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Chris
4e16705873
* fix(ecstore): stop pruning at nonempty directories (#7616) * fix(ecstore): stop pruning at nonempty directories * test(ecstore): release pruning fixtures before temp cleanup (cherry picked from commit8f150d1d8e) * fix(heal): preserve retryable batch failures during recovery (#7642) * fix(heal): preserve retryable batch failures during recovery * test(heal): pin prebuilt hooks binaries in ci (cherry picked from commit5cd58319ed) * fix(s3): reject oversize single PUT early and map body errors to 4xx (#7635) * fix(s3): reject oversize single PUT early and map body errors to 4xx A single PutObject above the 5 GiB single-request ceiling was only rejected after the client had streamed 5 GiB into s3s's read-time body budget, and the resulting BodySizeLimitExceeded surfaced from the erasure writer as 500 InternalError. A body whose connection hit EOF before Content-Length bytes arrived (hyper's IncompleteBody) was also a 500. SDKs retry 500s, so one oversize upload was resent from offset 0 five times. - PutObject and UploadPart reject a declared length above MAX_SINGLE_PUT_OBJECT_SIZE with 400 EntityTooLarge before reading the body; the constant moves to rustfs_config so the s3s limit and the admission check share one value. - ApiError maps BodySizeLimitExceeded to EntityTooLarge and a hyper body EOF to IncompleteBody across both io::Error conversions. Fixes #7596. * test(s3): cover UploadPart admission, aws-chunked length, real s3s limit - Poll-counting test body proves PutObject and UploadPart reject a declared size above the ceiling with zero body polls; exact-cap and zero-length parts pass admission. - A STREAMING-* aws-chunked PUT whose framed Content-Length exceeds the cap is admitted when the decoded length is within it and rejected when the decoded length is over it. - The display-based BodySizeLimitExceeded matcher is checked against the real error produced by the pinned s3s Body budget. (cherry picked from commit50b31bc75b) * fix(ecstore): make directory mtime fixture portable (#7623) * fix(ecstore): make directory mtime fixture portable * style(ecstore): format mtime fixture assertion --------- Co-authored-by: houseme <housemecn@gmail.com> Co-authored-by: Zhengchao An <anzhengchao@gmail.com> (cherry picked from commitb1cc286cac) * fix(storage): prevent readiness after native migration failures (#7652) * fix(storage): prevent readiness after native migration failures * fix(storage): skip unsupported IAM records before reading * fix(storage): use stable typed migration metadata errors * fix(storage): include migration record in startup errors * test(storage): cover native migration startup failures * test(storage): use array chunks in migration fixture --------- Co-authored-by: RJ Regenold <214054+rjregenold@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: cxymds <cxymds@gmail.com> (cherry picked from commit0cbc3ffe61) * fix(admin): expose OIDC account display fields (#7654) Expose verified OIDC username and email claims as display-only metadata on self-account responses while preserving the virtual parent as the authorization identity.\n\nKeep rustfs-madmin public response structs unchanged by adding the optional wire fields through private handler response wrappers. (cherry picked from commitf02bc947cd) * fix(replication): correct peer joins and remote-state reporting (#7650) * fix(replication): propagate verified peer deployment identities * fix(replication): report actual remote peer state * fix(replication): defer initial sync until all peers join * test(replication): shut down TLS fixtures cleanly --------- Co-authored-by: houseme <housemecn@gmail.com> (cherry picked from commit853ae63b6a) * fix(s3): bound stalled UploadPart request bodies (#7659) * fix(s3): bound stalled UploadPart request bodies * fix(ci): preserve the S3S footprint ratchet (cherry picked from commit666dfd9f9f) * fix(tables): reject reserved warehouse locations (#7671) Co-authored-by: cxymds <cxymds@gmail.com> (cherry picked from commit414176c47f) * fix(ci): bind nightly lanes to one resolved source (#7688) (cherry picked from commit01d8e4347f) * fix(replication): close the pre-stable convergence gaps from backlog#2367 (#7626) * fix(replication): total-order rule sort and honor V1 top-level Prefix Rule matching had two defects from the pre-GA replication audit (rustfs/backlog#2367 C-1 and C-2): - The actionable-rule sort compared same-destination rules by priority but answered Equal for any other pair, which is not a total order; the standard library sort panics on such comparators once a slice exceeds the insertion-sort threshold, so an object matching more than 20 enabled rules across two or more targets could panic the PUT or DELETE task. Rules now sort by priority descending with destination and id as tie-breakers, and filter_target_arns preserves that order instead of draining a HashSet. - A V1 rule written without a <Filter> carries its prefix at the top level; that field was never read, so <Prefix>logs/</Prefix> matched every object. ReplicationRuleExt::prefix now falls back to it, with a <Filter> keeping precedence. The existing prefix fixtures were built this way and had been asserting nothing. * fix(admin): advertise data-usage and listen capabilities to rc The rc client gated `rc du` and `rc watch` on a pinned contract that matched server versions by the string prefix `1.0.0-rc.