.MapPublicIpOnLaunch gated public IP
assignment. AWS contract is per-NIC override wins.
Extend TestPrepareRunInstances_PublicIPAutoAssigned to table-driven
3 cases: subnet true no-override, subnet false override true, subnet
true override false.
* refactor(config): drop upstream-DHCP config surface (static WAN pool only)
Hard-error in LoadConfig on legacy keys: [network] external_dhcp,
[nodes.<n>.vpcd] dhcp_bind_bridge, and [[network.external_pools]]
source = "dhcp". Add pool range validation (must fit inside the
gateway/prefix_len CIDR; per-cluster non-overlap).
Strip ExternalDHCP from config.NetworkConfig + formation.NetworkConfig
+ admin.ConfigSettings, and DhcpBindBridge from config.VPCDConfig +
admin.ConfigSettings + vpcd.Config. vpcd.ExternalPoolConfig.IsDHCP()
short-circuits to false; the field and downstream DHCP branches in
external_ipam / topology.go remain for Slice C to delete together with
dhcp_manager.
cmd/spinifex/cmd/admin.go: drop useExternalDHCP path and the
detectedDhcpBindBridge helper; require --external-pool when
--external-mode=pool; auto-detect default no longer infers source=dhcp.
service.go's wan_bridge legacy-key rejection now advises removing the
key entirely (vpcd auto-detects br-wan), not renaming to
dhcp_bind_bridge.
Two topology_test cases that exercise the DHCP gateway-LRP path are
skipped — Slice C deletes attachIGWLegacy and these tests together.
* refactor(vpcd): delete dhcp_manager + DHCP gateway-LRP path (Slice C)
Removes upstream-DHCP-client gateway-LRP allocation in favor of static
WAN-pool allocation (StaticRangeAllocator). Part of bead mulga-siv-125.3.3.
- delete services/vpcd/dhcp_manager.go + dhcp/ subpackage (~865 lines)
- delete allocateGatewayLRPIPViaDHCP + releaseGatewayLRPLease paths
- drop ExternalPoolConfig.Source + DhcpBindBridge + IsDHCP() fields
- drop ExternalIPAllocation lease fields (Expiry/ServerID/HWAddr) and
ExternalIPAMRecord.Source
- drop NewExternalIPAM nc *nats.Conn argument; update all 4 call sites
- rename verifyBridgeMode local dhcpBindBridge -> wanBridge; update error
strings and tests
Slice D (delete attachIGWLegacy + dispatcher) intentionally deferred.
* refactor(vpcd): delete attachIGWLegacy + IsDHCP stub (Slice D)
Closes mulga-siv-129 slice 4d. Part of bead mulga-siv-125.3.3.
handleIGWAttach now unconditionally delegates to external.IGWManager.
attachIGWLegacy (~207 lines, ~5 OVN write steps + chassis scheduling)
deleted along with its dispatcher branch in handleIGWAttach. The
ExternalPoolConfig.IsDHCP() dead stub is gone.
No code paths or NATS subjects regress: the static-pool / distributed
branches were already going through external.IGWManager since Slice 4d
(6719dc3).
* feat(ipam): Purpose field on every IPAM record (Slice B)
Part of bead mulga-siv-125.3.3.
Adds a Purpose enum (handlers/ec2/vpc/purpose.go) tagging every IP
allocation with its semantic role (eni-primary, eni-public, eip,
igw-lrp, natgw-external, …) so multi-VPC clusters can reclaim/audit
by (owner, purpose).
External IPAM (spinifex-external-ipam, v1→v2):
- ExternalIPAllocation.Type → .Purpose; legacy values mapped via
LegacyExternalTypeToPurpose (gateway→igw-lrp, auto_assign→eni-public,
elastic_ip→eip). Unknown legacy values warn and become "unknown".
- AllocateIP / AllocateFromPool / allocateFromPool param rename
allocType→purpose. All call sites pass Purpose* constants.
- migrate/002_external_ipam_purpose.go: idempotent CAS-retry migration
with v1/v2-union record shape so partial migrations resume cleanly.
Internal IPAM (spinifex-vpc-ipam, v1→v2):
- IPAMRecord.Allocated []string → []IPEntry{IP, Purpose, OwnerID}.
- AllocateIP gains purpose+ownerID args; ReleaseIP unchanged (still
keyed on IP).
- AllocatedIPs returns []IPEntry.
- eni.go reorders eniId generation before AllocateIP so the owning
resource ID lands on the new entry.
- migrate/003_ipam_purpose.go: cross-bucket backfill that reads the
ENI bucket via the new RunKVWithJetStream path. Orphaned IPs
(no owning ENI) warn and become Purpose=unknown.
