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Anso
3b650523c1
* fix(security): dedupe concurrent compose-stack scans
Track stack scans in scanningImages keyed stack:<nodeId>:<stackName>.
The /scan/stack route returns 409 when an in-flight scan exists, and
the service-side check is the real correctness barrier (the route
pre-check is a fast-path optimization that mirrors scanImage). The
dedup key release lives in a try/finally so failed scans free the
slot for retry.
Why: scanComposeStack had no equivalent of scanImage's scanningImages
guard, so two simultaneous calls for the same stack would both run
trivy config, both insert a vulnerability_scans row, and double-
process the result.
* feat(security): acknowledge misconfig findings
Adds a parallel acknowledgement system for Trivy misconfig findings
that mirrors cve_suppressions: a new misconfig_acknowledgements table,
read-time enrichment via the new misconfig-ack-filter utility, REST
CRUD endpoints, fleet-sync replication from control to replicas, a
Settings panel, and an Acknowledge button on the Misconfigs tab.
Schema and behavior parity with cve_suppressions:
- UNIQUE(rule_id, COALESCE(stack_pattern, '')) so fleet-wide acks
collide as expected
- blockIfReplica on every write
- Audit-log entries name the scope (rule_id, stack_pattern) but
never the reason text
- replicated_from_control flag controls UI delete affordance and
drives clearReplicatedRows on demote/reanchor
- Validators reused: validateStackPatternForRedos for glob safety,
sanitizeForLog for log fragments
SARIF export emits an external/accepted suppression entry per
acknowledged misconfig, matching the CVE pattern.
Per-row Acknowledge dialog prefills stack_pattern with the scan's
stack_context so the default scope is "rule + this stack only" and an
operator must broaden explicitly.
Tests: misconfig-ack-filter (15) and misconfig-ack-routes (23)
including the duplicate-409 case for both pinned and fleet-wide acks.
* fix(security): reap orphaned trivy tmp dirs at startup
When the buildEnv path writes a per-scan DOCKER_CONFIG dir under
os.tmpdir() and the process crashes before the finally block runs,
the dir leaks. Mirrors GitSourceService.sweepStaleTempDirs:
exported sweepStaleTrivyTempDirs is fire-and-forget at boot,
removes prefix-matching dirs older than 1 hour, swallows
permission/race failures, logs a single line if any were reaped.
* perf(security): emit per-batch summary for scanAllNodeImages
Adds one diag() line at the end of scanAllNodeImages summarising
unique image count, scanned, skipped, failed, violation count, and
elapsed time. Per-image diag inside scanImage stays useful for
debugging individual scans; the summary gives operators a single
fleet-level checkpoint when developer_mode is on.
* perf(security): cap SARIF export at 5000 findings per type
Replace the unbounded fetchAllPages walk on /scans/:id/sarif with a
hard limit of 5000 findings per type. When any type trips the cap,
emit run-level properties.truncated=true plus row_limit and per-type
totals so downstream tooling can flag the export as partial.
Console-warns for ops visibility.
A scan with 50k vulns previously streamed every row into memory
before serialising; the cap bounds memory and serialisation time at
the cost of completeness on pathological scans.
* docs(env): document TRIVY_BIN host-binary override
The env var is honored by TrivyService.detectTrivy as a fallback when
no managed install is present, but it was undocumented in
.env.example. Adds the var with a comment explaining precedence
(managed > TRIVY_BIN > PATH).
* test(security): cover scanComposeStack failure modes
Two new cases drive the existing try/catch through real failure
paths:
- Malformed Trivy stdout: row flips to status='failed' with the
parser error preserved on `error`.
- execFile rejection: row flips to status='failed' with a string
error message.
Pairs with the existing dedup tests so the failure path now also
verifies the scan row state, not just the thrown exception.
* test(e2e): security scanner + misconfig acknowledgement flow
Seven Playwright tests covering the scanner UI and the new
acknowledgement system end-to-end:
- Trivy availability gate (skips suite when binary absent so CI
without Trivy can opt out via E2E_SKIP_TRIVY=1)
- Stack config scan completes and records misconfig findings
- Concurrent stack scan returns 409 from the dedup gate
- Misconfig ack POST creates and lists on Settings
- Duplicate (rule_id, stack_pattern) returns 409
- Malformed rule_id (shell metacharacters) returns 400
- Misconfigs tab renders against a real stack scan
Tests drive the API for behaviour assertions and the UI only for
shell-rendering checks; the visual snapshot suite owns screenshots.
* docs(features): add misconfig acknowledgement workflow and SARIF cap
Refreshes vulnerability-scanning.mdx with:
- Misconfig acknowledgements section covering the per-row dialog,
Settings panel, scope/matching rules, and SARIF emission
- Tier table row for the new feature
- SARIF section note on the 5000 row-per-type cap and the
properties.truncated marker for partial exports
- Troubleshooting entries: SARIF cap, hidden Acknowledge button,
findings resurfacing after delete, Trivy DB phone-home, and
409 on concurrent compose-stack scans
* fix(ci): clear backend lint and CodeQL alerts
- Remove the dead fetchAllPages helper in routes/security.ts. It lost
its callers when the SARIF endpoint switched to direct paged reads
for the truncation cap. ESLint flagged it as unused.
