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Author SHA1 Message Date
cxymds 1a3810991d Merge branch 'main' into cxymds/fix-decommission-listing-failclosed 2026-08-22 11:24:07 +08:00
马登山 bb2330451a perf(ecstore): avoid successful listing name clone 2026-08-22 11:08:04 +08:00
马登山 09fac9a52b fix(ecstore): fail closed on unresolved decommission entries 2026-08-22 11:04:29 +08:00
Zhengchao An 5b951de2b7 test(ci): bound s3-tests failure logs (#6361) 2026-08-22 02:58:01 +00:00
Zhengchao An 98c4675617 refactor(e2e): consolidate duplicated helper functions into common.rs (#6355) 2026-08-22 01:10:14 +00:00
Zhengchao An eec34331de chore(madmin): remove dead trace structs, keep TraceType only (#6343)
chore(madmin): remove dead trace structs, keep TraceType bitflag helper only

TraceInfo, TraceInfoLegacy, TraceHTTPStats, TraceCallStats, TraceRequestInfo,
TraceResponseInfo, StorageStats, and OSStats are unreferenced outside trace.rs.
Trim to TraceType + its bitflag operations which are actively used by
service_commands.rs and profile_admin.rs.

-139 lines (215 -> 76 lines)
2026-08-22 01:01:24 +00:00
Zhengchao An 5d820df79c chore(obs): rename ReplicationStats to ReplicationMetricsSnapshot (#6344)
* chore(obs): ReplicationStats -> ReplicationMetricsSnapshot, BucketReplicationStats -> BucketReplicationMetricsSnapshot

Rename in-obs-crate ReplicationStats and BucketReplicationStats to
ReplicationMetricsSnapshot and BucketReplicationMetricsSnapshot respectively.
No serde impact (these types are Prometheus metric collectors, not serialized).
No external consumers found outside the obs crate.

* cleanup: remove #[serial] annotations from e2e_test, scanner, lifecycle, and object-capacity crates

Remove no-op #[serial] attributes (nextest ignores serial_test) and the
serial_test dependency from four crates. All tests already use temp_env
for env-var isolation, making #[serial] purely redundant.

Crates cleaned:
- e2e_test (37 annotations, 9 imports, removed serial_test dep)
- rustfs-scanner (115 annotations across 7 files, removed serial_test dep)
- rustfs-lifecycle (46 annotations, removed serial_test dep)
- rustfs-object-capacity (38 annotations, removed serial_test dep)

Also converted scanner/tests/lifecycle_integration_test.rs
with_forced_immediate_enqueue_timeout helper from unsafe raw
env::set_var/remove_var to temp_env::async_with_vars for proper
isolation, and added async_closure feature to scanner's temp-env dep.

* fix(lifecycle): restore #[serial] on 2 tests that read env vars without temp_env

eval_inner_expires_latest_object_after_days_due and
eval_inner_does_not_panic_on_many_equal_due_events call eval_inner()
which reads ENV_ILM_PROCESS_TIME via std::env::var(). Without #[serial]
they race with other tests that set these vars via temp_env.

* style: cargo fmt
2026-08-22 00:30:30 +00:00
Zhengchao An 37c5ce1399 docs(agents): streamline instruction routing (#6358) 2026-08-22 08:19:53 +08:00
Zhengchao An 61b5edf16e chore(ecstore): standardize 24 bare TODO/FIXME to tracked format (#6346) 2026-08-22 07:09:32 +08:00
Zhengchao An ab5d433fe1 feat(connect): add registration and credential rotation (#6353) 2026-08-22 07:07:29 +08:00
Zhengchao An bc07cfd115 ci: harden test selection and nightly coverage (#6341) 2026-08-21 15:04:08 +00:00
Zhengchao An bce5922aef feat(connect): answer offline enrolment challenges without a network (#6335) 2026-08-21 13:16:18 +00:00
cxymds adb90fc6e1 fix(scanner): defer usage publication during pool recovery (#6333)
* fix(scanner): defer usage publication during pool recovery

* fix(scanner): preserve metrics when publication is deferred

* fix(scanner): route test types through storage boundary

* fix(scanner): keep cache floor deferred during movement
2026-08-21 17:32:59 +08:00
cxymds cdfac5d7e3 fix(ecstore): avoid decommission walk deadline on backpressure (#6332)
fix(ecstore): bound decommission background walks
2026-08-21 17:32:12 +08:00
houseme ca4adea0c9 perf(server): trim internode REST compat stack (#6330)
Co-authored-by: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
2026-08-21 08:52:03 +00:00
GatewayJ 23a0f6324c fix(iam): preserve MinIO permanent credentials in migration (#6328)
* fix(iam): preserve MinIO permanent credentials in migration

* test(iam): cover MinIO credential migration end to end
2026-08-21 15:34:25 +08:00
Zhengchao An cdd9ab1124 fix(ci): update package checksums safely (#6329) 2026-08-21 15:28:42 +08:00
houseme 122a69df65 feat(ecstore): tune fdatasync group wait budget (#6327)
* feat(ecstore): tune fdatasync group wait budget

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>

* test(ecstore): cover fdatasync wait budget contract

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
2026-08-21 14:08:21 +08:00
cxymds dfeb732ac8 fix: make DeleteObjects idempotent for raw not-found errors (#6323)
* fix: make DeleteObjects idempotent for raw not-found errors

* fix: cover DeleteObjects raw not-found result dispatch
2026-08-21 03:12:37 +00:00
Henry Guo 1aae680373 fix(lifecycle): honor bucket default retention (#6324)
* fix(lifecycle): honor bucket retention during scanner expiry

* fix(lifecycle): reject zero object lock retention

* test(lifecycle): cover malformed retention metadata

---------

Co-authored-by: Henry Guo <marshawcoco@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-08-21 10:11:13 +08:00
cxymds 1b4f62d501 docs(agents): run adversarial review before pre-pr (#6325)
docs(agents): order adversarial review before pre-pr
2026-08-21 10:10:56 +08:00
houseme 4283591838 feat(ecstore): observe PUT commit lock admission (#6319)
* feat(ecstore): observe PUT commit lock admission

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>

* update h2 v0.4.18

* test(e2e): box SSE-KMS negative errors

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
2026-08-21 01:18:53 +00:00
Zhengchao An f2957a680d test: stabilize release-blocking full E2E checks (#6322) 2026-08-21 08:43:12 +08:00
Zhengchao An d22cb5d07a fix: resolve release-blocking integration failures (#6320)
* fix: resolve release-blocking integration failures

* fix: satisfy stable clippy lints

* fix: satisfy Rust 1.98 CI lints
2026-08-21 06:39:29 +08:00
houseme 762919b1ba perf(scanner): reduce per-object allocation churn (#6318)
Co-authored-by: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
2026-08-20 16:47:48 +00:00
houseme cee0d5cf9b perf(io-metrics): cache read version metric handles (#6317)
Co-authored-by: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
2026-08-20 16:39:26 +00:00
houseme 35af688cd9 test(obs): add metric dimension smoke harness (#6316)
test(obs): add metrics dimension smoke harness

Co-authored-by: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
2026-08-20 16:26:19 +00:00
GatewayJ 205337151a fix(webdav): allow bucket-scoped root listings (#6298)
* fix(webdav): allow bucket-scoped root listings

* test(webdav): use public protocol export

* test(webdav): initialize identity inline

---------

Co-authored-by: cxymds <cxymds@gmail.com>
2026-08-21 00:15:33 +08:00
Henry Guo 105b6fbfde fix(scanner): honor explicit cycle cadence (#6313)
Co-authored-by: Henry Guo <marshawcoco@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: houseme <housemecn@gmail.com>
2026-08-20 23:35:03 +08:00
houseme b2e573c48b feat(ecstore): bound put commit lock admission (#6315)
Co-authored-by: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
2026-08-20 23:33:17 +08:00
houseme 114bf5148c refactor(heal): prune statistics label helpers (#6312)
Co-authored-by: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
2026-08-20 22:43:59 +08:00
houseme 830e553a3c feat(obs): complete metric dimension coverage (#6314)
Co-authored-by: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
2026-08-20 22:43:40 +08:00
Zhengchao An d65fba9142 chore(release): prepare 1.0.0-rc.3 2026-08-20 21:50:34 +08:00
houseme 198a07d3fa feat(ecstore): observe put commit lock wait (#6310) 2026-08-20 21:47:30 +08:00
houseme 8bd2d5d967 perf(heal): reduce scheduler skip heap churn (#6311) 2026-08-20 21:47:11 +08:00
houseme efbef700ea fix(heal): emit MRF repair notices on completion (#6309)
Move MRF repaired-event fan-out from admission to successful terminal completion so scanner pending-heal ledgers only clear after the canonical heal task actually finishes. Track notice ownership across duplicate admission, retry merge, cancellation, and queue displacement.

Co-authored-by: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
2026-08-20 21:23:29 +08:00
houseme a247c79359 perf(heal): trim scanner and heal queue hot paths (#6307)
Cache heal queue dedup keys, avoid retry request double construction, clear task aliases after terminal completion, and age out stale scanner pending-heal ledger entries during retry sweeps.

Co-authored-by: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
2026-08-20 20:28:22 +08:00
houseme cd399d1e72 feat(ecstore): add default-off rename early ack probe (#6306) 2026-08-20 19:20:01 +08:00
houseme 095bf34086 refactor(scanner): split scanner.rs cycle/leadership/persist children (#6305)
Split the 8178-line scanner.rs (48% inline tests) into a canonical
scanner.rs + scanner/ module tree with zero behavior change:

- scanner.rs (~2140): cycle constants, schedule status, budget/config
  helpers, startup, maintenance features, the two run loops, and
  cycle-result finalization
- scanner/activity.rs (~770): wake/backoff policy and scanner activity
  observation (probing, generations, topology digest)
- scanner/heal_info.rs (~110): the background-heal info object
- scanner/cycle_state.rs (~500): cycle-state codec, persisted usage
  floors, and cycle-state persistence
- scanner/leadership.rs (~360): leader-lock claiming, usage-epoch
  fencing, and lock-loss handling
- scanner/usage_store.rs (~480): the CAS data-usage store pipeline and
  observed-snapshot cleanup
- scanner/tests.rs (~3920): the inline test module as a child module

All crate paths are unchanged: scanner::BackgroundHealInfo,
scanner::read_background_heal_info, scanner::store_data_usage_in_backend,
and scanner_topology_digest resolve through root re-exports with their
original visibilities, and the pub(crate) surface used by scanner_io and
remote_scanner re-exports at pub(crate). Cross-module items gain
pub(super), whose scope equals the old single-module privacy domain.
Code is moved verbatim apart from those markers, per-module import
headers, and rustfmt re-wraps.

Co-authored-by: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
2026-08-20 19:12:27 +08:00
houseme 2cf0ad0f85 perf(server): cache HTTP metric handles (#6304)
Cache fixed-label HTTP request and response metric handles so the hot request path avoids repeated recorder lookups for common counters, gauges, and histograms. Preserve the existing metric names and labels with focused mapping tests.

Co-authored-by: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
2026-08-20 19:12:18 +08:00
houseme 2b9dcc646f refactor(heal): split manager.rs queue/scheduler/scan children (#6303)
Split the 6723-line manager.rs (44% inline tests) into a canonical
manager.rs + manager/ module tree with zero behavior change:

- manager.rs (~1830): HealManager and HealState, HealConfig, task
  report/snapshot types, overlap policy, admission classification and
  queue admission, submit paths, task-state queries, and the
  statistics surface
- manager/queue.rs (~450): the priority heal queue, its per-key dedup
  index, and the queue bookkeeping structs
- manager/scheduler.rs (~620): start_scheduler and the
  process_heal_queue consumption loop with its skip/metric helpers
- manager/auto_scan.rs (~550): the automatic disk scanner
- manager/unclean_shutdown.rs (~390): unclean-shutdown recovery and
  its durable replacement-intent helpers
- manager/tests.rs (~2970): the inline test module as a child module

All module paths are unchanged. The queue structs' fields and the
cross-module helpers gain pub(super), whose scope equals the old
single-module privacy domain; HealManager's private fields stay in the
root and remain reachable from child impl blocks. Code is moved
verbatim apart from those markers, heal-level super:: path fixes for
the unclean-shutdown move, per-module import headers, and rustfmt
re-wraps.

The logging-guardrail rule for the manager demote_to_debug_when! count
now sums manager.rs with its manager/*.rs children, since one
scheduler site moved with process_heal_queue; the >= 6 threshold is
unchanged and the forbidden admission info!/warn! pattern check keeps
targeting the root admission code.

Co-authored-by: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
2026-08-20 19:12:07 +08:00
houseme 129677f0b3 refactor(scanner): split scanner_folder item actions and ledger (#6302)
* refactor(scanner): split scanner_folder item actions and ledger

Split the 6345-line scanner_folder.rs (46% inline tests) into a
canonical scanner_folder.rs + scanner_folder/ module tree with zero
behavior change:

- scanner_folder.rs (~2280): scan constants, alert cooldowns, metric
  accounting, resume ordering, tracing helpers, the FolderScanner
  struct with failed-object bookkeeping and the scan_folder traversal,
  and scan_data_folder
- scanner_folder/item_actions.rs (~890): CachedFolder, the get-size
  failure policy, ScannerItem with apply_actions and the heal/ILM
  admission helpers
- scanner_folder/ledger.rs (~280): the pending-scanner-heal ledger
  methods and their entry helpers (record/prune/clear-for-repaired/
  retry)
- scanner_folder/tests.rs (~2950): the inline test module as a child
  module

The ScannerItem path used by scanner_io resolves through a root
re-export, and every other crate path is unchanged. Cross-module items
gain pub(super), whose scope equals the old single-module privacy
domain. Code is moved verbatim apart from those markers, per-module
import headers, and rustfmt re-wraps.

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>

* fmt

---------

Co-authored-by: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
2026-08-20 19:11:55 +08:00
houseme c620a74230 test(ecstore): pin rename quorum tail visibility (#6301)
Add deterministic rename_data coverage for tail-disk success/failure, cancellation serialization, and strict quorum rollback visibility after disk reopen. This establishes the safety boundary before experimenting with write-quorum early ACK and background tail completion for backlog #925.

Co-authored-by: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
2026-08-20 18:12:36 +08:00
cxymds 319a03e638 fix(lifecycle): safely expire all object versions (#6291)
* fix(lifecycle): safely expire all object versions

* fix(lifecycle): preserve delete-all replication purges

* fix(lifecycle): remove dead replication journal

* fix(ci): avoid lifecycle transition test stack overflow

* fix(lifecycle): release recovery locks before tier IO

* test(lifecycle): align object-lock error assertions

* test(lifecycle): avoid scanner restore stack overflow

* test(scanner): avoid stack overflow in transition and restore flow test (#6300)

* refactor(scanner): split remote_scanner.rs into stream child module (#6289)

Split the 3080-line remote_scanner.rs (47% inline tests) into a
canonical foo.rs + foo/ module tree with zero behavior change:

- remote_scanner.rs (~320): protocol constants, process statics, and
  the request decode/validate/admit/preflight/claim API plus root
  re-exports
- remote_scanner/stream.rs (~1340): wire/frame types, replay cache,
  FrameAuthenticator, serve path, local bucket scan + persist, client
  scan, and the bounded stream plumbing
- remote_scanner/stream/tests.rs (~1470): the inline test module as a
  child module of stream so it can reach both parents' private items

All crate paths are unchanged: lib.rs re-exports
(serve_remote_scanner_request, RemoteScannerRequest, ...) resolve
through root re-exports, and scanner_io's crate::remote_scanner::
{scan_remote_bucket, RemoteScannerScanSpec, RemoteScannerOutcome}
paths resolve through pub(crate) re-exports. Cross-module items gain
pub(super), whose scope equals the old single-module privacy domain;
no item's effective visibility widens. Code is moved verbatim apart
from those markers, per-module import headers, and rustfmt line
re-wraps.

Co-authored-by: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>

* refactor(heal): split resume.rs into focused child modules (#6290)

Split the 4242-line resume.rs (46% inline tests) into a canonical
foo.rs + foo/ module tree with zero behavior change:

- resume.rs (~1020): state file constants, PersistThrottle, ResumeState,
  ResumeManager core (constructors, load/discovery, progress mutators,
  ordinary persistence) plus root re-exports
- resume/replacement.rs (~690): replacement-intent/proof types and the
  ResumeManager replacement-lifecycle methods
- resume/checkpoint.rs (~350): ResumeCheckpoint + CheckpointManager
- resume/utils.rs (~310): ResumeUtils statics
- resume/tests.rs (~1980): the inline test module as a child module

All module paths are unchanged (heal::resume::CheckpointManager and
friends resolve through root re-exports), so no consumer inside or
outside the crate changes. Items defined in child modules keep
module-private visibility; only the ten cross-module helpers gain
pub(super), which is not part of the crate API. Code is moved verbatim
apart from those visibility markers, four super::storage_api path
fixes, and the new per-module import headers.

Co-authored-by: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>

* refactor(scanner): split scanner_io.rs into child modules (#6294)

Split the 5369-line scanner_io.rs (39% inline tests) into a canonical
scanner_io.rs + scanner_io/ module tree with zero behavior change:

- scanner_io.rs (~660): constants, metadata-error constructors, the
  bucket scan plan, cycle-status classification helpers, the ScannerIO /
  ScannerIOCache / ScannerIODisk traits, and ScannerCycleResult
- scanner_io/dirty_usage.rs (~300): process-wide dirty-usage statics
  and the acknowledgment protocol
- scanner_io/guards.rs (~270): concurrency gauges and RAII guards
- scanner_io/cache.rs (~410): scanner cache locks and the snapshot
  persist/publish path
- scanner_io/io_cycle.rs (~390), io_cache.rs (~1160), io_disk.rs
  (~230): the ECStore / SetDisks / Disk trait implementations
- scanner_io/publish_gate_tests.rs (~750) and tests.rs (~1340): the two
  inline test modules as child modules

All crate paths are unchanged: the lib.rs scanner_io re-exports and
every crate::scanner_io:: consumer (scanner.rs, remote_scanner,
scanner_folder, and cross-crate rustfs users) resolve through root
re-exports with their original visibilities (pub stays pub, pub(crate)
stays pub(crate)). Cross-module items gain pub(super), whose scope
equals the old single-module privacy domain. Code is moved verbatim
apart from those markers, per-module import headers, and rustfmt
re-wraps.

The logging-guardrail nsscanner_disk skip-set_disks rule now points at
scanner_io/io_disk.rs where the function moved; the pattern and
thresholds are unchanged.

Co-authored-by: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>

* refactor(scanner): split data_usage_define persistence and tests (#6292)

Split the 3655-line data_usage_define.rs (59% inline tests) into a
canonical foo.rs + foo/ module tree with zero behavior change:

- data_usage_define.rs (~950): cache constants and revision helpers,
  the data-usage tree types, DataUsageCacheInfo with its hand-written
  Serialize, the in-memory tree operations, dui, and marshal/unmarshal
- data_usage_define/persistence.rs (~580): the load/backup/restore
  ladder (load, try_load_inner, revision_for_path) and the CAS save
  path with its retry policy and save metrics
- data_usage_define/tests.rs (~2155): the inline test module as a child
  module

All module paths are unchanged (the lib.rs data_usage_define::* glob
re-export and every crate::data_usage_define:: consumer resolve as
before). The hand-written map-encoded Serialize for
DataUsageCacheInfo is moved byte-for-byte per the AGENTS.md
cross-cutting invariant; on-disk names and the cache key format const
stay in the root. Four persistence helpers used by tests gain
pub(super), whose scope equals the old single-module privacy domain.
Code is moved verbatim apart from those markers, per-module import
headers, and rustfmt re-wraps.

Co-authored-by: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>

* chore(deps): bump datafusion to 55.0.0 (#6288)

* refactor(heal): split task.rs per heal kind (#6293)

* feat(ecstore): batch small file fdatasync commits (#6297)

* feat(ecstore): batch small file fdatasync commits

Add a default-off experimental file fdatasync group commit path for small rename_data shard directories. The coordinator batches same-disk waiters into one blocking task while preserving per-directory source fsync after shard contents are durable.

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>

* test(e2e): wait for compression S3 readiness

Reuse the shared S3 API readiness probe for compression test servers so multipart requests do not race the startup readiness gate after the TCP port opens.

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>

* fix(tier): recover multi-committed mutation intents (#6296)

* fix(tier): recover multi-committed mutation intents

* fix(tier): recover committed mutations on standalone nodes

* test(scanner): avoid stack overflow in transition test

---------

Co-authored-by: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: cxymds <cxymds@gmail.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: houseme <housemecn@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
2026-08-20 09:42:09 +00:00
houseme 621fcb93c7 feat(ecstore): expose fdatasync group wait metrics (#6299)
Add PUT-stage diagnostics for file fdatasync group commit wait time, per-group outstanding depth, and rename disk completion position. These metrics keep the existing default-off PUT stage gate and do not change group commit scheduling or quorum behavior.

Co-authored-by: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
2026-08-20 16:59:37 +08:00
cxymds 76eb9c72e4 fix(tier): recover multi-committed mutation intents (#6296)
* fix(tier): recover multi-committed mutation intents

* fix(tier): recover committed mutations on standalone nodes
2026-08-20 16:26:27 +08:00
houseme 51023dc258 feat(ecstore): batch small file fdatasync commits (#6297)
* feat(ecstore): batch small file fdatasync commits

Add a default-off experimental file fdatasync group commit path for small rename_data shard directories. The coordinator batches same-disk waiters into one blocking task while preserving per-directory source fsync after shard contents are durable.

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>

* test(e2e): wait for compression S3 readiness

Reuse the shared S3 API readiness probe for compression test servers so multipart requests do not race the startup readiness gate after the TCP port opens.

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
2026-08-20 15:22:56 +08:00
houseme 0d129ec4e7 refactor(heal): split task.rs per heal kind (#6293) 2026-08-20 12:24:16 +08:00
houseme fec9e8980a chore(deps): bump datafusion to 55.0.0 (#6288) 2026-08-20 12:23:53 +08:00
houseme c428c6615e refactor(scanner): split data_usage_define persistence and tests (#6292)
Split the 3655-line data_usage_define.rs (59% inline tests) into a
canonical foo.rs + foo/ module tree with zero behavior change:

- data_usage_define.rs (~950): cache constants and revision helpers,
  the data-usage tree types, DataUsageCacheInfo with its hand-written
  Serialize, the in-memory tree operations, dui, and marshal/unmarshal
- data_usage_define/persistence.rs (~580): the load/backup/restore
  ladder (load, try_load_inner, revision_for_path) and the CAS save
  path with its retry policy and save metrics
- data_usage_define/tests.rs (~2155): the inline test module as a child
  module

All module paths are unchanged (the lib.rs data_usage_define::* glob
re-export and every crate::data_usage_define:: consumer resolve as
before). The hand-written map-encoded Serialize for
DataUsageCacheInfo is moved byte-for-byte per the AGENTS.md
cross-cutting invariant; on-disk names and the cache key format const
stay in the root. Four persistence helpers used by tests gain
pub(super), whose scope equals the old single-module privacy domain.
Code is moved verbatim apart from those markers, per-module import
headers, and rustfmt re-wraps.

Co-authored-by: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
2026-08-20 12:23:09 +08:00
houseme 769e66511f refactor(scanner): split scanner_io.rs into child modules (#6294)
Split the 5369-line scanner_io.rs (39% inline tests) into a canonical
scanner_io.rs + scanner_io/ module tree with zero behavior change:

- scanner_io.rs (~660): constants, metadata-error constructors, the
  bucket scan plan, cycle-status classification helpers, the ScannerIO /
  ScannerIOCache / ScannerIODisk traits, and ScannerCycleResult
- scanner_io/dirty_usage.rs (~300): process-wide dirty-usage statics
  and the acknowledgment protocol
- scanner_io/guards.rs (~270): concurrency gauges and RAII guards
- scanner_io/cache.rs (~410): scanner cache locks and the snapshot
  persist/publish path
- scanner_io/io_cycle.rs (~390), io_cache.rs (~1160), io_disk.rs
  (~230): the ECStore / SetDisks / Disk trait implementations
- scanner_io/publish_gate_tests.rs (~750) and tests.rs (~1340): the two
  inline test modules as child modules

All crate paths are unchanged: the lib.rs scanner_io re-exports and
every crate::scanner_io:: consumer (scanner.rs, remote_scanner,
scanner_folder, and cross-crate rustfs users) resolve through root
re-exports with their original visibilities (pub stays pub, pub(crate)
stays pub(crate)). Cross-module items gain pub(super), whose scope
equals the old single-module privacy domain. Code is moved verbatim
apart from those markers, per-module import headers, and rustfmt
re-wraps.

The logging-guardrail nsscanner_disk skip-set_disks rule now points at
scanner_io/io_disk.rs where the function moved; the pattern and
thresholds are unchanged.

Co-authored-by: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
2026-08-20 12:18:45 +08:00
houseme e6fc661162 refactor(heal): split resume.rs into focused child modules (#6290)
Split the 4242-line resume.rs (46% inline tests) into a canonical
foo.rs + foo/ module tree with zero behavior change:

- resume.rs (~1020): state file constants, PersistThrottle, ResumeState,
  ResumeManager core (constructors, load/discovery, progress mutators,
  ordinary persistence) plus root re-exports
- resume/replacement.rs (~690): replacement-intent/proof types and the
  ResumeManager replacement-lifecycle methods
- resume/checkpoint.rs (~350): ResumeCheckpoint + CheckpointManager
- resume/utils.rs (~310): ResumeUtils statics
- resume/tests.rs (~1980): the inline test module as a child module

All module paths are unchanged (heal::resume::CheckpointManager and
friends resolve through root re-exports), so no consumer inside or
outside the crate changes. Items defined in child modules keep
module-private visibility; only the ten cross-module helpers gain
pub(super), which is not part of the crate API. Code is moved verbatim
apart from those visibility markers, four super::storage_api path
fixes, and the new per-module import headers.

Co-authored-by: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
2026-08-20 12:11:35 +08:00
houseme 305d291037 refactor(scanner): split remote_scanner.rs into stream child module (#6289)
Split the 3080-line remote_scanner.rs (47% inline tests) into a
canonical foo.rs + foo/ module tree with zero behavior change:

- remote_scanner.rs (~320): protocol constants, process statics, and
  the request decode/validate/admit/preflight/claim API plus root
  re-exports
- remote_scanner/stream.rs (~1340): wire/frame types, replay cache,
  FrameAuthenticator, serve path, local bucket scan + persist, client
  scan, and the bounded stream plumbing
- remote_scanner/stream/tests.rs (~1470): the inline test module as a
  child module of stream so it can reach both parents' private items

All crate paths are unchanged: lib.rs re-exports
(serve_remote_scanner_request, RemoteScannerRequest, ...) resolve
through root re-exports, and scanner_io's crate::remote_scanner::
{scan_remote_bucket, RemoteScannerScanSpec, RemoteScannerOutcome}
paths resolve through pub(crate) re-exports. Cross-module items gain
pub(super), whose scope equals the old single-module privacy domain;
no item's effective visibility widens. Code is moved verbatim apart
from those markers, per-module import headers, and rustfmt line
re-wraps.

Co-authored-by: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
2026-08-20 12:10:43 +08:00
唐小鸭 22b4ef9f0c fix(get): name the failing object on mid-stream GET body failures (#6284) 2026-08-20 03:33:31 +08:00
Zhengchao An c10d74c78b feat(connect): add device identity store and registration proof (#6267) 2026-08-20 03:32:59 +08:00
Zhengchao An 898aa4db95 chore: adjudicate the last 18 bare dead_code allows in the library crates (#6265)
* chore: adjudicate the last 18 bare dead_code allows in the library crates

Finishes backlog#1823 step 10 outside `rustfs/src` and `protocols`: config, s3select-query, common, madmin, heal, ecstore, signer and notify. Stripped first, then clippy asked which the compiler actually missed — 8 of the 18 were inert.

Seven items are deleted, each checked by grep as well as by clippy:

- `common/last_minute.rs`'s private `TimedAction` (with its impl) and `SizeCategory` (with its `Display` impl). The file's public surface — `AccElem`, `LastMinuteLatency` — stays; ecstore consumes it.
- `s3select-query`'s three `with_*` builders. `DefaultLogicalOptimizer::with_optimizer_rules` looks used, but the call in the same file is `SessionStateBuilder::with_optimizer_rules` from DataFusion; the local methods have no callers.
- `heal/manager.rs`'s `contains_key`. Its six apparent references are all `HashMap::contains_key`.

Three keep their code:

- `heal/storage.rs`'s `Test` variant is constructed by the `#[cfg(test)] test()` helper, which the lib target cannot see, so it takes a reasoned allow.
- `signer`'s `STREAMING_PAYLOAD_HDR` and `try_build_chunk_string_to_sign` gain the `_` prefix instead. That file already marks deliberately-unheld code that way — `_STREAMING_TRAILER_HDR`, `_PAYLOAD_CHUNK_SIZE`, and `_try_build_chunk_signature`, which is the only caller of that function. Following the existing convention removes the allow without an attribute.

`protocols` keeps its four; that crate needs `--features swift,sftp` to compile fully and is verified differently. The four `#![allow(dead_code)]` in `e2e_test` are module-root blankets in test-support files, which belong to steps 1-5 rather than step 10.

Refs backlog#1823

* chore(e2e_test): adjudicate the two dead_code allows the lib test target still needs

`cargo clippy --all-targets` compiles e2e_test's lib test target, which the earlier pass did not cover, so these two removals only surfaced in CI.

test_large_multipart_upload's allow was load-bearing: its call site in test_local_kms_multipart_upload is commented out behind "TODO: Re-enable after fixing streaming encryption issues with large files". The allow comes back with the reason string this batch uses everywhere else, so the next reader sees why it is parked instead of deleting a test we intend to run again.

TestDefinition.category was the opposite: written at all six definitions, read nowhere, and its enum's impl block is empty. The live copy of that type is crates/e2e_test/src/kms/test_runner.rs, which has an as_str; the policy copy is a vestige of it. Dropping the field, the enum, and the constructor parameter leaves the runner unchanged — it dispatches on name and filters on is_critical.

Verification: cargo clippy --all-targets -- -D warnings (workspace, the CI command) and cargo fmt --all --check both pass.

---------

Co-authored-by: houseme <housemecn@gmail.com>
2026-08-19 17:55:58 +00:00
houseme b1b4e443b2 perf(heal,scanner): single-flight MRF producers per detection event (#6282)
Two producer paths double-booked the same damage across repair records
(backlog#1894 axis A):

- The scanner's corrupt-metadata branch fired a durable MRF journal
  intent, an immediate High heal request, and a pending-ledger entry for
  the same object. When the MRF intent is accepted into the channel it
  already covers the repair durably (the consumer files a High Metadata
  heal and the journal replays it across restarts), so the immediate
  request and ledger entry are dropped in that case; on delivery failure
  (feature disabled, channel uninitialized, or full) the old immediate
  request + ledger path runs unchanged, keeping the repair safety net.
- The read path filed a journal intent before the read-repair
  reservation check, so a burst of reads failing on one object booked a
  journal record per retry. The intent now rides the submission: it is
  filed only when the sighting wins the dedup TTL, next to the Low
  request, via a new optional mrf_intent field on
  ReadRepairHealSubmission (None keeps the historical no-intent
  behavior for the other read-repair call sites).

Manager dedup-key semantics are untouched; the fix is that competing
producers stop double-booking. With RUSTFS_HEAL_MRF_ENABLE off both
paths behave exactly as before.

Co-authored-by: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
2026-08-19 17:32:16 +00:00
houseme d6efb65588 feat(heal,scanner): best-effort repaired notices from the MRF consumer (#6283)
The scanner's pending-heal ledger and the MRF journal tracked the same
damaged objects with no cross-talk: once the consumer landed an intent
with the heal manager, the ledger's retry entry for that target kept
re-submitting a heal the manager already owned (backlog#1894 axis B).

Fan the acceptance out: both dispatch sites in the MRF queue (the live
consumer and the startup replay) record a compact MrfRepairedEvent
(bucket, object, version bytes) in a bounded process-wide ring owned by
rustfs-common. The scanner drains its own bucket's notices at the top
of retry_pending_scanner_heals and clears the matching Object-kind
ledger entries in one batched retain + sync (a mass-recovery first
sweep must not turn into thousands of full-table ledger clones on the
scan task), with nil notice UUIDs mapping to None per the repo-wide
defensive-UUID invariant so unversioned entries match unversioned
notices only. Notices are best-effort by design — a lost or capped-out
notice leaves the entry to expire through its own attempts/age limits,
because the ledger is a retry oracle, not a source of truth; other
buckets' notices stay queued for their own scanners. Neither persistent
format changes; old nodes that keep double-booking remain harmless.

Co-authored-by: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
2026-08-19 17:31:26 +00:00
Zhengchao An 99c3811d93 fix(ecstore): classify decommission stage failures by type, not by message (#6269)
T2 of backlog#1827. `data_movement_stage_error` flattened every stage failure into `Error::other(format!(...))`, discarding the typed error. The cost was visible in tree: `is_decommission_target_capacity_error` had to match rendered text —

    let message = err.to_string();
    message.contains(&disk_full) || message.contains(&storage_full)

— to notice that the destination pool had filled up, and `is_decommission_copy_cleanup_safe_error` could not see a not-found that surfaced from inside a stage at all.

The wrapper now carries what it wrapped. `DataMovementStageError` renders the same string and returns the original through `source()`; `Error::other` boxes it through `std::io::Error`, so `data_movement_stage_source` recovers it by downcast. Both classifiers unwrap before matching, keeping their substring paths for errors that arrive through some other wrapper.

The rendered message is unchanged, which a test now pins against the exact string the old `format!` produced rather than against a `contains`. Three more cover the round trip for `DiskFull`, `StorageFull`, `FileNotFound` and `SlowDown`, that unrelated errors are not mistaken for stage wrappers, and — the case the issue names — that a not-found surfacing from inside a stage is judged cleanup-safe by the decommission loop exactly as a direct one is.

Refs backlog#1827
2026-08-19 16:04:29 +00:00
Zhengchao An 3a46baab13 refactor(admin): route observability handler auth through the shared gate (#6263)
Co-authored-by: houseme <housemecn@gmail.com>
2026-08-19 16:00:22 +00:00
houseme 81332718e6 perf(scanner): cut per-object allocations in the scan hot path (#6274) 2026-08-19 23:33:49 +08:00
houseme 0126f359e3 fix(heal): stop O(window) memmove in the heal result window (#6272) 2026-08-19 23:33:33 +08:00
houseme 10603d0870 chore(common): drop dead rule helpers and the s3s dependency (#6271) 2026-08-19 23:33:21 +08:00
houseme 7f8a8cdbac fix(madmin): send background-heal status over POST (#6270) 2026-08-19 23:33:06 +08:00
Zhengchao An cc0254d8de fix(admin): pass the real RemoteAddr so aws:SourceIp reaches policy evaluation (#6273)
backlog#1885. Six admin call sites hardcoded `None` for `validate_admin_request`'s `remote_addr`, so `aws:SourceIp` never entered the condition map for those endpoints.

`AddrFunc::evaluate` (crates/policy/src/policy/function/addr.rs:23-41) reads the key with `values.get(...)`; an absent key yields an empty iterator, the inner loop never runs, and the function returns `false`. That flips two policy shapes in opposite directions:

- `Allow` + an IpAddress whitelist stops matching, locking a legitimate admin out of these endpoints.
- `Deny` + an IpAddress blacklist also stops matching, so a source the policy means to block is let through. This one is a bypass, and it is the one nobody would report.

The sites now read the address the way the correct handlers do — `req.extensions.get::<Option<RemoteAddr>>()`, populated from the connection in `server/http.rs`.

A regression test covers both shapes at the policy layer, since that is where the direction is decided. The existing `test_iam_policy_source_ip` only exercised a present key matching or not matching; nothing covered an absent one.

A tree-wide sweep of all 88 `validate_admin_request*` call sites confirms these six were the only ones dropping the address. The issue asked whether more existed beyond the six it had found: they do not. Worth noting that a first pass checked the last argument and reported only three — `_with_bucket` takes `remote_addr` second-to-last — so the sweep is positional.

One caveat for operators, unchanged by this fix: admin authorization does not route the peer address through `crates/trusted-proxies`, so behind a reverse proxy these conditions match the proxy's address, not the client's.

Refs backlog#1885
2026-08-19 15:15:34 +00:00
Zhengchao An 1f23fd17b6 fix(scripts): stop the assertless-test census truncating bodies at string braces (#6280)
The census matched braces over raw source, so a `{` inside a string literal unbalanced the count and cut the test body short. `test_find_ellipses_patterns_leftover_brace_error_does_not_echo_input` was reported as assertionless because its input — `"http://:brace-secret@server/{1...2}}"` — ended the body before the `assert!` two lines below it.

Brace matching now runs over a literal-stripped view. The stripper carries state across lines, because the JSON and `r#"..."#` fixtures these tests are built from routinely span several; a per-line version falls out of phase on the first multi-line string and truncates far more than it fixes. Raw strings are closed on their own hash count, and a lone `'` is left alone so a lifetime (`&'a str`) is not mistaken for a char literal.

The candidate count is unchanged at 15, which is the interesting part: one entry left and one arrived. `utils/src/string.rs:942` drops out, correctly — it does assert. `io-metrics/src/lib.rs:3308` appears, also correctly — `test_record_get_object_path_and_stage` makes twenty-odd `record_*` calls and asserts nothing, the same shape #6238 fixed elsewhere in that file. It had been hidden behind a truncated body.

Refs backlog#1836
2026-08-19 15:07:21 +00:00
houseme be7f684718 refactor(heal): remove the dead MRF heal-type path (#6275)
HealType::MRF (a #1664-era "metadata repair file" task kind) had no
production construction site left: its only builder lived in the
HealEvent -> HealRequest converter, and the HealEvent/HealEventHandler
queue itself had zero production references — both were superseded by
the MrfIntent pipeline (mrf_queue.rs), which produces Object/Metadata/
ECDecode requests and never an MRF task. The dead path nevertheless
carried ~700 lines: the whole event.rs module, the heal_mrf executor,
a dedup-key arm, an overlap arm with the "\u{0}mrf" sentinel bucket
hack, per-kind labels, and an empty MrfRuntime::record_accept shell.

Deleting the variant is compile-time safe: HealType has no Serialize
derive, the protos wire enums carry no heal-type discriminant (the
receiver rebuilds it from HealChannelRequest fields), the MRF journal
encodes MrfKind (1/2/3), and the scanner pending-heal ledger uses its
own kind enum — none of them can name an MRF task.

Also resolves the in-crate naming clash where "MRF" denoted both the
dead task kind and the live mission-repair-feed loop; the loop stays,
the task kind goes.

Co-authored-by: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
2026-08-19 14:52:36 +00:00
Zhengchao An 3bde70d5b4 chore(protocols): narrow the SessionDiag blanket to its one unread field (#6266)
The last item-level bare allow of backlog#1823 step 10. `SessionDiag` itself is live — `sftp/server.rs` constructs one per accepted connection and `wedge_watchdog` reads `session_id`, `peer` and `last_activity_ms` off it — so the struct-level blanket was covering exactly one field: `accepted_at`, which is written at accept time and never read back. The allow moves onto that field with a reason.

The three remaining `#![allow(dead_code)]` in this crate (`sftp/test_support.rs`, `common/dummy_storage.rs`) are module-root blankets in test-support files, which belong to steps 1-5 rather than step 10.

Refs backlog#1823
2026-08-19 22:38:49 +08:00
Zhengchao An 5a1b0fe9df docs(admin): pin two authorization semantics against a dedup rewrite (#6279) 2026-08-19 22:04:25 +08:00
Henry Guo 24cfce12ed fix(metrics): remove duplicate scanner counter producers (#6245)
* fix(metrics): remove duplicate scanner counter producers

* chore(deps): centralize metrics test dependencies

* ci: avoid apt mirror for ripgrep setup

* test(protos): track read-version encoder refactor

---------

Co-authored-by: Henry Guo <marshawcoco@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: houseme <housemecn@gmail.com>
2026-08-19 21:58:22 +08:00
hector 9fed675185 feat(helm): add istio gateway class support (#6264) 2026-08-19 21:01:53 +08:00
houseme 1f8359537b docs(operations): restore the truncated tail of the English audit baseline (#6268)
The merge of rustfs#6261 lost the last 64 lines of the English
translation: merging main (to pick up rustfs#6258) resolved the
conflict on the renamed file by cutting it mid-table in section 6,
which dropped section 7 (backlog/history index), section 8 (audit
method and limitations) and section 9 (landing results) that the
Chinese counterpart still carries. Restore them verbatim from the
translation commit (0e051602f) so both language versions are complete
568-line mirrors of the full 0-9 baseline, as the PR body promised.

Co-authored-by: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
2026-08-19 18:15:03 +08:00
cxymds d7609b68a6 fix(lock): reject stale lease snapshots (#6249) 2026-08-19 14:47:33 +08:00
houseme 3958781320 feat(io-metrics): attribute ReadVersion RPC stages (#6262) 2026-08-19 14:47:17 +08:00
Zhengchao An 5cb12300bc refactor(sse): keep one bucket-default algorithm mapping for every writer (#6251) 2026-08-19 14:30:04 +08:00
Zhengchao An bce0c05f3c chore(rustfs): adjudicate the remaining 36 bare dead_code allows (#6259) 2026-08-19 14:28:57 +08:00
houseme 07cef6789b feat(ecstore): expose rename sync tail metrics (#6257)
Add default-off PUT stage helpers for fdatasync batch shape and rename quorum fanout shape so #925 follow-up probes can distinguish shard sync batching opportunities from fanout convergence.

Co-authored-by: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
2026-08-19 14:26:43 +08:00
houseme 05e6dc5f4a docs(operations): add an English counterpart of the heal/scanner audit baseline (#6261)
* docs(operations): land the heal/scanner MinIO audit baseline with closure results

Move the comprehensive heal/scanner vs MinIO analysis (2026-08-16) into
docs/operations/ so it finally enters the tree — the docs/ root is
ignored by the gitignore whitelist, which is why the baseline the audit
issue referenced as "to be merged with a PR" never landed. Append §9
closure results: all 14 backlog sub-issues (#1865-#1878) closed with the
per-item PR map, two further misjudgment corrections (HS-17 was already
implemented; HS-14's MinIO idle semantics drifted upstream), HS-12/HS-18
audit conclusions, and the registered follow-ups.

Backlog issue: rustfs/backlog#1862

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>

* docs(operations): add an English counterpart of the audit baseline

Rename the Chinese analysis to *_zh.md (matching the repo's bilingual
convention of scanner-excess-alerts.md / _zh.md) and add a full English
translation at the original path, cross-linked at the top of both files.

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>

---------

Signed-off-by: houseme <housemecn@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
2026-08-19 06:10:34 +00:00
cxymds 6f3f2f5f62 test(lifecycle): cover noncurrent marker cleanup cascade (#6252) 2026-08-19 14:06:38 +08:00
houseme b97fb02180 docs(operations): land the heal/scanner MinIO audit baseline with closure results (backlog#1862) (#6258)
docs(operations): land the heal/scanner MinIO audit baseline with closure results

Move the comprehensive heal/scanner vs MinIO analysis (2026-08-16) into
docs/operations/ so it finally enters the tree — the docs/ root is
ignored by the gitignore whitelist, which is why the baseline the audit
issue referenced as "to be merged with a PR" never landed. Append §9
closure results: all 14 backlog sub-issues (#1865-#1878) closed with the
per-item PR map, two further misjudgment corrections (HS-17 was already
implemented; HS-14's MinIO idle semantics drifted upstream), HS-12/HS-18
audit conclusions, and the registered follow-ups.

Backlog issue: rustfs/backlog#1862

Co-authored-by: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
2026-08-19 05:51:23 +00:00
Zhengchao An f7073d0191 refactor(admin): route plugin handler auth through authorize_admin_request (#6247) 2026-08-19 05:43:39 +00:00
houseme d404e1bb8a refactor(heal,scanner): clean up dead heal/scanner code, flags, and metrics (HS-09/10/19/20) (#6256) 2026-08-19 13:11:46 +08:00
Zhengchao An ceb6f779fb chore(rustfs): adjudicate 37 bare dead_code allows in the four densest files (#6254) 2026-08-19 13:11:32 +08:00
Zhengchao An e4eae22a70 test(crypto): replace the one-file key scan with a repo-wide guard (#6255) 2026-08-19 13:10:53 +08:00
houseme d030719dbc docs(scanner): record heal/scanner MinIO parity decisions (backlog#1878 HS-14/16/18) (#6250)
* refactor(scanner): drop the always-None single-disk default cycle hook

single_disk_default_cycle_secs returned None for every maintenance
feature combination, so the single-disk startup path already resolved
its default cycle from the speed preset (60s at 'default'). Remove the
never-wired hook and its pin tests, keep the explicit reset, and record
the decision: no special single-disk cycle override without measured
cold-start ILM latency evidence; clean-idle backoff already stretches
idle cadence (backlog#1878 HS-16).

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>

* docs(operations): add heal/scanner MinIO parity decision notes

Document the HS-14/16/18 decision batch from backlog#1878: the scanner
idle throttling semantics matrix (RUSTFS_SCANNER_IDLE_MODE x speed
preset x foreground read backoff) side by side with MinIO's current
static idle_speed switch as verified against upstream master, the
migration warnings for env names and value vocabularies, the bitrot
cycle default divergence (30d vs off), the stale-multipart / tmp / trash
three-stage cleanup comparison with the crash-residue window grading,
and the single-disk default cycle decision.

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
2026-08-19 05:01:39 +00:00
Zhengchao An 1741f79d7d test(audit,heal): assert three more smoke tests (#6248)
`audit_runtime_facade_stops_empty_replay_workers` called the stop path and checked nothing, the same shape as the notify facade test in the previous commit. It now asserts the worker manager is empty afterwards and that a second call — which shutdown paths make — stays harmless.

The two heal timestamp tests bound their fields to `_`. Both timestamps come from `SystemTime::now().duration_since(UNIX_EPOCH).unwrap_or_default()`, so a pre-epoch clock yields 0; binding to `_` could not tell that apart from a real reading, which is precisely what the tests said they were guarding. They now require the value to be past 2020-01-01, and `last_update` not to predate `start_time`.

`test_config_parsing_with_multiple_instances` is left as it was — see the issue comment. Asserting on it turned up something bigger than a missing assertion.