`; a server that reports `1.0.0` no longer matches, and the dynamic `advertised` list did not carry either name, so `rc du` against a GA server fails with an unsupported-capability error (rustfs/backlog#2367 E-2). Advertise `admin.data-usage` from the admin route inventory like the IAM entries, and `listen_notification` for the bucket `?events=` extension route the admin router dispatches. The client merges advertised entries ahead of its pinned contract, so no version sniffing is needed. * fix(site-replication): stop notifying the local site on remove and rotate The pending-remove and pending-rotation notification loops skipped the local site by endpoint only, while finalization identifies it by deployment id or endpoint. The reconcile tick resolves the local peer from the node's own listen address (and a handler from the request Host), so `remove --all` dialed the site's registered endpoint, waited out the request timeout against the lifecycle lock it was holding, and answered `Partial: failed to notify 1 peer(s)` for a removal that had succeeded (rustfs/backlog#2367 A-4, backlog#2195 item 3). Both loops now iterate the peers still awaiting notification through one helper that applies the finalization identity. * fix(site-replication): promote and settle IAM retries without a tick of slack Two retry-queue behaviours kept an IAM change from converging for ten to twenty minutes after a peer came back (rustfs/backlog#2367 A-1 and A-3, backlog#2305): - The lightweight 30-second pass filtered its reachability probe to bucket ops, so a backed-off IAM or bucket-metadata snapshot waited for the 600-second tick to notice the peer. It now probes every backed-off class and still replays only bounded bucket ops; promotion is a state flip the heavyweight tick acts on. - Backoffs are multiples of the tick interval, so a failure stamped δ seconds after a tick was 600 − δ old at the next tick and slipped a whole extra interval. The heavyweight drain now evaluates backoff halfway to its next tick. - An IAM entry first created by a non-deletion failure (the add bootstrap's snapshot send, the drain's own replay, an import-iam schedule) was never stamped `deletions_recorded`, so a later recorded deletion could not settle it and it escalated to the marker only `replicate repair` clears. Entries created by this binary now start recorded; a row persisted by an older binary keeps the escalation semantics. * fix(site-replication): reload peer node caches after bucket wiring writes Every S3 bucket-config write ends by asking the other nodes of the cluster to reload the bucket's metadata; the site-replication writers never did. On a multi-node site the node that ran the pairing (or applied a peer's bucket-meta item) rewrote the bucket targets and the derived replication rules on disk, while every other node kept serving its cached copy for up to the 15-minute refresh. A `resync start` routed to such a node reported every freshly wired bucket as `Config not found` and a bucket whose operator target the pairing had replaced as `recorded remote target no longer exists` (rustfs/backlog#2367 A-5, backlog#2195 item 2; functional SITE-105). Add one best-effort reload helper in the site-replication hooks and call it after the bucket setup, versioning, peer bucket-meta apply, removed-peer cleanup, make-with-versioning, and endpoint-refresh writes; the ensure helpers now report whether they wrote so unchanged passes stay silent. The resync manifest and start now read the persisted wiring instead of the node-local cache, matching the target read the start path already did. The new four-node e2e pairs two clusters and starts a resync through a non-coordinator node right after pairing; it also covers an IAM user created on a non-coordinator node converging to the peer site. * test(e2e): cover delete-marker replication from a multi-node source The functional suite reported delete markers created on a 3-node source never reaching the target (rustfs/backlog#2195 item 4, REP-105). The report was a probe defect, but the shape had no coverage: the existing delete-marker e2e runs a single-node source. Pin it against a four-node source replicating to a four-node peer and to a single-node target, with the write and the delete issued through different nodes. * ci(e2e): refresh the distributed selection for the