Migrate framework:
- KVContext gains an optional JetStream field; new
Registry.RunKVWithJetStream method threads it through. RunKV
signature unchanged — all other callers are unaffected.
Tests:
- ipam_test.go: AllocateIP signature updates; AllocatedIPs now asserts
IP / Purpose / OwnerID on the returned entries.
- external_ipam_test.go: replaces "auto_assign"/"elastic_ip" literals
with PurposeENIPublic/PurposeEIP and asserts alloc.Purpose.
- migrate/002 + 003 tests: schema-detect, idempotent rerun,
no-JetStream fallback, empty bucket.
* refactor(daemon): tombstone obsolete spinifex-dhcp-leases KV bucket
The dhcp_manager removed in Phase 2.3 (bead mulga-siv-125.3.3) owned the
spinifex-dhcp-leases KV bucket. The migrate framework only handles
per-bucket schema version bumps, not bucket deletion, so the obsolete
bucket would linger on upgraded clusters.
Add a one-shot tombstone after initJetStream that deletes the bucket if
present. DeleteKVBucketIfExists treats ErrBucketNotFound and
ErrStreamNotFound as success, so the call is idempotent across restarts.
* feat(config): add network.ipsec_enabled cluster flag (default true)
Add IPSecEnabled to NetworkConfig in both the cluster TOML schema and
the formation handshake payload. Default true so AWS-parity intra-AZ
encryption is on by default. Operators can flip false in
[network] for trusted single-rack lab topologies.
Phase 2.5 (bead mulga-siv-125.3.5) consumes the flag from admin init
(strongSwan provisioning), formation server (propagates to joiners),
and daemon startup (ovs-vsctl ipsec_encapsulation toggle).
* feat(admin): IPsec peer cert generator signed by cluster CA
Add GenerateIPSecPeerCert + IPSecCertPaths in spinifex/admin so admin
init (and the future admin add-node path) can issue per-node IKEv2 peer
credentials signed by the existing cluster CA. The cert carries
id-kp-ipsecIKE (RFC 4945) so strongSwan accepts it as an IKEv2 peer
credential when ovs-monitor-ipsec materialises tunnel configs.
Cluster CA is reused directly — no intermediate strongSwan PKI today;
when intermediate CAs land that becomes a separate workstream.
The cert/key pair lives under {configDir}/ipsec/peer.{pem,key}; the
daemon points OVS Open_vSwitch.other_config (certificate, private_key,
ca_cert) at these paths when network.ipsec_enabled is true.
* feat(admin): wire IPsec peer cert into admin init + join paths
Add --ipsec bool flag (default true) on adminInitCmd. Single-node init
and the multi-node leader path both emit an IPsec peer cert after the
existing CA+server-cert generation. The multi-node formation server
propagates the IPSecEnabled flag to joining nodes via NetworkConfig;
admin join honours it and emits its own peer cert during the same
cert-issuance step that already produces the server cert.
spinifex.toml template gains an unconditional [network] block carrying
ipsec_enabled so the value is visible to operators on every install
regardless of whether external networking is configured. The daemon
reads it via cluster config (NetworkConfig.IPSecEnabled).
Bead mulga-siv-125.3.5.
* build: install openvswitch-ipsec for OVN native IPsec
openvswitch-ipsec provides ovs-monitor-ipsec, which reads the
Open_vSwitch.other_config cert/key/CA pointers and materialises
strongSwan configs for every Geneve tunnel managed by ovn-controller.
Pulls in strongswan + strongswan-pki as transitive deps.
Required by bead mulga-siv-125.3.5.
* feat(daemon): enable OVN native IPsec on intra-AZ Geneve at startup
When network.ipsec_enabled is true (default), the daemon points the
local OVS DB other_config at the per-node IPsec peer cert that admin
init / admin join provisioned (configDir/ipsec/peer.{pem,key} + the
cluster CA at configDir/ca.pem), then sets
other_config:ipsec_encapsulation=true.
ovs-monitor-ipsec (shipped by the openvswitch-ipsec package) consumes
those pointers and materialises strongSwan configs for every Geneve
tunnel ovn-controller programs — including OVN-IC inter-AZ tunnels
when federation lands in Phase 3a.
Missing cert files log a warning and leave Geneve plaintext; operators
upgrading an older cluster reissue certs via spx admin to close the
gap.
Bead mulga-siv-125.3.5.
* test(e2e): multinode IPsec wiring + xfrm SAs + ESP capture
TestMultinodeIPSec asserts:
- OVS DB on every node carries certificate/private_key/ca_cert pointers
and other_config:ipsec_encapsulation=true (what daemon.enableOVNIPSec
writes).
- ip xfrm state on every node has at least one AEAD SA in AES-GCM mode
(rfc4106(gcm(aes)) or gcm(aes)) within 90s.