Refs backlog#1836
2026-08-19 12:20:54 +08:00
356 changed files with 66164 additions and 38621 deletions
+32 -264
View File
@@ -1,277 +1,45 @@
---
name: adversarial-validation
description: Execute the Adversarial Validation policy from the root AGENTS.md — run the applicable reviewer roles with RustFS-specific attack probes. Use on every behavior-affecting code change, bug fix, design proposal, or agent-instruction change that alters execution before declaring it done.
description: Review a final RustFS diff adversarially when the user requests adversarial review, the root AGENTS.md classifies the change as high risk, or a substantial PR is being reviewed. Do not use for ordinary questions, diagnosis, planning, status, documentation-only work, or routine low-risk implementation.
---
# Adversarial Validation Playbooks
# RustFS Adversarial Validation
The policy — risk tiers, role list, protocol, exit criteria — lives in the
root `AGENTS.md` under "Adversarial Validation (Default On)". Read it first;
this skill does not restate it. This file adds the RustFS-specific probe
playbook for each role: concrete attacks, where they apply, and the real
shipped bug or rule that earns each probe its place.
Use the risk tier and review shape defined in the root `AGENTS.md`. This skill
routes a review to RustFS-specific probes without loading unrelated domains.
## How to run a role
## Select Lenses
1. Pick the tier and the applicable roles per the root `AGENTS.md`.
2. Run each role as an independent pass over the final diff — a parallel
reviewer agent where the tooling supports it, otherwise a fresh
sequential pass that starts from the diff and the nearest scoped
`AGENTS.md`, discarding the writing session's assumptions.
3. Within a role, execute the probes whose domain the diff touches, plus any
attack the diff obviously invites that no probe lists — the playbook is a
floor, not a ceiling.
4. Report findings (concrete failure scenario or named missing test, with
file:line) or the role's null report: "attacked X, Y, Z — no break
found". A bare pass is not a result.
Read only the references required by the diff:
## Role playbooks
| Lens | When to read |
|---|---|
| [Correctness](references/correctness.md) | Every non-exempt adversarial review |
| [Simplicity](references/simplicity.md) | Mechanical/standard changes and production growth |
| [Test coverage](references/test-coverage.md) | Behavior or test changes |
| [Security](references/security.md) | Authn/authz, IAM, RPC trust, paths, secrets, parsing, browser, encryption |
| [Concurrency/durability](references/concurrency-durability.md) | Async shared state, locks, storage commit, cancellation, persisted queues |
| [Compatibility](references/compatibility.md) | S3 surface, MinIO interop, metadata, wire/disk formats, mixed versions |
| [Performance](references/performance.md) | Request/object hot paths, allocation, blocking work, fsync, fan-out |
### Correctness adversary
Do not read all references as a precaution. A path name alone is insufficient;
the changed behavior must touch the lens's domain.
- For any change touching error aggregation or quorum decisions, build the exact disk-error slice at the quorum boundary: N disks where successes == quorum, then flip one success to an error (quorum-1) and separately inject None/nil placeholder entries into the slice. Trace whether reduce_errs (or the new equivalent) picks the placeholder as the dominant error or lets quorum-1 pass as success. Also check heal/write paths: does a per-target failure at quorum-1 return an explicit error, or silently degrade to success?
- Where: crates/ecstore/src/disk/error_reduce.rs; crates/ecstore/src/set_disk/{core,ops}; crates/heal
- Evidence: Commit 20d61c73b 'stop reduce_errs leaking nil placeholder as dominant error' (#4551) and 47c1e730c 'make erasure heal write quorum best-effort per target' (#4545); crates/ecstore/AGENTS.md: 'Do not weaken quorum checks... Prefer explicit failure over silent data corruption or implicit success.'
- For any change in EC read/reconstruct/streaming code, trace the mid-stream error path: the first K shards read fine, then a shard turns out bitrot-corrupt or inconsistent after N bytes have already been sent to the client. Verify the error propagates as a stream error (client sees failure), not a clean end-of-body — a silently truncated GET body is data corruption. Also re-check byte accounting: sum of per-part bytes vs object size, and partNumber-to-offset routing for the first and last part.
- Where: crates/ecstore/src/set_disk/read.rs (reconstruct-read, inconsistent_source_indexes handling ~line 3827); codec streaming paths in crates/ecstore/src/erasure_coding
- Evidence: Known live bug: EC reconstruct-read failing on inconsistent shards mid-stream silently truncates GET body → client 'unexpected EOF'; commit 15808254d 'correct codec-streaming byte accounting and partNumber routing' (#4535).
- For any listing/pagination change, construct the exact-boundary inputs: (a) exactly max_keys/max_uploads matching entries — assert the response contains max and is_truncated=false, then max+1 entries — assert exactly max returned with is_truncated=true and a correct continuation marker; (b) a delimiter listing where folding into CommonPrefixes re-fills a full page; (c) an object 'a' coexisting with prefix dir 'a/'. Off-by-one and dropped-truncation bugs live exactly at these boundaries.
- Where: crates/ecstore listing/merge paths (metacache, list_objects, list_multipart_uploads); rustfs/src/storage
- Evidence: Three recent real bugs: fefa70b31 'stop ListMultipartUploads from returning one upload past max-uploads' (#4447), d91f4d455 'report truncation when delimiter list re-folds a full page' (#4538), 7e1f7f242 'preserve CommonPrefixes when an object and same-named prefix dir coexist' (#4563).
- Run the diff's logic with a directory object key (trailing slash, e.g. 'pre/dir/') as input. Check which layer encodes/decodes __XLDIR__ — set_disk never sees the trailing slash, so any trailing-slash branch added below the store layer is dead code and a wrong-layer bug. For delete paths, check whether options force a nil versionId onto directory keys: the resulting miss surfaces as version-not-found, not object-not-found, so callers matching only ObjectNotFound leak ghost directory entries.
- Where: crates/ecstore/src/store*.rs (store layer) vs crates/ecstore/src/set_disk/*; delete option construction (del_opts) and its callers
- Evidence: trailing-slash branches must live at store layer; del_opts injects nil version for dir keys, PR#4220 ghost-directory cleanup never fired on the real path (rustfs#4307, backlog#798 still OPEN).
- Feed every new binary-UUID metadata read the three degenerate values: key absent, zero-length bytes, and 16 zero bytes (nil UUID). All three must mean 'no value' — any path that produces Uuid::nil() and then acts on it (e.g. sends it as a versionId) is a finding. For tier code specifically: with remote-tier version None or "", assert the tier GET/DELETE request carries no versionId parameter at all — sending versionId="" or nil yields NoSuchVersion against unversioned tier buckets.
- Where: crates/filemeta/src/filemeta/version.rs; crates/ecstore/src/bucket/lifecycle/; crates/ecstore/src/services/tier/; any new consumer of crates/utils/src/http/metadata_compat.rs
- Evidence: AGENTS.md Cross-Cutting Domain Invariants (defensive Uuid read pattern + unversioned-tier rule); docs/operations/tier-ilm-debugging.md ('nil transition_ver_id = corrupt legacy write-back, readers must filter'); commit 726f3dc18 'accept empty remote version_id in tier recovery paths' (#4552).
- For each match/if-let on an error or algorithm enum touched by the diff, enumerate what the wildcard/else arm swallows. Inject the variants the author didn't think of — DiskNotFound during listing, an unsupported checksum algorithm, an Err from a cleanup rename/delete — and trace whether they degrade into 'not found', a wrong-but-plausible value, or silent success. Any error path that converges with the success path without logging and propagating is a finding.
- Where: crates/ecstore (listing, delete/rename cleanup); crates/checksums; error-mapping layers in rustfs/src/storage
- Evidence: Three recent real bugs of this exact shape: e0619e355 'stop treating DiskNotFound as object not-found in listing' (#4536), afaf8c681 'reject md5 instead of silently returning crc32' (#4513), f7d2b2563 'propagate disk delete/rename failures instead of swallowing them' (#4546).
- For any change to version ordering, index lookup, or shard/part indexing: (a) call the accessor with index == len() and len()-1 — a get_idx-style bound must reject, not panic or wrap; (b) construct two versions with identical mod-times and check the sort tie-break is total and deterministic (equal keys must not compare as both before each other); (c) for EC shard math, compute shard size for object sizes 0, 1, blockSize-1, blockSize, blockSize+1 and cross-check total reconstructed length against the object size.
- Where: crates/filemeta/src/filemeta/*.rs (version sort, get_idx); crates/ecstore/src/erasure_coding shard-size math
- Evidence: Commit 8bfb00bc0 'guard get_idx bound and fix sorts_before tie-break' (#4509) — both bug classes shipped before; ecstore AGENTS.md high-risk designation for read/write/repair correctness.
- Exercise the zero/empty end of every new size or count parameter: zero-length object PUT then GET (body must be empty, not error), part count 0, empty Vec of disks/entries into aggregation functions, and env/config values of 0 (must clamp or reject, never divide-by-zero or 'scan nothing and report zero usage'). Anywhere the diff computes a ratio, capacity, or progress percentage, plug in 0 and the max value.
- Where: crates/ecstore aggregation and scanner paths; crates/object-capacity; config/env parsing in touched crates
- Evidence: Commits 787cc77a7 'clamp zero capacity env values to safe defaults' (#4559) and 32b1094ec 'resolve a symlinked scan root instead of silently counting zero' (#4564) — zero-as-silent-wrong-answer is a recurring repo bug class.
- For any diff touching multipart or object commit paths, order the operations on paper and attack the failure point between them: kill the process (or return Err) after the commit rename but before cleanup, and after cleanup but before commit. Verify the earlier-failure case leaves the object readable and the later-failure case leaves no half-visible object; part meta files must never be deleted before the commit is durable.
- Where: crates/ecstore multipart commit/cleanup (set_disk/ops); rustfs/src/storage multipart handlers
- Evidence: Commit c77c5f047 'defer multipart part.N.meta cleanup until after commit' (#4548) — cleanup-before-commit ordering already caused a real data-loss window; the #4221 durability work shows fsync/ordering bugs are endemic here.
For a dedicated security audit or advisory analysis, use
`security-advisory-lessons` instead of loading it automatically during every
adversarial review.
Null report example: "Attacked quorum-1 error reduction, exact max-keys listing boundary, trailing-slash dir keys, nil-UUID tier versionId, and mid-stream reconstruct error propagation — no break found."
## Review Protocol
### Simplicity adversary
1. Freeze the exact final diff/head and list the selected lenses.
2. Run the review shape required by root `AGENTS.md`.
3. For each selected lens, either report a concrete finding or a null verdict
naming the attacks performed.
4. A finding needs `file:line`, a triggering input/state/interleaving, the wrong
outcome, and a focused fix or missing regression check.
5. Fix or rebut every finding with code-path, test, or invariant evidence.
6. After a non-trivial edit, rerun only lenses affected by that edit against the
new exact diff.
- Smaller-diff attack: inspect production growth separately from tests, fixtures, generated code, and documentation; test additions have no growth budget. Rewrite the production diff mentally (or in scratch) as the minimal equivalent edit. Report a finding only with a concrete smaller design that preserves correctness, compatibility, readability, and real boundaries; fewer lines alone are not evidence.
- Where: Any diff; extra scrutiny for crates/ecstore, crates/lock, rustfs/src/storage where 'preserve the existing control-flow shape' is an explicit rule
- Evidence: AGENTS.md 'Change Style for Existing Logic' (conditional extraction rule, preserve sensitive control flow, canonical modules) and 'Reuse Before You Write'; the Adversarial Validation roles list charters this attack.
- Reuse-and-necessity attack: for each new helper, search `crates/utils`, `crates/common`, the touched crate, the likely domain owner, and relevant direct dependencies. A reimplementation is a finding, but forced reuse with mismatched normalization, error, backoff, or durability semantics is also a finding. Demand a nameable trigger for new defensive branches. Tests remain subject to validity and near-duplicate coverage review, never a size limit.
- Where: Any diff adding helpers, branches on decoded/peer data, or tests
- Evidence: AGENTS.md 'Reuse Before You Write' and 'Necessary Code Only'; GHSA-f4vq-9ffr-m8m3 (normalization-asymmetry traversal — why forced reuse of normalizing helpers on raw keys is itself an attack); docs/operations/tier-ilm-debugging.md nil-versionId incident (why boundary re-checks are load-bearing).
- Replacement-and-comment attack: when the diff introduces a replacement path or representation, trace all callers and flag a superseded in-scope path left behind without a compatibility requirement. Keep one canonical core behind compatibility adapters. Comments must state non-obvious invariants completely without narration or change history. Never demand unrelated deletion or trade away correctness, compatibility, or readability to reduce the diff.
Null report example: "Separated production growth from tests/docs, tested a smaller equivalent, checked helper reuse and superseded paths, and found no break."
### Security reviewer
- For every admin handler in the diff, grep the exact AdminAction constant it passes to validate_admin_request and confirm it names the operation the handler actually performs. Construct the escalation: a low-privileged user whose policy grants the wrong-but-adjacent action (e.g. Export while the handler Imports, or Update while it Lists) — if the mismatched constant lets them through, that is the bug. Also confirm read-only endpoints (metrics, list, server-info, diagnostics) still call an operation-specific admin authz path and not a mere 'credentials exist' check.
- Where: rustfs/src/admin/handlers/**, rustfs/src/admin/router registration; check_permissions / validate_admin_request / AdminAction::* call sites
- Evidence: GHSA-vcwh-pff9-64cc (ImportIam checked ExportIAMAction), GHSA-mm2q-qcmx-gw4w (ListServiceAccount used UpdateServiceAccountAdminAction), GHSA-f5cv-v44x-2xgf (/admin/v3/metrics accepted any authenticated IAM user). advisory-patterns.md 'Admin authorization and route exposure'; rustfs/src/admin/AGENTS.md 'route registration, whitelist, handler authz must agree'.
- If the diff touches service-account or IAM import/update, treat parent, claims, accessKey, secretKey, status, policy names, and groups as attacker-controlled. Construct an ImportIam/create payload where parent points at root (or another user) and prove the code writes credentials without proving caller ownership or root authority. Separately, set deny_only=true (or 'no explicit deny') on a restricted account and check it does not skip the required allow check, letting it mint an unrestricted child.
- Where: crates/iam/, rustfs/src/admin/handlers (service account / import IAM), rustfs/src/auth.rs
- Evidence: GHSA-566f-q62r-wcr8 (attacker-controlled parent/claims/accessKey/secretKey → persistent backdoor under root), GHSA-xgr5-qc6w-vcg9 (deny_only=true skipped allow checks → privilege creation). crates/iam/AGENTS.md security boundaries; advisory-patterns.md 'IAM import, service accounts'.
- For a changed protocol-frontend handler (FTP/FTPS/SFTP/WebDAV/gateway), enumerate ALL sibling command handlers in the same driver — not just the changed one. For each, confirm it calls the per-operation IAM authorize hook mapped to the correct S3 action (RETR→GetObject, SIZE/MDTM→HeadObject, MKD→CreateBucket, bucket probe→ListBucket/HeadBucket) BEFORE touching storage. Construct a denied-authz case and prove the storage backend is never reached.
- Where: crates/protocols/ (FtpsDriver, SftpDriver, WebDAV), authorize_operation call sites
- Evidence: GHSA-3g29-xff2-92vp (FTP RETR/SIZE/MDTM authenticated but skipped IAM), GHSA-g3vq-vv42-f647 (FTPS MKD called create_bucket without s3:CreateBucket). advisory-patterns.md: 'RustFS advisories show mixed guarded and unguarded siblings in the same driver.'
- For any secret/token/signature/password comparison in the diff, check it uses a constant-time compare (e.g. subtle/constant_time_eq), not == or early-return byte loops. Then check the failure-response paths: construct an invalid-user request and an invalid-secret request and confirm they are indistinguishable (same error, no early length short-circuit) so an attacker cannot enumerate valid users or time-side-channel the secret.
- Where: crates/protocols/ (FTPS/WebDAV/FormPost auth), crates/credentials/, rustfs/src/auth.rs, RPC signature verification
- Evidence: GHSA-3p3x-734c-h5vx (FTPS/WebDAV early-return string equality + distinguishable invalid-user vs invalid-password). Fix commits 3c3113619 (constant-time FTPS/WebDAV) and c41062f27 (constant-time FormPost signature). 3p3x was fixed by PR #4403.
- If the diff parses or transports secret-bearing config (env vars, key files, connection strings), grep every error-construction and format site on that value's path (`format!` feeding `Error::other`/`configuration_error`/`panic!`/`expect`) for interpolation of the raw value or of variables named like secret material. Construct the likeliest misconfiguration: the operator supplies the bare secret without the expected `<name>:` prefix (or with a stray newline) — if the parse-failure hint echoes the input, the secret lands in startup logs. Error strings are log content; the hint may name the env var and expected format, never the value. If the diff re-implements an existing parse helper, diff the two error paths — the duplicate is where the leak hides.
- Where: rustfs/src/init.rs (env plumbing), crates/kms/src/config.rs, crates/credentials/, any from_env/parse on secret values; mechanical backstop in scripts/check_logging_guardrails.sh (secret-interpolation check)
- Evidence: PR #5222 introduced `got: {secret_str}` in build_static_kms_config's format-hint error — a bare base64 key (the secret itself) would have been echoed into startup logs; fixed by PR #5243. The parallel parse in KmsConfig::from_env already omitted the value: the leak lived only in the duplicated copy (AGENTS.md 'Reuse Before You Write').
- If the diff touches internode/RPC auth secret handling, trace whether the RPC HMAC secret can fall back to a public default (e.g. 'rustfsadmin', 'rustfs rpc') or be derived deterministically from the S3 root credentials. Construct the case where RUSTFS_RPC_SECRET is unset and confirm the code fails closed rather than silently using a default or a root-derived key. Verify RPC signing keys are independent random secrets, not reused across S3-root/RPC-HMAC/STS-JWT roles.
- Where: crates/credentials/, crates/ecstore/src/rpc/, internode auth setup
- Evidence: GHSA-r5qv-rc46-hv8q (fell back to 'rustfsadmin'), GHSA-75fx/68cw (RPC secret derivable from root creds → forgeable signatures), GHSA-h956 (hard-coded 'rustfs rpc'), GHSA-m77q (STS JWT reused root secret). Fix commit 7b2055405 (fail closed when deriving RPC secret from default credentials, PR#4402).
- If the diff touches RPC/NodeService authentication, verify the HMAC payload binds the EXACT concrete gRPC method path (not a service prefix), the HTTP method surrogate, and a fresh timestamp. Construct captured valid metadata for method A and replay it to method B within the timestamp window — if it authorizes, the signature is under-bound. Also test stale timestamp, wrong path, wrong method, wrong secret.
- Where: crates/ecstore/src/rpc/, verify_rpc_signature / NodeServiceServer, x-rustfs-signature handling
- Evidence: GHSA-c667-rgrv-99vj (signed service prefix instead of concrete method path → cross-method replay in timestamp window). advisory-patterns.md 'RPC input validation and panic safety'; Minimum Regression Test Expectations lists replay across two methods.
- For any RPC/gRPC handler or deserialization touched, feed empty bytes, truncated MessagePack/protobuf, invalid enum discriminants, and stale timestamps. Grep the deserialization path for unwrap()/expect()/panic-prone decode and prove malformed attacker payloads return a typed error, not a panic (remote DoS). Weak internode auth makes reachability worse, so combine with the RPC-secret probe.
- Where: crates/ecstore/src/rpc/, any #[derive(Deserialize)] decoded from wire bytes, RPC handler bodies
- Evidence: GHSA-gw2x-q739-qhcr (malformed GetMetrics reached unwrap() → remote DoS). advisory-patterns.md 'Treat all RPC payload bytes as attacker-controlled.' rust-code-quality skill: unwrap abuse.
- Take any object key, RPC disk path, or archive/tar/zip entry name introduced or handled in the diff and construct traversal payloads: '../', URL-encoded '%2e%2e%2f', absolute paths, platform separators, empty components. Trace the value through parse → authz check → final storage path and prove (a) authz and storage normalize the SAME way, and (b) the canonicalized path cannot escape the bucket/prefix root. Attack the case where authz sees the raw attacker bucket but storage cleaning crosses into a victim bucket.
- Where: crates/ecstore (path join/canonicalize), rustfs/src/storage/, Snowball auto-extract / normalize_extract_entry_key, rpc read_file_stream
- Evidence: GHSA-pq29-69jg-9mxc (read_file_stream joined untrusted paths, no canonical boundary check), GHSA-8r6f-hmq2-28rg (traversal object keys bypassed authz), GHSA-f4vq-9ffr-m8m3 (Snowball '../victim-bucket/object' authorized raw path then storage crossed boundary). Note __XLDIR__ trailing-slash encoding is store-layer only.
- If the diff touches multipart/copy or presigned POST, verify UploadPartCopy enforces source GetObject AND destination PutObject semantics equivalent to CopyObject, including copy-source policy conditions (not just independent source-read + dest-write). Construct a cross-bucket UploadPartCopy from a bucket the caller cannot read. For presigned POST, submit an upload that violates content-length-range, key prefix, or exact content-type and prove the server rejects it.
- Where: rustfs/src/storage / S3 API handlers: upload_part_copy, CompleteMultipartUpload, PostObject policy enforcement
- Evidence: GHSA-mx42-j6wv-px98 (UploadPartCopy missed source authz → cross-bucket exfil), GHSA-wfxj-ph3v-7mjf (missed destination copy-source policy constraint), GHSA-w5fh-f8xh-5x3p (presigned POST didn't enforce signed policy conditions). advisory-patterns.md 'S3 copy, multipart, and upload policy validation'.
- Grep the diff for debug!/trace!/info!/error! and any ?value / {:?} on structs or response bodies that can carry secret_key, session_token, JWT claims, HMAC secrets, expected signatures, access keys beyond safe identifiers, or raw credential-bearing responses. Check custom Debug impls and merged-config dumps too. Construct the error path (invalid signature, failed auth) and confirm it does not log the secret or the derived authenticator. Verify audit/notify entries redact credential request headers.
- Where: rustfs/src/**, crates/iam/, crates/audit/, crates/notify/, crates/targets/, RPC signature error paths
- Evidence: GHSA-r54g (STS creds logged at info), GHSA-8cm2 (debug logs leaked tokens/secrets/JWT claims/raw STS bodies), GHSA-333v (invalid RPC signature log included HMAC secret + expected signature). Fix commit ee6f79110 (redact credential request headers from audit/notify, backlog#963). rustfs-logging-governance skill.
- For any struct in the diff deserialized from untrusted input (S3 XML/JSON, lifecycle rules, bucket policy, replication config, RPC payload), check for #[serde(deny_unknown_fields)]. Construct a payload with a typo'd field (e.g. 'NoncurentDays') or an extra field and prove it is rejected, not silently ignored. Flag #[serde(default)] on security-critical fields (retention days, limits, permissions) lacking explicit post-deserialize validation, and any user-controlled integer cast with `as` (i32 as u32) — feed a negative value and check it doesn't wrap to a huge positive.
- Where: crates/policy/ (bucket policy), crates/ecstore lifecycle/ILM config, replication config structs, crates/protocols XML parsing
- Evidence: AGENTS.md 'Serde Safety'; advisory-patterns.md 'Serde deserialization' (no deny_unknown_fields found repo-wide; 'NoncurentDays' typo silently accepted; i32 as u32 wrap). Fix commit 1acd47f15 (SSE crash-loop DoS + credential reserved-char bypass, backlog#806).
- If the diff touches SSE / encryption reader-writer composition, do not trust API metadata claiming encryption. Trace the reader wrapper order (HashReader / EncryptReader / compression / warp) and confirm EncryptReader is actually in the chain that writes to disk — construct the case where a helper unwraps a nested reader and bypasses encryption, storing plaintext. Require a regression test that inspects the ACTUAL stored bytes on disk, not just read-back. Also check encrypted-object checksums are not exposed.
- Where: rustfs/src/storage/ecfs.rs, crates/rio/ (reader wrappers), crates/kms/, SSE-C replication
- Evidence: GHSA-xrrf-67jm-3c2r (SSE metadata reported encryption while composition bypassed EncryptReader, stored plaintext). Fix commits a7b9659e7 (hide encrypted object checksums, #4529), 80cc3b1fc (preserve SSE-C checksum state, #4410). advisory-patterns.md 'SSE and on-disk storage invariants'.
- If the diff touches CORS or the console/browser/object-preview surface: confirm default CORS does not reflect an arbitrary Origin while also sending Access-Control-Allow-Credentials: true — construct a request with a spoofed Origin and check the response. For preview, confirm attacker-controlled object content is origin-isolated (not rendered in a same-origin iframe with console creds), served with nosniff/CSP, and that preview trust derives from validated content-type + sandboxing, NOT from object name/extension (.pdf, .html). Separately, if aws:SourceIp is evaluated, spoof X-Forwarded-For / X-Real-IP as a direct (non-trusted-proxy) client and confirm the socket peer IP is used instead.
- Where: rustfs/src/server/layer.rs (CORS), console preview/auth code, aws:SourceIp / policy condition evaluation, X-Forwarded-For handling
- Evidence: GHSA-x5xv-223c-8vm7 (default CORS reflected arbitrary origins with credentials), GHSA-v9fg-3cr2-277j (preview rendered attacker HTML same-origin, exposed localStorage creds), GHSA-7gcx-wg4x-q9x6 (extension-based PDF detection bypassed sandbox), GHSA-fc6g-2gcp-2qrq (aws:SourceIp trusted client XFF). advisory-patterns.md 'Browser, CORS' + 'Trusted proxy'.
Null report example: "Attacked admin action-constant matching in the two changed handlers (both call validate_admin_request with the exact AdminAction), the FTPS RETR/SIZE authz parity, and the new lifecycle struct's serde surface (has deny_unknown_fields) — no break found."
### Concurrency/durability reviewer
- For every new or moved lock acquisition, enumerate all other code paths that take any overlapping subset of those locks and construct the concrete ABBA interleaving (thread 1 holds A wants B, thread 2 holds B wants A). If the diff acquires 2+ locks without a comment documenting acquisition order, that alone is a finding.
- Where: crates/ecstore/** (namespace locks, set_disk, disk registry), crates/audit/**, crates/lock/**, any Mutex/RwLock pair in a diff
- Evidence: crates/ecstore/AGENTS.md 'Lock Ordering' (document order; same set in different orders = deadlock); real ABBA deadlock fixed in c0d5f938f (#4421, audit registry vs stream_cancellers)
- If the diff touches the object write/commit path or a lock guard's lifetime, construct the timeline where the distributed lock is lost (heartbeat refresh fails / expiry) after shard writes but before the xl.meta rename commit — verify the commit is fenced on guard.is_lock_lost() (set_disk/ops/object.rs:874-880) and the diff does not move the commit outside the fenced region or drop the guard early.
- Where: crates/ecstore/src/set_disk/ops/object.rs, ops/multipart.rs, crates/lock/**
- Evidence: 1e6207c08 (#4406) fence write commit on lock loss; ddf197ba5 (#4388) heartbeat lock refresh; backlog#899 fencing comment in object.rs
- For any change to file creation or write-then-rename: write out the exact syscall order (write tmp -> fdatasync tmp -> rename -> fsync parent dir -> fsync ancestor dirs on first object under a prefix) and simulate a power cut after each step. Flag any dropped/reordered sync, and check the change honors the durability gate (RUSTFS_DRIVE_SYNC_ENABLE, strict/relaxed/none modes, per-bucket overrides) instead of hardcoding one mode. The 'skip tmp parent fsync' optimization is only sound when the file is renamed out of tmp — verify that precondition still holds.
- Where: crates/ecstore/src/disk/local.rs, disk/os.rs, disk/fs.rs, crates/ecstore/src/bucket/durability.rs, set_disk/core/io_primitives.rs
- Evidence: PR #4221 (the repo previously had no fsync anywhere); 2df315baf/c081586e7 (#4493) fsync ancestor dirs; 062a68d15 (#4387) tmp-parent-fsync skip is rename-conditional; eaff17cad (#4397) durability modes; 54872d52d (#4478) rename_data crash harness exists — extend it for the diff
- If the diff touches quorum counting or per-disk error aggregation, construct adversarial error vectors for reduce_errs: nil/placeholder entries, DiskNotFound mixed with FileNotFound, exactly quorum-1 agreeing errors — and show which dominant error wins. Specifically attack the case where offline-disk errors get counted as 'object does not exist', flipping a read/heal decision into data loss. Also check quorum monotonicity: a retry or heal pass must never conclude with a LOWER quorum than the original write.
- Where: crates/ecstore/src/disk/error_reduce.rs, crates/ecstore/src/api/mod.rs, set_disk read/heal paths
- Evidence: 20d61c73b (#4551) reduce_errs leaked nil placeholder as dominant error; e0619e355 (#4536) DiskNotFound treated as object-not-found in listing; quorum monotonicity flagged as open follow-up to #4221 (#4221 follow-up list); crates/ecstore/AGENTS.md 'Do not weaken quorum checks'
- For any multi-disk fan-out (delete, rename, heal write, cleanup), trace each per-disk Result: find any `let _ =`, `.ok()`, or best-effort collapse that keeps a failed disk out of the quorum math. Construct the run where exactly write_quorum-1 disks succeed and prove the op still returns success — that is the bug. Conversely, for heal writes, check one bad target cannot fail the whole heal (best-effort per target).
- Where: crates/ecstore/src/set_disk/ops/*.rs, disk/disk_store.rs, crates/heal/**
- Evidence: f7d2b2563 (#4546) disk delete/rename failures were swallowed; 47c1e730c (#4545) heal write quorum made best-effort per target; 2b063b0c4 (#4400) disk-replacement heal missed versions
- For every new .await placed between a state mutation and its cleanup/commit (or inside select!/timeout/spawned task that can be aborted), construct the cancellation point: client disconnects and the future is dropped exactly there. Enumerate what is left behind — tmp files, incremented counters never decremented, half-written xl.meta, a held permit/waiter — and verify cleanup runs in Drop or the state is re-entrant. Background loops the diff adds must have a hard outer timeout so a wedged awaitee cannot pin them forever.
- Where: crates/ecstore/** write paths, crates/object-capacity/** scanners, crates/audit/**, anything using tokio::select! or spawn+abort
- Evidence: d608e320f io_uring cancel-safety spike (cancellation known-hard here); 5a372557e (#4533) wedged scans needed hard outer timeout; 7b87d4d13 (#4520) waiter-count leak; e44bece00 (#4497) audit start race + paused drops
- If the diff touches metacache/list producers or cursor resume, construct the interleaving where the producer task completes (or errors) while a reader with a saved cursor comes back for the next page — verify a completed producer is tolerated (no error, no hang) and that a re-folded/full page reports truncation instead of silently ending the listing early. Also feed a corrupt/oversized length prefix into any metacache decode the diff touches.
- Where: crates/ecstore/src/cache_value/metacache_set.rs, crates/ecstore/src/store/list_objects.rs, crates/filemeta/**
- Evidence: 91a23361e (#4531) tolerate completed metacache producers; d91f4d455 (#4538) delimiter re-fold dropped truncation flag; d2c100fd3 (#4226) corrupt length-prefix guard
- For multipart changes, construct concurrent operations on the SAME uploadId: put_object_part racing put_object_part (same part number), abort racing complete between the parts listing and the commit rename, and list-parts racing cleanup. Verify every metadata read/list/abort holds the per-uploadId lock, and that part.N.meta cleanup is deferred until AFTER the commit rename — cleanup before commit loses parts on a crash between the two.
- Where: crates/ecstore/src/set_disk/ops/multipart.rs, rustfs/src/storage/
- Evidence: 3bc8d79fe (#4329) serialize put_object_part per uploadId; 7fb95d4fc (#4428) unlocked upload metadata reads/aborts; 93ffbdb9b (#4437) unlocked part listings; c77c5f047 (#4548) part.N.meta cleanup moved after commit
- Any cleanup/rollback logic added near a commit: verify it runs strictly AFTER the commit is durable, is best-effort (its failure must not fail an already-committed write), and is safe under retry — i.e., re-running it after a partial first attempt must never delete the newly-committed data dir or the last surviving copy.
- Where: crates/ecstore/src/set_disk/ops/object.rs (rename_data tail), ops/multipart.rs, disk cleanup helpers
- Evidence: afc7f1d6f/d908243e6 (#4386, backlog#898) post-commit old-data-dir cleanup had to be made best-effort; e7cc719c1 (#4389) speculative tmp cleanup moved off hot path
- If the diff does read-modify-write on any persisted shared state (bucket metadata, notify/target config, queue store), construct two concurrent writers: show whether the second write silently discards the first (lost update) — RMW must be serialized or CAS-guarded. For persisted queues/replay, construct crash-mid-replay and prove entries are neither lost nor delivered twice without an idempotency key.
- Where: crates/notify/**, crates/targets/** (queue store, SQL backends), crates/ecstore/src/bucket/metadata_sys.rs
- Evidence: 2490d4ee2 (#4425) persisted config RMW lost updates; 08e44b95f (#4505) queue store crash-safety + replay lifecycle; e008cc5da (#4500) SQL backend idempotency
- If the diff touches erasure decode/reconstruct or streaming GET, construct the failure mid-stream: shards become inconsistent (or a disk read fails) after N bytes of the body have already been sent — verify the stream surfaces an error to the client instead of ending cleanly at a truncated length. Silent truncation on a 200 response is the known failure mode.
- Where: crates/ecstore/src/set_disk/read.rs (reconstruct-read validation, historically ~line 3117), crates/ecstore/src/erasure/coding/decode.rs
- Evidence: Known open bug: EC reconstruct-read 'inconsistent shards' mid-GET silently truncates body -> client unexpected EOF; crates/ecstore/AGENTS.md 'explicit failure over silent corruption'
Null report example: "Attacked lock ordering on the new disk-registry mutex pair, lock-loss fencing across the moved commit, power-cut points around the added rename, and cancellation at the two new awaits — no break found; quorum math and metacache paths untouched by this diff."
### Compatibility reviewer
- Grep the diff for raw 'x-rustfs-internal-' or 'x-minio-internal-' string literals used with map.insert/remove/get instead of the metadata_compat helpers. If found, construct the MinIO-written object case: a metadata map containing ONLY 'X-Minio-Internal-<suffix>' (mixed case, no RustFS key) and trace the diff's read path — does it miss the value? Then construct the removal case: does remove leave the twin key behind so a stale MinIO-key value resurrects on next read? Also check the value-type trap: get_bytes has NO case-insensitive fallback (unlike get_str), so a diff that moves a suffix from FileInfo.metadata (String) to meta_sys (Vec<u8>) silently loses mixed-case MinIO keys.
- Where: Any code touching FileInfo.metadata / user_defined / meta_sys: crates/ecstore/, crates/filemeta/, rustfs/src/storage/, crates/utils/src/http/metadata_compat.rs
- Evidence: Repo-wide invariant in AGENTS.md 'Cross-Cutting Domain Invariants' and CLAUDE.md; helpers and the asymmetry are pinned by tests test_str_lookup_accepts_minio_metadata_case and test_get_bytes_no_case_insensitive_fallback in crates/utils/src/http/metadata_compat.rs
- For any diff reading a binary UUID from internal metadata (transitioned-versionID, tier-free-versionID, data_dir), trace the three degenerate inputs — key absent, value empty (b""), value nil UUID — through to the outgoing tier/S3 request. The bug shape to hunt: unwrap_or_default() or Uuid::from_slice(..).unwrap_or(Uuid::nil()) turning 'no value' into Uuid::nil(), which then gets serialized as ?versionId=00000000-... and the remote tier returns NoSuchVersion. The required pattern is .and_then(|v| Uuid::from_slice(&v).ok()).filter(|u| !u.is_nil()).
- Where: crates/ecstore/src/bucket/lifecycle/ (bucket_lifecycle_ops.rs, tier_sweeper.rs), crates/ecstore/src/services/tier/warm_backend_*.rs, crates/filemeta/src/filemeta/version.rs
- Evidence: Historical production bug documented in docs/operations/tier-ilm-debugging.md ('Nil-UUID versionId sent to tier'); regression tests live in crates/filemeta/src/filemeta/version.rs; follow-up fix 726f3dc18 'accept empty remote version_id in tier recovery paths' (#4552)
- For any diff touching tier or replication GET/DELETE against a remote S3 target, enumerate BOTH directions of the versionId contract and trace each: (a) remote version None/"" means the tier bucket is unversioned — the request must carry NO versionId parameter at all (not an empty one, not nil); (b) remote version Some(v) on a versioned target — the versionId MUST be sent, especially on version-purge deletes, or the delete lands on the wrong version / creates a delete marker instead of purging. Check whether the diff collapses these cases through a single Option/String conversion that loses the distinction.
- Where: crates/ecstore/src/services/tier/warm_backend*.rs, crates/ecstore/src/bucket/lifecycle/tier_sweeper.rs, replication code under crates/ecstore/src/bucket/
- Evidence: Invariant in AGENTS.md and docs/operations/tier-ilm-debugging.md; real bug fixed by 0fad35645 'send versionId on version-purge deletes to generic S3 targets' (#4401) — the versioned direction, and #4552 — the unversioned direction
- If the diff changes xl.meta encoding (adds/reorders msgpack header fields, touches FileMeta::marshal_msg or codec.rs encode paths), attack downgrade and cross-vendor parse: encode an object with the new code and decode it with (a) the meta_ver<=3 read path and (b) the real-MinIO fixture tests from #4377. Then check the header signature: is it recomputed over the new bytes, or copied/hardcoded? MinIO validates it; a stale or zero signature makes MinIO reject the file. Finally verify XL_META_VERSION was not silently bumped — old RustFS/MinIO nodes reject meta_ver > 3 during a rolling upgrade.
- Where: crates/filemeta/src/filemeta.rs (XL_HEADER_VERSION/XL_META_VERSION, lines ~46-54), crates/filemeta/src/filemeta/codec.rs (check_xl2_v1, decode_xl_headers)
- Evidence: Real bug 073bc9675 'compute header signature instead of hardcoding zero' (#4343); format contract pinned in docs/architecture/minio-file-format-compat.md (write meta_ver 3, read <=3, XL2 magic); parity fixtures from a91d9cefc (#4377)
- If the diff touches xl.meta / FileInfo decode (into_fileinfo, version parsing, part arrays), construct hostile foreign input: a MinIO- or corruption-shaped msgpack with a parts-count that disagrees with the etags/sizes array lengths, missing optional fields, and a meta_ver 2 object with legacy checksum. Trace whether the new code indexes past an array, panics, or fabricates default values instead of returning a decode error. Run the pinned legacy fixtures (test_issue_2265_legacy_meta_v2_object_compatibility, test_issue_2288) plus the #4377 real-MinIO xl.meta parse tests against the diff.
- Where: crates/filemeta/src/ (fileinfo.rs, filemeta.rs, filemeta/codec.rs, filemeta/version.rs)
- Evidence: Real bug 7efacbdf9 'validate part array lengths in into_fileinfo' (#4382); legacy meta_ver 2 regression fixtures at crates/filemeta/src/filemeta.rs (~:1130-:1174) cited by docs/architecture/minio-file-format-compat.md
- If the diff 'corrects' a formula, constant, or layout that is a byte-for-byte MinIO port (shard-size math, bitrot hash interleaving, erasure distribution, inline-data prefix), treat the correction itself as the bug: verify against legacy on-disk data before accepting. Concretely: run crates/ecstore/tests/legacy_bitrot_read_test.rs and the ECA-18 pinning tests; check whether existing objects written by old RustFS or MinIO still verify byte-for-byte. Known trap examples: bitrot_shard_file_size's bare return for non-streaming algorithms is CORRECT MinIO whole-file behavior, and the 32-byte prefix on inline data is the HighwayHash256 bitrot hash, not corruption.
- Where: crates/ecstore/src/erasure/coding/bitrot.rs, crates/ecstore/src/io_support/bitrot.rs, crates/filemeta/src/fileinfo.rs
- Evidence: f96314a1d 'pin streaming-only bitrot layout invariant (ECA-18)' (#4553) — audit explicitly decided NOT to change the formula because it breaks legacy interop; #4377 proved the inline-data prefix is the bitrot hash
- For any diff that copies object metadata into an S3-client-visible surface (GET/HEAD response headers, notification event userMetadata, ListObjects/replication payloads, copy-object metadata directives), construct an object carrying internal keys under BOTH prefixes and in non-canonical casing ('X-Minio-Internal-Compression') and confirm every one is stripped via is_internal_key (which is case-insensitive) — not by an exact-match filter on one prefix. Leaked internal keys are an API-semantics break and an information leak.
- Where: rustfs/src/storage/, crates/notify/, replication and copy_object paths in crates/ecstore/
- Evidence: Real bug cf8929189 'strip rustfs/minio internal metadata from event userMetadata' (#4419); is_internal_key contract in crates/utils/src/http/metadata_compat.rs
- If the diff touches crates/protos (node.proto, models.fbs) or internode RPC request/response structs, attack the rolling-upgrade interleaving: an old node sends a message without the new field to a new node, and a new node sends the extended message to an old node. Verify proto field numbers are only appended (never reused/renumbered), FlatBuffers tables are only extended at the end, and that an absent new field decodes to a safe default on the receiving side — 'safe' meaning it must not be interpreted as success/authorization (RPC errors fail closed) and must not flip a quorum decision.
- Where: crates/protos/ (node.proto, models.fbs, generated/), gRPC transport and dispatch in the internode layer
- Evidence: 6f613317f 'optimize gRPC transport' (#4337) shows the wire layer churns; security advisory 68cw fixed by PR#4402 established RPC fail-closed as a repo rule (see .agents/skills/security-advisory-lessons)
- For S3 handler diffs, replay the request shapes real clients actually send, not just the canonical one: mc and aws-sdk differ on path normalization (root '//' ListBuckets), virtual-host vs path style, and header casing. Then attack every pagination boundary the diff touches: request exactly max-keys/max-uploads/max-parts items and verify the response returns exactly N (not N+1), sets IsTruncated correctly, and yields a NextMarker/KeyMarker that resumes without skipping or duplicating — construct the N+1st-item case explicitly.
- Where: rustfs/src/storage/ S3 handlers, listing paths in crates/ecstore/src/store/ and set_disk/
- Evidence: Real bugs 511ad31ba 'normalize root double-slash ListBuckets requests' (#4336) and fefa70b31 'stop ListMultipartUploads from returning one upload past max-uploads' (#4447); docs/architecture/s3-compatibility-matrix.md is the compat source of truth
- If the diff changes bucket-metadata (.metadata.bin) or IAM/config parsing structs, run it against the real MinIO RELEASE.2025-07-23 fixtures: the msgpack blob uses PascalCase field names, so any serde rename, field-type change, or derive tweak silently drops MinIO-written fields instead of erroring. Verify parse_all_configs still loads all ten config types from the fixture without loss, and that drop-in migration still decrypts MinIO-encrypted IAM/server config rather than treating ciphertext as corrupt.
- Where: crates/ecstore/src/bucket/metadata*, crates/ecstore/src/bucket/migration.rs, IAM/config load paths in crates/iam/ and crates/config/
- Evidence: Fixture parity test parses_real_minio_bucket_metadata_blob_without_loss from a91d9cefc (#4377); real bug 717cdd2ab 'decrypt MinIO IAM & server config on drop-in migration' (#4358); format matrix in docs/architecture/minio-file-format-compat.md
- If the diff adds a compatibility shim, legacy fallback, wrapper, or old-endpoint alias (grep the diff for 'legacy', 'fallback', 'compat', 'deprecated'), verify two things: (1) it carries a RUSTFS_COMPAT_TODO(<task-id>) marker with an exact removal condition and a matching entry in the register — an unmarked shim becomes permanent dead weight; (2) the fallback's default direction is safe for old data: e.g. a new decode path must fall back to the legacy decode for old objects by default, not gate legacy reads behind an opt-in flag that makes existing data unreadable after upgrade.
- Where: Anywhere in the diff; register at docs/architecture/compat-cleanup-register.md; recent example: allow_inplace_legacy_fallback flag in the ecstore erasure codec streaming path
- Evidence: docs/architecture/compat-cleanup-register.md review checklist; d232a46b4 wired legacy decode prefetch behind a default-OFF gate while keeping legacy reads working (#4542), with arity fallout fixed in 05890d6e2 (#4573)
Null report example: "Attacked dual-key metadata writes/removals against MinIO-only-key objects, nil/empty transitioned-versionID paths to the tier, xl.meta encode against meta_ver<=3 decoders and the #4377 real-MinIO fixtures, and proto field-number evolution for old-node/new-node RPC — no compatibility break found."
### Performance reviewer
- For each `.clone()` or allocation added to a per-request/per-object path, identify the copied data and execution frequency. Report a finding only for a concrete repeated cost or benchmark regression. Recommend borrowing, moving, `Bytes`/`Arc`, `Cow`, or capacity reservation only when it reduces that cost without obscuring ownership or APIs.
- Where: crates/ecstore/src/set_disk/**, crates/ecstore/src/store*.rs, rustfs/src/storage/, crates/filemeta/, request handlers in rustfs/src/
- Evidence: crates/ecstore/AGENTS.md 'Allocation Discipline in Hot Paths'; .agents/skills/rust-code-quality/SKILL.md requires a concrete hot-path cost rather than a proxy metric
- For every new sync_all/sync_data/fdatasync/flush/File::sync call in the diff, trace the call chain to DurabilityMode / RUSTFS_DRIVE_SYNC_ENABLE resolution (crates/ecstore/src/disk/local.rs:291 DurabilityMode, :347 resolve_durability_mode) and to per-bucket durability overrides. Construct the run where the operator sets mode=none (or legacy RUSTFS_DRIVE_SYNC_ENABLE=false) and the new fsync still fires — that is an ungated durability cost and a regression on 4KiB writes.
- Where: crates/ecstore/src/disk/local.rs, crates/ecstore/src/bucket/durability.rs, crates/ecstore/src/set_disk/** (rename_data/commit paths), any crate doing tokio::fs or std::fs writes