new replication cases Four distributed cases were added (two site-replication, two delete-marker replication). The linux digest is derived from the last CI listing of the lane (34 cases, matching the previous pin) plus the four new names; the darwin digest is the local listing, which selects the same 38 cases. (cherry picked from commitaeaba86d73) * fix(e2e): require a verified server binary for every e2e run (#7687) * fix(ci): share quick checks and lint workflows * fix(ci): install actionlint from its verified release * fix(ci): reject dependencies on required quick checks * feat(test): verify the E2E server build and source identity * test(e2e): register verified Darwin test membership * test(e2e): record verified Linux receipt test membership * test(e2e): record compiled Darwin receipt test membership * test(e2e): record compiled Linux receipt test membership * test(e2e): record Darwin e2e-full membership after merging main * fix(test): route scanner/heal evidence E2E runs through the verified server binary The evidence runners built rustfs with plain cargo and then ran e2e_test directly, which now fails without a run receipt. They build through scripts/e2e_binary.py and run the e2e_test invocations under e2e_binary.py run; the obsolete rustfs.features stamp is removed. * docs(e2e): run server-backed e2e commands through the verified binary wrapper * test(e2e): record Linux e2e-full membership from the branch CI listing (cherry picked from commit2909b1bfe1) * fix(kms): classify KMS/SSE error contracts and SSE-S3 headers (#7697) * fix(sse): classify bare SSE-KMS writes when no KMS is available A `aws:kms` request without a key id, on a bucket without a default key, returned `500 InternalError` whenever no KMS service was running: the "no KMS key available" branch exited with an untyped storage error before the availability classification that the keyed form already received. Route that branch through the same split: `503 ServiceUnavailable` while a configured KMS is stopped, `400 InvalidRequest` when KMS was never configured, and `400 InvalidRequest` naming the missing key id when a running KMS has no default key. `CreateMultipartUpload` shares the path. Adds a unit test for the bare form and an e2e module that stops KMS through the admin API, runs a master-key-only node, and runs a Local KMS without a default key; refreshes the e2e-full selection digests. (cherry picked from commit c3259dadc3d603a9185a5b0ad9f83dfb884e61c8) * fix(sse): keep KMS error classes on the encrypted read path GetObject, CopyObject and UploadPartCopy on an SSE-KMS object whose key no longer exists answered `500 InternalError` ("KMS key not found") while PutObject under the same key already answered `400 KMS.NotFoundException`. The read path carries its classification through ecstore's `EncryptionResolutionErrorKind`, which had no kind for a missing key, a denied KMS grant or a missing backend capability, so all three folded onto `DecryptionFailed` and the S3 layer reported an internal fault. Add `KeyNotFound`, `AccessDenied` and `NotImplemented` kinds, map them on both sides of the boundary, and give an envelope the configured backend cannot unwrap a diagnosable message while keeping its `500`. Unit tests cover the kind round trip and the reader wrapping; a new e2e test deletes a key immediately and checks GET/Copy return 400 with `KMS.NotFoundException` while HEAD stays 200. The e2e-full selection digests are refreshed from the current listing (the previous digests predated the delete-authorization tests) and the e2e `create_default_key` helper is updated to the accepted `EncryptDecrypt` spelling. (cherry picked from commit 2523a9814e97caea318d4ff1a51bef3a4d4445b2) * fix(kms): classify key-management errors on the admin routes `POST /kms/keys`, the legacy `create-key` alias and `generate-data-key` reported every backend refusal as `500`: a blank key name (which each backend failed on differently, the Local backend by writing a key file with an empty stem), a name already taken, an unknown key, a disabled key and a capability the backend lacks. `delete` and the lifecycle routes already classified the same errors. Refuse a blank or whitespace name in `KmsManager::create_key` before any backend sees it, and share one `KmsError` to status mapping across create, delete and generate-data-key (400 for validation and key state, 404 for an unknown key, 409 for a taken name, 501 for a missing capability, 500 only for damaged material). The XML-error routes carry the same status explicitly since s3s derives none for a custom code. The read-only Static backend now reports create, delete and cancel-deletion as `UnsupportedCapability`, matching its rotate and enable/disable answers, so the admin API returns 501 for all of them. (cherry picked from commit e33cac5493c4d9d6662e0d2980b58ba2b24a6d1b) * fix(sse): stop SSE-S3 responses from naming