* fix(security): dedupe concurrent compose-stack scans
Track stack scans in scanningImages keyed stack:<nodeId>:<stackName>.
The /scan/stack route returns 409 when an in-flight scan exists, and
the service-side check is the real correctness barrier (the route
pre-check is a fast-path optimization that mirrors scanImage). The
dedup key release lives in a try/finally so failed scans free the
slot for retry.
Why: scanComposeStack had no equivalent of scanImage's scanningImages
guard, so two simultaneous calls for the same stack would both run
trivy config, both insert a vulnerability_scans row, and double-
process the result.
* feat(security): acknowledge misconfig findings
Adds a parallel acknowledgement system for Trivy misconfig findings
that mirrors cve_suppressions: a new misconfig_acknowledgements table,
read-time enrichment via the new misconfig-ack-filter utility, REST
CRUD endpoints, fleet-sync replication from control to replicas, a
Settings panel, and an Acknowledge button on the Misconfigs tab.
Schema and behavior parity with cve_suppressions:
- UNIQUE(rule_id, COALESCE(stack_pattern, '')) so fleet-wide acks
collide as expected
- blockIfReplica on every write
- Audit-log entries name the scope (rule_id, stack_pattern) but
never the reason text
- replicated_from_control flag controls UI delete affordance and
drives clearReplicatedRows on demote/reanchor
- Validators reused: validateStackPatternForRedos for glob safety,
sanitizeForLog for log fragments
SARIF export emits an external/accepted suppression entry per
acknowledged misconfig, matching the CVE pattern.
Per-row Acknowledge dialog prefills stack_pattern with the scan's
stack_context so the default scope is "rule + this stack only" and an
operator must broaden explicitly.
Tests: misconfig-ack-filter (15) and misconfig-ack-routes (23)
including the duplicate-409 case for both pinned and fleet-wide acks.
* fix(security): reap orphaned trivy tmp dirs at startup
When the buildEnv path writes a per-scan DOCKER_CONFIG dir under
os.tmpdir() and the process crashes before the finally block runs,
the dir leaks. Mirrors GitSourceService.sweepStaleTempDirs:
exported sweepStaleTrivyTempDirs is fire-and-forget at boot,
removes prefix-matching dirs older than 1 hour, swallows
permission/race failures, logs a single line if any were reaped.
* perf(security): emit per-batch summary for scanAllNodeImages
Adds one diag() line at the end of scanAllNodeImages summarising
unique image count, scanned, skipped, failed, violation count, and
elapsed time. Per-image diag inside scanImage stays useful for
debugging individual scans; the summary gives operators a single
fleet-level checkpoint when developer_mode is on.
* perf(security): cap SARIF export at 5000 findings per type
Replace the unbounded fetchAllPages walk on /scans/:id/sarif with a
hard limit of 5000 findings per type. When any type trips the cap,
emit run-level properties.truncated=true plus row_limit and per-type
totals so downstream tooling can flag the export as partial.
Console-warns for ops visibility.
A scan with 50k vulns previously streamed every row into memory
before serialising; the cap bounds memory and serialisation time at
the cost of completeness on pathological scans.
* docs(env): document TRIVY_BIN host-binary override
The env var is honored by TrivyService.detectTrivy as a fallback when
no managed install is present, but it was undocumented in
.env.example. Adds the var with a comment explaining precedence
(managed > TRIVY_BIN > PATH).
* test(security): cover scanComposeStack failure modes
Two new cases drive the existing try/catch through real failure
paths:
- Malformed Trivy stdout: row flips to status='failed' with the
parser error preserved on `error`.
- execFile rejection: row flips to status='failed' with a string
error message.
Pairs with the existing dedup tests so the failure path now also
verifies the scan row state, not just the thrown exception.
* test(e2e): security scanner + misconfig acknowledgement flow
Seven Playwright tests covering the scanner UI and the new
acknowledgement system end-to-end:
- Trivy availability gate (skips suite when binary absent so CI
without Trivy can opt out via E2E_SKIP_TRIVY=1)
- Stack config scan completes and records misconfig findings
- Concurrent stack scan returns 409 from the dedup gate
- Misconfig ack POST creates and lists on Settings
- Duplicate (rule_id, stack_pattern) returns 409
- Malformed rule_id (shell metacharacters) returns 400
- Misconfigs tab renders against a real stack scan
Tests drive the API for behaviour assertions and the UI only for
shell-rendering checks; the visual snapshot suite owns screenshots.
