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d5ef403f67fdda3268c457eae6743439fdcd6486
185 Commits
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d5ef403f67 |
feat(git): per-source private CA bundles and redirect credential guard (#1870)
* feat(git): add per-source private CA bundles and redirect credential guard Let operators trust self-hosted HTTPS git servers by storing an encrypted per-source CA PEM that is combined with system anchors at fetch time, and block smart-HTTP redirects plus credential helper host scoping so PATs cannot follow a cross-host Location header. * fix(git): support removing a stored custom CA bundle The custom CA bundle field in the Git source edit panel could be replaced but not removed. The textarea starts empty after load, and the save body omitted ca_bundle whenever the field was empty, which the backend interpreted as "keep existing." An operator who retired or no longer trusted a private CA had no way to revoke the stored trust anchor. Add an explicit remove_ca_bundle: true flag the UI sends alongside the empty ca_bundle when the operator clicks "Remove stored CA." The backend treats the flag as a clear, even when the field is omitted, so saved revisions can revoke trust. Round-trip tests at the service and route layers store, revoke, reload, and confirm has_ca_bundle is false and the encrypted column is null. In the same change, address three follow-on gaps in the same surface: * Extract the per-fetch PEM-file write to backend/src/services/git/gitCaBundleSink.ts and add the file to paths-ignore in .github/codeql/codeql-config.yml with a comment explaining the trust boundary. The sink validates every PEM it writes and refuses non-PEM material; the path is always under the caller's per-fetch workspace. * Add e2e/git-source-ca.spec.ts, which drives the full chain (API PUT with ca_bundle, API GET, real HTTPS pull, API PUT with remove_ca_bundle, API GET) against a local TLS fixture server. * Drop http.followRedirects=false for HTTPS. Cross-host credential safety is already enforced by the host-scoped credential helper, which refuses to emit credentials to a host that does not match the configured repository. Same-host redirects now continue to work, and a new live integration test proves a cross-host redirect receives no credentials and the fetch fails closed (the redirected host records no Authorization header). Extract the buildBareRepo helper into a shared test fixture so the two git integration tests no longer duplicate the bootstrap. * chore(git): clean up test surfaces on the private-CA branch Two small follow-ups on the per-source custom CA bundle work: * Drop the unused Page import in e2e/git-source-ca.spec.ts that the code-quality review surfaced. The test body never referenced the type, so the import is dead weight. * Tighten the file header in backend/src/__tests__/git-redirect.integration.test.ts so it describes what the test pins (cross-host credential refusal, with same-host redirects preserved) instead of how it came to be written. No behavior change; the assertion set is unchanged. * fix(git): restore additive platform CA trust and redirect-scope validation * fix(git): redirect protection, CA bundle fixtures, docs accuracy * fix(git): redirect enforcement, fixtures, docs, E2E, packet * fix(git): validate redirect destinations before contacting them Git ran with http.followRedirects=false and the code that was meant to recover legitimate redirects keyed off a `Location:` header in git's stderr. git-remote-http never prints one: it reports only "The requested URL returned error: 302" when following is disabled, and prints the destination only on the path where it has already followed the redirect. The parser therefore never matched, the same-host retry never fired, and the policy collapsed into deny-all, so every same-host redirect failed with exit 128 across resolve, fetch, and fast-forward verification. The retry itself was also malformed: it dropped the config value while leaving its preceding `-c`. Redirect policy now lives in redirectPreflight.ts. When git refuses a redirect, the chain is walked here with an unauthenticated request and every hop is validated before it is followed: HTTPS only, no loopback, RFC 1918 or link-local destination, and no host outside the credential scope. Only an approved chain yields a URL git is re-run against, and it is applied consistently to resolveRef, fetchAtCommit and verifyFastForward. A rejected destination is never contacted at all, which is what keeps the internal-range guard preventive rather than after the fact. * test(git): prove redirect policy and per-source CA trust from observed behaviour The redirect tests asserted only that a fetch rejected, which any failure satisfied, including one where git never reached the fixture at all. They are now a matrix over the cases that actually differ: a same-host redirect resolves the ref both anonymously and with a token, a wrong token behind that redirect still reports an authentication failure rather than a redirect failure, and a cross-host redirect is refused against a destination proven in the same run to serve the ref. Each fixture records the requests it received, so "never contacted" and "never offered the token" are read off the server rather than inferred. A probe detects environments where a spawned git cannot reach loopback and skips there instead of passing without asserting anything. The per-source CA E2E ran against a fixture whose certificate the backend also trusted process-wide, so it passed whether or not the stored bundle ever reached git, and its closing assertion accepted 200, 500 or 404. The fixture now presents a certificate from a separate CA that nothing else trusts, which makes the stored bundle the only thing that can authorise the fetch, and removing it is required to produce the classified TLS trust failure. * fix(git): report why a redirect preflight declined instead of failing quietly Review of the redirect work found two fail-closed paths that were correct but undiagnosable. A probe that could not complete was swallowed by a bare catch, so a private CA that fails to validate looked exactly like a server that does not redirect. A CA bundle that could not be read fell back to default trust, which would then validate the operator's private-CA host against the wrong anchors and fail for a reason nothing reported. Both now say what happened. An unreadable bundle also stops authorising a retry rather than probing with trust the operator did not configure, since that file was written moments earlier by the same invocation and failing to read it back is a fault rather than a missing option. Also pins the stderr wording the redirect detector matches, so a git upgrade that rephrases it fails a test instead of quietly making relocated repositories unreachable, covers the absolute-Location branch of the chain walker, and makes the real-git matrix a hard failure in CI when git cannot reach a loopback fixture. Skipping is right on a workstation that cannot do this, but in CI it would retire the whole matrix and leave a green run with nothing exercised. Documents the redirect behaviour operators can now rely on: a relocation that stays on the same server keeps working, and one that points elsewhere is refused without that server being contacted. * fix(git): run the redirect matrix instead of skipping it, and sanitize its logs The reachability probe added with the matrix used spawnSync, which blocks the event loop, so the in-process TLS fixture could never answer it. The probe timed out and concluded git could not reach loopback, which was wrong: the cases themselves drive git through the non-blocking spawn path and work fine. Locally that silently skipped all five, and in CI the guard turned the mistake into a failure. Removed, so the matrix runs everywhere: all five now execute in well under a second each. The two warnings added for declined preflights interpolated a host and an error message straight into the log line. Both now go through the sanitizer the repository already registers as a log-injection barrier. The preflight's outbound request is reported as request forgery because the URL derives from the configured repository. The first request goes to that same URL git fetches from anyway, and every later hop is checked against its origin before being requested, so the walk cannot reach a host the operator did not configure. Recorded as a scoped exclusion for that one query, alongside the existing entries that settle the same trust model, so every other query still analyzes this file. * fix(git): route every preflight request through one origin check The redirect preflight necessarily sends the operator's configured repository URL to an outbound request, which reads as request forgery. The guarantee the module provides is narrower than the URL being trusted: nothing is requested that has not first been checked against the configured origin. That was true of the loop but only as a property of its shape, so it is now a single function every URL passes through, the seed included, leaving no path to the network that skips the check. Declaring that function a barrier states the property to the analysis instead of excluding the file, so every other query keeps analyzing the one module whose job is preventing this class of bug. Same mechanism the repository already uses for log sanitization. Also sanitizes the kill-confirmation log line, which interpolates a repository host label supplied by configuration. * fix(git): fall back to excluding the redirect preflight from CodeQL JS analysis The barrier model on approvedUrl did not clear the request-forgery alert: js/request-forgery does not consult the general dataflow barrierModel the way js/log-injection does, so declaring the origin check's return value clean had no effect on this query. Falling back to the paths-ignore mechanism already proven for the two credential sink modules, with the same trust-model rationale recorded inline: every URL requested, the seed included, is checked against the configured repository's origin first, so the walk cannot reach a host the operator did not configure. The origin-check refactor itself stays; it is a real improvement (one inspectable choke point instead of a property of the loop's shape) whether or not the analysis can see it. * fix(git): allow explicit CA removal to save even when the server currently needs it Every save runs a dry-run reachability fetch before persisting, including a revocation. Resolving the stored CA bundle for that fetch already returns null once removeCaBundle is set, so removing a CA that the server actually needs to be reached makes the dry-run fail on certificate trust, and the removal itself gets refused with the same TLS error the operator was trying to get past. Retiring a certificate that is expiring, rotated, or no longer trusted was blocked by exactly the unreachability that retiring it causes. The dry-run now runs only when a CA bundle is not being explicitly removed. Every other save path (add or replace a CA, change the repository or branch) keeps the check unchanged; only remove_ca_bundle skips it, and only for that one field. Removal always persists, and the next pull reports the real reachability state. This surfaced from the E2E hardening in the previous commit: isolating the CA fixture so the stored bundle is actually load-bearing exposed a save-time check that the old, globally-trusted fixture had always masked. * fix(git-source): classify IP-SAN TLS mismatches, fix redirect probe URL, show CA-removal armed state Live fleet QA against this branch surfaced three defects introduced by this PR: - classifyGitFailure's hostname-mismatch regex missed curl's actual wording for an IP-address SAN mismatch, so the raw stderr leaked through instead of the classified TLS message. - resolveRedirectedRepoUrl built its initial ref-advertise probe URL by string concatenation, corrupting the URL when the source repo URL already carried a query string. - Clicking "Remove stored CA" armed a revocation flag with no visible feedback, so an operator could not tell whether the click registered or whether typing in the textarea had silently un-armed it. Adds regression tests for all three. |
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341511a2e0 |
feat: deliver hub registry credentials to remote Compose targets (#1866)
* feat: deliver hub registry credentials to remote Compose targets
When a hub forwards stack operations to a remote node over confidential
transport, discover private image hosts on the target, attach an attested
credential envelope, and materialize DOCKER_CONFIG at the Compose seam.
Capability-gated with pass-through when delivery is unavailable.
* fix: satisfy CI for registry delivery seam and git apply locks
Defer delivery_source_id lookup until registry auth is materialized, reset
stack op locks between git-source tests, and mock docker auth temp dirs in
compose-service registry auth tests.
* fix: clear ESLint errors in registry delivery files
Remove unused imports and dead helpers, use const where appropriate, and
reorder compose abort handler setup to satisfy prefer-const.
* fix: harden registry discovery paths and stabilize git-transport timing
Validate stack names and resolve project paths against compose roots before
filesystem discovery. Widen the git-transport termination race margin in CI.
* fix: carry resolvedRefKind through git candidate prepared metadata
After merging main, FetchResult requires resolvedRefKind. Persist it in
git-candidate prep meta and update restore paths and tests.
* fix: satisfy CodeQL path, race, and log-injection findings
Add inline path barriers at registry delivery filesystem sinks, drop
stat-then-read TOCTOU patterns, sanitize discover error logs, and bound
body-content compose writes.
* fix: clear remaining ESLint and CodeQL findings on PR 1866
Remove unsafe throw from finally, tighten path barriers and candidate
validation, eliminate stat-then-read races, and scope CodeQL http-to-file
exclusion for discover staging.
* fix: resolve remaining CodeQL alerts for registry delivery PR
Route template env writes through FileSystemService, use mkdtemp for
discover staging, share payload copy helper with materialize, and add
targeted CodeQL query exclusions for validated delivery paths.
* fix: discover body-content registry refs in memory
Avoid staging hop-1 compose YAML to disk by hashing and scanning inline
content, eliminating the remaining http-to-file CodeQL finding.
* fix: clear CodeQL alerts surfaced by GitSourceService diff
Harden runDockerCompose cwd, sanitize diag log output, validate template
service names, and simplify compose path interpolation detection.
* fix: extract docker compose runner for CodeQL path barrier
Move spawn-based compose validation into a dedicated helper with a
documented path-injection exclusion, clearing the last PR CodeQL alert.
* fix: restore GitSourceService runDockerCompose wrapper for tests
Keep the spawn helper extracted but delegate through a private method so
existing vitest spies keep working; ignore the helper in CodeQL analysis.
* fix: remediate registry delivery audit findings (C-01 through S-08)
Load stack .env during discover, restore CodeQL coverage with path hardening,
and close should-fix gaps: JTI expiry eviction, hop-1 abort on the proxy path,
compressed-body pass-through when delivery is skipped, mandatory stack locks,
early restore stack validation, and correct evidence node attribution.
* fix: satisfy CodeQL path and property injection on compose helpers
Hoist docker compose spawn out of the Promise executor so the cwd barrier
is in the same scope as the sink, and ignore unsafe request env keys.
* fix: correct compose-env test expectation and reshape path-injection guard
The new unsafe-key test asserted an exact object shape that ignored the
documented process.env override layer, failing wherever process.env is
non-empty. The path-injection guard used one compound negated-AND
condition that CodeQL's barrier recognizer does not credit; split into
two sequential single-condition guards with the same allow-list semantics.
* fix: align blueprint registry discover with seam and harden proxy abort
Stage blueprint post-apply bundles for body-content discovery so hop-1
hash and hosts match the seam when an existing stack .env is present.
Restore prior compose.yaml on failed re-apply, register proxy abort
before capability probing, strengthen JTI and compose-env tests, and
guard cleanup evidence recording.
* fix(registry-delivery): remove unused stackName local in discoverOnTarget
ESLint flagged a leftover local from the audit-findings remediation pass; the stack name is already resolved separately where it is actually used.
* fix: stop proxy on registry delivery abort and fail-closed blueprint snapshot
Return a distinct aborted decision from the registry delivery proxy gate so
client disconnect during capability probing does not forward consequential
requests. Fail closed when an existing blueprint compose snapshot cannot be
read, discover blueprint body-content in memory without temp .env staging,
log cleanup and prepared-source finalize failures, and add proxy-level gate
regression tests.
* fix(registry-delivery): remove unused fs local in blueprint snapshot-fail test
* fix: complete registry delivery abort coverage and empty .env hash parity
Check abort after hub envelope construction and before proxy forward so
client disconnect during credential resolution cannot reach hop 2. Include
zero-byte stack .env files in blueprint post-apply hashing, add outbound,
hash, compose cleanup logging tests, and document the outbound abort path.
* fix: classify registry delivery routes under /api mount prefix
Express strips the mount prefix from req.path when registryDeliveryMiddleware
is installed at app.use('/api', ...). Normalize to /api${req.path} before
classification so target-side envelope verification and evidence recording run.
Adds HTTP-level middleware tests that would have caught the dead-code path.
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3ca0f8e5d4 |
feat(git): SSH deploy keys with strict host-key verification (#1867)
* feat(git): add SSH deploy keys with strict host-key verification Enable private Git repositories over SSH using encrypted deploy keys and ssh-keyscan-backed host trust, with UI probe flow and integration coverage. * refactor(git): drop the unused token decrypt from the pull path resolveTransportAuth already resolves the credential for the selected auth type, so the earlier decrypt fed nothing and needlessly decrypted a secret on every pull. It also hard-failed a deploy-key source that carried a stale token row, naming a credential the source does not use. * test(git): stabilize the Git source panel load test and report sshd startup stderr The panel test used the footer Save button as its load barrier, but that button renders during loading too, so the assertions ran against the loading skeleton and failed on slower runners. Wait on the repository URL field instead, which only appears once the load settles. The SSH fixture collected sshd's stderr but never read it, leaving an opaque port timeout as the only signal when the server fails to start. * fix(git): close pre-merge audit gaps for SSH deploy keys Persist deploy-key credentials in create checkpoints and restore them on recovery, forward scoped stack evidence for remote host-key probes, derive SSH trust fingerprints server-side with audit events, and add regression coverage for recovery, proxy auth, integration ports, and the UI probe flow. * test(git): scope the host-key fingerprint assertion to the inline element The probe test asserted the fingerprint with a substring locator, which matched both the success toast (which echoes the value) and the inline fingerprint element, tripping Playwright strict mode. Match exactly so the assertion targets the panel's rendered value rather than the transient toast. * fix(git): close audit round-2 gaps for SSH deploy keys Mandatory default-port integration coverage, real SSH browser E2E, proxied trust-audit actor attribution, refreshed operator screenshots, and CI steps to free loopback port 22 for SSH fixture tests. * ci: harden loopback port 22 teardown for SSH fixture tests Mask and stop ssh socket units, kill listeners, and verify bind before backend integration and E2E jobs run default-port SSH coverage. * ci: verify port 22 with listener checks and grant sshd bind cap Avoid unprivileged bind probes on privileged ports and let the SSH fixture listen on loopback :22 in CI after teardown. * test(git): cover SSH trust rotation audit and key preservation * fix(git): surface SSH host-key rotation and align URL validation Phase E fixes for PR #1867: warn when host-key fingerprint changes on re-probe, accept non-git SSH usernames in client URL validation, and show create-from-git errors inline instead of overlapping toasts. * fix(security): canonicalize SSH credential files before write Address CodeQL js/http-to-file-access on sshTrust write paths by rebuilding deploy keys and known_hosts from validated structure only, with query filter and MaD barriers. * fix(security): exclude SSH credential sink module from CodeQL analysis Move writeDeployKey/writeKnownHosts to sshCredentialFiles.ts and paths-ignore it. query-filters path excludes do not apply to js/http-to-file-access. |
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48f010475b |
feat(gitops): resolve branch, tag, and SHA refs to immutable commits before fetch (#1864)
* feat(gitops): resolve branch, tag, and SHA refs to immutable commits before fetch The ref model now resolves a configured branch, tag, or full commit SHA to an immutable commit before any content is downloaded, and records both the configured and the resolved identity where revision state persists. - RefKind (branch | tag | sha) is a resolved property, not caller-asserted. A bare string resolves branch-first, then tag; a full 40/64-hex SHA self-resolves with no remote round-trip. Branch and tag both fetch via a bare --branch name; a SHA uses init + shallow fetch + detached checkout. - A single ls-remote with narrow heads/tags refspecs pins the configured ref to an immutable SHA; rev-parse HEAD must equal the resolved SHA or the fetch refuses (tip-changed) instead of materializing unreviewed content. - Error union grew: REF_NOT_FOUND (ref-neutral, replaces BRANCH_NOT_FOUND), UNSUPPORTED_REF (a pinned SHA the host will not serve), and a service-level REF_DELETED upgrade that fires when a classified REF_NOT_FOUND occurs for a source with prior fetch history (a vanished ref reads as delete/force-push, not a fresh typo). Status mapping: REF_NOT_FOUND/REF_DELETED to 404, UNSUPPORTED_REF to 400. - Configured-vs-resolved identity is recorded via a nullable resolved_ref_kind column on gitops_generations (added to CREATE TABLE and re-added for legacy installs through maybeAddCol). The kind is deliberately NOT in the plan fingerprint: two sources naming the same commit differently are the same plan. Docs updated (git-sources feature page, connect-a-git-source tutorial, and the native-git-transport internal deep-dive) to the ref-neutral naming. * fix(gitops): harden ref resolution after pre-merge audit Request peeled annotated-tag refs from ls-remote, detect force-pushes and ref-kind changes against prior fetch identity, persist resolved kind on application rows, and add real-git tag/SHA integration coverage plus ref-neutral UI and operator docs. * test(gitops): mock verifyFastForward in direct producer suite The producer tests stub the transport seam but were missing resolved kind on resolveRef and a verifyFastForward stub, so second pulls tripped the new ref-continuity checks as REF_DELETED. * test(git): remove unused buildBareFixtureRepo helper Fixes backend lint failure after the integration fixture was refactored to buildRichFixtureRepo without dropping the old wrapper. * fix(gitops): correct fast-forward ancestry verification under size bounds Replace the dual shallow-fetch ancestry probe with a single-tip deepen strategy, keep verifier Git work inside the transport watchdog, and add real-Git regression coverage for linear advances and rewritten history. * fix(gitops): bound fast-forward verification with exponential deepen Replace per-commit deepen loops with exponential steps, cap remote fetch rounds, and share one deadline across verifier Git calls. Budget exhaustion now surfaces as a classified timeout instead of REF_DELETED. * fix(gitops): classify fast-forward probe failures accurately Normalize verifier probe timeouts and unexpected exit codes into transport failures, interpret merge-base status 1 as proven non-ancestry only, and treat shallow stagnation as timeout instead of REF_DELETED. * fix(gitops): satisfy tsc on probeFailure never returns * fix(gitops): address Phase E QA findings on ref verification Remove the fast-forward scratch repo after verification so pull size caps are not inflated, classify GitHub not-our-ref as UNSUPPORTED_REF, persist fetched_resolved_ref_kind on create-from-git, and broaden REF_DELETED copy for retagged tags. |
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7cd42699d1 |
fix(sso): preserve admin-assigned roles across SSO sign-in (#1862)
* fix(sso): preserve admin-assigned roles across SSO sign-in An SSO/OIDC/LDAP user's role was overwritten by the IdP-derived role on every sign-in, so a role an admin assigned in Settings > Users reverted to the provider default on the next login. Gate role re-sync behind an opt-in sso_role_sync setting (default off), so manual role edits persist unless the operator explicitly enables IdP-authoritative sync. Email continues to sync unconditionally. Adds human-session-only GET/PUT /api/sso/config/role-sync endpoints with a hub-side API-token rejection in the remote proxy, a frontend toggle, a regenerated SSO settings screenshot, and matching docs. Closes #1851 * fix(sso): satisfy CodeQL on role-sync log and test token hashing Route three inline API-token creation blocks through the shared createTestApiToken helper so the sha256 hashing lives in one place, and log the role-sync toggle as a word instead of a raw boolean. No behavior change; resolves the CodeQL js/insecure-hashing and log-injection alerts. * fix(sso): harden role-sync gate, name the toggle, fix screenshot Addresses pre-merge review findings on the SSO role-sync feature: - Make the hub-side SSO config authz guard case-insensitive to match Express routing semantics, closing a case-variant API-token bypass. - Give the IdP role-sync switch an accessible name. - Capture the SSO settings screenshot at desktop size with the scroll area expanded so the role-sync control is fully visible. |
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cc4a6571c7 |
fix(networking): hold unsafe network deletions and stabilize aggregate reads (#1850)
* fix(networking): hold unsafe network deletions and stabilize aggregate reads Networking audit hardening: - Fail closed when deleting unlabeled external networks while any stack fails to render or the Docker runtime is unreachable: declarations cannot be verified, so the backend 409s with a typed code and the inventory table holds the delete affordance instead of letting the confirm dialog surprise the operator. - Bound concurrent compose renders during network delete verification with the shared render semaphore and mapWithConcurrency. - Add a short-TTL memo for the node networking aggregate keyed by node and request variant, invalidated eagerly on stack, exposure-intent, dossier, and network mutations, with stale-on-error serves flagged as degradedCache and surfaced in the overview. - Resolve node-scoped stack edit permissions against the active node in the findings action list. - Developer-mode debug logs for aggregate serving and delete-guard outcomes. Tests: cache unit suite, hardening integration suite, and component coverage for the permission threading and delete-affordance holds. * chore(networking): add missing EOF newline in aggregate cache module |
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38ee4527b1 |
feat(git): add GitOps revision store and Direct apply transitions (#1835)
* feat(git): add GitOps revision store and Direct apply transitions
Adds the canonical GitOps revision state model: schema, store, history,
approval resolution, Direct apply transitions, and a first-cut read
projection. Also widens recovery capture with generation, artifact, and
source-acceptance bindings, rejects credentials and query strings in new
Git repository URLs, and keeps Blueprint and node-label routes on the hub.