the wrapping KMS key `x-amz-server-side-encryption-aws-kms-key-id` is defined for `aws:kms` objects only, but PutObject, CopyObject, CreateMultipartUpload and GetObject returned it for `AES256` objects too, carrying the KMS key that wraps the SSE-S3 data key (the service default, or the literal `default` on a node without KMS). The write paths copied `kms_key_id` from the encryption material unconditionally, and the single-decrypt GET classification did the same after resolving the key for authorization. Add `EncryptionMaterial::response_kms_key_id`, which yields the id only for SSE-KMS, use it at the four write-response sites, and gate the GET classification the same way. CompleteMultipartUpload and HeadObject already omitted the header. Unit tests pin both directions; a new e2e test covers Put/Get/Head/Copy and CreateMultipartUpload for AES256 with an aws:kms control. The e2e-full selection digests are refreshed from the current listing. (cherry picked from commit 29d793a63352b0b60fd53c565e80fdbede8964bb) * fix(s3): validate PutBucketEncryption rules before storing them A default-encryption rule naming an unknown `SSEAlgorithm` (for example `AES128`), a rule without `ApplyServerSideEncryptionByDefault`, an empty rule list, or a `KMSMasterKeyID` on an `AES256` rule was stored as written: the only algorithm check on the route decided whether to fill in the default KMS key. `GetBucketEncryption` then advertised that configuration while the write path encrypted header-less writes under its `AES256` fallback, so the bucket's declared and actual schemes disagreed. Two comments claimed the route already refused unknown algorithms. Validate the configuration before any of it is applied: `MalformedXML` for a malformed rule set or unknown algorithm, `InvalidArgument` for a key id on a non-KMS rule, and nothing stored on refusal. Correct the two comments to describe when the AES256 fallback is still reachable. Unit tests cover every refusal and the accepted shapes; an e2e test checks the refusals leave the previous configuration in place. The e2e-full selection digests are refreshed from the current listing. (cherry picked from commit 29e4486dce41197ed93f5253cdbabc57d27a4ddb) * test(e2e): refresh e2e-full selection for the combined KMS/SSE fixes * test: align two unit tests with the new KMS and bucket-encryption contracts `scheduled_deletion_carries_a_deadline_and_can_be_cancelled` still expects the state error (`InvalidOperation`) for cancelling a key that is not pending deletion; only the Static backend's mutations moved to `UnsupportedCapability`. The uninitialized-store PutBucketEncryption test now sends a well-formed AES256 rule so it reaches the store lookup instead of the new configuration validation. (cherry picked from commite2e6a2535a) * fix(site-replication): keep an operator's bucket-level target to a peer instead of taking it over (#7709) * fix(site-replication): keep an operator's bucket-level target to a peer instead of taking it over Site replication wired each bucket by looking for an existing replication target "to the same peer" and rewriting the first match in place as its own same-name target. An operator's bucket-level target that happened to point at that site (different target bucket, operator credentials) was the first match whenever it pre-dated the join, and the reconciler repeats the pass every 600s, so the takeover also depended on target order afterwards. The operator's rule then named an ARN no target backed and their bucket replication stopped silently, while the inherited bucket-level reset id made every site resync report the bucket as owned by another resync (rustfs/backlog#2479, rustfs/backlog#2489). Follow MinIO's `getRemoteARN` / `getRemoteARNForPeer` shape instead: - Wiring updates a target in place only under the same ARN, or when it is recognisably the site's own under an older ARN shape (same peer, same-name target bucket, site replication service account). Anything else gets the site target added next to it. - The site resync manifest takes the target the derived `site-repl-<deployment id>` rule names (same-name shape as fallback), so an operator target to the peer neither aborts the bucket as "multiple remote targets matched peer" nor gets resynced into. - Peer removal prunes only targets a pruned derived rule names or the same-name target bucket; operator targets stamped with the peer's deployment id survive together with their rules. Unit tests cover the three predicates. e2e `test_site_replication_keeps_operator_bucket_target_to_peer` runs a bucket-level replication plus `replication-reset` to the future peer, joins the sites, and requires the operator target untouched, both paths delivering, the site resync completing against the site target, and the operator target and rule surviving `replicate remove --all`; without the fix it fails at the join with the operator