* docs(features): add misconfig acknowledgement workflow and SARIF cap
Refreshes vulnerability-scanning.mdx with:
- Misconfig acknowledgements section covering the per-row dialog,
Settings panel, scope/matching rules, and SARIF emission
- Tier table row for the new feature
- SARIF section note on the 5000 row-per-type cap and the
properties.truncated marker for partial exports
- Troubleshooting entries: SARIF cap, hidden Acknowledge button,
findings resurfacing after delete, Trivy DB phone-home, and
409 on concurrent compose-stack scans
* fix(ci): clear backend lint and CodeQL alerts
- Remove the dead fetchAllPages helper in routes/security.ts. It lost
its callers when the SARIF endpoint switched to direct paged reads
for the truncation cap. ESLint flagged it as unused.
- Switch the trivy-tmp-cleanup test helper to fs.mkdtempSync. Building
paths under os.tmpdir() with predictable names tripped CodeQL's
js/insecure-temporary-file rule (high severity), which warns about
symlink-pre-creation attacks even in test code. mkdtempSync appends
a process-random suffix and creates the dir atomically; the
sencho-trivy- prefix is preserved so the production sweep still
matches the test fixtures.
Hide the Traffic / Routing, Deployments, Federation and Secrets Fleet
tabs by default. They re-appear when the operator opts in by setting
SENCHO_EXPERIMENTAL=true. Backend routes and database tables are
unchanged; this is a UI discovery gate only.
The /api/meta endpoint now returns experimental as a boolean. A new
useExperimental hook reads it once per page load and feeds the four
tab triggers and tab content panels in FleetView.
Updates the backend listen port, Vite dev proxy target, Docker EXPOSE,
compose port mapping, .env.example default, GitHub Actions smoke-test
default, healthcheck URLs, and every doc/example reference. Test fixtures
that include example URLs were updated for consistency, though their
assertions are port-agnostic.
The rate-limit value of 3000 in middleware/rateLimiters.ts and the
3000 entry in WEB_UI_PORTS (which detects user containers like Grafana)
are intentionally untouched.
* fix(api): add tiered rate limiting to prevent polling lockouts
Replace the single global rate limiter (100 req/min/IP) with a tiered
system that separates high-frequency polling endpoints from standard
API traffic:
- Polling tier (300/min): /stats, /system/stats, /stacks/statuses,
/metrics/historical, /health, /meta, /auth/status, /auth/sso/providers,
/license. Exempt from the global limiter but governed by their own
safety net to prevent resource exhaustion.
- Standard tier (200/min): All other endpoints, raised from 100.
- Webhook tier (500/min): POST /webhooks/:id/trigger, dedicated limiter
for CI/CD platforms sharing datacenter IPs.
- Auth tier: Unchanged (5-10 attempts / 15 min).
Enterprise adaptations:
- Authenticated requests keyed by user session (JWT sub/username) instead
of IP, preventing shared NAT/VPN environments from pooling budgets.
- Internal node-to-node traffic (node_proxy tokens) bypasses all rate
limiters entirely.
Includes comprehensive stress tests (21 cases) validating tier
separation, node proxy bypass, and per-user keying.
* chore(deps): bump axios to 1.15.0 to fix SSRF vulnerability
Addresses GHSA-3p68-rc4w-qgx5 (NO_PROXY hostname normalization bypass).
Apply a global rate limit of 100 requests/min per IP to all /api/ routes
in production, configurable via API_RATE_LIMIT env var. Auth endpoints
retain their existing stricter limits which stack independently.
Returns 429 Too Many Requests when exceeded.
* feat: SSO & LDAP authentication for Team Pro
Add SSO integration allowing Team Pro users to authenticate via LDAP/Active Directory, Google, GitHub, and Okta identity providers. SSO works alongside password authentication with auto-provisioning and role mapping.
- LDAP bind+search authentication with group-based role mapping
- OIDC/OAuth2 flows with PKCE and CSRF protection for Google, GitHub, Okta
- Auto-provisioning: first SSO login creates a Sencho account automatically
- Role mapping via LDAP group membership or OIDC JWT claims
- SSO settings UI in Settings → SSO with per-provider config and test connection
- SSO login buttons on login page with LDAP toggle
- Environment variable seeding for infrastructure-as-code workflows
- Secrets encrypted at rest via CryptoService (AES-256-GCM)
- Seat limit enforcement during auto-provisioning
- Full documentation: feature docs, quickstart guides, env var reference
* fix: resolve ESLint errors in SSO feature
- Remove unnecessary escape characters in regex character classes
- Remove unused `issuer` variable from OIDC callback handler
- Fix setState-in-effect lint error in Login.tsx by using useState initializer
- Suppress set-state-in-effect for SSOSection fetch pattern (matches existing codebase convention)
Anso