- Evidence: #4221 fsync work caused a measured -10% 4KiB write regression (#814 investigation), later gated; durability modes added in eaff17cad (#4397), per-bucket tier overrides in 13e48d93a (#4407); 2df315baf (#4493) shows even ancestor-dir fsyncs are routed through the gate
- Attack blocking-work placement from both directions: (a) find new synchronous fs calls, hashing, or EC encode/decode executed directly on an async runtime thread without spawn_blocking/block_in_place — construct the stall (a slow disk blocks a worker thread and every task queued on it); (b) find new code that splits one logical disk operation into multiple spawn_blocking hops per object — each hop is a threadpool round-trip, so K hops x N objects multiplies latency. Demand the author justify the placement with the size of the work, not habit.
- Where: crates/ecstore/src/disk/local.rs, crates/ecstore/src/erasure_coding/, crates/ecstore/src/bitrot/, crates/rio/
- Evidence: 608ab14d7 (#4554, HP-12) folded metadata open+fstat+read into a single spawn_blocking because per-op hops were measurably slow; 8fc637fb1 (#4484) moved the short EC encode inline because block_in_place cost exceeded the work — direction depends on measured work size
- For each lock acquisition the diff adds or relocates, mark the guard's live range and list every .await and disk/RPC call inside it. Construct the contention interleaving: N concurrent requests serialize on the guard while the holder waits on IO; for namespace/multipart commit locks, compute worst-case hold time (fsync + rename per disk) against the lock's timeout. Also diff the acquisition order against other paths taking the same locks (ABBA).
- Where: crates/ecstore/src/set_disk/** (commit/rename paths), crates/lock/, crates/audit/ registry, any RwLock/Mutex in per-request paths
- Evidence: crates/ecstore/AGENTS.md 'Lock Ordering'; c0d5f938f (#4421) fixed a real ABBA deadlock between registry and stream_cancellers; #4370 history: fsync-heavy serial cross-disk commits held a lock long enough to blow test timeouts (#4370)
- Trace exactly what executes inside the PUT commit critical section (under the object write lock, between tmp write and rename_data completion) before vs after the diff. Any newly added work there — cleanup, extra stat, additional rename, O_DIRECT write, logging — is an attack target: construct the per-PUT latency delta and demand it be moved off the critical section or parallelized across disks.
- Where: crates/ecstore/src/set_disk/ops/*, crates/ecstore/src/disk/local.rs rename_data path
- Evidence: Three real optimizations removed exactly this class of regression: e7cc719c1 (#4389) moved speculative PUT-tail tmp cleanup off the hot path, 92c8c6db7 (#4411) moved O_DIRECT shard-writes off the commit critical section, 651ccac13 (#4487) parallelized tmp xl.meta write and shard fdatasync on commit
- Find any new loop in a batch API that performs a per-item stat/read/RPC sequentially. Construct the concrete blowup: a 1000-key DeleteObjects or a full listing page -> 1000 serial round-trips added by the diff. Demand either a gate (skip when not needed) or bounded parallelism; for startup/load paths, check for accidental O(n^2) (re-scanning the full list per item).
- Where: crates/ecstore/src/store_delete*.rs / batch object APIs, listing/metacache paths, crates/iam/ store loading, crates/heal/
- Evidence: a413729b1 (#4398) had to gate and parallelize the DeleteObjects per-object stat fanout after it shipped serial; 16a91c35e (#4537) fixed O(n^2) IAM startup load by chunking — both were diff-introduced fanouts of this exact shape
- For every buffer the diff allocates on the encode/decode/shard path, check: is it sized with with_capacity to the EC-expanded block (not the logical size, not default-grown)? Does it copy into a fresh Vec where Bytes::slice/clone (refcount) or the io-core buffer pool would avoid the copy? Does the diff read hash and data in separate passes where one pass suffices? Construct the per-block byte-copy count before vs after. If the diff touches the io-core pool, verify gauge accounting still balances.
- Where: crates/ecstore/src/erasure_coding/, crates/ecstore/src/bitrot/, crates/io-core/src/pool.rs, crates/rio/
- Evidence: 92bf55ce6 (#4396) fixed a real regression by right-sizing BytesMut encode ingest capacity to the EC-expanded block; 47bee8b31 (#4475) merged bitrot hash+data into one read pass; 7fa3d0d4b (#4534) shows pool gauge accounting is easy to drift when touching buffer reuse
- For every logging or instrumentation statement the diff adds, classify the call site frequency: per-request, per-object, per-shard, or per-block. Anything info!/warn!/error! at per-object frequency or higher is a finding — construct the flood (one listing under client cancellation, one 10k-object heal) and count emitted lines. New metrics/timers on the data path must be feature-gated, not always-on. Run scripts/check_logging_guardrails.sh on the diff.
- Where: any per-request/per-object code, especially crates/ecstore listing and heal loops, rustfs/src/storage/ handlers; scripts/check_logging_guardrails.sh
- Evidence: .agents/skills/rustfs-logging-governance/SKILL.md (trace level for hot-path/repetitive success events); d25ddb0e1 (#4372) fixed real listing-cancellation error-log noise; hotpath instrumentation is deliberately feature-gated (3f13d098b #4394, f262fcfce #4541 HP-14)
- Count how many times the diff's request path parses or fetches the same metadata: xl.meta/FileMeta decoded more than once per object, bucket metadata (metadata_sys) re-fetched inside a per-object loop, or the dual x-rustfs-internal/x-minio-internal key lookup re-run repeatedly on the same map. Construct the per-request parse count before vs after; a second full FileMeta decode per GET is a finding.
- Where: crates/filemeta/, crates/ecstore/src/set_disk/** read paths, crates/ecstore/src/bucket/metadata_sys.rs, crates/utils/src/http/metadata_compat.rs
- Evidence: 608ab14d7 (#4554) exists because redundant metadata-read syscall sequences per object were measurable; CLAUDE.md dual-key metadata convention makes repeated get_bytes lookups an easy hidden double-parse
- If the diff touches PUT/GET/commit/erasure paths and claims 'no perf impact', demand numbers, not assertion: run the criterion benches (cargo bench -p ecstore — comparison_benchmark, erasure_benchmark, rename_data_meta_benchmark, single_block_non_inline_benchmark per crates/ecstore/benches/) against origin/main, and for end-to-end paths the warp A/B relative-budget gate (scripts/run_hotpath_warp_ab.sh --baseline-ref origin/main, as .github/workflows/performance-ab.yml runs it). Probe specifically at 4KiB object size — that is where the last real regression hid.
- Where: crates/ecstore/benches/, .github/workflows/performance-ab.yml, scripts/run_hotpath_warp_ab.sh
- Evidence: crates/ecstore/AGENTS.md: 'Benchmark-sensitive changes should include measurable rationale'; performance-ab.yml (215747022 #4480) is the repo's own relative-budget gate; the #4221 regression was only visible at 4KiB writes (#814 bisect)
Null report example: "Attacked the new rename_data commit-section work, durability-gate routing of the added fdatasync, guard live-range across the shard-write awaits, and per-object clone count in the PUT path; ran comparison_benchmark + rename_data_meta_benchmark vs origin/main (4KiB delta within noise) — no break found."
### Test-coverage skeptic
- For every testable behavior claim in the PR description, revert that hunk and name the focused test or executable check that detects the revert. If no reasonable check exists, require the reason and residual risk from the validation floor. Especially verify the check exercises the real production path, not a lookalike helper.
- Where: All crates; highest value in crates/ecstore, rustfs/src/storage, crates/heal
- Evidence: AGENTS.md testable-behavior exit criterion. Real bug: PR #4220 (ghost-directory cleanup) merged with green tests but its fix never executed on the real delete path — required follow-up rustfs#4307, backlog#798 stayed OPEN. The tests exercised a path the production flow never took.
- Read each added/modified test and confirm it asserts the real outcome (returned value, stored bytes, error variant), not merely 'call succeeded' or 'no panic'. Flag any test whose only observable is that the function returned, and any `assert!(result.is_err())` that never checks WHICH error. Then check: does the test prove the exploit/failure form is denied, or only that the intended form still works?
- Where: crates/e2e_test (security_boundary_test.rs pattern), and every #[cfg(test)] module in the diff
- Evidence: Commit dee8e4e63 (#4466) had to rewrite 277 lines of crates/e2e_test/src/security_boundary_test.rs because 'security boundary tests' passed without asserting real outcomes. .agents/skills/rust-code-quality/SKILL.md requires an observable failure criterion; .agents/skills/security-advisory-lessons/SKILL.md asks whether the exploit form is denied.
- When the diff adds a boolean/mode parameter or config flag, find the test that fails if the flag's effect is INVERTED inside the changed function. Tests that were mechanically updated to pass `false`/default at every call site assert nothing about the new behavior. Execute the check: flip the flag's branch in the source and confirm at least one test goes red for each branch.
- Where: crates/ecstore/src/set_disk/ (e.g. build_codec_streaming_part_reader), any function gaining a parameter
- Evidence: Commit 05890d6e2 (#4573): PR #4560 added a 15th param allow_inplace_legacy_fallback; the arity tests were fixed by passing `false` everywhere — they assert Err outcomes independent of the flag, so the fallback behavior itself has no revert-detecting test at those sites.
- Mutation spot-check on error propagation: for each newly added `?`, `return Err`, or error-mapping line, mentally replace it with `Ok(default)`/ignore and ask which test fails. The swallowed-error bug class recurs in this repo and always ships with green tests — a fix that propagates errors needs a test that injects the failure (faulty disk, failed rename, dispatch error) and asserts the caller sees Err.
- Where: crates/ecstore (disk delete/rename, reduce_errs), crates/audit, crates/notify, crates/targets
- Evidence: Three recent fixes for the same class: f7d2b2563 (#4546, disk delete/rename failures swallowed), dbc628f16 (#4424, audit dispatch failures swallowed), 20d61c73b (#4551, reduce_errs leaking nil placeholder as dominant error). All existed while tests were green.
- Any test touching GET/read/reconstruct/stream paths must assert the FULL body content and exact length against a known value, not status-ok or first-bytes. Construct the degraded-read case (missing/inconsistent shards forcing EC reconstruction) and assert byte-for-byte equality; a mid-stream failure that truncates the body passes every test that only checks headers or the first chunk.
- Where: crates/ecstore/src/set_disk/read.rs and ops/, crates/rio, crates/e2e_test GET scenarios
- Evidence: Known live bug: EC reconstruct-read verification failure mid-GET at set_disk read path silently truncates the body → client 'unexpected EOF'; version-independent, undetected by existing suites because none assert full-body integrity under shard inconsistency.
- For on-disk / on-wire format changes (xl.meta, .metadata.bin, bitrot framing), reject round-trip-only tests: a struct serialized and deserialized by the same code under test cannot catch format drift. Demand the test parse a REAL captured fixture from crates/filemeta/tests/fixtures, crates/ecstore/tests/fixtures, or crates/rio-v2/tests/minio_fixture_lab — or capture a new one from a single-disk MinIO instance (RELEASE.2025-07-23 procedure from #4377).
- Where: crates/filemeta, crates/ecstore (headers, msgpack bucket metadata), crates/rio-v2, migration code
- Evidence: Commit 073bc9675 (#4343): filemeta header signature was hardcoded to zero — round-trip tests passed for months. Commit a91d9cefc (#4377) established the real-MinIO fixture convention (inline/versioned/multipart xl.meta, HighwayHash256-prefixed inline bodies) precisely because synthetic fixtures proved nothing about interop.
- Attack new concurrency tests for flakiness-by-construction: grep the added tests for `sleep(`, fixed timeouts under ~30s on lock acquisition, and use of shared global state (disk registry, lock client, GLOBAL_*). Serialized cross-disk commits exceed small lock timeouts under full-suite CI disk load. If the test shares global state or saturates IO, it must join the `ecstore-serial-flaky` nextest test-group in .config/nextest.toml (note: serial_test's #[serial] does NOT work — nextest runs each test in its own process). Require readiness polling, never fixed sleeps.
- Where: crates/ecstore tests, crates/e2e_test, .config/nextest.toml
- Evidence: Commit 2dfa3d3c3 (#4370): concurrent_resend test flaked with Lock(Timeout 5s) on CI — six legitimate serialized cross-disk commits under IO pressure needed 30s. Commit 7c701d9f2 (#4558) created the nextest test-group after bucket_delete_* raced make_bucket into InsufficientWriteQuorum. 65849740f (#4213) deflaked global-state contamination. crates/e2e_test/AGENTS.md: 'readiness checks and explicit polling over fixed sleep-based timing'.
- If the diff writes internal object metadata, run the dual-key mutation: delete the `x-minio-internal-<suffix>` write (keeping only `x-rustfs-internal-`) and check whether any test fails. Because `get_bytes` prefers the RustFS key, every read-back test stays green while MinIO interop is silently broken — coverage must include an assertion that BOTH keys are present in the stored metadata map.
- Where: crates/utils/src/http/metadata_compat.rs and all its callers in crates/ecstore and rustfs/src/storage
- Evidence: CLAUDE.md domain convention: metadata must be written under both x-rustfs-internal- and x-minio-internal- keys for MinIO interop; get_bytes prefers the RustFS key, making the MinIO-key half of the invariant invisible to read-back tests.
- For changed quorum/version/UUID logic, name the tests covering the specific poison values: quorum1 disks, nil UUID, absent vs empty vs nil-serialized UUID bytes, remote-tier version_id of None/"" (unversioned tier bucket → no versionId sent), and the same metadata read on both MetaObject and MetaDeleteMarker version types. Mutation check: remove a `.filter(|u| !u.is_nil())` guard from the diff and confirm a test fails; if none does, the nil-UUID class is uncovered.
- Where: crates/ecstore (tier recovery, heal, quorum paths), crates/filemeta, code reading UUIDs from xl.meta metadata
- Evidence: Commit 726f3dc18 (#4552) fixed rejection of empty remote version_id in tier recovery. CLAUDE.md invariant: absent/empty/nil UUID all mean 'no value', not Uuid::nil(). docs/operations/tier-ilm-debugging.md: None/"" tier version means unversioned bucket. df9cbc4ed (#4427): unvalidated distribution values caused shuffle index panic — edge values reached production untested.
- For any pagination/limit/truncation change, construct the exact-boundary test: result count == max (page exactly full), max+1, and a delimiter re-fold that lands precisely on the page boundary — assert both the item count AND the is_truncated/continuation marker. Off-by-one at the page boundary is a recurring shipped bug here.
- Where: crates/ecstore listing paths (list_objects, ListMultipartUploads, metacache), S3 handlers in rustfs/src/storage
- Evidence: Two shipped boundary bugs: fefa70b31 (#4447) ListMultipartUploads returned one upload past max-uploads; d91f4d455 (#4538) delimiter re-fold of a full page lost the truncation flag. Both survived existing tests because no test pinned n == max exactly.
- A green focused test is evidence only for the targets it builds. Follow the `AGENTS.md` validation tier: add package-scoped Clippy or broader test-target compilation only when changed targets, features, or dependents remain uncovered; do not require a workspace-wide build by default.
- Where: All crates; especially concurrent-branch merges into crates/ecstore
- Evidence: #4322 broke main because only cargo test ran (field_reassign_with_default is clippy-only). b06f3df6b (#4441) and 05890d6e2 (#4573): test code broke the workspace test build (E0061) on main after textually-clean merges, failing CI for every open PR.
Null report example: "Attacked revert-detection for all 3 claimed behaviors (each has a named test that fails on revert), flag-inversion on the new fallback parameter (both branches covered in codec_streaming tests), full-body assertions on the changed GET path, and n==max pagination boundary — no coverage gap found."
## Sources and maintenance
Probes are distilled from shipped bugs in git history (commit/PR references
above), GitHub security advisories (see the security-advisory-lessons
skill), scoped `AGENTS.md` rules, and invariants under `docs/architecture/`
and `docs/operations/`. Line numbers drift; re-locate the invariant. Merge
new incidents into an existing probe when they share a failure class; add a
new probe only for a distinct attack, rather than growing the root policy.
Do not turn a null verdict into a long checklist. Record concise evidence that
the relevant failure classes were attacked.
@@ -0,0 +1,24 @@
# Compatibility Lens
- Internal metadata uses `metadata_compat` helpers for dual RustFS/MinIO keys,
including mixed casing and removal of both twins.
- Binary UUID metadata treats absent, empty, and nil as no value. Unversioned
remote tiers receive no `versionId`; versioned purge requests retain the real
version ID.
- `xl.meta` changes preserve supported header/meta versions, recompute
signatures, decode legacy fixtures, and remain readable by old RustFS/MinIO.
- Foreign/corrupt metadata validates parallel array lengths and missing fields;
it returns a decode error rather than indexing, panicking, or fabricating data.
- Do not “correct” byte-for-byte MinIO ports without legacy fixture evidence.
Bitrot framing, shard math, distribution, and inline prefixes are contracts.
- Client-visible metadata/events strip both internal prefixes
case-insensitively.
- Proto fields are appended, never reused/renumbered; FlatBuffers tables extend
compatibly and absent new fields fail closed where authorization/quorum is
involved.
- Replay real client request shapes and exact pagination boundaries for S3
handler changes.
- Bucket metadata/IAM/config parsing remains compatible with pinned real MinIO
fixtures and encrypted migration data.
- Compatibility shims use `RUSTFS_COMPAT_TODO(<task-id>)`, have a removal
condition, and default toward reading old data safely.
@@ -0,0 +1,23 @@
# Concurrency and Durability Lens
- For every changed lock, enumerate overlapping lock sets and construct the
ABBA interleaving. Multiple-lock order must be documented and consistent.
- Mark guard lifetimes and every `.await`, disk, and RPC call inside them.
Estimate contention and timeout behavior under concurrent requests.
- Object commits remain fenced if the distributed lock is lost after shard
writes and before metadata rename.
- For write/rename changes, trace `write tmp -> sync tmp -> rename -> sync parent
-> sync required ancestors`; simulate a crash after each step and honor the
configured durability gate.
- Multi-disk fan-out counts every result. Quorum-minus-one cannot become success;
heal remains best-effort per target where that is the established contract.
- At every new cancellable await between mutation and cleanup/commit, drop the
future and inspect leftover files, counters, permits, and replay state.
- Multipart operations on the same upload ID are serialized where required;
abort/complete/list races cannot delete parts before durable commit.
- Post-commit cleanup is best-effort, retry-safe, and cannot fail an already
committed write or delete the last surviving copy.
- Persisted read-modify-write uses serialization/CAS. Queue replay is crash-safe
and duplicate delivery has an idempotency contract.
- Streaming reconstruction failures after partial output surface as errors, not
successful EOF.
@@ -0,0 +1,29 @@
# Correctness Lens
Attack the changed behavior, not every subsystem in the repository.
- Trace new error paths to the caller. Inject the ignored/wildcard variants and
verify they cannot become success, not-found, or a plausible default.
- Exercise zero/empty/missing, maximum, and exact-boundary inputs for every
changed count, size, index, page limit, or optional value.
- For aggregation/quorum changes, test exactly quorum and quorum-minus-one with
mixed disk errors and nil/placeholder entries.
- For listing/pagination, test `n == max`, `n == max + 1`, delimiter folding,
continuation markers, and object/prefix name collisions.
- For EC/read/streaming changes, inject failure after partial output and verify
the client receives an error rather than a clean truncated body. Assert exact
bytes and length.
- For multipart/object commits, fail before/after rename and cleanup; committed
data must remain readable and pre-commit cleanup must not destroy parts.
- For version/index ordering, test `len - 1`, `len`, equal timestamps, missing
versions, and deterministic tie-breaking.
- For directory-object behavior, trace `__XLDIR__` at the store layer; branches
below the layer that sees trailing slashes are dead.
- For binary UUID metadata, absent, empty, and nil all mean no value. Never send
nil/empty `versionId` to an unversioned tier.
- For agent rules/skill routers, test a trigger matrix covering ordinary
inquiry, low-risk implementation, explicit review, high-risk code, PR
creation, release, and post-PR monitoring. Each case must select only the
intended workflow and retain required safety/authorization boundaries.
Null verdicts name only the probes relevant to the diff.
@@ -0,0 +1,20 @@
# Performance Lens
- For added clones/allocations on request/object/block paths, quantify copied
data and frequency. Recommend borrowing, move, `Bytes`/`Arc`, `Cow`, or
capacity reservation only for a concrete repeated cost.
- Route every new sync/flush through the durability-mode and bucket override
gates; mode `none` must not pay the new fsync.
- Keep blocking filesystem/CPU work off async runtime threads, but do not split
one small operation into many `spawn_blocking` round trips.
- Measure lock hold time across I/O and compare acquisition order for ABBA.
- Keep cleanup, extra stat/rename, and diagnostics out of the PUT commit critical
section when they need not be there.
- Detect per-item serial I/O/RPC in batch APIs and accidental quadratic scans;
use a gate or bounded concurrency when the concrete fan-out warrants it.
- Count buffer growth and byte copies in EC/bitrot paths; preserve pool gauge
balance and avoid repeated metadata decode/fetch per object.
- Repetitive success logs stay at `trace`; metrics/instrumentation on hot paths
require an existing gate.
- Claims of no impact on PUT/GET/commit/erasure paths need relevant benchmark or
A/B evidence, especially for 4 KiB objects.
@@ -0,0 +1,31 @@
# Security Lens
Use `security-advisory-lessons` only for a dedicated advisory/security audit.
For an ordinary matched diff, attack these boundaries:
- Admin routes: route registration, whitelist, handler authn, and the exact
`AdminAction` must agree. Read-only diagnostics still require admin authz.
- IAM/service accounts: treat parent, claims, keys, groups, status, and policy
names as attacker-controlled; prove ownership/root authority before writes.
- Protocol frontends: every changed/sibling command authorizes the matching S3
action before reaching storage.
- Secrets/signatures: use constant-time comparison, normalize public failures,
keep RPC/root/STS keys independent, and fail closed when secrets are absent.
- RPC: bind signatures to the exact method/path and timestamp; reject replay,
stale, malformed, truncated, and invalid-enum payloads without panic.
- Paths/object/archive entries: reject traversal, absolute/platform escapes,
and normalization differences between authz and storage.
- Copy/multipart/presigned POST: enforce source, destination, version-aware
actions, copy-source conditions, and every signed policy condition.
- Logging/errors: never expose credentials, tokens, expected signatures, raw
secret-bearing input, or merged configs—including via `Debug` and parse errors.
- Untrusted serde: reject unknown fields where compatible and validate
security-critical defaults/ranges before numeric conversion.
- SSE/browser/CORS/trusted proxy: inspect stored ciphertext and wrapper order;
isolate user content; never reflect credentialed arbitrary origins or trust
forwarded identity from direct clients.
- Object Lock: unreadable/fabricated/unparsable metadata fails closed across
foreground, lifecycle, scanner, and force-delete paths.
Security findings distinguish unauthenticated compromise from a
low-privileged authenticated bypass.
@@ -0,0 +1,22 @@
# Simplicity Lens
- Compare the production diff with the smallest equivalent local edit. Fewer
lines alone are not evidence; the replacement must preserve correctness,
compatibility, readability, and real boundaries.
- Search the touched crate, domain owner, `crates/utils`, `crates/common`, and
relevant dependencies for each new helper, constant, wrapper, or fixture.
- Reject forced reuse when normalization, error, deadline, or durability
semantics differ.
- Require a concrete trigger for every new defensive branch. Keep boundary
checks for disk/RPC/version data and checks immediately before destructive
actions.
- Flag one-caller helpers only when they merely forward or split a short linear
flow without adding domain naming, invariant isolation, or useful context.
- Ensure a replacement removes the superseded in-scope path or keeps one
canonical core behind a documented compatibility adapter.
- Remove narration/change-history comments; preserve concise safety, lock,
durability, and compatibility invariants.
- Treat tests, fixtures, generated code, and documentation separately from
production growth. Do not optimize away meaningful regression coverage.
A finding must include a concrete smaller design, not a style preference.
@@ -0,0 +1,24 @@
# Test-Coverage Lens
- For every behavior claim, name the focused test/check that fails if the
changed hunk is reverted. If none is practical, require the reason and
residual risk.
- Confirm tests exercise the real production path and assert returned values,
exact bytes, stored state, or the specific error variant—not only success,
`is_err()`, or no panic.
- For new flags/modes, verify each branch and ask which test fails if the branch
is inverted.
- For new error propagation, inject the failure and assert the caller observes
it; mentally replacing `?`/`return Err` with success must break a test.
- Streaming GET tests assert the complete body and length under degraded reads.
- Disk/wire-format tests use pinned foreign/legacy fixtures; same-code
round-trips are insufficient for compatibility.
- Concurrency tests use readiness polling, isolate global state, and avoid fixed
sleeps or unrealistically short timeouts. Use nextest groups when process-level
serialization is required.
- Internal metadata tests assert both RustFS and MinIO keys, not only read-back
through a helper that prefers one key.
- Boundary companions are distinct coverage: `n == max` vs `max + 1`, and
absent vs empty vs nil UUID.
- A focused test proves only the targets/features it builds. Add compilation or
Clippy only for uncovered changed targets.
@@ -1,11 +1,12 @@
---
name: code-change-verification
description: Verify code changes by identifying correctness, regression, security, and performance risks from diffs or patches, then produce prioritized findings with file/line evidence and concrete fixes. Use when reviewing commits, PRs, and merged patches before/after release.
description: Review a commit, PR, or merged patch when the user requests ordinary code-change verification. Do not combine with adversarial-validation; use that skill instead for explicitly adversarial, substantial, or high-risk RustFS reviews.
---
# Code Change Verification
Use this skill to review code changes consistently before merge, before release, and during incident follow-up.
Use this skill for an ordinary requested review. If the root policy or user calls
for adversarial validation, use `adversarial-validation` instead of running both.
## Quick Start
@@ -79,4 +80,3 @@ Run the full checklist in [rust-code-quality](../rust-code-quality/SKILL.md) —
- Impact: ...
- Fix suggestion: ...
- Validation: ...
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
interface:
display_name: "Code Change Verification"
short_description: "Prioritize risks and verify code changes before merge."
default_prompt: "Inspect a patch or diff, identify correctness/security/regression risks, and return prioritized findings with file/line evidence and fixes."
default_prompt: "Use $code-change-verification for an ordinary requested diff review with prioritized findings."
+33 -84
View File
@@ -1,97 +1,46 @@
---
name: pr-creation-checker
description: Prepare PR-ready diffs by validating scope, checking required verification steps, drafting a compliant English PR title/body, and surfacing blockers before opening or updating a pull request in RustFS.
description: Perform the final RustFS PR preflight and draft compliant English title/body metadata immediately before creating or updating a PR. Do not use during implementation or as a second general code review.
---
# PR Creation Checker
Use this skill before `gh pr create`, before `gh pr edit`, or when reviewing whether a branch is ready for PR.
Use this skill only at the PR boundary. Reuse completed diff review and
verification evidence; do not reread the repository or rerun equivalent checks.
## Read sources of truth first
## Preflight
- Read `AGENTS.md`.
- Read `.github/pull_request_template.md`.
- Use `Makefile` and `.config/make/` for local quality commands.
- Use `.github/workflows/ci.yml` for CI expectations.
- Do not restate long command matrices or template sections from memory when the files exist.
1. Confirm the branch is based on current `origin/main` and contains only the
intended task diff.
2. Inspect `git diff --stat`, `git diff --check`, and changed file names for
secrets, logs, generated artifacts, or unrelated edits.
3. Confirm the checks selected by root `AGENTS.md` passed on the final diff.
Do not replace focused behavioral tests with a generic gate or rerun checks
already covered by an unchanged umbrella run.
4. Read `.github/pull_request_template.md`. Consult `Makefile`, `.config/make/`,
or CI only when the required command/current gate is uncertain.
5. Return `BLOCKED` for an unclean scope, missing required evidence, failed
required checks, or non-compliant metadata.
## Workflow
## Metadata
1. Collect PR context
- Confirm base branch, current branch, change goal, and scope.
- Confirm whether the task is: draft a new PR, update an existing PR, or preflight-check readiness.
- Confirm whether the branch includes only intended changes.
- Title: English Conventional Commit, at most 72 characters, with no tool
prefix.
- Body: English, exact template headings, `N/A` where needed, concise rationale,
actual verification commands, and material risks/rollback notes.
- Use repository-relative paths; never include local absolute paths.
- Keep prose paragraphs on one logical line and never include the literal
sequence `\n`.
- Use a temporary body file with `gh pr create --body-file` or
`gh pr edit --body-file`; never pass multiline Markdown inline.
2. Inspect change scope
- Review the diff and summarize what changed.
- Inspect `git diff --stat` and `git diff --numstat`; assess production-code growth separately. Tests, fixtures, generated code, and documentation have no growth budget. Treat line counts as signals, not quotas.
- Call out unrelated edits, generated artifacts, logs, or secrets as blockers.
- Mark risky areas explicitly: auth, storage, config, network, migrations, breaking changes.
- Use the simplicity-adversary verdict instead of producing a per-symbol inventory. Block growth only when the review identifies duplication or gives a concrete smaller design that preserves correctness, compatibility, readability, and real boundaries.
- Confirm replacement implementations remove the superseded in-scope path or adapt compatibility at the boundary to one canonical core.
- Scan the diff for newly added string literals and confirm whether they duplicate values already defined as constants/enums/typed wrappers in the same module or shared modules.
- Treat introducing a new hardcoded literal where a project constant already exists as a likely regression risk; require either a refactor to reuse the constant or an explicit exception explanation in the PR body.
## Output
3. Verify readiness requirements
- Select checks from `AGENTS.md` "Verification Before PR" based on the final diff's risk tier. Do not replace a focused behavioral test with `make pre-commit`, or a required high-risk `make pre-pr` with a narrower gate.
- For focused verification, state why the selected tier is sufficient and list the scope-specific commands in the PR body.
- If `make` is unavailable, use the equivalent commands from `.config/make/`.
- Add scope-specific verification commands when the changed area needs more than the baseline.
- If required checks fail, stop and return `BLOCKED`.
- Status: `READY` or `BLOCKED`.
- Title.
- Complete PR body.
- Verification commands and results.
- Risks or `N/A`.
4. Draft PR metadata
- Write the PR title in English using Conventional Commits and keep it within 72 characters.
- If a generic PR workflow suggests a different title format, ignore it and follow the repository rule instead.
- In RustFS, do not use tool-specific prefixes such as `[codex]` when the repository requires Conventional Commits.
- Keep the PR body in English.
- Use the exact section headings from `.github/pull_request_template.md`.
- Fill non-applicable sections with `N/A`.
- Include verification commands in the PR description.
- Do not include local filesystem paths in the PR body unless the user explicitly asks for them.
- Prefer repo-relative paths, command names, and concise summaries over machine-specific paths such as `/Users/...`.
5. Prepare reviewer context
- Summarize why the change exists.
- Summarize what was verified.
- Call out risks, rollout notes, config impact, and rollback notes when applicable.
- Mention assumptions or missing context instead of guessing.
6. Prepare CLI-safe output
- When proposing `gh pr create` or `gh pr edit`, use `--body-file`, never inline `--body` for multiline markdown.
- Return a ready-to-save PR body plus a short title.
- If not ready, return blockers first and list the minimum steps needed to unblock.
## Output format
### Status
- `READY` or `BLOCKED`
### Title
- `<type>(<scope>): <summary>`
### PR Body
- Reproduce the repository template headings exactly.
- Fill every section.
- Omit local absolute paths unless explicitly required.
### Verification
- List each command run.
- State pass/fail.
### Risks
- List breaking changes, config changes, migration impact, or `N/A`.
## Blocker rules
- Return `BLOCKED` if the checks required by the `AGENTS.md` validation tier have not passed.
- Return `BLOCKED` if a documentation-only, agent-instruction-only, or local developer-tooling-only change lacks focused verification for the changed surface.
- Return `BLOCKED` if the diff contains unrelated changes that are not acknowledged.
- Return `BLOCKED` if required template sections are missing.
- Return `BLOCKED` if the title/body is not in English.
- Return `BLOCKED` if the title does not follow the repository's Conventional Commit rule.
- Return `BLOCKED` if the diff introduces string literals that should use existing constants but did not.
- Return `BLOCKED` for production-code growth only when the review identifies a duplicated or superseded implementation, or supplies a concrete smaller design with equivalent semantics. Fewer lines alone are not evidence.
## Reference
- Use [pr-readiness-checklist.md](references/pr-readiness-checklist.md) for a short final pass before opening or editing the PR.
Immediately before the GitHub write, repeat only the five preflight checks above
against the final head.
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
interface:
display_name: "PR Creation Checker"
short_description: "Draft RustFS-ready PRs with checks, template, and blockers."
default_prompt: "Inspect a branch or diff, verify required PR checks, and produce a compliant English PR title/body plus blockers or readiness status."
default_prompt: "Use $pr-creation-checker for final PR preflight and compliant English title/body metadata."
@@ -1,16 +0,0 @@
# PR Readiness Checklist
- Confirm the branch is based on current `main`.
- Confirm the diff matches the stated scope.
- Confirm no secrets, logs, temp files, or unrelated refactors are included.
- Confirm the checks required by the `AGENTS.md` validation tier passed.
- For focused verification, confirm it covered the changed surface and the PR body explains why the selected tier is sufficient.
- Confirm extra verification commands are listed for risky changes.
- Confirm the PR title uses Conventional Commits and stays within 72 characters.
- Confirm the PR title does not use tool-specific prefixes such as `[codex]`.
- Confirm the PR body is in English.
- Confirm the PR body keeps the exact headings from `.github/pull_request_template.md`.
- Confirm non-applicable sections are filled with `N/A`.
- Confirm the PR body does not include local absolute paths unless explicitly required.
- Confirm multiline GitHub CLI commands use `--body-file`.
- Confirm new hardcoded string literals were not introduced for values already represented by existing constants/enums (including protocol labels, error identifiers, headers, and metric names), or record a justified exception.
+4 -3
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@@ -1,11 +1,12 @@
---
name: rust-code-quality
description: Enforce Rust-specific code quality rules on every Rust change. Use before merge to catch unwrap abuse, silent truncation, unnecessary cloning, lock ordering violations, recursion risks, and error type anti-patterns.
description: Run a focused Rust quality review when the user requests one, when reviewing a Rust PR/commit, or when another selected review workflow delegates Rust-specific checks. Do not auto-load for every implementation edit.
---
# Rust Code Quality Gate
Use this skill on every Rust code change to enforce quality rules that `cargo clippy` does not catch.
Use this skill for a dedicated Rust review to cover rules that `cargo clippy`
does not catch.
## Quick Start
@@ -45,7 +46,7 @@ rg -n 'unwrap_or_default\(\)|unwrap_or\(' <changed-files>
## Manual Review Checklist
For every Rust code change, verify:
For the Rust diff under review, verify:
### Error Handling
- [ ] Every production `unwrap()` or `expect()` is infallible by type or a checked invariant; explain only non-obvious invariants, using an existing type, a useful `expect` message, or a concise comment
@@ -1,107 +1,34 @@
---
name: rustfs-logging-governance
description: Standardize and review RustFS logging with structured `tracing` events, lower noise on hot paths, preserve security-sensitive diagnostics, and extend guardrails to prevent legacy logging patterns from returning. Use whenever a change adds or edits any `tracing` macro call (`error!`/`warn!`/`info!`/`debug!`/`trace!`/`#[instrument]`) — including a single log line added in passing while fixing unrelated logic, which is how most new log sites enter the repo — and when reviewing RustFS logs, startup/config diagnostics, cloud metadata logs, request validation logs, or `scripts/check_logging_guardrails.sh`.
description: Add or review RustFS `tracing` events with the repository field shape, level policy, privacy boundaries, and guardrails. Use when a change adds or edits a tracing macro/instrumentation site or the logging guardrail script.
---
# RustFS Logging Governance
Use this skill when RustFS logging needs to be added, cleaned up, reviewed, or protected against regressions.
Apply this skill only to changed logging sites; do not turn a local log edit into
a broad logging cleanup.
## Quick Start
## Workflow
1. Identify the files whose logs are changing.
2. Scan current `tracing` or `log` macros before editing.
3. Convert sentence-style logs to short event-style logs.
4. Demote hot-path success logs unless operators truly need them at `info`.
5. Preserve failure, fallback, and security-relevant diagnostics.
6. Update `scripts/check_logging_guardrails.sh` when a broad cleanup removes a legacy pattern class.
7. Validate with formatting, targeted checks/tests, and the logging guardrail script.
1. Read the changed function/module context and classify the site as lifecycle,
request/hot path, fallback, external fetch, or summary.
2. Match neighboring structured events and reuse existing `EVENT_*`,
`LOG_COMPONENT_*`, and `LOG_SUBSYSTEM_*` constants.
3. Put stable fields first (`event`, `component`, `subsystem`, `state`/`result`,
then context) and a short label last.
4. Select the level by operational meaning:
- `error`: behavior/security-affecting failure;
- `warn`: degraded/fallback/operator-actionable state;
- `info`: low-frequency lifecycle/mode change;
- `debug`: targeted diagnostics;
- `trace`: repetitive request/object/shard success paths.
5. Never log secrets, tokens, auth headers, credential payloads, raw
attacker-controlled bodies, or merged config dumps. Error strings and
`Debug` output are log surfaces too.
6. Prefer one aggregate summary over inventories or startup banners.
7. Run `./scripts/check_logging_guardrails.sh` and the checks selected by root
`AGENTS.md`.
## Core Workflow
### 1. Scope the logging surface
- Read the changed module in full before touching log lines.
- Classify the log site:
- lifecycle/startup
- request or validation path
- background loop or hot path
- fallback/degraded behavior
- cloud metadata or external fetch path
- metrics/config summary
- Do not rewrite business logic to make logging easier.
### 2. Use the RustFS event shape
- Prefer fields first, message second.
- Use short labels, not prose paragraphs.
- Default field shape:
- `event`
- `component`
- `subsystem`
- `state` or `result`
- key context fields
- Reuse stable field names and avoid inventing near-duplicates.
See `references/logging-governance.md` for the event model, level policy, and anti-pattern list.
### 3. Choose the right level
- `error`: operation failure that affects behavior or security guarantees.
- `warn`: degraded path, fallback, suspicious input, or operator-actionable misconfiguration.
- `info`: low-frequency lifecycle or mode selection.
- `debug`: targeted diagnostics and low-volume detail.
- `trace`: hot-path and repetitive success-path events.
When in doubt, lower the verbosity of normal success paths and keep structured detail in fields.
### 4. Preserve security and privacy boundaries
- Do not log secrets, tokens, auth headers, raw credential payloads, or merged config dumps.
- Avoid logging raw forwarded headers or full trusted network inventories above `debug`.
- Keep warning/error logs useful without echoing attacker-controlled payloads unnecessarily.
### 5. Keep summaries aggregated
- Replace multi-line startup banners or checklist logs with one structured event.
- If metrics already express a concept, avoid duplicating it with many `info!` lines.
- Prefer counts, modes, and sources over inventories unless debug detail is truly needed.
### 6. Update guardrails when needed
- Broad logging cleanup should usually extend `scripts/check_logging_guardrails.sh`.
- Add forbidden patterns only for styles the repo has intentionally retired:
- sentence-style lifecycle logs
- noisy hot-path `info!`
- checklist-style summary logs
- legacy fallback wording that has been replaced by structured fields
- Keep guardrails concrete and grep-friendly.
### 7. Validate manually
Use the smallest relevant set:
```bash
cargo fmt --all --check
./scripts/check_logging_guardrails.sh
cargo check -p <affected-crate>
cargo test -p <affected-crate>
```
For broader Rust changes, add:
```bash
./scripts/check_unsafe_code_allowances.sh
./scripts/check_architecture_migration_rules.sh
cargo clippy -p <affected-crates> --all-targets -- -D warnings
```
## RustFS-Specific Notes
- The durable RustFS logging direction is `event + component + subsystem + state/result + key context fields`.
- `crates/concurrency` and `crates/trusted-proxies` are examples of this style for lifecycle, fallback, and cloud metadata logs.
- `scripts/check_logging_guardrails.sh` is the enforcement point for preventing removed log styles from returning.
## References
- Read `references/logging-governance.md` when you need the detailed field set, anti-pattern examples, or guardrail update checklist.
Read [logging-governance.md](references/logging-governance.md) only for a broad
logging audit, event-model migration, or guardrail expansion. Ordinary single-
site edits do not require the full workspace scope map.
@@ -1,285 +1,62 @@
# RustFS Logging Governance Reference
# Logging Audit and Migration Reference
## Workspace Scope Map
Read this reference only for a broad logging audit, an event-model migration,
or a change to `scripts/check_logging_guardrails.sh`. Use `Cargo.toml` for the
current workspace/crate list instead of maintaining one here.
Use `Cargo.toml` `[workspace].members` as the source of truth for crate membership. When doing a broad logging sweep, classify crates by operational role so logs stay consistent within each role.
## Audit by Operational Role
### Core Server And Request Handling
- Server/protocol/admin: lifecycle, authorization failures, request boundaries,
and degraded subsystems; avoid normal request success at `info`.
- Storage/heal/scanner/capacity: integrity failures and aggregate lifecycle;
avoid per-object, per-shard, and folder iteration noise.
- IAM/policy/credentials/KMS/crypto: safe identifiers and enforcement results;
never emit secrets, claims, payloads, or expected authenticators.
- Notify/audit/targets: target lifecycle and batch/backpressure summaries; avoid
per-event success logs.
- Locking/concurrency/I/O foundations: contention anomalies and state changes;
prefer metrics for high-frequency worker/permit signals.
- Shared type/schema crates: log at the operational caller boundary unless the
crate itself owns the failure context.
- `rustfs`
- Role: top-level server, startup, auth, admin wiring, S3 request handling.
- Logging focus: startup lifecycle, config summaries, authn/authz failures, protocol entrypoints, degraded subsystems.
- `crates/protocols`
- Role: protocol integrations such as FTP, SFTP, WebDAV, and related server-side protocol layers.
- Logging focus: listener lifecycle, per-protocol enablement/disablement, request bridge failures.
- `crates/madmin`
- Role: admin API contracts and management interfaces.
- Logging focus: admin action boundaries, validation failures, compatibility warnings.
- `crates/trusted-proxies`
- Role: forwarded IP trust, proxy chain validation, cloud metadata sources.
- Logging focus: direct/trusted/fallback decisions, degraded metadata fetches, aggregated config summaries.
- `crates/keystone`
- Role: Keystone auth integration.
- Logging focus: integration enablement, upstream auth failures, config safety without credential leakage.
## Event Shape
### Storage, Healing, And Data Plane
Prefer stable fields in this order when available:
- `crates/ecstore`
- Role: erasure-coded storage implementation and peer/store initialization.
- Logging focus: disk/peer lifecycle, storage fallback, object I/O failures, avoid per-object noise.
- `crates/heal`
- Role: healing orchestration and repair workflows.
- Logging focus: scheduler lifecycle, repair decisions, backlog or skipped work summaries, avoid repetitive task spam at `info`.
- `crates/scanner`
- Role: data integrity scanning and health monitoring.
- Logging focus: scan lifecycle, compaction/deep-heal transitions, lag/backlog, noisy folder iteration should stay at `debug/trace`.
- `crates/object-capacity`
- Role: capacity scan and refresh core.