- tcpdump catches ESP (ip proto 50) on the underlay (best-effort —
logged only; geneve may be idle during the 5s capture window).
Skips cleanly when the cluster was bootstrapped with --ipsec=false
(no ipsec_encapsulation key on first node).
Read-only over SSH; runs in the parallel bucket alongside the other
non-mutating multinode tests.
* fix(igw): write attachment State="attached" for AWS parity
Reconciler intent loader (network/reconcile/intent.go::loadIGWs) filters
IGW records with `State == "attached"`, but AttachInternetGateway was
writing `State = "available"`. The reconciler therefore never picked up
any attached IGW — `intent_igws=0` on every pass — so the OVN external
switch + gateway LRP + WAN bridge wiring built by IGWManager.AttachIGW
never ran for default-VPC IGWs (whose live `vpc.igw-attach` publish at
daemon bootstrap is lost — vpcd subscriber not yet wired).
Net effect on single-node e2e: every SSH probe to 192.168.x public IPs
timed out (TestSSHProbe, TestModifyInstanceAttribute, TestRebootInstance,
TestNATGateway, TestSGToSGDatapath) because SNAT/DNAT rules on the VPC
router had no path to the external network.
Match AWS InternetGatewayAttachment.State semantics:
- Attach: State="attached"
- Detach: State="detached"
Detach value is internal — recordToEC2 gates Attachments on VpcId != "",
so the detached State is never surfaced to API consumers.
Bead: mulga-siv-131
* fix(reconcile): call AttachIGW when IGW topology missing
applyIGWs previously deferred to the NATS handler when an intent IGW
had no external switch in OVN. When the vpc.igw-attach event is lost
(bootstrap-time default-VPC IGW published before vpcd subscriber is
ready), deferral never resolves and VM public-IP traffic dies.
Call IGWManager.AttachIGW directly — it is idempotent (short-circuits
when the external switch already exists), so the reconciler converges
default-VPC IGWs on first pass without duplicating work on subsequent
passes.
Closes mulga-siv-132.
* fix(test): align NewExternalIPAM call with 2-arg signature
Rebase onto dev pulled in daemon_system_instance_test.go which used
the legacy 3-arg NewExternalIPAM(jsNC, js, pools). The feature branch
already narrowed the signature to (js, pools) via the upstream-DHCP
config drop; align the test with the current signature.
* fix(vpcd): EnsureSubnet must EnsureVPC first to avoid NATS race
vpc.create-vpc and vpc.create-subnet are independent NATS events with
no inter-event ordering guarantee. Tenant bootstrap on iam.account.created
publishes both within <1ms, so the subnet handler's
CreateLogicalRouterPort can race the parent VPC's CreateLogicalRouter and
fail with "logical router not found". The cascade fails CreateNetworkInterface
which fails RunInstances which surfaces as InsufficientInstanceCapacity to
the SDK — masking the underlying topology race.
handleSubnetCreate now calls EnsureVPC(VPCID-only) before EnsureSubnet.
EnsureVPC short-circuits on existing LR (idempotent), so the race-winning
vpc.create-vpc handler's full CIDR/VNI ExternalIDs are preserved; if subnet
wins the race the LR is created with bare ExternalIDs (cosmetic) and the
follow-on vpc.create-vpc short-circuits.
Adds TestIntegration_SubnetBeforeVPC regression covering both orderings.
Closes mulga-siv-133.
* feat(ansible): require --external-pool, drop NAT, forward EXTRA_VARS
spx admin init now rejects --external-mode=nat and demands --external-pool
when mode=pool. The ansible init role silently skipped pool flags when the
range was unset, so installs fell over inside the spx validator. Make
targets also swallowed `-e` (make's env-override flag), so operators could
not override pool start/end without editing defaults.yml.
- vars/defaults.yml: rename nat_gateway_ip → external_gateway_ip; add
spinifex_external_no_external opt-out; document the spx flag contract.
- roles/init/tasks/main.yml: drop NAT branch; assert pool range upfront
with a fail_msg pointing at EXTRA_VARS / defaults.yml; emit gateway,
prefix-len, gateway-ip only when explicitly set (let spx auto-detect);
honour --no-external.
- playbooks/dev-reset.yml: rename captured var; coerce legacy
external_mode=nat to pool with a warn; tighten gateway regex with \b.
- Makefile: ansible-dev-* targets now forward EXTRA_VARS="key=val ..."
through --extra-vars so `make` callers can override without editing
defaults.yml.
- scripts/ansible/README.md: document pool requirement, both invocation
styles (direct -e vs make EXTRA_VARS), NAT removal.
