Every filesystem operation against user compose folders (save, create,
deploy, update, rollback, template install, fleet snapshot restore)
previously failed with EACCES whenever a stack container had chowned
its own bind mount to another UID, which is extremely common with
linuxserver/* images and anything that runs as root by default.
Running Sencho as root eliminates the entire class of permission bugs
at the source and matches the default posture of Portainer, Dockge,
Komodo, and Yacht. Mounting /var/run/docker.sock is already equivalent
to root-on-host, so the previous non-root hardening provided essentially
no additional isolation while breaking real features.
Changes:
- docker-entrypoint.sh: default path stays root, no GID dance, no
privilege drop. Opt-out via SENCHO_USER=sencho restores the legacy
behavior bit-for-bit (chown data dir, match Docker socket GID,
su-exec to the user). Fails fast if SENCHO_USER names a nonexistent
account. Kubernetes / OpenShift forced-non-root compat preserved via
the existing id -u = 0 guard.
- FileSystemService: delete forceDeleteViaDocker (the ~40-line helper
that shelled out to an alpine container to work around EACCES during
deleteStack) and simplify deleteStack to a single fsPromises.rm call.
Tests updated accordingly.
- Dockerfile: keep the sencho user+group pre-created so the opt-out
path works out of the box; comments updated to document the new
default.
- Docs: new "Container user" section in configuration.mdx documenting
the root default and the SENCHO_USER opt-out; troubleshooting and
self-hosting updated to match.
Self-heal encryption key file permissions to 0600 on startup. Increase
minimum password length from 6 to 8 characters per NIST SP 800-63B.
Remove console.log statements that exposed file paths, .env locations,
stack names, and admin usernames to stdout.
The merge of PR58 into PR59's branch produced a corrupt docker-entrypoint.sh
(97 lines) where PR59's if block was cut off mid-way (missing exec su-exec
and closing fi) and then PR58's entire if block was appended. This caused:
/usr/local/bin/docker-entrypoint.sh: line 98: syntax error: unexpected
end of file (expecting "fi")
Fix: overwrite with the clean 71-line version and add a defensive
`sed -i 's/\r//'` step in the Dockerfile to strip Windows CRLF line
endings at build time, preventing this class of error even if CRLF
slips past .gitattributes in future.
Helmet's defaults are designed for HTTPS-only deployments. Two directives
were actively breaking plain-HTTP self-hosted instances:
- upgrade-insecure-requests: causes browsers to upgrade all JS/CSS/asset
fetches to HTTPS → ERR_SSL_PROTOCOL_ERROR → completely blank page
- Strict-Transport-Security: permanently instructs browsers to refuse HTTP
for 1 year, even after the header is removed from the server
Also handle docker socket GID=0 (root:root) edge case in entrypoint and
add [entrypoint] diagnostic log lines for easier debugging.
Add docker-entrypoint.sh that runs as root at startup, fixes ownership
of the DATA_DIR volume (only files with wrong user or group), then drops
to the non-root sencho user via su-exec before starting Node.
This eliminates the SQLITE_READONLY crash that occurs when a host-mounted
data volume was created by root or chowned to the wrong UID. The pattern
mirrors the official PostgreSQL, Redis, and MariaDB Docker images.
- Install su-exec in Stage 3 (10KB Alpine tool, idiomatic alternative to gosu)
- Remove USER directive; entrypoint handles the privilege drop instead
- Use ENTRYPOINT + CMD so Node becomes PID 1 (correct SIGTERM handling)
- Add .gitattributes to enforce LF line endings for *.sh files
Anso