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rustfs/.agents/skills/adversarial-validation/references/security.md
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2026-08-22 08:19:53 +08:00

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# Security Lens
Use `security-advisory-lessons` only for a dedicated advisory/security audit.
For an ordinary matched diff, attack these boundaries:
- Admin routes: route registration, whitelist, handler authn, and the exact
`AdminAction` must agree. Read-only diagnostics still require admin authz.
- IAM/service accounts: treat parent, claims, keys, groups, status, and policy
names as attacker-controlled; prove ownership/root authority before writes.
- Protocol frontends: every changed/sibling command authorizes the matching S3
action before reaching storage.
- Secrets/signatures: use constant-time comparison, normalize public failures,
keep RPC/root/STS keys independent, and fail closed when secrets are absent.
- RPC: bind signatures to the exact method/path and timestamp; reject replay,
stale, malformed, truncated, and invalid-enum payloads without panic.
- Paths/object/archive entries: reject traversal, absolute/platform escapes,
and normalization differences between authz and storage.
- Copy/multipart/presigned POST: enforce source, destination, version-aware
actions, copy-source conditions, and every signed policy condition.
- Logging/errors: never expose credentials, tokens, expected signatures, raw
secret-bearing input, or merged configs—including via `Debug` and parse errors.
- Untrusted serde: reject unknown fields where compatible and validate
security-critical defaults/ranges before numeric conversion.
- SSE/browser/CORS/trusted proxy: inspect stored ciphertext and wrapper order;
isolate user content; never reflect credentialed arbitrary origins or trust
forwarded identity from direct clients.
- Object Lock: unreadable/fabricated/unparsable metadata fails closed across
foreground, lifecycle, scanner, and force-delete paths.
Security findings distinguish unauthenticated compromise from a
low-privileged authenticated bypass.