- Logging focus: refresh lifecycle, degraded capacity sources, aggregate stats rather than per-object chatter.
- `crates/filemeta`
- Role: file metadata parsing and helpers.
- Logging focus: parse failures, schema/format mismatch, avoid dumping raw metadata payloads.
- `crates/storage-api`
- Role: storage contracts and shared data plane interfaces.
- Logging focus: contract mismatch and boundary diagnostics, usually low-volume.
- `crates/checksums`
- Role: checksum helpers and validation.
- Logging focus: integrity failures and compatibility mismatches, not per-chunk success logs.
- `crates/zip`
- Role: ZIP handling and compression helpers.
- Logging focus: parse/extract failures, archive path safety issues, avoid verbose file-by-file success logs.
1. `event`
2. `component`
3. `subsystem`
4. `state` or `result`
5. stable context such as mode, duration, reason, counts, safe identifiers, or
capacity/permit values
6. short message label
### Security, Identity, And Policy
Reuse the module's constants and neighboring field names. Do not create aliases
for the same concept.
- `crates/iam`
- Role: identity and access management.
- Logging focus: authz decision boundaries, imported payload safety, do not leak principals, secrets, or claims.
- `crates/policy`
- Role: policy modeling and evaluation.
- Logging focus: deny/allow decision context, parser/validation failures, no raw secret-bearing request dumps.
- `crates/credentials`
- Role: credential handling.
- Logging focus: never log secrets or tokens; only safe identifiers and redacted states.
- `crates/kms`
- Role: key management service integration.
- Logging focus: init/health/fallback, key-source availability, never log key material.
- `crates/crypto`
- Role: cryptographic helpers and security primitives.
- Logging focus: only algorithm or mode state, not plaintext, ciphertext, or secret-derived material.
- `crates/security-governance`
- Role: security governance contracts.
- Logging focus: policy/state transitions and enforcement diagnostics.
- `crates/signer`
- Role: request signing helpers.
- Logging focus: signature validation failures without expected-signature leakage.
## Patterns to Retire
### Notifications, Audit, And Targets
- sentence-style lifecycle announcements;
- startup banners and checklist lines;
- repetitive success logs at `info`/`debug`;
- raw inventories when an aggregate count is sufficient;
- fallback prose with values embedded in the message;
- `?value`/`Debug` output for credential-bearing or attacker-controlled data;
- logging a parse input when the malformed input may itself be a secret.
- `crates/notify`
- Role: notification dispatch, runtime facade, notifier implementations.
- Logging focus: target lifecycle, dispatch summaries, stream lag/backpressure, avoid per-event success spam.
- `crates/audit`
- Role: audit target fan-out and audit pipeline management.
- Logging focus: pipeline lifecycle, target availability, batch dispatch summaries, avoid noisy "started successfully" prose.
- `crates/targets`
- Role: target-specific configuration and utilities used by fan-out style systems.
- Logging focus: target selection, config validation, per-target degraded state.
- `crates/s3-types`
- Role: S3 event and type definitions.
- Logging focus: usually minimal; keep logging at integration boundaries rather than low-level type crates.
- `crates/s3-ops`
- Role: S3 operation definitions and mapping.
- Logging focus: mapping/contract failures, unsupported combinations, not normal-path request spam.
## Guardrail Changes
### Concurrency, Locking, And Runtime Foundations
When expanding `scripts/check_logging_guardrails.sh`:
- `crates/concurrency`
- Role: timeout, locking, backpressure, and I/O scheduling facade.
- Logging focus: lifecycle transitions and degraded states, not high-frequency worker/permit churn at `info`.
- `crates/lock`
- Role: distributed locking implementation.
- Logging focus: lock lifecycle, contention anomalies, lock ordering or timeout diagnostics.
- `crates/tls-runtime`
- Role: shared TLS runtime foundation.
- Logging focus: certificate lifecycle, reload/fallback, validation failures without sensitive dumps.
- `crates/obs`
- Role: observability helpers.
- Logging focus: this crate shapes other crates' telemetry conventions; avoid recursive or redundant summaries.
- `crates/io-core`
- Role: zero-copy I/O core primitives.
- Logging focus: keep very sparse; prefer metrics unless failures are actionable.
- `crates/io-metrics`
- Role: I/O metrics collection.
- Logging focus: typically minimal; metrics should carry the hot-path signal.
- `crates/rio`
- Role: Rust I/O utility layer.
- Logging focus: compatibility or runtime boundary failures, not fast-path internals.
- `crates/rio-v2`
- Role: next-generation I/O compatibility layer.
- Logging focus: migration/feature-mode differences and degraded fallback between I/O paths.
- `crates/utils`
- Role: shared helpers.
- Logging focus: usually avoid direct logging in generic helpers unless the helper is itself an operational boundary.
- `crates/common`
- Role: shared data structures and helpers.
- Logging focus: same principle as `utils`; prefer callers to log context-rich events.
- `crates/config`
- Role: configuration management.
- Logging focus: config source, fallback, validation, and summary aggregation; avoid dumping merged configs.
- `crates/data-usage`
- Role: shared data usage models and algorithms.
- Logging focus: refresh lifecycle, summary stats, and degraded reads.
1. Add only files/patterns intentionally migrated in the same change.
2. Keep patterns concrete and grep-friendly.
3. Do not encode a style that remains valid elsewhere as a global ban.
4. Run the guardrail script and the root validation tier.
5. Treat the script as a floor; manually verify level, field shape, and privacy.
### Schema, Contracts, And API Support
- `crates/protos`
- Role: protobuf definitions.
- Logging focus: usually none inside the crate; emit logs at decode/use boundaries.
- `crates/extension-schema`
- Role: extension schema contracts.
- Logging focus: schema validation and compatibility mismatches.
- `crates/s3select-api`
- Role: S3 Select API interfaces.
- Logging focus: request validation and unsupported feature boundaries.
- `crates/s3select-query`
- Role: S3 Select query engine.
- Logging focus: query parse/planning/execution failures, avoid row-level spam.
- `crates/protocols`
- Role: non-S3 protocol support.
- Logging focus: see core server section; keep per-request verbosity below `info`.
### Testing And Non-Production Crates
- `crates/e2e_test`
- Role: end-to-end tests.
- Logging focus: test clarity matters more than production governance, but avoid copying test-only logging style into production crates.
## Current Guardrail Coverage Map
`scripts/check_logging_guardrails.sh` currently enforces retired patterns in these high-signal areas:
- `rustfs/src/main.rs`
- `rustfs/src/startup_iam.rs`
- `rustfs/src/auth.rs`
- `rustfs/src/protocols/client.rs`
- `crates/audit/src/pipeline.rs`
- `crates/audit/src/system.rs`
- `crates/audit/src/global.rs`
- `crates/notify/src/config_manager.rs`
- `crates/notify/src/runtime_facade.rs`
- `crates/notify/src/notifier.rs`
- `crates/ecstore/src/store/peer.rs`
- `crates/ecstore/src/store/init.rs`
- `crates/ecstore/src/tier/tier.rs`
- `crates/concurrency/src/workers.rs`
- `crates/concurrency/src/manager.rs`
- `crates/concurrency/src/lock.rs`
- `crates/concurrency/src/deadlock.rs`
- `crates/trusted-proxies/src/global.rs`
- `crates/trusted-proxies/src/config/loader.rs`
- `crates/trusted-proxies/src/proxy/metrics.rs`
- `crates/trusted-proxies/src/proxy/validator.rs`
- `crates/trusted-proxies/src/proxy/chain.rs`
- `crates/trusted-proxies/src/middleware/service.rs`
- `crates/trusted-proxies/src/cloud/detector.rs`
- `crates/trusted-proxies/src/cloud/ranges.rs`
- `crates/trusted-proxies/src/cloud/metadata/aws.rs`
- `crates/trusted-proxies/src/cloud/metadata/azure.rs`
- `crates/trusted-proxies/src/cloud/metadata/gcp.rs`
When expanding coverage, prefer crates with:
- repeated sentence-style lifecycle logs
- high-frequency success-path `info!`
- startup/config checklist banners
- security-sensitive fallback wording
- external fetch/retry/fallback flows
That typically means the next broad candidates are `rustfs`, `crates/notify`, `crates/audit`, `crates/targets`, `crates/heal`, and `crates/scanner`.
## Event Model
Prefer this structure when the fields are available:
- `event`
- `component`
- `subsystem`
- `state` or `result`
- stable context fields such as:
- `enabled`
- `implementation`
- `validation_mode`
- `peer_ip`
- `client_ip`
- `proxy_hops`
- `duration_ms`
- `fallback`
- `reason`
- `range_count`
- `hold_time_ms`
- `available_slots`
- `total_slots`
- `permits_in_use`
## Level Policy
- `error`: the operation fails and callers or security guarantees are affected.
- `warn`: a degraded path, fallback, suspicious request, or operator-actionable config issue occurs.
- `info`: a low-frequency lifecycle or mode transition occurs.
- `debug`: useful diagnostics exist but normal operators do not need them all the time.
- `trace`: hot-path and repetitive success-path details occur.
## Preferred Patterns
- Use a short message label:
- `"trusted proxy validation failed"`
- `"concurrency manager state changed"`
- `"trusted proxy cloud metadata loaded"`
- Put key meaning into fields, not only the message text.
- Aggregate config or metrics summaries into one log event.
## Retired Patterns
These should usually be removed or replaced:
- Sentence-style lifecycle logs:
- `info!("Concurrency manager stopped")`
- `info!("Trusted Proxies module initialized")`
- Checklist or banner logs:
- `info!("=== Application Configuration ===")`
- `info!("Available metrics:")`
- Hot-path noise:
- `info!("worker take, {}", *available)`
- `debug!("Proxy validation successful in {:?}", duration)`
- Legacy fallback prose:
- `"Request from private network but not trusted: ..."`
- `"Cloud metadata fetching is disabled"`
## Guardrail Update Checklist
When extending `scripts/check_logging_guardrails.sh`:
1. Add the touched files to `checked_files`.
2. Add only legacy patterns that have been intentionally retired.
3. Keep patterns literal and grep-friendly.
4. Run the guardrail script after changes.
5. Avoid adding patterns for logs that are still valid elsewhere in the repo.
## Validation Checklist
For logging-only changes:
Useful search seeds for the changed surface:
```bash
cargo fmt --all --check
./scripts/check_logging_guardrails.sh
cargo check -p <affected-crate>
cargo test -p <affected-crate>
```
For broader Rust changes:
```bash
./scripts/check_unsafe_code_allowances.sh
./scripts/check_architecture_migration_rules.sh
cargo clippy -p <affected-crates> --all-targets -- -D warnings
rg -n 'error!|warn!|info!|debug!|trace!|#\[instrument' <changed-paths>
rg -n '\?[^,)]|secret|token|credential|authorization|merged_config' <changed-paths>
```
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
---
name: rustfs-release-publish
description: "End-to-end RustFS release pipeline: first publish any merged-but-unreleased rustfs/console changes and wait for its latest Release asset, then bump RustFS version files on main directly to the final target, publish a visible GitHub prerelease from a preview tag without updating latest channels, validate it, and publish the final tag on the SAME commit. Use whenever the user wants to release/publish a RustFS version (发版/发布)."
description: "Run the end-to-end RustFS console gate, version bump, preview validation, and final-tag publication pipeline. Use only when the user explicitly asks to release or publish a RustFS version (发版/发布)."
---
# RustFS Release Publish (preview-validated pipeline)
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
---
name: rustfs-release-version-bump
description: "Publish a RustFS alpha/beta/stable release with an auditable flow: confirm target version and scope, update workspace and release assets (including strict rustfs.spec changelog identity/date/version format), run required verification, and finish with commit, push, and GitHub PR creation."
description: "Prepare the version-file and release-asset bump for an exact RustFS alpha/beta/stable target, with verification and optional commit/push/PR delivery. Use for an explicit version bump or when invoked by the release-publish workflow."
---
# RustFS Release Version Bump
@@ -81,10 +81,7 @@ Only drop a file when the current repository release process clearly no longer r
4. Verify before shipping
- Run:
- `cargo fmt --all`
- `cargo fmt --all --check`
- `make pre-commit`
- If verification passes, run `cargo clean`.
- If `make pre-commit` fails, return `BLOCKED` with root cause and do not silently widen scope to fix unrelated issues unless user asks.
5. Commit strategy
@@ -109,10 +106,7 @@ Only drop a file when the current repository release process clearly no longer r
- `git diff --name-only origin/main...HEAD`
- `git diff --stat origin/main...HEAD`
- `rg -n "<old_version>|<new_version>" Cargo.toml Cargo.lock README.md README_ZH.md flake.nix helm/rustfs/Chart.yaml rustfs.spec`
- `cargo fmt --all`
- `cargo fmt --all --check`
- `make pre-commit`
- `cargo clean`
## Output contract
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
interface:
display_name: "RustFS Release Bump"
short_description: "Prepare RustFS release branches like PR #2957."
default_prompt: "Use $rustfs-release-version-bump to prepare a RustFS release version, ask about any unclear version policy, and finish the commit/push/PR flow."
default_prompt: "Use $rustfs-release-version-bump to prepare and verify an exact RustFS release-version bump."
+25 -155
View File
@@ -1,170 +1,40 @@
---
name: security-advisory-lessons
description: Apply RustFS security lessons distilled from repository GitHub Security Advisories. Use when making or reviewing RustFS code changes, doing security checks, handling PR review for auth/authz, IAM, storage, RPC, logging, CORS, console/browser, encryption, policy, or endpoint changes, and when deciding which security regression tests are required.
description: Perform a dedicated RustFS security/advisory review for authn/authz, IAM, RPC trust, paths, secrets, browser isolation, encryption, Object Lock, or other security boundaries. Use only when the user requests a security/advisory review or an adversarial review explicitly escalates to the full advisory map; do not auto-load solely because code touches a sensitive path.
---
# RustFS Security Advisory Lessons
Use this skill as a RustFS-specific security lens before changing or approving code. For the distilled advisory lessons and review patterns, read [advisory-patterns.md](references/advisory-patterns.md).
Use this skill as the deep security lens. For a normal adversarial review with a
matched security surface, the concise security reference under
`adversarial-validation` is sufficient.
When currentness matters, fetch the live advisory inventory instead of relying on this skill as a status mirror:
## Workflow
1. Freeze the exact diff/head and identify the changed trust boundaries.
2. Read [advisory-patterns.md](references/advisory-patterns.md), then apply only
the matching sections. Useful headings are
auth/admin, IAM/STS/OIDC, policy/plugins, S3/copy/multipart, protocols, paths,
secrets/logging/RPC, browser/CORS/proxy, SSE, Object Lock, and serde.
3. Trace unauthenticated, low-privilege, wrong-action/owner/bucket, malformed,
and default-config cases. Security decisions must fail closed.
4. Require a focused negative regression test for the bypass/exploit form, not
only the intended success path. State residual risk when a test is impractical.
5. Report proven vulnerabilities separately from defense-in-depth hardening.
When advisory currentness matters, fetch the live inventory instead of treating
the reference as a status mirror:
```bash
gh api repos/rustfs/rustfs/security-advisories --paginate \
--jq '.[] | {ghsa_id,state,severity,summary,updated_at}'
```
Fetch full advisory details only when the live summary suggests a new or changed lesson:
Fetch an individual advisory only when the live summary indicates a new or
changed lesson.
```bash
gh api repos/rustfs/rustfs/security-advisories/<GHSA_ID>
```
## Finding Standard
For the full pattern map, read [advisory-patterns.md](references/advisory-patterns.md).
## Workflow
### 1. Scope the change
- Identify touched routes, protocol frontends, handlers, storage paths, credentials, logs, browser surfaces, CI/release code, and policy checks.
- Treat these paths as security-sensitive by default: `rustfs/src/admin/`, `rustfs/src/storage/`, `rustfs/src/auth.rs`, `rustfs/src/server/layer.rs`, `crates/iam/`, `crates/policy/`, `crates/credentials/`, `crates/ecstore/src/rpc/`, `crates/protocols/`, `crates/rio/`, OIDC/STS federation code, and console preview/auth code.
### 2. Map to advisory classes
- Read [advisory-patterns.md](references/advisory-patterns.md) for matching GHSA lessons.
- Do not rely on advisory titles alone. Confirm whether the issue is authentication, authorization, input validation, storage invariant, browser isolation, logging, or operational hardening.
### 3. Verify fail-closed behavior
- Check that unauthenticated, wrong-permission, cross-user, cross-bucket, malformed-input, and default-config cases fail explicitly.
- Prefer exact action/permission checks over broad helper calls or inferred ownership.
- Confirm lower storage/RPC layers do not bypass checks done in upper layers.
### 4. Require regression evidence
- For behavior changes, add focused negative tests that reproduce the advisory class.
- For sensitive fixes, include tests for the bypass form, not only the happy path.
- If a test is impractical, explain the residual risk and provide a manual verification command.
### 5. Report clearly
- Lead with concrete findings and file/line evidence.
- Separate proven vulnerabilities from hardening risks.
- Avoid exaggerating unauthenticated impact when the code actually rejects unauthenticated requests but allows a low-privileged authenticated bypass.
## Advisory-Derived Guardrails
### Auth and admin authorization
- Every admin or diagnostic route needs an explicit authn and authz story. Route registration, router whitelist, and handler-level authorization must agree.
- Match the admin action to the operation exactly. Copy-paste action constants are a known RustFS vulnerability class.
- Avoid authentication-only helpers for state-changing admin APIs; use `validate_admin_request` or the established equivalent with the right `AdminAction`.
- Read-only admin APIs such as metrics, server info, and diagnostics still require admin authorization; checking only that credentials exist is not enough.
- Replication admin reads can expose remote target credentials; list/get target endpoints require replication/admin authorization and must not return secrets to low-privilege callers.
- Do not assume admin-action `Resource` scoping constrains blast radius unless the policy engine actually enforces resources for that action.
### IAM and service accounts
- Treat imported IAM payload fields as attacker-controlled: `parent`, `claims`, `accessKey`, `secretKey`, status, policy names, and groups.
- For service account create/update/import, prove parent ownership or root/admin authority before writing credentials or claims; an action permission alone must not allow choosing root or another user as `target_user`.
- Treat IAM export packages as credential disclosure surfaces; never include plaintext user or service-account secret keys unless the caller is allowed to recover those secrets and the export format is intentionally sealed.
- Do not let `deny_only` or "no explicit deny" become an allow decision that skips required allow checks.
- Test cross-user list/update/import flows with wrong, correct, self, parent, and root identities.
### STS, OIDC, and federation flows
- Every STS endpoint must have an explicit authentication story: SigV4 where required, OIDC token verification for web identity, and role/session policy validation before issuing credentials.
- For web identity, the JWT is the credential; exemption from SigV4 is not itself an authentication bypass. Treat pre-verification claims only as untrusted routing hints, bound token size, normalize public failures, rate-limit discovery, and issue credentials only after signature, issuer, audience, and expiration checks.
- JWT session tokens must be signed and verified by a trusted issuer/key path, not by service-account-controlled material or a reused root secret.
- JWT verification must enforce required claims and expiration for every bearer token path; "allow missing exp" is never acceptable for user-presented credentials.
- Public OIDC bootstrap and callback routes must treat `Host`, `X-Forwarded-Proto`, redirect targets, `state`, and callback parameters as untrusted; credential-bearing redirects require a configured, allowlisted origin.
- OIDC discovery and validation URLs are SSRF sinks. Resolve and classify hostnames at connection time, reject rebinding to loopback/private/link-local ranges, and do not rely on literal string checks.
### IAM policy conditions and plugins
- Treat request headers as attacker-controlled even after SigV4; callers sign their own spoofed headers. Do not merge them into server-derived condition keys such as identity, groups, version ID, signature version, JWT, or LDAP claims.
- Keep the condition-key namespace explicit. Reserved server-derived keys must reject or ignore colliding headers, while intentional request-header keys such as `s3:x-amz-*` remain available.
- Quantified IAM condition tests need partially overlapping multi-value sets. Fully contained and fully disjoint sets cannot distinguish `ForAllValues` from `ForAnyValue` bugs.
- External policy plugins must receive the same security context as built-in policy evaluation. If OPA or another plugin depends on existing object tags, load and pass `ExistingObjectTag/*` before the plugin decision.
### S3 object actions, copy, multipart, and presigned POST
- Version-aware object requests need version-aware actions. Explicit `versionId` reads and copy sources must authorize `s3:GetObjectVersion`, not only `s3:GetObject`.
- Multipart copy must enforce source `GetObject` and destination `PutObject` semantics equivalent to `CopyObject`, including copy-source and policy conditions.
- Do not let `CreateMultipartUpload`, `UploadPartCopy`, `CompleteMultipartUpload`, or `AbortMultipartUpload` return success without authorization.
- Fallbacks from version actions to non-version actions must still pass the same public-access-block, anonymous-deny, and post-authorization gates as a direct allow.
- Presigned POST policies are server-side contracts. Enforce `content-length-range`, key prefix, exact metadata/content-type, and all signed policy conditions.
### Protocol frontends and IAM parity
- FTP/FTPS, SFTP, gateway, and other protocol drivers must enforce IAM per operation before calling storage backends; authentication to a protocol listener is not authorization.
- Match protocol commands to the same S3 actions as HTTP, such as `RETR` to `GetObject`, `SIZE`/`MDTM` to `HeadObject`, `MKD` to `CreateBucket`, and bucket probes to `ListBucket` or `HeadBucket`.
- Review every handler in a protocol driver, not only the changed handler, because RustFS advisories show mixed guarded and unguarded siblings in the same driver.
- Regression tests for protocol frontends should deny the shared authorization hook and prove the backend is not reached for the denied command.
- Compare protocol secrets in constant time, normalize invalid-user and invalid-secret failures where practical, and add rate limiting before exposing password-style protocol endpoints.
### Paths, object keys, and filesystem access
- Never join untrusted bucket/object/RPC path strings onto filesystem roots without normalization and boundary checks.
- Reject or safely handle `..`, absolute paths, URL-encoded traversal, platform separators, empty components, and paths that canonicalize outside the intended root.
- Validate both S3 object-key paths and internode/RPC disk paths; storage helpers can bypass S3 authorization if they trust already-parsed paths.
- Archive auto-extract paths are object keys too. Validate tar/zip entry names before IAM checks and before storage writes, and prove cleaned paths cannot cross bucket or prefix boundaries.
### Secrets, default credentials, and crypto
- Do not ship hard-coded shared tokens, HMAC secrets, private keys, or production test keys.
- Defaults for root credentials and internode/RPC auth must fail closed for network-reachable deployments or generate per-install random secrets; warnings alone are not a security boundary.
- Keep cryptographic roles separated: root S3 credentials, RPC HMAC keys, and STS/JWT signing keys must not be reused or deterministically derived from each other.
- License or token validation must use signatures with embedded public/verifying keys only; do not use private-key decryption as authenticity.
- Plan key rotation and key IDs when removing exposed keys.
### Logging and debug output
- Logs must never include access keys beyond safe identifiers, secret keys, session tokens, JWT claims, HMAC secrets, expected signatures, license secrets, or raw response bodies containing credentials.
- Treat `Debug` implementations, `?value` tracing, merged config dumps, and dependency-level HTTP body logging as leak surfaces.
- Error and panic messages are log content: they propagate through `?` and get printed by `error!`/startup logging far from where they were constructed. Never interpolate a raw config or credential value into an error string.
- A value that fails secret-format parsing is usually the secret itself (e.g. a bare base64 key missing its `<name>:` prefix), so a parse-failure hint must name the env var or file and the expected format, never echo the input. Redacting `Debug` impls does not cover this channel.
- Add log-capture tests or targeted unit tests for redaction wrappers when changing credential structs or response bodies.
### RPC, parsing, and panic safety
- Treat all RPC payload bytes as attacker-controlled. Replace `unwrap`, `expect`, and panic-prone deserialization with typed errors.
- Malformed request tests should cover empty bytes, truncated MessagePack/protobuf, invalid enum values, stale timestamps, and invalid signatures.
- RPC authentication must be independently strong; do not depend on S3 admin credentials unless the fallback is explicit and safe.
- RPC signatures must bind the exact generated gRPC method path, timestamp, and request method. Service-prefix signatures must not authorize a different concrete NodeService call.
### Browser, CORS, and console surfaces
- Do not reflect arbitrary `Origin` while also allowing credentials. Default CORS should be no CORS unless explicitly configured.
- Do not render user-controlled object content in a same-origin iframe with console credentials available to JavaScript.
- Prefer origin separation for object preview/download, `nosniff`, CSP, strict content-type handling, and avoiding durable credentials in `localStorage`.
- Preview safety must be based on trusted content type and sandboxing, not object names or extensions such as `.pdf`.
- Console license/version-like metadata endpoints should expose only coarse public data unless authenticated, especially subject names and expiration timestamps.
### Profiling, debug, and health endpoints
- Profiling and debug endpoints are not health checks. They require admin auth, opt-in enablement, rate limiting, and safe responses.
- Do not return absolute filesystem paths or other deployment layout in unauthenticated or low-privilege responses.
- Ensure health endpoint allowlists cannot accidentally include expensive diagnostics.
### Trusted proxy and network identity
- Only honor `X-Forwarded-For` or `X-Real-IP` when the request came from a configured trusted proxy.
- Apply the same trusted-proxy rule to scheme and host derivation; direct clients must not control security-sensitive redirects through `Host`, `X-Forwarded-Host`, or `X-Forwarded-Proto`.
- Direct clients must use the socket peer address for `aws:SourceIp` and policy condition evaluation.
- Add tests for direct spoofed headers and trusted-proxy headers.
### SSE and storage invariants
- Encryption metadata is not proof that bytes were encrypted on disk.
- When touching reader/writer wrappers such as hashing, encryption, compression, or warp readers, verify wrapper order and inspect stored bytes in regression tests.
- Avoid helper shortcuts that unwrap nested readers and accidentally bypass encryption or integrity layers.
### Object Lock and retention invariants
- Object Lock state must fail closed when bucket metadata is unreadable, fabricated, or unparsable. Only a confirmed absence of Object Lock configuration may permit unprotected deletes or writes.
- Do not collapse metadata read faults, missing persisted metadata, parse failures, and genuinely absent Object Lock config into one "not configured" result.
- Retention enforcement must cover foreground deletes, batch deletes, force-delete helpers, default-retention materialization on PUT, lifecycle expiry, scanner sweeps, and all-versions expiry.
## Review Prompts
Use these prompts while reviewing a diff:
- Could a low-privileged authenticated user reach this path with the wrong action, parent, bucket, or source object?
- Does a non-HTTP protocol path call the same authorization boundary as the S3 API before touching storage?
- Does a public/default/empty config change security behavior from fail-closed to fail-open?
- Is any attacker-controlled value later used as a path, policy condition, credential identity, log field, URL, Origin, or response body?
- Does this response contain stored replication, remote target, or service credentials that need redaction or stricter authorization?
- Does any error constructor or `format!` interpolate a variable that can hold secret material, including a config parse error that echoes the raw input?
- Does an IAM export/import path expose or trust plaintext credential secrets beyond the caller's intended authority?
- Can this STS/OIDC path issue credentials without SigV4, trusted issuer validation, allowlisted redirects, or trusted-proxy host/scheme handling?
- Can a service-account or STS token omit `exp`, forge `sessionPolicy`, or use a principal-controlled key as signing authority?
- Does this outbound validation path resolve attacker-supplied hostnames and reject private, loopback, link-local, and rebound addresses at the actual connection boundary?
- Is an archive entry, object key, or policy resource normalized differently between authorization and storage?
- Is the same operation implemented in multiple paths, such as `CopyObject` vs `UploadPartCopy`, and do all paths enforce the same security contract?
- Does an explicit object version, fallback action, or plugin authorization path pass through the same action and post-authorization gates as the direct S3 path?
- Can a caller-controlled header populate a condition key that should be derived only by the server?
- Do condition tests include partially overlapping multi-value inputs for quantified operators?
- Does unreadable bucket metadata make Object Lock or retention enforcement fail closed rather than disappear?
- Does a preview or browser-surface fix preserve the original security invariant when adding alternate viewers or file-type detection?
- Does the test prove the exploit form is denied, or only that the intended form still works?
Each finding includes severity, `file:line`, attacker prerequisites, concrete
input/path, impact, smallest safe fix, and a regression check. Do not exaggerate
unauthenticated impact when the actual issue requires authenticated low privilege.
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
interface:
display_name: "Security Advisory Lessons"
short_description: "Apply advisory lessons in reviews."
default_prompt: "Review code changes against past RustFS security advisory lessons and report concrete risks, missing tests, and recommended fixes."
default_prompt: "Use $security-advisory-lessons for a dedicated RustFS security review grounded in past advisories."
+2
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,2 @@
sha256-darwin=b4ae71aa894e5c7795ae3eb8116f1777a7601d0f5db3898be2e48faf3329bd9b
sha256-linux=433debd9d9defa832986269abdf0f1d131597b2d7a417ce930e17c1fd47d85ba
+1
View File
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
sha256=9b9bc336b43b70d0e06e0adb5455bf035bb18945d85d60936eb6fe4d48e0e680
+2
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,2 @@
sha256-darwin=55534a97fbd376f64c8f6c341d319017d11ff77cad6da8629a1a7f6a874e0315
sha256-linux=c06fb8c19aed6f388b9dc61cb8251b7a44f8561a9bf764ad2b9e635598f8dc17
+1
View File
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
sha256=655a3f3c1d042e694339d15caba7580518320322d1bac0f09450b37e6c09e2e7
+1
View File
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
sha256=ec27cde6ce6400723c4b372bfbd2ac61709c744294e4810af765e8a808d8e31d
+5
View File
@@ -75,6 +75,11 @@ embedded-secrets-check: ## Check no private key material or credential literal i
@echo "🔑 Checking embedded secret material guard..."
./scripts/check_embedded_secrets.sh
.PHONY: test-wiring-check
test-wiring-check: ## Check tests stay registered and selected by their intended runners
@echo "🧪 Checking test wiring..."
python3 ./scripts/check_test_wiring.py
.PHONY: log-analyzer-rules-check
log-analyzer-rules-check: core-deps ## Check log-analyzer rule anchors still exist verbatim in source
@echo "🩺 Checking log-analyzer rule anchors..."
+3 -3
View File
@@ -19,13 +19,13 @@ planning-docs-check: ## Check that no planning-type documents are committed
./scripts/check_no_planning_docs.sh
.PHONY: pre-commit
pre-commit: fmt-check unsafe-code-check architecture-migration-check logging-guardrails-check tokio-io-uring-check extension-schema-check body-cache-whitelist-check s3s-footprint-check fips-wording-check embedded-secrets-check doc-paths-check planning-docs-check quick-check ## Run fast pre-commit checks without clippy/full tests
pre-commit: fmt-check unsafe-code-check architecture-migration-check logging-guardrails-check tokio-io-uring-check extension-schema-check body-cache-whitelist-check s3s-footprint-check fips-wording-check embedded-secrets-check test-wiring-check doc-paths-check planning-docs-check quick-check ## Run fast pre-commit checks without clippy/full tests
@echo "✅ All pre-commit checks passed!"
.PHONY: pre-pr
pre-pr: fmt-check unsafe-code-check architecture-migration-check logging-guardrails-check tokio-io-uring-check extension-schema-check body-cache-whitelist-check s3s-footprint-check fips-wording-check embedded-secrets-check doc-paths-check planning-docs-check log-analyzer-rules-check clippy-check test ## Run full pre-PR checks with clippy and tests
pre-pr: fmt-check unsafe-code-check architecture-migration-check logging-guardrails-check tokio-io-uring-check extension-schema-check body-cache-whitelist-check s3s-footprint-check fips-wording-check embedded-secrets-check test-wiring-check doc-paths-check planning-docs-check log-analyzer-rules-check clippy-check test ## Run full pre-PR checks with clippy and tests
@echo "✅ All pre-PR checks passed!"
.PHONY: dev-check
dev-check: fmt-check unsafe-code-check architecture-migration-check logging-guardrails-check tokio-io-uring-check extension-schema-check body-cache-whitelist-check s3s-footprint-check fips-wording-check embedded-secrets-check doc-paths-check planning-docs-check quick-check ## Run fast local development checks
dev-check: fmt-check unsafe-code-check architecture-migration-check logging-guardrails-check tokio-io-uring-check extension-schema-check body-cache-whitelist-check s3s-footprint-check fips-wording-check embedded-secrets-check test-wiring-check doc-paths-check planning-docs-check quick-check ## Run fast local development checks
@echo "✅ Fast development checks passed!"
+2
View File
@@ -35,6 +35,8 @@ script-tests: ## Run shell script tests
./scripts/test_pinned_paired_abba_bench.sh
./scripts/test_manual_transition_runbooks.sh
./scripts/check_embedded_secrets.sh --self-test
python3 ./scripts/check_test_wiring.py --self-test
python3 ./scripts/s3-tests/test_report_compat.py
bash -n ./scripts/validate_object_data_cache_cold_stampede.sh
python3 ./scripts/check_object_data_cache_follower_samples.py --self-test
./scripts/validate_object_data_cache_cold_stampede.sh --self-test
+48 -14
View File
@@ -38,10 +38,11 @@ e2e-vault = { max-threads = 1 }
# replacement_privileged_e2e_test when explicitly run as root on Linux). They
# are correct in isolation but resource-heavy; serialize them under nextest's
# process boundary (serial_test's #[serial] does not cross it) so several 4-disk
# servers never run at once. ci-7's nightly picks these up via the e2e suite;
# servers never run at once. The e2e-full merge/main lane picks these up;
# they are deliberately NOT in the fast PR `e2e-smoke` filter.
e2e-reliability = { max-threads = 1 }
e2e-inline-boundaries = { max-threads = 1 }
e2e-cluster-nightly = { max-threads = 1 }
# --- default profile (local): serialize the flaky groups, never retry --------
[[profile.default.overrides]]
@@ -161,7 +162,7 @@ retries = 2
# Serialize the 4-disk reliability / degraded-read e2e tests under the ci
# profile too (see the e2e-reliability test-group note near the top). Not a
# quarantine: no retries, just single-threaded so several 4-disk servers never
# run concurrently when ci-7's nightly runs the full e2e suite.
# run concurrently when e2e-full runs the suite.
[[profile.ci.overrides]]
filter = 'package(e2e_test) & test(/^(reliability_disk_fault|degraded_read_eof_regression|replacement_privileged_e2e)_test::/)'
test-group = 'e2e-reliability'
@@ -230,8 +231,8 @@ test-group = 'ecstore-serial-flaky'
# the nightly profile derives its set as "the replication module MINUS this
# allowlist", so any new replication test lands in nightly by default (never
# silently unrun) until it is explicitly blessed as fast here. Keep the two
# regexes byte-identical. Count invariant: 20 here + 49 nightly = 69 total
# (authority: `cargo nextest list`; docs/testing/e2e-suite-inventory.md).
# regexes byte-identical. The committed profile selection digests make changes
# visible in CI; current counts live in docs/testing/e2e-suite-inventory.md.
# HISTORY (2026-07-11): the 20 fast tests were briefly pulled out of this lane
# (#4724) because they set a loopback (127.0.0.1) replication target that the
# SSRF egress guard rejected on every PR after repl-1 (#4712). That is fixed —
@@ -327,9 +328,8 @@ slow-timeout = { period = "60s", terminate-after = 2, grace-period = "10s" }
# the STS dual-node test actually exercises its path (it skips gracefully with
# a visible log line when awscurl is absent), and routes scheduled failures
# through .github/actions/schedule-failure-issue (ci-8). Explicit division of
# labor with ci-5's future e2e-full merge gate: these tests run ONLY here, not
# double-run there. TODO(ci-7): fold this interim repl-owned lane into the ci
# domain's consolidated scheduled e2e workflow once it exists.
# labor with e2e-full: these tests run only in the consolidated nightly
# workflow, not in the merge/main lane.
[profile.e2e-repl-nightly]
default-filter = """
package(e2e_test)
@@ -343,26 +343,60 @@ fail-fast = false
# workflow as the failure-triage artifact.
path = "junit.xml"
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# e2e-nightly profile — destructive multi-process cluster fault domains
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# These seven modules are deliberately outside e2e-full's merge budget. Each
# starts a real multi-process or multi-disk topology and exercises node/disk
# loss, quorum, cleanup, notification fan-in, or admin-timeout behavior. The
# consolidated nightly workflow runs them serially to avoid resource
# starvation; failures are never retried.
[profile.e2e-nightly]
default-filter = """
package(e2e_test)
& test(/^(admin_timeout_regression_test|cluster_concurrency_test|cluster_multidrive_pool_test|heal_erasure_disk_rebuild_test|namespace_lock_quorum_test|object_lambda_test|stale_multipart_cleanup_cluster_test)::/)
"""
fail-fast = false
[profile.e2e-nightly.junit]
path = "junit.xml"
[[profile.e2e-nightly.overrides]]
filter = 'package(e2e_test)'
test-group = 'e2e-cluster-nightly'
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# e2e-protocols profile — serial protocol lane
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# The suite owns fixed ports, so the nightly workflow runs this exact profile
# with one nextest worker.
[profile.e2e-protocols]
default-filter = 'package(e2e_test) & test(/^protocols::/)'
fail-fast = false
[profile.e2e-protocols.junit]
path = "junit.xml"
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# e2e-full profile — merge-gate full single-node e2e lane (backlog#1149 ci-5)
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# The merge gate (ci.yml `e2e-full` job: push main + merge_group +
# workflow_dispatch). Runs the never-automated user-visible suites — KMS (40),
# object_lock (33), multipart_auth (109), quota, checksum, encryption,
# workflow_dispatch). Runs the user-visible KMS, object-lock, multipart-auth,
# quota, checksum, encryption,
# security-boundary, ... — that the fast PR `e2e-smoke` subset deliberately
# skips. Budget <= 45 min; authority for the suite count is `cargo nextest list
# --profile e2e-full` (see docs/testing/e2e-suite-inventory.md).
#
# The filter is "the whole e2e_test crate MINUS the sets owned by other lanes":
# * protocols:: — FTPS/SFTP/WebDAV, still pinned to --test-threads=1 by fixed
# ports; they join a scheduled lane once ci-6 randomises the ports (ci-7).
# * protocols:: — FTPS/SFTP/WebDAV, run from the dedicated protocol profile
# with one worker because the suite owns fixed ports.
# * the 7 cluster suites that spin up a RustFSTestClusterEnvironment
# (cluster_concurrency, cluster_multidrive_pool, stale_multipart_cleanup_cluster,
# namespace_lock_quorum, heal_erasure_disk_rebuild, admin_timeout_regression,
# object_lambda) — too heavy for the merge budget; they run in ci-7's
# nightly 4-node lane.
# object_lambda) — too heavy for the merge budget; they run in the
# e2e-nightly serial cluster-fault lane.
# * replication_extension_test — repl-1 already splits it into the PR
# `e2e-smoke` (20 fast) and `e2e-repl-nightly` (49 slow) lanes and reserves
# `e2e-smoke` (20 fast) and `e2e-repl-nightly` (55 slow) lanes and reserves
# it for those, so e2e-full does not double-run it.
# * #[ignore]d tests — nextest skips them by default (no --run-ignored); the
# manual-localhost:9000 reliant/policy tests are ci-13's migration.
+3 -4
View File
@@ -46,10 +46,9 @@ lists when upstream changes.
the PR.
- **Weekly + manual**: `.github/workflows/e2e-s3tests.yml` runs the full
upstream suite (`TEST_SCOPE=all`) against a Docker deployment (single node
or a 4-node distributed cluster behind HAProxy). It fails only on
regressions in the implemented whitelist and publishes a classification
report (`compat-report.md`, also shown in the job summary) listing promotion
candidates and unclassified tests.
or a 4-node distributed cluster behind HAProxy). The canonical gate policy
and compatibility-report behavior are documented in
[`scripts/s3-tests/README.md`](../../scripts/s3-tests/README.md).
## Running Tests Locally
@@ -53,9 +53,9 @@ jobs:
persist-credentials: false
- name: Install ripgrep
run: |
sudo apt-get update
sudo apt-get install -y ripgrep
uses: taiki-e/install-action@bffeee26d4db9be238a4ea78d8826604ebcb594d # v2
with:
tool: ripgrep@15.2.0
- name: Check architecture migration rules
run: ./scripts/check_architecture_migration_rules.sh
+6 -1
View File
@@ -83,7 +83,9 @@ jobs:
persist-credentials: false
- name: Install ripgrep
run: sudo apt-get update && sudo apt-get install -y ripgrep
uses: taiki-e/install-action@bffeee26d4db9be238a4ea78d8826604ebcb594d # v2
with:
tool: ripgrep@15.2.0
- name: Install Rust toolchain
uses: dtolnay/rust-toolchain@29eef336d9b2848a0b548edc03f92a220660cdb8 # stable
@@ -123,6 +125,9 @@ jobs:
- name: Check no embedded secret material
run: ./scripts/check_embedded_secrets.sh
- name: Check test wiring
run: python3 ./scripts/check_test_wiring.py
- name: Check no planning docs committed
run: ./scripts/check_no_planning_docs.sh
+21 -6
View File
@@ -118,7 +118,9 @@ jobs:
persist-credentials: false
- name: Install ripgrep
run: sudo apt-get update && sudo apt-get install -y ripgrep
uses: taiki-e/install-action@bffeee26d4db9be238a4ea78d8826604ebcb594d # v2
with:
tool: ripgrep@15.2.0
- name: Install Rust toolchain
uses: dtolnay/rust-toolchain@29eef336d9b2848a0b548edc03f92a220660cdb8 # stable
@@ -158,6 +160,9 @@ jobs:
- name: Check no embedded secret material
run: ./scripts/check_embedded_secrets.sh
- name: Check test wiring
run: python3 ./scripts/check_test_wiring.py
- name: Check no planning docs committed
run: ./scripts/check_no_planning_docs.sh
@@ -684,9 +689,9 @@ jobs:
- name: Make binary executable
run: chmod +x ./target/debug/rustfs
# Build the e2e test graph once. The archive is reused by the security
# count-floor check and the smoke run below, avoiding a second compile of
# the same e2e_test target on cold runners (backlog#1645).
# Build the e2e test graph once. The archive is reused by the smoke
# selection guard, security exact-count check, and run below, avoiding a
# second compile of the same e2e_test target on cold runners (backlog#1645).
- name: Archive e2e smoke test binaries
env:
NEXTEST_ARCHIVE: ${{ runner.temp }}/rustfs-e2e-smoke.tar.zst
@@ -694,6 +699,7 @@ jobs:
run: |
cargo nextest archive --profile e2e-smoke -p e2e_test --archive-file "${NEXTEST_ARCHIVE}"
cargo nextest list --profile e2e-smoke --archive-file "${NEXTEST_ARCHIVE}" --message-format json > "${NEXTEST_LISTING}"
python3 ./scripts/check_test_wiring.py --check-profile e2e-smoke "${NEXTEST_LISTING}"
./scripts/check_security_smoke_count.sh check "${NEXTEST_LISTING}"
# PR smoke subset of the in-repo e2e suite (backlog#1149 ci-4). The
@@ -758,7 +764,7 @@ jobs:
# suites — KMS, object_lock, multipart_auth, quota, checksum, encryption,
# security-boundary, ... — via the e2e-full nextest profile. Too heavy for
# every PR, so it is gated to main pushes, the merge queue, and manual
# dispatch. protocols / the 6 cluster suites / replication / #[ignore] are
# dispatch. protocols / the 7 cluster suites / replication / #[ignore] are
# owned by other lanes (see .config/nextest.toml profile.e2e-full).
if: >-
github.event_name == 'workflow_dispatch' ||
@@ -818,6 +824,13 @@ jobs:
- name: Make binary executable
run: chmod +x ./target/debug/rustfs
- name: Verify e2e full membership
env:
NEXTEST_LISTING: ${{ runner.temp }}/rustfs-e2e-full-list.json
run: |
cargo nextest list --profile e2e-full -p e2e_test --message-format json > "${NEXTEST_LISTING}"
python3 ./scripts/check_test_wiring.py --check-profile e2e-full "${NEXTEST_LISTING}"
# Full single-node e2e lane (backlog#1149 ci-5). The e2e-full
# default-filter in .config/nextest.toml is the single wiring mechanism —
# extend that filter, never add ad-hoc e2e jobs here. Reuses the downloaded
@@ -830,7 +843,9 @@ jobs:
uses: actions/upload-artifact@b7c566a772e6b6bfb58ed0dc250532a479d7789f # v6
with:
name: e2e-full-junit-${{ github.run_number }}
path: target/nextest/e2e-full/junit.xml
path: |
target/nextest/e2e-full/junit.xml
${{ runner.temp }}/rustfs-e2e-full-list.json
retention-days: 7
e2e-tests-rio-v2:
+122 -11
View File
@@ -12,7 +12,7 @@
# See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
# limitations under the License.
# Nightly full replication e2e lane (backlog#1147 repl-1, deps: ci-4).
# Consolidated nightly e2e lane for replication, cluster faults, and protocols.
#
# The per-PR gate (ci.yml `e2e-tests` job, `--profile e2e-smoke`) runs the
# FAST replication tests. This scheduled lane runs the remaining heavier
@@ -28,15 +28,12 @@