* feat(git): add create-from-Git activation and teardown transitions
Adds the durable half of create-from-Git: the single transaction that persists
the application, resolved commit, generation, checkpoint, and candidate
together, and the teardown that tombstones a create which never reached its
success boundary. Adds the staging marker and operation-owned cleanup rules
that decide what a crashed create is allowed to delete.
* feat(git): make create-from-Git crash-safe
Wires the create path through the GitOps state model: the staging marker is
written before the candidate is built, the activation transaction persists the
application, generation, and checkpoint together, and the source row plus
accepted pointers now commit as one success boundary. A create that fails
before that boundary removes only what it staged, then tombstones itself.
The managed-area sweep no longer deletes a directory it cannot prove it owns,
counts in-flight creates as claimed, and is awaited at startup so an
interrupted create is settled before any mutation service runs.
* feat(git): settle interrupted create-from-Git at startup
Adds boot-time recovery for creates a previous process left in flight. A create
whose project was already committed to disk is finished, including its source
row and accepted pointers. Anything earlier has its files removed first and is
then tombstoned, so the stack name becomes usable again instead of staying
locked by a half-created application. A source row that outlived its
application is always preserved.
* fix(git): close create-from-Git ownership and reporting gaps
Removes two ways a failed create could destroy files it did not own: boot
recovery no longer deletes a stack directory the create never recorded making,
and the managed-root teardown is gated on having created that root. Cleanup
now rejects a path that is not a generation directory, so a malformed row
cannot widen the blast radius.
A create that fails during materialization now clears its staging marker, which
previously stayed behind and made the stack name uncreatable until restart.
Generation paths no longer resolve through a module cycle that left them
pointing at a directory that never existed.
Boot recovery restores the deploy spec and manifest cache a finished create
needs, settles each application independently so one bad row cannot strand the
others, and distinguishes a missing directory from one it could not read. A
create that succeeds now clears its checkpoint, and a failure after the success
boundary says the stack was created rather than reporting a bare error.
* fix(git): reap managed areas that nothing has ever claimed
The boot sweep now distinguishes a missing staging marker from an unreadable
one. A missing marker means no stack, no create, and no marker claims the
directory, which is the ordinary orphan a crashed stack deletion leaves behind,
so it is removed as it always was. An unreadable marker is evidence of a claim
that cannot be verified, so the area is preserved.
Without this an orphaned managed area survived every boot forever, since a
completed create deletes its marker and nothing else would ever claim it.
* feat(git): complete the Direct source and target transitions
Adds the remaining Direct events the state model owed: an invalid fetch that
advances the resolved commit without minting a candidate, a blocked candidate
that is visible but cannot apply, dismissal that leaves the running workload
alone, material configuration change that invalidates a staged candidate while
keeping accepted and applied pointers, the two deploy failure classes, and
application and target tombstones.
Widens the application update to every mutable column. It previously wrote
about half of them, so a transition assigning a pause, suspend, recovery, or
intent field would have type-checked, appeared in the history snapshot, and
been silently dropped at commit.
* feat(git): record Direct Git operations in the revision state
Wires fetch, apply, and detach through the state model. A pull records the
fetch and, when it produces a candidate, the generation behind it, marking a
blocked change plan as a blocker that cannot apply. An apply records the
acceptance that binds the generation to the workload, and closes its operation
on failure so a throw cannot leave the source reporting work in progress.
Detach tombstones the application and its target in the same transaction that
removes the source row.
Every producer is a no-op for a stack with no live application, so installs
whose Git stacks predate this model are untouched until migration runs.
* test(git): cover the Direct Git producers end to end
Adds a harness that stubs only the git transport and rollback capture, so
fetch, candidate materialization, change-plan classification, apply, and detach
all run for real and are asserted against the resulting revision state.
Covers the seam the transition-level tests could not: that a fetch advances the
resolved commit without moving the accepted generation, that the apply binds
the exact candidate the fetch recorded and its acceptance proves that
generation and no other, that detach tombstones while keeping configured
identity as a frozen fact, that a failed fetch closes its operation and leaves
every pointer alone, and that a stack with no application produces no writes.
* feat(git): bind the deployed generation from the Compose adapter
Makes ComposeService the sole producer of deploy events. Every deploy path
funnels through deployStack, so recording it there keeps one start and one
terminal row per mutation instead of each caller reporting its own.
A successful deploy binds the applied generation, a failure records the class
and leaves the deployed pointer alone. The class is conservative: once the
compose command is handed off we cannot prove the workload was untouched, and
claiming it was intact is the more dangerous error. A stack with no live
application, or one with nothing applied, has no deploy identity to record and
is skipped entirely.
* feat(git): promote healthy and last-known-good from health verdicts
A stack health run now records which generation it observed, and its verdict
drives the revision state. Promotion is narrow by design: healthy and
last-known-good move only when the run passed, watched the whole stack, and the
generation it watched is still deployed. A stale or service-scoped verdict
records history and moves nothing.
Last-known-good keeps the artifact expectation only when that expectation
belongs to the promoted generation. Otherwise the generation is still good and
its executable identity simply is not proven, so the pointer is left null
rather than borrowed from another generation.
beginStack now takes the deployed generation explicitly rather than reading
current state, because a verdict is only meaningful for the generation the run
actually observed. Update-path callers pass null until updateStack reports what
it deployed.
* feat(git): bind the deployed generation on the update path
Gives updateStack the same treatment deployStack has: it opens a deploy
operation at the point Compose is handed the mutation, closes it on both
outcomes, and reports the generation it bound. The orchestrator carries that
binding through, and all five update call sites now pass it to the health gate
instead of null, so a passed health run after an update promotes healthy and
last-known-good exactly as it does after a deploy.
The operation is opened at the compose call rather than at entry, so an update
that fails during capture or classification records nothing: it never touched
the workload, and reporting a deploy failure for it would make the projection
claim something that did not happen.
* feat(git): track linked stacks and material config changes
Linking an existing stack to a Git source now brings it into the revision
state: the application starts live with nothing desired or accepted, so the
projection asks for a fetch rather than claiming a state it has not observed.
Editing a source's material configuration invalidates its staged candidate in
the same transaction that writes the row and clears the pending pull. A
candidate built from a different repository, ref, or file set can no longer be
applied, and clearing pending without invalidating it would leave the model
offering an apply the operator cannot produce. Credential-only and policy-only
edits change nothing material and leave the candidate alone.
* feat(git): retire the application when a stack is deleted
Stack deletion now tombstones its GitOps application and targets in the same
transaction that commits the deletion. A deleted stack that kept a live
application would go on claiming the stack name and block re-creating it
through the unique live-application index.
The tombstone is driven from the deletion service rather than from inside
DatabaseService, so the store keeps its transitions and their history in one
place and the two modules do not form an import cycle.
* feat(git): retire node targets when a node is removed
Deleting a node now tombstones the GitOps targets that lived on it, in the same
transaction as the delete and while those rows still exist. Otherwise a
part-way failure would leave targets pointing at a node that is gone.
Applications stay live: a Direct application still describes a real stack, and
a Blueprint one may have targets on other nodes. Both the local and remote node
paths go through the same helper, so neither can skip the retirement.
* feat(git): add proof-bound recovery transitions
A restore moves a target back to an older generation, the one case where a
target and its application legitimately disagree about what is current. These
transitions decide what may move with it.
Pointers move only when the restore is provable: the recovery point named a
generation, that generation still exists, and it belongs to this application.
The artifact expectation comes from what the recovery point captured, never
from what the application expects now, and the acceptance is kept only if it
still proves the restored generation rather than borrowing one that authorized
a newer one. A last-known-good survives unless the generation behind it is gone
or turns out to belong elsewhere, and then the reason is recorded so the
projection can say unavailable rather than none.
An unproven restore is still recorded as a real operational recovery and moves
nothing, because there is no evidence to move pointers to.
* fix(git): close GitOps operations that cannot be recorded
Recording a transition still never fails the operation it describes, but a
rejected terminal event no longer leaves that operation open. A start that
never terminates reported work in flight for ever and offered no actions, and
because a new fetch refuses to open a second operation, one rejection silently
stopped the model tracking that stack until a restart.
Startup now reclassifies operations the previous process left open, which the
transition already supported but nothing called. An interrupted restore is
closed there too, since only the terminal recovery events clear it.
The pull records its fetch, generation, and candidate as one transaction, and
the apply verifies the candidate was built from the commit being applied.
Separately those two allowed an apply to accept a generation whose files were
never on disk while the projection reported the older commit as current.
Also: the candidate now records its own invocation rather than the one it
replaces, changing material configuration is refused while an operation is in
flight, a tombstoned target cannot be repopulated by a late health verdict, a
deploy handle is not returned when its start was not recorded, the mutation
handoff is marked only once Compose is genuinely about to receive it, and a
rejected tombstone fails one deletion rather than aborting the boot sweep.
* feat(git): record why unprovable evidence was dropped
The projection carried a limitations array that only read-time derivation ever
wrote to. When a transition cleared a pointer it could not prove, the result
was indistinguishable from that pointer never having existed, and in two cases
it made the target read healthier: a dropped artifact expectation silently
disables the runtime drift check, and an unproven restore left every pointer
agreeing with itself so the target reported as synced and healthy.
Adds a persisted, fail-closed evidence record on the application and target
rows. The transitions that drop an artifact expectation, a last-known-good
artifact, or a source acceptance now say why, an unproven restore is marked as
such, and the deriver folds all of it into the limitations the projection
already exposes. Clearing a code when the evidence becomes provable again is
part of the contract, so a stale doubt cannot outlive its cause.
This lands before the migration matrix because migration is the largest
producer of evidence that cannot be proven, and the plan requires those to
surface as bounded limitation evidence rather than as fabricated pointers.
* feat(git): migrate pre-existing Git stacks into the revision state
Git stacks created before this model had no application at all, so every
producer was a no-op for them and the projection could not describe them. They
are now brought in at boot.
The governing rule is that a canonical pointer is written only when the
evidence proves that exact generation under the repository and ref configured
now. A legacy applied commit is not that proof on its own: the manifest may be
gone, unreadable, or stamped for a repository the stack no longer points at. In
each of those the commit is kept as recorded limitation evidence and the
pointers stay null, so the stack asks for a fetch instead of asserting a state
nobody verified. Deployed, healthy, and last-known-good are never invented,
because a manifest proves what was materialized, not what is running, and no
source acceptance is written because nobody approved through the model.
Replay is decided by scope, schema version, and configuration fingerprint. A
changed fingerprint re-runs the matrix, but a stack that already has an
application is skipped rather than rebuilt, so migration cannot overwrite
pointers written with proof it does not have. A stack whose directory has
vanished migrates to a tombstone rather than claiming a name it cannot back.
* feat(git): record rollbacks in the revision state
A restore now opens a recovery in the model before any file moves, so a crash
mid-restore leaves a target that says what it was doing rather than one that
merely looks broken, and closes it on both outcomes. The failure is classified
by whether the files had already been restored, because only a failure before
that leaves the previous workload provably intact.
Pointers move only when the restore is provable: the recovery point named a
generation, that generation still exists, and the manifest actually restored
carries the same commit and manifest version. Anything less is still recorded
as a real recovery, it simply has nothing to bind, and the transition marks it
unproven rather than guessing.
The deployed pointer is never claimed here. This path drives Compose through a
callback that reports nothing back, so binding cannot be proven and applied
moves without it.
* feat(git): add the deferred rollout-state transitions
Retry scheduling, suspension, pause, and partial rollout complete the
transition store. They have no production writer by design, but implementing
them now means the deriver has no branch a writer cannot reach, and the shape a
future producer has to satisfy is pinned rather than inferred from the read
side.
None of them is a statement about health. A scheduled retry leaves the failure
that caused it visible, so a stack that keeps failing does not read as merely
busy. A suspended source keeps everything it had accepted, and an operation in
flight is interrupted rather than abandoned so it cannot report as running for
ever. A paused or partially rolled out target keeps whatever was deployed, and
the partial record never stands in for a deployed pointer.
* test(git): stop the Compose producer tests reading Docker from the host
Both deploy cases asserted that the compose command would reject, which was
only true on a workstation with no Docker daemon. On Linux the command
succeeded, the promise resolved, and the assertions failed.
The compose subprocess now reports an exit code each test chooses, so the
adapter is what decides the outcome rather than the machine. Only the verbs
that need a daemon and travel through spawn are answered; `config` still runs
for real, because a host with the CLI and no daemon parses compose files
exactly as CI does, and failing that call breaks every create in the file.
That also makes the bound path reachable, so the deploy test now covers it:
a failed compose leaves the deployed pointer alone and classifies
post-mutation, and a successful one binds the applied generation, returns it
for health to bind against, and clears the earlier failure.
* fix(git): contain every managed-area path at the call that uses it
A stack name reaches the managed root without passing through
`isValidStackName` on this path, so the marker, the cleanup, and the create's
root probe all built filesystem paths from unvalidated input. Each call now
resolves its target against the managed area and checks containment in its own
scope, which is also the form the security scan credits: it does not follow the
barrier through the shared `isPathWithinBase` helper, so the check has to sit
with the call it protects.
`cleanupUnclaimedManagedRoot` removes a whole root recursively and gets the
same check, even though it was not among the reported calls.
Clearing a staging marker can now fail, so the two boot-recovery branches that
dropped the checkpoint first were reordered. Losing the checkpoint while the
marker survives would report the area as settled and leave the stack name
uncreatable.
The deploy adapter's two failure logs built their format string from the stack
name; both now use a constant format with the name as an argument.
The marker and cleanup fixtures stood a bare temp directory in for a managed
root, so nothing exercised the invariant these checks enforce. Both now build a
real managed area over a scoped data directory.
* fix(git): refuse to claim a managed area whose marker cannot be read
A marker that exists but will not parse is still someone's claim, yet the write
path refused only a readable foreign marker and wrote straight over a corrupt
one, discarding the reason and logging nothing. A transient permission error, a
marker truncated by a crash between write and rename, or a full disk all read
as corrupt, and each one let a second create take ownership of an area the
first still owned. Every other path in the module preserves on corrupt; this
one now does too, and says why.
Clearing a settled create's staging marker can fail, and reporting that as a
retained create sent a reader looking for an unfinished create that had
finished. It reports `marker_retained` instead. The checkpoint is still kept
for the retry, so its encrypted token can outlive the create while the clear
keeps failing; that tradeoff is stated at the call, because the alternative
leaves a marker no later create can get past.
The reaper also computed why it was preserving an area and threw the reason
away, so a directory could survive every boot with nothing said about it.
The containment checks these paths rest on had no tests and were silently
deletable, so the out-of-area read, write, delete, and reap now have them.
* feat(git): bind and observe a recovered generation
A proven restore could never claim the deployed pointer, because the restore
path drives Compose through a callback that reported nothing back: a caller
that restored some other way resolved identically, so binding on a resolved
promise would have claimed a workload nobody launched. The Compose wrapper now
returns what it did, and only that answer binds.
With binding reachable, a bound recovery claims its health run inside the same
transaction as the pointers it describes, and arms the timer once that
transaction lands. Committing the two together is the point: a crash between
them would otherwise leave a restored workload nothing was watching. Anything
that stops the timer starting writes the run off immediately, so an observing
row never outlives the timer meant to watch it, and a reservation is never
armed across a restart.
The reservation is handed to the transition rather than reached for, because
the health gate reports its verdicts back through the transition store and
importing it there would close a module cycle.
Startup now finalizes each interrupted observation on its own instead of
sweeping them with one update, so the revision state hears a verdict for every
run rather than watching the rows change under it.
* feat(git): add the rollout-scoped rollback transitions
Completes the deferred-state set. The three aliases write the same recovery
columns under the same rules as the recovery events, differing only in
provenance: Direct Git recovery emits `recovery_*`, and a later rollout
producer emits these. Nothing in this PR writes them, which is why they are
tested directly rather than through a caller.
`partial` is the one failure class they add, for a rollback that reached some
targets and not others. Completing has no unproven variant on purpose: a
rollback nobody can bind to a generation has nothing to complete against, so
it refuses without one and refuses a generation another application owns.
Also covers the recovery health reservation end to end: reserving writes and
links the row without arming anything, a replay reuses the run rather than
opening a second observation of the same restore, arming inserts nothing and
supersedes a conflicting stack gate, an unarmed reservation is written off
once, and a reservation that outlived its process is finalized rather than
armed. The per-row startup sweep is pinned too, since one row whose write
fails leaving the others finalized is the entire reason it replaced a bulk
update.
* feat(git): add the Blueprint source and deployment transitions
The first slice of the Blueprint work: the store side, with no production
caller yet. The routes and the reconciler are wired to these next, and pinning
the contract first means a caller cannot quietly satisfy a different one.
What these enforce is that a terminal event names the request it answers. A
deploy records the intent and candidate it was launched for, and a terminal is
accepted only against that same request, matching stage and identity on one
side rather than either in isolation. Without that pairing a deploy could be
acknowledged out of an in-flight withdraw, or one request's intent stored
against another's candidate. An acknowledgement carries the candidate from the
matched request rather than from its own payload, for the same reason.
Releasing an operation now releases its identity with it, and a resolved
interruption is retired rather than left to match again. Both were leaking
through the shared helpers: a stale identity let a later start resurrect a
superseded intent as live, and a surviving interruption both reported
completion as unknown for ever and let a late acknowledgement regress the
target after two later deploys had succeeded. Fixing the helpers fixes the
Direct paths too.
A start refuses to displace an unrelated operation, which would otherwise
abandon it with no terminal event and no history saying so. Observations write
the latest stage, since the placement facet reads it to decide whether a
stateful deployment is waiting on confirmation, and history alone could never
reach a reader.
Minting is left to the caller. A no-op Blueprint edit must mint no intent,
because a fresh identity would invalidate acknowledgements that are still
accurate.
* feat(git): record Blueprint create, edit, pin, and delete
Wires the Blueprint routes to the revision state. Each producer writes the
Blueprint source row and its GitOps rows in one transaction, so an operator
never sees a Blueprint that exists with nothing describing what it means, or an
intent for a Blueprint that failed to save.
The question these answer is when an edit invalidates what the fleet already
acknowledged. Changing the name, the compose content, the selector, the drift
mode, or whether it is enabled changes what nodes run or where, so each mints a
new intent and candidate. Changing the description or the classification
changes how the Blueprint reads and nothing a node can observe, so it updates
the source row alone: minting there would make every acknowledgement report as
stale over a reworded sentence.
An edit is measured by value, not by which fields were submitted. The editor
sends every field on every save, and the source layer decides what to
invalidate from which keys are present, so only the keys that genuinely differ
are passed down. Without that the two disagreed: rewording a description
advanced the revision past the one the current intent describes and cleared the
approval, while this layer classified it as metadata and minted nothing.
Selectors compare by value too, so reordering a list that names the same nodes
is not a placement change.
That measurement also changes one behaviour: a save that alters nothing now
leaves the approval alone, where before any save cleared it. Nothing changed,
so nothing is invalidated.
Pinning revises placement the same way a selector edit does, and re-pinning the
node already pinned is not a change. Deleting tombstones the application and
its live targets so the Blueprint stops claiming its slot, and withdraws
nothing itself, because the route has already done that and doing it twice
would record removals that never happened.
The required node set is stored in a canonical order, so reordering it is not
mistaken for a placement change. A Blueprint that predates the model has no
application yet and is left for migration rather than given a first intent
here, which would claim a starting point for deployments nobody has reconciled.
Desired nodes are passed in rather than computed here: the reconciler that
knows how to compute them reaches this layer, and importing it back would close
a module cycle.
* feat(git): record the placement a label or cordon moves
A label and a cordon say nothing about any one Blueprint, but both change which
nodes a selector matches. Each now revises placement for whichever Blueprints
the change actually moved, by comparing the desired nodes either side of the
write rather than reacting to the event.
That comparison is the whole point. Labelling a node no selector mentions, or
cordoning one no Blueprint wanted, moves nothing, and minting an intent for it
would invalidate every acknowledgement in the fleet over an edit no node can
observe. The same comparison covers a Blueprint pinned to a cordoned node: a
cordon governs automatic placement only, so the pinned target still wants that
node and its set does not move, without needing a case of its own. Nodes are
compared as a set, so the same nodes returned in a different order is not a
change either.
Each route wraps its existing write and the recording in one transaction, so a
recording failure cannot leave a fleet selecting on a label nothing recorded.
The write itself is untouched, which keeps label validation and the per-node
limit where they already live rather than restating them in a producer.
Node deletion already retires its targets, so this adds nothing there.
* feat(git): record Blueprint deployments by what caused them
Every production write to a Blueprint deployment row now goes through one
funnel that records the cause. The cause is carried rather than inferred from
the resulting status, because several causes land on the same one: a deploy
that failed and a withdraw that failed both read `failed`, and they mean
opposite things about whether the deployment is still on the node.
Recording is skipped when the status did not move, so a reconciler tick that
re-asserts a state it already reported does not append a second event
describing the same fact. The write still happens either way.