target gone. The repl-nightly selection digest is refreshed for the new case. * test(site-replication): drop a redundant clone flagged by clippy The reconcile unit test cloned the remote peer into the state map although the binding is not used afterwards; workspace clippy (-D warnings) rejects that as redundant_clone. (cherry picked from commitecdc55fa4b) * fix: enforce S3 permissions for recursive force deletion (#7661) * fix: enforce S3 authorization for recursive deletion * fix: satisfy the s3s footprint guard * fix: restore list versions policy compatibility (#7686) (cherry picked from commit3fd1ce414d) * fix(ci): repair functional defaults and chain regression checks (#7664) * fix(ci): default functional suites to nightly packages * test(ci): follow the fault-tolerance chain handoff (cherry picked from commit509a0fa90c) * fix(ci): align security workflow tests with chain (#7679) (cherry picked from commitd9e47d2813) * test(ecstore): keep tier cleanup tests stable after immediate receipt queueing Release PR #7766 made PUT/CopyObject overwrites queue the tier free-version cleanup receipt immediately, which broke two ecstore tests on release CI. In tier_overwrite_put_and_self_copy_recover_persisted_cleanup_owners the restarted store already runs expiry workers from the second iteration on, so they deleted the remote bytes before the test could assert that the commit leaves them in place; the test now fails the first remote DELETE via set_remove_failure(true) so the cleanup owner stays durable and the later restart still has to rediscover it from xl.meta (the failed remove does not bump remove_count, and the test re-enables removes before the recovery wait). In batch_transitioned_delete_post_commit_failures_roll_back_without_free_version_receipt the convergence loop now treats a transient InsufficientReadQuorum as "not yet converged", because cleanup rewrites xl.meta disk by disk and a racing read can briefly miss quorum (seen in the rio-v2 lane); any other error still panics. * Revert "fix(ci): align security workflow tests with chain (#7679)" This reverts commit4544359f6d. * Revert "fix(ci): repair functional defaults and chain regression checks (#7664)" This reverts commit5ba7ec0291. * fix(ecstore): pass shard integrity to backported ingest-mode test The stalled-reader test backported with #7659 used main's four-argument encode_with_ingest_mode, but release's signature takes an optional IntegrityBuilder, so pass None to keep the test focused on ingest-mode cleanup. --------- Co-authored-by: Henry Guo <marshawcoco@gmail.com> Co-authored-by: 唐小鸭 <tangtang1251@qq.com> Co-authored-by: houseme <housemecn@gmail.com> Co-authored-by: RJ Regenold <rregenold@teamraft.com> Co-authored-by: RJ Regenold <214054+rjregenold@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: cxymds <cxymds@gmail.com> Co-authored-by: GatewayJ <835269233@qq.com> Co-authored-by: Jason Kossis <jkossis@gmail.com>
107 lines
9.2 KiB
Markdown
107 lines
9.2 KiB
Markdown
# Distributed 4-node 4-disk e2e
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**Use this when:** adding or diagnosing GitHub Actions coverage for a 4-node cluster, or deciding whether a behaviour belongs in `e2e-distributed` versus the single-node `e2e-full` lane, the nightly cluster-fault lane, or the hardware functional chain.
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**Source of truth:** `crates/e2e_test/src/distributed/`, `[profile.e2e-distributed]` in `.config/nextest.toml`, `.github/workflows/e2e-distributed.yml`.
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## Topology
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The in-tree harness runs every node on `127.0.0.1` with a distinct port. That matches `RustFSTestClusterEnvironment` in `crates/e2e_test/src/common.rs`:
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| Layout | Constructor | Use |
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|---|---|---|
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| 4 nodes × 4 drives, one pool | `ClusterTopology::single_pool_multidrive(4, 4)` | S3, object lock, versioning, quota, observability, concurrency, chaos |
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| 4 nodes × 1 drive, one pool | `ClusterTopology::single_pool(4)` | Two-site replication (8 processes total); direct/rolling upgrade from the pinned previous release |
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| 1 single-node pool × 4 drives, then `append_single_node_pool` three times | expansion seed | Pool expand, then decommission / rebalance / integrity |
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A multi-pool layout in which any pool spans several localhost ports is not expressible (`RUSTFS_VOLUMES` host ellipses would collide on disk paths). Multi-host striped expansion pools remain the hardware functional-chain / backlog #1313 / #1314 lane.
