Files
sencho/docker-entrypoint.sh
T
SaelixCode cf2946cfa6 fix(security): remove CSP upgrade-insecure-requests and HSTS over HTTP
Helmet's defaults are designed for HTTPS-only deployments. Two directives
were actively breaking plain-HTTP self-hosted instances:

- upgrade-insecure-requests: causes browsers to upgrade all JS/CSS/asset
  fetches to HTTPS → ERR_SSL_PROTOCOL_ERROR → completely blank page
- Strict-Transport-Security: permanently instructs browsers to refuse HTTP
  for 1 year, even after the header is removed from the server

Also handle docker socket GID=0 (root:root) edge case in entrypoint and
add [entrypoint] diagnostic log lines for easier debugging.
2026-03-22 15:42:48 -04:00

72 lines
3.8 KiB
Bash

#!/bin/sh
set -e
# Resolve the data directory, mirroring DatabaseService.ts logic.
DATA_DIR="${DATA_DIR:-/app/data}"
# If running as root (the default Docker container start), fix volume ownership,
# fix Docker socket group access, then drop privileges before executing the app.
#
# This is the industry-standard pattern used by the official PostgreSQL, Redis,
# and MariaDB Docker images, and by Docker management tools like Portainer and
# Dockge that also require access to /var/run/docker.sock as a non-root user.
#
# The UID guard also ensures compatibility with strict environments like
# Kubernetes (runAsNonRoot: true) or OpenShift, where the container is forced to
# run as a random high UID. In that case both blocks are skipped and the app
# exec's directly without crashing.
if [ "$(id -u)" = '0' ]; then
# ── 1. Fix data volume ownership ────────────────────────────────────────
# Handles host volumes previously created by root or a different UID, which
# would cause SQLITE_READONLY errors when the non-root sencho user starts.
# Only touches files with wrong user OR group (efficient on large dirs).
mkdir -p "$DATA_DIR"
find "$DATA_DIR" \( \! -user sencho -o \! -group sencho \) \
-exec chown sencho:sencho '{}' +
echo "[entrypoint] Data directory ownership ensured: $DATA_DIR"
# ── 2. Fix Docker socket group access ───────────────────────────────────
# The Docker socket on the host is owned by the host's docker group, whose
# GID varies by Linux distribution and does not match any group inside the
# container by default.
#
# Solution: detect the socket's GID at runtime, create a matching group
# inside the container if one doesn't already exist, then add sencho to it.
# su-exec calls getgrouplist() which reads /etc/group, so supplementary
# groups added here ARE inherited by the Node process.
if [ -S /var/run/docker.sock ]; then
DOCKER_SOCK_GID=$(stat -c '%g' /var/run/docker.sock)
DOCKER_SOCK_MODE=$(stat -c '%a' /var/run/docker.sock)
echo "[entrypoint] Docker socket found: GID=$DOCKER_SOCK_GID mode=$DOCKER_SOCK_MODE"
if [ "$DOCKER_SOCK_GID" = "0" ]; then
# Socket is owned by root:root. The only way to access it without
# running as root is to make it group-readable and assign a shared
# group. We create a 'docker-sock' group with GID 0 for clarity.
echo "[entrypoint] WARNING: Docker socket is root:root — adding sencho to root group"
addgroup sencho root 2>/dev/null || true
else
if ! getent group "$DOCKER_SOCK_GID" > /dev/null 2>&1; then
addgroup -S -g "$DOCKER_SOCK_GID" docker-host
echo "[entrypoint] Created group docker-host with GID $DOCKER_SOCK_GID"
fi
DOCKER_GROUP=$(getent group "$DOCKER_SOCK_GID" | cut -d: -f1)
addgroup sencho "$DOCKER_GROUP" 2>/dev/null || true
echo "[entrypoint] Added sencho to group '$DOCKER_GROUP' (GID $DOCKER_SOCK_GID)"
fi
else
echo "[entrypoint] WARNING: /var/run/docker.sock not found — Docker features will be unavailable"
fi
echo "[entrypoint] Dropping privileges to sencho (uid=$(id -u sencho))"
# ── 3. Drop privileges ──────────────────────────────────────────────────
# Replace this shell process with su-exec so that Node becomes PID 1 and
# receives SIGTERM/SIGINT directly from Docker. su-exec calls getgrouplist()
# for named users, so all supplementary groups set above are inherited.
exec su-exec sencho "$@"
fi
exec "$@"