Files
sencho/backend/src/services/PolicyEnforcement.ts
T
Anso 4e5ba17710 refactor(backend): sanitize user input before logging to close CRLF injection (#807)
* refactor(backend): sanitize user input before logging to close CRLF injection

Adds a small sanitizeForLog helper that strips CR, LF, tab, and ASCII
control characters (0x00-0x1F, 0x7F) from a value before it is embedded
in a console.log/warn/error/debug call. Wraps every call site where a
user-controlled value (req.params, req.body, req.query, or a value
derived from them) flows into a log message.

Closes the bulk of the open CodeQL alerts in this family:
- 96 js/log-injection
- 28 js/tainted-format-string

The helper is in backend/src/utils/safeLog.ts. Routes still pre-validate
input at the request boundary; this is the second line of defense and
gives static analyzers a sanitizer they can trace through. JSON
responses, Docker filter labels, and other non-log call sites are
intentionally left unwrapped.

* refactor(backend): printf-style format strings for tainted-log call sites

CodeQL's js/tainted-format-string rule flags template literals in the first
arg of console.X when any interpolated value is user-controlled, regardless
of whether each value is sanitized inline. The canonical mitigation is to
use a static format string and pass values as positional args.

Converts the 28 flagged template literals to printf-style ("%s") format
strings, with sanitizeForLog applied to each positional arg. Also fills in
the log-injection wraps on 9 sites where a user-controlled value was
missed in the first sweep (agents, fleet, gitSources, imageUpdates,
GitSourceService).

No behavior change at runtime. Node's util.format substitutes %s tokens
identically to template-literal interpolation.

* fix(backend): wrap nodeId/snapshotId in fleet restore debug log

CodeQL flagged the unwrapped numeric args even though they cannot
contain control chars in practice. Apply the sanitizer for taint-flow
recognition.
2026-04-27 10:47:23 -04:00

143 lines
5.0 KiB
TypeScript

/**
* Pre-deploy policy gate.
*
* Extracted from `index.ts` so route handlers and the scheduler can call a
* single, unit-testable function rather than copy-paste the gate logic.
*
* The gate fails open when Trivy is missing (users are never locked out by
* tooling state) and fails closed when the compose file cannot be parsed
* (a broken stack must not silently bypass a block policy).
*/
import { ComposeService } from './ComposeService';
import { DatabaseService } from './DatabaseService';
import type { ScanPolicy, VulnSeverity } from './DatabaseService';
import { FleetSyncService } from './FleetSyncService';
import { NotificationService } from './NotificationService';
import { sanitizeForLog } from '../utils/safeLog';
import TrivyService from './TrivyService';
import { isSeverityAtLeast } from '../utils/severity';
import { validateImageRef } from '../utils/image-ref';
import { getErrorMessage } from '../utils/errors';
export interface PolicyViolation {
imageRef: string;
severity: VulnSeverity;
criticalCount: number;
highCount: number;
scanId: number;
}
export interface PolicyEnforcementOptions {
bypass: boolean;
actor: string;
ip?: string;
/** HTTP method of the originating request; used for audit attribution. */
auditMethod?: string;
/** Request path of the originating route; used for audit attribution. */
auditPath?: string;
}
export interface PolicyEnforcementResult {
ok: boolean;
bypassed: boolean;
policy?: ScanPolicy;
violations: PolicyViolation[];
trivyMissing?: boolean;
}
export async function enforcePolicyPreDeploy(
stackName: string,
nodeId: number,
opts: PolicyEnforcementOptions,
): Promise<PolicyEnforcementResult> {
const svc = TrivyService.getInstance();
const db = DatabaseService.getInstance();
const policy = db.getMatchingPolicy(nodeId, stackName, FleetSyncService.getSelfIdentity());
if (!policy || !policy.enabled || !policy.block_on_deploy) {
return { ok: true, bypassed: false, policy: policy ?? undefined, violations: [] };
}
if (!svc.isTrivyAvailable()) {
NotificationService.getInstance().dispatchAlert(
'warning',
'scan_finding',
`Pre-deploy scan for "${stackName}" skipped: Trivy not installed on this node`,
{ stackName },
);
return { ok: true, bypassed: false, policy, violations: [], trivyMissing: true };
}
let imageRefs: string[] = [];
try {
imageRefs = await ComposeService.getInstance(nodeId).listStackImages(stackName);
} catch (err) {
const message = getErrorMessage(err, 'compose parse failed');
console.error('[Policy] listStackImages failed for %s:', sanitizeForLog(stackName), sanitizeForLog(message));
return {
ok: false,
bypassed: false,
policy,
violations: [{
imageRef: '(compose parse error)',
severity: 'UNKNOWN',
criticalCount: 0,
highCount: 0,
scanId: 0,
}],
};
}
const violations: PolicyViolation[] = [];
for (const imageRef of imageRefs) {
if (!validateImageRef(imageRef)) continue;
try {
const scan = await svc.scanImagePreflight(imageRef, nodeId, stackName);
const severity = scan.highest_severity ?? 'UNKNOWN';
if (isSeverityAtLeast(severity, policy.max_severity)) {
violations.push({
imageRef,
severity,
criticalCount: scan.critical_count,
highCount: scan.high_count,
scanId: scan.id,
});
}
} catch (err) {
const message = getErrorMessage(err, 'pre-flight scan failed');
console.error(`[Policy] scanImagePreflight failed for ${imageRef}:`, message);
violations.push({
imageRef,
severity: 'UNKNOWN',
criticalCount: 0,
highCount: 0,
scanId: 0,
});
}
}
if (violations.length === 0) {
return { ok: true, bypassed: false, policy, violations: [] };
}
if (opts.bypass) {
try {
db.insertAuditLog({
timestamp: Date.now(),
username: opts.actor,
method: opts.auditMethod ?? 'POST',
path: opts.auditPath ?? `/api/stacks/${stackName}/deploy`,
status_code: 200,
node_id: nodeId,
ip_address: opts.ip ?? '',
summary: `policy.bypass stack="${stackName}" policy="${policy.name}" violations=${violations.length} images=[${violations.map((v) => v.imageRef).join(',')}]`,
});
} catch (err) {
console.error('[Policy] Failed to record bypass audit entry:', err);
}
return { ok: true, bypassed: true, policy, violations };
}
return { ok: false, bypassed: false, policy, violations };
}