* fix(ipsec): guard ipsec_encapsulation on ovs-monitor-ipsec liveness
enableOVNIPSec set OVS cert pointers + ipsec_encapsulation=true without
ensuring ovs-monitor-ipsec.service was running. Without that daemon, OVS
holds the cert pointers unused, strongSwan never gets IKE config, and
tunnel traffic ovn-controller marks for encryption gets silently
dropped. TestMultinodeIPSec fails on `node1 xfrm has no AEAD SAs`.
- systemd: spinifex-daemon Wants=/After= ovs-monitor-ipsec.service
- daemon: ensureOVSMonitorIPSecActive — systemctl enable --now +
is-active poll; refuses to flip ipsec_encapsulation if daemon is dead
- daemon: single-node short-circuit — no peers means no tunnels means
the flag is at best inert and at worst load-bearing-silent-drop
- ci: capture-net-diag.sh + workflow steps to snapshot OVS/OVN/xfrm
state on failure, fan out across all 3 multinode nodes
Refs: mulga-siv-136
* test(e2e): sticky-skip downstream SSH tests when probe fails
When TestSSHProbe times out (3 min, typically because of mulga-siv-134
datapath bug), four downstream tests each re-probe SSH on the same
broken datapath and time out identically — single-node job runs ~24 min
instead of ~12 min, with the same error logged five times.
First waitForSSHReady timeout now sets a package-level atomic flag;
subsequent waitForSSHReady / trySSHReady / requireSSHHealthy calls skip
immediately. Preserves the original red signal on TestSSHProbe and on
any test that genuinely needed SSH (Skip ≠ Pass). Bool variant
(trySSHReady) consults but does not set the flag — its caller already
treats False as advisory warning, not fatal.
TestSGToSGDatapath has its own EventuallyErr SSH wait (not via
waitForSSHReady) and needs an explicit requireSSHHealthy(t) gate at
the top of runSGToSGDatapath. TestNATGateway already calls
waitForSSHReady first so the gate fires naturally.
Refs: mulga-siv-137
* fix(ipsec): use Debian unit name openvswitch-ipsec.service
CI artifact shows `Unit ovs-monitor-ipsec.service could not be found`
on every node. Debian's openvswitch-ipsec package ships the unit as
openvswitch-ipsec.service (the binary inside is ovs-monitor-ipsec, but
systemd's name follows the package). The previous commit guarded on
the wrong unit name, so:
- spinifex-daemon.service Wants=/After= silently no-op'd (missing unit)
- enableOVNIPSec's `systemctl enable --now ovs-monitor-ipsec.service`
failed, daemon logged a warning and continued without flipping
ipsec_encapsulation=true
- TestMultinodeIPSec skipped with `node1 reports ""` because OVS DB
never received the cert pointers
Rename across all 5 spots (daemon, systemd unit, test, CI diag script,
workflow journal capture) to match the Debian package layout.
Note: the package itself still must be present on the CI VM image —
that's tracked in the mulga repo (image-builder provision.sh +
bootstrap-install.sh shim).
Refs: mulga-siv-136
* fix(e2e): authorize default SG tcp/22 + icmp in single-node fixture
admin init leaves the default SG closed (AWS parity); the Go single suite
never ported the Phase-5 SG-ingress block that run-e2e.sh has had since day
one, so every test runner SSH/ping probe hits the OVN port-group ACL drop.
- ec2helpers: add AuthorizeICMPIngress + EnsureDefaultSGOpen helpers.
- single/main_test: open default SG once per process in pkgFixOnce.Do.
- witness: extend ensureDefaultSGSSHIngress to authorize ICMP too.
- run-e2e.sh: append matching ICMP authorize next to tcp/22 block.
mulga-siv-134
* fix(network/reconcile): key DHCP_Options lookup by subnet_id not CIDR
Multi-tenant default VPCs share the same subnet CIDR (172.31.0.0/20) per
account. The existing FindDHCPOptionsByCIDR gate at apply.go:107 found
the first account's DHCP_Options row and skipped creation for every
subsequent subnet with the same CIDR. Those subnets' ports then attached
nothing (FindDHCPOptionsByExternalID misses on subnet_id), VMs got no
DHCPv4 lease, and SSH/ICMP into them silently failed even though SG
ACLs and NAT were correct.
Switch the gate to FindDHCPOptionsByExternalID keyed on spinifex:subnet_id
so each subnet owns its own row, matching the attach lookup at line 203.
Verified: account 000000000001 default VPC RunInstances now produces an
LSP with dhcpv4_options populated, VM cloud-init reports a 172.31.0.5/20
lease + default route via 172.31.0.1, and ping + ssh TCP handshake to
the EIP succeed end-to-end. Stale DHCP_Options row for the prior dead
subnet was wiped manually; reconciler recreated the correct row for the
live subnet on its next pass.