# add ad-hoc cargo-test steps here; change the filterset instead. The
# authoritative membership and count come from
# `cargo nextest list -p e2e_test --profile e2e-repl-nightly`; the PR/nightly
# count invariant is maintained next to the filtersets in .config/nextest.toml
# (deliberately not duplicated here).
# selection digest is committed under .config/.
#
# Explicit division of labor: the nightly subset runs ONLY here, never double-run
# in ci-5's future e2e-full merge gate. TODO(ci-7): once the ci domain's
# consolidated scheduled e2e workflow exists, fold this interim repl-owned lane
# into it rather than growing a second scheduled entrypoint.
# Explicit division of labor: these subsets run only here and never double-run
# in the e2e-full merge gate.
name: e2e-replication-nightly
name: e2e-nightly
on:
workflow_dispatch:
@@ -50,6 +47,10 @@ on:
permissions:
contents: read
concurrency:
group: ${{ github.workflow }}-${{ github.ref }}
cancel-in-progress: false
jobs:
repl-nightly:
name: Replication e2e (nightly)
@@ -97,9 +98,20 @@ jobs:
# demand otherwise, but a single explicit build avoids several parallel
# nextest test processes racing to build it at once.
- name: Build rustfs binary
run: cargo build -p rustfs --bins
run: |
cargo build -p rustfs --bins
: > target/debug/rustfs.features
- name: Verify replication e2e membership
env:
NEXTEST_LISTING: ${{ runner.temp }}/rustfs-e2e-repl-nightly-list.json
run: |
cargo nextest list --profile e2e-repl-nightly -p e2e_test --message-format json > "${NEXTEST_LISTING}"
python3 ./scripts/check_test_wiring.py --check-profile e2e-repl-nightly "${NEXTEST_LISTING}"
- name: Run replication e2e nightly suite
env:
RUSTFS_E2E_LOG_DIR: ${{ runner.temp }}/rustfs-e2e-repl-nightly-logs
run: cargo nextest run --profile e2e-repl-nightly -p e2e_test
- name: Upload nextest junit report
@@ -107,13 +119,112 @@ jobs:
uses: actions/upload-artifact@b7c566a772e6b6bfb58ed0dc250532a479d7789f # v6
with:
name: e2e-replication-nightly-junit-${{ github.run_number }}
path: target/nextest/e2e-repl-nightly/junit.xml
path: |
target/nextest/e2e-repl-nightly/junit.xml
${{ runner.temp }}/rustfs-e2e-repl-nightly-list.json
${{ runner.temp }}/rustfs-e2e-repl-nightly-logs/
retention-days: 7
if-no-files-found: ignore
cluster-nightly:
name: Cluster fault e2e (nightly)
runs-on: sm-standard-4
timeout-minutes: 90
env:
FORCE_JAVASCRIPT_ACTIONS_TO_NODE24: "true"
steps:
- name: Checkout repository
uses: actions/checkout@9c091bb21b7c1c1d1991bb908d89e4e9dddfe3e0 # v7
with:
persist-credentials: false
- name: Setup Rust environment
uses: ./.github/actions/setup
with:
rust-version: stable
cache-shared-key: ci-e2e-nightly
cache-save-if: 'false'
install-build-packaging-tools: 'false'
- name: Build rustfs binary
run: |
cargo build -p rustfs --bins --features e2e-test-hooks
: > target/debug/rustfs.features
- name: Verify cluster fault e2e membership
env:
NEXTEST_LISTING: ${{ runner.temp }}/rustfs-e2e-nightly-list.json
run: |
cargo nextest list --profile e2e-nightly -p e2e_test --message-format json > "${NEXTEST_LISTING}"
python3 ./scripts/check_test_wiring.py --check-profile e2e-nightly "${NEXTEST_LISTING}"
- name: Run cluster fault e2e nightly suite
env:
RUSTFS_E2E_LOG_DIR: ${{ runner.temp }}/rustfs-e2e-nightly-logs
run: cargo nextest run --profile e2e-nightly -p e2e_test
- name: Upload cluster fault diagnostics
if: always()
uses: actions/upload-artifact@b7c566a772e6b6bfb58ed0dc250532a479d7789f # v6
with:
name: e2e-cluster-nightly-${{ github.run_number }}
path: |
target/nextest/e2e-nightly/junit.xml
${{ runner.temp }}/rustfs-e2e-nightly-list.json
${{ runner.temp }}/rustfs-e2e-nightly-logs/
retention-days: 7
if-no-files-found: warn
protocols-nightly:
name: Protocol e2e (nightly)
runs-on: sm-standard-4
timeout-minutes: 90
env:
FORCE_JAVASCRIPT_ACTIONS_TO_NODE24: "true"
RUSTFS_BUILD_FEATURES: ftps,webdav,sftp
steps:
- name: Checkout repository
uses: actions/checkout@9c091bb21b7c1c1d1991bb908d89e4e9dddfe3e0 # v7
with:
persist-credentials: false
- name: Setup Rust environment
uses: ./.github/actions/setup
with:
rust-version: stable
cache-shared-key: ci-e2e-protocols
cache-save-if: 'false'
install-build-packaging-tools: 'false'
# The suite owns fixed protocol ports and serializes its internal cases.
- name: Verify protocol e2e membership
env:
NEXTEST_LISTING: ${{ runner.temp }}/rustfs-e2e-protocols-list.json
run: |
cargo nextest list --profile e2e-protocols -p e2e_test --message-format json > "${NEXTEST_LISTING}"
python3 ./scripts/check_test_wiring.py --check-profile e2e-protocols "${NEXTEST_LISTING}"
- name: Run protocol e2e nightly suite
env:
RUSTFS_E2E_LOG_DIR: ${{ runner.temp }}/rustfs-protocol-e2e-logs
run: >-
cargo nextest run -j 1 --profile e2e-protocols -p e2e_test --no-capture
- name: Upload protocol diagnostics
if: always()
uses: actions/upload-artifact@b7c566a772e6b6bfb58ed0dc250532a479d7789f # v6
with:
name: e2e-protocol-nightly-${{ github.run_number }}
path: |
target/nextest/e2e-protocols/junit.xml
${{ runner.temp }}/rustfs-e2e-protocols-list.json
${{ runner.temp }}/rustfs-protocol-e2e-logs/
retention-days: 7
if-no-files-found: warn
alert-on-failure:
name: Alert on scheduled failure
needs: [repl-nightly]
needs: [repl-nightly, cluster-nightly, protocols-nightly]
# Only scheduled runs open/append the tracking issue (backlog#1149 ci-8);
# manual workflow_dispatch runs stay quiet so a debugging run never files a
# spurious alert.
+28 -35
View File
@@ -18,10 +18,9 @@
# runs only the implemented_tests.txt whitelist. This workflow complements it:
#
# - Scheduled weekly full sweep (TEST_SCOPE=all): runs the ENTIRE upstream
# suite and reports promotion candidates (tests that newly pass) and
# unclassified tests. The job fails only on regressions in the implemented
# whitelist or on infrastructure errors — expected failures from
# not-yet-implemented features do not turn the run red.
# suite and reports promotion candidates. Regressions, unclassified tests,
# incomplete execution, and infrastructure errors fail the job; classified
# failures for not-yet-implemented features remain informational.
# - Manual runs (workflow_dispatch): same, with configurable mode/scope.
#
# All test execution is delegated to scripts/s3-tests/run.sh (single source of
@@ -45,13 +44,6 @@
# The PR gate (ci.yml s3-implemented-tests) is unaffected: it avoids Docker
# via DEPLOY_MODE=binary and defers all pip setup to run.sh's self-bootstrap.
# DISABLED. This workflow is switched off in the repository's Actions settings
# (state: disabled_manually) and does not run on any trigger, including its cron
# and workflow_dispatch. That state lives in GitHub's UI and is invisible when
# reading this file, which has already misled at least one audit — hence this
# banner. Re-enabling is a UI action; anyone doing so should first check that the
# workflow still matches the current CI layout. See rustfs/backlog#1603.
#
name: e2e-s3tests
on:
@@ -81,6 +73,19 @@ on:
description: "Stop after N failures. '0' to run everything."
required: false
default: "0"
shard-count:
description: "Exact-node-ID shard count for a targeted manual run"
required: false
default: "1"
type: choice
options:
- "1"
- "2"
- "4"
shard-index:
description: "Zero-based shard index for a targeted manual run"
required: false
default: "0"
markexpr:
description: "Optional pytest -m expression"
required: false
@@ -111,6 +116,8 @@ env:
XDIST: ${{ github.event.inputs.xdist || '4' }}
MAXFAIL: ${{ github.event.inputs.maxfail || '0' }}
MARKEXPR: ${{ github.event.inputs.markexpr || '' }}
S3_SHARD_COUNT: ${{ github.event_name == 'schedule' && '4' || github.event.inputs.shard-count || '1' }}
TEST_TIMEOUT: "300"
concurrency:
group: ${{ github.workflow }}-${{ github.ref }}-${{ github.event.inputs['test-mode'] || 'single' }}
@@ -127,19 +134,22 @@ defaults:
jobs:
s3tests:
name: s3tests (${{ matrix.test-mode }}, shard ${{ matrix.shard-index }})
# GitHub-hosted: reliably provides Docker + docker compose + python3/pip.
# See the header note (ci-1) for why the self-hosted sm-standard-4 label
# was abandoned. TODO(ci-8): scheduled-failure alerting (auto-open issue)
# is added by the ci-8 composite action; do not implement it here.
# was abandoned. Scheduled failures are handled by alert-on-failure below.
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
timeout-minutes: 180
strategy:
fail-fast: false
max-parallel: 2
matrix:
# Scheduled sweeps cover both topologies; manual runs use the input.
test-mode: ${{ github.event_name == 'schedule' && fromJSON('["single", "multi"]') || fromJSON(format('["{0}"]', github.event.inputs.test-mode || 'single')) }}
shard-index: ${{ github.event_name == 'schedule' && fromJSON('[0, 1, 2, 3]') || fromJSON(format('[{0}]', github.event.inputs.shard-index || '0')) }}
env:
TEST_MODE: ${{ matrix.test-mode }}
S3_SHARD_INDEX: ${{ matrix.shard-index }}
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@9c091bb21b7c1c1d1991bb908d89e4e9dddfe3e0 # v7
with:
@@ -181,6 +191,7 @@ jobs:
- name: Start single RustFS
if: env.TEST_MODE == 'single'
run: |
SSE_KEY="$(head -c 32 /dev/zero | base64 -w0)"
docker network inspect rustfs-net >/dev/null 2>&1 || docker network create rustfs-net
docker rm -f rustfs-single >/dev/null 2>&1 || true
# The four disks share one physical device on the runner (a single
@@ -193,6 +204,7 @@ jobs:
-e RUSTFS_ADDRESS=0.0.0.0:9000 \
-e RUSTFS_ACCESS_KEY="${S3_ACCESS_KEY}" \
-e RUSTFS_SECRET_KEY="${S3_SECRET_KEY}" \
-e RUSTFS_SSE_S3_MASTER_KEY="${SSE_KEY}" \
-e RUSTFS_VOLUMES="/data/rustfs{0...3}" \
-e RUSTFS_UNSAFE_BYPASS_DISK_CHECK=true \
-v /tmp/rustfs-single:/data \
@@ -201,6 +213,7 @@ jobs:
- name: Start 4-node distributed cluster
if: env.TEST_MODE == 'multi'
run: |
SSE_KEY="$(head -c 32 /dev/zero | base64 -w0)"
# A real distributed deployment: every node lists all endpoints in
# RUSTFS_VOLUMES so data is erasure-coded ACROSS nodes. Do not use
# node-local volume paths here — that would create four independent
@@ -213,6 +226,7 @@ jobs:
RUSTFS_ADDRESS: "0.0.0.0:9000"
RUSTFS_ACCESS_KEY: ${S3_ACCESS_KEY}
RUSTFS_SECRET_KEY: ${S3_SECRET_KEY}
RUSTFS_SSE_S3_MASTER_KEY: "${SSE_KEY}"
RUSTFS_VOLUMES: "http://rustfs{1...4}:9000/data/rustfs{0...3}"
# Each node's four disks share one physical device inside its
# container, so bypass the local physical-disk-independence guard
@@ -294,7 +308,6 @@ jobs:
- name: Run ceph s3-tests
run: |
set +e
DEPLOY_MODE=existing \
TEST_MODE="${TEST_MODE}" \
TEST_SCOPE="${TEST_SCOPE}" \
@@ -302,26 +315,6 @@ jobs:
MAXFAIL="${MAXFAIL}" \
MARKEXPR="${MARKEXPR}" \
./scripts/s3-tests/run.sh
RC=$?
set -e
if [ "${TEST_SCOPE}" = "implemented" ]; then
# Whitelist run: every failure is a regression.
exit "${RC}"
fi
# Full sweep: failures outside the implemented whitelist are
# inventory (promotion candidates / unimplemented features), not a
# gate. Fail only on whitelist regressions or infrastructure errors.
JUNIT="artifacts/s3tests-${TEST_MODE}/junit.xml"
if [ ! -f "${JUNIT}" ]; then
echo "No junit.xml produced — infrastructure failure (exit ${RC})" >&2
exit "${RC}"
fi
python3 scripts/s3-tests/report_compat.py \
--junit "${JUNIT}" \
--lists-dir scripts/s3-tests \
--fail-on-regression
- name: Publish compatibility report
if: always()
@@ -346,7 +339,7 @@ jobs:
if: always() && env.ACT != 'true'
uses: actions/upload-artifact@b7c566a772e6b6bfb58ed0dc250532a479d7789f # v6
with:
name: s3tests-${{ env.TEST_MODE }}
name: s3tests-${{ env.TEST_MODE }}-shard-${{ matrix.shard-index }}
path: artifacts/**
alert-on-failure:
+11 -24
View File
@@ -12,27 +12,22 @@
# See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
# limitations under the License.
# DISABLED. This workflow is switched off in the repository's Actions settings
# (state: disabled_manually) and does not run on any trigger, including its cron
# and workflow_dispatch. That state lives in GitHub's UI and is invisible when
# reading this file, which has already misled at least one audit — hence this
# banner. Re-enabling is a UI action; anyone doing so should first check that the
# workflow still matches the current CI layout. See rustfs/backlog#1603.
#
name: Fuzz
on:
pull_request:
types: [ opened, synchronize, reopened, closed ]
# PR trigger is intentionally narrow: only changes to the fuzz harness
# itself gate a PR. Broad crate paths (ecstore/filemeta/utils/policy/…)
# are covered by the nightly `schedule` run below, which fuzzes against
# whatever landed on main. Widening these paths previously queued a
# ~45min fuzz-build on nearly every PR and is why this workflow was
# disabled; do not re-add crate paths here.
# Run when the harness or any directly fuzzed production crate changes.
paths:
- "fuzz/**"
- "scripts/fuzz/**"
- "crates/ecstore/**"
- "crates/filemeta/**"
- "crates/policy/**"
- "crates/security-governance/**"
- "crates/utils/**"
- "Cargo.toml"
- "Cargo.lock"
- ".github/workflows/fuzz.yml"
schedule:
- cron: "0 2 * * *"
@@ -81,7 +76,7 @@ jobs:
github.event_name == 'schedule' ||
github.event_name == 'workflow_dispatch'
runs-on: sm-standard-4
timeout-minutes: 45
timeout-minutes: 60
env:
FORCE_JAVASCRIPT_ACTIONS_TO_NODE24: "true"
steps:
@@ -121,12 +116,7 @@ jobs:
uses: actions/upload-artifact@b7c566a772e6b6bfb58ed0dc250532a479d7789f # v6
with:
name: fuzz-prebuilt-binaries-${{ github.run_number }}
path: |
fuzz/prebuilt/${{ env.CARGO_BUILD_TARGET }}/release/archive_extract
fuzz/prebuilt/${{ env.CARGO_BUILD_TARGET }}/release/bucket_validation
fuzz/prebuilt/${{ env.CARGO_BUILD_TARGET }}/release/local_metadata
fuzz/prebuilt/${{ env.CARGO_BUILD_TARGET }}/release/path_containment
fuzz/prebuilt/${{ env.CARGO_BUILD_TARGET }}/release/policy_ingress
path: fuzz/prebuilt/${{ env.CARGO_BUILD_TARGET }}/release/
if-no-files-found: error
retention-days: 1
compression-level: 0
@@ -192,10 +182,7 @@ jobs:
nightly-fuzz-corpus:
name: "Nightly / ${{ matrix.target }}"
needs: fuzz-build
# TODO(ci-8): when the schedule-failure-issue composite action lands,
# add a step here (or a dependent job) that opens/updates a GitHub issue
# on nightly failure. ci-8 is the single alerting mechanism for all
# scheduled workflows; do not self-roll alerting in this workflow.
# Scheduled failures are handled by alert-on-failure below.
if: >
github.event_name == 'schedule' ||
(github.event_name == 'workflow_dispatch' &&
+4 -4
View File
@@ -189,6 +189,7 @@ jobs:
timeout-minutes: 30
strategy:
fail-fast: false
max-parallel: 1
matrix:
include:
- arch: x86_64
@@ -510,15 +511,13 @@ jobs:
CHECKSUM_DIR="$(mktemp -d)"
gh release download "$TAG" -p 'SHA256SUMS' -p 'SHA512SUMS' \
-D "$CHECKSUM_DIR" --clobber 2>/dev/null || true
-D "$CHECKSUM_DIR" --clobber
for spec in "SHA256SUMS:sha256sum" "SHA512SUMS:sha512sum"; do
asset="${spec%%:*}"
checksum_cmd="${spec##*:}"
checksum_file="${CHECKSUM_DIR}/${asset}"
touch "$checksum_file"
for f in "$DEB_FILE" "$RPM_FILE"; do
if [[ -n "$f" && -f "$f" ]]; then
base="$(basename "$f")"
@@ -531,7 +530,8 @@ jobs:
grep -Fv -- "$base" "$checksum_file" > "${checksum_file}.tmp" || true
grep -Fv -- "$github_base" "${checksum_file}.tmp" > "${checksum_file}.tmp2" || true
mv "${checksum_file}.tmp2" "$checksum_file"
(cd "$(dirname "$f")" && "$checksum_cmd" -- "$github_base") >> "$checksum_file"
digest=$("$checksum_cmd" -- "$f" | awk '{print $1}')
printf '%s %s\n' "$digest" "$github_base" >> "$checksum_file"
fi
done
+192 -336
View File
@@ -1,399 +1,255 @@
# RustFS Agent Instructions (Global)
# RustFS Agent Instructions
This root file keeps repository-wide rules only.
Use the nearest subdirectory `AGENTS.md` for path-specific guidance.
This file contains repository-wide rules. Use the nearest subdirectory
`AGENTS.md` for path-specific invariants.
## Rule Precedence
## Precedence
1. System/developer instructions.
2. Current user/task instructions.
3. The nearest `AGENTS.md` in the current path.
4. This file (global defaults).
2. The current user request.
3. The nearest `AGENTS.md`.
4. This file.
If repo-level instructions conflict, follow the nearest file and keep behavior aligned with CI.
## Operating Model
## Execution Discipline
- Read the relevant existing code, tests, and local guidance before changing behavior. For new helpers or test setup, that read includes `crates/utils`, `crates/common`, and the touched crate's own `test_util`/fixtures (see Reuse Before You Write).
- State assumptions when they affect the implementation or verification path.
- If a task has multiple plausible interpretations, list the options briefly and choose the narrowest reasonable path; ask when the ambiguity would make the change risky.
- For multi-step work, keep the plan minimal and tied to verifiable outcomes.
- Avoid redundant file reads, repeated commands, and unnecessary exploratory work once enough context is available.
- A good result is a minimal diff with clear assumptions, no over-engineering, and independent verification that survives Adversarial Validation (below).
- Inquiry, diagnosis, review, and planning tasks are read-only unless the user
explicitly requests changes.
- For implementation, read the relevant code, tests, and local guidance, then
make the smallest change that satisfies the request.
- State assumptions only when they affect behavior or verification. Ask only
when a wrong assumption would materially change the result.
- Do not load every skill or inspect unrelated modules preemptively. Select a
skill only when its description directly matches the request or changed
surface.
- Avoid repeated reads and equivalent verification commands once enough
evidence exists.
## Worktree and Disk Hygiene
- Unless the requester explicitly says otherwise, treat every new implementation task as isolated work: fetch the latest `origin/main`, confirm the requested change is not already present there, and create a dedicated feature branch and worktree from that exact upstream commit before editing. Do not implement new work directly in the primary checkout or reuse a worktree from another task.
- Check available disk space before creating the worktree or starting dependency downloads, builds, tests, coverage, or other artifact-heavy commands. For long-running or artifact-heavy work, re-check disk usage at natural phase boundaries and before broad validation; if remaining space may not safely accommodate the next command, stop and reclaim task-owned artifacts before continuing.
- Keep cleanup scoped and safe: remove generated build/test/coverage artifacts and temporary files created by the task when they are no longer needed, and never delete another task's worktree or uncommitted files. Prefer shared dependency caches where supported instead of duplicating large artifacts across worktrees.
- At handoff, report the disk-space checks, cleanup performed, and any retained worktree or artifacts with the reason they are still needed.
- Start implementation from the latest `origin/main` and confirm the requested
change is not already present.
- An existing clean, isolated task worktree is sufficient. Create another
worktree only when the current checkout is shared, dirty with unrelated work,
or belongs to another task.
- Never commit from a shared checkout. Use an `overtrue/` feature branch unless
the user requests another name.
- Check free space before artifact-heavy builds, tests, coverage, or downloads.
Re-check before a broad gate when space is tight.
- Remove only task-owned temporary/build artifacts. Never delete another task's
worktree or uncommitted data.
- At handoff, mention disk or cleanup details only when they affected execution
or artifacts/worktrees remain intentionally.
## PR Lifecycle Monitoring
## Change Style
- Creating or updating a PR is not the terminal state. Unless the requester explicitly limits the task to PR creation, monitor the PR through its terminal state: merged, closed, or explicitly handed off because progress requires user or maintainer action.
- While the task is active, monitor CI/check runs, review decisions and unresolved threads, mergeability and conflicts, and unexpected head/base changes. Prefer event-driven or bounded waits provided by the current environment over frequent polling; report only state changes, actionable failures, or meaningful prolonged delays.
- Investigate every failing check and review comment before changing code. Fix failures attributable to the task, run the verification required for the new diff, push the update, respond to or resolve the corresponding review threads, and resume monitoring. Do not weaken checks, dismiss valid feedback, or retry flaky failures merely to obtain a green result.
- Treat opening, green CI, approval, and mergeability as intermediate states. Never merge without the required reviewer approval or explicit authority. If progress depends on credentials, infrastructure, a maintainer decision, or another external action, report the exact blocker and the evidence already collected.
- If the current execution environment cannot remain active until the next PR event, use a supported automation, monitor, or thread wakeup when available and within scope. Otherwise leave an explicit handoff containing the PR, current state, next event to observe, and pending cleanup; do not imply that background monitoring exists when none is scheduled.
- After observing a merge, verify the commits are preserved on the upstream base, ensure the worktree is clean, remove the dedicated worktree, prune stale worktree metadata, and delete the local task branch when it is no longer in use. For a closed or abandoned PR, preserve any unmerged work unless deletion was explicitly authorized. Do not delete remote branches unless explicitly requested or repository automation owns that cleanup.
- Preserve existing control flow unless changing it is required for correctness.
- Prefer a direct local edit over new files, wrappers, managers, or speculative
abstractions.
- Add a helper only when it removes current duplication, names a real domain
boundary, or isolates a non-trivial invariant.
- Remove an in-scope path superseded by the change. If compatibility requires it,
adapt at the boundary to one canonical core and use the repository's
`RUSTFS_COMPAT_TODO` policy.
- Comments explain non-obvious invariants or reasons. Do not narrate code or
record change history.
- Mention unrelated problems when useful; do not fix them in a narrow task.
## Autonomy and Approval Boundaries
## Reuse and Boundary Rules
- Inquiry tasks (answer, explain, review, diagnose, plan): report findings; do not change files unless a fix is explicitly requested.
- Action tasks (change, build, fix): make in-scope local changes without asking for approval.
- Ask for confirmation before destructive or hard-to-reverse operations (force-pushes, history rewrites, deleting data or branches), merging a PR (reviewer approval required), or any material expansion of the requested scope.
## Communication and Language
- Respond in the same language used by the requester.
- Keep source code, comments, commit messages, and PR title/body in English.
- Be concise. Avoid sycophantic openers, closing fluff, and verbose status reporting.
## Change Style for Existing Logic
- Start with the smallest direct, local edit. Add production files, types, traits, helpers, wrappers, or abstraction layers only when current behavior requires them. Extraction must remove present duplication, enforce a real boundary, or materially clarify a non-trivial flow; anticipated reuse is not enough.
- Use Rust's default module file layout (`mod foo;` with `foo.rs` or `foo/mod.rs`/`foo/*.rs`).
Avoid `#[path = "..."]` for module inclusion; move files into the canonical module tree instead.
If an unavoidable generated-code, FFI, or test-fixture exception remains, keep it local and document why the canonical layout cannot work.
- Solve only the requested problem; do not add speculative features, configurability, or adjacent improvements.
- Prefer editing existing code over rewriting files or reshaping unrelated logic.
- Modify only what is required. Remove any in-scope path or representation superseded by the change. If compatibility or rollback requires retention, adapt at the boundary to one canonical core and follow the repository's `RUSTFS_COMPAT_TODO` removal policy; never delete unrelated code merely to improve addition/deletion statistics.
- Preserve the existing control-flow and logic shape when fixing bugs or addressing review comments, especially in init, distributed coordination, locking, metadata, and concurrency paths.
- Do not refactor existing code only to make it easier to unit test.
- Keep fixes narrowly aligned with the requested behavior; avoid semantic-adjacent rewrites while touching sensitive paths.
- Keep code elegant, concise, and direct. Prefer the smallest readable design and existing abstractions over parallel managers, factories, adapters, or wrappers added only to make the design look extensible.
- Comments state non-obvious reasons, assumptions, and invariants in the shortest complete form. Their length follows the invariant's complexity: `SAFETY`, lock ordering, durability, and compatibility contracts may need a short list of conditions. Never narrate the next line, restate a signature, or record change history; move durable design rationale to architecture or operations documentation.
- Mention unrelated issues when useful, but do not fix them as part of a narrow task.
## Reuse Before You Write
Search for an existing implementation before writing a new one; extend what exists instead of duplicating it:
- **Helpers and utilities** (path/string handling, hashing, retry, env parsing, IO wrappers): check `crates/utils`, `crates/common`, the touched crate, the likely domain-owning crate, and relevant direct workspace dependencies from `Cargo.toml`. Search snake_case signatures with a focused term. Reimplementing an existing workspace helper — or hand-rolling what `std`, `tokio`, or an existing dependency already provides — is a review finding, not a style preference.
- **Reuse requires matching semantics, not a matching name**: before adopting a helper, check its normalization (`clean` resolves `.`/`..` — never apply it to raw S3 object keys), error type, backoff/deadline behavior, and durability gating against the call site. When semantics differ, a new narrowly-named helper with a comment naming the rejected lookalike is the correct outcome. The inverse also holds: workspace wrappers exist because raw `std`/`tokio` semantics were insufficient (durability gates, retries) — prefer the wrapper over the raw call.
- **Constants and fixed tokens** (protocol labels, error identifiers, header keys, event names, metric names, command tags): search for existing constants/enums that already represent the same semantic value and reuse them. If a value is truly new, define one local constant near related logic; never scatter the literal across sites. When changing existing behavior, align naming and format with the established constants.
- **Test scaffolding**: reuse existing test utilities and fixtures (the touched crate's own `test_util` module and `tests/fixtures`, or `crates/test-utils`) instead of writing new setup code — run `rg -l '<fn-under-test>' <crate>/src <crate>/tests` before writing a test. A new test must pin a failure mode no existing test covers. Near-duplicate means same code path AND same poison-value class: this repo's boundary companions (n==max vs max+1, absent vs empty vs nil UUID bytes, MetaObject vs MetaDeleteMarker) are distinct by definition and must all be written.
## Necessary Code Only
Net-new code — files, types, branches, comments — is cost to justify, not progress:
- Inspect production-code additions separately. Tests, fixtures, generated code, and documentation do not count as production-code growth. Line counts are signals, not quotas: new production structures must map to a current requirement, and a blocker requires a concrete smaller design that preserves correctness, compatibility, readability, and real boundaries.
- Validate at the trust boundary — untrusted client input, bytes read from disk, RPC payloads, config (see Serde Safety and Cross-Cutting Domain Invariants) — then trust the type: do not re-check what the type system or a validated upstream layer already guarantees, and cite the establishing check (`file:line`) when the guarantee is not obvious.
- The exception is load-bearing: a value that crossed a persistence, RPC, or version boundary is never guaranteed by the code on the other side — a peer may be older or buggy, disk bytes may be corrupt — so the Cross-Cutting Domain Invariant patterns apply at every consumer, and re-checks immediately before a destructive action (delete, overwrite, quorum decision) stay. Deleting an existing guard is a behavior change requiring adversarial review, not cleanup.
- Every new branch needs a nameable trigger: a concrete input, state, or failure that reaches it — for boundary-crossing values, corrupt or stale persisted/peer data is always nameable. If you cannot name one, do not write the branch. If the case is truly unreachable, encode the invariant in the type; where that is impossible, return a typed internal error (fail closed). `debug_assert!` is acceptable only for pure internal arithmetic on values that never crossed a disk/RPC/config boundary — never as the sole guard on decoded or peer-supplied data.
- Never substitute a default where the value is required (e.g. `unwrap_or_default()` on metadata that must exist) — that converts corruption into a wrong answer. Return the typed error instead: explicit failure over implicit success.
- Attach error context once, at the layer where it is actionable: re-wrapping equivalent context at every hop is noise, and expanding a fallible chain into nested `match` blocks where `?` or a combinator suffices is a finding. Never add context by converting a typed error into a generic variant below an error-aggregation or quorum layer (`reduce_errs` classifies by variant equality) — context there belongs in a `tracing` event, not the error value.
- Before adding helpers, constants, fixtures, or wrappers, search the touched
crate, the domain-owning crate, `crates/utils`, `crates/common`, and relevant
direct dependencies.
- Reuse requires matching semantics: normalization, error types, deadlines,
durability, and compatibility must fit the call site. A narrowly named local
helper is better than forced reuse with different semantics.
- Validate untrusted input at its trust boundary, then trust the validated type.
Values crossing disk, RPC, persistence, or version boundaries remain
untrusted at every consumer.
- Re-check boundary values immediately before destructive actions such as
delete, overwrite, or quorum decisions.
- Every new branch needs a concrete triggering input/state. For decoded or peer
data, corruption and mixed-version input are valid triggers.
- Required values must return a typed error when absent or corrupt; do not use a
default that converts corruption into a plausible result.
- Attach error context once where it is actionable. Do not erase typed errors
below aggregation or quorum layers.
## Sources of Truth
- Workspace layout and crate membership: `Cargo.toml` (`[workspace].members`)
- Local quality commands: `Makefile` and `.config/make/`
- CI quality gates: `.github/workflows/ci.yml`
- PR template: `.github/pull_request_template.md`
- High-level architecture and crate map: `ARCHITECTURE.md`
- Migration guardrails, readiness contracts, support matrices:
`docs/architecture/README.md` (routes by audience)
- Shared agent skills (all tools): `.agents/skills/` — each `SKILL.md` carries
a frontmatter `description` stating when it applies. Scan the descriptions
before starting a task and follow any skill that matches, even if your tool
does not auto-load skills:
`grep -m1 '^description:' .agents/skills/*/SKILL.md`
Claude Code reads them through the `.claude/skills` symlink; add new skills
to `.agents/skills/` only, never as separate copies per tool
- Workspace membership: `Cargo.toml`.
- Local gates: `Makefile` and `.config/make/`.
- CI gates: `.github/workflows/ci.yml`.
- PR format: `.github/pull_request_template.md`.
- Architecture routing: `ARCHITECTURE.md` and `docs/architecture/README.md`.
- Agent skills: `.agents/skills/*/SKILL.md`.
Avoid duplicating long crate lists or command matrices in instruction files.
Reference the source files above instead.
Do not commit one-shot plans, trackers, migration ledgers, benchmark snapshots,
or agent scratch notes. Durable architecture belongs under `docs/architecture/`,
operations under `docs/operations/`, and testing references under
`docs/testing/`. `scripts/check_no_planning_docs.sh` enforces this boundary.
Do not commit planning-type documents — one-shot implementation/optimization
plans, task trackers, migration-progress ledgers, phase/PR templates,
issue-scoped benchmark-result snapshots or optimization conclusions, or
agent-generated working notes (e.g. anything a `superpowers`/scratch workflow
produces). Keep that work in the issue tracker or your local worktree, not in
the repository. Only durable reference — the architecture set under
`docs/architecture/`, repeatable operational runbooks under `docs/operations/`,
and the test-suite references under `docs/testing/` — belongs in version
control; `.gitignore` ignores everything else under `docs/` by default, so a new
plan file will not be tracked unless someone force-adds it — don't.
`scripts/check_no_planning_docs.sh` (wired into `make pre-commit`/`pre-pr` and
CI) fails the build if anything is committed under `docs/superpowers/`, even via
`git add -f`.
## Verification
## Verification Before PR
Select checks from the final task-owned diff. Scoped `AGENTS.md` files may add a
concrete path-specific check, but must not replace this tiering with a generic
full-workspace gate.
Convert changes into independently verifiable outcomes. This section controls
agent-run local validation; preparing a commit or PR does not by itself require
the broadest gate. Inspect only the final task-owned diff, classify it by
behavioral impact rather than line count or path alone, and run the smallest
set of checks that provides meaningful coverage. Do not let unrelated
worktree changes or a generic contributor checklist expand the scope.
Non-exempt changes must also pass Adversarial Validation (next section) before
the checks below count as completion.
### Documentation and Instructions
### Validation floor
For prose, comments, agent instructions, and skill metadata that cannot affect
runtime/build output:
- Every change that is not documentation-only must finish with
`cargo fmt --all --check` passing. An umbrella gate that runs this exact
check satisfies the requirement; do not run it twice. Use `cargo fmt --all`
only when formatting needs to be fixed. Run the configured formatter or
validator for other changed languages when one exists.
- Documentation-only or instruction-only means all task-owned changes are
prose or documentation assets and cannot affect runtime, builds, CI,
dependencies, generated code, or tests. Run `git diff --check` and any
relevant documentation guard, but skip Cargo formatting, compilation,
Clippy, tests, `make pre-commit`, and `make pre-pr`.
- Behavior changes require relevant existing or new tests. Prefer the most
focused test or affected package. A passing targeted test can also provide
sufficient compilation coverage when it builds every changed target and
feature involved; do not add a redundant `cargo check` in that case.
- `cargo check` supplements compilation coverage; it never substitutes for a
behavioral test. If a relevant test cannot reasonably be added or run, use
the narrowest compilation check and report the reason and remaining risk.
- Run `git diff --check`.
- Run the relevant documentation guard or skill validator when applicable.
- Skip Cargo formatting, compilation, Clippy, tests, `make pre-commit`, and
`make pre-pr`.
### Validation tiers
### Non-Behavioral Source Changes
1. **Documentation/instruction-only:** Apply the exemption above. Run a guard
such as `make doc-paths-check` only when it is relevant to the edited text.
2. **Non-behavioral source change:** For comments, formatting, or another
demonstrably non-executable change, run the formatting floor. Compilation,
Clippy, and tests may be skipped only when the edit cannot affect
compilation or runtime behavior; run targeted doctests if executable
documentation examples changed.
3. **Localized or bounded behavior change:** Run the formatting floor and the
narrowest relevant tests. Add package-scoped `cargo check` or Clippy only
for changed targets, features, APIs, error handling, async behavior, or
control flow not already covered. When several crates are affected but the
dependency set is identifiable, validate those packages and known
dependents instead of the whole workspace. Use `make pre-commit` only when
a repository-wide fast gate adds useful confidence beyond those checks.
4. **Broad or high-risk change:** Run `make pre-pr` only when targeted coverage
cannot bound the impact, including:
- dependency, feature, build-script, procedural-macro, code-generation,
toolchain, or CI changes that alter compilation or the test matrix;
- cross-crate public APIs, shared foundational code, or broad refactors with
an unbounded dependent set;
- locking, storage durability or formats, erasure coding, replication,
RPC/protocol compatibility, IAM/KMS/auth, cryptography, or other
security-sensitive behavior;
- a targeted check that reveals wider impact, an explicit user request, or
a release policy that requires the full gate.
- Run the formatter/validator for the changed language.
- Add compilation or doctests only when syntax or executable examples changed.
Documentation-only and non-behavioral classifications take precedence over
path-based triggers. A small diff can still be high-risk, while a CI comment,
manifest comment, or release-note edit does not require full validation.
### Localized Behavior Changes
`make pre-pr` includes `make pre-commit` coverage. Never run both for the same
unchanged diff, and do not repeat equivalent checks during PR preparation or
because a local hook already ran them. Rerun only checks whose scope is affected
by later edits. Full workspace checks do not replace a relevant integration or
E2E test for changed behavior; run that focused test when required and
available, or report why it was not run and the remaining risk.
- Run `cargo fmt --all --check` for Rust changes.
- Run the narrowest test that exercises the changed behavior.
- Add package-scoped `cargo check` or Clippy only for targets, features, public
APIs, error handling, or control flow not compiled by the focused test.
- Use `make pre-commit` only when its repository-wide fast checks add confidence
beyond the focused checks.
If `make` is unavailable, run the equivalent checks defined under
`.config/make/`. At handoff, list the checks actually run, checks intentionally
skipped, and the reason for the selected tier.
### Broad or High-Risk Changes
After build-based verification completes, clean generated build artifacts before wrapping up to avoid unnecessary disk usage.
Do not open a PR with code changes when the required checks fail.
Make a failing check pass by fixing the cause, never by weakening the gate:
do not loosen or skip a guard script, add entries to a baseline or allowance
list, suppress a lint with `#[allow]`, mark a failing test `#[ignore]`, or
delete or relax a failing assertion to get green. If a check itself is wrong,
change it deliberately and state the rationale in the PR.
After the required adversarial review, run `make pre-pr` when targeted coverage
cannot bound the impact, including dependency/toolchain/build-matrix changes,
unbounded cross-crate APIs, or locking, durability, erasure coding, replication,
RPC, IAM/KMS/auth, cryptography, on-disk/on-wire, and S3-visible behavior.
For flaky tests, do not paper over them with retries. Follow the flake policy
in [docs/testing/README.md](docs/testing/README.md) (open an issue within 24h,
quarantine with an issue link, fix or delete within 30 days); the local
`default` nextest profile never retries.
`make pre-pr` includes `make pre-commit`; never run both for the same unchanged
diff. Do not repeat a check already covered by a successful umbrella gate.
Rerun only checks affected by later edits.
## Adversarial Validation (Default On)
Never weaken a gate to get green: do not add baselines/allowances, suppress
lints, ignore tests, or relax assertions unless changing that policy is itself
the reviewed task. Follow `docs/testing/README.md` for flaky tests.
Every non-exempt output (see Risk tiers) — code change, bug fix, or
design/solution proposal — passes multi-role adversarial review before it
counts as done.
Author confidence is not evidence: each role's job is to refute the change,
not to bless it.
## Adversarial Validation
### Risk tiers
Adversarial validation applies to final implementation diffs, explicitly
requested adversarial/design reviews, and agent-instruction changes that alter
execution. Ordinary questions, diagnoses, status reports, non-adversarial code
reviews, and low-risk planning do not trigger it.
Pick the tier from the riskiest file touched; when in doubt, pick the higher.
Risk and review shape:
- **Exempt:** docs/comments, formatting, and typos that cannot affect runtime,
builds, tests, or agent execution. Skip this section.
- **Mechanical:** pure renames, file moves, test-only or tooling changes, and
agent-instruction changes that alter execution —
correctness and simplicity adversaries only.
- **Standard (the default):** any change that affects behavior.
- **High risk:** touches locking, erasure coding, quorum/heal, replication,
multipart, RPC, lifecycle/tiering, metadata formats (`xl.meta`),
persistence/fsync, IAM/KMS/auth, on-disk or on-wire formats, or
S3 API-visible behavior.
- **Exempt:** documentation, comments, formatting, or typos with no runtime,
build, test, or agent-execution effect.
- **Mechanical:** renames, moves, test/tooling-only changes, and agent-rule
changes. Run correctness and simplicity lenses.
- **Standard:** localized behavior changes. Run one integrated final-diff pass
covering correctness, simplicity, and test coverage; add only domain lenses
matched by the diff.
- **High risk / substantial PR review:** high risk includes locking,
erasure/quorum/heal, replication, multipart, RPC, lifecycle/tiering,
persistence/fsync, IAM/KMS/auth, cryptography, on-disk/on-wire formats, and
S3-visible semantics. Cover all applicable lenses using exactly two
independent reviewers when delegation is explicitly authorized. Split the
lenses between them. Otherwise perform two fresh sequential passes.
### Roles
Available domain lenses are security, concurrency/durability, compatibility,
and performance. Select `.agents/skills/adversarial-validation/SKILL.md` for an
explicit adversarial request, a high-risk change, or a substantial PR review;
then read only its matching role references. A routine standard pass does not
load the playbook unless the reviewer needs a RustFS-specific probe.
Run each applicable role as an independent pass over the final diff (or
proposal text) — parallel reviewer agents where the tooling supports them,
otherwise sequential passes that each start fresh from the diff and the
nearest scoped `AGENTS.md`, discarding the writing session's assumptions.
Each role either produces findings or reports "attacked X, Y, Z — no break
found"; a bare pass is not a result. Repo-specific attack probes for every
role live in `.agents/skills/adversarial-validation/` — run them, they
encode this repo's shipped bugs.
A finding must name a concrete input/state/interleaving and wrong outcome, or a
specific missing regression check, with `file:line`. Resolve it by fixing the
diff or rebutting it with code-path/test/invariant evidence. After a non-trivial
fix, rerun only affected lenses.
- **Correctness adversary** — construct a concrete input/state/interleaving
that yields wrong output, data loss, or a crash. Probe error paths and edge
values (empty, nil UUID, zero-length, quorum1, missing version).
- **Simplicity adversary** — same behavior, less code. Hunt reimplemented helpers, rewrites where an in-place edit suffices, speculative abstractions, defensive branches with no nameable trigger, redundant error wrapping, near-duplicate tests, and narration comments. A one-caller helper is a finding only when it merely forwards or splits a short linear flow without adding domain naming, boundary isolation, an invariant, or useful error context. Report a concrete smaller replacement; fewer lines alone are not evidence.
- **Security reviewer** — authn/authz bypass, injection, secret leakage,
untrusted deserialization (see Serde Safety), path traversal, timing leaks.
- **Concurrency/durability reviewer** — lock ordering, races, cancellation,
partial failure, retry/idempotency, crash and power-loss ordering.
- **Compatibility reviewer** — S3 API surface, MinIO interop, on-disk and
on-wire formats, mixed-version upgrade/downgrade paths.
- **Performance reviewer** — allocation and cloning on hot paths, lock hold
time across IO, sync or CPU-heavy work on async runtime threads, added
fsync/flush outside the durability gate, hot-path logging noise. A
measurable regression on a per-request or per-object path is a finding.
- **Test-coverage skeptic** — for each testable behavior claim, name the test
or executable check that detects a revert; then name a changed line that
could be wrong while all checks stay green. If a focused check is not
reasonable, require the reason and residual risk from the validation floor.
Test additions have no line-count or growth budget.
For high-risk PRs, record one concise verdict per covered lens in the PR body.
Standard tier: correctness adversary + simplicity adversary + test-coverage
skeptic, plus every role whose domain the diff touches (async or
shared-state code → concurrency; parsing of untrusted input → security;
public crate API shape → compatibility; per-request or per-object hot paths
→ performance).
High risk: all seven roles.
## Pull Request Lifecycle
### Protocol
1. A finding states a concrete failure scenario (input/state → wrong
outcome) or names a missing test, with severity and file:line. "Looks
risky" is not a finding.
2. Resolve every finding: fix it, or rebut it with evidence — a test, a
traced code path, or a cited invariant. Restated intent and "unlikely"
are not rebuttals.
3. After non-trivial fixes, re-run the roles whose domain the fix touched.
4. For proposals with no diff, roles attack assumptions, failure modes,
migration/rollback, and testability instead — including the simplest
rejected alternative and the blast radius when the design fails.
### Exit criteria
- Every applicable role has run; every finding is fixed or rebutted with
evidence.
- Every testable behavior change has a focused regression check. Exceptions
follow the validation floor and state why a check is impractical and what
risk remains.
- The Verification Before PR gates pass — adversarial review supplements
those gates, never replaces them.
- High risk only: record a one-line verdict per role in the PR description.
- Creating or updating a PR includes one immediate snapshot of checks,
mergeability, reviews, and unresolved threads.
- Unless the user explicitly requests monitoring, a release workflow requires
it, or an automation already owns it, hand off after the PR is open with the
current state and next event to watch. Do not delay ordinary handoff with
fixed quiet-period sleeps.
- For requested monitoring, use event-driven or bounded waits. Report only state
changes, actionable failures, or a meaningful prolonged delay.
- Investigate failures/comments before changing code. Fix task-attributable
issues, rerun affected verification, push, reply or resolve the thread, then
resume the requested monitor.
- Never merge without required reviewer approval or explicit authority.
- After an observed merge, verify the commit reached the base, then clean the
task worktree/branch when safe. Preserve unmerged work for closed PRs unless
deletion was explicitly authorized.
## Git and PR Baseline
- Use feature branches based on the latest `main`.
- Assume other agent sessions work this repository concurrently. Never commit
in a shared checkout; do all work on a dedicated feature branch, preferably
in a dedicated worktree.
- Immediately before branching, fetch `origin/main` and branch from it;
confirm the target issue is not already fixed there before writing code.
- Follow Conventional Commits, with subject length <= 72 characters.
- Keep PR title and description in English.
- Use `.github/pull_request_template.md` and keep all section headings.
- Use `N/A` for non-applicable template sections.
- Include verification commands in the PR description.