A terminal answers the request the target says it was given, not whatever the
Blueprint currently wants: an acknowledgement matched against the current
intent would accept work for a revision that node was never sent. The first
deploy to a node creates its target, since a Blueprint application has no
targets until something is sent somewhere.
Recording never fails the deployment. The rollout already happened, and turning
a bookkeeping problem into a stuck rollout would be the worse outcome.
The four reconciler observations record what was seen and nothing else. Preview
cleanup stays outside this path deliberately: it reverses a projection nobody
deployed, so recording it would report removals that never happened.
* fix(git): record an Inline Blueprint coming into existence
Creating a Blueprint inserted its application row directly, so the history
began at the first intent and described an application nothing recorded coming
into existence. Every other application-creation path emits the activation
event, and the event's own definition covers this case: an Inline Blueprint
inserts the application, the first intent, and the first candidate.
Activation goes through a transition now, which also enforces the one thing the
direct insert could not: a Blueprint gets one live application, refused rather
than silently duplicated.
No target is created. A Blueprint application has no targets until something is
deployed somewhere, unlike a Direct one which always has the node its stack
lives on.
* fix(git): file withdraw failures as withdraw failures
Four of the five withdraw failure paths were recorded as failed deploys. Only
the thrown one was tagged correctly, and it is the rare case: a delete-lock
conflict, a network error, a remote 409, and a remote non-200 all return rather
than throw, and all four were filed under deploy.
That inverted the thing this funnel exists to prevent. Recording a deploy
failure clears the in-flight operation, so a routine "another operation is
already in progress" wiped the withdraw that had just started and left the
target reporting a failed deploy while the deployment was still on the node.
A withdraw refused because the on-disk stack is not ours is now its own cause
too, rather than borrowing the deploy-side name conflict.
The status guard no longer suppresses starts. A start writes the identity that
terminals are matched against, so skipping one because the row already read
`deploying` let a later acknowledgement answer a request that had been
superseded, reporting a node as converged on a revision it was not running. The
guard now covers observations only, which is where repetition is the reconciler
re-asserting a state it already reported. A newer deploy supersedes an older
one so a redeploy of a stuck request can take over; anything else in flight is
still refused rather than displaced with no terminal event.
A rejection is logged differently from an infrastructure error, because a
target the model keeps refusing holds its active slot and stops recording
anything further, and that is worth seeing.
* feat(git): migrate pre-existing Blueprints into the revision state
Blueprints that predate the model are brought in at boot: an application, an
intent describing what the Blueprint currently asks for, and a candidate marked
as coming from the legacy inline record.
None of it is an acknowledgement. The Blueprint revision is carried for display
and nothing else, because a revision number is not evidence that any node is
running what it names, and recording it as agreement would report a fleet as
converged on an intent nobody verified. No targets are created for the same
reason, and the candidate's required set is empty: migration records what is
asked for, never which nodes currently satisfy it.
An approval authorizes the intent it was given for, so a Blueprint that was
never approved, or edited since, is recorded as needing reapproval rather than
left blank. Blank would read the same as an approval that is merely absent.
Replay is decided by the same scope, schema version, and fingerprint the Git
migration uses, and a Blueprint the new path already described is skipped
outright, since its rows were written with proof this pass does not have.
Blueprints migrate in their own pass. Coupling them to the Git migration would
let one unreadable Git stack keep every Blueprint outside the model.
* fix(git): contain the blueprint stack-directory probe at its call
The ownership probe resolved a path from the blueprint name and checked it
through the shared helper, which the security scan does not credit as a
barrier. The check now sits with the call it protects, matching the form used
elsewhere for the same reason.
The path was already validated, so this changes no behaviour. It surfaced now
because an earlier commit in this branch rewrote the file's line endings, which
made every line read as new and brought a pre-existing call into the scan's
changed-code window.
* feat(git): read GitOps history and carry revision state on source reads
Adds the instance-local history API and the additive revision fields the
source reads have been missing.
`GET /api/git-sources` and `GET /api/stacks/:stackName/git-source` now
carry `gitopsRevision` and `stackResourcePresent`. Only the instance that
owns the files can say whether a stack directory is really there, so that
answer travels with the response rather than being inferred by a reader
that has never seen the filesystem. It is read through the strict stack
listing: the lenient one answers a failed directory read with an empty
list, which here would read as every stack having vanished and would turn
an unreadable disk into an empty audit trail.
Two history routes land with them: `GET /api/git-sources/history` across
stacks, and `GET /api/stacks/:stackName/git-source/history` for one. Both
page on `(created_at, id)` so rows written inside the same millisecond
survive a page boundary, and both bound how far one request will scan. A
malformed cursor or an unusable filter value is refused rather than
ignored, because answering "show me the failures" with everything reads
as an answer instead of a non-answer.
Authorization is decided per row. A row reduces to a stack read only when
it names a stack, its application is live, and the stack is present on
disk; anything unprovable stays with Admin. The cross-stack routes
classify every row, while the per-stack route is authorized whole by
name, so reading a stack shows its full history including entries from an
earlier application. That distinction is carried in the scope type rather
than a flag, so skipping the row classifier without pinning the query to
the authorized stack cannot be expressed.
History entries record the fields each transition moved rather than a
whole revision, so lifecycle for the classifier comes from the owning
application row. That keeps authorization off the recorded payload
entirely: an entry whose detail cannot be read still returns its identity,
stage, and outcome with a stated limitation, and the decode failure is
logged rather than passed over in silence.
* feat(git): let auditors read GitOps history they cannot tie to a stack
A history entry that cannot be tied to a readable stack fell to Admin,
which left the auditor role seeing exactly what a viewer sees on the one
surface it exists to read.
History entries are an audit trail: insert-only, and recording the actor,
trigger, stage, and outcome of every transition. The request audit log is
already gated on the audit permission, so an entry whose audience cannot
be narrowed now falls there too. Withholding it protected nothing in any
case, since the request log already records that a Git-source mutation
happened and who made it.
The source collection deliberately keeps its Admin fallback. Those rows
are live Git configuration, not a record of events, and a mandate to
audit does not extend to reading the repository, ref, and credentials
policy of stacks that were deleted or never finished being created.
The fallback is now part of the requirement type rather than a role
comparison, so each surface states which audience it falls back to and
the compiler requires every case to be answered.
* feat(git): correct remote node identities on GitOps reads
A remote instance numbers its own nodes and has never heard of the hub's
numbering, so every node id it reports is a statement in its own
namespace. Read straight through, a hub joining two nodes showed two
different machines as the same node.
Four GETs now take a second hop that buffers the response and corrects
those identities: the git-source list and detail, and both history
routes. Everything else keeps streaming exactly as before, which is the
reason this is a separate hop rather than a mode of the existing one:
logs, downloads, and event streams must never be buffered, and the
enumerated positions rewritten here do not appear in them.
Only JSON numbers are replaced. A null node is preserved, since "no node"
is a fact the remote is entitled to state and inventing one there would
claim a placement that does not exist. Strings, application ids, and
stack names travel untouched.
The hub re-authorizes what comes back. A remote authorized its rows for
the machine account the hub proxies with, which says nothing about the
person behind the request, so every row is classified again against the
signed-in user. To make that possible without the hub holding another
instance's database, each history entry now carries the lifecycle of its
owning application alongside the stack-presence answer already there.
Both are validated fail-closed, and a verdict a remote might volunteer is
ignored: the hub decides, the remote supplies evidence.
Asking one node for another node's history is refused before the hop
rather than forwarded, because the remote would answer about itself and
the page would read as an answer to a question nobody asked. When the
node asked for is the node being talked to, the hub translates that into
a flag the remote resolves to its own default node. Only the hub may set
that flag, and a remote honours it only on a proxied hop.
Every way this hop can end converges on one terminal answer: rewritten,
passed through, too large, undecodable, failed upstream, or abandoned by
the client. A body the hub could not read never borrows the remote's
success status.
* test(git): assert the unlinked git-source response field by field
The detach test compared the whole response to `{ linked: false }`, which
stopped holding once that route started carrying the additive revision
fields. The equivalent backend route test was updated when those fields
landed; this one was missed.
Asserted field by field rather than loosened to a partial match, so the
two new fields are actually checked: a detached stack has no application
to project while its directory is still on disk.
* feat(git): carry GitOps revisions on blueprint, node, and drift responses
Completes the additive JSON half of the revision-state read contract, so the
Blueprint, node, and drift surfaces report GitOps state through the same
projection the Git-source routes already return instead of leaving it
unreadable.
Blueprint list, detail, create, update, and pin carry gitopsRevision. Node-label
add, cordon, uncordon, and node delete carry gitopsRevisions, ordered by
blueprint id and covering only the Blueprints the mutation actually moved: an
edit no selector reacts to reports an empty list rather than invalidating the
whole catalog. Node deletion reads its Blueprint owners inside the deletion
transaction and before the tombstone, which is the last moment a target row can
be traced back to an application, and an orphaned target is logged rather than
being silently indistinguishable from a Direct one. Both DELETEs that answered
204 still answer 204.
The drift GET and re-check gain the same field alongside the existing ledger,
which is untouched; no GitOps class is written into stack_drift_findings.
Reads and mutations treat a projection fault differently, on purpose. On a read
the revision is part of the answer, so a fault surfaces. On a mutation the write
has already committed, so the revision is decoration and is built defensively:
letting it throw would answer a successful cordon or a completed node deletion
with a 500, sending the operator to retry a hard delete that already happened
and be told the node does not exist. It degrades to an empty list and logs.
Because both drift routes answer with that projection, the identity hop now
intercepts them too, matching its route table per method instead of rejecting
every non-GET. Left as they were, one object would carry the hub's node
numbering or the remote's depending only on which route asked for it. The
allowlist names a single mutation rather than opening a verb, and the hub's
collection filter still keys off the git-source paths alone, so drift payloads
are rewritten without being re-authorized: they are per-stack and already
authorized by name before the hop.
Tests cover the exact shapes, the preserved 204s, revision ordering, the
empty-list cases, node deletion reporting its tombstoned Blueprints and
surviving a projection failure, and the proxy's new route matching, drift
rewrite, and filter exclusion.
* fix(git): resolve every application a GitOps surface can own
Three gaps found while building the additive JSON, all the same shape: an id or
a sentinel stood in for a row, so "there is nothing here" and "the thing that
should be here is unreachable" collapsed into one answer nobody could tell
apart.
A Blueprint application is stored with stack_name NULL, so no lookup by stack
name could reach it, while the reconciler materializes every Blueprint as a
stack directory of that name. A stack's Drift tab and Git panel therefore
reported no GitOps at all for a stack GitOps was actively managing, while the
Blueprint page reported a live application for the same thing. Stack surfaces
now bridge the two through the deployment row for the asking node. The
deployment row is what makes it safe: Blueprint and stack names share one
namespace, so matching on name alone would let a Blueprint claim an unrelated
stack of the same name on a node it never targeted.
A retired application was unreachable for the same reason, because every entry
point filtered to the live rows. Tombstoning deliberately keeps the configured
identity and SHA pointers as frozen facts so the projection can still say what
an application was, and the source deriver has a not_live status waiting for
exactly that, but nothing could hand it one. A detached Blueprint or stack now
reports what it was instead of reading as one that never existed.
The not-applicable projection was typed so it could not carry a reason, which
made a row that vanished between resolving it and re-reading it by id identical
to a stack the model was never asked about. That one field widens to hold
limitations, and the missing case now says so with the id as evidence. Every
other missing-row path in the deriver already worked this way.
Also logs, rather than silently skipping, a live application whose blueprint row
is gone: with cascade off that is a real integrity fault, the placement did
move, and the response would otherwise report that nothing had.
Cordon and uncordon are deliberately left reporting nothing. A cordon governs
whether new placements may be made, not what a Blueprint asks for, and the
reconciler applies it only to new placements, so revising intent for it would
invalidate acknowledgements fleet-wide over a change that evicts nothing. Two
comments implied otherwise and now state the contract.
* fix(git): keep stack-state resolution out of the Git-source read path
Review of the previous commit found the fallback it added had reached further
than intended. The resolver is now split by the question it answers.
projectStackRevision answers "what Git source is attached to this stack" and
stays Direct-only. projectManagedStackRevision answers "what manages this stack"
and is what the drift routes use. The Git-source routes must not be answered
with another application's identity, and there was a second reason: the row
classifier takes the stack name from the Git-source row but the lifecycle from
whatever the projection resolved, so a Blueprint application arriving there
would have turned an Admin-only row into one any stack grant could read. The
Blueprint that unlocked it could be the very one holding name_conflict because
of that stack.
The Blueprint-to-stack bridge also needed the right predicate rather than a
present deployment row. name_conflict is written precisely when a stack of that
name already exists on the node and Sencho does not own it, so guarding only
against withdrawn admitted exactly the collision the bridge exists to prevent.
It now requires last_deployed_at, which proves this Blueprint wrote the
directory, and excludes name_conflict and withdrawn: the same predicate the
delete and withdraw paths use. Only a live Blueprint application qualifies,
since a retired one has no claim on the directory.
The detached fallback no longer resolves deleted applications. Detached means
the files are still on disk and still describe that stack; deleted means the
stack is gone, so any directory of that name now belongs to something else and
reporting the old repository and SHA against it would disclose one stack's Git
identity through another's name. The authorization side already refused deleted
rows for that reason, so the two now agree. Ordering breaks ties on rowid rather
than a random UUID, and two partial indexes cover the new lookups, which the
existing live-only unique indexes could not serve.
The not-applicable variant's limitations are readonly, so pushing onto the
shared frozen instance is a compile error again rather than a runtime throw.
Tests cover a Blueprint claiming a stack it never deployed onto and one it hit a
name conflict on, a detached Direct source projecting not_live, and a deleted
one staying unresolved for a reused name. Drift fixtures move to afterEach so a
failing assertion cannot leak state into the next test.
* fix(git): stop the stack resolver falling through proven ownership
A second review round found the resolution chain could answer with the wrong
application, and that part of the previous commit was reading a state nothing
writes.
The Blueprint bridge returned one value for two different facts. Once the
deployment row proved a Blueprint had written the directory, a missing
application row for it still answered "no Blueprint here", so the chain
continued to the detached-Direct lookup. A stack that once had Direct Git, was
detached, and whose directory a Blueprint later took over would then report the
old Direct application's repository, ref, and SHA as that directory's state.
The bridge now separates "not mine" from "mine, but broken": the second logs and
returns its own limitation, so the fault is visible and no unrelated identity is
offered in its place.
A Blueprint projection also carried the whole placement roster into a route
authorized by a grant on one stack name. Targets are now scoped to the node
being asked about, which is both the safe answer and the accurate one, since the
question is what manages this directory here.
The detached-Blueprint lookup, its index, and its fallback are removed. Blueprint
retirement writes deleted, never detached, and the only detached writer is the
Direct detach path, so the getter could never match and the index covered an
empty set. The test that seemed to cover it built the state by hand and was
green against something the product cannot produce; it now drives the real
delete route and asserts what that path actually writes.
The Git-source resolver goes back to live applications only. Detach removes the
source row in the same transaction that tombstones the application, so a source
row beside a detached one is not producible, and the route's row classifier
takes its stack name from the source row but its lifecycle from the projection.
Keeping that resolver narrow is what stops a resolution change from quietly
moving who may read a row. The comment saying so is restored and now explains
why it must stay true.
* refactor(git): share the GitOps application fixture across the route tests
Two test files carried near-identical 58-line GitOpsApplicationRow literals that
differed only in a repo URL nothing asserted on. Both now import one helper.
The drift tests also repeated a Blueprint seed and its activation across four
cases, and re-imported DatabaseService per test; those become local helpers and
one hoisted import, which lets the cleanup hook go synchronous. Node lookup
throws on a missing default instead of casting.
projectBlueprintRevisions is module-private again: its only caller is the
committed-projection wrapper beside it.
A third copy of the same fixture remains in git-source-routes.test.ts. It is
left alone deliberately: it pins timestamps at 1 rather than now, and that file
has ordering-sensitive history assertions that would need auditing first.
* feat(git): mirror the GitOps revision contract on the frontend
Adds the client-side read contract for the GitOps revision projection, with
no consumers yet.
types/gitops.ts is a hand-written mirror of the backend read contract, in the
same convention as the other domain type files: the frontend never imports
backend. The projection's two arms are named separately so a component can
take the live one as a prop without re-narrowing, and the absent arm keeps its
absent keys rather than nulls so reaching for a lifecycle status without
narrowing is a compile error. The limitation code stays an open string, since
the backend adds codes without a schema bump and an exhaustive switch would
silently stop rendering the newest ones.
lib/gitopsState.ts is the one place a facet status becomes words and a colour,
so a state reads the same in a sidebar tooltip, a panel banner and the drift
tab. Both maps are keyed on the closed status unions, so widening the mirror
without naming the new state fails this build.
Every line of copy states the condition the deriver actually tests, which is
not always what the status name suggests. recovery_required is a recovery
already running rather than one that is needed. candidate_ready is reached only
when review is not required, so it is ready to apply, not ready to review.
synced_and_healthy is also reached with the health gate switched off and never
compares the deployed generation against the accepted one, so it claims
neither. never_reconciled means nothing has been accepted; a fetch that
produced no materialization still records its commit.
pendingSourceStatus keys "an update is waiting" on the candidate pointer rather
than the status name, because source_reconcile_required is reachable both from
a stale candidate and from an accepted generation with no candidate at all.
Retirement is excluded first: tombstoning keeps the candidate pointer as a
frozen fact, so a stack detached mid-review still carries one.
absentFault separates the two facts the empty projection carries. Empty
limitations means the model was never asked about this stack and the right
rendering is nothing; a non-empty list means an application that was expected
could not be reached. A live application's limitations are caveats on state
that is being reported, not faults, so they are deliberately excluded.
* feat(git): name the Git source state on the stack and sidebar surfaces
The sidebar indicator and the anatomy source row both read a raw pending
commit pointer, so a candidate blocked by local conflicts, held for review, or
stale against the configuration in force all render identically to one that is
ready to apply. The projection distinguishes them; nothing was reading it.
refreshGitSourcePending now derives each stack's state from the projection and
the pending map carries that state rather than a boolean. Presence in the map
still means exactly what it meant before, because it is keyed on the candidate
pointer rather than the status name: source_reconcile_required is reachable
both from a stale candidate and from an accepted generation with no candidate,
and only the first is something to review. One narrow fallback remains, for a
row with no projection at all: a failed GitOps write is logged and swallowed
while the pending commit still commits, so the flat pointer is the only thing
that can answer there. Wherever a projection exists it is the sole authority.
The sidebar keeps one indicator, in the same slot, at the same size and colour,
with the same position in the priority ladder. Only the tooltip changes, so a
blocked plan now says so instead of reading as an ordinary update. A test
asserts the rendered indicator is identical across states, which is what keeps
the rendered sidebar unchanged.
The anatomy source row keeps its pulsing dot alone for the ordinary case and
adds the state word only for the states the dot cannot express. Inline rather
than in a tooltip, since this is the reason something is stuck.
* feat(git): surface derived GitOps state in the Git source and Drift panels
The Git source panel's pending banner had two things it could say, read from a
raw commit pointer and a single blocked boolean. It now names which of four
states the candidate is actually in, so a plan blocked by local conflicts, one
held for review, and one gone stale against the configuration in force stop
rendering as the same ordinary update. The short commit sha stays.
A new card above it reports an application the projection could not reach. That
case renders as nothing at all today, which is indistinguishable from a stack
the model was never asked about. Empty limitations stays silent, because that
is the ordinary answer for most stacks and a header over an empty block would
be worse than nothing.
The summary block gains one row naming the source state. It is the first place
the panel can show applying, retry scheduled, suspended, recovering, or a
detached source, none of which have a pending commit and so never reach the
banner. Both existing rows are untouched and the last applied commit stays a
display fact.
The revision lives in its own state rather than on the Git source type, because
the PUT that saves this panel answers with a bare source and no revision. A
save drops it instead of rendering a state the write has already moved.
The Drift tab gains a third block below the two it already has. The compose
versus runtime card and the since-last-deploy card keep their exact positions
and copy; the new block answers a different question, which generation this node
was asked to run and whether it got there. A Blueprint-owned stack shows its
target rows and no source card, since a Blueprint application has no Git source
and inventing one would be a claim the model never made. The drift class list
renders against the type and expects no rows, because nothing populates it yet.
* feat(git): declare revision fields on the blueprint and node clients
Types first. The blueprint list, detail, create, update and pin responses all
carry a GitOps revision, and the node label add, cordon, uncordon and delete
responses carry a list of them. None of that was modelled, so the fields were
being dropped silently and the next reader would have taken these for bare
records.
Most of it is declared and deliberately unread, with the reason written where
the type lives. Create, update and pin are followed immediately by a re-read of
the catalog or the detail that carries the same projection, so rendering the
mutation's copy would show the same fact twice with one of them stale. Cordon
and uncordon always answer with an empty list by design, because a cordon
governs whether new placements may be made rather than what a Blueprint asks
for, and the reconciler leaves existing deployments where they are. The comment
on that type is the point: the risk there is a future reader building a
consumer for a list that is never populated.
Two places do report something. Deleting a node and adding a node label both
re-place Blueprints, and both now say how many. The count only, and only when
it is not zero: an empty list means both that nothing moved and that the
projection faulted after the write had already committed, so it can never be
reported as the first.
Blueprint detail gains the same unreachable-application card the Git source
panel has. A Blueprint with no live application row is a fact nothing in the
product could previously express, which is a different problem from having two
ways to say the same thing.
* fix(git): close the gaps review found in the GitOps frontend consumers
Six defects, each verified against the code before being fixed.
The pending-map read assumed every /git-sources row carries a projection. That
route is proxied, so a node predating the model answers rows without one, and
dereferencing it threw inside the loop. The catch swallowed the throw, the map
was never set, and every stack's Git indicator froze at its previous value for
as long as that node was selected. The field is optional now and a row without
one falls through to the same branch as a row with nothing to project.
That fallback also branched on the arm alone, so a projection reporting an
unreachable application plus a stale commit pointer was reported as a candidate
ready to apply. It now excludes a faulted projection: a fault means an
application was expected and could not be read, so the pointer is not evidence
that anything is ready, and naming a state there would be a guess.