* fix(ipsec): enable openvswitch-ipsec at provision time, drop daemon write
Provisioning now runs `systemctl enable --now openvswitch-ipsec.service`
alongside openvswitch-switch and ovn-controller. The spinifex-daemon
process drops its `enable --now` shell-out and only polls is-active.
Sudoers gains one read-only line:
spinifex-daemon ALL=(root) NOPASSWD: /usr/bin/systemctl is-active openvswitch-ipsec.service
This mirrors the existing vpcd ovn-controller is-active precedent and
removes the daemon's need for systemd-write capability. Aligns with
least-privilege service account pattern: provision enables services,
daemon only reads status.
If the unit is inactive at runtime, the daemon refuses to flip
ipsec_encapsulation=true (silent-drop guard from mulga-siv-136) and
surfaces a clear error pointing at scripts/setup-ovn.sh.
* chore: unblock preflight on feat/network-layer-redesign
Two pre-existing failures blocked preflight on the branch:
- govulncheck flagged golang.org/x/net@v0.54.0 (GO-2026-5026, ASCII Punycode
rejection bug in idna.ToASCII); reached via utils.DownloadFileWithProgress.
Bump to v0.55.0; go mod tidy carries x/sys to v0.45.0.
- TestTopologyHandler_SubnetCreate_RouterPortFails asserted subnet create
fails when the parent VPC router is missing. That contract changed in
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8841241541 | fix(setup-ovn): del-port cleanup without bridge name to avoid error on first run | ||
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9d665f9dde | bringing local networking changes onto dev branch | ||
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69404b38ce |
fix(vpcd): public-IP boot race + DHCP DORA hardening (siv-33/34/36/37/38/39) (#177)
* fix(installer): emit kernel cmdline to ttyS0 alongside tty0 (mulga-siv-33)
GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX in /etc/default/grub only listed console=tty0, so the
installed kernel printed nothing on serial after the GRUB menu. Headless
installs (CI, racks with serial-only IPMI, remote-dev SSH-to-QEMU) saw a
black screen forever and had no path to debug boot failures.
Append console=ttyS0,115200 — the last `console=` on the cmdline becomes
the system console, so ttyS0 wins on serial-only hardware while tty0
still receives output on local displays.
Plan: docs/development/bugs/iso-public-ip-boot-race.md
* fix(ipam): widen vpc.dhcp.acquire retry budget to 60 s (mulga-siv-34)
ObtainDHCPLease retried only 5 attempts × 1 s before returning a hard
error. On a cold ISO boot, NATS comes up well before vpcd's reconcile
leader-election + dhcp.Manager subscribe (typical 5–30 s, pathological
~60 s during full reconcile), so daemon's NewExternalIPAM races vpcd's
dhcp.acquire subscription and fails permanently — d.externalIPAM stays
nil for the daemon's lifetime, daemon_handlers_instance.go silently
skips all auto-public-IP allocation, and instances launch with no
public IP, no dnat_and_snat, and no NAT event ever published.
Bump maxAttempts to 60 with 1 s spacing; expose both as package vars
so tests can shrink the budget for fast timeout-path coverage. Pure
widening of the existing retry loop — no behaviour change on the
success path, only the worst-case wallclock when vpcd never comes up.
The dominant cause of slow vpcd starts (mulga-siv-33: systemd-networkd
not enabled in the ISO → veth pair vanishes on reboot → vpcd
crashloops) is fixed alongside this. A 60 s budget fits comfortably
above all observed healthy-startup times.
Plan: docs/development/bugs/iso-public-ip-boot-race.md
* fix(setup-ovn): declare Linux WAN bridge as NetDev so networkd-managed veth resolves Bridge= on reboot (mulga-siv-33)
The veth-mode reboot persistence drop-ins added in mulga-998.b were
incomplete: setup-ovn.sh wrote `15-spinifex-veth-wan.network` with
`Bridge=br-wan`, but never declared br-wan itself to networkd.
br-wan is created by `networking.service` (ifupdown via
`/etc/network/interfaces`, generated by `install.go writeNetworkConfig`),
not networkd. networkd's `Bridge=` directive requires the target to be a
known NetDev — when it isn't, networkd silently logs
`br-wan NetDev could not be found, ignoring assignment` and the veth
ends up with no master. vpcd's bridge-mode sanity check then fails on
every reboot.
Fix: also write `14-spinifex-br-wan.netdev` declaring br-wan as
`Kind=bridge`. networkd matches the existing kernel bridge by name+kind
(the `Failed to create netdev: File exists` log is harmless), and
`Bridge=br-wan` resolves on next boot. ifupdown still owns DHCP and the
IP — networkd just needs the NetDev declaration to enslave the veth.