- Switch the trivy-tmp-cleanup test helper to fs.mkdtempSync. Building
paths under os.tmpdir() with predictable names tripped CodeQL's
js/insecure-temporary-file rule (high severity), which warns about
symlink-pre-creation attacks even in test code. mkdtempSync appends
a process-random suffix and creates the dir atomically; the
sencho-trivy- prefix is preserved so the production sweep still
matches the test fixtures.
94 lines
3.2 KiB
Bash
94 lines
3.2 KiB
Bash
# Sencho Configuration
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# Copy this file to .env and update the values for production
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# JWT secret - generate a secure random string for production
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JWT_SECRET=your-secure-jwt-secret-here
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# Directory containing docker-compose files
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COMPOSE_DIR=/path/to/your/compose/files
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# HTTP server port (default: 1852)
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PORT=1852
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# Database and state directory inside the container (default: /app/data)
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DATA_DIR=/app/data
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# Optional path to a host-installed Trivy binary. Sencho first looks for a
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# managed install under DATA_DIR/bin/trivy; if absent and TRIVY_BIN is set,
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# Sencho uses that path; otherwise it falls back to `trivy` on PATH. Once a
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# managed install is present, the managed copy takes precedence over this.
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TRIVY_BIN=
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# Node environment (set automatically in Docker image; only change for local dev)
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NODE_ENV=production
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# Frontend URL for CORS in production (leave empty for same-origin setups)
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FRONTEND_URL=
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# Global API rate limit (requests per minute per user session, production only)
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# Authenticated requests are keyed by user ID; unauthenticated by IP.
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# Internal node-to-node traffic (node_proxy tokens) bypasses this limit entirely.
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API_RATE_LIMIT=200
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# Polling endpoint rate limit (requests per minute, production only)
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# Applies to dashboard/status polling endpoints that are exempt from the global limit.
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# Increase for environments with many concurrent browser sessions behind shared NAT.
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API_POLLING_RATE_LIMIT=300
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# ─── SSO / LDAP Configuration ────────────────────────────────────
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# LDAP / Active Directory
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SSO_LDAP_ENABLED=false
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SSO_LDAP_URL=ldap://ldap.example.com:389
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SSO_LDAP_BIND_DN=cn=readonly,dc=example,dc=com
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SSO_LDAP_BIND_PASSWORD=
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SSO_LDAP_SEARCH_BASE=ou=users,dc=example,dc=com
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SSO_LDAP_SEARCH_FILTER=(uid={{username}})
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SSO_LDAP_ADMIN_GROUP_DN=
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SSO_LDAP_DEFAULT_ROLE=viewer
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SSO_LDAP_DISPLAY_NAME=LDAP
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SSO_LDAP_TLS_REJECT_UNAUTHORIZED=true
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# Google OIDC
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SSO_OIDC_GOOGLE_ENABLED=false
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SSO_OIDC_GOOGLE_CLIENT_ID=
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SSO_OIDC_GOOGLE_CLIENT_SECRET=
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# GitHub OAuth
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SSO_OIDC_GITHUB_ENABLED=false
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SSO_OIDC_GITHUB_CLIENT_ID=
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SSO_OIDC_GITHUB_CLIENT_SECRET=
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# Okta OIDC
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SSO_OIDC_OKTA_ENABLED=false
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SSO_OIDC_OKTA_ISSUER_URL=
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SSO_OIDC_OKTA_CLIENT_ID=
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SSO_OIDC_OKTA_CLIENT_SECRET=
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# Custom OIDC (Keycloak, Authentik, Authelia, Zitadel, etc.)
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SSO_OIDC_CUSTOM_ENABLED=false
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SSO_OIDC_CUSTOM_DISPLAY_NAME=Custom OIDC
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SSO_OIDC_CUSTOM_ISSUER_URL=
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SSO_OIDC_CUSTOM_CLIENT_ID=
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SSO_OIDC_CUSTOM_CLIENT_SECRET=
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SSO_OIDC_CUSTOM_SCOPES=openid email profile
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SSO_OIDC_CUSTOM_ID_CLAIM=
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SSO_OIDC_CUSTOM_USERNAME_CLAIM=
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SSO_OIDC_CUSTOM_EMAIL_CLAIM=
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# Role mapping (shared across OIDC providers)
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SSO_OIDC_ADMIN_CLAIM=groups
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SSO_OIDC_ADMIN_CLAIM_VALUE=sencho-admins
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SSO_DEFAULT_ROLE=viewer
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# External base URL for OAuth callback URLs (required behind reverse proxy)
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SSO_CALLBACK_URL=
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# Experimental UI surfaces. When unset or any value other than "true",
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# the UI hides surfaces that are kept in the repo but not yet promoted
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# to the default 1.0 build (Fleet Traffic · Routing tab, Fleet
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# Deployments / Blueprints tab, Fleet Federation tab, Fleet Secrets
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# sync tab, Fleet Actions tab). Backend routes for these surfaces stay
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# live regardless. This flag controls UI discovery only.
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SENCHO_EXPERIMENTAL=false
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