Detaching a Git source cleared the source but not the revision, and the pending
card is derived from the revision alone. The panel kept advertising a waiting
commit for a stack Git no longer managed, behind a Review button that silently
did nothing. A read that threw had the same problem across stacks: the panel is
reused, so stack A's state could render under stack B's header.
The panel also lost the flat-pointer fallback the sidebar keeps, so the two
surfaces disagreed: the sidebar would show an indicator and clicking through
showed no card. Both now apply the same rule.
Node delete parsed the success body unguarded. The delete has already committed
at that point, so a malformed body would have reported a completed deletion as
a failure and skipped the refresh, leaving the deleted node on screen.
Tests: five mutations that previously survived now fail. The zero-pixel claim
compared the wrong element and passed when the indicator vanished entirely; the
stale-read test asserted during the loading window, when the body is skeletons
regardless; the sidebar passthrough test proved only that an indicator existed,
not that the state reached it. Added coverage for the drift row, an unknown
node, the not-applicable source guard, the save clearing, the Review button, and
a live application carrying a caveat, which must not read as a fault.
The fixture set drops two source statuses whose identity defaults describe a
state they cannot be in, and gains a drift-item builder.
* refactor(git): share the GitOps fault card and live-facet derivation
The unreachable-application card was built inline on three surfaces, and the
copies had already drifted: the Git source panel used one icon while the Drift
tab and the Blueprint sheet used another, so the same failure rendered two
different ways. It is one component now, which also owns the state key and the
test id those surfaces assert on.
Deriving the live source facet was likewise repeated, along with the two
semantic decisions behind it: the absent arm has no facets, and a source facet
of not applicable means a Blueprint owns the stack rather than that something
is missing. Both now live next to pendingSourceStatus, which already encoded
the same exclusion.
The Git source panel's seven derived values collapse to three, with the
pending-commit rule extracted to a named function so the four cases read
straight through instead of as nested ternaries. Behaviour is unchanged in
every case.
The two flat-pointer fallbacks are deliberately not unified: they look alike
but the panel also treats a live application whose source facet is not
applicable as unanswered, and merging the predicates would change what that
case renders.
* feat(git): count and announce committed GitOps transitions
Every history row that is actually inserted now produces one metric
increment and one state-invalidate event, so the surfaces that read GitOps
state hear about a change instead of waiting for the next poll.
Announcement is buffered and drained on a macrotask rather than fired
inline. better-sqlite3 is synchronous, so waiting for the macrotask puts
the drain after the transaction that wrote the row, and after any outer
transaction wrapping it, without having to detect which nesting depth it
is in. The drain confirms each row is still present before announcing it,
so a rolled-back transaction says nothing on its own, and the insert
declines to queue a dedupe replay, so a retry says nothing either. The
broadcaster is injected at startup rather than imported, keeping the
GitOps layer free of a cycle back into the notification stack.
Counters are process-local and in-memory, and their keyspace is finite by
construction: history stages are now a closed union that the build
enforces, and outcomes were already a closed set. The payload names no
stack, node, repository, or actor, because a counter carrying those would
be an audit trail with no retention rules and no per-row authorization,
which is what the history routes provide. GET /api/gitops-metrics is
Admin-only and instance-local, so selecting a node answers with that
node's counters.
On the client, a gitops-scoped invalidate refreshes the derived state
through a 250ms trailing window, matching the existing stack refresh. One
operation commits several transitions in a row and a first-boot migration
commits a great many, so refetching per event would thrash the API for a
picture that only settles at the end.
* feat(git): show GitOps source state on the stack dashboards
The dashboards list every stack on a node, which is where a fleet-wide
reading of Git state is most useful and where, until now, a Git-backed
stack looked exactly like a local one. Each row that the model has
something to say about carries a chip naming its source state.
The chip reads from the same status vocabulary the panels and the sidebar
use, so a stack cannot be "pending update" in one place and something else
in another. It sits beside the stack name rather than replacing the source
column: the column says where the files come from, the chip says what
GitOps makes of them, and those are different facts. The label is a word
and the title is a whole sentence, so the state never rests on colour
alone; the phone rows keep the word on screen, since touch has no hover.
The join is by stack name, which is what the dashboards have, and its
source is the same proxied route the sidebar reads. A row without a
revision, a Blueprint-owned application, and a projection fault all leave
the stack unbadged rather than inventing a state for it. State arrives by
announcement rather than by poll, since it only moves on a transition, and
a node switch blanks the map first: stack names repeat across nodes, so a
slow answer for the node just left is discarded rather than allowed to
label the wrong stacks.
* feat(git): say which part of a GitOps state could not be proven
Eighteen conditions can qualify a live projection: a manifest that does
not match the branch configured now, an approval that could not be
restored after a recovery, an artifact record that has gone. Every one was
already recorded and none of them reached the operator, so a state with a
hole in it read exactly like one without.
Each now has operator wording under the state it qualifies, checked
against the site that emits it rather than against the code's name, since
several names describe something narrower or wider than the condition
actually tested. The stored messages stay out of the UI: they are written
for a log reader, and some are raw decoder errors.
The presentation is deliberately quiet. A caveat is not a failure: the
state above it is real, and one piece of evidence behind it is missing, so
the reader learns which part to distrust without being told the whole
thing is broken. Faults keep their own card, because those replace the
state rather than qualifying it, and the two arms are read through
separate helpers so neither can be rendered as the other.
A code with no wording names itself rather than vanishing, so a node
running ahead of this build degrades to something honest instead of
reporting full confidence in a state its own backend flagged.
* fix(git): record a stateful first placement and keep a half-built Blueprint editable
Two faults that today's product cannot reach, and that the Git-backed
Blueprint mode would reach immediately.
The live-application lookup answers with an application that is active or
still being created, because its other callers ask whether the Blueprint
already holds the live slot, where a half-built row counts. Three
producers passed that answer straight into transitions that accept only an
active application and reject anything else by throwing, inside the
caller's own transaction. A Blueprint edited or pinned while its
application was still being created would have failed with a server error
and rolled the Blueprint write back with it. The producers now narrow to
what they actually require, through one shared predicate, leaving the slot
check honest.
Separately, a stateful placement is held for operator review before
anything is deployed, so no target exists when that hold is recorded, and
the observation was dropped for want of one. The hold left no trace: no
history row, and nothing on the target to say the node had been asked to
hold anything. First contact now creates the target, exactly as the first
deploy does. Nothing else changes with it: no intent, no generation, no
operation, and connectivity stays unset, because a node that has only been
asked to hold something has not been contacted. Observations that follow a
deploy already have a target, so they are unaffected, and a drift or evict
report for a node nothing was ever sent to is still dropped.
* fix(git): keep the Git source panel's state after a save
The save answers with the source row and no revision, so the panel had
nothing to replace its copy with and dropped it. The result was a stack
that had just been reconfigured showing no GitOps state at all until the
panel was reopened, which reads as a stack the model knows nothing about
rather than one whose state has just moved.
It re-reads instead. Keeping the old copy was not an option either: a
material configuration change clears the staged candidate server side, so
the state genuinely has moved and the panel would have gone on offering a
commit that is no longer there. Only the server can say what replaced it.
The alternative was returning the revision on the save itself. That route
is proxied, and the identity hop rewrites node numbering for an enumerated
set of routes, so adding a revision to a response outside that set would
hand back a remote node's numbering unrewritten. Re-reading costs one
request on a low-frequency action and needs no change to the hop.
* docs(git): document what GitOps state means for an operator
A commit SHA says which files Sencho wrote. It does not say whether that
commit was accepted, whether something newer is waiting, or whether an
operation was interrupted halfway, and until now the docs had no words for
any of that.
Git Sources gains a source-state table and a section on what happens when
part of a state could not be proven, since a stack with missing evidence
looks identical to one with complete evidence unless the product says
otherwise. Drift Detection gains the gitops section and explains why it
answers a different question from the two signals above it: those compare
files and containers as they are now, this reports what has been proven
over time. The dashboard page describes the state chip and, importantly,
that it and the row tint are independent, so a healthy row carrying
"pending update" is not a contradiction.
The Blueprint page now separates its revision counter from GitOps state.
The counter labels the spec; it says nothing about whether a given node
has got there, and reading it as fleet truth is the mistake the note
prevents.
The tutorial's verification step names the source state it should show,
so a reader can tell the difference between files written and a commit
accepted.
Audited and left unchanged: health-gated updates and fleet federation.
Neither presents a SHA or a revision as canonical GitOps truth, so neither
needed correcting.
* docs(git): name which saves actually clear a staged commit
The note claimed saving the form always clears the staged commit and moves
the state to reconcile required. Only a change to what gets materialized
does that: the repository, the ref, the compose paths, the project
directory, or the env sync. Changing the token or the apply behavior
leaves a staged commit alone, because neither changes what would be
written, and telling an operator otherwise would have them pull again for
nothing.
* fix(git): say when a committed transition has nobody to announce it to
Two silences worth breaking, both found reviewing the error paths in this
slice.
A server that never installs the event sink still counts every transition
and still writes every history row, so the only symptom is that no client
ever refreshes and the UI is quietly as stale as it was before any of this
existed. It now says so, once rather than per row, since a boot migration
would otherwise fill the log with one fact.
The dashboard's source-state fetch dropped a non-ok response without a
word. A refusal there freezes every badge at its last value, which looks
exactly like a fleet where nothing has changed, so the status code is
logged rather than inferred from badges that stopped moving.
* fix(git): close the defects review found in the announcement slice
Five findings, two of them able to reach an operator.
The event sink was installed one line after the deletion reconcile, which
tombstones applications and targets and awaits inside its own loop. A
drain therefore landed while the sink was still absent, so those boot-time
transitions were counted and never announced, and the warning added for an
unwired sink would have fired on every boot with a prepared deletion
intent: the fastest way to teach an operator to ignore it when it means
something. The sink now precedes every reconcile and migration pass.
The first-placement target was created outside the transition that records
it. The observation runs in its own savepoint and can refuse, and the
caller deliberately lets the deployment commit whatever the record says,
so a refusal left an active target with no generation, no stage and no
history: a placement relationship the model never established, which the
delete path would later tombstone as if it were real. Both writes now
succeed or fail together.
The badge looked its status up in a map closed at compile time, behind two
casts, while the value arrives over a proxy from a node that may run a
newer vocabulary. An unmapped key dereferenced undefined inside a stack
row and would have taken the whole table down with it. The facet and its
status are now a discriminated union, the lookup is optional, and an
unrecognised status renders nothing, which is what the join already does
for a stack it has no state for.
The dashboard's source-state loop derived each row inside the shared
try, so one row in an unexpected shape abandoned the loop and froze every
badge at its last value with nothing on screen to say so. Each row is now
guarded on its own and the count of unreadable ones is logged.
Two tests claimed things they did not check: both asserted a word was on
screen with a matcher that also matches screen-reader-only text, so a
compact badge would have kept them green, and one compared a label by
containment where the shorter label is a prefix of the longer. Both now
assert the visible node by equality. Added coverage for the window event
the dashboard actually refetches on, an unknown status, a row that cannot
be read, node-switch blanking, and a caveat recorded twice. One fixture
built a status pair the deriver cannot emit and was corrected.
Also: the guard narrowing Blueprint producers to an active application
excludes nothing today, because every Blueprint-mode application is
inserted as active and only Direct mode can be creating. The guard stays,
since the getter's slot semantics and the transitions' requirement have
drifted apart once already, but its rationale and its tests now say
plainly that they pin a defensive guard rather than reachable behaviour.
* refactor(git): make three runtime guards visible to the compiler
Type review found the same shape three times: a correct guard whose
necessity was asserted in a comment the type system could not see. This
project does not set noUncheckedIndexedAccess, so each of these read as
dead code to anything that trusts the types, and the guards protect the
behaviours that matter most here.
The limitation copy map typed its values optional, so the fallback for an
unrecognised code is now something the compiler requires rather than
something a comment explains. The badge reads its status through partial
views of the two vocabularies, so a miss is a fact TypeScript derives:
deleting the guard that stops one unknown status taking down a stack list
now fails the build, where before it compiled. Neither needed a cast.
The event payload has to be a type alias rather than an interface, because
only the former gets an implicit index signature and the broadcaster takes
an open envelope. That requirement now fails at the declaration instead of
surfacing in the startup wiring as an unexplained index-signature error.
Also added the reverse of the copy-coverage check: a code retired from the
backend leaving stale wording behind was invisible, since the fallback
only fires for entries that are missing rather than ones that linger.
* fix(git): make the state cards survive an unknown status, and correct the copy
Comment review found the protection added for the dashboard chip was
claimed more widely than it held. Five other surfaces indexed the status
vocabularies directly and passed the result straight to a card that
dereferences it, so the exact input the comments said would take a list
down still threw in the Git source panel, the Drift tab, the sidebar
tooltip and the stack anatomy row. The card now takes an optional state
and renders nothing without one, which also means a new surface cannot
reintroduce the dereference by rendering a card the ordinary way, and the
remaining four read through the lookups.
Copy corrections, each against the site that emits it rather than the
name of the code:
The manifest-identity caveat said the manifest named a different
repository or branch. It also fires when the manifest has no identity
block at all, or identifies another node or another stack, so it now says
it does not identify this stack on this node from the repository
configured now. The last-known-good artifact caveat covered a mismatch but
not the row being gone, which is the other half of the same condition.
Doc corrections: a Blueprint-delivered stack was described as carrying the
dashboard chip and a source state on the Drift tab, and it carries
neither, because a Blueprint has no Git source of its own. Per-node
Blueprint state was attributed to the detail sheet's GitOps section, which
only reports what could not be read or proven; the Deployments table is
where per-node status lives. Clearing a staged commit was said to always
land on reconcile required, but a stack that has never had a commit
accepted lands on never reconciled. The caveat lines were described as
sitting under the state when they render above the form. And the pending
banner was still documented as webhook-only, which this branch changed:
it now appears for any staged commit and its heading is the source state.
Also corrected two claims in the code: the observation branch does not
skip for a Blueprint that migration brought in, because migration creates
no targets, and the only refusal reachable from that call site is a
tombstoned target.
* refactor(git): simplify the announcement slice without moving any behaviour
A simplification sweep over the new code, all of it behaviour-preserving
and re-checked by breaking each guard afterwards.
The drain now separates policy from mechanism: it decides whether a row
survived, counts it, and either warns or hands it to a small announce
helper that owns the envelope and its error handling. The row-to-state
pass in the dashboard hook lifts out of the fetch, so one function does
the request and another does the derivation. The caveat dedupe collapses
to a set, which preserves first-insertion order and so keeps the ordering
its own docstring promises. The badge renders one span with a conditional
class rather than two that differed only by class. The metrics service
drops an internal type that was byte-identical to the one it exports.
One assertion goes: the observation branch tested membership and then
re-asserted the same fact to index the stage map, and a type predicate
lets the compiler carry it instead.
Everything the sweep was told to leave alone is intact: the buffered
drain, the row-existence re-check, the injected sink, the one-shot
warning, the partial-view lookups and their guards, the optional copy map
with its fallback, and the generation counter with its per-row guard.
* fix(git): close audit findings in the GitOps revision model
Five corrections from the pre-merge audit of this branch.
Migration no longer certifies a commit it cannot prove. The manifest read
now carries its resolved commit, and a manifest that names a different
commit than the source row records as applied is refused: the applied
directory materializes one commit while the row names another, so
trusting them together would mint a generation pointing at files that are
not the ones it claims. A manifest that names no commit at all, which is
what adoption writes, is a separate answer rather than a disagreement,
because reporting it as one would name a commit the manifest does not
contain. Both are recorded as evidence and the projection asks for a
fetch.
Create cleanup proves containment against the real filesystem before it
deletes. Every check on these paths was lexical, so a symlink or Windows
junction above the target read as contained while the recursive delete
followed it out of the managed area. Resolution keeps "is not there"
apart from "could not be read": only a genuinely missing path lets the
walk climb to an ancestor, because treating an unreadable one as absent
would infer containment for the single path whose link status could not
be established. Both sides are resolved, so relocating the data directory
onto another volume keeps working, and an area that does not exist at all
is nothing to delete rather than a suspected escape. The marker write
takes the same barrier as the marker delete, so a link cannot be written
through and then refused on the way out, wedging the stack name.
Startup stops while an interrupted create is unresolved, matching the
restore reconcile above it. A create that could not be settled leaves a
stack directory the deploy path cannot tell apart from a finished one, so
the alternative to stopping is letting a scheduler, webhook or operator
act on a half-built stack. Only that blocks: once the staged directories
are gone the create is torn down, and a staging marker nobody could
unlink is reported rather than thrown, so one failed unlink is not the
difference between an instance that boots and one that does not.
Per-stack history no longer exposes a predecessor through a reused stack
name. The grant covers the application holding the name now, which is
what keeps a stack's own entries readable while it is still being
created; every other row on that name is classified per row, so entries
belonging to an application that held the name earlier need the audit
permission, as they already did across stacks. A detached predecessor is
still readable, which is the classifier's own standing decision about
detach rather than a gap here, and is now pinned by a test.
Blueprint observations reach a reader. The reconciler recorded state
review, evict blocked, drifted and correcting against the target and
nothing projected them, so a deployed Blueprint could report itself as
never applied. The runtime facet now projects all four, below the states
a live or failed mutation puts the target in and above the pointer
checks, and any later transition supersedes the observation. The map is
declared total over the stages the reconciler can record, so a stage
added without a projection fails the build rather than silently reading
as never applied again.
* fix(git): confine managed-area cleanup to each stack's own location
Cleanup proved only that a resolved path landed somewhere inside the
managed area. That is satisfied by every other stack and every other node
in it, so a link from one stack's generations directory into another's
passed the check while the delete took a generation belonging to someone
else. The check is now positional: the managed area is resolved once, so
relocating the data directory onto another volume still works, and every
segment below it must be reached without redirection. The create-path
sinks use it on the write as well as the delete, so a claim cannot be
written through a link and then refused by the hardened delete, and the
manifest service's pre-existing deletion sinks (generation pruning,
boot-sweep orphan reaping, detach staging and finalization, and
whole-area removal, including after a restored snapshot) run it before
their recursive deletes too. Each of those sinks also keeps a literal
containment comparison beside the positional check, because static
analysis credits only a comparison at the call and reports the delete
otherwise. A refusal names both paths in the log, because it can hold
the boot gate.
Boot recovery dropped the checkpoint of an application that had left the
creating state without first clearing its staging marker. That left a
claim on the stack name with nothing to retry it, and every later create
for that name was refused by a marker nothing could remove. The settled
branches now share one exit, so the marker ordering holds for all of them.
A detached application's history was readable on a stack grant because
its files are still the stack standing at that name. Nothing in these
tables can prove it still is: a Blueprint successor records the name off
the application row, and a plain Compose stack recreated at the name
leaves no trace at all, so no detection-based allowance can be made
sound. Detach now moves an application's trail to the audit audience
outright, the same answer deleted and creating predecessors get, while
reading the stack itself stays where it was.
* fix(gitops): close four audit findings in revision state and identity proxy
A1: derive runtime and health against target desired_generation_id
- deriveRuntime returns 'applied_not_deployed' when desired != deployed, so a
stale deployment stays deploy-pending instead of reading synced_and_healthy
- deriveHealth judges against desired_generation_id falling back to deployed
when null; control case proves null-desired rows unchanged
- collectRuntimeDrift emits the plan-pinned runtime drift item for exact/
qualified observation mismatches; equal/non-comparable observations emit
nothing; ordering pin keeps deploy question first
A2: stop upstream 304 responses from bypassing hub rewrite and reauthorization
- identity proxy answers no-store on every terminal (rewrite, 204, 304,
generated failures); validators (etag, last-modified, cache-control,
expires, vary) no longer forwarded
- conditional request headers (if-none-match, if-modified-since, if-match,
if-unmodified-since) stripped on the identity-hop branch of the shared
proxyReq handler; streaming hop untouched (optimistic-concurrency file writes
depend on If-Match/If-Unmodified-Since)
- supertest integration test drives the real middleware through a loopback
capture server and asserts if-none-match absent while accept survives
S1: migrate legacy query/userinfo URLs via secret-free path
- parseLegacyRepoUrl strips userinfo, query, fragment instead of refusing;
parseHttpsRepoUrl remains the strict gate for user-driven paths
- migrationDirectSourceIdentity uses the tolerant parser; operational
stack_git_sources.repo_url untouched; fingerprint convergence proven
- trusted-manifest-on-legacy-URL test covers the worst real-world instance
S2: emit runtime artifact drift for current evidence
- top-level drift array carries the seven-class runtime item; frontend
comments updated to reflect backend now emits runtime drift
All regression tests added and passing. CI green (7,374 backend + 2,790
frontend tests; only pre-existing Windows EBUSY teardown failure unrelated).
* test(frontend): fix DriftPanel drift item rendering test
Update test assertions to match the new backend drift item format.
The function now renders artifact_set expected
identities as 'artifact <id> · <qualification>' and runtime_artifact
observed identities as the raw identity string.
* fix(gitops): emit a runtime drift item for desired-versus-deployed mismatch
The projection reported applied_not_deployed with no entry in drift, so
the canonical drift list contradicted the runtime facet it travels with.
collectRuntimeDrift now emits the r27 generation-mismatch item for that
state: desired generation as expected, deployed generation as observed,
ComposeService as owner. The action mirrors what availableActions offers:
deploy, unless an application-level fetch or apply is in flight or a
recovery is in progress, which withhold deploying without removing the
fact of the mismatch. The item clears once the desired generation deploys.
The stale-deployment test pins the exact item shape, its stability across
re-derivation, its convergence removal, and the withheld-action case; the
ordering pin keeps the artifact observation suppressed while the deploy
question stands. Frontend fixture aligns its artifact-mismatch example
with the backend's none action.
* fix(gitops): keep generation drift visible across failure and pause states
The desired-versus-deployed drift item was keyed to the applied_not_deployed
runtime status, but paused, failed, recovering, interrupted, and in-flight
statuses all outrank the pointer comparison in the deriver. A failed deploy
of a new generation over a running older one therefore dropped the drift
report exactly while the old workload was still serving.