The write is gated to avoid clobbering operator-managed networkd config:
if any other `.netdev` under `/etc/systemd/network`,
`/run/systemd/network`, or `/usr/lib/systemd/network` already declares
the WAN bridge by name, the write is skipped with a log line pointing
at the operator file. Cleanup hook also removes the new file when
switching away from veth mode.
Verified end-to-end via QEMU repro: clean install + first boot + reboot,
veth-wan-br master persists across reboots, vpcd starts cleanly.
* fix(vpcd/dhcp): enable AF_PACKET promisc on bridge for DORA (mulga-siv-33)
Real-world DHCP servers commonly ignore the BOOTP BROADCAST flag and
reply with a unicast OFFER addressed to the synthetic per-tenant chaddr
(e.g. 02:f3:...). A Linux bridge floods unknown unicast to slave ports
but does NOT pass it up to the bridge netdev unless IFF_PROMISC is set,
so vpcd's AF_PACKET socket on br-wan misses the OFFER and DORA times
out at 15s ("unable to receive an offer: context deadline exceeded").
Dev/CI didn't hit this:
- CI uses spx_wan_mode=static — no DORA via vpcd.
- QEMU dev DHCP servers (SLIRP/dnsmasq) honor the BROADCAST flag, so
their replies are L2 broadcast which the bridge always passes up.
Replace the three nclient4.New(iface, ...) call sites in Acquire/Renew/
Release with nclient4.NewWithConn(...) wrapping a custom AF_PACKET
DGRAM conn that calls SetPromiscuous(true). Promisc is per-socket
(per-DORA, ~15s) and refcounted by the kernel — auto-clears on close.
* revert(vpcd/dhcp): drop AF_PACKET promisc wrapper, restore nclient4.New
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94600d7b84 | OVN chassis issues, new reconsile function, reboot fixed (#165) | ||
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6b75470b0f |
fix: admin-up veth-wan-ovs via networkd (mulga-998.b Fix 1 follow-up)
Fix 1 persisted the veth pair across reboot via
15-spinifex-veth-wan.{netdev,network}, but only configured
veth-wan-br. Its peer veth-wan-ovs had no .network unit, so
networkd left it unmanaged and admin-DOWN after reboot. That
cascades: peer goes LOWERLAYERDOWN, br-wan loses carrier,
external DHCP/NAT path broken — despite vpcd correctly
detecting mode=veth and the sanity check passing.
OVS does not admin-up external (non-internal) ports — that's
networkd's job. Pre-reboot the setup-ovn.sh 'ip link set
veth-wan-ovs up' made it work, but that doesn't persist.
Write a second unit 16-spinifex-veth-wan-ovs.network with
ConfigureWithoutCarrier=yes so networkd flips admin state
without taking ownership of bridge/address assignment (OVS
retains that). Cleanup paths in the non-veth branch of
setup-ovn.sh and reset-dev-env.sh updated to remove the new
unit too.
Verified live via 'networkctl reload': veth-wan-ovs and
veth-wan-br both UP, br-wan LOWER_UP. Reboot drill per
docs/development/bugs/dhcp-vpcd-issues.md 'Live drill 1'
still required to confirm persistence.
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abd93098fc |
fix: persist veth-wan pair across reboot (mulga-998.b Fix 1)
setup-ovn.sh's veth branch creates veth-wan-br ↔ veth-wan-ovs but nothing
recreates the kernel interfaces on reboot. OVSDB remembers veth-wan-ovs
as a port on br-ext but the peer is gone — the external path silently
breaks and vpcd falls through to direct mode.
- setup-ovn.sh: write /etc/systemd/network/15-spinifex-veth-wan.{netdev,network}
in the veth branch so systemd-networkd recreates the pair on boot. Add
a single pre-case guard that rips down stale veth persistence + the OVS
port + the kernel veth whenever WAN_BRIDGE_MODE != veth, so mode
transitions are idempotent (D17).
- reset-dev-env.sh: delete the netdev/network units during cleanup so
`make reset` gives a truly clean slate.
- spinifex-vpcd.service: After=systemd-networkd.service openvswitch-switch.service
so vpcd's sanity checks see a populated kernel + OVSDB (D5).