- When using `gh pr create`/`gh pr edit`, write the markdown body to a file
and pass `--body-file`; multiline inline `--body` is unsafe — backticks and
shell expansion can corrupt content or trigger unintended commands.
Pattern: `cat > /tmp/pr_body.md <<'EOF' ... EOF`, then
`--body-file /tmp/pr_body.md` (keep the file outside the checkout).
- Do not include the literal sequence `\n` in any GitHub issue, pull request, or discussion comment.
- Do not hard-wrap prose in PR/issue/discussion bodies; write each paragraph as a
single line and let it reflow. GitHub renders single newlines inside a paragraph
as line breaks, so mid-sentence wrapping shows up as ugly breaks. Only break lines
for list items, code blocks, and deliberate separators.
- After fixing code review comments or CI findings, always mark corresponding review
comments/threads as resolved before returning to the user.
- In handling review comments, confirm the underlying issue before changing code.
If a suggested change is not appropriate for behavior or risk, reply with a
concise rationale instead of blindly applying it.
- Follow Conventional Commits; keep the subject at most 72 characters.
- Source comments, commits, PR titles, and PR bodies are in English.
- Keep every heading from `.github/pull_request_template.md`; use `N/A` where
needed and include commands actually run.
- Use `--body-file` for multiline `gh pr create`/`gh pr edit` content.
- PR/issue/discussion content must not contain the literal sequence `\n` or
hard-wrapped prose paragraphs.
- Do not include local absolute paths or tool-specific labels/prefixes in GitHub
content.
- Resolve review threads after the underlying issue is fixed. If declining a
suggestion, reply with a short evidence-based reason.
## Security Baseline
- Never commit secrets, credentials, or key material.
- Use environment variables or vault tooling for sensitive configuration.
- For localhost-sensitive tests, verify proxy settings to avoid traffic leakage.
- For localhost-sensitive tests, bypass proxies explicitly.
- Untrusted S3 XML/JSON, lifecycle, policy, replication, and RPC structures use
strict deserialization where compatibility permits. Security-critical
defaults require explicit validation.
## Logging
Applies to **every** `tracing` macro you add or edit, including a single line
added in passing while fixing something else — not only to log-focused changes.
For every added or edited `tracing` call:
- Fields first, message second: `event`, `component`, `subsystem`,
`result`/`state`, then key context. The message is a short label, not a
sentence with values interpolated into it.
- Reuse the existing `EVENT_*` / `LOG_COMPONENT_*` / `LOG_SUBSYSTEM_*`
constants of the module you are editing; match the shape of the log sites
already in that file rather than introducing a second style next to them.
- Level policy: `error` for behavior/security-affecting failures, `warn` for
degraded or fallback paths, `info` for low-frequency lifecycle, `debug` for
targeted diagnostics, `trace` for hot paths. Per-object and per-request
success paths are `trace`.
- Never log secrets, tokens, credential payloads, or merged config dumps.
- `scripts/check_logging_guardrails.sh` enforces a subset of this on the files
it lists; passing it is a floor, not evidence the log matches the house style.
- Reuse the module's `EVENT_*`, `LOG_COMPONENT_*`, and `LOG_SUBSYSTEM_*`
constants and field shape.
- Put fields first and a short label last.
- Use `error` for behavior/security failure, `warn` for degradation/fallback,
`info` for low-frequency lifecycle, `debug` for diagnostics, and `trace` for
repetitive request/object success paths.
- Never log secrets, credential payloads, or merged configs.
See `.agents/skills/rustfs-logging-governance/SKILL.md` for the full event
model, level policy, and guardrail-update checklist.
Use `.agents/skills/rustfs-logging-governance/SKILL.md` for logging changes.
## Tools
## Cross-Cutting Storage Invariants
### xl.meta decode tool Quick Use
- Write internal object metadata under both `x-rustfs-internal-<suffix>` and
`x-minio-internal-<suffix>` using
`crates/utils/src/http/metadata_compat.rs` helpers.
- Read binary UUID metadata with
`.and_then(|v| Uuid::from_slice(&v).ok()).filter(|u| !u.is_nil())`; absent,
empty, and nil all mean no value.
- Remote-tier version `None` or `""` means an unversioned bucket; send no
`versionId` on tier GET/DELETE.
- `DataUsageCacheInfo` and `DataUsageEntry` keep their hand-written map
serialization and new fields remain `#[serde(default)]` for older readers.
```
cargo run -p rustfs-filemeta --example dump_fileinfo -- "/path/to/file/xl.meta"
```
## Naming
## Serde Safety
Use Rust API naming: `SCREAMING_SNAKE_CASE` constants/statics, `snake_case`
functions/variables, and `PascalCase` types. Do not rename unrelated existing
violations.
- Add `#[serde(deny_unknown_fields)]` to structs deserialized from untrusted input (S3 API XML/JSON, lifecycle rules, bucket policies, replication configs).
- When `deny_unknown_fields` is impractical (backward compatibility), at minimum log unknown fields at `warn` level.
- Never use `#[serde(default)]` on security-critical fields without explicit validation of the resulting value.
## Scoped Guidance
## Cross-Cutting Domain Invariants
- Write internal object metadata under **both** `x-rustfs-internal-<suffix>`
and `x-minio-internal-<suffix>` keys (MinIO interop). Use the helpers in
`crates/utils/src/http/metadata_compat.rs` (`get_bytes` prefers the RustFS
key); never write only one of the two.
- Read binary UUID metadata defensively:
`.and_then(|v| Uuid::from_slice(&v).ok()).filter(|u| !u.is_nil())`
absent, empty, and nil all mean "no value", never `Uuid::nil()`.
- A remote-tier version of `None`/`""` means the tier bucket is unversioned:
send **no** `versionId` on tier GET/DELETE.
- Structs persisted in the scanner data-usage cache (`DataUsageCacheInfo`,
`DataUsageEntry`) carry a hand-written map-encoded `Serialize`. MessagePack
encodes derived structs as arrays, where an appended field makes the whole
cache a decode error for older readers — keep new fields `#[serde(default)]`
and keep the map encoding rather than reverting to `derive(Serialize)`.
## Naming Conventions
- Follow Rust API Guidelines for naming: `SCREAMING_SNAKE_CASE` for statics and constants, `snake_case` for functions and variables, `PascalCase` for types.
- Do not use camelCase or Hungarian notation (e.g., `globalDeploymentIDPtr``GLOBAL_DEPLOYMENT_ID`).
- If existing code violates naming conventions, do not widen the violation in new code. Do not rename existing symbols as part of an unrelated task; mention the violation instead (see Change Style for Existing Logic).
## Scoped Guidance in This Repository
Many crates and modules carry their own `AGENTS.md` with path-specific rules
(security boundaries, lock ordering, domain invariants). Before editing a
path, check for the nearest one:
Before editing, locate the nearest instructions with:
```bash
git ls-files '*AGENTS.md'
```
The nearest file wins. Do not maintain a hand-written index of these files
here — it goes stale.
The nearest file wins for domain invariants. Keep generic workflow and
validation policy in this root file.
+6 -4
View File
@@ -91,8 +91,9 @@ A green `make pre-commit` is not enough to open a pull request.
`make pre-pr` is the **full** gate: it runs all of the guard checks above,
then `clippy-check` (`cargo clippy --all-targets --all-features -- -D warnings`)
and `test` (shell script tests, workspace tests excluding `e2e_test`, and doc
tests). Run `make pre-pr` before opening or updating a pull request — this is
what CI enforces.
tests). Complete the applicable multi-role adversarial review described in
`AGENTS.md` before running `make pre-pr`; then run the gate before opening or
updating a pull request. This is what CI enforces.
### 🔒 Git Pre-commit Hooks (optional)
@@ -150,8 +151,9 @@ Example output when formatting fails:
2. **Format your code**: `make fmt` or `cargo fmt --all`
3. **Run the fast gate**: `make pre-commit` (no clippy, no tests)
4. **Commit your changes**: `git commit -m "your message"`
5. **Run the full gate before opening/updating a PR**: `make pre-pr` (clippy + tests)
6. **Push to your branch**: `git push`
5. **Complete the applicable multi-role adversarial review** for non-exempt changes (see `AGENTS.md`)
6. **Run the full gate before opening/updating a PR**: `make pre-pr` (clippy + tests)
7. **Push to your branch**: `git push`
### 🛠️ IDE Integration
Generated
+177 -147
View File
@@ -1198,9 +1198,9 @@ dependencies = [
[[package]]
name = "aws-smithy-http-client"
version = "1.3.0"
version = "1.4.0"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
checksum = "3c1c8a04cb31ba74d0115af5a890bb8c0d48fba64b52812fa13929a6ef0cc83c"
checksum = "ebfd138fac0337cee7516c352757ea73b9f2266e57d0bcb5bc70e9547e45aef1"
dependencies = [
"aws-smithy-async",
"aws-smithy-protocol-test",
@@ -1280,9 +1280,9 @@ dependencies = [
[[package]]
name = "aws-smithy-runtime"
version = "1.13.1"
version = "1.14.0"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
checksum = "483b858ff67522011c4786310c5cd8fd88d0be7ea3d5f1a48328446300c4269e"
checksum = "b82e438d30e02a825d363bd639a9efaed68a8089d86101054b0081e7e0d3e606"
dependencies = [
"aws-smithy-async",
"aws-smithy-http",
@@ -1306,9 +1306,9 @@ dependencies = [
[[package]]
name = "aws-smithy-runtime-api"
version = "1.14.0"
version = "1.15.0"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
checksum = "3b98f2e1fd67ec06618f9c291e5e495a468e60519e44c9c1979cd0521f3affdb"
checksum = "954c563ce84507722d2679f07a35d21b9c6466b3872d513020d0281fc8112ac9"
dependencies = [
"aws-smithy-async",
"aws-smithy-runtime-api-macros",
@@ -1598,7 +1598,7 @@ version = "0.10.4"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
checksum = "3078c7629b62d3f0439517fa394996acacc5cbc91c5a20d8c658e77abd503a71"
dependencies = [
"generic-array 0.14.7",
"generic-array 0.14.9",
]
[[package]]
@@ -1617,7 +1617,7 @@ version = "0.3.3"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
checksum = "a8894febbff9f758034a5b8e12d87918f56dfc64a8e1fe757d65e29041538d93"
dependencies = [
"generic-array 0.14.7",
"generic-array 0.14.9",
]
[[package]]
@@ -1968,7 +1968,7 @@ version = "0.4.4"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
checksum = "773f3b9af64447d2ce9850330c473515014aa235e6a783b02db81ff39e4a3dad"
dependencies = [
"crypto-common 0.1.7",
"crypto-common 0.1.6",
"inout 0.1.4",
]
@@ -2428,7 +2428,7 @@ version = "0.5.5"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
checksum = "0dc92fb57ca44df6db8059111ab3af99a63d5d0f8375d9972e319a379c6bab76"
dependencies = [
"generic-array 0.14.7",
"generic-array 0.14.9",
"rand_core 0.6.4",
"subtle",
"zeroize",
@@ -2453,11 +2453,11 @@ dependencies = [
[[package]]
name = "crypto-common"
version = "0.1.7"
version = "0.1.6"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
checksum = "78c8292055d1c1df0cce5d180393dc8cce0abec0a7102adb6c7b1eef6016d60a"
checksum = "1bfb12502f3fc46cca1bb51ac28df9d618d813cdc3d2f25b9fe775a34af26bb3"
dependencies = [
"generic-array 0.14.7",
"generic-array 0.14.9",
"typenum",
]
@@ -2703,8 +2703,9 @@ checksum = "4583a4551df46e2792f82ceeac45e850d2e2d5debba0b91f102385cda5b11f06"
[[package]]
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"mime_guess",
"opentelemetry",
"opentelemetry_sdk",
"p256 0.13.2",
"parking_lot",
"percent-encoding",
"pin-project-lite",
@@ -9225,6 +9256,7 @@ dependencies = [
"url",
"urlencoding",
"uuid",
"x509-parser",
"zeroize",
"zip",
"zstd",
@@ -9232,7 +9264,7 @@ dependencies = [
[[package]]
name = "rustfs-audit"
version = "1.0.0-rc.2"
version = "1.0.0-rc.3"
dependencies = [
"async-trait",
"const-str",
@@ -9255,7 +9287,7 @@ dependencies = [
[[package]]
name = "rustfs-checksums"
version = "1.0.0-rc.2"
version = "1.0.0-rc.3"
dependencies = [
"base64-simd",
"bytes",
@@ -9271,14 +9303,13 @@ dependencies = [
[[package]]
name = "rustfs-common"
version = "1.0.0-rc.2"
version = "1.0.0-rc.3"
dependencies = [
"chrono",
"hotpath",
"jiff",
"metrics",
"rmp-serde",
"s3s",
"serde",
"serde_json",
"smallvec",
@@ -9290,7 +9321,7 @@ dependencies = [
[[package]]
name = "rustfs-concurrency"
version = "1.0.0-rc.2"
version = "1.0.0-rc.3"
dependencies = [
"hotpath",
"insta",
@@ -9303,7 +9334,7 @@ dependencies = [
[[package]]
name = "rustfs-config"
version = "1.0.0-rc.2"
version = "1.0.0-rc.3"
dependencies = [
"const-str",
"hotpath",
@@ -9313,7 +9344,7 @@ dependencies = [
[[package]]
name = "rustfs-credentials"
version = "1.0.0-rc.2"
version = "1.0.0-rc.3"
dependencies = [
"base64-simd",
"hmac 0.13.0",
@@ -9327,7 +9358,7 @@ dependencies = [
[[package]]
name = "rustfs-crypto"
version = "1.0.0-rc.2"
version = "1.0.0-rc.3"
dependencies = [
"aes-gcm",
"argon2",
@@ -9348,7 +9379,7 @@ dependencies = [
[[package]]
name = "rustfs-data-usage"
version = "1.0.0-rc.2"
version = "1.0.0-rc.3"
dependencies = [
"hotpath",
"rmp-serde",
@@ -9358,13 +9389,12 @@ dependencies = [
[[package]]
name = "rustfs-ecstore"
version = "1.0.0-rc.2"
version = "1.0.0-rc.3"
dependencies = [
"arc-swap",
"async-channel",
"async-recursion",
"async-trait",
"aws-config",
"aws-credential-types",
"aws-sdk-s3",
"aws-smithy-http-client",
@@ -9402,6 +9432,7 @@ dependencies = [
"md-5 0.11.0",
"memmap2",
"metrics",
"metrics-util",
"moka",
"num_cpus",
"opentelemetry",
@@ -9498,7 +9529,7 @@ dependencies = [
[[package]]
name = "rustfs-extension-schema"
version = "1.0.0-rc.2"
version = "1.0.0-rc.3"
dependencies = [
"hotpath",
"serde",
@@ -9508,7 +9539,7 @@ dependencies = [
[[package]]
name = "rustfs-filemeta"
version = "1.0.0-rc.2"
version = "1.0.0-rc.3"
dependencies = [
"arc-swap",
"byteorder",
@@ -9535,7 +9566,7 @@ dependencies = [
[[package]]
name = "rustfs-heal"
version = "1.0.0-rc.2"
version = "1.0.0-rc.3"
dependencies = [
"async-trait",
"base64 0.23.1",
@@ -9568,7 +9599,7 @@ dependencies = [
[[package]]
name = "rustfs-iam"
version = "1.0.0-rc.2"
version = "1.0.0-rc.3"
dependencies = [
"arc-swap",
"async-trait",
@@ -9609,7 +9640,7 @@ dependencies = [
[[package]]
name = "rustfs-io-core"
version = "1.0.0-rc.2"
version = "1.0.0-rc.3"
dependencies = [
"bytes",
"hotpath",
@@ -9621,7 +9652,7 @@ dependencies = [
[[package]]
name = "rustfs-io-metrics"
version = "1.0.0-rc.2"
version = "1.0.0-rc.3"
dependencies = [
"criterion",
"hotpath",
@@ -9685,7 +9716,7 @@ dependencies = [
[[package]]
name = "rustfs-keystone"
version = "1.0.0-rc.2"
version = "1.0.0-rc.3"
dependencies = [
"bytes",
"futures",
@@ -9712,7 +9743,7 @@ dependencies = [
[[package]]
name = "rustfs-kms"
version = "1.0.0-rc.2"
version = "1.0.0-rc.3"
dependencies = [
"aes-gcm",
"anyhow",
@@ -9761,7 +9792,7 @@ dependencies = [
[[package]]
name = "rustfs-lifecycle"
version = "1.0.0-rc.2"
version = "1.0.0-rc.3"
dependencies = [
"async-trait",
"hotpath",
@@ -9784,7 +9815,7 @@ dependencies = [
[[package]]
name = "rustfs-lock"
version = "1.0.0-rc.2"
version = "1.0.0-rc.3"
dependencies = [
"async-trait",
"compact_str",
@@ -9807,7 +9838,7 @@ dependencies = [
[[package]]
name = "rustfs-log-analyzer"
version = "1.0.0-rc.2"
version = "1.0.0-rc.3"
dependencies = [
"chrono",
"flate2",
@@ -9826,7 +9857,7 @@ dependencies = [
[[package]]
name = "rustfs-madmin"
version = "1.0.0-rc.2"
version = "1.0.0-rc.3"
dependencies = [
"hotpath",
"http 1.5.0",
@@ -9846,7 +9877,7 @@ dependencies = [
[[package]]
name = "rustfs-notify"
version = "1.0.0-rc.2"
version = "1.0.0-rc.3"
dependencies = [
"arc-swap",
"async-trait",
@@ -9881,7 +9912,7 @@ dependencies = [
[[package]]
name = "rustfs-object-capacity"
version = "1.0.0-rc.2"
version = "1.0.0-rc.3"
dependencies = [
"criterion",
"futures",
@@ -9889,7 +9920,6 @@ dependencies = [
"rustfs-config",
"rustfs-io-metrics",
"rustfs-utils",
"serial_test",
"temp-env",
"tempfile",
"tokio",
@@ -9901,7 +9931,7 @@ dependencies = [
[[package]]
name = "rustfs-object-data-cache"
version = "1.0.0-rc.2"
version = "1.0.0-rc.3"
dependencies = [
"bytes",
"criterion",
@@ -9918,7 +9948,7 @@ dependencies = [
[[package]]
name = "rustfs-obs"
version = "1.0.0-rc.2"
version = "1.0.0-rc.3"
dependencies = [
"chrono",
"crossbeam-channel",
@@ -9933,6 +9963,7 @@ dependencies = [
"libc",
"log",
"metrics",
"metrics-util",
"num_cpus",
"nvml-wrapper",
"opentelemetry",
@@ -9973,7 +10004,7 @@ dependencies = [
[[package]]
name = "rustfs-policy"
version = "1.0.0-rc.2"
version = "1.0.0-rc.3"
dependencies = [
"async-trait",
"base64-simd",
@@ -10004,7 +10035,7 @@ dependencies = [
[[package]]
name = "rustfs-protocols"
version = "1.0.0-rc.2"
version = "1.0.0-rc.3"
dependencies = [
"astral-tokio-tar",
"async-compression",
@@ -10066,7 +10097,7 @@ dependencies = [
[[package]]
name = "rustfs-protos"
version = "1.0.0-rc.2"
version = "1.0.0-rc.3"
dependencies = [
"flatbuffers",
"hotpath",
@@ -10090,7 +10121,7 @@ dependencies = [
[[package]]
name = "rustfs-replication"
version = "1.0.0-rc.2"
version = "1.0.0-rc.3"
dependencies = [
"byteorder",
"bytes",
@@ -10108,7 +10139,7 @@ dependencies = [
[[package]]
name = "rustfs-rio"
version = "1.0.0-rc.2"
version = "1.0.0-rc.3"
dependencies = [
"aes-gcm",
"arc-swap",
@@ -10146,7 +10177,7 @@ dependencies = [
[[package]]
name = "rustfs-rio-v2"
version = "1.0.0-rc.2"
version = "1.0.0-rc.3"
dependencies = [
"aes-gcm",
"bytes",
@@ -10169,7 +10200,7 @@ dependencies = [
[[package]]
name = "rustfs-s3-ops"
version = "1.0.0-rc.2"
version = "1.0.0-rc.3"
dependencies = [
"hotpath",
"rustfs-s3-types",
@@ -10177,7 +10208,7 @@ dependencies = [
[[package]]
name = "rustfs-s3-types"
version = "1.0.0-rc.2"
version = "1.0.0-rc.3"
dependencies = [
"hotpath",
"serde",
@@ -10186,7 +10217,7 @@ dependencies = [
[[package]]
name = "rustfs-s3select-api"
version = "1.0.0-rc.2"
version = "1.0.0-rc.3"
dependencies = [
"async-trait",
"bytes",
@@ -10216,7 +10247,7 @@ dependencies = [
[[package]]
name = "rustfs-s3select-query"
version = "1.0.0-rc.2"
version = "1.0.0-rc.3"
dependencies = [
"async-recursion",
"async-trait",
@@ -10235,7 +10266,7 @@ dependencies = [
[[package]]
name = "rustfs-scanner"
version = "1.0.0-rc.2"
version = "1.0.0-rc.3"
dependencies = [
"async-trait",
"bytes",
@@ -10261,7 +10292,6 @@ dependencies = [
"s3s",
"serde",
"serde_json",
"serial_test",
"sha2 0.11.0",
"temp-env",
"tempfile",
@@ -10276,7 +10306,7 @@ dependencies = [
[[package]]
name = "rustfs-security-governance"
version = "1.0.0-rc.2"
version = "1.0.0-rc.3"
dependencies = [
"hotpath",
"thiserror 2.0.20",
@@ -10284,7 +10314,7 @@ dependencies = [
[[package]]
name = "rustfs-signer"
version = "1.0.0-rc.2"
version = "1.0.0-rc.3"
dependencies = [
"base64-simd",
"bytes",
@@ -10302,7 +10332,7 @@ dependencies = [
[[package]]
name = "rustfs-storage-api"
version = "1.0.0-rc.2"
version = "1.0.0-rc.3"
dependencies = [
"async-trait",
"hotpath",
@@ -10317,7 +10347,7 @@ dependencies = [
[[package]]
name = "rustfs-targets"
version = "1.0.0-rc.2"
version = "1.0.0-rc.3"
dependencies = [
"arc-swap",
"async-nats",
@@ -10371,7 +10401,7 @@ dependencies = [
[[package]]
name = "rustfs-test-utils"
version = "1.0.0-rc.2"
version = "1.0.0-rc.3"
dependencies = [
"hotpath",
"rustfs-data-usage",
@@ -10387,7 +10417,7 @@ dependencies = [
[[package]]
name = "rustfs-tls-runtime"
version = "1.0.0-rc.2"
version = "1.0.0-rc.3"
dependencies = [
"arc-swap",
"hotpath",
@@ -10408,7 +10438,7 @@ dependencies = [
[[package]]
name = "rustfs-trusted-proxies"
version = "1.0.0-rc.2"
version = "1.0.0-rc.3"
dependencies = [
"async-trait",
"axum",
@@ -10445,7 +10475,7 @@ dependencies = [
[[package]]
name = "rustfs-utils"
version = "1.0.0-rc.2"
version = "1.0.0-rc.3"
dependencies = [
"base64-simd",
"blake2",
@@ -10487,7 +10517,7 @@ dependencies = [
[[package]]
name = "rustfs-zip"
version = "1.0.0-rc.2"
version = "1.0.0-rc.3"
dependencies = [
"async-compression",
"hotpath",
@@ -10677,8 +10707,8 @@ checksum = "9774ba4a74de5f7b1c1451ed6cd5285a32eddb5cccb8cc655a4e50009e06477f"
[[package]]
name = "s3s"
version = "0.14.1"
source = "git+https://github.com/rustfs/s3s.git?rev=d358a68783096df1db0c3e314127f2704603b29e#d358a68783096df1db0c3e314127f2704603b29e"
version = "0.15.0-alpha.1"
source = "git+https://github.com/rustfs/s3s.git?rev=ed70cb048cc4be168419d461cb9ac3c2c7fa6d5a#ed70cb048cc4be168419d461cb9ac3c2c7fa6d5a"
dependencies = [
"arc-swap",
"arrayvec",
@@ -10832,7 +10862,7 @@ checksum = "d3e97a565f76233a6003f9f5c54be1d9c5bdfa3eccfb189469f11ec4901c47dc"
dependencies = [
"base16ct 0.2.0",
"der 0.7.10",
"generic-array 0.14.7",
"generic-array 0.14.9",
"pkcs8 0.10.2",
"subtle",
"zeroize",
@@ -11617,9 +11647,9 @@ checksum = "13c2bddecc57b384dee18652358fb23172facb8a2c51ccc10d74c157bdea3292"
[[package]]
name = "suppaftp"
version = "10.0.1"
version = "10.0.2"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
checksum = "9c890e698eaf58526b6e7105d74c5d91ebe76a4da1faac2e20ff10e8e5c8bcff"
checksum = "821001051ea3d12a60fb790b8c7cb9a6f5f8698dcfdca4cd533a025fefb0b5b8"
dependencies = [
"async-trait",
"chrono",
@@ -11810,7 +11840,7 @@ source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
checksum = "32497e9a4c7b38532efcdebeef879707aa9f794296a4f0244f6f69e9bc8574bd"
dependencies = [
"fastrand",
"getrandom 0.3.4",
"getrandom 0.4.3",
"once_cell",
"rustix",
"windows-sys 0.61.2",
@@ -13360,9 +13390,9 @@ dependencies = [
[[package]]
name = "zerovec"
version = "0.11.7"
version = "0.11.8"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
checksum = "94b5c6b5976d66c1d703c4fd17d3f5e43c8cedaacf604961b171adc7130896d8"
checksum = "bb0464e17806c1d976d5cba29399c7f08e516e279e2ba493f63123b5fca67dd8"
dependencies = [
"yoke",
"zerofrom",
+55 -53
View File
@@ -69,7 +69,7 @@ edition = "2024"
license = "Apache-2.0"
repository = "https://github.com/rustfs/rustfs"
rust-version = "1.97.1"
version = "1.0.0-rc.2"
version = "1.0.0-rc.3"
homepage = "https://rustfs.com"
description = "RustFS is a high-performance distributed object storage software built using Rust, one of the most popular languages worldwide. "
keywords = ["RustFS", "Minio", "object-storage", "filesystem", "s3"]
@@ -86,52 +86,52 @@ redundant_clone = "warn"
[workspace.dependencies]
# RustFS Internal Crates
rustfs = { path = "./rustfs", version = "1.0.0-rc.2" }
rustfs-heal = { path = "crates/heal", version = "1.0.0-rc.2" }
rustfs-audit = { path = "crates/audit", version = "1.0.0-rc.2" }
rustfs-checksums = { path = "crates/checksums", version = "1.0.0-rc.2" }
rustfs-common = { path = "crates/common", version = "1.0.0-rc.2" }
rustfs-data-usage = { path = "crates/data-usage", version = "1.0.0-rc.2" }
rustfs-config = { path = "./crates/config", version = "1.0.0-rc.2" }
rustfs-concurrency = { path = "./crates/concurrency", version = "1.0.0-rc.2" }
rustfs-credentials = { path = "crates/credentials", version = "1.0.0-rc.2" }
rustfs-crypto = { path = "crates/crypto", version = "1.0.0-rc.2" }
rustfs-ecstore = { path = "crates/ecstore", version = "1.0.0-rc.2" }
rustfs-filemeta = { path = "crates/filemeta", version = "1.0.0-rc.2" }
rustfs-iam = { path = "crates/iam", version = "1.0.0-rc.2" }
rustfs-keystone = { path = "crates/keystone", version = "1.0.0-rc.2" }
rustfs-lifecycle = { path = "crates/lifecycle", version = "1.0.0-rc.2" }
rustfs-kms = { path = "crates/kms", version = "1.0.0-rc.2" }
rustfs-lock = { path = "crates/lock", version = "1.0.0-rc.2" }
rustfs-madmin = { path = "crates/madmin", version = "1.0.0-rc.2" }
rustfs-notify = { path = "crates/notify", version = "1.0.0-rc.2" }
rustfs-io-metrics = { path = "crates/io-metrics", version = "1.0.0-rc.2" }
rustfs-io-core = { path = "crates/io-core", version = "1.0.0-rc.2" }
rustfs-object-capacity = { path = "crates/object-capacity", version = "1.0.0-rc.2" }
rustfs-object-data-cache = { path = "crates/object-data-cache", version = "1.0.0-rc.2", default-features = false }
rustfs-log-analyzer = { path = "crates/log-analyzer", version = "1.0.0-rc.2" }
rustfs-obs = { path = "crates/obs", version = "1.0.0-rc.2" }
rustfs-policy = { path = "crates/policy", version = "1.0.0-rc.2" }
rustfs-protos = { path = "crates/protos", version = "1.0.0-rc.2" }
rustfs-protocols = { path = "crates/protocols", version = "1.0.0-rc.2" }
rustfs-replication = { path = "crates/replication", version = "1.0.0-rc.2" }
rustfs-rio = { path = "crates/rio", version = "1.0.0-rc.2" }
rustfs-rio-v2 = { path = "crates/rio-v2", version = "1.0.0-rc.2" }
rustfs-s3-types = { path = "crates/s3-types", version = "1.0.0-rc.2" }
rustfs-s3-ops = { path = "crates/s3-ops", version = "1.0.0-rc.2" }
rustfs-s3select-api = { path = "crates/s3select-api", version = "1.0.0-rc.2" }
rustfs-s3select-query = { path = "crates/s3select-query", version = "1.0.0-rc.2" }
rustfs-scanner = { path = "crates/scanner", version = "1.0.0-rc.2" }
rustfs-security-governance = { path = "crates/security-governance", version = "1.0.0-rc.2" }
rustfs-extension-schema = { path = "crates/extension-schema", version = "1.0.0-rc.2" }
rustfs-signer = { path = "crates/signer", version = "1.0.0-rc.2" }
rustfs-storage-api = { path = "crates/storage-api", version = "1.0.0-rc.2" }
rustfs-trusted-proxies = { path = "crates/trusted-proxies", version = "1.0.0-rc.2" }
rustfs-targets = { path = "crates/targets", version = "1.0.0-rc.2" }
rustfs-test-utils = { path = "crates/test-utils", version = "1.0.0-rc.2" }
rustfs-tls-runtime = { path = "crates/tls-runtime", version = "1.0.0-rc.2" }
rustfs-utils = { path = "crates/utils", version = "1.0.0-rc.2" }
rustfs-zip = { path = "./crates/zip", version = "1.0.0-rc.2" }
rustfs = { path = "./rustfs", version = "1.0.0-rc.3" }
rustfs-heal = { path = "crates/heal", version = "1.0.0-rc.3" }
rustfs-audit = { path = "crates/audit", version = "1.0.0-rc.3" }
rustfs-checksums = { path = "crates/checksums", version = "1.0.0-rc.3" }
rustfs-common = { path = "crates/common", version = "1.0.0-rc.3" }
rustfs-data-usage = { path = "crates/data-usage", version = "1.0.0-rc.3" }
rustfs-config = { path = "./crates/config", version = "1.0.0-rc.3" }
rustfs-concurrency = { path = "./crates/concurrency", version = "1.0.0-rc.3" }
rustfs-credentials = { path = "crates/credentials", version = "1.0.0-rc.3" }
rustfs-crypto = { path = "crates/crypto", version = "1.0.0-rc.3" }
rustfs-ecstore = { path = "crates/ecstore", version = "1.0.0-rc.3" }
rustfs-filemeta = { path = "crates/filemeta", version = "1.0.0-rc.3" }
rustfs-iam = { path = "crates/iam", version = "1.0.0-rc.3" }
rustfs-keystone = { path = "crates/keystone", version = "1.0.0-rc.3" }
rustfs-lifecycle = { path = "crates/lifecycle", version = "1.0.0-rc.3" }
rustfs-kms = { path = "crates/kms", version = "1.0.0-rc.3" }
rustfs-lock = { path = "crates/lock", version = "1.0.0-rc.3" }
rustfs-madmin = { path = "crates/madmin", version = "1.0.0-rc.3" }
rustfs-notify = { path = "crates/notify", version = "1.0.0-rc.3" }
rustfs-io-metrics = { path = "crates/io-metrics", version = "1.0.0-rc.3" }
rustfs-io-core = { path = "crates/io-core", version = "1.0.0-rc.3" }
rustfs-object-capacity = { path = "crates/object-capacity", version = "1.0.0-rc.3" }
rustfs-object-data-cache = { path = "crates/object-data-cache", version = "1.0.0-rc.3", default-features = false }
rustfs-log-analyzer = { path = "crates/log-analyzer", version = "1.0.0-rc.3" }
rustfs-obs = { path = "crates/obs", version = "1.0.0-rc.3" }
rustfs-policy = { path = "crates/policy", version = "1.0.0-rc.3" }
rustfs-protos = { path = "crates/protos", version = "1.0.0-rc.3" }
rustfs-protocols = { path = "crates/protocols", version = "1.0.0-rc.3" }
rustfs-replication = { path = "crates/replication", version = "1.0.0-rc.3" }
rustfs-rio = { path = "crates/rio", version = "1.0.0-rc.3" }
rustfs-rio-v2 = { path = "crates/rio-v2", version = "1.0.0-rc.3" }
rustfs-s3-types = { path = "crates/s3-types", version = "1.0.0-rc.3" }
rustfs-s3-ops = { path = "crates/s3-ops", version = "1.0.0-rc.3" }
rustfs-s3select-api = { path = "crates/s3select-api", version = "1.0.0-rc.3" }
rustfs-s3select-query = { path = "crates/s3select-query", version = "1.0.0-rc.3" }
rustfs-scanner = { path = "crates/scanner", version = "1.0.0-rc.3" }
rustfs-security-governance = { path = "crates/security-governance", version = "1.0.0-rc.3" }
rustfs-extension-schema = { path = "crates/extension-schema", version = "1.0.0-rc.3" }
rustfs-signer = { path = "crates/signer", version = "1.0.0-rc.3" }
rustfs-storage-api = { path = "crates/storage-api", version = "1.0.0-rc.3" }
rustfs-trusted-proxies = { path = "crates/trusted-proxies", version = "1.0.0-rc.3" }
rustfs-targets = { path = "crates/targets", version = "1.0.0-rc.3" }
rustfs-test-utils = { path = "crates/test-utils", version = "1.0.0-rc.3" }
rustfs-tls-runtime = { path = "crates/tls-runtime", version = "1.0.0-rc.3" }
rustfs-utils = { path = "crates/utils", version = "1.0.0-rc.3" }
rustfs-zip = { path = "./crates/zip", version = "1.0.0-rc.3" }
# Async Runtime and Networking
async-channel = "2.5.0"
@@ -204,6 +204,7 @@ rsa = { version = "=0.10.0-rc.18" }
rustls = { default-features = false, version = "0.23.43" }
rustls-native-certs = "0.8"
rustls-pki-types = "1.15.1"
x509-parser = "0.18.1"
sha1 = "0.11.0"
sha2 = "0.11.0"
subtle = "2.6"
@@ -231,8 +232,8 @@ aws-credential-types = { version = "1.3.0" }
aws-sdk-kms = { default-features = false, version = "1.115.0" }
aws-sdk-s3 = { default-features = false, version = "1.142.0" }
aws-sdk-sts = { default-features = false, version = "1.111.0" }
aws-smithy-http-client = { default-features = false, version = "1.3.0" }
aws-smithy-runtime-api = { version = "1.14.0" }
aws-smithy-http-client = { default-features = false, version = "1.4.0" }
aws-smithy-runtime-api = { version = "1.15.0" }
aws-smithy-types = { version = "1.6.2" }
base64 = "0.23.1"
base64-simd = "0.8.0"
@@ -245,8 +246,7 @@ crossbeam-queue = "0.3.13"
crossbeam-channel = "0.5.16"
crossbeam-deque = "0.8.7"
crossbeam-utils = "0.8.22"
datafusion = { default-features = false, git = "https://github.com/apache/datafusion.git", rev = "e08aed1e5de41dcf81d529140dae07723b942a5e" }
#datafusion = { default-features = false, version = "54.1.0" }
datafusion = { default-features = false, version = "55.0.0" }
derive_builder = "0.20.2"
enumset = "1.1.14"
faster-hex = "0.10.0"
@@ -264,6 +264,7 @@ lazy_static = "1.5.0"
libc = "0.2.189"
libsystemd = "0.7.2"
local-ip-address = "0.6.13"
log = "0.4"
memmap2 = "0.9.11"
lz4 = "1.28.1"
matchit = "0.9.2"
@@ -290,7 +291,7 @@ rustify = { version = "0.7", default-features = false }
rustix = { version = "1.1.4" }
rust-embed = { version = "8.12.0" }
rustc-hash = { version = "2.1.3" }
s3s = { git = "https://github.com/rustfs/s3s.git", rev = "d358a68783096df1db0c3e314127f2704603b29e" }
s3s = { git = "https://github.com/rustfs/s3s.git", rev = "ed70cb048cc4be168419d461cb9ac3c2c7fa6d5a" }
serial_test = "4.0.1"
shadow-rs = { default-features = false, version = "2.0.0" }
siphasher = "1.0.3"
@@ -326,6 +327,7 @@ zstd = "0.13.3"
# Observability and Metrics
metrics = "0.24.6"
metrics-util = "0.20"
dial9-tokio-telemetry = "0.3"
opentelemetry = { version = "0.32.0" }
opentelemetry-appender-tracing = { version = "0.32.0" }
@@ -339,7 +341,7 @@ pyroscope = { version = "2.1.1" }
# FTP and SFTP
libunftp = { version = "0.23.0" }
unftp-core = "0.1.0"
suppaftp = { version = "10.0.1" }
suppaftp = { version = "10.0.2" }
rcgen = { version = "0.14.9", default-features = false, features = ["aws_lc_rs", "crypto", "pem"] }
russh = { version = "0.62.7" }
russh-sftp = "2.4.0"
+1 -1
View File
@@ -116,7 +116,7 @@ chown -R 10001:10001 data logs
docker run -d -p 9000:9000 -p 9001:9001 -v $(pwd)/data:/data -v $(pwd)/logs:/logs rustfs/rustfs:latest
# Using specific version
docker run -d -p 9000:9000 -p 9001:9001 -v $(pwd)/data:/data -v $(pwd)/logs:/logs rustfs/rustfs:1.0.0-rc.2
docker run -d -p 9000:9000 -p 9001:9001 -v $(pwd)/data:/data -v $(pwd)/logs:/logs rustfs/rustfs:1.0.0-rc.3
```
If you use [podman](https://github.com/containers/podman) instead of docker, you can install the RustFS with the below command
+1 -1
View File
@@ -113,7 +113,7 @@ chown -R 10001:10001 data logs
docker run -d -p 9000:9000 -p 9001:9001 -v $(pwd)/data:/data -v $(pwd)/logs:/logs rustfs/rustfs:latest
# 使用指定版本运行
docker run -d -p 9000:9000 -p 9001:9001 -v $(pwd)/data:/data -v $(pwd)/logs:/logs rustfs/rustfs:1.0.0-rc.2
docker run -d -p 9000:9000 -p 9001:9001 -v $(pwd)/data:/data -v $(pwd)/logs:/logs rustfs/rustfs:1.0.0-rc.3
```
如果您通过绑定挂载启用 TLS 证书目录,也请用同样方式准备该目录:
+6 -2
View File
@@ -19,7 +19,9 @@ Applies to all paths under `crates/`.
- Document lock acquisition order when a module uses multiple locks. Never acquire the same set of locks in different orders across code paths.
- Never hold a `tokio::sync::RwLock`/`Mutex` write guard across `.await` points unless the critical section is unavoidably async and the hold time is bounded.
- Prefer `compare_exchange` loops over load-then-store for concurrent counters (peak values, adaptive heuristics).
- Prefer direct atomic `fetch_*` operations for unconditional updates and
`compare_exchange` loops only for conditional updates such as peaks or
adaptive state.
- When resetting multi-field atomic statistics, use a version/sequence counter or accept that concurrent readers may see partial snapshots; document the tradeoff.
- `std::sync::Mutex` is acceptable in async context only when held for a brief, non-`await`-containing critical section. If in doubt, use `tokio::sync::Mutex`.
@@ -40,7 +42,9 @@ Applies to all paths under `crates/`.
- Keep unit tests close to the module they test.
- Keep integration tests under each crate's `tests/` directory.
- Add regression tests for bug fixes and behavior changes.
- Every test function must contain at least one `assert!`/`assert_eq!`/`assert_matches!`. A test that only calls code without asserting is not a test.
- Every test needs an observable failure criterion. Direct assertions,
delegated assertions, snapshots/properties, `#[should_panic]`, and meaningful
`Result` failures are all valid; a call that can silently succeed is not.
- In tests, prefer `.expect("context: what was being tested")` over bare `.unwrap()`. A test failure should tell you which operation failed and with what input.
## Async and Performance
-1
View File
@@ -50,4 +50,3 @@ crate.
- `cargo test -p rustfs-audit`
- Focused: `cargo test -p rustfs-audit --test pipeline_layer_test`
- Focused: `cargo test -p rustfs-audit pipeline`
- Full gate before commit: `make pre-commit`
+9 -2
View File
@@ -236,12 +236,19 @@ async fn audit_pipeline_reports_empty_runtime_snapshots() {
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn audit_runtime_facade_stops_empty_replay_workers() {
async fn stopping_audit_replay_workers_is_a_no_op_when_there_are_none() {
let registry = Arc::new(Mutex::new(AuditRegistry::new()));
let replay_workers = Arc::new(RwLock::new(rustfs_targets::ReplayWorkerManager::new()));
let facade = AuditRuntimeFacade::new(registry, replay_workers);
let facade = AuditRuntimeFacade::new(registry, Arc::clone(&replay_workers));
facade.stop_replay_workers().await;
// The stop path takes the manager's workers and hands them to the adapter,
// so an empty facade must leave it empty rather than wedge it, and a second
// call — which shutdown paths make — must stay harmless (rustfs/backlog#1836).
assert!(replay_workers.read().await.is_empty());
facade.stop_replay_workers().await;
assert!(replay_workers.read().await.is_empty());
}
#[tokio::test]
-1
View File
@@ -44,7 +44,6 @@ metrics = { workspace = true }
serde = { workspace = true, features = ["derive"] }
smallvec = { workspace = true }
rmp-serde = { workspace = true }
s3s = { workspace = true, features = ["minio"] }
tracing = { workspace = true }
[dev-dependencies]
-99
View File
@@ -12,7 +12,6 @@
// See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
// limitations under the License.
use s3s::dto::{BucketLifecycleConfiguration, ExpirationStatus, LifecycleRule, ReplicationConfiguration, ReplicationRuleStatus};
use serde::{Deserialize, Serialize};
use std::{
fmt::{self, Display},
@@ -633,104 +632,6 @@ pub fn create_heal_response(
}
}
fn lc_get_prefix(rule: &LifecycleRule) -> String {
if let Some(p) = &rule.prefix {
return p.to_string();
} else if let Some(filter) = &rule.filter {
if let Some(p) = &filter.prefix {
return p.to_string();
} else if let Some(and) = &filter.and
&& let Some(p) = &and.prefix
{
return p.to_string();
}
}
"".into()
}
pub fn lc_has_active_rules(config: &BucketLifecycleConfiguration, prefix: &str) -> bool {
if config.rules.is_empty() {
return false;
}
for rule in config.rules.iter() {
if rule.status == ExpirationStatus::from_static(ExpirationStatus::DISABLED) {
continue;
}
let rule_prefix = lc_get_prefix(rule);
if !prefix.is_empty() && !rule_prefix.is_empty() && !prefix.starts_with(&rule_prefix) && !rule_prefix.starts_with(prefix)
{
continue;
}
if let Some(e) = &rule.noncurrent_version_expiration {
if e.noncurrent_days.is_some() {
return true;
}
if let Some(true) = e.newer_noncurrent_versions.map(|d| d > 0) {
return true;
}
}
if rule.noncurrent_version_transitions.is_some() {
return true;
}
if let Some(true) = rule.expiration.as_ref().map(|e| e.date.is_some()) {
return true;
}
if let Some(true) = rule.expiration.as_ref().map(|e| e.days.is_some()) {
return true;
}
if let Some(Some(true)) = rule.expiration.as_ref().map(|e| e.expired_object_delete_marker) {
return true;
}
if let Some(true) = rule.transitions.as_ref().map(|t| !t.is_empty()) {
return true;
}
if rule.transitions.is_some() {
return true;
}
}
false
}
pub fn rep_has_active_rules(config: &ReplicationConfiguration, prefix: &str, recursive: bool) -> bool {
if config.rules.is_empty() {
return false;
}
for rule in config.rules.iter() {
if rule
.status
.eq(&ReplicationRuleStatus::from_static(ReplicationRuleStatus::DISABLED))
{
continue;
}
if !prefix.is_empty()
&& let Some(filter) = &rule.filter
&& let Some(r_prefix) = &filter.prefix
&& !r_prefix.is_empty()
{
// incoming prefix must be in rule prefix
if !recursive && !prefix.starts_with(r_prefix) {
continue;
}
// If recursive, we can skip this rule if it doesn't match the tested prefix or level below prefix
// does not match
if recursive && !r_prefix.starts_with(prefix) && !prefix.starts_with(r_prefix) {
continue;
}
}
return true;
}
false
}
pub async fn send_heal_disk(set_disk_id: String, priority: Option<HealChannelPriority>) -> Result<(), String> {
let req = HealChannelRequest {
id: Uuid::new_v4().to_string(),
-76
View File
@@ -13,82 +13,6 @@
// limitations under the License.
use std::time::{Duration, SystemTime, UNIX_EPOCH};
#[allow(dead_code)]
#[derive(Debug, Default)]
struct TimedAction {
count: u64,
acc_time: u64,
min_time: Option<u64>,
max_time: Option<u64>,
bytes: u64,
}
#[allow(dead_code)]
impl TimedAction {
// Avg returns the average time spent on the action.
pub fn avg(&self) -> Option<Duration> {
if self.count == 0 {
return None;
}
Some(Duration::from_nanos(self.acc_time / self.count))
}
// AvgBytes returns the average bytes processed.
pub fn avg_bytes(&self) -> u64 {
if self.count == 0 {
return 0;
}
self.bytes / self.count
}
// Merge other into t.
pub fn merge(&mut self, other: TimedAction) {
self.count += other.count;
self.acc_time += other.acc_time;
self.bytes += other.bytes;
if self.count == 0 {
self.min_time = other.min_time;
}
if let Some(other_min) = other.min_time {
self.min_time = self.min_time.map_or(Some(other_min), |min| Some(min.min(other_min)));
}
self.max_time = self
.max_time
.map_or(other.max_time, |max| Some(max.max(other.max_time.unwrap_or(0))));
}
}
#[allow(dead_code)]
#[derive(Debug)]
enum SizeCategory {
SizeLessThan1KiB = 0,
SizeLessThan1MiB,
SizeLessThan10MiB,
SizeLessThan100MiB,
SizeLessThan1GiB,
SizeGreaterThan1GiB,
// Add new entries here
SizeLastElemMarker,
}
impl std::fmt::Display for SizeCategory {
fn fmt(&self, f: &mut std::fmt::Formatter<'_>) -> std::fmt::Result {
let s = match *self {
SizeCategory::SizeLessThan1KiB => "SizeLessThan1KiB",
SizeCategory::SizeLessThan1MiB => "SizeLessThan1MiB",
SizeCategory::SizeLessThan10MiB => "SizeLessThan10MiB",
SizeCategory::SizeLessThan100MiB => "SizeLessThan100MiB",
SizeCategory::SizeLessThan1GiB => "SizeLessThan1GiB",
SizeCategory::SizeGreaterThan1GiB => "SizeGreaterThan1GiB",
SizeCategory::SizeLastElemMarker => "SizeLastElemMarker",
};
write!(f, "{s}")
}
}
#[derive(Clone, Debug, Default, Copy)]
pub struct AccElem {
pub total: u64,
+110 -25
View File
@@ -729,7 +729,7 @@ fn timestamp_elapsed_seconds_since(now: Timestamp, earlier: Timestamp) -> u64 {
return 0;
}
u64::try_from(duration.as_secs()).map_or(u64::MAX, |seconds| seconds)
u64::try_from(duration.as_secs()).unwrap_or(u64::MAX)
}
#[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, Default)]
@@ -781,6 +781,19 @@ struct ScannerBucketDriveResultValue {
last_seen: u64,
}
#[derive(Clone, Debug, Eq, Hash, PartialEq)]
struct ScannerActiveBucketDriveKey {
source: String,
bucket: String,
drive: String,
}
#[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug)]
struct ScannerActiveBucketDriveValue {
count: u64,
started_at: Timestamp,
}
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
// Metrics
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
@@ -813,6 +826,7 @@ pub struct Metrics {
scanner_set_scans_active: AtomicU64,
scanner_disk_bucket_scan_states: Mutex<HashMap<ScannerDiskBucketScanKey, ScannerDiskBucketScanState>>,
scanner_bucket_drive_results: Mutex<ScannerBucketDriveResults>,
scanner_active_bucket_drive_scans: Mutex<HashMap<ScannerActiveBucketDriveKey, ScannerActiveBucketDriveValue>>,
scanner_bucket_drive_result_clock: AtomicU64,
current_scan_cycle_bucket_drive_results_start: Mutex<HashMap<ScannerBucketDriveResultKey, u64>>,
last_scan_cycle_bucket_drive_results: Mutex<Vec<ScannerBucketDriveResultSnapshot>>,
@@ -1045,6 +1059,15 @@ pub struct ScannerBucketDriveResultSnapshot {
pub count: u64,
}
#[derive(Clone, Debug, Default, Serialize, Deserialize, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub struct ScannerActiveBucketDriveSnapshot {
pub source: String,
pub bucket: String,
pub drive: String,
pub count: u64,
pub age_seconds: u64,
}
#[derive(Clone, Debug, Default, Serialize, Deserialize, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub struct ScannerReplicationRepairSnapshot {
pub source: String,
@@ -1387,6 +1410,8 @@ pub struct ScannerRuntimeDetailsReport {
pub current_cycle_bucket_drive_results: Vec<ScannerBucketDriveResultSnapshot>,
#[serde(default)]
pub last_cycle_bucket_drive_results: Vec<ScannerBucketDriveResultSnapshot>,
#[serde(default)]
pub active_bucket_drive_scans: Vec<ScannerActiveBucketDriveSnapshot>,
}
impl CurrentCycle {
@@ -1401,25 +1426,11 @@ impl CurrentCycle {
}
/// OTEL metric name constants for scanner metrics
const OTEL_SCANNER_OBJECTS_SCANNED: &str = "rustfs_scanner_objects_scanned_total";
const OTEL_SCANNER_DIRECTORIES_SCANNED: &str = "rustfs_scanner_directories_scanned_total";
const OTEL_SCANNER_BUCKETS_SCANNED: &str = "rustfs_scanner_buckets_scanned_total";
const OTEL_SCANNER_CYCLES: &str = "rustfs_scanner_cycles_total";
const OTEL_SCANNER_CYCLE_DURATION_SECONDS: &str = "rustfs_scanner_cycle_duration_seconds";
const OTEL_SCANNER_BUCKET_DRIVE_DURATION_SECONDS: &str = "rustfs_scanner_bucket_drive_duration_seconds";
fn emit_otel_counter(metric: usize, count: u64) {
match Metric::from_index(metric) {
Some(Metric::ScanObject) => {
metrics::counter!(OTEL_SCANNER_OBJECTS_SCANNED).increment(count);
}
Some(Metric::ScanFolder) => {
metrics::counter!(OTEL_SCANNER_DIRECTORIES_SCANNED).increment(count);
}
_ => {}
}
}
fn scan_cycle_result_label(result: u8) -> &'static str {
match result {
SCAN_CYCLE_RESULT_SUCCESS => SCAN_CYCLE_RESULT_SUCCESS_LABEL,
@@ -1760,7 +1771,7 @@ pub fn emit_scan_cycle_deferred(duration: Duration) {
metrics::counter!(OTEL_SCANNER_CYCLES, "result" => SCAN_CYCLE_RESULT_DEFERRED_LABEL).increment(1);
}
pub fn emit_scan_bucket_drive_complete(success: bool, bucket: &str, disk: &str, duration: Duration) {
pub fn emit_scan_bucket_drive_complete(_source: ScannerWorkSource, success: bool, bucket: &str, disk: &str, duration: Duration) {
let result = if success { "success" } else { "error" };
global_metrics().record_scanner_bucket_drive_result(bucket, disk, result);
metrics::counter!(
@@ -1778,7 +1789,7 @@ pub fn emit_scan_bucket_drive_complete(success: bool, bucket: &str, disk: &str,
.record(duration.as_secs_f64());
}
pub fn emit_scan_bucket_drive_partial(bucket: &str, disk: &str, duration: Duration) {
pub fn emit_scan_bucket_drive_partial(_source: ScannerWorkSource, bucket: &str, disk: &str, duration: Duration) {
global_metrics().record_scanner_bucket_drive_result(bucket, disk, SCAN_CYCLE_RESULT_PARTIAL_LABEL);
metrics::counter!(
OTEL_SCANNER_BUCKETS_SCANNED,
@@ -1831,6 +1842,7 @@ impl Metrics {
scanner_set_scans_active: AtomicU64::new(0),
scanner_disk_bucket_scan_states: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
scanner_bucket_drive_results: Mutex::new(ScannerBucketDriveResults::default()),
scanner_active_bucket_drive_scans: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
scanner_bucket_drive_result_clock: AtomicU64::new(0),
current_scan_cycle_bucket_drive_results_start: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
last_scan_cycle_bucket_drive_results: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
@@ -1960,7 +1972,6 @@ impl Metrics {
let duration = SystemTime::now().duration_since(start).unwrap_or_default();
global_metrics().operations[metric_idx].fetch_add(1, Ordering::Relaxed);
global_metrics().record_source_work_for_metric(metric, 1);
emit_otel_counter(metric_idx, 1);
if metric_idx < Metric::LastRealtime as usize {
global_metrics().latency[metric_idx].add(duration);
}
@@ -1976,7 +1987,6 @@ impl Metrics {
let duration = SystemTime::now().duration_since(start).unwrap_or_default();
global_metrics().operations[metric_idx].fetch_add(1, Ordering::Relaxed);
global_metrics().record_source_work_for_metric(metric, 1);
emit_otel_counter(metric_idx, 1);
if metric_idx < Metric::LastRealtime as usize {
global_metrics().latency[metric_idx].add_size(duration, size);
}
@@ -1992,7 +2002,6 @@ impl Metrics {
let duration = SystemTime::now().duration_since(start).unwrap_or_default();
global_metrics().operations[metric_idx].fetch_add(1, Ordering::Relaxed);
global_metrics().record_source_work_for_metric(metric, 1);
emit_otel_counter(metric_idx, 1);
if metric_idx < Metric::LastRealtime as usize {
global_metrics().latency[metric_idx].add(duration);
}
@@ -2010,7 +2019,6 @@ impl Metrics {
let count = usize_to_u64_saturated(count);
global_metrics().operations[metric_idx].fetch_add(count, Ordering::Relaxed);
global_metrics().record_source_work_for_metric(metric, count);
emit_otel_counter(metric_idx, count);
if metric_idx < Metric::LastRealtime as usize {
global_metrics().latency[metric_idx].add(duration);
}
@@ -2031,7 +2039,6 @@ impl Metrics {
let duration = SystemTime::now().duration_since(start).unwrap_or_default();
let metric_idx = Metric::Ilm as usize;
global_metrics().operations[metric_idx].fetch_add(versions, Ordering::Relaxed);
emit_otel_counter(metric_idx, versions);
global_metrics().actions[a_idx].fetch_add(versions, Ordering::Relaxed);
global_metrics().actions_latency[a_idx].add(duration);
})
@@ -2044,7 +2051,6 @@ impl Metrics {
let metric_idx = metric as usize;
global_metrics().operations[metric_idx].fetch_add(1, Ordering::Relaxed);
global_metrics().record_source_work_for_metric(metric, 1);
emit_otel_counter(metric_idx, 1);
if metric_idx < Metric::LastRealtime as usize {
global_metrics().latency[metric_idx].add(duration);
}
@@ -2328,8 +2334,45 @@ impl Metrics {
}
}
pub fn record_scan_bucket_drive_start(&self) {
pub fn record_scan_bucket_drive_start(&self, source: ScannerWorkSource, bucket: &str, drive: &str) {
self.operations[Metric::ScanBucketDriveStart as usize].fetch_add(1, Ordering::Relaxed);
if bucket.is_empty() || drive.is_empty() {
return;
}
let key = ScannerActiveBucketDriveKey {
source: source.as_str().to_string(),
bucket: bucket.to_string(),
drive: drive.to_string(),
};
let mut active = self
.scanner_active_bucket_drive_scans
.lock()
.unwrap_or_else(|poisoned| poisoned.into_inner());
active
.entry(key)
.and_modify(|value| value.count = value.count.saturating_add(1))
.or_insert(ScannerActiveBucketDriveValue {
count: 1,
started_at: Timestamp::now(),
});
}
pub fn record_scan_bucket_drive_end(&self, source: ScannerWorkSource, bucket: &str, drive: &str) {
let key = ScannerActiveBucketDriveKey {
source: source.as_str().to_string(),
bucket: bucket.to_string(),
drive: drive.to_string(),
};
let mut active = self
.scanner_active_bucket_drive_scans
.lock()
.unwrap_or_else(|poisoned| poisoned.into_inner());
if let Some(value) = active.get_mut(&key) {
value.count = value.count.saturating_sub(1);
if value.count == 0 {
active.remove(&key);
}
}
}