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Data-movement cases fail closed. A decommission or rebalance test must observe a successful start response, an active state, a clean terminal state, non-zero movement counters, and post-operation object integrity. An unsupported response, HTTP 5xx, missing status fields, cleanup warning, or zero-progress terminal response fails the case; pre/post S3 availability alone is not evidence that movement ran.
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The four expansion pools must report independent capacity. Four directories on one runner filesystem all return the same `statfs` totals, so RustFS correctly concludes that no pool is less free than the cluster average and performs no rebalance. The Actions job runs on GitHub-hosted `ubuntu-latest` and mounts four isolated 1 GiB tmpfs filesystems, then exports their absolute paths through `RUSTFS_E2E_POOL_ROOTS`. It does not use the self-hosted `sm-standard-4` ARC pods: those cannot create filesystems (`mount -o loop` fails with `No such file or directory`, and `mount -t tmpfs` fails with `cannot mount tmpfs read-only`). Sized tmpfs still reports a distinct `st_dev` and independent 1 GiB `statfs` capacity. The harness rejects missing, duplicate, relative, nonexistent, or same-device roots instead of allowing a vacuous movement pass. Planned pool additions stop every process with SIGTERM; hard process termination remains a chaos-only fault. After the fourth pool joins, the harness performs one full graceful persistent restart: this proves the expanded pool map survives restart and ensures movement begins only after every replica can load the converged metadata.
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The expansion fixture is an all-current-binary fleet, so it initializes pool metadata with the documented V3 write and fleet-confirmation gates. Decommission cases write their baseline objects, version history, and multipart data into pool 0 before adding pools 1–3, then retire pool 0. This makes a passing result evidence of user-data movement rather than merely an internal-metadata counter changing.
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## What this lane covers
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`python3 scripts/e2e_binary.py run -- cargo nextest run --profile e2e-distributed -p e2e_test` selects `distributed::*`:
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- S3 put / get / head / list / copy / rename / delete / presign, range and conditional reads, special keys, metadata, tags, pagination, empty objects, multipart complete and abort
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- Object Lock COMPLIANCE, GOVERNANCE and bypass, legal hold, bucket default retention, and non-lock bucket rejection
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- Versioning, exact historical reads, delete-marker removal, and suspended null-version overwrite semantics
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- Bucket replication between two 4-node clusters, including metadata/tags and target-outage retry; hard quota admission and absence of rejected keys
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- Ready/live probes on every node, exact 4-server/16-disk inventory, realtime metrics on every node, and correlated audit-webhook delivery. The observability case runs at WARN and suspends two node processes to model nonresponsive peers: cached drives become unknown immediately, exact per-node HTTP PUT deltas expose sub-quorum failures, the local metadata snapshot does not invent a write latch, and resumed peers allow new writes and byte-identical reads from every node. This models stalled processes, not a physical network partition.
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- Pool expand, decommission, rebalance, checksum integrity, versioned and multipart data, and S3 during active movement
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- Bidirectional site-replication convergence plus enabled/synchronized peer state on both sites
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- A 24-worker mixed PUT/HEAD/GET/COPY/DELETE workload; concurrent PUT during active decommission
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- Node kill/restart, full process restart, node-facing TCP blackhole/recovery, in-flight streaming GETs across a peer kill, and fresh-drive replacement verified by physical `xl.meta`/part-shard census
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- Multipart, cross-node listing, list-buckets agreement
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- Direct and rolling upgrade from the pinned previous release: historical objects, versioned history, and IAM user AK/SK still work afterwards
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## Existing Actions gaps this lane does not replace
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Those suites stay in place; this lane fills the in-tree 4×4 hole they leave.