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75fb15be2b |
feat: spx admin init/join listen-vs-advertise split + br-mgmt OVS provisioning (#158)
* fix: provision br-mgmt as OVS bridge + loopback guard for LB gateway Convert br-mgmt from an externally-provisioned Linux bridge to an OVS bridge owned by scripts/setup-ovn.sh, giving every deployment type (tofu-cluster, production single-node, production multi-node) a single provisioning path. setup-ovn.sh grows --mgmt-bridge / --mgmt-cidr / --mgmt-iface / --no-mgmt-bridge flags. Default creates br-mgmt with fail-mode=standalone (excluded from ovn-bridge-mappings so ovn-controller ignores it) and assigns the mgmt IP via a systemd-networkd drop-in so it survives reboot. SetupMgmtTapDevice / CleanupMgmtTapDevice switch from `ip link master` to `ovs-vsctl add-port` / `del-port` to match the new bridge type. Add a loopback guard to wireLBAgentConfig's fallback branch: on a production single-node with awsgw bound to 127.0.0.1 and no mgmt bridge, the fallback previously injected 127.0.0.1 into LB VM cloud-init — silently unreachable because the VM's loopback is its own. The guard leaves GatewayURL empty and the existing "LB agent gateway URL not configured" error fires instead. Regression covered in daemon_wire_lb_test.go. * fix: auto-detect primary IP for admin init --bind default Bare `spx admin init` used a 127.0.0.1 default that kept awsgw on loopback only, so system VMs on br-mgmt could never reach it. Auto-detect the default-route source IPv4 instead, which keeps TLS cert SANs specific (still not a wildcard). Dev-install scripts now pass --bind 127.0.0.1 explicitly to preserve loopback-only behavior on laptops. Closes mulga-siv-7. * test: refresh wire lb loopback-bind comment for siv-7 * fix: dev-install scripts should let admin init auto-detect --bind Pinning --bind to 127.0.0.1 on dev installs left awsgw loopback-only while setup-ovn.sh still provisions br-mgmt, so LB VMs hit 10.15.8.1:9999 with no listener. Drop the explicit --bind so auto-detect picks the primary IP and the siv-6 mgmtRouteVia path routes LB traffic to a real listener. * fix: bind awsgw and predastore on 0.0.0.0 in spinifex.toml template PR #144 (nats TLS) made every service listen on --bind's specific IP. For awsgw and predastore this broke localhost-reachability that the UI proxy (spinifexui/spinifexui.go:193-194) and AWS CLI spinifex profile rely on — latent since #144, surfaced by siv-7's auto-detect default on dev installs (502 from the UI). Hardcode awsgw and predastore host fields to 0.0.0.0 so both listen wildcard; loopback clients (UI proxy, spinifex AWS CLI profile, same-host daemon → predastore) keep working, LAN clients still reach them via the LAN-IP SAN on the cert. daemon.host and nats.host stay as {{.BindIP}} because peer-advertised values must not resolve to 0.0.0.0/loopback. predastore.host normalization at config.go:207 rewrites 0.0.0.0 → 127.0.0.1 for local-node consumers, so existing callers see a usable connect address. * revert: siv-7 --bind auto-detect + siv-6 loopback guard (prep mulga-siv-8) Clears the deck before layering the listen-vs-advertise split (mulga-siv-8). The plan restores --bind=0.0.0.0 as the single-node default and introduces an explicit --advertise flag for off-host dial targets; the reverted approach (auto-detect a specific IP at init, hardcode 0.0.0.0 in the template, guard against loopback in wireLBAgentConfig) becomes redundant once that lands. Reverts: - |
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6026d46ba1 | fix: ovn logging | ||
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a56a2baf1f | feat: privilege separation (#114) | ||
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216842cc1b | fix: enable ovn on boot | ||
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4d56565c3f |
feat: veth pair bridge — link Linux bridge to OVS without conversion
setup-ovn.sh now detects whether the default route is on a Linux bridge or OVS bridge. When it's a Linux bridge (e.g. br-wan from cloud-init), instead of destructively converting it, the script creates an OVS bridge (br-ext) and links them with a veth pair. The Linux bridge keeps its IP, routes, and ports untouched — no WAN interruption. Also fixes all pre-existing lint issues (gofmt, ineffassign, errchkjson, gosec, modernize, whitespace) to bring golangci-lint to 0 issues. Tested: pool mode with static IP range on single-node (ben-banksia). VM gets public IP 192.168.1.201, SSH works, outbound internet works. |
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34b50b11fb |
refactor: setup-ovn.sh — replace br-external with configurable WAN bridge
Replace --external-bridge/--external-iface/--direct with: - --wan-bridge=NAME: OVS bridge for WAN traffic (auto-detected from default route if it's already a bridge) - --wan-iface=NAME: physical NIC to add to the WAN bridge - --macvlan: SSH-safe macvlan mode for single-NIC hosts Auto-detection logic: - If default route goes through a bridge (br-wan) → use it directly - If default route is a physical NIC → stop with guidance (never auto-move a NIC into OVS — may drop SSH) Bridge-mappings updated: external:$WAN_BRIDGE (was external:br-external). OVN logical network name stays "external" (no topology.go change needed). Encap IP now prefers br-vpc IP when available (dedicated VPC data plane). Part of mulga-739. Blocks VPC E2E work. |
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88baf5e202 |
feat: direct bridge mode — prefer over macvlan when WAN NIC != SSH NIC
Auto-detect bridge topology: if a dedicated WAN NIC exists (not used for SSH), add it directly to br-external instead of creating a macvlan. Direct bridge enables distributed NAT (DNAT on VM's own chassis) and eliminates macvlan workarounds (MAC alignment, gratuitous ARPs, centralized NAT bottleneck). - topology.go: bridge-mode-aware NAT and localnet port options - vpcd.go: auto-detect bridge mode, skip MAC alignment for direct bridge - setup-ovn.sh: --direct flag for physical NIC on br-external - reset-dev-env.sh: SSH NIC detection via SSH_CONNECTION |
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daae6ca6b8 |
refactor: remove single-nic bridge mode, standardize on macvlan
The single-nic IP migration path was fragile and caused connectivity
issues during setup. macvlan is now the only bridge strategy — always
creates spx-ext-{nic} on the WAN NIC. Removed --single-nic flag,
SingleNIC config/detection fields, and updated all docs.
