Files
sencho/.github/workflows/release-please.yml
T
Anso c1ce13758f ci: harden supply chain (SHA pin actions, least-privilege permissions) (#475)
Pin three third-party actions to full commit SHAs with version comments
so dependabot can update them in place without exposing the pipeline to
upstream tag tampering:

  - aquasecurity/trivy-action@v0.35.0
  - peter-evans/create-pull-request@v8.1.1
  - googleapis/release-please-action@v4.4.0

Add a workflow-level permissions: contents: read default to ci.yml, with
update-screenshots keeping its explicit contents: write + pull-requests:
write override. Add the same default to docker-publish.yml (single job).

Expand .dockerignore to explicitly exclude .env*, *.key, *.pem, .github/,
docs/, website/, e2e/, tests/, test-results/, and playwright-report/ as
defense in depth against accidental build-context leaks. None of these
paths are read by any COPY step in Dockerfile.
2026-04-10 13:41:49 -04:00

24 lines
683 B
YAML

name: Release Please
on:
push:
branches:
- main
permissions:
contents: write
pull-requests: write
jobs:
release-please:
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
steps:
- uses: googleapis/release-please-action@16a9c90856f42705d54a6fda1823352bdc62cf38 # v4.4.0
with:
# GITHUB_TOKEN cannot trigger other workflows (GitHub security restriction).
# Using DOCS_REPO_TOKEN (PAT) ensures the tag push from release-please
# cascades to docker-publish.yml and publishes to Docker Hub.
token: ${{ secrets.DOCS_REPO_TOKEN }}
config-file: release-please-config.json
manifest-file: .release-please-manifest.json