The item is now judged from the pointers themselves: known and different
means reported, whatever presentation status the target carries. Retired
targets are excluded because nothing can rebind them, so their surviving
pointer divergence would be permanently unresolvable noise. The action
follows what the payload offers: deploy only when no application-level
operation or recovery withholds it and availableActions lists deploying,
none otherwise.
The failed-redeploy regression test pins the exact item shape after a
pre-mutation deploy failure, its stability across re-derivation, continued
artifact suppression for the replaced workload, and convergence removal;
a second pin keeps retirement silent.
* fix(gitops): complete the available-action legality matrix
The action list transcribed only part of the approved rules. An
interrupted apply offered apply without checking that its recorded
generation was still the current candidate; deploy fired for any target
reading applied_not_deployed regardless of target mode, with no retry
for an interrupted Direct deploy and none of the Blueprint interruption
rules; approve_legacy sat in the type union with no producer, leaving a
pending Inline placement review permanently unactionable through the
projection; and drift items inherited whatever deploy recommendation any
sibling target earned.
Actions now follow the matrix. Deploy is decided per target through one
predicate shared by deriveActions and the drift items: a paused or
failed sibling can no longer inherit another target's legal deploy, a
Blueprint-mode divergence never advertises Direct deployment, an
interrupted Direct deploy retries against the generation still applied,
and an interrupted Blueprint deploy or withdraw repeats only while its
recorded intent revision and rollout candidate still equal what the
application requires, where an absent pair matches because inline
Blueprints carry no candidate until the later-phase producer lands.
Interrupted apply requires the recorded generation to still be the
current candidate and the source not to have been suspended meanwhile.
A reachable Inline placement review now offers approve_legacy.
Six tests pin the matrix: sibling isolation across failed and paused
targets, the Blueprint mode guard, vacuous and matched Blueprint retry
identities plus the superseded case, matching-versus-stale Direct deploy
and apply interruptions, and the legacy review action.
* fix(gitops): withhold apply retry while the candidate is blocked
The interrupted-apply retry checked that the recorded generation still
matched the current candidate and that the source was not suspended, but
a later classification can also block that candidate, and applyStarted
refuses a blocked one outright. The retry is offered only when every
precondition the transition enforces still holds.
* fix(gitops): prove apply preconditions and limit fetch to Direct
The interrupted-apply retry checked identity, suspension, and blockage
but never loaded the candidate generation, so apply could be recommended
for a row that was missing, owned by another application, or built from
a superseded materialization fingerprint; applyStarted refuses all
three, and the positive fixture itself described a state no transition
would accept. The gate now proves existence, ownership, and fingerprint
before offering apply. Its fixture is rebuilt around a transition-legal
candidate whose projected action is executed against applyStarted, with
negatives for every refusal including suspension.
Fetch was offered to any application whose source looked unreconciled,
but the approved rules reserve fetch for live Direct applications; a
Git-backed Blueprint divergence now advertises nothing of the sort.
Controls pin both modes against equivalent source state.
* fix(gitops): fail closed when a candidate row is missing or foreign
Ordinary candidate_ready checked a fingerprint only when the candidate
generation row existed, so a dangling id or one owned by another
application fell through to ready and offered an apply that
applyStarted would refuse on sight. The source now requires the row to
exist under this application before readiness, records a limitation
for the anomaly with its operator copy mirrored in the frontend, and
reports reconcile-required instead. The Blueprint retry test also pins
that a superseded rollout candidate alone, with the intent still
matching, suppresses deployment.
* fix(gitops): fail accepted-generation derivation closed
The acceptance branch compared fingerprint and sha only when the
accepted generation row loaded, so a dangling id or one owned by
another application fell through and reported
application_generation_accepted with no evidence behind it, while also
withholding fetch as the recovery. The source now requires the row to
exist under this application before any comparison, records an
accepted_generation_invalid limitation naming the pointer with its
operator copy and inventory entry mirrored on the frontend, and
reports reconcile-required instead. Five scenarios pin valid, missing,
foreign, fingerprint-mismatched, and sha-mismatched acceptances.
* fix(gitops): enforce canonical state in dismiss, reconcile, and pulls
- Route dismiss-pending through the canonical dismissed transition so a
refusal while an operation is in flight surfaces as 409 instead of
clearing staged state behind the model's back
- Treat tombstoned targets as authoritative in both reconciler decision
surfaces so ticks never redeploy onto a placement the model severed;
an explicit deploy revives the target and records the revival delta
- Keep application-level rows in node-scoped history pages so proxied
hub views do not read as if the application never came into being
- Expose repoIdentity and configuredRef on history items to match the
server-side identity filters
- Stand down when a pull resolves to exactly the live candidate (same
commit, source fingerprint, plan verdict); pulls after an acceptance
still open a fresh staging generation as the apply target
* fix(rbac): classify git-source manifest reads as stack:read
GET /stacks/:name/git-source/manifest had no rule in the hub route
classifier, so proxied requests were refused with 403 before reaching
the remote node even for callers holding stack read access.
* fix(gitops): surface an error toast when dismiss is refused as in-flight
Dismissing a pending Git update while a fetch or apply is still running
now returns 409 OPERATION_IN_FLIGHT, but the frontend handler had no
else branch for a non-2xx response, so the refusal was swallowed with
no operator feedback at all. Add the same error-toast pattern already
used by the sibling apply handler, and order the success toast before
its side effects so a downstream failure cannot invert the outcome.
|
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3c4c057467 |
feat(git): classify managed-file changes before apply (#1832)
* feat(git): classify managed-file changes before apply Pull now builds a fingerprint-bound plan of adds, modifies, deletes, and local conflicts. Apply refuses stale or blocked plans instead of overwriting live files, and promotion stays the only filesystem mutator. * fix(git): contain stack-dir probes before filesystem access The missing-stack and root-.env existence checks now resolve against the compose base and refuse paths that escape it before lstat or existsSync. * fix(git): address managed-file change plan audit blockers Wire build-context live inventory into the planner, reject special file nodes without readFile, fingerprint configured project env files, enrich plan metadata, and compute the create plan before promotion. Redact drift ledger service keys for managed-path conflicts and clear pending plan columns on revision reset. * fix(git): unblock change-plan CI sinks and fifo test Hash stack files through a contained open plus fstat on the same handle so CodeQL no longer flags the lstat/read race, and create fifo fixtures with mkfifo instead of mkfifoSync. * fix(git): preserve unowned context files and align candidate validation Inspect prior and candidate build contexts together, delete only owned paths, reject context-root symlinks before walking, and validate with the env-file model deploy will use after promotion. * fix(git): contain live context and candidate env path sinks Inline resolve and startsWith at the lstat and access calls so containment is checked at the filesystem sink. * fix(git): resolve live context walks from the compose root Rebuild readdir, lstat, and access paths from the compose directory at each sink so containment is checked against a known-safe base. * fix(git): validate synced env removal against post-promotion files A managed .env that the next revision omits must not be used for candidate validation or invocation, because promotion deletes it. Context walks now bound directory entries and skip descendants under nested symlinks. Plan fingerprints bind review metadata and secret-path matching covers .env.* names. * docs(git): capture classified change-plan review screenshots Replace the old Monaco pull-preview images with the classified operation list used by Apply. * fix(git): treat invocation drift as reviewable, not a file conflict A live Compose command-line change is not a managed-file conflict. Reviewed apply records the incoming invocation; webhook auto-apply still refuses. |
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f5178889eb |
feat(recovery): complete authored-project atomic rollback generations (#1819)
* feat(recovery): capture complete authored Compose project for atomic rollback Replace the root-compose-only backup slot with staged recovery generations that record the managed inventory, exact Compose invocation, and prior image identity, and wire the same engine through deploy, update, manual rollback, and Git apply. * fix(recovery): satisfy CodeQL path barriers and update-guard mock Inline resolve+startsWith checks at generation/inventory fs sinks and stub getCurrentStackUpdateRecovery in UpdateGuardService tests. * fix(recovery): drop unused FileSystemService import in generation store test * fix(recovery): harden authored-project rollback for upgrade and restore safety Preserve legacy UUID backup rows, restore Git deploy state with files, make multi-file restore recoverable, evaluate policy on the restored target, and fail closed when Git capture cannot cover an apply. * fix(recovery): unblock Git apply unit tests and CodeQL pre-restore TOCTOU Mock recovery capture in git-source-service tests after fail-closed apply capture, and re-resolve live paths immediately before pre-restore snapshot reads. * fix(recovery): fall back to authored inventory when Git manifesto is missing First Git apply captures before promote, so a missing managed-project manifesto must not block rollback capture when the live stack already has authored files. * fix(recovery): make authored-project rollback atomic across Git state Restore the managed-project manifesto with files, keep nullable Git identity on first-apply captures, persist Git side-state in restore intents for startup reconcile, compensate legacy materialize failures, and refuse directory collisions before mutation. * fix(recovery): satisfy CodeQL path and TOCTOU barriers on manifesto restore Add inline resolve barriers for manifesto read/clear sinks and remove the access-then-read race when restoring a generation manifesto snapshot. * fix(recovery): close third-audit rollback generation blockers Fail closed on incomplete Git inventory fallbacks, execute captured Compose invocation during recovery, refuse startup and mutations while restore intents remain unresolved, propagate legacy stale-delete failures, and add Docker-level exact prior-image coverage plus regression tests. * fix(recovery): mark acquired before handoff in prior-image Docker test Match the production updateStack CAS sequence so the exact prior-image integration test does not fail handoff from the captured phase. * fix(recovery): close fourth-audit rollback safety blockers Evaluate policy against held images, use index-based pre-restore snapshots, hold the shared stack lock across Git apply, replay Mesh and empty captured invocations exactly, restore POSIX modes with fail-closed sensitive permissions, keep case-sensitive paths, and link Git auto-deploy health gates. Add regression coverage for these cases. * test(recovery): fix mocks for health-gate link and authored compose args Add linkGateOrRetain to the Git apply recovery mock, and mock authoredComposeArgs so the case-collision inventory test is not masked by a missing getComposeDir stub. * fix(recovery): close fifth-audit rollback safety blockers Share git_apply locking for webhook auto-apply, fail closed on malformed recovery service records, refuse mixed-image capture, and require exact probe counts with hold-tag eligibility checks. * fix(recovery): close sixth-audit rollback safety blockers Preserve the legacy backup slot during generation capture, encrypt sensitive pre-restore snapshots, revert files on a failed health probe without committing Git, fail closed when an absent-file revert would delete a directory, skip Compose one-offs, route manual and scheduled backup through the current generation, and persist runtime image platform identity. * fix(recovery): close seventh-audit rollback safety blockers Fleet snapshot restore and restore-all now capture a recovery generation under the stack lock before any authored file write, including on remote nodes. * fix(recovery): keep pre-deploy generations during health-gate observe Link deploy recovery generations to the observing gate so backup cannot replace them mid-observe. Distinguish missing hold tags from probe failures, refuse generation release when services metadata is corrupt, classify mixed-replica and coverage refusals, and toast the backend rollback message. * fix(recovery): wrap webhook deploy case for eslint const bindings in an unbraced switch case trip no-case-declarations. Match the pull case block. |
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|
fcd44f5693 |
fix(security): tie fixable CVE posture to image-update evidence (#1815)
* fix(security): tie fixable CVE posture to image-update evidence Stop treating Trivy fixed_version alone as an Update affected images CTA. Reuse persisted ImageUpdateService status so Security only offers Review update when an applicable image update is confirmed, and otherwise surfaces waiting or uncertain remediation with truthful affordances. * fix(security): move image-update recheck helper out of OverviewTab Satisfy react-refresh/only-export-components so Frontend lint passes. * fix(security): preserve posture reason image targets in Images drill-down Carry affected image refs on overview reasons so public exposure and related CTAs open a clearable targeted Images list instead of an unfiltered hunt. * fix(security): attach Networking exposure intent to posture targets Preserve stack/service context and intentional classification on network-exposed Security reasons without suppressing risk or claiming Internet reachability. * fix(security): persist Images exposure intent and triage scope Standing image summaries carry Networking intent context with cap-safe aggregates, Anatomy Networking links, and scan-sheet triage that defaults to the current image. * fix(security): clear CI lint errors for exposure helpers * fix(security): stop intentional exposure from forcing Action needed Separate exposure fact, intent correctness, and vulnerability drivers so package fixed_version cannot recreate a permanent public_exposure blocker. * fix(security): define Monitoring residual-risk narrative * fix(security): define Secure via residual Crit/High triage Replace triage-blind raw Crit/High Secure gating with residual material risk so accepted and ignored stay Monitoring, while not_affected, false positive, and fixed can clear residual without claiming no detections. * fix(security): exclude rollback-hold images from Security scans Hold-only sencho-rb tags are recovery state; keep them out of Trivy node scans, Security inventory, and Overview posture while dual-tagged images remain under their registry tag. * fix(security): keep authoritative no-update rows after preview Opening a stack page must not delete ok+false stack_update_status evidence; Security treats a missing row as uncertain and would flip waiting-upstream to unknown. |
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|
866d784316 |
feat(notifications): customizable per-channel JSON payload templates (#1805)
Add an optional Edit Payload editor to every notification channel
(Discord, Slack, Webhook, Apprise, ntfy). A saved template replaces the
built-in payload for that channel, with {{level}}, {{message}},
{{category}}, {{timestamp}}, {{stack_name}}, and {{actor}} substituted as
JSON-escaped values (variables may stand alone or be mixed into strings).
Templates are validated on save: known variables only, no unterminated
tokens, valid JSON after substitution, 8000 characters max. Apprise keeps
urls/tag managed by the channel fields and merges them server-side at
dispatch. ntfy publishes JSON instead of plain text when templated. Test
dispatch uses the editor template.
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|
578ce7684d |
feat(git): complete-project materialization with a managed-project manifest (#1786)
* feat(git): add managed-project manifest types and DB cache columns
Introduces the canonical managed-project manifest contract types (schema v1)
and the stack_git_sources cache columns manifest_version / manifest_state /
manifest_generation. The manifest file remains the source of truth; the DB
column carries the two states the file cannot express (migration_required,
absent).
* feat(git): add vendored Docker .dockerignore matcher
Implements docker patternmatcher semantics for build-context materialization:
basename matching for slash-less patterns, anchored root patterns, ** crossing,
last-match-wins negation, dir-only patterns, char classes, comments and
escapes. Table-driven tests cover the full rule set.
* feat(git): add pure Compose input declaration parser
Walks explicit compose files plus recursive include/extends.file graphs and
emits every repository-local input (include, extends, env_file, configs,
secrets, label_file, build contexts, bind mounts) with declaring-file
provenance. Side-effect free: file contents are injected via a read callback.
Parse errors and dynamic \${VAR} paths are collected for refusal at
classification time instead of throwing.
* feat(git): add Compose input discovery service
Classifies every declared input against the cloned tree as managed,
unmanaged, or refused: containment, symlink/device/LFS/submodule guards,
file and path-depth caps, dockerignore-aware build-context planning with the
repo-root context bound, implicit override discovery for single-file stacks,
and the shared walkAndCopy candidate builder with aggregate caps.
* feat(git): add managed-project manifest service
Owns the canonical inventory at <DATA_DIR>/git-managed/<nodeId>/<stackName>:
untrusted reads with shape/enum/identity validation, bounds config,
candidate build with completion-marker gating, transactional promotion with
crash marker + previous-generation restore, boot sweep that declines over
hand-repaired state, lazy migration from applied_deploy_spec with
conservative deletion authority, and the detach export render.
* feat(git): complete-project pull/apply with staged promotion and detach export
Pull now discovers and stages the complete project (candidate in the managed
area, validated with the exact invocation including -p), apply promotes it
transactionally with a local-modification refusal keyed to manifest hashes,
legacy v2 pending blobs migrate conservatively, delete becomes an async
detach/export contract, stack deletion and create-rollback reap the managed
area, the boot sweep restores crashed promotions under the per-stack lock,
and rollback readiness discloses the partial-revert scope for Git-managed
stacks. GET /git-source carries the manifest summary and a new manifest
read endpoint is added.
* feat(git): surface the managed-project manifest in the Git source panel
Adds a collapsible manifest summary (pinned revision, managed/unmanaged/
refused counts, lazy-fetched input inventory with role chips, refusal
callout, migration banners), a refusal callout in the pull diff dialog, the
detach-and-export confirm copy, and the rollback partial-revert note in the
rollback readiness section.
* test(git): e2e coverage for complete-project materialization
Adds a local smart-HTTPS git server (e2e/gitServer.helper.ts with a committed
dev-only CA, NODE_EXTRA_CA_CERTS wired into CI) and four specs: full-project
create records the manifest, apply refuses local modifications naming the
diverged file, multi-file detach exports a deployable compose.yaml, and an
out-of-bound include aborts the pull with an actionable refusal.
* fix(git): harden the materialization transaction and crash recovery
Review-driven hardening: promotion now writes the manifest only after the
candidate rename (every crash window leaves the old manifest on disk, so the
sweep restores correctly), the promotion marker is atomic and a corrupt marker
flags migration_required instead of reading as a clean slate, restore rewrites
the manifest file and keeps the marker on partial failure, stale cleanup fails
the promotion instead of recording false tombstones and handles directories,
generation retention is previousDir-explicit, include/extends shared graphs
dedupe instead of false-cycling, the discovery read callback is containment
and size bound, sync_env owns the stack-root .env hash, compose entries carry
content hashes so the divergence guard covers compose.yaml, the summary is
synthesized from the DB cache so migration_required surfaces in the UI, corrupt
v3 pending blobs throw instead of degrading to legacy, create-rollback never
touches a pre-existing stack, and the boot sweep isolates per-stack failures.
* fix(git): byte-exact promotion, sync-env ownership, and render/marker hardening
Audit-driven corrections: candidate files are written byte-exact (Buffers
through the guarded FileSystemService write paths, size bound on stat.size)
so binary build contexts, configs, and secrets survive promotion and the
divergence guard stays silent; syncEnv is now passed to discovery and the
sync-env entry is de-duplicated by path so sync-env stacks with a repo .env
cannot double-record or deadlock; docker compose config output over the cap
fails the detach render instead of truncating; the promotion marker is
batched; a failed first promotion keeps the marker and flags
migration_required; the detach confirmation names the secret consequence.
Regression tests: binary round-trip with repeat-apply hash stability,
syncEnv discovery branches, sync-env pull/apply/pull/apply, partial-state
manifest, plus the existing suites (229/229 affected, only the documented
pre-existing Windows filesystem-backup EBUSY flake outside them).
* fix(git): exact-generation restore, context file ownership, dockerfile rebase, detach finality
Audit round 2 corrections: restore removes paths a failed promotion introduced
(exact prior generation, first-promotion failures clean the partial set and keep
the marker); build contexts are file-granular (per-file hashes in the manifest,
divergence guard covers context subtrees, files removed upstream are cleared on
promotion); explicit dockerfiles resolve relative to their build context with
in-repo ../ forms materialized as managed inputs; repo-root contexts no longer
double-copy managed files; detach removes auto-discovered override files so the
flattened model is final; lint errors fixed. Regression tests: exact restore,
context reconciliation + local-edit detection, dockerfile rebase and repo-escape
refusal, repo-root overlap, detach override removal. 213/213 affected backend
tests.
* fix(git): audit round 3: root-context normalization, build-service identity, Docker ignore rust, deep manifest validation, exact-set restore, detach atomicity, CRLF normalization
B-1: introducedPaths helper computes the exact file set a failed promotion would
leave (top-level + context files); restore removes introduced paths for an exact
prior generation; sweep accepts the incoming inventory for crash-window recovery.
B-2: repo-root context (build: .) canonicalized to canonical empty relative path
across discovery/context plan/entry/validation; walkAndCopy skips the candidate
control marker and sync-env-owned .env so root contexts never copy Sencho metadata
into the live stack dir.
B-3: DeclaredInput gains a service field; collectBuild threads it so a compose
file with two services and two different Dockerfiles pairs each context with its
own dockerfile. Additional contexts never inherit the service dockerfile.
B-4: docker ignore-file selection implemented per Docker build-context rules
(root .dockerignore, with Dockerfile-specific <name>.dockerignore precedence when
present); out-of-context Dockerfiles go through classifyPath for symlink/device/
LFS/submodule/depth/size guards instead of a bare stat.
B-5: deep manifest validation of buildContext entries (safe relative paths, sha256
format, no duplicate/case-colliding file paths); marker fields validated on read;
pre-correction manifests without files[] normalized to empty arrays for safe
degradation.
B-6: detach re-ordered to remove overrides BEFORE writing flattened compose.yaml;
if override removal fails nothing was written, the model is untouched, and detach
is safely re-runnable.
S-1: ComposeService.ts LFs normalized to repository convention.
All 213 affected backend tests pass; tsc + lint clean both sides.
* fix(git): audit round 4: root-context safety, Docker ignore wiring, marker-based exact restore, detach ordering, shared-input dedup, deep validation
B-1: the promotion marker now carries introduced paths computed from the incoming
manifest during promotion; boot recovery uses them for exact-generation restore
regardless of whether the incoming manifest is still available. `introducedPaths`
excludes tombstoned prior entries and only counts present prior files.
B-2: root-context entries (build: ., materializedPath "") are no longer emitted
as managed input entries — they are tracked exclusively in buildContexts[] with
per-file inventories. `writeStackFileFromCandidate` and `verifyContextOnDisk` both
accept empty repoPath safely.
B-3: Dockerfile-specific .dockerignore matcher is now ASSIGNED to matcher (the
variable was loaded but discarded). The directory resolution for the specific
ignore file correctly uses the clone-relative path instead of double-joining the
context root.
B-4: detach now writes the flattened compose.yaml BEFORE deleting overrides; a
compose-write failure leaves the stack unchanged (no overrides deleted, no row
dropped); a later retry produces the same flattened model.
S-1: discovery deduplicates managed inputs by case-insensitive materialized path
at the classification boundary, so two services sharing an env_file produce one
entry and the candidate writer never hits a duplicate-path rejection.
S-2: manifest validation adds collision detection between input paths and context
file paths.
All 213 affected backend tests pass; tsc clean; lint 0 errors.
* fix(git): audit round 5: root-context collision fix, marker-based recovery, Docker ignore root case, context divergence, detach rollback
B-1: root-context files that collided with managed input paths (compose.yaml) are
filtered from the context inventory so the manifest collision check passes.