pub fn record_scan_bucket_drive_failure(&self) {
@@ -2802,6 +2845,26 @@ impl Metrics {
} else {
Vec::new()
};
let now = Timestamp::now();
let mut active_bucket_drive_scans = self
.scanner_active_bucket_drive_scans
.lock()
.unwrap_or_else(|poisoned| poisoned.into_inner())
.iter()
.map(|(key, value)| ScannerActiveBucketDriveSnapshot {
source: key.source.clone(),
bucket: key.bucket.clone(),
drive: key.drive.clone(),
count: value.count,
age_seconds: timestamp_elapsed_seconds_since(now, value.started_at),
})
.collect::<Vec<_>>();
active_bucket_drive_scans.sort_by(|left, right| {
left.source
.cmp(&right.source)
.then_with(|| left.bucket.cmp(&right.bucket))
.then_with(|| left.drive.cmp(&right.drive))
});
ScannerRuntimeDetailsReport {
disk_bucket_scan_states: self.scanner_disk_bucket_scan_state_snapshots(),
bucket_drive_results: self.scanner_bucket_drive_result_counter_snapshots(),
@@ -2811,6 +2874,7 @@ impl Metrics {
.lock()
.unwrap_or_else(|poisoned| poisoned.into_inner())
.clone(),
active_bucket_drive_scans,
}
}
@@ -4391,7 +4455,7 @@ mod tests {
#[tokio::test]
async fn report_includes_bucket_drive_scan_starts() {
let metrics = Metrics::new();
metrics.record_scan_bucket_drive_start();
metrics.record_scan_bucket_drive_start(ScannerWorkSource::Usage, "bucket-a", "/mnt/data/1");
metrics.record_scan_bucket_drive_failure();
let report = metrics.report().await;
@@ -4400,6 +4464,27 @@ mod tests {
assert_eq!(report.life_time_ops.get("scan_bucket_drive_failure"), Some(&1));
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn active_bucket_drive_snapshot_is_structured_and_retired_on_end() {
let metrics = Metrics::new();
metrics.record_scan_bucket_drive_start(ScannerWorkSource::Usage, "bucket-a", "/mnt/data/1");
metrics.record_scan_bucket_drive_start(ScannerWorkSource::Usage, "bucket-a", "/mnt/data/1");
let active = metrics.scanner_runtime_details_report().active_bucket_drive_scans;
assert_eq!(active.len(), 1);
assert_eq!(active[0].source, ScannerWorkSource::Usage.as_str());
assert_eq!(active[0].bucket, "bucket-a");
assert_eq!(active[0].drive, "/mnt/data/1");
assert_eq!(active[0].count, 2);
metrics.record_scan_bucket_drive_end(ScannerWorkSource::Usage, "bucket-a", "/mnt/data/1");
assert_eq!(metrics.scanner_runtime_details_report().active_bucket_drive_scans[0].count, 1);
metrics.record_scan_bucket_drive_end(ScannerWorkSource::Usage, "bucket-a", "/mnt/data/1");
assert!(metrics.scanner_runtime_details_report().active_bucket_drive_scans.is_empty());
metrics.record_scan_bucket_drive_start(ScannerWorkSource::Usage, "", "/mnt/data/1");
assert!(metrics.scanner_runtime_details_report().active_bucket_drive_scans.is_empty());
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn report_includes_structured_bucket_drive_results() {
let metrics = Metrics::new();
+84
View File
@@ -148,6 +148,62 @@ fn unix_now_ms() -> u64 {
.unwrap_or(0)
}
/// A repair the MRF consumer landed, fanned out so retry ledgers can drop
/// entries the journal no longer tracks (backlog#1894 axis B). The payload
/// mirrors the intent identity so consumers match without re-parsing.
#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub struct MrfRepairedEvent {
pub bucket: Arc<str>,
pub object: Arc<str>,
pub version_id: Option<[u8; 16]>,
}
/// Bound on the repaired-event backlog. Notices are best-effort hints; when
/// the ring is full the oldest are dropped and the affected ledger entries
/// simply expire through their own attempts/age limits.
const MRF_REPAIRED_EVENT_CAP: usize = 4096;
static MRF_REPAIRED_EVENTS: OnceLock<std::sync::Mutex<std::collections::VecDeque<MrfRepairedEvent>>> = OnceLock::new();
/// Record that the MRF consumer landed a repair. Never blocks: the critical
/// section is a deque push under a std mutex.
pub fn note_mrf_repaired(bucket: &str, object: &str, version_id: Option<[u8; 16]>) {
let registry = MRF_REPAIRED_EVENTS.get_or_init(|| std::sync::Mutex::new(std::collections::VecDeque::new()));
let Ok(mut events) = registry.lock() else {
return;
};
if events.len() >= MRF_REPAIRED_EVENT_CAP {
events.pop_front();
}
events.push_back(MrfRepairedEvent {
bucket: Arc::from(bucket),
object: Arc::from(object),
version_id,
});
}
/// Take the repair notices recorded for `bucket`, leaving other buckets'
/// notices in place for their own scanners.
pub fn take_mrf_repaired_events_for(bucket: &str) -> Vec<MrfRepairedEvent> {
let Some(registry) = MRF_REPAIRED_EVENTS.get() else {
return Vec::new();
};
let Ok(mut events) = registry.lock() else {
return Vec::new();
};
let mut taken = Vec::new();
let mut retained = std::collections::VecDeque::with_capacity(events.len());
while let Some(event) = events.pop_front() {
if event.bucket.as_ref() == bucket {
taken.push(event);
} else {
retained.push_back(event);
}
}
*events = retained;
taken
}
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
use super::*;
@@ -200,4 +256,32 @@ mod tests {
assert!(!try_send_mrf_intent(MrfKind::MetadataCorruption, "b", "o", None));
set_mrf_delivery_enabled(true);
}
#[test]
fn repaired_events_take_is_bucket_scoped_and_cap_bounded() {
// Distinct buckets keep their notices until their own scanner takes
// them; a take for one bucket leaves the others' notices in place.
note_mrf_repaired("bucket-a", "object-1", None);
note_mrf_repaired("bucket-b", "object-2", None);
note_mrf_repaired("bucket-a", "object-3", None);
let taken_a = take_mrf_repaired_events_for("bucket-a");
assert_eq!(taken_a.len(), 2);
assert_eq!(taken_a[0].object.as_ref(), "object-1");
assert_eq!(taken_a[1].object.as_ref(), "object-3");
assert!(take_mrf_repaired_events_for("bucket-a").is_empty(), "take is destructive per bucket");
let taken_b = take_mrf_repaired_events_for("bucket-b");
assert_eq!(taken_b.len(), 1);
assert_eq!(taken_b[0].object.as_ref(), "object-2");
// Cap bound: flooding the ring drops the oldest notices rather than
// growing unbounded.
for i in 0..=(MRF_REPAIRED_EVENT_CAP + 8) {
note_mrf_repaired("flood-bucket", &format!("object-{i}"), None);
}
let flooded = take_mrf_repaired_events_for("flood-bucket");
assert_eq!(flooded.len(), MRF_REPAIRED_EVENT_CAP);
assert_eq!(flooded[0].object.as_ref(), "object-9", "the oldest notices past the cap are dropped");
}
}
+9
View File
@@ -115,6 +115,15 @@ Current guidance:
- enables KMS readiness enforcement for `/health/ready`.
- default is `false`.
## Object lock admission environment variables
- `RUSTFS_PUT_COMMIT_NAMESPACE_LOCK_ACQUIRE_TIMEOUT_MS`
- experimental same-object PUT commit namespace-lock admission budget.
- default is `0`, which disables this override and keeps `RUSTFS_OBJECT_LOCK_ACQUIRE_TIMEOUT` behavior.
- when set, only `put_object_commit` write-lock acquisition is bounded by this millisecond budget; other namespace lock users keep the global object-lock timeout.
- timeout returns S3 `SlowDown`, so clients should use normal SDK retry handling.
- this is not a fdatasync or group-commit switch. Track fdatasync batching separately with `rustfs_s3_put_object_rename_fdatasync_batch_files`.
## Drive timeout environment variables
- `RUSTFS_DRIVE_METADATA_TIMEOUT_SECS`
+13
View File
@@ -427,6 +427,19 @@ pub const ENV_OBJECT_LOCK_ACQUIRE_TIMEOUT: &str = "RUSTFS_OBJECT_LOCK_ACQUIRE_TI
/// Default lock acquisition timeout: 5 seconds.
pub const DEFAULT_OBJECT_LOCK_ACQUIRE_TIMEOUT: u64 = 5;
/// Environment variable for the experimental PUT commit namespace lock acquire timeout in milliseconds.
///
/// A value of `0` disables the experiment and keeps
/// `RUSTFS_OBJECT_LOCK_ACQUIRE_TIMEOUT` as the timeout. This only bounds the
/// `put_object_commit` namespace write-lock wait and is intended for #925
/// tail-drain admission experiments.
///
/// Default: 0 milliseconds (disabled).
pub const ENV_PUT_COMMIT_NAMESPACE_LOCK_ACQUIRE_TIMEOUT_MS: &str = "RUSTFS_PUT_COMMIT_NAMESPACE_LOCK_ACQUIRE_TIMEOUT_MS";
/// Default: PUT commit namespace lock acquire timeout override is disabled.
pub const DEFAULT_PUT_COMMIT_NAMESPACE_LOCK_ACQUIRE_TIMEOUT_MS: u64 = 0;
/// Environment variable for remote namespace lock RPC transport timeout in milliseconds.
///
/// This timeout bounds the internode RPC call itself. It is intentionally
-9
View File
@@ -228,15 +228,6 @@ pub const DEFAULT_SCANNER_MAX_CONCURRENT_DISK_SCANS: usize = 4;
/// Default object interval for cooperative scanner yields.
pub const DEFAULT_SCANNER_YIELD_EVERY_N_OBJECTS: u64 = 128;
/// Compatibility flag kept for Patch 3 rollback windows.
///
/// Inline scanner heal execution has been removed in favor of heal-candidate enqueue.
/// When this flag is enabled, RustFS logs a warning and continues to use enqueue-based heal.
pub const ENV_SCANNER_INLINE_HEAL_ENABLE: &str = "RUSTFS_SCANNER_INLINE_HEAL_ENABLE";
/// Default inline scanner heal compatibility mode.
pub const DEFAULT_SCANNER_INLINE_HEAL_ENABLE: bool = false;
/// Scanner speed preset controlling throttling behavior.
///
/// Each preset defines three parameters:
-4
View File
@@ -92,15 +92,11 @@ pub const NOTIFY_SUB_SYSTEMS: &[&str] = &[
pub const NOTIFY_KAFKA_SUB_SYS: &str = "notify_kafka";
pub const NOTIFY_MQTT_SUB_SYS: &str = "notify_mqtt";
pub const NOTIFY_MYSQL_SUB_SYS: &str = "notify_mysql";
#[allow(dead_code)]
pub const NOTIFY_NATS_SUB_SYS: &str = "notify_nats";
#[allow(dead_code)]
pub const NOTIFY_NSQ_SUB_SYS: &str = "notify_nsq";
#[allow(dead_code)]
pub const NOTIFY_ES_SUB_SYS: &str = "notify_elasticsearch";
pub const NOTIFY_AMQP_SUB_SYS: &str = "notify_amqp";
pub const NOTIFY_POSTGRES_SUB_SYS: &str = "notify_postgres";
#[allow(dead_code)]
pub const NOTIFY_REDIS_SUB_SYS: &str = "notify_redis";
pub const NOTIFY_REDIS_DEFAULT_CHANNEL: &str = "rustfs_notify_channel";
pub const NOTIFY_PULSAR_SUB_SYS: &str = "notify_pulsar";
-1
View File
@@ -28,4 +28,3 @@ follow.
## Suggested Validation
- `cargo test --package e2e_test`
- Full gate before commit: `make pre-commit`
-1
View File
@@ -96,7 +96,6 @@ tokio-stream = { workspace = true }
rustfs-madmin.workspace = true
rustfs-filemeta.workspace = true
bytes = { workspace = true, features = ["serde"] }
serial_test = { workspace = true }
aws-sdk-s3 = { workspace = true, default-features = false, features = ["sigv4a", "default-https-client", "rt-tokio"] }
aws-sdk-sts = { workspace = true, default-features = false, features = ["default-https-client", "rt-tokio"] }
aws-config = { workspace = true }
+26 -21
View File
@@ -48,16 +48,14 @@ cargo nextest run --profile e2e-smoke -p e2e_test
cargo nextest run -j1 --run-ignored ignored-only -p rustfs-scanner -p rustfs \
-E 'binary(lifecycle_integration_test) or (package(rustfs) and test(lifecycle_transition_api_test))'
# Protocols suite — fixed ports, MUST be single-threaded, gated by build features
RUSTFS_BUILD_FEATURES=ftps,webdav,sftp \
cargo test -p e2e_test test_protocol_core_suite -- --test-threads=1 --nocapture
```
The protocols suite has its own contract (fixed bind ports 90229301,
`--test-threads=1`, feature-gated scheduling) documented in
single-worker execution, feature-gated scheduling) documented in
[`src/protocols/README.md`](src/protocols/README.md). `RUSTFS_BUILD_FEATURES`
selects which features the spawned binary is built with; leave it unset to run
every protocol entry.
every protocol entry. Use the exact profile command under
[Troubleshooting](#troubleshooting) for CI-equivalent execution.
### `#[ignore]` semantics
@@ -159,27 +157,26 @@ construction (random port + isolated temp dir) and need no serialization.
## CI map
`e2e_test` is **excluded** from the main `cargo nextest run --profile ci --all`
pass ([`.github/workflows/ci.yml`](../../.github/workflows/ci.yml) line 158,
`--exclude e2e_test`) — the whole crate is too slow to gate every PR. Subsets
join CI through the nextest profile system only (never as ad-hoc jobs):
pass (`--exclude e2e_test`) — the whole crate is too slow to gate every PR.
Subsets join CI through nextest profiles; the fixed-port protocol suite uses
the same profile for membership and execution with one nightly worker.
| Suite | Runs where | Status |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Smoke subset (`e2e-smoke` profile) | `e2e-tests` job, every PR | **Active** (backlog#1149 ci-4) |
| Full single-node suite (`e2e-full` profile) | `e2e-full` job, merge queue + main | **Active** (backlog#1149 ci-5) |
| `s3s-e2e` black-box | `e2e-tests` + `e2e-tests-rio-v2` jobs | **Active** (external conformance tool) |
| ILM / lifecycle (ignored) | `test-ilm-integration-serial` lane, `-j1` | **Active** (backlog#1148 ilm-1) |
| KMS suite | — | Not in CI yet (backlog#1149 ci-5) |
| Protocols (FTPS/WebDAV/SFTP) | — | Not in CI yet (backlog#1149 ci-7) |
| KMS suite | `e2e-full` job, merge queue + main | **Active** |
| Cluster faults (`e2e-nightly` profile) | consolidated nightly workflow | **Active** (backlog#1149 ci-7) |
| Protocols (FTPS/WebDAV/SFTP) | consolidated nightly workflow, serial | **Active** (backlog#1149 ci-7) |
| Replication (fast subset) | `e2e-smoke` profile, `e2e-tests` job, every PR | **Active** (backlog#1147 repl-1) |
| Replication (slow + dual-node) | `e2e-repl-nightly` profile, scheduled workflow | **Active** (backlog#1147 repl-1) |
| `reliant/*` (pre-started server) | — | Manual only |
| Replication (slow + multi-node) | `e2e-repl-nightly` profile, consolidated nightly workflow | **Active** (backlog#1147 repl-1) |
| `reliant/*` | 19 tests in PR smoke; remaining default tests in `e2e-full` | **Active** except `#[ignore]` |
Links: [`ci.yml`](../../.github/workflows/ci.yml) `e2e-tests` (line 347),
`test-ilm-integration-serial` (line 196). The `e2e-smoke` `default-filter` in
[`.config/nextest.toml`](../../.config/nextest.toml) is the **single wiring
mechanism** — extend that filter (or add a sibling profile) to admit more
tests; do not add e2e jobs to `ci.yml`. repl-1 / ilm-3 are landing in parallel
and may add lanes; keep the table above easy to extend.
The profile filters in [`.config/nextest.toml`](../../.config/nextest.toml) are
the wiring source of truth. Committed test-ID digests under
`.config/e2e-*-selection.txt` make every membership change explicit.
## Troubleshooting
@@ -188,9 +185,15 @@ and may add lanes; keep the table above easy to extend.
```bash
# Smoke (e2e-tests job) — includes the 20 fast replication tests
cargo nextest run --profile e2e-smoke -p e2e_test
# Replication nightly lane (16 slow + dual-node tests; install awscurl for the
# STS dual-node test, else it skips gracefully)
# Full single-node merge/main lane
cargo nextest run --profile e2e-full -p e2e_test
# Cluster fault nightly lane
cargo nextest run --profile e2e-nightly -p e2e_test
# Replication nightly lane; install awscurl so STS paths do not skip
cargo nextest run --profile e2e-repl-nightly -p e2e_test
# Fixed-port protocol nightly lane
RUSTFS_BUILD_FEATURES=ftps,webdav,sftp \
cargo nextest run -j 1 --profile e2e-protocols -p e2e_test --no-capture
# ILM serial lane
cargo nextest run -j1 --run-ignored ignored-only -p rustfs-scanner -p rustfs \
-E 'binary(lifecycle_integration_test) or (package(rustfs) and test(lifecycle_transition_api_test))'
@@ -273,4 +276,6 @@ current subset is.
`docs/testing/e2e-suite-inventory.md` records the per-module test counts as
listed by `cargo nextest list -p e2e_test`. Regenerate it when adding or
moving e2e tests so acceptance numbers in the test-strategy issues
(backlog#1147#1155) stay auditable.
(backlog#1147#1155) stay auditable. When a profile membership change is
intentional, review its JSON listing before updating the matching
`.config/e2e-*-selection.txt` test-ID digest.
+153 -1
View File
@@ -30,6 +30,7 @@ use reqwest::StatusCode;
use rustfs_signer::constants::UNSIGNED_PAYLOAD;
use rustfs_signer::sign_v4;
use s3s::Body;
use serde_json;
use std::ffi::OsStr;
use std::fs as stdfs;
use std::io::ErrorKind;
@@ -53,7 +54,8 @@ pub(crate) const FAST_DATA_USAGE_SCANNER_ENV: &[(&str, &str)] =
pub const TEST_BUCKET: &str = "e2e-test-bucket";
const RUSTFS_FULL_FEATURE: &str = "full";
const TEST_PORT_MIN: u16 = 20_000;
const TEST_PORT_RANGE: u16 = 40_000;
// Keep allocator ports below the ephemeral range used by bind(..., 0) test helpers.
const TEST_PORT_RANGE: u16 = 10_000;
const TEST_PORT_COUNTER_PATH: &str = "/tmp/rustfs_e2e_next_port";
const TEST_PORT_LOCK_DIR: &str = "/tmp/rustfs_e2e_port_allocator.lock";
const TEST_PORT_LOCK_STALE_AFTER: Duration = Duration::from_secs(30);
@@ -1582,6 +1584,156 @@ impl Drop for RustFSTestClusterEnvironment {
}
}
/// Send a SigV4-signed HTTP request and return the raw `reqwest::Response`.
///
/// Unlike [`signed_s3_request`], this variant accepts `body: Option<Vec<u8>>`
/// (binary-safe) and reorders parameters so that `access_key`/`secret_key`
/// appear before the body — matching the convention used by the replication
/// extension and object-lambda e2e suites.
pub(crate) async fn signed_request(
method: http::Method,
url: &str,
access_key: &str,
secret_key: &str,
body: Option<Vec<u8>>,
content_type: Option<&str>,
) -> Result<reqwest::Response, Box<dyn std::error::Error + Send + Sync>> {
let uri = url.parse::<http::Uri>()?;
let authority = uri.authority().ok_or("request URL missing authority")?.to_string();
let mut request = http::Request::builder().method(method.clone()).uri(uri);
request = request.header(HOST, authority);
request = request.header("x-amz-content-sha256", UNSIGNED_PAYLOAD);
if let Some(content_type) = content_type {
request = request.header(CONTENT_TYPE, content_type);
}
let content_len = body.as_ref().map(|body| body.len() as i64).unwrap_or_default();
let signed = sign_v4(request.body(Body::empty())?, content_len, access_key, secret_key, "", "us-east-1");
let reqwest_method = reqwest::Method::from_bytes(method.as_str().as_bytes())?;
let client = local_http_client();
let mut request_builder = client.request(reqwest_method, url);
for (name, value) in signed.headers() {
request_builder = request_builder.header(name, value);
}
if let Some(body) = body {
request_builder = request_builder.body(body);
}
Ok(request_builder.send().await?)
}
/// Like [`signed_request`], but uses a caller-supplied `reqwest::Client`
/// instead of the shared [`local_http_client`].
pub(crate) async fn signed_request_with_client(
client: &reqwest::Client,
method: http::Method,
url: &str,
access_key: &str,
secret_key: &str,
body: Option<Vec<u8>>,
content_type: Option<&str>,
) -> Result<reqwest::Response, Box<dyn std::error::Error + Send + Sync>> {
let uri = url.parse::<http::Uri>()?;
let authority = uri.authority().ok_or("request URL missing authority")?.to_string();
let mut request = http::Request::builder().method(method.clone()).uri(uri);
request = request.header(HOST, authority);
request = request.header("x-amz-content-sha256", UNSIGNED_PAYLOAD);
if let Some(content_type) = content_type {
request = request.header(CONTENT_TYPE, content_type);
}
let content_len = body.as_ref().map(|body| body.len() as i64).unwrap_or_default();
let signed = sign_v4(request.body(Body::empty())?, content_len, access_key, secret_key, "", "us-east-1");
let reqwest_method = reqwest::Method::from_bytes(method.as_str().as_bytes())?;
let mut request_builder = client.request(reqwest_method, url);
for (name, value) in signed.headers() {
request_builder = request_builder.header(name, value);
}
if let Some(body) = body {
request_builder = request_builder.body(body);
}
Ok(request_builder.send().await?)
}
/// Like [`signed_request`], but includes a `session_token` in the
/// `x-amz-security-token` header and passes it to the SigV4 signer.
pub(crate) async fn signed_request_with_session_token(
method: http::Method,
url: &str,
access_key: &str,
secret_key: &str,
session_token: &str,
body: Option<Vec<u8>>,
content_type: Option<&str>,
) -> Result<reqwest::Response, Box<dyn std::error::Error + Send + Sync>> {
let uri = url.parse::<http::Uri>()?;
let authority = uri.authority().ok_or("request URL missing authority")?.to_string();
let mut request = http::Request::builder().method(method.clone()).uri(uri);
request = request.header(HOST, authority);
request = request.header("x-amz-content-sha256", UNSIGNED_PAYLOAD);
if !session_token.is_empty() {
request = request.header("x-amz-security-token", session_token);
}
if let Some(content_type) = content_type {
request = request.header(CONTENT_TYPE, content_type);
}
let content_len = body.as_ref().map(|body| body.len() as i64).unwrap_or_default();
let signed = sign_v4(
request.body(Body::empty())?,
content_len,
access_key,
secret_key,
session_token,
"us-east-1",
);
let reqwest_method = reqwest::Method::from_bytes(method.as_str().as_bytes())?;
let client = local_http_client();
let mut request_builder = client.request(reqwest_method, url);
for (name, value) in signed.headers() {
request_builder = request_builder.header(name, value);
}
if let Some(body) = body {
request_builder = request_builder.body(body);
}
Ok(request_builder.send().await?)
}
/// Create a new user via the admin API.
pub(crate) async fn admin_create_user(
env: &RustFSTestEnvironment,
username: &str,
secret_key: &str,
) -> Result<(), Box<dyn std::error::Error + Send + Sync>> {
let url = format!("{}/rustfs/admin/v3/add-user?accessKey={}", env.url, username);
let body = serde_json::json!({
"secretKey": secret_key,
"status": "enabled"
});
let response = signed_request(
http::Method::PUT,
&url,
&env.access_key,
&env.secret_key,
Some(body.to_string().into_bytes()),
Some("application/json"),
)
.await?;
if response.status() != reqwest::StatusCode::OK {
let status = response.status();
let body = response.text().await.unwrap_or_default();
return Err(format!("create user failed: {status} {body}").into());
}
Ok(())
}
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
use super::*;
+2 -25
View File
@@ -6,9 +6,6 @@ use aws_sdk_s3::types::{CompletedMultipartUpload, CompletedPart};
use std::fs;
use std::path::PathBuf;
use std::process::Command;
use std::time::Duration;
use tokio::net::TcpStream;
use tokio::time::sleep;
use tracing::info;
const COMPRESSION_TEST_BUCKET: &str = "compression-test-bucket";
@@ -87,17 +84,7 @@ async fn start_rustfs_with_compression(env: &mut RustFSTestEnvironment) -> Resul
env.process = Some(process);
info!("Waiting for RustFS server with compression enabled on {}", env.address);
for i in 0..30 {
if TcpStream::connect(&env.address).await.is_ok() {
info!("RustFS server is ready after {} attempts", i + 1);
return Ok(());
}
if i == 29 {
return Err("RustFS server failed to become ready".into());
}
sleep(Duration::from_secs(1)).await;
}
Ok(())
env.wait_for_server_ready().await
}
#[tokio::test]
@@ -666,17 +653,7 @@ async fn start_rustfs_with_compression_and_sse(
env.process = Some(process);
info!("Waiting for RustFS server with compression + SSE-S3 enabled on {}", env.address);
for i in 0..30 {
if TcpStream::connect(&env.address).await.is_ok() {
info!("RustFS server is ready after {} attempts", i + 1);
return Ok(());
}
if i == 29 {
return Err("RustFS server failed to become ready".into());
}
sleep(Duration::from_secs(1)).await;
}
Ok(())
env.wait_for_server_ready().await
}
/// SSE-S3 + disk compression multipart: each part is compressed and then encrypted, and every GET
@@ -55,7 +55,6 @@ mod tests {
use aws_sdk_s3::Client;
use aws_sdk_s3::primitives::ByteStream;
use aws_sdk_s3::types::{CompletedMultipartUpload, CompletedPart};
use serial_test::serial;
use sha2::{Digest, Sha256};
use std::error::Error;
use tokio::time::{Duration, timeout};
@@ -269,7 +268,6 @@ mod tests {
/// stripes) and a multipart object (3 parts × 5 MiB) must GET back as a
/// full, byte-identical body with the correct Content-Length. No early EOF.
#[tokio::test]
#[serial]
async fn degraded_read_large_objects_with_one_disk_offline_return_full_body() -> TestResult {
init_logging();
info!("dist-13 (a): large-object degraded read with one of four disks offline");
@@ -335,7 +333,6 @@ mod tests {
/// mid-stream — the exact window the fixes had to reconstruct through rather
/// than truncate.
#[tokio::test]
#[serial]
async fn degraded_read_reconstructs_through_midstream_bitrot_within_quorum() -> TestResult {
init_logging();
info!("dist-13 (b): mid-stream bitrot within quorum must reconstruct a full body");
@@ -393,7 +390,6 @@ mod tests {
/// Content-Length. `get_checked` panics on that forbidden outcome, so this
/// test fails loudly if the truncation bug ever returns.
#[tokio::test]
#[serial]
async fn beyond_quorum_degraded_read_never_silently_truncates() -> TestResult {
init_logging();
info!("dist-13 (c): beyond-quorum degraded read must fail, never 200+truncated");
@@ -0,0 +1,248 @@
// Copyright 2024 RustFS Team
//
// Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
// you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
// You may obtain a copy of the License at
//
// http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
//
// Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
// distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
// WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
// See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
// limitations under the License.
//! E2E proof that a mid-stream GET failure is *reportable* — rustfs#4784.
//!
//! The functional invariant (a beyond-quorum read must fail rather than return
//! a clean short body) is already covered by
//! `degraded_read_eof_regression_test`. This suite covers the half that issue
//! #4784 got stuck on for a month: whether an operator can tell, from the
//! source server's log alone, that a GET failed mid-body and **which object**
//! it failed on.
//!
//! The reporter saw only downstream symptoms — `rclone` reporting
//! `unexpected EOF` on its PUT, and the receiving RustFS logging
//! `Io error: error reading a body from connection` with a 500. In a cross-remote
//! `rclone sync`, the source GET body *is* the destination PUT body, so a source
//! read that ends short of its committed `Content-Length` surfaces as a PUT
//! failure on the far side. Built-in replication and site replication have the
//! same shape (read locally, PUT remotely), which is why every transport in that
//! report failed the same way.
//!
//! The source side, meanwhile, said nothing:
//! * `GetObjectReaderStream`'s short-read and read-error arms only incremented
//! a metric; their log lines sat behind the `tracing-chunk-debug` cargo
//! feature, which is not in the default feature set and therefore is not
//! compiled into any released binary.
//! * `GetObjectStreamingReader` did log mid-stream failures, but only under a
//! `request_id` — with no bucket or object name, a failure could not be
//! traced back to the object that caused it.
//! * Those lines were `warn!`, while `DEFAULT_LOG_LEVEL` is `error`, so a
//! default deployment filtered them out anyway.
//!
//! This test reproduces the source-side fault against a real server over the S3
//! API and asserts the operator-visible evidence, at the **default** log level.
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
use crate::chaos::DiskFaultHarness;
use crate::common::init_logging;
use aws_sdk_s3::Client;
use aws_sdk_s3::primitives::ByteStream;
use aws_sdk_s3::types::{CompletedMultipartUpload, CompletedPart};
use std::error::Error;
use tokio::time::{Duration, timeout};
use tracing::info;
type TestResult = Result<(), Box<dyn Error + Send + Sync>>;
const MIB: usize = 1024 * 1024;
const OP_TIMEOUT: Duration = Duration::from_secs(90);
/// The structured event name every GET body failure is tagged with.
const STREAM_BODY_EVENT: &str = "get_object_stream_body";
fn payload(len: usize, seed: u8) -> Vec<u8> {
(0..len)
.map(|i| (i as u64).wrapping_mul(2654435761).wrapping_add(seed as u64) as u8)
.collect()
}
/// Upload a multipart object so the data lands in real `part.*` shard files
/// rather than being inlined into `xl.meta` (inlined objects cannot be
/// corrupted shard-wise, and never exercise the streaming read path).
async fn put_multipart(
client: &Client,
bucket: &str,
key: &str,
parts: Vec<Vec<u8>>,
) -> Result<usize, Box<dyn Error + Send + Sync>> {
let total_len = parts.iter().map(Vec::len).sum();
let create = client.create_multipart_upload().bucket(bucket).key(key).send().await?;
let upload_id = create.upload_id().ok_or("missing upload id")?.to_string();
let mut completed = Vec::with_capacity(parts.len());
for (index, part_body) in parts.into_iter().enumerate() {
let part_number = (index + 1) as i32;
let uploaded = timeout(
OP_TIMEOUT,
client
.upload_part()
.bucket(bucket)
.key(key)
.upload_id(&upload_id)
.part_number(part_number)
.body(ByteStream::from(part_body))
.send(),
)
.await
.map_err(|_| format!("upload_part {part_number} timed out"))??;
completed.push(
CompletedPart::builder()
.part_number(part_number)
.e_tag(uploaded.e_tag().ok_or("missing part etag")?)
.build(),
);
}
timeout(
OP_TIMEOUT,
client
.complete_multipart_upload()
.bucket(bucket)
.key(key)
.upload_id(&upload_id)
.multipart_upload(CompletedMultipartUpload::builder().set_parts(Some(completed)).build())
.send(),
)
.await
.map_err(|_| "complete_multipart_upload timed out")??;
Ok(total_len)
}
/// rustfs#4784: reproduce the source-side fault the reporter kept hitting —
/// a GET that commits `200` + a full `Content-Length` and then cannot finish
/// the body — and assert the server log names the object, at the log level a
/// default deployment actually runs with.
#[tokio::test]
async fn midstream_get_failure_is_logged_with_the_object_at_default_log_level() -> TestResult {
init_logging();
info!("rustfs#4784: a mid-stream GET failure must name its object in the source log");
let mut harness = DiskFaultHarness::new(4).await?;
// Capture the child's stdout so the test can read what an operator would.
let log_path = format!("{}/server.log", harness.env.temp_dir);
harness.env.capture_log_path = Some(log_path.clone());
// Reproduce a DEFAULT deployment's logging, not the e2e harness's
// permissive `rustfs=info`: `DEFAULT_LOG_LEVEL` is `error`. Before the
// #4784 fix these failures were `warn!`, so a default deployment
// filtered them out entirely — which is why the reporter's source logs
// were empty. extra_env is applied after the harness's own RUST_LOG, so
// this wins.
harness.set_env("RUST_LOG", "error");
harness.set_env("RUSTFS_OBS_LOGGER_LEVEL", "error");
harness.start_server().await?;
let client = harness.env.create_s3_client();
let bucket = "issue4784-source-read";
client.create_bucket().bucket(bucket).send().await?;
// Named after the reporter's restic index objects, which is where they
// saw the failures.
let key = "index/3b18542ab3af4c3d03f804c7a24173e7836ef7fa447b5d1e9d634f975cc51611";
let expected_len = put_multipart(
&client,
bucket,
key,
vec![payload(5 * MIB, 71), payload(5 * MIB, 72), payload(5 * MIB, 73)],
)
.await?;
// Baseline: the object reads back completely before any corruption.
let baseline = timeout(OP_TIMEOUT, client.get_object().bucket(bucket).key(key).send())
.await
.map_err(|_| "baseline GET timed out")??
.body
.collect()
.await?;
assert_eq!(baseline.into_bytes().len(), expected_len, "baseline GET must return the whole object");
// Corrupt three of four shards in a 2+2 set: below the 2-shard read
// quorum. The corruption sits mid-file, so block 0 still reads clean —
// the server commits 200 + the full Content-Length and only then cannot
// reconstruct. That is the mid-stream window the reporter's downstream
// saw as `unexpected EOF`.
harness.corrupt_object_shard(0, bucket, key)?;
harness.corrupt_object_shard(1, bucket, key)?;
harness.corrupt_object_shard(2, bucket, key)?;
let response = timeout(OP_TIMEOUT, client.get_object().bucket(bucket).key(key).send())
.await
.map_err(|_| "degraded GET timed out")?;
// Either outcome is functionally correct (that invariant belongs to
// degraded_read_eof_regression_test); this suite only needs the read to
// have failed so there is something to report.
let delivered = match response {
Err(err) => {
info!("degraded GET failed before the body: {err}");
None
}
Ok(response) => match response.body.collect().await {
Ok(aggregated) => Some(aggregated.into_bytes().len()),
Err(err) => {
info!("degraded GET failed mid-body as expected: {err}");
None
}
},
};
assert_ne!(
delivered,
Some(expected_len),
"the beyond-quorum read unexpectedly succeeded; this suite needs a failed read to have something to report"
);
// Give the child a moment to flush its stdout.
tokio::time::sleep(Duration::from_millis(500)).await;
let logged = std::fs::read_to_string(&log_path)?;
let failure_lines: Vec<&str> = logged.lines().filter(|line| line.contains(STREAM_BODY_EVENT)).collect();
assert!(
!failure_lines.is_empty(),
"a mid-stream GET failure produced no `{STREAM_BODY_EVENT}` line at the default log level. \
This is the #4784 blind spot: the failure was only counted in a metric, or logged below \
`error` and filtered out. Captured log:\n{logged}"
);
// The identity is the whole point: a request_id alone cannot be resolved
// back to an object once the request is over.
assert!(
failure_lines.iter().any(|line| line.contains(key)),
"no `{STREAM_BODY_EVENT}` line named the failing object `{key}`, so the report is still \
unactionable. Lines seen:\n{}",
failure_lines.join("\n")
);
assert!(
failure_lines.iter().any(|line| line.contains(bucket)),
"no `{STREAM_BODY_EVENT}` line named the failing bucket `{bucket}`. Lines seen:\n{}",
failure_lines.join("\n")
);
info!(
"source-side evidence now present: {} stream-body failure line(s) naming the object",
failure_lines.len()
);
for line in &failure_lines {
info!("operator-visible evidence: {line}");
}
Ok(())
}
}
@@ -46,7 +46,6 @@ use prost::Message;
use rustfs_signer::constants::UNSIGNED_PAYLOAD;
use rustfs_signer::sign_v4;
use s3s::Body;
use serial_test::serial;
use std::collections::BTreeMap;
use std::convert::Infallible;
use std::error::Error;
@@ -1028,20 +1027,6 @@ impl<'a> ReaderPathExpectation<'a> {
}
}
fn with_size_bucket(
object: ReaderObject<'a>,
expected_path: &'a str,
object_class: &'a str,
expected_size_bucket: &'a str,
) -> Self {
Self {
object,
expected_path,
object_class,
expected_size_bucket: Some(expected_size_bucket),
}
}
fn with_any_size_bucket(object: ReaderObject<'a>, expected_path: &'a str, object_class: &'a str) -> Self {
Self {
object,
@@ -1709,7 +1694,6 @@ fn assert_storage_layout(
}
#[tokio::test]
#[serial]
async fn four_node_inline_storage_and_get_boundaries() -> TestResult {
init_logging();
@@ -1781,7 +1765,6 @@ async fn four_node_inline_storage_and_get_boundaries() -> TestResult {
}
#[tokio::test]
#[serial]
async fn four_node_empty_legacy_volumes_start_as_fresh() -> TestResult {
init_logging();
@@ -1819,7 +1802,6 @@ async fn four_node_empty_legacy_volumes_start_as_fresh() -> TestResult {
}
#[tokio::test]
#[serial]
async fn four_node_inline_fallback_controls() -> TestResult {
init_logging();
@@ -1884,7 +1866,6 @@ async fn four_node_inline_fallback_controls() -> TestResult {
}
#[tokio::test]
#[serial]
async fn four_node_compressed_inline_fallback() -> TestResult {
init_logging();
@@ -1909,12 +1890,7 @@ async fn four_node_compressed_inline_fallback() -> TestResult {
assert_reader_path(
&collector,
&client,
ReaderPathExpectation::with_size_bucket(
ReaderObject::new(bucket, key, &body, put.e_tag(), None),
LEGACY_DUPLEX,
COMPRESSED,
size_bucket(4 * KIB),
),
ReaderPathExpectation::for_class(ReaderObject::new(bucket, key, &body, put.e_tag(), None), LEGACY_DUPLEX, COMPRESSED),
)
.await?;
@@ -1924,7 +1900,6 @@ async fn four_node_compressed_inline_fallback() -> TestResult {
/// Multipart disk compression is live again, so a compression-enabled cluster classifies multipart objects as compressed and the roundtrip (full GET plus partNumber GET) must still return the original bytes.
/// Reverting the multipart compression fix must fail this test.
#[tokio::test]
#[serial]
async fn four_node_multipart_disk_compression_roundtrip() -> TestResult {
init_logging();
@@ -1971,7 +1946,6 @@ async fn four_node_multipart_disk_compression_roundtrip() -> TestResult {
/// read costs on the order of the covering part's block size against a ~5 MiB
/// object.
#[tokio::test]
#[serial]
async fn four_node_compressed_multipart_tail_range_reads_are_bounded() -> TestResult {
init_logging();
@@ -2038,7 +2012,6 @@ async fn four_node_compressed_multipart_tail_range_reads_are_bounded() -> TestRe
}
#[tokio::test]
#[serial]
async fn four_node_mixed_msgpack_compat_mode_preserves_fallback_controls() -> TestResult {
init_logging();
@@ -2142,7 +2115,6 @@ async fn four_node_mixed_msgpack_compat_mode_preserves_fallback_controls() -> Te
}
#[tokio::test]
#[serial]
async fn four_node_add_tier_converges() -> TestResult {
init_logging();
@@ -2161,7 +2133,6 @@ async fn four_node_add_tier_converges() -> TestResult {
}
#[tokio::test]
#[serial]
async fn four_node_add_tier_converges_after_offline_node_restart_without_second_mutation() -> TestResult {
init_logging();
@@ -2183,7 +2154,6 @@ async fn four_node_add_tier_converges_after_offline_node_restart_without_second_
}
#[tokio::test]
#[serial]
async fn four_node_manual_transition_job_status_survives_node_restart() -> TestResult {
init_logging();
@@ -2258,7 +2228,6 @@ async fn four_node_manual_transition_job_status_survives_node_restart() -> TestR
}
#[tokio::test]
#[serial]
async fn four_node_manual_transition_distributed_admission_conflict_reports_status_and_backpressure() -> TestResult {
init_logging();
@@ -2274,6 +2243,7 @@ async fn four_node_manual_transition_distributed_admission_conflict_reports_stat
hot.set_env("RUSTFS_SCANNER_CYCLE", "3600");
hot.set_env("RUSTFS_MAX_TRANSITION_WORKERS", "1");
hot.set_env("RUSTFS_TRANSITION_QUEUE_CAPACITY", "1");
hot.set_env("RUSTFS_TRANSITION_QUEUE_SEND_TIMEOUT_MS", "1");
hot.start().await?;
let hot_client = hot.create_s3_client(0)?;
@@ -2290,7 +2260,7 @@ async fn four_node_manual_transition_distributed_admission_conflict_reports_stat
.put_object()
.bucket(&bucket)
.key(key)
.body(ByteStream::from(payload(64 * KIB, index)))
.body(ByteStream::from(payload(1024 * KIB, index)))
.send()
.await?;
}
@@ -2399,7 +2369,6 @@ async fn four_node_manual_transition_distributed_admission_conflict_reports_stat
}
#[tokio::test]
#[serial]
#[ignore = "manual #1508 evidence harness: starts a 4-node cluster, a remote tier, and an in-flight transition job"]
async fn four_node_manual_transition_rollout_non_empty_restart_readback() -> TestResult {
init_logging();
@@ -2504,7 +2473,6 @@ async fn four_node_manual_transition_rollout_non_empty_restart_readback() -> Tes
}
#[tokio::test]
#[serial]
async fn four_node_mixed_msgpack_compat_mode_preserves_fallback_controls_during_transition() -> TestResult {
init_logging();
@@ -2616,7 +2584,6 @@ async fn four_node_mixed_msgpack_compat_mode_preserves_fallback_controls_during_
}
#[tokio::test]
#[serial]
async fn four_node_transitioned_inline_fallback() -> TestResult {
init_logging();
+51 -1
View File
@@ -40,7 +40,7 @@ use std::time::Duration;
use tokio::fs;
use tokio::net::TcpStream;
use tokio::time::sleep;
use tracing::{debug, error, info};
use tracing::{debug, error, info, warn};
// KMS-specific constants
pub const TEST_BUCKET: &str = "kms-test-bucket";
@@ -177,6 +177,49 @@ pub async fn get_kms_status(
Ok(status)
}
/// Poll the KMS status endpoint until the backend reports ready or the timeout
/// expires. Replaces hard-coded `sleep(Duration::from_secs(3))` startup waits
/// with an active readiness probe so tests start as soon as KMS is usable
/// (typically < 1 s) instead of always waiting the full 3 s.
///
/// Uses exponential back-off starting at 200 ms (doubling each attempt, capped
/// at 1 s) up to a total wall-clock budget of 5 s.
pub async fn wait_for_kms_ready(
base_url: &str,
access_key: &str,
secret_key: &str,
) -> Result<(), Box<dyn std::error::Error + Send + Sync>> {
let total_deadline = Duration::from_secs(5);
let start = tokio::time::Instant::now();
let mut backoff = Duration::from_millis(200);
let max_backoff = Duration::from_secs(1);
let mut first_attempt = true;
loop {
if !first_attempt {
if start.elapsed() >= total_deadline {
return Err("KMS failed to become ready within 5 seconds".into());
}
sleep(backoff).await;
backoff = (backoff * 2).min(max_backoff);
}
first_attempt = false;
match get_kms_status(base_url, access_key, secret_key).await {
Ok(status) => {
info!("KMS is ready (status: {})", status);
return Ok(());
}
Err(e) => {
if start.elapsed() >= total_deadline {
return Err(format!("KMS did not become ready within 5 s: last error: {e}").into());
}
warn!(error = %e, elapsed_ms = start.elapsed().as_millis() as u64, "KMS not ready yet, retrying…");
}
}
}
}
/// Create a default KMS key for testing and return the created key ID
pub async fn create_default_key(
base_url: &str,
@@ -861,6 +904,13 @@ impl LocalKMSTestEnvironment {
Ok(default_key_id.to_string())
}
/// Poll the KMS status endpoint until the backend reports ready.
///
/// Prefer this over a fixed `sleep` after calling `start_rustfs_for_local_kms`.
pub async fn wait_for_kms_ready(&self) -> Result<(), Box<dyn std::error::Error + Send + Sync>> {
wait_for_kms_ready(&self.base_env.url, &self.base_env.access_key, &self.base_env.secret_key).await
}
/// Configure Local KMS backend with a predefined default key
pub async fn configure_local_kms(&self) -> Result<String, Box<dyn std::error::Error + Send + Sync>> {
// Use a fixed, predictable default key ID
@@ -39,6 +39,7 @@ use std::time::Duration;
use tracing::info;
type TestResult = Result<(), Box<dyn std::error::Error + Send + Sync>>;
type S3OperationResult<T> = Result<T, Box<aws_sdk_s3::Error>>;
const ALLOWED_KEY: &str = "kms-matrix-allowed-key";
const OTHER_KEY: &str = "kms-matrix-other-key";
@@ -130,7 +131,7 @@ fn policy_document(statements: Vec<serde_json::Value>) -> String {
serde_json::json!({ "Version": "2012-10-17", "Statement": statements }).to_string()
}
async fn put_sse_kms(client: &Client, key: &str, kms_key_id: &str) -> Result<(), aws_sdk_s3::Error> {
async fn put_sse_kms(client: &Client, key: &str, kms_key_id: &str) -> S3OperationResult<()> {
client
.put_object()
.bucket(BUCKET)
@@ -141,16 +142,23 @@ async fn put_sse_kms(client: &Client, key: &str, kms_key_id: &str) -> Result<(),
.send()
.await
.map(|_| ())
.map_err(aws_sdk_s3::Error::from)
.map_err(|error| Box::new(aws_sdk_s3::Error::from(error)))
}
/// Assert the operation failed with `AccessDenied` rather than any other error.
///
/// A bare `is_err` would also accept `KMSKeyDisabled` or an internal error, which
/// would hide both a leak of key state and an outage masquerading as a denial.
fn assert_access_denied<T: std::fmt::Debug>(result: Result<T, aws_sdk_s3::Error>, what: &str) {
fn assert_access_denied<T: std::fmt::Debug, E: std::fmt::Debug + std::borrow::Borrow<aws_sdk_s3::Error>>(
result: Result<T, E>,
what: &str,
) {
let error = result.expect_err(&format!("{what} must be denied"));
assert_eq!(error.code(), Some("AccessDenied"), "{what} must fail with AccessDenied: {error:?}");
assert_eq!(
error.borrow().code(),
Some("AccessDenied"),
"{what} must fail with AccessDenied: {error:?}"
);
}
/// Retry an SSE-KMS write until the identity's policy has reached the request path.
@@ -296,7 +304,7 @@ async fn sse_kms_per_key_authorization_negative_matrix() -> TestResult {
.send()
.await
.map(|_| ())
.map_err(aws_sdk_s3::Error::from),
.map_err(|err| Box::new(aws_sdk_s3::Error::from(err))),
"SSE-KMS read by an identity holding no kms grant",
);
@@ -310,7 +318,7 @@ async fn sse_kms_per_key_authorization_negative_matrix() -> TestResult {
.send()
.await
.map(|_| ())
.map_err(aws_sdk_s3::Error::from),
.map_err(|err| Box::new(aws_sdk_s3::Error::from(err))),
"SSE-KMS read by an identity holding kms:GenerateDataKey but not kms:Decrypt",
);
+4 -1
View File
@@ -647,7 +647,10 @@ async fn test_multipart_upload_with_sse_c(
}
/// Test large multipart upload to verify streaming encryption works correctly
#[allow(dead_code)]
#[allow(
dead_code,
reason = "parked behind the TODO in test_local_kms_multipart_upload until streaming encryption is fixed for large files (backlog#1823)"
)]
async fn test_large_multipart_upload(
s3_client: &aws_sdk_s3::Client,
bucket: &str,
@@ -19,7 +19,6 @@
//! multipart upload behaviour.
use crate::common::{TEST_BUCKET, init_logging};
use serial_test::serial;
use tokio::time::{Duration, sleep};
use tracing::{error, info};
@@ -62,7 +61,6 @@ impl VaultKmsTestContext {
}
#[tokio::test]
#[serial]
async fn test_vault_kms_end_to_end() -> Result<(), Box<dyn std::error::Error + Send + Sync>> {
init_logging();
if skip_if_kms_admin_tool_unavailable("test_vault_kms_end_to_end") {
@@ -118,7 +116,6 @@ async fn test_vault_kms_end_to_end() -> Result<(), Box<dyn std::error::Error + S
}
#[tokio::test]
#[serial]
async fn test_vault_kms_key_isolation() -> Result<(), Box<dyn std::error::Error + Send + Sync>> {
init_logging();
if skip_if_kms_admin_tool_unavailable("test_vault_kms_key_isolation") {
@@ -205,7 +202,6 @@ async fn test_vault_kms_key_isolation() -> Result<(), Box<dyn std::error::Error
}
#[tokio::test]
#[serial]
async fn test_vault_kms_large_file() -> Result<(), Box<dyn std::error::Error + Send + Sync>> {
init_logging();
if skip_if_kms_admin_tool_unavailable("test_vault_kms_large_file") {
@@ -270,7 +266,6 @@ async fn test_vault_kms_large_file() -> Result<(), Box<dyn std::error::Error + S
}
#[tokio::test]
#[serial]
async fn test_vault_kms_multipart_upload() -> Result<(), Box<dyn std::error::Error + Send + Sync>> {
init_logging();
if skip_if_kms_admin_tool_unavailable("test_vault_kms_multipart_upload") {
@@ -301,7 +296,6 @@ async fn test_vault_kms_multipart_upload() -> Result<(), Box<dyn std::error::Err
}
#[tokio::test]
#[serial]
async fn test_vault_kms_key_operations() -> Result<(), Box<dyn std::error::Error + Send + Sync>> {
init_logging();
if skip_if_kms_admin_tool_unavailable("test_vault_kms_key_operations") {
+5
View File
@@ -48,6 +48,11 @@ mod replacement_privileged_e2e_test;
#[cfg(test)]
mod degraded_read_eof_regression_test;
// rustfs#4784: a mid-stream GET failure must be reportable from the source
// server's log alone — naming the object, at the default log level.
#[cfg(test)]
mod get_stream_failure_observability_test;
// backlog#1183: GET codec-streaming fast path must be byte/header identical to
// the legacy duplex path before its rollout gates can be flipped on by default.
#[cfg(test)]
+2 -36
View File
@@ -12,12 +12,11 @@
// See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
// limitations under the License.
use crate::common::{RustFSTestClusterEnvironment, RustFSTestEnvironment, init_logging, local_http_client};
use crate::common::{RustFSTestClusterEnvironment, RustFSTestEnvironment, init_logging, local_http_client, signed_request};
use aws_sdk_s3::primitives::ByteStream;
use http::header::{CONTENT_TYPE, HOST};
use reqwest::StatusCode;
use rustfs_signer::constants::UNSIGNED_PAYLOAD;
use rustfs_signer::{pre_sign_v4, sign_v4};
use rustfs_signer::pre_sign_v4;
use rustfs_utils::egress::ENV_OUTBOUND_ALLOW_ORIGINS;
use s3s::Body;
use std::collections::HashMap;
@@ -227,39 +226,6 @@ async fn presigned_get_request(
Ok(local_http_client().get(signed.uri().to_string()).send().await?)
}
async fn signed_request(
method: http::Method,
url: &str,
access_key: &str,
secret_key: &str,
body: Option<Vec<u8>>,
content_type: Option<&str>,
) -> Result<reqwest::Response, Box<dyn Error + Send + Sync>> {
let uri = url.parse::<http::Uri>()?;
let authority = uri.authority().ok_or("request URL missing authority")?.to_string();
let mut request = http::Request::builder().method(method.clone()).uri(uri);
request = request.header(HOST, authority);
request = request.header("x-amz-content-sha256", UNSIGNED_PAYLOAD);
if let Some(content_type) = content_type {
request = request.header(CONTENT_TYPE, content_type);
}
let content_len = body.as_ref().map(|body| body.len() as i64).unwrap_or_default();
let signed = sign_v4(request.body(Body::empty())?, content_len, access_key, secret_key, "", "us-east-1");
let reqwest_method = reqwest::Method::from_bytes(method.as_str().as_bytes())?;
let client = local_http_client();
let mut request_builder = client.request(reqwest_method, url);
for (name, value) in signed.headers() {
request_builder = request_builder.header(name, value);
}
if let Some(body) = body {
request_builder = request_builder.body(body);
}
Ok(request_builder.send().await?)
}
async fn configure_webhook_target(
env: &RustFSTestEnvironment,
target_name: &str,
@@ -17,7 +17,6 @@
use crate::common::{awscurl_delete, awscurl_put, init_logging};
use crate::policy::test_env::PolicyTestEnvironment;
use aws_sdk_s3::primitives::ByteStream;
use serial_test::serial;
use tracing::info;
/// Helper function to create a regular user with given credentials
@@ -122,7 +121,6 @@ async fn cleanup_user_and_policy(env: &PolicyTestEnvironment, username: &str, po
