Commit Graph

4 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
Anso af4b17cc37 ci: migrate DOCS_REPO_TOKEN to sencho-token-app installation token (#490)
Replace the long-lived DOCS_REPO_TOKEN personal access token with
short-lived installation tokens minted per-job from the sencho-token-app
GitHub App (owned by the AnsoCode org, installed on both Sencho and
sencho-docs).

Why this is better than the PAT:

- Scoped per-job to only the repo the job actually touches, not one
  token that works everywhere. update-screenshots and release-please
  mint against Sencho; sync-docs mints against sencho-docs.
- Scoped per-job to only the permission scopes the job actually needs
  (contents:write and sometimes pull-requests:write), not the broader
  scope a PAT carries.
- Auto-revoked at job end by the action's post-run step, so a leaked
  log line or artifact is useful for at most the remainder of that job.
- Not tied to any individual user account: no more risk of the token
  silently dying when the human who minted it leaves or rotates keys.
- Like a PAT but unlike GITHUB_TOKEN, installation tokens DO trigger
  downstream workflow runs, so the release-please tag push still
  cascades into docker-publish.yml exactly as before.

Jobs migrated:
- release-please.yml: single mint, passed to release-please-action.
- ci.yml update-screenshots: one mint reused by checkout, peter-evans
  create-pull-request, and the gh pr merge step.
- ci.yml sync-docs: one mint targeting sencho-docs, fed to the git
  clone URL as x-access-token.

DOCS_REPO_TOKEN can be deleted from repo secrets after the first full
release cycle under this migration validates release-please,
update-screenshots, and sync-docs all succeed end-to-end.

actions/create-github-app-token pinned to v3.0.0 at SHA
f8d387b68d61c58ab83c6c016672934102569859, consistent with the
SHA-pinning convention established in the supply-chain hardening PR.
2026-04-10 15:48:33 -04:00
Anso c1ce13758f ci: harden supply chain (SHA pin actions, least-privilege permissions) (#475)
Pin three third-party actions to full commit SHAs with version comments
so dependabot can update them in place without exposing the pipeline to
upstream tag tampering:

  - aquasecurity/trivy-action@v0.35.0
  - peter-evans/create-pull-request@v8.1.1
  - googleapis/release-please-action@v4.4.0

Add a workflow-level permissions: contents: read default to ci.yml, with
update-screenshots keeping its explicit contents: write + pull-requests:
write override. Add the same default to docker-publish.yml (single job).

Expand .dockerignore to explicitly exclude .env*, *.key, *.pem, .github/,
docs/, website/, e2e/, tests/, test-results/, and playwright-report/ as
defense in depth against accidental build-context leaks. None of these
paths are read by any COPY step in Dockerfile.
2026-04-10 13:41:49 -04:00
SaelixCode 79fde6e2bd fix(editor): bundle Monaco locally to fix stuck Loading state and CSP block
- Add monaco-editor to frontend deps and configure @monaco-editor/react
  to use the local bundle via loader.config({ monaco }) instead of
  fetching from cdn.jsdelivr.net (blocked by CSP scriptSrc: self)
- Wire editorWorker via Vite ?worker syntax — blob: URLs already
  permitted by existing workerSrc CSP directive, no CSP changes needed
- fix(ci): use DOCS_REPO_TOKEN in release-please so tag creation
  cascades to docker-publish.yml (GITHUB_TOKEN cannot trigger workflows)
- fix(ci): auto-merge screenshots PR via gh pr merge --auto --squash
2026-03-24 19:43:55 -04:00
SaelixCode c294def7cc feat(ci): add release-please automated versioning workflow 2026-03-24 19:01:09 -04:00