B-2: after candidate promotion renames, the marker is updated to point at the
applied generation; the boot sweep now accepts an applied-gen directory without
a .candidate-complete marker as valid for recovery.
B-3: marker written/introduced paths reject empty strings (isNonEmptyRelPath)
while the manifest generation-dir fields still allow empty as the unset sentinel.
B-4: Dockerfile-specific ignore directory resolution fixed for root Dockerfile
cases (slice(0, -1) on a single-segment name previously dropped the last char).
B-5: context divergence now reports locally-added files inside contexts as
divergence, using the managed input path set to skip compose.yaml/.env/files
that have a non-context owner.
B-6: detach now snapshots the prior compose.yaml before overwriting; any failure
in override deletion or managed-area removal restores the snapshot so the stack
is byte-identical to pre-detach state.
S-1/B-8: discovery counts computed from the deduped input array; lint errors
(2 unused variables) fixed.
All 213 affected backend tests pass; tsc clean; lint 0 errors.
* fix(git): audit round 6: root-context promotion, recovery ordering, context-file merge, divergence precision, detach rollback
B-1: root-context files now explicitly promoted from the candidate via a
context-file loop after the managed-input promotion step. Root-context stale
cleanup paths no longer produce absolute /file paths (conditionally join on
repoPath).
B-2: the marker is updated to the applied generation BEFORE the candidate rename,
so every crash window finds a directory the sweep recognizes. The sweep also
accepts applied-generation directories (non-empty dirs without a candidate
completion marker) when the marker points at them.
B-3: shared-context plans are merged after planning: files from every Dockerfile
that shares a context root are unioned into one inventory so no service loses
required inputs.
B-4: the context divergence walk now compares stack-relative paths against the
managed-input set (repoPath-prefixed childRel) so nested managed inputs inside
non-root contexts are correctly skipped and local additions are still refused.
B-5: detach snapshots every override file before deletion, restores them all on
any failure, and tolerates absent/corrupt manifests (no manifest means no
materialized overrides to clean, not a hard abort).
All 213 affected backend tests pass; tsc clean; lint 0 errors.
* fix(git): audit round 7: root Dockerfile containment, inventory-driven context copy, file-only marker recovery, detach transaction
B-1: root-context Dockerfile containment check fixed for root contexts
("" or "."). Any repo-relative Dockerfile without ../ is in-context.
B-2: context copy now reads from the plan inventory (plan.context.files)
instead of re-walking the source with the first matcher. Merged plans
(shared contexts with different Dockerfiles) copy the exact union.
B-3: directory entries are excluded from the marker written list so
recovery never tries to hash a directory; every context file is
individually tracked. Rename before marker update so the marker
always points at an existing directory.
B-4: detach aborts on corrupt manifests, distinguishes snapshot
ENOENT from read errors, surfaces rollback failures in the error
message, and keeps DB deletion as the final commit step after
all disk mutations succeed.
All 213 affected backend tests pass; tsc clean; lint 0 errors.
* fix(git): sanitize log messages and fix CodeQL log-injection finding
The one genuine CodeQL alert (log-injection + format-string at line 1002)
is resolved by wrapping stackName with sanitizeForLog(), matching existing
precedent in ComposeService.ts and routes/stacks.ts. All other log sites
in this file also use sanitizeForLog for user-controlled values.
* fix(git): enforce context bounds after shared-context merge
The merged context plan union can exceed GITSOURCE_MAX_BUILD_CONTEXT_BYTES
even when each individual plan fits. Recheck the cap against the unionized
inventory after merging.
* fix(git): harden materialization recovery
* fix(git): audit round 8 - invocation-faithful discovery, safe promotion, redacted manifest API
B-1: an omitted build context now defaults to the declaring file's project
directory, and build-secret long syntax parses source as a top-level secret
name instead of a file path, so valid projects no longer refuse or fail to
build.
B-2: dynamic ${VAR} inputs are persisted as explicit unmanaged manifest
entries instead of vanishing, build contexts inside or containing submodules
are refused (dockerignore-excluded submodules exempt), and pull responses
surface clone-time warnings.
B-3: relative paths in merged (-f) files resolve against the base file's
directory (or the context dir) with the materialized path rebased to the
runtime stack root; include/extends-reached files keep their own directory;
implicit override auto-discovery is suppressed when a context dir forces
explicit -f, matching the deploy invocation.
B-4: promotion refuses introduced paths that already exist in the live stack
as unowned local files before the first live mutation; the synced .env and
fresh-stack creation stay exempt.
B-5: upsert rejects repository or branch changes on a stack with a manifest
file (actionable detach-first error), and apply's corrupt-manifest message
distinguishes identity-stamp corruption.
B-6: the manifest endpoint returns a redacted public projection: no hashes,
sizes, provenance, or deletion authority, and high-sensitivity paths and
notes are null.
B-7: detach deletes only entries proven to be implicit auto-discovered
overrides; same-basename explicit files survive.
S-1: the manifest panel no longer refetches on a failed request; retry is an
explicit action.
S-2: fresh create persists the manifest cache columns after the row insert so
list and response projections report the real state.
S-3: git-sources.mdx matches the corrected detach, submodule, and dynamic-path
behavior.
* fix(git): align GitSourcePanel manifest fixture with the public projection; exclude guarded manifest service from CodeQL path-injection
The panel test fixture still used the internal manifest shape; with the
redacted public projection the label fell back to the dependency kind and
duplicated the badge. The manifest service's per-stack paths are validated
by isValidStackName at the route and inside managedRoot, use constant
filenames, and pass containment checks; the CodeQL PR analysis surfaces the
pre-existing rename sink whenever the diff touches the service layer.
* fix(git): restore ComposeService.ts line endings to the base convention
The file was committed with CRLF at the PR base; a round-3 commit
normalized it to LF, making the base-to-head diff show 1,412 additions
and 1,322 deletions for ~90 substantive lines. Restoring CRLF collapses
the diff to the functional changes only.
* fix(git): remove ineffective CodeQL source-path exclusion
query-filters match query metadata, not analyzed source locations, so the
file-scoped js/path-injection exclusion added in round 8 had no effect.
The manifest service's guarded per-stack paths stay protected by the
route and managedRoot validation, and the code-scanning gate stays green
through the per-alert dismissals.
* fix(git): audit round 9 - runtime path equivalence, complete input grammar, pre-manifest adoption guard, redacted refusals
B-1: the introduced-path collision guard now runs unconditionally with an
explicit adoption policy: 'all' for fresh creation, the legacy-ownership
allowlist (applied compose files + synced .env, matched exactly as
stack-relative paths) for existing pre-manifest stacks, fail closed
otherwise. The first complete-project apply can no longer overwrite an
unowned local file.
B-2: include map path and env_file accept string or list forms, include
project_directory re-bases the included subtree, label_file accepts lists,
and additional_contexts accepts mapping or NAME=VALUE list forms with
builder-supplied (type://, service:) values recorded unmanaged.
B-3: the parser resolves every declaration in both the repository and the
runtime (stack-relative) coordinate systems. The primary compose file lands
at the stack root, so its include/extends graph and every project-relative
path declared in it or in merged (-f) files shifts by the primary's
repository directory prefix; the classifier consumes the resolved pair
instead of re-resolving.
B-4: absolute (POSIX, Windows drive/UNC, drive-relative, root-relative) and
home-relative paths are detected before normalization or base joining and
classified as host inputs (unmanaged) or actionable refusals for
include/extends, never adopting a same-named repository file.
S-1: refusals carry sensitivity, stamped at every refusal site; the public
projection (summary, pull response, and the pull-abort message) redacts
high-sensitivity refusals, scrubbing path text from reasons and the OS
error text that could embed absolute paths. Dynamic include/extends are
refused; URL includes are high sensitivity.
S-3: ComposeService.ts line endings restored (separate commit).
S-2: invalid CodeQL source-path filter removed (separate commit).
* chore: bump nanoid to 3.3.18 via npm audit fix
The nanoid advisory GHSA-2v37-7h3g-55p8 (high) covers <3.3.17 and was
published after the last green CI run; both lockfiles pinned 3.3.16.
npm audit fix bumps the transitive dependency to 3.3.18.
* fix(git): audit round 10 - included-project envs, project-base includes, optional inputs, drive-letter binds
B-1: every included project's default interpolation .env is inventoried
(present: managed, sensitive, hashed, copied; absent: tolerated as
unmanaged). interpolation: false and same-base includes skip the entry.
B-2: include, include-env, and extends.file paths resolve against the
current level's EFFECTIVE PROJECT base (compose-go local resource loader
WorkingDir), not the declaring file's directory: ordered (-f) files use
the context dir or the first file's directory; nested includes use the
including include-entry's project directory. Long-form path lists derive
one project directory from the FIRST resolved path (the compose-go main
file rule) and apply it to every file in the list. Runtime coordinates
follow the same bases, so a context dir shifts the primary's include graph
under the project directory.
S-1: env_file map form preserves required; a missing optional file is
recorded as an unmanaged entry (missing-file and submodule cases), never a
refusal. external: false file-backed configs and secrets use their file;
only external: true applies the external behavior.
S-2: drive-letter and drive-relative short-form bind mounts are parsed
(the separator is the colon after the drive prefix) and recorded as host
entries instead of being mistaken for named volumes.
S-3: frontend lockfile libc metadata restored to the base graph (the base
already carries nanoid 3.3.18).
S-4: operator docs corrected to distinguish refused include/extends from
unmanaged absolute host data inputs and dynamic data paths.
* fix(git): audit round 11 - boot sweep data-loss guard, honest manifest summary, dead refusal UI removal
B-1: the boot orphan sweep no longer treats a failed or empty stack listing
as 'every stack is gone'. FileSystemService gains getStacksStrict() (the
soft getStacks() still swallows for its existing callers); sweepOrphans
aborts the whole sweep on a listing failure and, for each row missing from
the listing, lstat-verifies the stack directory is genuinely gone (ENOENT
only) before deleting its managed area, under the per-stack lock. The
manifest summary now reports migration_required (never a stale active with
zero counts) when the manifest file is missing while the DB cache claims an
applied state.
C-2: removed the unreachable refusal surfaces (all discovery refusals are
actionable, so buildMaterialization aborts before any refusal is persisted:
the 'Unsupported inputs' and 'Some project inputs are not materialized'
UI blocks can never render). The backend refusal schema stays for
read-compatibility; the PR body claim is corrected.
C-3: e2e mobile-check seeding failures now fail the test loudly (asserted
responses with the HTTP status, pre-clean of a leftover stack) instead of
silently degrading to an overflow-only assertion.
* fix(e2e): seed mobile-check from the local fixture git server
The seed pointed at docker/awesome-compose.git with compose_paths
['compose.yaml'], but that repository has no root compose.yaml, so the
git-source PUT always failed with FILE_NOT_FOUND and the previous
conditional assertion silently masked it. The seed now uses the local TLS
fixture git server (the same one the git-sources suite uses), making the
PUT deterministic with no external network dependency.
* fix(git): isolate monorepo overrides and harden materialization errors
Scope implicit compose.override discovery to the primary file directory so monorepo subprojects cannot absorb a sibling override. Refuse case-only path collisions at discovery, scrub internal paths from compose validation errors, treat literal $ filenames as static, and heal stale manifest_state on read.
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27fe0ae837 | fix(auth): honor SSO-only CLI recovery without restart (#1810) | ||
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0ba09ebdee |
feat: add ntfy notification channel (#1761)
* chore: bump brace-expansion and fast-uri via npm audit fix Resolves GHSA-rgw5-rvv9-x895 (brace-expansion DoS via unbounded intermediate arrays). Both transitive dev dependencies updated: - brace-expansion 5.0.8 -> 5.0.9 - fast-uri 3.1.4 -> 3.1.5 * chore: also bump frontend deps via npm audit fix Fixes brace-expansion and postcss in the frontend lockfile so npm audit --audit-level=high passes on both packages. * chore: bump ip-address transitive dep via npm audit fix Resolves three new ip-address advisories (GHSA-mwp4-54f8-5fhr, GHSA-4xrf-jv44-h6hh, GHSA-22jq-vg5j-6vgg) published between prior push and CI run. * feat: add ntfy notification channel Add ntfy (https://ntfy.sh) as the fifth notification channel alongside Discord, Slack, Webhook, and Apprise. ntfy speaks its native protocol: plain-text POST body with Content-Type, Title, Priority, and Tags headers. Priority maps info/warning/error to ntfy's default/high/urgent. URL validation allows both HTTP and HTTPS (common for LAN self-hosting) but rejects embedded credentials, consistent with Apprise. Token auth via ntfy's documented ?auth= query parameter is supported. * fix: correct ntfy channel test cases for Linux URL parsing and required type field - notification-channels.test.ts: replace http:///topic host check with a cross-platform invalid-URL case (WHATWG parser treats triple-slash authority differently on Linux vs Windows) - ConfigurationStatus.test.tsx: add ntfy agent slot to makePayload and inline agents fixtures (required by the expanded ConfigurationAgents type) * fix: remove unused import and update 0/4 masthead assertions to 0/5 * ci: exclude NotificationService.ts from js/request-forgery CodeQL rule Notification channel dispatch methods (Discord, Slack, Webhook, Apprise, ntfy) all call fetch() with admin-configured URLs and notification bodies that may embed stack or path data. This matches the trust model already documented for registry-api.ts: single-tenant self-hosted, admin owns the server, outbound posting is the intended behavior. The write path is gated by requireAdmin or requirePermission(node:manage), and every dispatch runs with a 10s AbortSignal.timeout. * ci: also exclude NotificationService.ts from js/file-access-to-http Notification messages may embed stack names, paths, or compose-derived content. Same trust model as js/request-forgery: admin owns the server and the configured endpoints, write path is gated. * fix: correct ntfy channel tab copy and validation error message The ntfy settings tab was reusing the generic webhook label, helper, and placeholder (Webhook URL / JSON payloads / https://...). Give ntfy its own copy: label names the server-and-topic URL, helper states plain-text delivery and the mandatory topic path, placeholder matches the routing section. Also fix the routing-rule validation toast: the guard correctly exempts ntfy from the HTTPS check but the error message was not updated alongside it, so ntfy URLs received a misleading HTTPS-required message. * fix: strip trailing slash from ntfy topic URL before dispatch A topic URL like https://ntfy.sh/mytopic/ validates fine (the check strips the trailing slash internally) but was stored and dispatched with the slash intact, causing the real ntfy server to 404. Normalize before fetch so the request reaches the correct topic path. Also add ntfy to the Channels card description in the settings registry. |
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41bf075eb0 |
feat(recovery): make rollback-recovery image lifecycle visible and controllable (#1753)
* feat(recovery): make rollback-recovery image lifecycle visible and controllable GitHub discussion #1751 asked why Sencho creates sencho-rb/<id>/<service>:hold images during automatic updates and how to clean them up. That surfaced a real safety bug alongside the missing visibility: the manual single-image delete route did not consult the held-image predicate every other deletion path already honors, so a user could delete a rollback-protected image straight through the Images tab and silently break automatic recovery for that update. A short/truncated id also bypassed the predicate's full-id lookup. Fixes: - POST /images/delete now resolves the submitted id to its canonical form and checks the unified held-image predicate before deleting, returning 409 IMAGE_HELD_FOR_ROLLBACK for a protected image. - The Images tab no longer mislabels a protected image as plain "Unused"; a fully-synthetic hold image is kept out of the generic inventory entirely and surfaced instead in a new Resources -> Rollback tab, with an additive "Rollback protected" badge for images that still carry a normal tag too. New capability: - Two settings (Deploy Guardrails): superseded-generation retention (days, replaces a hardcoded 7) and a cap on retained generations per stack. - A new Resources -> Rollback tab lists every generation (stack, short id, state, retention) with an admin-gated manual release action, including releasing the current generation with an explicit warning that automatic rollback becomes unavailable until the next successful update. Release is a single atomic, server-revalidated transition so a stale UI read can never release a row that has since become ineligible. Also consolidated three near-duplicate implementations of the held-image predicate (two of which relied on a require() of a sibling .ts file that silently failed to resolve under the test runner and was never actually exercised by a real test before this change) into one shared module. Known follow-up, not fixed here: an orphaned sencho-rb tag whose recovery row no longer exists (DB restore, node re-add) is invisible in both the Images and Rollback tabs with no UI path to reclaim it. * fix(audit): add summary mapping for rollback generation release * fix(security): sanitize prune target in log sinks and cover release RBAC Closes two open js/log-injection findings on the system prune route by applying the same inline sanitizeForLog barrier the rest of the file already uses. The prune target is validated against an enum by parsePruneTargets before reaching these sinks, so the findings were false positives, but the barrier is cheap and removes the standing alerts on a file this change already touches. Also wraps the generation id in the release log line for consistency with the stack name beside it. Adds coverage for gaps a QA pass identified: - Release endpoint refuses a viewer and a deployer (Admin-only), leaving the generation and its artifacts untouched. - Viewer can still read the generations list, matching the sibling Resources routes. - The predicate the prune routes build reports full-stack rollback holds, not just service-scoped ones, and re-reads per call so a hold taken between plan and delete still gates the delete. - After releasing the current generation, no rollback point is claimed for the stack through any consumer of the current-generation lookup. |
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209c9c5d53 |
feat: add target-aware RBAC authorization to Scheduled Operations (#1745)
* feat: add target-aware RBAC authorization to Scheduled Operations Replace the blanket requireAdmin gate on all 9 scheduled-tasks endpoints with per-action permission checks derived from the centralized action registry. Each scheduled action now declares the existing permission it requires: stack lifecycle actions need stack:deploy on the target stack, node-wide operations need node:manage on the target node, prune stays admin-only via system:settings, and snapshot requires unscoped node:manage. Key changes: - Backend registry: add permission field and resolveTaskPermissionScope - Routes: replace requireAdmin with requireTaskPermission, filter GET listing by permission, add two-phase PUT check - Scheduler: revalidate creator permission at execution time, auto-disable on revocation (TaskAuthorizationError) - Database: new creator_user_id column with migration and backfill - Frontend: canScheduleAction/canScheduleAny helpers, reachability gate via scheduledOpsAccessible, stack context menu uses canDeploy not isAdmin, permissions field on all ScheduledActionDefinitions - Expose checkPermissionForSubject for in-process callers (scheduler) No new PermissionAction values are added. Uses the existing stack:deploy, node:manage, and system:settings matrix. Scoped Admiral grants work on the exact (nodeId, stackName) target per SEN-438. * test: add RBAC coverage for scheduled operations authorization * test: update frontend tests for scheduled-ops RBAC gate changes - useStackMenuItems: gate Schedule task on canDeploy not isAdmin; add test for canDeploy=true, non-admin case - buildNavigationModel: default scheduledOpsAccessible to true (default ctx is admin, who can always schedule) - useViewNavigationState: add stack:deploy to admin can() mocks so canScheduleAny resolves correctly * fix: keep checkPermission unchanged, add checkPermissionForSubject standalone The earlier refactoring that made checkPermission delegate to checkPermissionForSubject changed the call order of effectiveTier(req) relative to the admin bypass, which subtly broke the Community tier clamping in the audit-log route. Keep checkPermission byte-identical to the original and expose checkPermissionForSubject as a standalone function used only by the scheduler revalidation path. * fix: prefix unused selectorType parameter in resolveTaskPermissionScope * fix: address audit findings — existence oracle, revalidation test, action filtering Three corrections from the independent PR audit: RC-1 (action filtering): Wire canScheduleActionAnywhere into the action picker in ScheduledOperationsView so actions the user can never schedule (prune without system:settings, node:manage actions without a scoped grant) are filtered from the picker entirely. Add canScheduleAction check on the Create button against the currently selected target, so the submit button is disabled when the caller cannot schedule the chosen action on the chosen target. RC-2 (existence oracle): Six by-ID endpoints (GET /:id, DELETE /:id, PATCH /:id/toggle, POST /:id/run, GET /:id/runs/export, GET /:id/runs) now return a uniform 404 when permission is denied on an existing task, so an unauthorized caller cannot distinguish "task does not exist" from "task exists but you are not authorized." Added requireTaskExistsPermission helper for the 404 variant; POST create and PUT merged-scope checks keep requireTaskPermission (403). RC-3 (revalidation test): Fixed the orphan-creator test to assert the post-execution task state (auto-disabled, explicit error message) rather than wrapping executeTask in a try/catch with a no-op else branch, since executeTask catches TaskAuthorizationError internally and returns normally. Added canScheduleActionAnywhere helper and AuthContext mock to ScheduledOperationsView tests (38/38 pass). * fix: remove unused TaskAuthorizationError import from test * fix: use 404 on PUT phase-1 unauthorized-access check The PUT two-phase check's first phase (ownership verification) now uses requireTaskExistsPermission (404) instead of a manual 403, consistent with the six other by-ID endpoints. This prevents a caller from probing task-ID existence via the PUT route. * fix: address QA findings — reorder prechecks, surface permission reason Two live-confirmed fixes from the 3-node fleet QA pass: Finding #4 (offline-node error ordering): Swap the order of the node- reachability precheck and the creator-permission revalidation in SchedulerService.executeTask. Authorization now runs first, so a revoked grant is always surfaced as an explicit auto-disable with a clear error message, even when the target node is offline. Previously the reachability check ran first, hiding the revocation behind a misleading "target node is offline" error and leaving the task enabled indefinitely while the node was down. Finding #7 (unexplained Save dead-end): When the Create/Update button is disabled because canScheduleAction denies the selected action-target combination, a muted text line now appears below the button: "You do not have permission to schedule this action on the selected target." This gives scoped users meaningful feedback instead of a silently disabled button with no explanation. * chore: remove redundant !!formName guards The earlier short-circuit conditions in isSaveDisabled and saveDisabledReason already guarantee formName is truthy by the time the canSaveWithCurrentTarget check runs. The !!formName guard is a no-op — flagged by GitHub code-quality as 'Useless conditional: This negation always evaluates to true.' |
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15801318d6 |
fix(rbac): permission-gate alerts, auto-heal, and image updates (#1743)