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| Existing lane | Gap |
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| `rustfs-*-test.yml` functional chain | Clones private `rustfs/auto-testing`, runs on three shared VMs (`vm000`–`vm002`), `continue-on-error: true`, not a merge signal, not 4 nodes. Hardware `rustfs-upgrade-test.yml` stays there |
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| `e2e-upgrade.yml` | Single-node SSE/multipart/delete-marker contracts plus mixed-version listing; does not pin IAM user AK/SK on a 4-node cluster |
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| `e2e-smoke` / `e2e-full` | Most selected cases are single-node; distributed modules are intentionally owned by this serialized lane |
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| `e2e-nightly` | 4-node cluster faults and heal, not S3/lock/versioning/quota/decommission matrix |
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| `e2e-repl-nightly` | Site and bucket replication on 1–3 *single-node* processes |
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| `e2e-s3tests.yml` `multi` | Weekly ceph/s3-tests against Docker 4-node; not lock/WORM, decommission, chaos, or checksum integrity |
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| `crates/e2e_test/src/chaos.rs` | Single-node disk faults only |
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Hardware power-loss, physical NIC pull, authenticated inter-node partition, firmware/media errors, and replacement-server provisioning still belong on the hardware validation VMs. This lane provides deterministic process kill, fresh local-volume replacement, and node-facing TCP blackhole analogues; it does not claim physical fault certification.
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## Run
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```bash
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python3 scripts/e2e_binary.py build --bins
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# Expansion/decommission/rebalance cases require four paths on distinct filesystems.
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# If you do not already have four disks, sized tmpfs is enough:
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# for p in 0 1 2 3; do
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# sudo mkdir -p /mnt/rustfs-pool-$p
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# sudo mount -t tmpfs -o size=1G,nosuid,nodev,mode=1777 tmpfs /mnt/rustfs-pool-$p
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# done
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export RUSTFS_E2E_POOL_ROOTS=/mnt/rustfs-pool-0:/mnt/rustfs-pool-1:/mnt/rustfs-pool-2:/mnt/rustfs-pool-3
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# Upgrade cases require the pinned previous binary (CI downloads it).
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export RUSTFS_UPGRADE_SOURCE_BINARY=/path/to/rustfs-1.0.0-rc.2
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python3 scripts/e2e_binary.py run -- cargo nextest run --profile e2e-distributed -p e2e_test
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```
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Without `RUSTFS_UPGRADE_SOURCE_BINARY` the two `distributed::upgrade_test::*` cases fail closed. Without four distinct `RUSTFS_E2E_POOL_ROOTS`, the expansion and data-movement cases fail closed. Filter upgrades out for a local run that is not checking upgrade:
|
||
|
||
```bash
|
||
python3 scripts/e2e_binary.py run -- cargo nextest run --profile e2e-distributed -p e2e_test -E 'not test(/^distributed::upgrade_test::/)'
|
||
```
|
||
|
||
The upgrade topology is `ClusterTopology::single_pool(4)` (4 nodes × 1 drive). That matches the proven mixed-version fixture in `upgrade_compatibility_test`; 4×4 localhost drives are rejected by the previous release's same-device disk check.
|
||
|
||
Scanner/Heal G09 release evidence can be collected on Linux x86_64 with the
|
||
same pinned previous-release binary used by `e2e-upgrade.yml`:
|
||
|
||
```bash
|
||
scripts/run_scanner_heal_g09_upgrade_evidence.sh
|
||
```
|
||
|
||
The runner builds the current `rustfs` binary, downloads and verifies the
|
||
pinned previous release, runs the mixed-version rolling-upgrade and rollback
|
||
tests, and leaves the required raw G09 artifacts under
|
||
`target/scanner-heal-g09-upgrade-evidence/<timestamp>/`. These artifacts are
|
||
inputs for the Scanner/Heal release bundle gate; the runner does not mark the
|
||
full release matrix complete by itself.
|
||
|
||
The distributed Scanner/Heal EC8+4 restart case is registered as
|
||
`ec84-target-drive-restart` and selected by this profile:
|
||
|
||
```bash
|
||
scripts/run_scanner_heal_evidence_case.sh --case ec84-target-drive-restart
|
||
```
|
||
|
||
That command records the current build, runs exactly the registered
|
||
`distributed::heal_test` case, validates the JUnit/listing/oracle receipt, and
|
||
keeps the wider release gate blocked until the remaining release evidence lanes
|
||
have measured artifacts.
|
||
|
||
Membership is pinned by `.config/e2e-distributed-selection.txt`. Update the Linux and Darwin entries with `python3 ./scripts/check_test_wiring.py --update-profile e2e-distributed <listing.json> <platform>` after adding or renaming a case.
|