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665093343c |
fix: preserve DNS resolution after IP migration to br-external
When setup-ovn.sh migrates the WAN IP from a physical NIC to br-external, systemd-resolved loses its DNS association (DNS servers are per-interface). This breaks hostname resolution for everything on the host — git, apt, curl, SSH all fail. Now captures DNS config from the original interface before migration and re-associates it with br-external via resolvectl. Falls back to 8.8.8.8 if no DNS was configured on the original interface. |
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2af3bf5287 |
feat: auto-detect network topology + DHCP gateway in admin init
spx admin init now works with zero external networking flags: - Auto-detects WAN interface, gateway, prefix from ip route - Auto-detects single-NIC vs multi-NIC mode - Defaults to nat mode with DHCP for gateway IP - Prints detected topology with interface roles setup-ovn.sh gains --dhcp flag: obtains a DHCP lease on the macvlan/bridge interface for the OVN gateway SNAT address, then writes gateway_ip into spinifex.toml. Tested on VM: macvlan gets separate IP from router DHCP, host keeps its original IP. Three tiers of external networking: - Zero flags: auto nat+DHCP (VMs get outbound internet) - --external-pool=start-end: pool mode (VMs get public IPs) - --no-external: overlay only (no internet for VMs) |
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1ee7012ba9 |
feat: Phase 7 — single-NIC macvlan bridge strategy
Add --single-nic flag to setup-ovn.sh. When used with --external-bridge,
creates a macvlan sub-interface (spx-ext-{iface}) in bridge mode off the
host's NIC instead of adding the NIC directly to br-external. The host
keeps its IP — no migration, SSH-safe.
Strategy selection:
- Dedicated NIC: --external-iface=eth1 (add directly)
- Single NIC: --external-iface=eth0 --single-nic (macvlan)
- IP migration: --external-iface=eth0 (legacy, no --single-nic)
Add single_nic bool field to VPCDConfig for per-node config. Different
nodes in a cluster can use different strategies. Unit test verifies
single_nic parsing alongside external_interface.
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c1cdfc07c3 |
feat: Phase 1 completion — external IPAM, br-external setup, config template
Add external IPAM module (CAS-based IP allocation from admin-defined pools in NATS KV). Supports multi-pool with region/AZ scoping, pool fallback logic, gateway IP reservation, and concurrent allocation via CAS retries. 12 unit tests covering allocation, release, exhaustion, CAS conflict, multi-pool, fallback, validation, and idempotent init. Add --external-bridge flag to setup-ovn.sh: creates OVS bridge br-external, adds WAN NIC, migrates host IP to bridge, and sets ovn-bridge-mappings=external:br-external for OVN localnet ports. Add commented [network] section and external_interface to spinifex.toml config template for discoverability. |
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5d93786995 |
refactor: rename hive to spinifex in all shell scripts
- Update scripts/: start-dev, stop-dev, dev-setup, setup, setup-ovn, etc. - Update tests/e2e/: all E2E test scripts - Update scripts/iac/: rename hive-test.sh → spinifex-test.sh, update TF files - Update config/: rename hive.service and install script - Binary refs use spx, env vars use SPINIFEX_, paths use spinifex |
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4466de04d3 | fix: ovn logrotate | ||
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d90bf53eaf | fix: log rotate ovn | ||
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48c0565d47 | fix: ovn shut down on stop-dev.sh | ||
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8188707c91 | feat: VPC networking v1 — OVN-based virtual networking for EC2 instances |