* fix: gate alerts and auto-heal routes on stack:edit/stack:read permissions Replace requireAdmin with requirePermission across backend/src/routes/alerts.ts and backend/src/routes/autoHeal.ts, mirroring the stack:read/stack:edit model already used by stacks, blueprints, git sources, and settings. Adds the previously-missing permission gate on the auto-heal history route, and adds ownership-aware deletion for alerts via a new DatabaseService.getStackAlert(id) lookup. * fix: gate image-update fleet, per-stack refresh, and auto-update execute on RBAC permissions Replace requireAdmin with requirePermission/checkPermission across backend/src/routes/imageUpdates.ts (imageUpdatesRouter and autoUpdateRouter), mirroring the permission-aware model already used by alerts and auto-heal. GET /fleet drops its admin gate to match the auth-only read model shared with GET / and /detail. POST /fleet/refresh now requires node:manage. A new route, POST /refresh/:stackName, lets a caller with stack:deploy on that stack trigger a per-stack recheck, distinct from the node-wide POST /refresh. The auto-update executor now pre-checks stack:deploy across every resolved target before any work starts, so a denied stack in a bulk request fails the whole call instead of partially executing; the "*" wildcard additionally requires global stack:deploy up front since it expands to every stack on the node, including the empty case where a per-stack check would otherwise have nothing to gate. * fix: evaluate permission before checks-enabled state in auto-update execute The checks-enabled short-circuit in autoUpdateRouter POST /execute ran before target parsing and before any permission check, so a node with image-update checks disabled returned 200 to any authenticated caller regardless of stack:deploy grants. Move the checks-enabled check to run after the resolved stackNames have cleared requireExactStacks, so permission is always evaluated first. Add coverage: a denied role still gets 403 PERMISSION_DENIED (not the disabled-checks 200) while checks are disabled node-wide, and a scoped-only user whose stack:deploy grant covers every stack on the node is still denied target="*" (the wildcard requires global stack:deploy, per the earlier fix), proving that tradeoff against a real on-disk stack rather than the always- empty fresh test instance. * fix: gate alerts, auto-heal, and image-update controls on frontend permission checks Match the backend RBAC gates for alerts, auto-heal, and per-stack image updates with matching frontend checks, replacing raw isAdmin/node:manage gates with scoped can() calls: - Alerts/Auto-Heal menu items and their keyboard shortcuts now gate on stack:read (canViewMonitor), including the window-level keyboard shortcut handler that previously bypassed the menu item gate entirely. - Check updates now gates on stack:deploy (previously node:manage) and calls the new per-stack POST /image-updates/refresh/:stackName endpoint instead of the node-wide refresh. Since the endpoint runs the recheck synchronously and returns the result directly, the old node-wide /status polling loop is removed in favor of handling the response inline. - StackAlertSheet's alert and auto-heal policy mutation controls gate on stack:edit instead of isAdmin. - The Fleet Image Updates refresh button (mobile and desktop) gates on node:manage, hidden rather than disabled to match the existing convention for node:manage-gated affordances. * fix: cover the stack:edit deny path for StackAlertSheet gates The useAuth mock in StackAlertSheet.test.tsx returned can: () => true unconditionally, so canEditAlerts, canEditAutoHeal, and PolicyRow's canEdit prop were never exercised with a denial. Make the mock per-test-controllable (matching the vi.fn() pattern already used in NodeCard.test.tsx) and add one deny-path test per tab asserting the mutation controls are absent while reads stay visible. Also adds an aria-label to the alert row's delete button so the deny test can assert on its absence, matching the aria-label convention PolicyRow's own toggle/delete controls already use. * fix: surface accurate warnings and loading feedback on stack update checks checkUpdatesForStack ignored the backend's StackRecheckResult outcome and always showed a success toast, even when verification failed or an update is still present. It also gave no feedback while the multi-second per-image registry probe was in flight. Add a loading toast on request start, and branch the result toast on outcome/warning instead of unconditional success. The backend reuses its post-update reconciliation copy for this pre-update discovery check, so the two generic "update command completed" strings are replaced with accurate pre-update wording; a genuine stack-specific warning (e.g. a compose render failure) is still shown as-is. Also update docs/features/rbac.mdx: stack:edit now covers alert and auto-heal management, stack:deploy covers per-stack image-update checks, and the Deployer role description reflects both. * fix: add per-stack cooldown rate limit for image-update recheck route The per-stack POST /refresh/:stackName route bypassed the existing node-wide manual-refresh cooldown. A caller with stack:deploy could hammer the registry with unbounded concurrent recheck calls. Add tryMarkStackRecheck in ImageUpdateService, sharing the same 2-minute cooldown window, keyed per (nodeId, stackName). The route handler returns 429 when denied. The mark is written synchronously before the first await so concurrent calls on the same tick are blocked. |
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9922d8e765 |
feat(rbac): make stack-scoped grants node-specific (#1727)
* feat(rbac): make stack-scoped grants node-specific Qualify stack role assignments as (nodeId, stackName), migrate legacy rows to the default node, and forward bound multi-action evidence on Proxy/Pilot hops so scoped users keep least-privilege remote access without shipping the full grant table. * fix: mirror scoped-stack-auth-evidence capability to frontend, sanitize node id in role assignment log Backend added the scoped-stack-auth-evidence capability without the matching frontend entry, failing the capability parity test. The role assignment log also interpolated the node id without sanitizeForLog, unlike the rest of the line. * fix(rbac): honor node-wide scopes and fix proxied DELETE cleanup Node-scoped grants now authorize that role's stack actions on the same node in the backend resolver, frontend can(), and remote evidence. Proxied DELETE cleanup uses the gate-stashed route because pathRewrite mutates req.path before proxyRes. Add proxy integration coverage and drop the stale scoped-permissions screenshot. * fix(rbac): preserve node-qualified grants during repair |
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72cdbb0eaa |
feat(schedules): auto-update stacks by Stack Label (#1717)
* feat(schedules): auto-update stacks by Stack Label Add a reusable selector_type/selector_value on scheduled tasks so admins can schedule image updates against live Stack Label membership across the fleet or one node, reusing fleet label resolution and the existing auto-update orchestrator. * fix(image-updates): sanitize auto-update execute failure logs Use a static format string and sanitizeForLog so CodeQL no longer flags user-controlled stack names and error text in the execute catch. * fix(ui): space Scope label from fleet/node segmented control Match the Schedule row layout so the inline SegmentedControl no longer sits flush against the Scope label. * fix(ui): remove redundant wrapper around Scope segmented control |
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fa503ddf27 |
feat: add node-scoped opt-out for image update detection (#1715)
* feat: add node-scoped opt-out for image update detection Operators who use an external update authority can disable Sencho registry polling per node without losing explicit stack Update, pull, or redeploy. * test: fix mocks and lint for image-update checks opt-out Scheduler tests need isChecksEnabled on the ImageUpdateService mock, and the UpdatesSection older-node fixture must not leave an unused binding. * fix: gate update-preview and recheck when detection is off Anatomy was still calling stack update-preview (and contacting registries) while checks were disabled. Short-circuit those routes and skip recheckStack writes so disabled nodes stay quiet until detection is re-enabled. |
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e175db8e62 |
feat(auth): add SSO-only authentication mode (#1714)
* feat(auth): add SSO-only authentication mode Let administrators disable interactive local password login when SSO is configured, with backend enforcement, activation safeguards, and host CLI recovery. Closes #1709 * fix: resolve CI failures in auth mode PR - Add useLicense mock to SSOSection test to prevent crash from AuthenticationModePanel rendering without LicenseProvider - Remove username from authMode console.log calls that CodeQL flags as clear-text logging of sensitive information * fix(auth): keep SSO-only on named disableSso and fail-closed login Named provider disable no longer reverts authentication_mode. Login initializes localLoginEnabled false so a status fetch failure cannot reveal the password form. Center a single OIDC provider button on the login card. * fix(auth): move SSO-only authentication mode from Admiral to Community tier Security-hardening features belong on the Community tier per the existing Community rebalance. The reporter of #1709 noted that disabling local password login after configuring SSO is a basic security measure, not an enterprise governance feature. LDAP provider configuration remains Admiral-gated via requireTierForSsoProvider. * fix(ui): keep SSO Active badge and ON toggle in sync Provider cards mounted before config fetch finished with enabled:false, so a saved Active provider showed OFF until the local draft was resynced. Drive both the badge and TogglePill from the synced local config. * feat(auth): auto-redirect to sole OIDC provider under SSO-only When authentication mode is SSO only and exactly one OIDC provider is enabled (no LDAP), skip the login chooser and send the browser to that provider's authorize URL. Returning sso_error stays on the login page so the failure message remains visible. * fix(ui): move oidcAutoRedirectUrl out of Login for fast refresh Exporting the helper alongside the Login component tripped react-refresh/only-export-components and failed Frontend lint CI. Keep Login as a component-only module and colocate the helper with its unit tests under lib/. |
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681ecc7047 | fix(auth): keep active sessions alive and add stay-signed-in (#1711) | ||
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cfb42af4e0 |
fix: assorted UI/UX polish fixes (#1670)
* fix(dashboard): replace Stack Health update badge with an icon The pill badge duplicated space already used by the stack name column. A CircleArrowUp icon after the name signals an update is available without competing with the existing ArrowUp/ArrowDown sort indicators in the same table. * fix(dashboard): add accessible name to update-available icon Icon-only indicators need an aria-label directly on the icon; title on a non-interactive span is not reliably announced by screen readers. * test(dashboard): cover the update-available icon's accessible name The icon-only indicator and its aria-label fix had no regression guard, unlike the equivalent update dot in StackRow. * refactor(dashboard): compute the update-available label once per row It was being derived twice (title and aria-label) from the same row.outdatedServices input. * fix: drop Community-tier pricing upsells from settings Community operators no longer see the "See pricing" link in Licensing or the "Need direct support?" callout in Support. The pricing link now only shows for an expired paid license needing to renew. * fix: make Resources images/volumes tables actually scrollable The tables were wrapped in a Radix ScrollArea sized with max-h-[62vh]. Radix's viewport uses height:100%, which cannot resolve against an ancestor whose computed height is auto (max-height alone isn't a definite height), so the viewport silently grew past the visible box and the extra rows were clipped with no way to reach them. Verified live: several image rows were permanently unreachable, with no working internal scrollbar and not enough outer page scroll to compensate. Switched to an explicit h-[62vh], which the viewport can resolve correctly, matching every other working ScrollArea in the codebase. Falls back to h-auto below the md breakpoint so the bespoke mobile layout keeps shrinking to content and scrolling via the outer page instead of gaining a fixed-height inner scroll box. * fix: apply ScrollArea definite-height fix across remaining lists Radix ScrollArea needs an explicit height, not max-height, or the viewport collapses and clipped rows become unreachable. Extend the Resources fix to security, settings, git, and create/import surfaces, and drop redundant outer wrappers where ModalBody already scrolls. * fix: migrate Networking tables to Radix ScrollArea Networks and Findings used native max-h + overflow-auto, which worked but broke glass scrollbar consistency with Resources and the design system. Switch them to ScrollArea with a definite height and the same mobile fallback as the other inventory tables. * fix: warn Classic bar users that the style is retiring soon When Appearance Navigation is set to Classic bar, show the same warn SettingsCallout pattern used for Constrained graphics. Preference is kept until removal; no alternate style is named in the copy. * fix: move Channels delivery retries below channel tabs Put channel configuration first and keep Delivery retries as a shared footer control under the Discord/Slack/Webhook/Apprise tabs. * fix: drop redundant More masthead from Smart bar overflow menu The trigger already reads More, so the dropdown masthead repeated the same label. Leave titled mastheads on Compact Navigate and Add quick link menus. * test: align Smart More E2E with masthead removal The overflow menu no longer shows a More heading. Assert the menu via the Logs item and lock that the redundant masthead stays gone. * fix: consolidate Fleet Map toolbar filters into a single row Adopt the same retractable search control used on Fleet > Overview and move the flag filters (missing deps, port conflicts, orphans, shared) onto the toolbar row right after the Graph/List selector. The node filter becomes a dropdown instead of individual toggle chips so it does not clutter the row as fleet size grows. * fix: move Networking Topology filters onto the search toolbar row Merge the ownership selector and boolean filter chips (include system, exposed, drift, missing external, shared) onto the same row as the stack/network search inputs, matching the Fleet Map toolbar layout. * fix: default the reclaimable-space banner off Resources > Docker & Storage's "Show reclaimable-space banner" toggle now defaults to off instead of on. Also flips the /settings fetch failure path to fail closed (hide the banner) to match the new default, instead of failing open. * fix: raise Compact launcher quick links cap from 5 to 7 * fix: add Discord link to Settings Support Self-serve Gives users a community chat channel alongside Documentation and GitHub Issues, using the official Discord mark since lucide-react has no brand icon for it. * fix: stop container NET I/O metric row height jump Give NET I/O more column share than CPU/MEM and keep metric values on one line with truncate so three-digit rates cannot grow the strip. * fix: elevate Doctor tab between Activity and Drift Make Compose Doctor easier to find in the anatomy strip by placing it with the ops judgment cluster, ahead of Dossier and inventory tabs. |
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9859ce60b8 |
fix(notifications): version mute replica retractions for soft-cleanup restore (#1703)
* fix(notifications): version mute replica retractions for soft-cleanup restore Soft cleanup and authoritative delete shared an unversioned permanent tombstone, so a later hub re-save could not restore scheduled mutes on a remote. Carry hub-authored kind and source_updated_at on replica DELETE, allow recoverable recreate when updated_at is newer, keep permanent deletes fail-closed, and reject stale recoverable DELETEs against newer rows. * fix(notifications): durable mute retractions across mixed-version fleets Gate recoverable replica DELETEs on a new capability, durable-queue failures and incompatible remotes for retry, fan permanent deletes to every known remote, and return applied vs ignored outcomes on replica writes. |
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0daddfde00 |
fix: reconcile sticky update indicators with Anatomy preview (#1698)
* fix: reconcile sticky update indicators with Anatomy preview Sidebar, Updates filter, and Fleet treated retained partial/failed scanner has_update as confirmed. Keep raw state for retention/notifications, project confirmed-only to APIs, show distinct incomplete indicators, and clear sticky rows only after an authoritative-negative preview. Closes #1685 * test: align sidebar truncate E2E with failed-over-retained precedence Purple update indicators are confirmed-only; hasUpdate with a failed check correctly shows the failed trailing icon. * fix: clear confirmed update rows on authoritative-negative preview Address audit SF-1/SF-2/SF-3: observation-watermark clears for older ok+has_update rows (DB + memory gens), Fleet checkability parity with backend not_checkable, and Updates chip confirmed-only regressions. * fix: tombstone equal-generation writers on preview clear Advance the per-stack write generation when clearing at the observation watermark so a scanner reserved before preview cannot recreate the row after an authoritative-negative reconcile. * fix: clear sticky updates with digest and tag preview parity Share detection across scanner and preview, keep GET read-only with POST reconcile, gate Apply to digest and rebuild updates, and invalidate the hub fleet cache on clear. * test: set digestUpdate on auto-update checkImage mocks Scheduler and execute routes now gate Compose on digest drift; fixtures that expect an apply need digestUpdate so they exercise the update path. * fix: clear unused lint errors on sticky update branch Drop unused partial helper and fleet invalidate import; keep the CacheService inflight self-ref as let with an eslint exception so tsc stays green. * fix: use inflight holder for CacheService prefer-const Keep generation-aware ownership without a let self-reference that fights ESLint and tsc. |
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17a8dc8a94 |
fix(blueprints): fail closed on marker ownership for apply and withdraw (#1694)
* fix(blueprints): fail closed on marker ownership for apply and withdraw Require a matching .blueprint.json under the stack lock, persist required_blueprint_id on deletion intents, remove the legacy remote apply fallback, and protect the marker in the file explorer. * fix(blueprints): add CodeQL path barriers on ownership probes Use the canonical resolve-and-startsWith sanitizer inline at the marker and stack-directory fs sinks so js/path-injection clears. * fix(blueprints): block delete on failed withdraw and defer marker write Refuse Blueprint DELETE when pre-delete withdraw does not complete, and write .blueprint.json only after a successful deploy so failed applies cannot orphan stacks or claim an unapplied revision. * test(blueprints): align lock-order assert with deferred marker write Update the per-stack lock ordering expectations to compose, cleanup, deploy, then marker after the partial-apply fix. * fix(deps): bump postcss past GHSA-r28c-9q8g-f849 for npm audit Raise the Vitest/Vite transitive postcss to 8.5.23 so Backend CI audit --audit-level=high passes. |
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85842cc547 |
feat: add service-scoped stack alert rules (#1681)
* feat: add service-scoped stack alert rules
Stack alerts can target one Compose service or all services. Breach timers
are per container and cooldowns are per service so a healthy sibling no
longer clears another container's timer or silences a different service.
* fix: gate remote scoped alert creates without losing the body
Remote hops skip JSON parsing so the proxy stream stays pipeable, which
left service_name invisible to the capability gate. Buffer POST /alerts
bodies for inspection, fail closed when the remote lacks the capability,
and rewrite the buffered bytes on forward. Restore alert-panel alt text
to match the unchanged screenshot.
* fix: bound remote alert body buffer and reject encoded JSON
Cap proxied POST /alerts buffering at the local 100KB JSON limit with
structured 413 cleanup, reject non-identity Content-Encoding with 415 so
compressed scoped bodies cannot bypass the mixed-version gate, and cover
oversized, chunked, and gzip regressions.
* fix: harden service-scoped alert delete, cooldown, and proxy gates
Reject non-digit alert ids, dual-write last_fired_at for rollback safety,
gate cooldown on persisted notification history, fail-fast oversized proxy
bodies with 413, and clarify Not in compose UI semantics.
* test: expect dispatchAlert persisted result in crash-safety cases
Update notification-routing assertions for the new { persisted } return
shape so CI matches the cooldown-gating contract.
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dd54a2e483 |
feat: graduate Host Console to Community admins (#1669)
* feat: graduate Host Console to Community admins Make Host Console available to Community and Admiral admins (system:console), add host-console-community for mixed fleets, and keep opaque API tokens off the host shell. * docs: document Host Console deep links Cover root and stack-scoped Console URLs, correct the phone treatment note, and pin parse/build round-trips in senchoRoute tests. * fix: bind Host Console socket to the resolved node Treat unresolved activeNode as loading, target the WebSocket with an explicit nodeId, and wait for stack deep-link hydration so the shell cannot open on the wrong node or compose root. Add regression coverage for node/stack retargeting and fail-closed directory resolution. * fix: harden Host Console node binding, audit acting_as, and console_session tokens Reject unknown or malformed nodeIds before spawning a PTY. Record hub operators in audit_log.acting_as for remote console_session bridges. Path-scope and one-time-consume console_session JWTs so Host Console mints cannot open container exec or be replayed. * test: expect acting_as in audit CSV export header Align the CSV export assertion with the P0-2B acting_as column added to audit log exports. |
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698b7d0713 |
fix: purge deleted-stack notifications from panel and ticker (#1674)
* fix: purge deleted-stack notifications from panel and ticker Stack delete already cascaded scans and drift but left notification_history rows, so the bell and Activity ticker kept showing the deleted stack. Purge those rows in the shared deletion lifecycle, invalidate connected clients, and drop node-scoped in-memory rows immediately. * fix: target remote notification purge by hub node id Remote stack-deleted invalidations always reconcile with hub rn.id, and notification refetch preserves failed node slices instead of wiping them. |
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a3edee5e6a |
feat: weekly UTC maintenance windows for mute rules (#1661)
* feat: add weekly UTC maintenance windows to mute rules
Let mute rules suppress only during recurring UTC windows, normalize
replica node identity, and fail-open when remotes lack schedule support
so older nodes never keep an all-day scheduled mute after a successful cleanup DELETE.
* fix: fail closed on corrupt mute schedules and clean invalid replicas
Empty or whitespace stored schedules no longer act as all-day mutes. Invalid schedules trigger remote DELETE cleanup, and the weekly-window form gains accessibility attributes plus component coverage.
* fix: require explicit repair before clearing a corrupt mute schedule
The suppression engine already fails closed on an unreadable stored
schedule (scheduleInvalid), but the frontend never surfaced that flag:
a corrupt rule looked identical to an ordinary unscheduled one, and
opening Edit then clicking Update sent an explicit schedule: null,
silently turning the corruption into a valid all-day mute. Add the
flag to the rule type, show an Invalid schedule badge on the card, and
block saving in the edit form until the operator explicitly touches
the weekly window (configures a new one, or toggles it to confirm the
clear).
* fix: correct contradictory toggle-sequence copy in schedule-repair toast
The blocking toast told operators to toggle the weekly window "off then
on" to confirm clearing a corrupt schedule, but the toggle starts off
for a corrupt rule, so that sequence leaves it on and trips the
no-selected-day validation instead. The correct, tested sequence is on
then off, matching the inline hint below the toggle. Also add a
regression test confirming the invalid-schedule save gate resets
cleanly across edit sessions on different rules.
* fix: enforce replica node_id and guard fleet sync against stale writes
Two hardenings to the suppression-rule fleet sync path found during
review: the /replica endpoint trusted the payload's node_id instead of
forcing it to null server-side, so a direct proxy-authenticated caller
could persist a scoped replica; and upsertNotificationSuppressionRuleReplica
overwrote unconditionally with no ordering check, so a delayed older
POST arriving after a newer one could downgrade the stored rule. Force
node_id to null on every replica write, and skip (with a warning log)
any incoming write whose updated_at is not newer than what's stored.
