* refactor(backend): sanitize user input before logging to close CRLF injection
Adds a small sanitizeForLog helper that strips CR, LF, tab, and ASCII
control characters (0x00-0x1F, 0x7F) from a value before it is embedded
in a console.log/warn/error/debug call. Wraps every call site where a
user-controlled value (req.params, req.body, req.query, or a value
derived from them) flows into a log message.
Closes the bulk of the open CodeQL alerts in this family:
- 96 js/log-injection
- 28 js/tainted-format-string
The helper is in backend/src/utils/safeLog.ts. Routes still pre-validate
input at the request boundary; this is the second line of defense and
gives static analyzers a sanitizer they can trace through. JSON
responses, Docker filter labels, and other non-log call sites are
intentionally left unwrapped.
* refactor(backend): printf-style format strings for tainted-log call sites
CodeQL's js/tainted-format-string rule flags template literals in the first
arg of console.X when any interpolated value is user-controlled, regardless
of whether each value is sanitized inline. The canonical mitigation is to
use a static format string and pass values as positional args.
Converts the 28 flagged template literals to printf-style ("%s") format
strings, with sanitizeForLog applied to each positional arg. Also fills in
the log-injection wraps on 9 sites where a user-controlled value was
missed in the first sweep (agents, fleet, gitSources, imageUpdates,
GitSourceService).
No behavior change at runtime. Node's util.format substitutes %s tokens
identically to template-literal interpolation.
* fix(backend): wrap nodeId/snapshotId in fleet restore debug log
CodeQL flagged the unwrapped numeric args even though they cannot
contain control chars in practice. Apply the sanitizer for taint-flow
recognition.
Introduce a NotificationCategory string-literal union (11 values) and
thread it through dispatchAlert as a required second argument. All
callers (DockerEventService, AutoHealService, ImageUpdateService,
MonitorService, PolicyEnforcement, policyGate, SchedulerService,
imageUpdates route) pass an explicit category at every call site,
giving TypeScript compile-time enforcement that no new emit site can
be added without choosing a category.
DatabaseService gains an idempotent migration that adds a nullable
category TEXT column to notification_history; existing rows keep
category=NULL (displayed as Uncategorized in the UI). The
getNotificationHistory method accepts an optional category filter
that is forwarded from the GET /api/notifications/history route via
a ?category= query param.
NotificationPanel gains a category Select dropdown so users can
filter history by category. The frontend types mirror the backend
union so API responses are type-safe end-to-end.
All 75 test files (1410 tests) updated to the new 4-arg dispatchAlert
signature and passing.
Policies with block_on_deploy=1 now scan every stack image before
docker compose up runs and reject the deploy with HTTP 409 on violation.
The UI opens a dialog listing offending images; admins can override per
deploy with ?ignorePolicy=true, and every bypass is recorded in the
audit log with the originating route, actor, policy, and image list.
When Trivy is not installed on the target node the gate fails open with
a warning notification, so teams are never locked out by tooling state.
Post-deploy and scheduled scans still evaluate matching policies and
dispatch warnings on violations to surface drift on long-running stacks.
Public API additions: policy and suppression CRUD under /api/security,
plus the documented 409 block-response shape on all deploy paths.
Anso