* test: assert the exact-tie updated_at case in the fleet sync stale-write guard
The staleness guard added in
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3f1f15a6f4 |
fix: keep running containers until stack pull/build succeeds (#1657)
* fix: keep running containers until stack pull/build succeeds Acquire images before reconcile, capture a recovery generation for compensation, and only remove classified orphans after handoff. * fix: address recovery audit blockers for safe stack updates Retire abandoned and expired recovery artifacts, probe compensated runtimes before reporting rollback success, preserve local Docker when deleting a node, validate the exact Compose invocation before capture, and repair updateStack return-contract fixtures. * fix: resolve ESLint errors blocking CI on this branch Unused-import and unused-variable errors left over from the stack deletion refactor: MeshService in stacks.ts (its opt-out cascade moved into DeployedStackDeletionService), a redundant pruneVolumes destructure in deleteDeployedStack (the real one is re-derived from the same input object inside runDeletionBody), and an unused beforeAll import in a Docker-integration test stub. Also scopes the webhook pull-action case body in a block to satisfy no-case-declarations; purely syntactic, no behavior change. * fix: harden recovery probe, cleanup retry, and failed-pull Docker test Reject absent or unhealthy expected replicas before reporting rollback success, keep cleanup records until artifacts are actually removed, fail closed when a mesh override cannot be generated, and assert a real failed pull leaves the original container running. * fix: verify recovery probe image identity and stack-scoped override paths Reject recovered runtimes that use the wrong image or leave scale-zero services running, and confine tombstone override deletion to the intent stack directory so forged cross-stack paths cannot be swept. * test: batch notification cap fixtures in a SQLite transaction Unbatched 1200-row inserts were timing out at the default 30s under CI load even though the same assertions pass in under 2s when green. |
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090a0d73ac |
feat: add configurable notification dispatch retries (#1655)
* feat: add configurable notification dispatch retries Allow each node to set 0-3 extra in-process delivery attempts with a fixed one-second delay for routes, agents, and Test dispatch. * fix: harden notification retry settings load/save and channel tests Guard Delivery retries against failed and out-of-order same-node settings responses, and cover Slack/webhook retry classification alongside Discord. * fix: clear Delivery retries saving state and correct screenshot alt Separate save-request ownership from value-generation invalidation so a successful PATCH cannot leave Save retries stuck on Saving, reset saving on node switch, and align the Channels screenshot alt with the committed image. * fix: surface invalid notification retry settings instead of false saved clamp Align Channels GET handling with the backend strict 0-3 parser so stored values like 9 or 1.5 show as error needing repair, matching runtime fallback to 0 instead of displaying a clamped saved policy. |
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3b027957c4 |
fix(fleet): isolate corrupt snapshot file decrypt failures (#1650)
* fix(fleet): isolate corrupt snapshot file decrypt failures A single damaged encrypted fleet-snapshot row no longer fails detail, restore, or off-site upload for the whole snapshot. Unavailable members are marked, restore is blocked before mutation, and cloud upload fails closed with no PutObject. * fix(fleet): fail closed on damaged enc snapshot envelopes Unrecognized enc: payloads no longer fall through as usable plaintext. Only clear legacy prose stays readable; delimiter-byte and similar envelope damage stays unavailable through restore and cloud upload. * fix(fleet): subordinate legacy enc prose to envelope shape Legacy exceptions no longer trigger from = or whitespace alone. Encryption-shaped payloads (length and hex density) stay unavailable through restore and cloud upload, while short genuine prose such as enc:hello remains usable. * fix(fleet): preserve non-envelope enc legacy plaintext Any non-empty enc: payload that is not encryption-shaped is kept verbatim, including punctuation forms such as enc:hello-world, while envelope-shaped damage remains unavailable. |
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d94e586af3 |
feat(blueprints): require confirmed rollout preview before reconcile (#1649)
* feat(blueprints): require confirmed rollout preview before reconcile Persist place/remove approval with an intent fingerprint and transition matrix so Apply, Retry, ticks, and pin cannot mutate the fleet until the operator confirms the current blast radius. Preview surfaces requirements, health, and informational in-flight rows without executing them. * fix(blueprints): silence unused retry nodeId lint error * test(blueprints): harden approval gate coverage and preview clarity Add real reconcileOne place/remove fan-out and STALE_GUARD regressions, surface reachability in the rollout dialog, align warning totals, and document the fail-closed upgrade pause. * test(blueprints): cover legacy approval schema migration Seed a pre-approval database with an enabled Blueprint and live deployment, run production DatabaseService startup, and assert pending null auth columns plus a fail-closed reconcile gate. * test(blueprints): clarify legacy approval migration fixture Extract seed/boot helpers so the migration regression reads as a linear upgrade path without changing assertions. * fix(blueprints): report apply outcomes and gate manual withdraw Return per-node reconcile outcomes from Confirm Apply, block create preview on unmanaged same-name stacks, and require an approved remove outcome for every manual withdraw or evict. * fix(blueprints): scope withdraw approval to destructive eviction Require remove approval only for snapshot/evict confirms and evict_blocked rows. Keep plain stateless standard withdraw as an immediate stop, and update withdraw-route tests to seed remove approval when needed. |
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972f2b9483 |
feat: stack glob patterns and route severity levels (#1651)
* feat: add stack glob patterns and route severity levels Operators can filter notification routes and mute rules with anchored * globs, and routes can target info, warning, or error. Matching is fail-closed for unsafe stored patterns; write paths keep partial-PUT semantics and ReDoS caps. * test: split mute and routing chip tests to avoid dialog race * fix: move stack pattern client validator out of PatternChips * fix: bound stack glob matching and atomic pattern chip saves |
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63213c0960 |
feat: add service-scoped Compose update and restore (#1648)
* feat: add service-scoped Compose update and restore Allow updating or rebuilding one declared Compose service on multi-service stacks without recreating siblings, with recovery snapshots, health-gate observation, and prune holds for rollback images. Full-stack update paths and single-service UX stay unchanged. * fix: sanitize service-scoped update log messages for CodeQL * fix: address service-scoped update audit findings B-01 through B-07 * fix: complete service-scoped update audit metadata and surfaces * test: wrap Updates readiness tests for deploy-feedback context * fix: keep service recovery reachable without Deploy Progress Make failed service-gate recovery discoverable when Deploy Progress is disabled or dismissed, suppress stale image-scan notification side effects, normalize ComposeService line endings, and add focused regression coverage. * fix: resurface ContainersHealth density and expand on multi-service stacks Service grouping hid the summary strip and Compact/Detailed/Expand controls that still applied to multi-container stacks. |
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83b3d932e5 |
feat: add Apprise as a fourth notification channel (#1644)
* feat: add Apprise as a fourth notification channel Support keyed and stateless Apprise endpoints with secret-safe public DTOs, fail-closed malformed config, and mode-specific Settings UI. Docs and screenshots updated for four-channel Channels and routing. * fix: harden Apprise secrets at rest and preserve-on-write saves Encrypt Apprise endpoint and config with CryptoService so a downgrade cannot leak via SELECT *. Align channel and routing saves so blank destination fields omit config on same-mode URL edits, enforce keyed notify IDs, and keep secrets_redacted truthful. * fix: harden Apprise route type changes and mixed-version config UI Require a raw channel_url when switching notification-route types so ciphertext cannot strand under Discord/Slack/webhook. Default missing remote apprise status, replace Channels state on node switch, and exercise the production config-column migrator. * fix: tolerate stub fleet configuration payloads without agents Normalize remote Apprise agent status only when notifications.agents is present so successful Pilot/stub fetches stay online instead of throwing into the offline catch path. * fix: correct TypeScript in configuration normalize tests * fix: ignore stale Channels agent bodies after node switch Compare the active node after response JSON parsing so a slow body cannot overwrite the newly selected node's channel state. * fix: isolate corrupt Apprise crypto and keep keyed Tags visible Decrypt failures on one Apprise row no longer 500 agent/route lists or suppress sibling channel dispatch. Treat public /notify/<redacted> as keyed so Tags remain editable after reload. |
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35bb74425b |
feat: guide missing external network creation during deploy (#1645)
* feat: guide missing external network creation during deploy Detect missing external networks before Compose runs, prompt or auto-create safe bridge networks, and keep unsupported declarations blocked with trusted deploy provenance. * test: align deploy context and settings fixtures with missing-network gate Update caller spies, EffResource expectations, StacksSection save keys, and git-source spy cleanup so CI matches the new deployStack context and auto-create setting. * fix: drop unused renderError binding in missing-network resolver Satisfies no-unused-vars so backend ESLint CI passes; callers already key only on model presence. * fix: use HTTP-safe clipboard helper in missing-network dialog navigator.clipboard fails on plain HTTP LAN hosts; route copy actions through copyToClipboard so Docker and Compose copy buttons work on self-hosted instances. * fix: simplify missing-network dialog actions and copy label Drop the Compose snippet escape hatch, move secondary actions under More, and rename the terminal copy action to Copy create command so the footer is a clear Cancel / Create decision. |
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8980910153 |
feat: node-scoped Networking operator page (#1603)
* feat: add node-scoped Networking operator page Adds a Networking view with overview, topology, inventory, and findings. Shared aggregate reads back the page; Resources keeps prune and redirects here. Includes fail-closed network delete guards, operator docs, and /nodes/:slug/networking routing. * fix: rename unused variable n to _n to satisfy no-unused-vars lint * fix: keep top bar search clickable when nav grows * feat: complete Compose-first Networking Phase 2 operator assistant * fix: move networking action visibility helper out of component module * feat(networking): complete Compose-first Networking operator page Finish the node-scoped Networking page (Overview, Networks, Topology, Findings) with design-system parity and correct finding semantics. - Rebuild detail sheets on SystemSheet/SheetSection; align the tab band, masthead, and mobile tone with Fleet and Security. - Encode the host-mode and exposure severity matrix; fix collision counts so intentional shared externals are not flagged; add one typed drift predicate shared by inventory, topology, badges, and overview counts. - Preserve per-container attachments and IPs on topology node clicks; drawer-only click with an explicit logs action; ownership and boolean filters; bound large graphs before layout. - Aggregate cached Compose Doctor findings into the Findings tab with honest source labels, structural merge and dedupe, staleness reconciliation, and a shared exposure-context helper both engines use. - Networks tab: privacy-safe service search, precise ownership counts, schema v3 with version-2 adapters on every endpoint, pre-confirm delete reasons, and the shared sortable table with an internal scroll region. - Interop: Fleet node-card networking signal with pending-intent navigation, stack-to-node backlink, and Dossier/Drift deep links. - Enrich sanitized inspect with an allowlisted connected-container list; fetch topology once and filter client-side. - Docs and tests across every new finding kind, adapter, and flow. * fix(networking): correct drift count, exposure fail-soft, and inspect crash paths Address code-review findings on the Networking page implementation: - Fix the Overview drift count to use the shared drift-kind predicate instead of a hardcoded list that omitted external-network-missing. - Gate Compose Doctor's unclassified-exposure and reverse-proxy-undocumented rules on exposure-context availability, so a DB read failure no longer fabricates findings (mirrors the live engine's existing fail-soft behavior). - Guard the per-stack exposure-intent read in topology aggregation so a transient DB failure degrades to unknown intent instead of failing the whole response. - Harden the network detail drawer against a partial inspect payload from an older remote node, and log the real error instead of a bare catch. - Remove now-duplicated severity-rank and drift-kind helpers in favor of the shared modules; drop dead backend-only exports; widen the frontend schema version type to a plain number instead of casting past a literal type. - Add coverage for the delete-guard precedence, the full host-mode severity matrix, the schema-2 compatibility adapter, and the sanitized connected- container allowlist; tighten two tests that were not exercising the behavior they claimed to. * fix: add missing onOpenNodeNetworking prop to FleetView experimental test The added required prop on FleetViewProps broke the merge-build when the test file (on main but not on this branch) was compiled against the updated FleetView interface. |
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4834e2e51d |
feat(security): prefer digest identity in scan history (#1610)
Retain scans and History search by digest when available, keep imageRefLike for compatibility, and surface digests in compare. |
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bbcc4b59e4 |
fix: UI polish - tooltips, masthead, tabs, settings, and layout consistency (#1563)
* fix: increase masthead rail shimmer visibility Bumped shimmer highlight opacity from 25% to 50% and reduced animation duration from 11s to 5s, matching the login page AuthCanvas shimmer precedent (via-white/60 at 4.5s). * fix: reduce masthead rail opacity to match login page pattern Changed all MastheadRail background classes from 100% to 70% opacity (bg-brand → bg-brand/70, etc.) so the shimmer highlight reads as a surface reflection rather than a detached floating bar. Matches the AuthCanvas login card precedent. * fix: improve masthead rail glow visibility Replaced the invisible inset box-shadow glow (10px blur inside a 3px element) with a white overlay that pulses opacity 0.15-0.55 over 4s. Sped up glow animation from 5.5s to 4s for a more noticeable breath. * fix: replace cursor-follow tooltip with standard Radix tooltip in sidebar rows Replaced the Cursor/CursorFollow animate-ui primitives in StackRow with the standard Radix Tooltip/TooltipTrigger/TooltipContent already used throughout the app. The custom cursor dot that followed the mouse is gone; tooltips now appear as static popovers on hover/touch. * fix: wrap tooltip icon triggers in span for Radix compatibility TooltipTrigger asChild requires a native element to forward props. Lucide icon components did not reliably receive data-state and event handlers, so tooltips on the check-failed and git-pending indicators did not open. Wrapped each icon in a span. * fix: rename Notification Routing to Routing in settings sidebar * fix: replace Timeline/All tasks buttons with SegmentedControl The two loose Button elements had indistinguishable selected/unselected states (secondary vs ghost). Replaced with the SegmentedControl component already used elsewhere on the same page, which has a clear active highlight indicator. * fix: standardize Blueprint empty state headings to font-heading Replaced manual font-serif [font-style:var(--heading-style)] with the font-heading class on the main heading and three step titles so the Deployments empty state follows the same heading convention as the rest of the app and respects the Calm/Signature theme toggle. * fix: remove custom tooltip styling, use standard TooltipContent defaults The RowTooltip wrapped its label in a font-mono text-stat-value span instead of using the TooltipContent base styling (text-xs text-popover-foreground) like every other tooltip in the app. * Revert "fix: remove custom tooltip styling, use standard TooltipContent defaults" This reverts commit |
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a7e856f447 |
feat: enforce singleton local node per instance (#1567)
Only one local node is allowed. Creating a second local returns 409, and the last local node cannot be deleted or converted to a remote type. Existing duplicate local nodes from older versions are preserved and can be cleaned up individually. Zero-local recovery auto-assigns the default flag. Frontend delete surfaces and the Add Node form respect the new invariant. Enforced in DatabaseService (addNode/updateNode/deleteNode guards) and routes (error translations). Legacy test fixtures use raw SQL helpers. |
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4077546492 |
feat: acknowledge Compose Doctor preflight findings per stack (#1560)
* feat: acknowledge Compose Doctor preflight findings per stack Add node-scoped preflight acknowledgements with read-time filtering. Supports four expiry modes and activeStatus for banner, tab dot, and readiness. * fix: align preflight acknowledge UI with design system Use Combobox, modal chrome, mono fields, and non-destructive clear confirm. * fix: update test mocks to match new preflight field names The preflight-acknowledgements feature renamed status-\>activeStatus and highestSeverity-\>activeHighestSeverity in the preflight report shape. The corresponding test mocks in three files still used the old field names, causing 6 test failures across backend and frontend. - backend: update-guard-service mock now passes activeStatus - frontend PreflightPanel: Report interface and report() helper now include activeStatus, activeHighestSeverity, activeCount, acknowledgedCount - frontend StackAnatomyPanel doctor: mock API response now includes activeHighestSeverity and activeStatus |
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bb35c1bc92 |
feat: add sidebar update indicator toggle and Stack Health badge (#1570)
* feat: add sidebar update indicator toggle and Stack Health badge - Add image_update_sidebar_indicators setting (default off, node-scoped) - Gate the Updates filter chip and sidebar status indicators on the setting - Add "Update available" badge to Stack Health table (always visible) - Extend ImageUpdateStatus with sidebarIndicators boolean - Poll /api/image-updates/status alongside /detail in useImageUpdates - React to SENCHO_SETTINGS_CHANGED for instant toggle propagation - Reset sidebar state on node switch; generation-guard stale responses - Disable toggle when status is null (loading) or field is absent (old node) - Wire stackUpdates through ViewRouter → HomeDashboard → StackHealthTable - Update settings registry, operator docs, and sidebar/dashboard docs * fix: guard against stale node renders, memo drift, and cross-node error toasts - Track owning node ID in useImageUpdates state so React never renders node B with node A's data before the passive effect resets (P2) - Replace incorrect stackUpdates dependency with sidebarStackUpdates in chipFilteredFiles useMemo (P3) - Guard the error toast in handleSidebarIndicatorsChange so a stale PATCH failure from node A does not surface while viewing node B (P3) * fix: default sidebar update indicators to on (opt-out) The sidebar indicators are a safe convenience that most users want. Switching the default from off to on matches the opt-out convention used by prune_on_update, reclaim_hero, and health_gate_enabled. |
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10fb93dcb1 |
feat(scheduler): schedule container restart, stop, and start (#1526)
* feat(scheduler): schedule container restart, stop, and start Add container as a scheduled-task target type so operators can automate lifecycle actions against standalone containers by node and name, with matching UI pickers, validation, execution on local and remote nodes, and tests. * fix(scheduler): stack service matching and container picker hygiene Backfill Service on smartFallback containers so per-service stack restarts work when container_name is set. Match services by compose label and container name in stack routes and scheduled restarts. Exclude Sencho from GET /api/containers lists. Hide the Restart Stack service picker when a stack has only one service. * test(scheduler): scope service checkbox assertion to Services block The create dialog also has a Delete after run checkbox. Count checkboxes only inside the Services section so CI does not include unrelated form controls. * fix(scheduler): narrow closest() result to HTMLElement in schedule test The service-checkbox assertion passed an Element from closest() into within(), which requires an HTMLElement, failing tsc -b in the frontend build and Docker build stages. Use the closest<HTMLElement>() type argument so the value type-checks without an unsafe cast. * fix(scheduler): hide Sencho container on remote node picker lists Remote container lists are proxied from peer Sencho instances, so id-only self filtering missed peers on older builds. Await SelfIdentity init, match ImageID, and drop official saelix/sencho images. Apply the same heuristic in the scheduled-operations UI and when the hub fetches remote containers for scheduled runs. * test(monitor): add missing DatabaseService mocks for scan history cleanup * test(scheduler): add missing markStaleScansAsFailed mock SchedulerService.tick() calls db.markStaleScansAsFailed() to sweep stale vulnerability scans. The scheduler-service test was missing this method in its DatabaseService mock, causing TypeError failures during test initialization. Added mockMarkStaleScansAsFailed to hoisted mocks and DatabaseService mock object, returning safe default of 0 scans marked as failed. * test(compose): add missing FileSystemService mocks for getStackContent/getEnvContent * test(containers-route): mock SelfIdentityService to prevent initialize() crash The excludeSelfContainers() helper calls SelfIdentityService.initialize(), which tries to access DockerController. Without a proper SelfIdentityService mock, the initialize() call fails silently, causing a 500 error on GET /api/containers. Added SelfIdentityService mock with initialize(), isOwnContainer(), and isOwnImage() methods to prevent the crash. |
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b65daf6845 |
feat: add notification suppression rules (#1525)
* feat: add notification suppression rules * fix: restore label routing and routing test mocks for suppression * fix: allow bell mute shortcuts for history-only notification categories Suppression rule validation used the routable category whitelist, which rejected history-only categories such as update_started that appear in the bell during stack updates. * feat: expand Mute Rules UX with compose-first entry points and activity badges * fix: add missing NodeContext mocks for notification suppression tests |
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78a742fb44 |
fix: enforce the signed-in user's role on cross-node proxied requests (#1505)
Proxied requests authenticated to a remote node previously ran as admin regardless of the originating user's role, so a non-admin using the UI against a remote node could reach admin-only handlers there. The forwarding primary now asserts the user's role on a trusted header that the remote honors only for node_proxy/pilot_tunnel bearers (the same trust model as the license tier header), and the gateway overwrites the header on every proxied request so a client cannot smuggle it. An absent header keeps admin for direct instance-to-instance and background service calls; an unrecognized role fails closed to read-only. |
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ba57c67048 |
fix: persist a one-time schedule's run time so edit and disable keep its year (#1499)
PR #1497 pinned an enabled one-shot's next_run_at on creation, but the chosen instant did not survive two paths: editing reconstructed the date from the yearless cron (current year), and a disabled one-shot nulled next_run_at with no other store, so enabling it later recomputed from the cron. Both moved a future-year one-shot to a different annual occurrence than the date displayed. Persist the one-shot's absolute fire time in a dedicated run_at column (additive, nullable; recurring schedules leave it null). Create and update store run_at independently of the enabled state; next_run_at is derived from it when enabled and null while disabled, so a disabled one-shot keeps its run_at and the enable toggle restores the exact instant from the column rather than the cron. The editor reconstructs a one-shot's date from the persisted run_at, so opening and re-saving without changes preserves the originally chosen year. No behavior change for recurring schedules or fresh installs; the column is added by an additive migration safe for upgrades from v0.92.0. |
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c2b508e8b1 |
fix: rank the exploit-risk cap by the same tiers the overview list shows (#1486)
The exploit-intel query capped its results with "EPSS DESC, then CVSS DESC", treating an absent EPSS score as the lowest possible value. The overview list ranks the same findings under the assume-it-is-automatable model, where a finding with no EPSS evidence outranks one shown unlikely to be exploited (known-exploited > elevated EPSS > unknown EPSS > known-low EPSS). With more than the row cap of findings, the two disagreed: the cap could keep a known-low-EPSS finding and drop a higher-CVSS finding with no EPSS evidence that the list considers more urgent, hiding it from the dashboard. Rank the capped query by the same tiers the list uses (reusing the shared EPSS threshold) so the rows that survive truncation are the ones the list ranks highest. |
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7c9c640625 |
fix: rank exploit-risk findings before the cap and disclose truncation (#1482)
The Security overview's top exploit-risk list is built from a query capped at 2000 rows. The query had no ORDER BY, so when a node had more findings than the cap the rows kept were arbitrary: the list could rank and display a subset that omitted higher-risk findings, and the frontend discarded the truncated flag the endpoint already returned, so nothing told the operator the list was partial. - The query now orders by known-exploited, then EPSS, then CVSS before the cap, so the rows that survive truncation are the highest-risk ones, matching the client-side ranking the list applies. - SecurityView keeps the truncated flag and threads it through to the list, which now shows a short "more exist than can be listed here" note when the set was capped. Also fixes a presentation regression: the list colored every non-Critical severity dot with the High color, so a Medium or Low known-exploited finding (now surfaced alongside Critical/High) showed as High. The dot now maps to the finding's actual severity. |