/// Test AWS policy variables with single-value scenarios
#[tokio::test(flavor = "multi_thread")]
#[serial]
#[ignore = "Starts a rustfs server; enable when running full E2E"]
pub async fn test_aws_policy_variables_single_value() -> Result<(), Box<dyn std::error::Error + Send + Sync>> {
test_aws_policy_variables_single_value_impl().await
@@ -275,7 +273,6 @@ pub async fn test_aws_policy_variables_single_value_impl_with_env(
/// Test AWS policy variables with multi-value scenarios
#[tokio::test(flavor = "multi_thread")]
#[serial]
#[ignore = "Starts a rustfs server; enable when running full E2E"]
pub async fn test_aws_policy_variables_multi_value() -> Result<(), Box<dyn std::error::Error + Send + Sync>> {
test_aws_policy_variables_multi_value_impl().await
@@ -401,7 +398,6 @@ pub async fn test_aws_policy_variables_multi_value_impl_with_env(
/// Test AWS policy variables with variable concatenation
#[tokio::test(flavor = "multi_thread")]
#[serial]
#[ignore = "Starts a rustfs server; enable when running full E2E"]
pub async fn test_aws_policy_variables_concatenation() -> Result<(), Box<dyn std::error::Error + Send + Sync>> {
test_aws_policy_variables_concatenation_impl().await
@@ -491,7 +487,6 @@ pub async fn test_aws_policy_variables_concatenation_impl_with_env(
/// Test AWS policy variables with nested scenarios
#[tokio::test(flavor = "multi_thread")]
#[serial]
#[ignore = "Starts a rustfs server; enable when running full E2E"]
pub async fn test_aws_policy_variables_nested() -> Result<(), Box<dyn std::error::Error + Send + Sync>> {
test_aws_policy_variables_nested_impl().await
@@ -509,7 +504,6 @@ pub async fn test_aws_policy_variables_nested_impl() -> Result<(), Box<dyn std::
/// Test AWS policy variables with STS temporary credentials
#[tokio::test(flavor = "multi_thread")]
#[serial]
#[ignore = "Starts a rustfs server; enable when running full E2E"]
pub async fn test_aws_policy_variables_sts() -> Result<(), Box<dyn std::error::Error + Send + Sync>> {
test_aws_policy_variables_sts_impl().await
@@ -705,7 +699,6 @@ pub async fn test_aws_policy_variables_sts_impl_with_env(
/// Test AWS policy variables with deny scenarios
#[tokio::test(flavor = "multi_thread")]
#[serial]
#[ignore = "Starts a rustfs server; enable when running full E2E"]
pub async fn test_aws_policy_variables_deny() -> Result<(), Box<dyn std::error::Error + Send + Sync>> {
test_aws_policy_variables_deny_impl().await
+7 -24
View File
@@ -14,37 +14,21 @@
use crate::common::init_logging;
use crate::policy::test_env::PolicyTestEnvironment;
use serial_test::serial;
use std::time::Instant;
use tokio::time::{Duration, sleep};
use tracing::{error, info};
/// Core test categories
#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub enum TestCategory {
SingleValue,
MultiValue,
Concatenation,
Nested,
DenyScenarios,
}
impl TestCategory {}
/// Test case definition
#[derive(Debug, Clone)]
pub struct TestDefinition {
pub name: String,
#[allow(dead_code)]
pub category: TestCategory,
pub is_critical: bool,
}
impl TestDefinition {
pub fn new(name: impl Into<String>, category: TestCategory, is_critical: bool) -> Self {
pub fn new(name: impl Into<String>, is_critical: bool) -> Self {
Self {
name: name.into(),
category,
is_critical,
}
}
@@ -92,12 +76,12 @@ impl PolicyTestSuite {
/// Create default test suite
pub fn new() -> Self {
let tests = vec![
TestDefinition::new("test_aws_policy_variables_single_value", TestCategory::SingleValue, true),
TestDefinition::new("test_aws_policy_variables_multi_value", TestCategory::MultiValue, true),
TestDefinition::new("test_aws_policy_variables_concatenation", TestCategory::Concatenation, true),
TestDefinition::new("test_aws_policy_variables_nested", TestCategory::Nested, true),
TestDefinition::new("test_aws_policy_variables_deny", TestCategory::DenyScenarios, true),
TestDefinition::new("test_aws_policy_variables_sts", TestCategory::SingleValue, true),
TestDefinition::new("test_aws_policy_variables_single_value", true),
TestDefinition::new("test_aws_policy_variables_multi_value", true),
TestDefinition::new("test_aws_policy_variables_concatenation", true),
TestDefinition::new("test_aws_policy_variables_nested", true),
TestDefinition::new("test_aws_policy_variables_deny", true),
TestDefinition::new("test_aws_policy_variables_sts", true),
];
Self {
@@ -228,7 +212,6 @@ impl PolicyTestSuite {
/// Test suite
#[tokio::test]
#[serial]
#[ignore = "Connects to existing rustfs server"]
async fn test_policy_critical_suite() -> Result<(), Box<dyn std::error::Error + Send + Sync>> {
let config = TestSuiteConfig {
+7 -1
View File
@@ -11,10 +11,17 @@ test process directly.
## Running Tests
Use the canonical CI-equivalent protocol command in the parent
[`e2e_test` README](../../README.md#troubleshooting).
For targeted debugging of the core suite only:
```bash
RUSTFS_BUILD_FEATURES=ftps,webdav,sftp cargo test --package e2e_test test_protocol_core_suite -- --test-threads=1 --nocapture
```
This targeted command does not cover the full `e2e-protocols` profile.
`RUSTFS_BUILD_FEATURES` controls which features the test rustfs binary is
built with. When this variable is set, the protocol test runner schedules
only entries whose protocol is present in the requested feature list. Leave
@@ -133,4 +140,3 @@ property without consulting any external doc.
Bind ports 9023 (SFTP) and 9100 (S3). Spawns rustfs with
`RUSTFS_SFTP_IDLE_TIMEOUT=5`, sleeps 10 s past the timeout, then issues an
SFTP request and asserts the server has closed the session.
+105 -2
View File
@@ -41,7 +41,6 @@ use reqwest::Client;
use rustfs_signer::constants::UNSIGNED_PAYLOAD;
use rustfs_signer::sign_v4;
use s3s::Body;
use serial_test::serial;
use tokio::process::Command;
use tracing::info;
@@ -233,6 +232,111 @@ pub async fn test_webdav_core_operations() -> Result<()> {
);
info!("PASS: PUT file '{}' successful", filename);
// Regression for #6260: a bucket-scoped policy must be able to discover its bucket at the
// WebDAV root without the unrelated global ListAllMyBuckets permission.
let scoped_bucket = "webdav-scoped-bucket";
let scoped_file = "visible.txt";
let scoped_user = "webdav-scoped-user";
let scoped_secret = "webdav-scoped-secret";
let scoped_policy_name = "webdav-scoped-policy";
let resp = client
.request(reqwest::Method::from_bytes(b"MKCOL").unwrap(), format!("{}/{}", base_url, scoped_bucket))
.header("Authorization", &auth_header)
.send()
.await?;
assert_eq!(resp.status().as_u16(), 201, "scoped test bucket should be created");
let resp = client
.put(format!("{}/{}/{}", base_url, scoped_bucket, scoped_file))
.header("Authorization", &auth_header)
.body("visible to the scoped principal")
.send()
.await?;
assert_eq!(resp.status().as_u16(), 201, "scoped test object should be created");
admin_create_user(&admin_base_url, scoped_user, scoped_secret).await?;
admin_add_canned_policy(
&admin_base_url,
scoped_policy_name,
&serde_json::json!({
"Version": "2012-10-17",
"Statement": [
{
"Effect": "Allow",
"Action": ["s3:*"],
"Resource": [
format!("arn:aws:s3:::{}", scoped_bucket),
format!("arn:aws:s3:::{}/*", scoped_bucket)
]
},
{
"Effect": "Deny",
"Action": ["s3:*"],
"Resource": [
format!("arn:aws:s3:::{}", scoped_bucket),
format!("arn:aws:s3:::{}/*", scoped_bucket)
],
"Condition": { "Bool": { "aws:SecureTransport": "true" } }
},
{
"Effect": "Deny",
"Action": ["s3:*"],
"Resource": [
format!("arn:aws:s3:::{}", scoped_bucket),
format!("arn:aws:s3:::{}/*", scoped_bucket)
],
"Condition": { "StringEquals": { "s3:signatureversion": "AWS4-HMAC-SHA256" } }
}
]
}),
)
.await?;
admin_attach_policy_to_user(&admin_base_url, scoped_policy_name, scoped_user).await?;
let scoped_auth = basic_auth_header_for(scoped_user, scoped_secret);
let resp = client
.request(reqwest::Method::from_bytes(b"PROPFIND").unwrap(), &base_url)
.header("Authorization", &scoped_auth)
.header("Depth", "1")
.header("x-amz-content-sha256", "STREAMING-AWS4-HMAC-SHA256-PAYLOAD")
.send()
.await?;
assert_eq!(resp.status().as_u16(), 207, "bucket-scoped root PROPFIND should succeed");
let root_listing = resp.text().await?;
assert!(root_listing.contains(scoped_bucket), "the authorized bucket should be listed");
assert!(!root_listing.contains(bucket_name), "an unauthorized bucket must not be listed");
let resp = client
.request(
reqwest::Method::from_bytes(b"PROPFIND").unwrap(),
format!("{}/{}", base_url, scoped_bucket),
)
.header("Authorization", &scoped_auth)
.header("Depth", "1")
.send()
.await?;
assert_eq!(resp.status().as_u16(), 207, "authorized bucket PROPFIND should succeed");
assert!(resp.text().await?.contains(scoped_file), "the authorized object should be listed");
let denied_user = "webdav-no-buckets-user";
let denied_secret = "webdav-no-buckets-secret";
admin_create_user(&admin_base_url, denied_user, denied_secret).await?;
let resp = client
.request(reqwest::Method::from_bytes(b"PROPFIND").unwrap(), &base_url)
.header("Authorization", basic_auth_header_for(denied_user, denied_secret))
.header("Depth", "1")
.send()
.await?;
assert_eq!(
resp.status().as_u16(),
207,
"PROPFIND keeps the root resource visible when the directory listing is forbidden"
);
let denied_body = resp.text().await?;
assert!(!denied_body.contains(scoped_bucket), "a denied response must not leak the scoped bucket");
assert!(!denied_body.contains(bucket_name), "a denied response must not leak the admin bucket");
// Test GET (download file)
info!("Testing WebDAV: GET (download file '{}')", filename);
let resp = client
@@ -716,7 +820,6 @@ pub async fn test_webdav_core_operations() -> Result<()> {
}
#[tokio::test]
#[serial]
async fn test_webdav_core_operations_direct() -> Result<()> {
test_webdav_core_operations().await
}
+40 -24
View File
@@ -169,6 +169,42 @@ impl QuotaTestEnv {
bucket: &str,
quota_bytes: u64,
) -> Result<(), Box<dyn std::error::Error + Send + Sync>> {
self.wait_for_quota_usage_for(bucket).await?;
let quota_path = format!("/rustfs/admin/v3/quota/{bucket}");
let quota_config = serde_json::json!({
"quota": quota_bytes,
"quota_type": "HARD"
})
.to_string();
let readiness = async {
loop {
let (status, response) = admin_request(
&self.env.url,
Method::PUT,
&quota_path,
Some(quota_config.clone()),
&self.env.access_key,
&self.env.secret_key,
)
.await?;
if status.is_success() {
return Ok::<(), Box<dyn std::error::Error + Send + Sync>>(());
}
if status != StatusCode::SERVICE_UNAVAILABLE {
return Err(format!("failed to set quota for {bucket}: {status} {response}").into());
}
sleep(Duration::from_secs(1)).await;
}
};
match timeout(Duration::from_secs(30), readiness).await {
Ok(result) => result,
Err(_) => Err(format!("quota readiness did not converge for {bucket} within 30 seconds").into()),
}
}
pub async fn wait_for_quota_usage_for(&self, bucket: &str) -> Result<(), Box<dyn std::error::Error + Send + Sync>> {
let stats_path = format!("/rustfs/admin/v3/quota-stats/{bucket}");
let readiness = async {
loop {
@@ -181,28 +217,12 @@ impl QuotaTestEnv {
if status != StatusCode::SERVICE_UNAVAILABLE {
return Err(format!("quota usage readiness failed for {bucket}: {status} {response}").into());
}
sleep(Duration::from_secs(1)).await;
}
};
match timeout(Duration::from_secs(30), readiness).await {
Ok(result) => result?,
Err(_) => {
return Err(format!("quota usage did not become authoritative for {bucket} within 30 seconds").into());
}
}
let url = format!("{}/rustfs/admin/v3/quota/{}", self.env.url, bucket);
let quota_config = serde_json::json!({
"quota": quota_bytes,
"quota_type": "HARD"
});
let response = awscurl_put(&url, &quota_config.to_string(), &self.env.access_key, &self.env.secret_key).await?;
if response.contains("error") {
Err(format!("Failed to set quota: {}", response).into())
} else {
Ok(())
Ok(result) => result,
Err(_) => Err(format!("quota usage did not become authoritative for {bucket} within 30 seconds").into()),
}
}
@@ -614,6 +634,7 @@ mod integration_tests {
let env = QuotaTestEnv::new().await?;
env.create_bucket().await?;
env.wait_for_quota_usage_for(&env.bucket_name).await?;
// Test 1: GET quota for bucket without quota config
let url = format!("{}/rustfs/admin/v3/quota/{}", env.env.url, env.bucket_name);
@@ -621,12 +642,7 @@ mod integration_tests {
assert!(response.contains("quota") && response.contains("null"));
// Test 2: PUT quota - valid config
let quota_config = serde_json::json!({
"quota": 1048576,
"quota_type": "HARD"
});
let response = awscurl_put(&url, &quota_config.to_string(), &env.env.access_key, &env.env.secret_key).await?;
assert!(response.contains("success") || !response.contains("error"));
env.set_bucket_quota(1048576).await?;
// Test 3: GET quota after setting
let response = awscurl_get(&url, &env.env.access_key, &env.env.secret_key).await?;
@@ -27,7 +27,6 @@ mod tests {
use aws_sdk_s3::Client;
use aws_sdk_s3::primitives::ByteStream;
use aws_sdk_s3::types::{BucketVersioningStatus, CompletedMultipartUpload, CompletedPart, VersioningConfiguration};
use serial_test::serial;
use sha2::{Digest, Sha256};
use std::collections::HashSet;
use std::error::Error;
@@ -157,7 +156,6 @@ mod tests {
/// content, degraded writes must succeed, and everything must still
/// verify after the disk returns.
#[tokio::test]
#[serial]
async fn test_degraded_read_write_with_one_disk_offline() -> Result<(), Box<dyn std::error::Error + Send + Sync>> {
init_logging();
info!("Reliability: degraded read/write with one of four disks offline");
@@ -210,7 +208,6 @@ mod tests {
/// bytes to a reader: per-shard bitrot checksums reject the bad shard and
/// the object is reconstructed from the remaining shards.
#[tokio::test]
#[serial]
async fn test_bitrot_corrupted_shard_read_returns_correct_data() -> Result<(), Box<dyn std::error::Error + Send + Sync>> {
init_logging();
info!("Reliability: GET must read through a bitrot-corrupted shard");
@@ -253,7 +250,6 @@ mod tests {
/// heal, and require the replaced disk to be rebuilt and all content to
/// verify against the sha256 manifest.
#[tokio::test]
#[serial]
async fn test_fresh_disk_replacement_heals_after_sigkill_restart() -> Result<(), Box<dyn std::error::Error + Send + Sync>> {
init_logging();
info!("Reliability: fresh-disk replacement heals after SIGKILL restart");
@@ -327,7 +323,6 @@ mod tests {
}
#[tokio::test]
#[serial]
async fn test_versioned_shard_census_selects_each_version_data_dir() -> Result<(), Box<dyn Error + Send + Sync>> {
init_logging();
info!("Reliability: physical shard census selects the requested object version");
+170
View File
@@ -168,6 +168,24 @@ async fn wait_for_version_expired(
}
}
async fn wait_for_key_versions_empty(client: &Client, bucket: &str, key: &str, deadline: StdDuration) -> TestResult {
let start = std::time::Instant::now();
loop {
let listing = client.list_object_versions().bucket(bucket).prefix(key).send().await?;
if listing.versions().is_empty() && listing.delete_markers().is_empty() {
return Ok(());
}
if start.elapsed() >= deadline {
return Err(format!(
"object {bucket}/{key} still had versions or delete markers after {}s: {listing:?}",
deadline.as_secs()
)
.into());
}
tokio::time::sleep(StdDuration::from_millis(500)).await;
}
}
/// Build a prefix-scoped `Days`-based expiration rule.
fn expiration_rule(id: &str, prefix: &str, days: i32) -> Result<LifecycleRule, Box<dyn std::error::Error + Send + Sync>> {
let rule = LifecycleRule::builder()
@@ -193,6 +211,21 @@ fn noncurrent_expiration_rule(
Ok(rule)
}
fn noncurrent_expiration_with_delete_marker_cleanup_rule(
id: &str,
prefix: &str,
days: i32,
) -> Result<LifecycleRule, Box<dyn std::error::Error + Send + Sync>> {
let rule = LifecycleRule::builder()
.id(id)
.filter(LifecycleRuleFilter::builder().prefix(prefix).build())
.expiration(LifecycleExpiration::builder().expired_object_delete_marker(true).build())
.noncurrent_version_expiration(NoncurrentVersionExpiration::builder().noncurrent_days(days).build())
.status(ExpirationStatus::Enabled)
.build()?;
Ok(rule)
}
async fn put_expiration_config(client: &Client, bucket: &str, rule: LifecycleRule) -> TestResult {
let lifecycle = BucketLifecycleConfiguration::builder().rules(rule).build()?;
client
@@ -412,6 +445,143 @@ async fn test_lifecycle_noncurrent_version_expiry_removes_only_old_version() ->
Ok(())
}
/// A combined `NoncurrentDays=1` and `ExpiredObjectDeleteMarker=true` rule
/// must remove a noncurrent data version and then its sole latest delete
/// marker, without expiring current-only objects. A second prefix with only
/// noncurrent expiry proves that marker cleanup comes from EODM.
#[tokio::test(flavor = "multi_thread", worker_threads = 2)]
async fn test_lifecycle_noncurrent_expiry_then_cleans_expired_delete_marker() -> TestResult {
let mut env = RustFSTestEnvironment::new().await?;
let mut extra_env = fast_lifecycle_env();
extra_env.push(("RUSTFS_ILM_DEBUG_DAY_SECS", "2"));
env.start_rustfs_server_with_env(vec![], &extra_env).await?;
let client = env.create_s3_client();
let bucket = "ilm-expired-delete-marker";
client.create_bucket().bucket(bucket).send().await?;
client
.put_bucket_versioning()
.bucket(bucket)
.versioning_configuration(
VersioningConfiguration::builder()
.status(BucketVersioningStatus::Enabled)
.build(),
)
.send()
.await?;
let cascade_key = "cascade/deleted.txt";
let cascade_put = client
.put_object()
.bucket(bucket)
.key(cascade_key)
.body(ByteStream::from_static(b"cascade payload"))
.send()
.await?;
let cascade_data_version = cascade_put
.version_id()
.map(str::to_string)
.expect("cascade PUT returns a version id");
let cascade_delete = client.delete_object().bucket(bucket).key(cascade_key).send().await?;
let cascade_marker_version = cascade_delete
.version_id()
.map(str::to_string)
.expect("cascade DELETE returns a marker version id");
assert_eq!(cascade_delete.delete_marker(), Some(true));
let survivor_key = "cascade/current-only.txt";
client
.put_object()
.bucket(bucket)
.key(survivor_key)
.body(ByteStream::from_static(b"current payload"))
.send()
.await?;
let survivor_before = client.get_object().bucket(bucket).key(survivor_key).send().await?;
assert_eq!(survivor_before.body.collect().await?.into_bytes().as_ref(), b"current payload");
let control_key = "nve-only/deleted.txt";
let control_put = client
.put_object()
.bucket(bucket)
.key(control_key)
.body(ByteStream::from_static(b"control payload"))
.send()
.await?;
let control_data_version = control_put
.version_id()
.map(str::to_string)
.expect("control PUT returns a version id");
let control_delete = client.delete_object().bucket(bucket).key(control_key).send().await?;
let control_marker_version = control_delete
.version_id()
.map(str::to_string)
.expect("control DELETE returns a marker version id");
assert_eq!(control_delete.delete_marker(), Some(true));
let cascade_before = client
.list_object_versions()
.bucket(bucket)
.prefix(cascade_key)
.send()
.await?;
assert!(
cascade_before
.versions()
.iter()
.any(|version| version.version_id() == Some(cascade_data_version.as_str())),
"cascade data version must exist before lifecycle is installed: {cascade_before:?}"
);
assert!(
cascade_before
.delete_markers()
.iter()
.any(|marker| { marker.version_id() == Some(cascade_marker_version.as_str()) && marker.is_latest() == Some(true) }),
"cascade latest delete marker must exist before lifecycle is installed: {cascade_before:?}"
);
let lifecycle = BucketLifecycleConfiguration::builder()
.rules(noncurrent_expiration_with_delete_marker_cleanup_rule(
"expire-and-clean-marker",
"cascade/",
1,
)?)
.rules(noncurrent_expiration_rule("expire-only", "nve-only/", 1)?)
.build()?;
client
.put_bucket_lifecycle_configuration()
.bucket(bucket)
.lifecycle_configuration(lifecycle)
.send()
.await?;
wait_for_key_versions_empty(&client, bucket, cascade_key, StdDuration::from_secs(90)).await?;
wait_for_version_expired(&client, bucket, control_key, &control_data_version, StdDuration::from_secs(90)).await?;
let survivor = client.get_object().bucket(bucket).key(survivor_key).send().await?;
assert_eq!(survivor.body.collect().await?.into_bytes().as_ref(), b"current payload");
let control_after = client
.list_object_versions()
.bucket(bucket)
.prefix(control_key)
.send()
.await?;
assert!(
control_after.versions().is_empty(),
"NVE-only control must remove its data version: {control_after:?}"
);
assert!(
control_after
.delete_markers()
.iter()
.any(|marker| { marker.version_id() == Some(control_marker_version.as_str()) && marker.is_latest() == Some(true) }),
"NVE-only control must preserve its latest delete marker: {control_after:?}"
);
Ok(())
}
/// `Days=0` expiration is invalid per S3 semantics (`Days` must be a positive
/// integer >= 1). A `PutBucketLifecycleConfiguration` carrying a zero-day rule
/// must be rejected with `InvalidArgument` (HTTP 400) - see crates/lifecycle
+56 -25
View File
@@ -110,6 +110,7 @@ const USER_META_KEY: &str = "ilm7-origin";
const USER_META_VAL: &str = "hermetic-transition";
const HDR_SOURCE_REPLICATION_REQUEST: &str = "x-rustfs-source-replication-request";
const HDR_SOURCE_MTIME: &str = "x-rustfs-source-mtime";
const TIER_MUTATION_RECOVERY_CHANGED: &str = "Remote tier mutation recovery changed before publish";
/// 5 MiB — the S3 minimum size for a non-final multipart part; the object's only
/// internal part boundary sits at this offset.
@@ -183,28 +184,58 @@ async fn add_rustfs_tier(hot: &RustFSTestEnvironment, cold: &RustFSTestEnvironme
})
.to_string();
let (status, resp) = signed_admin_request(
&hot.url,
Method::PUT,
"/rustfs/admin/v3/tier",
Some(&body),
&hot.access_key,
&hot.secret_key,
)
.await?;
if !status.is_success() {
return Err(format!("AddTier(RustFS) failed: status={status}, body={resp}").into());
let verify_path = format!("/rustfs/admin/v3/tier/{TIER_NAME}");
let deadline = Instant::now() + StdDuration::from_secs(30);
let mut recovery_changed = false;
loop {
if recovery_changed {
let (status, _) =
signed_admin_request(&hot.url, Method::GET, &verify_path, None, &hot.access_key, &hot.secret_key).await?;
if status.is_success() {
return Ok(());
}
}
let (status, resp) = signed_admin_request(
&hot.url,
Method::PUT,
"/rustfs/admin/v3/tier",
Some(&body),
&hot.access_key,
&hot.secret_key,
)
.await?;
if status.is_success() {
return Ok(());
}
if resp.contains(TIER_MUTATION_RECOVERY_CHANGED) {
recovery_changed = true;
} else if !recovery_changed || !resp.contains("TierNameAlreadyExist") {
return Err(format!("AddTier(RustFS) failed: status={status}, body={resp}").into());
}
if Instant::now() >= deadline {
return Err(format!("AddTier(RustFS) failed: status={status}, body={resp}").into());
}
tokio::time::sleep(StdDuration::from_millis(100)).await;
}
Ok(())
}
async fn remove_rustfs_tier_force(hot: &RustFSTestEnvironment) -> TestResult {
let path = format!("/rustfs/admin/v3/tier/{TIER_NAME}?force=true");
let (status, resp) = signed_admin_request(&hot.url, Method::DELETE, &path, None, &hot.access_key, &hot.secret_key).await?;
if !status.is_success() {
return Err(format!("RemoveTier(RustFS) failed: status={status}, body={resp}").into());
let deadline = Instant::now() + StdDuration::from_secs(30);
loop {
let (status, resp) =
signed_admin_request(&hot.url, Method::DELETE, &path, None, &hot.access_key, &hot.secret_key).await?;
if status.is_success() {
return Ok(());
}
if (!resp.contains("TierNameBackendInUse") && !resp.contains(TIER_MUTATION_RECOVERY_CHANGED))
|| Instant::now() >= deadline
{
return Err(format!("RemoveTier(RustFS) failed: status={status}, body={resp}").into());
}
// Tier mutation cleanup and startup recovery are asynchronous.
tokio::time::sleep(StdDuration::from_millis(100)).await;
}
Ok(())
}
/// A current-version `Transition Days=0` rule scoped to the object's prefix.
@@ -1477,15 +1508,6 @@ async fn test_manual_transition_async_tier_failure_reports_terminal_partial() ->
add_rustfs_tier(&hot, &cold).await?;
hot_client.create_bucket().bucket(MANUAL_TIER_FAILURE_BUCKET).send().await?;
let due_mtime = OffsetDateTime::now_utc() - time::Duration::hours(25);
put_backdated_single_part_object(
&hot_client,
MANUAL_TIER_FAILURE_BUCKET,
MANUAL_TIER_FAILURE_KEY,
b"manual tier failure object",
due_mtime,
)
.await?;
put_lifecycle_transition_rule(
&hot_client,
MANUAL_TIER_FAILURE_BUCKET,
@@ -1496,6 +1518,15 @@ async fn test_manual_transition_async_tier_failure_reports_terminal_partial() ->
.await?;
remove_rustfs_tier_force(&hot).await?;
let due_mtime = OffsetDateTime::now_utc() - time::Duration::hours(25);
put_backdated_single_part_object(
&hot_client,
MANUAL_TIER_FAILURE_BUCKET,
MANUAL_TIER_FAILURE_KEY,
b"manual tier failure object",
due_mtime,
)
.await?;
let before_remote_count = cold_tier_object_count(&cold_client).await?;
let accepted = manual_transition_async_run(&hot, MANUAL_TIER_FAILURE_BUCKET, MANUAL_TIER_FAILURE_PREFIX, false, 10).await?;
assert_eq!(accepted.state, "accepted");
@@ -29,7 +29,6 @@ mod tests {
use aws_sdk_s3::primitives::ByteStream;
use aws_sdk_s3::types::{BucketVersioningStatus, CompletedMultipartUpload, CompletedPart, VersioningConfiguration};
use http::Method;
use serial_test::serial;
use sha2::{Digest, Sha256};
use std::collections::BTreeSet;
use std::error::Error;
@@ -1061,7 +1060,6 @@ mod tests {
/// Linux mount namespaces are per-thread; keep mount setup and process
/// spawning on one OS thread so child RustFS nodes inherit the test mounts.
#[tokio::test(flavor = "current_thread")]
#[serial]
#[ignore = "requires Linux root/CAP_SYS_ADMIN and RUSTFS_PRIVILEGED_REPLACEMENT_E2E=1"]
async fn test_privileged_3x4_auto_replacement_rebuilds_ec8_plus_4_without_admin_heal()
-> Result<(), Box<dyn Error + Send + Sync>> {
@@ -1075,7 +1073,6 @@ mod tests {
/// Linux mount namespaces are per-thread; keep mount setup and process
/// spawning on one OS thread so child RustFS nodes inherit the test mounts.
#[tokio::test(flavor = "current_thread")]
#[serial]
#[ignore = "requires Linux root/CAP_SYS_ADMIN and RUSTFS_PRIVILEGED_REPLACEMENT_E2E=1"]
async fn test_privileged_3x4_auto_replacement_rebuilds_ec6_plus_6_without_admin_heal()
-> Result<(), Box<dyn Error + Send + Sync>> {
@@ -13,8 +13,9 @@
// limitations under the License.
use crate::common::{
RustFSTestEnvironment, awscurl_available, awscurl_post_sts_form_urlencoded, init_logging, local_http_client,
replication_fast_env, rustfs_binary_path,
RustFSTestEnvironment, admin_create_user, awscurl_available, awscurl_post_sts_form_urlencoded, init_logging,
local_http_client, replication_fast_env, rustfs_binary_path, signed_request, signed_request_with_client,
signed_request_with_session_token,
};
use crate::fake_s3_target::{
FAKE_ACCESS_KEY, FAKE_SECRET_KEY, FakeS3Target, FaultAction as FakeTargetFault, Operation as FakeTargetOperation,
@@ -35,7 +36,7 @@ use base64::{Engine, engine::general_purpose::STANDARD as BASE64_STANDARD};
use bytes::Bytes;
use flate2::read::GzDecoder;
use futures::{Stream, StreamExt};
use http::header::{CONTENT_ENCODING, CONTENT_TYPE, HOST};
use http::header::CONTENT_ENCODING;
use http_body_util::{BodyExt, Full};
use hyper::body::Incoming;
use hyper::server::conn::http1;
@@ -56,9 +57,6 @@ use rustfs_madmin::{
AddServiceAccountReq, ListServiceAccountsResp, PeerInfo, PeerSite, ReplicateAddStatus, ReplicateEditStatus,
ReplicateRemoveStatus, SRRemoveReq, SRResyncOpStatus, SRStatusInfo, SiteReplicationInfo, SyncStatus,
};
use rustfs_signer::constants::UNSIGNED_PAYLOAD;
use rustfs_signer::sign_v4;
use s3s::Body;
use s3s::header::X_AMZ_REPLICATION_STATUS;
use sha2::{Digest, Sha256};
use std::collections::BTreeMap;
@@ -387,116 +385,6 @@ struct ReplicationResetStatusTarget {
object: String,
}
async fn signed_request(
method: http::Method,
url: &str,
access_key: &str,
secret_key: &str,
body: Option<Vec<u8>>,
content_type: Option<&str>,
) -> Result<reqwest::Response, Box<dyn Error + Send + Sync>> {
let uri = url.parse::<http::Uri>()?;
let authority = uri.authority().ok_or("request URL missing authority")?.to_string();
let mut request = http::Request::builder().method(method.clone()).uri(uri);
request = request.header(HOST, authority);
request = request.header("x-amz-content-sha256", UNSIGNED_PAYLOAD);
if let Some(content_type) = content_type {
request = request.header(CONTENT_TYPE, content_type);
}
let content_len = body.as_ref().map(|body| body.len() as i64).unwrap_or_default();
let signed = sign_v4(request.body(Body::empty())?, content_len, access_key, secret_key, "", "us-east-1");
let reqwest_method = reqwest::Method::from_bytes(method.as_str().as_bytes())?;
let client = local_http_client();
let mut request_builder = client.request(reqwest_method, url);
for (name, value) in signed.headers() {
request_builder = request_builder.header(name, value);
}
if let Some(body) = body {
request_builder = request_builder.body(body);
}
Ok(request_builder.send().await?)
}
async fn signed_request_with_client(
client: &reqwest::Client,
method: http::Method,
url: &str,
access_key: &str,
secret_key: &str,
body: Option<Vec<u8>>,
content_type: Option<&str>,
) -> Result<reqwest::Response, Box<dyn Error + Send + Sync>> {
let uri = url.parse::<http::Uri>()?;
let authority = uri.authority().ok_or("request URL missing authority")?.to_string();
let mut request = http::Request::builder().method(method.clone()).uri(uri);
request = request.header(HOST, authority);
request = request.header("x-amz-content-sha256", UNSIGNED_PAYLOAD);
if let Some(content_type) = content_type {
request = request.header(CONTENT_TYPE, content_type);
}
let content_len = body.as_ref().map(|body| body.len() as i64).unwrap_or_default();
let signed = sign_v4(request.body(Body::empty())?, content_len, access_key, secret_key, "", "us-east-1");
let reqwest_method = reqwest::Method::from_bytes(method.as_str().as_bytes())?;
let mut request_builder = client.request(reqwest_method, url);
for (name, value) in signed.headers() {
request_builder = request_builder.header(name, value);
}
if let Some(body) = body {
request_builder = request_builder.body(body);
}
Ok(request_builder.send().await?)
}
async fn signed_request_with_session_token(
method: http::Method,
url: &str,
access_key: &str,
secret_key: &str,
session_token: &str,
body: Option<Vec<u8>>,
content_type: Option<&str>,
) -> Result<reqwest::Response, Box<dyn Error + Send + Sync>> {
let uri = url.parse::<http::Uri>()?;
let authority = uri.authority().ok_or("request URL missing authority")?.to_string();
let mut request = http::Request::builder().method(method.clone()).uri(uri);
request = request.header(HOST, authority);
request = request.header("x-amz-content-sha256", UNSIGNED_PAYLOAD);
if !session_token.is_empty() {
request = request.header("x-amz-security-token", session_token);
}
if let Some(content_type) = content_type {
request = request.header(CONTENT_TYPE, content_type);
}
let content_len = body.as_ref().map(|body| body.len() as i64).unwrap_or_default();
let signed = sign_v4(
request.body(Body::empty())?,
content_len,
access_key,
secret_key,
session_token,
"us-east-1",
);
let reqwest_method = reqwest::Method::from_bytes(method.as_str().as_bytes())?;
let client = local_http_client();
let mut request_builder = client.request(reqwest_method, url);
for (name, value) in signed.headers() {
request_builder = request_builder.header(name, value);
}
if let Some(body) = body {
request_builder = request_builder.body(body);
}
Ok(request_builder.send().await?)
}
fn extract_xml_tag(xml: &str, tag: &str) -> Option<String> {
let open = format!("<{tag}>");
let close = format!("</{tag}>");
@@ -1016,35 +904,6 @@ fn create_user_s3_client(env: &RustFSTestEnvironment, access_key: &str, secret_k
Client::from_conf(config)
}
async fn admin_create_user(
env: &RustFSTestEnvironment,
username: &str,
secret_key: &str,
) -> Result<(), Box<dyn Error + Send + Sync>> {
let url = format!("{}/rustfs/admin/v3/add-user?accessKey={}", env.url, username);
let body = serde_json::json!({
"secretKey": secret_key,
"status": "enabled"
});
let response = signed_request(
http::Method::PUT,
&url,
&env.access_key,
&env.secret_key,
Some(body.to_string().into_bytes()),
Some("application/json"),
)
.await?;
if response.status() != StatusCode::OK {
let status = response.status();
let body = response.text().await.unwrap_or_default();
return Err(format!("create user failed: {status} {body}").into());
}
Ok(())
}
async fn admin_add_canned_policy(
env: &RustFSTestEnvironment,
policy_name: &str,
-1
View File
@@ -49,4 +49,3 @@ Applies to `crates/ecstore/`.
## Suggested Validation
- `cargo test -p rustfs-ecstore`
- Full gate before commit: `make pre-commit`
+1 -1
View File
@@ -229,7 +229,6 @@ base64-simd.workspace = true
serde_urlencoded.workspace = true
google-cloud-storage = { workspace = true }
google-cloud-auth = { workspace = true }
aws-config = { workspace = true }
faster-hex = { workspace = true }
ratelimit = { workspace = true }
aws-smithy-http-client = { workspace = true, default-features = false, features = ["rustls-aws-lc"] }
@@ -268,6 +267,7 @@ tracing-subscriber = { workspace = true, features = ["json", "env-filter", "time
# dispatcher to keep tracing's process-global callsite-interest cache honest.
tracing-core = { workspace = true }
serial_test = { workspace = true }
metrics-util = { workspace = true, features = ["debugging"] }
opentelemetry_sdk = { workspace = true, features = ["rt-tokio"] }
proptest = "1"
rcgen.workspace = true
+20 -13
View File
@@ -90,6 +90,12 @@ use uuid::Uuid;
const MAX_CONCURRENT_TARGET_HEALTH_CHECKS: usize = 16;
const REDACTED_CREDENTIAL: &str = "<redacted>";
pub type HeadObjectSdkError = Box<SdkError<HeadObjectError>>;
pub type GetObjectSdkError = Box<SdkError<GetObjectError>>;
pub type GetObjectTaggingSdkError = Box<SdkError<GetObjectTaggingError>>;
pub type PutObjectTaggingSdkError = Box<SdkError<PutObjectTaggingError>>;
pub type DeleteObjectTaggingSdkError = Box<SdkError<DeleteObjectTaggingError>>;
pub static GLOBAL_BUCKET_TARGET_SYS: OnceLock<BucketTargetSys> = OnceLock::new();
fn replication_target_versioning_enabled(versioning: Option<&BucketVersioningStatus>) -> bool {
@@ -860,7 +866,7 @@ impl BucketTargetSys {
return Some(cli);
}
// TODO: spawn a task to reload the target
// TODO(backlog): spawn an async task to proactively reload the replication target
if self.is_reloading_target(bucket, arn).await {
return None;
}
@@ -1968,7 +1974,7 @@ impl TargetClient {
bucket: &str,
object: &str,
version_id: Option<String>,
) -> Result<HeadObjectOutput, SdkError<HeadObjectError>> {
) -> Result<HeadObjectOutput, HeadObjectSdkError> {
// Announce the replication check so a RustFS target returns SSE-C
// object metadata (etag/size) without the customer key the replication
// worker cannot hold; otherwise SSE-C replicas never converge on HEAD.
@@ -1981,8 +1987,7 @@ impl TargetClient {
// object with an identical ETag, and the worker concludes the object
// already converged — so it never actually replicates it.
insert_header(&mut headers, SUFFIX_SOURCE_PROXY_REQUEST, "false");
match self
.client
self.client
.head_object()
.bucket(bucket)
.key(object)
@@ -1999,10 +2004,7 @@ impl TargetClient {
})
.send()
.await
{
Ok(res) => Ok(res),
Err(e) => Err(e),
}
.map_err(Box::new)
}
/// HEAD used by the read-proxy path (GET/HEAD of an object not yet
@@ -2023,7 +2025,7 @@ impl TargetClient {
range: Option<String>,
part_number: Option<i32>,
extra_headers: HeaderMap,
) -> Result<HeadObjectOutput, SdkError<HeadObjectError>> {
) -> Result<HeadObjectOutput, HeadObjectSdkError> {
let headers = proxy_outbound_headers(extra_headers);
self.client
.head_object()
@@ -2036,6 +2038,7 @@ impl TargetClient {
.map_request(move |req| apply_extra_headers(req, &headers))
.send()
.await
.map_err(Box::new)
}
/// GET used by the read-proxy path (MinIO `proxyGetToReplicationTarget`).
@@ -2051,7 +2054,7 @@ impl TargetClient {
range: Option<String>,
part_number: Option<i32>,
extra_headers: HeaderMap,
) -> Result<GetObjectOutput, SdkError<GetObjectError>> {
) -> Result<GetObjectOutput, GetObjectSdkError> {
let headers = proxy_outbound_headers(extra_headers);
self.client
.get_object()
@@ -2064,6 +2067,7 @@ impl TargetClient {
.map_request(move |req| apply_extra_headers(req, &headers))
.send()
.await
.map_err(Box::new)
}
/// GetObjectTagging for the tagging read-proxy path
@@ -2073,7 +2077,7 @@ impl TargetClient {
bucket: &str,
object: &str,
version_id: Option<String>,
) -> Result<GetObjectTaggingOutput, SdkError<GetObjectTaggingError>> {
) -> Result<GetObjectTaggingOutput, GetObjectTaggingSdkError> {
let headers = proxy_outbound_headers(HeaderMap::new());
self.client
.get_object_tagging()
@@ -2084,6 +2088,7 @@ impl TargetClient {
.map_request(move |req| apply_extra_headers(req, &headers))
.send()
.await
.map_err(Box::new)
}
/// PutObjectTagging for the tagging proxy path
@@ -2094,7 +2099,7 @@ impl TargetClient {
object: &str,
version_id: Option<String>,
tagging: SdkTagging,
) -> Result<PutObjectTaggingOutput, SdkError<PutObjectTaggingError>> {
) -> Result<PutObjectTaggingOutput, PutObjectTaggingSdkError> {
let headers = proxy_outbound_headers(HeaderMap::new());
self.client
.put_object_tagging()
@@ -2106,6 +2111,7 @@ impl TargetClient {
.map_request(move |req| apply_extra_headers(req, &headers))
.send()
.await
.map_err(Box::new)
}
/// DeleteObjectTagging for the tagging proxy path
@@ -2115,7 +2121,7 @@ impl TargetClient {
bucket: &str,
object: &str,
version_id: Option<String>,
) -> Result<DeleteObjectTaggingOutput, SdkError<DeleteObjectTaggingError>> {
) -> Result<DeleteObjectTaggingOutput, DeleteObjectTaggingSdkError> {
let headers = proxy_outbound_headers(HeaderMap::new());
self.client
.delete_object_tagging()
@@ -2126,6 +2132,7 @@ impl TargetClient {
.map_request(move |req| apply_extra_headers(req, &headers))
.send()
.await
.map_err(Box::new)
}
/// On success returns the version id the target assigned (from
@@ -2180,7 +2180,7 @@ pub async fn recover_manual_transition_jobs_once(
if limit == 0 {
return Err(Error::other("manual transition job recovery limit must be greater than zero"));
}
let list_limit = i32::try_from(limit).map_or(i32::MAX, |value| value);
let list_limit = i32::try_from(limit).unwrap_or(i32::MAX);
let page = api
.clone()
.list_objects_v2(
@@ -2386,7 +2386,7 @@ async fn replay_manual_transition_pending_tasks(
version_id: task.version_id,
etag: task.etag,
mod_time,
size: task.size.map_or(0, |size| size),
size: task.size.unwrap_or(0),
is_latest: task.is_latest.unwrap_or(false),
..Default::default()
};
@@ -4994,6 +4994,9 @@ pub async fn apply_expiry_on_transitioned_object(
src: &LcEventSrc,
bucket_incarnation_id: Uuid,
) -> bool {
if lc_event.action.delete_all() {
return apply_expiry_on_non_transitioned_objects(api, oi, lc_event, src, bucket_incarnation_id).await;
}
let time_ilm = Metrics::time_ilm(lc_event.action);
if let Err(_err) = expire_transitioned_object(api, oi, lc_event, src, bucket_incarnation_id).await {
return false;
@@ -5047,13 +5050,24 @@ pub async fn apply_expiry_on_non_transitioned_objects(
if lc_event.action.delete_all() {
opts.delete_prefix = true;
opts.delete_prefix_object = true;
opts.lifecycle_delete_all = Some(crate::object_api::LifecycleDeleteAllRequest {
version_id: oi.version_id.filter(|version_id| !version_id.is_nil()),
delete_marker: oi.delete_marker,
action: lc_event.action,
rule_id: lc_event.rule_id.clone(),
phase: crate::object_api::LifecycleDeleteAllPhase::Preflight,
});
opts.ensure_lifecycle_delete_all_journal();
}
let time_ilm = Metrics::time_ilm(lc_event.action);
//debug!("lc_event.action: {:?}", lc_event.action);
debug!("expiry_on_non_transitioned_objects opts: {:?}", opts);
let mut dobj = match api.delete_object(&oi.bucket, &encode_dir_object(&oi.name), opts).await {
let mut dobj = match api
.delete_object_with_tier_delete_journal(&oi.bucket, &encode_dir_object(&oi.name), opts)
.await
{
Ok(dobj) => dobj,
Err(e) => {
error!(
@@ -5283,7 +5297,7 @@ mod tests {
};
use crate::bucket::lifecycle::tier_last_day_stats::LastDayTierStats;
use crate::bucket::lifecycle::tier_sweeper::Jentry;
use crate::bucket::metadata::BUCKET_LIFECYCLE_CONFIG;
use crate::bucket::metadata::{BUCKET_LIFECYCLE_CONFIG, BUCKET_VERSIONING_CONFIG};
use crate::bucket::metadata_sys;
#[cfg(feature = "test-util")]
use crate::client::transition_api::ReaderImpl;
@@ -5304,6 +5318,7 @@ mod tests {
use crate::storage_api_contracts::{
bucket::{BucketOperations, BucketOptions, DeleteBucketOptions, MakeBucketOptions},
lifecycle::ExpirationOptions,
list::ListOperations as _,
multipart::MultipartOperations as _,
object::{ObjectIO as _, ObjectOperations as _},
};
@@ -10917,6 +10932,199 @@ mod tests {
);
}
#[tokio::test]
#[serial]
async fn queued_delete_all_rechecks_a_same_id_rule_moved_into_the_future() {
let (_disk_paths, ecstore) = setup_test_env().await;
let bucket = format!("stale-delete-all-rule-{}", Uuid::new_v4().simple());
let object = "object";
create_test_bucket(&ecstore, &bucket).await;
metadata_sys::update(
&bucket,
BUCKET_VERSIONING_CONFIG,
b"<VersioningConfiguration><Status>Enabled</Status></VersioningConfiguration>".to_vec(),
)
.await
.expect("bucket versioning should be enabled");
let lifecycle_xml = |days| {
format!(
r#"<LifecycleConfiguration>
<Rule>
<ID>delete-marker-history</ID>
<Status>Enabled</Status>
<Filter><Prefix></Prefix></Filter>
<DelMarkerExpiration><Days>{days}</Days></DelMarkerExpiration>
</Rule>
</LifecycleConfiguration>"#
)
};
metadata_sys::update(&bucket, BUCKET_LIFECYCLE_CONFIG, lifecycle_xml(1).into_bytes())
.await
.expect("initial lifecycle rule should be stored");
let old_time = OffsetDateTime::now_utc() - time::Duration::days(3);
let mut reader = PutObjReader::from_vec(b"old version".to_vec());
ecstore
.put_object(
&bucket,
object,
&mut reader,
&ObjectOptions {
versioned: true,
mod_time: Some(old_time - time::Duration::hours(1)),
..Default::default()
},
)
.await
.expect("old version should be stored");
let marker = ecstore
.delete_object(
&bucket,
object,
ObjectOptions {
versioned: true,
mod_time: Some(old_time),
..Default::default()
},
)
.await
.expect("delete marker should be created");
let queued_event = crate::bucket::lifecycle::lifecycle::Event {
action: IlmAction::DelMarkerDeleteAllVersionsAction,
rule_id: "delete-marker-history".to_string(),
..Default::default()
};
metadata_sys::update(&bucket, BUCKET_LIFECYCLE_CONFIG, lifecycle_xml(30).into_bytes())
.await
.expect("updated lifecycle rule should be stored");
let incarnation = ecstore
.bucket_incarnation_id_from_disk(&bucket)
.await
.expect("bucket incarnation should be available");
let deleted = super::apply_expiry_on_non_transitioned_objects(
ecstore.clone(),
&marker,
&queued_event,
&LcEventSrc::Scanner,
incarnation,
)
.await;
assert!(!deleted, "the stale queued rule must be rejected");
let versions = ecstore
.clone()
.list_object_versions(&bucket, object, None, None, None, 10)
.await
.expect("remaining versions should be listable");
assert_eq!(versions.objects.iter().filter(|version| version.name == object).count(), 2);
metadata_sys::update(&bucket, BUCKET_LIFECYCLE_CONFIG, lifecycle_xml(1).into_bytes())
.await
.expect("due lifecycle rule should be restored");
let deleted = super::apply_expiry_on_non_transitioned_objects(
ecstore.clone(),
&marker,
&queued_event,
&LcEventSrc::Scanner,
incarnation,
)
.await;
assert!(deleted, "the current due rule should purge marker and history");
let versions = ecstore
.clone()
.list_object_versions(&bucket, object, None, None, None, 10)
.await
.expect("purged versions should be listable");
assert_eq!(versions.objects.iter().filter(|version| version.name == object).count(), 0);
}
#[tokio::test]
#[serial]
async fn queued_expired_object_all_versions_purges_history_through_transitioned_dispatch() {
let (_disk_paths, ecstore) = setup_test_env().await;
let bucket = format!("expired-all-versions-{}", Uuid::new_v4().simple());
let object = "object";
create_test_bucket(&ecstore, &bucket).await;
metadata_sys::update(
&bucket,
BUCKET_VERSIONING_CONFIG,
b"<VersioningConfiguration><Status>Enabled</Status></VersioningConfiguration>".to_vec(),
)
.await
.expect("bucket versioning should be enabled");
metadata_sys::update(
&bucket,
BUCKET_LIFECYCLE_CONFIG,
br#"<LifecycleConfiguration>
<Rule>
<ID>delete-all-versions</ID>
<Status>Enabled</Status>
<Filter><Prefix></Prefix></Filter>
<Expiration><Days>1</Days><ExpiredObjectAllVersions>true</ExpiredObjectAllVersions></Expiration>
</Rule>
</LifecycleConfiguration>"#
.to_vec(),
)
.await
.expect("delete-all lifecycle rule should be stored");
let old_time = OffsetDateTime::now_utc() - time::Duration::days(3);
let mut old_reader = PutObjReader::from_vec(b"old version".to_vec());
ecstore
.put_object(
&bucket,
object,
&mut old_reader,
&ObjectOptions {
versioned: true,
mod_time: Some(old_time - time::Duration::hours(1)),
..Default::default()
},
)
.await
.expect("old version should be stored");
let mut current_reader = PutObjReader::from_vec(b"current version".to_vec());
let mut current = ecstore
.put_object(
&bucket,
object,
&mut current_reader,
&ObjectOptions {
versioned: true,
mod_time: Some(old_time),
..Default::default()
},
)
.await
.expect("current version should be stored");
current.transitioned_object.status = crate::bucket::lifecycle::lifecycle::TRANSITION_COMPLETE.to_string();
let incarnation = ecstore
.bucket_incarnation_id_from_disk(&bucket)
.await
.expect("bucket incarnation should be available");
let deleted = super::apply_expiry_on_transitioned_object(
ecstore.clone(),
&current,
&crate::bucket::lifecycle::lifecycle::Event {
action: IlmAction::DeleteAllVersionsAction,
rule_id: "delete-all-versions".to_string(),
..Default::default()
},
&LcEventSrc::Scanner,
incarnation,
)
.await;
assert!(deleted, "delete-all must not degrade to transitioned single-version expiry");
let versions = ecstore
.list_object_versions(&bucket, object, None, None, None, 10)
.await
.expect("purged versions should be listable");
assert_eq!(versions.objects.iter().filter(|version| version.name == object).count(), 0);
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn existing_object_lifecycle_skips_current_expiration_for_explicit_legal_hold() {
let lc = latest_expiration_lifecycle();
@@ -435,12 +435,88 @@ async fn process_committed_tier_delete_journal_entry(api: Arc<ECStore>, je: &Jen
remove_tier_delete_journal_entry(api, je).await
}
async fn reconcile_prepared_tier_delete_journal_entry(api: Arc<ECStore>, je: &Jentry) -> std::io::Result<()> {
let (data, metadata) =
config_boundary::read_config_with_metadata(api.clone(), &tier_delete_journal_object_name(je), &ObjectOptions::default())
fn object_info_references_tier_delete(info: &ObjectInfo, je: &Jentry) -> std::io::Result<bool> {
if info.transitioned_object.status != rustfs_filemeta::TRANSITION_COMPLETE
|| info.transitioned_object.name != je.obj_name
|| info.transitioned_object.tier != je.tier_name
{
return Ok(false);
}
let source_backend_identity = tier_destination_id_from_metadata(&info.user_defined)?;
if source_backend_identity.is_some() && source_backend_identity != je.backend_identity {
return Ok(false);
}
if !je.version_id_exact {
return Ok(true);
}
Ok(match info.transition_version_state {
rustfs_filemeta::TransitionVersionState::Unknown => true,
rustfs_filemeta::TransitionVersionState::KnownDisabled => false,
rustfs_filemeta::TransitionVersionState::SuspendedNull | rustfs_filemeta::TransitionVersionState::Exact => {
info.transitioned_object.version_id == je.version_id
}
})
}
async fn prepared_tier_delete_has_live_source(
api: &ECStore,
source: &TierDeleteSourceIdentity,
je: &Jentry,
) -> std::io::Result<(bool, Vec<crate::store::ObjectLockDiagGuard>)> {
let lock_object = rustfs_utils::path::encode_dir_object(&source.object);
let mut lock_opts = ObjectOptions::default();
let read_guards = api
.acquire_all_object_read_locks("tier_delete_journal_recovery", &source.bucket, &lock_object, &mut lock_opts)
.await
.map_err(std::io::Error::other)?;
if api.ctx.lock_manager().is_disabled() {
return Err(std::io::Error::new(
std::io::ErrorKind::WouldBlock,
"tier delete journal recovery requires namespace locking",
));
}
let mut has_live_source = false;
for pool in &api.pools {
let set = pool.get_disks_by_key(&lock_object);
let Some(versions) = set
.load_file_info_versions_exact(&source.bucket, &source.object)
.await
.map_err(std::io::Error::other)?;
.map_err(std::io::Error::other)?
else {
continue;
};
for version in versions.versions.iter().filter(|version| !version.tier_free_version()) {
let info = ObjectInfo::from_file_info(version, &source.bucket, &source.object, source.versioned);
if object_info_references_tier_delete(&info, je)? {
has_live_source = true;
break;
}
}
if has_live_source {
break;
}
}
if read_guards.iter().any(crate::store::ObjectLockDiagGuard::is_lock_lost) {
return Err(std::io::Error::new(
std::io::ErrorKind::WouldBlock,
"tier delete journal recovery object read lock was lost",
));
}
Ok((has_live_source, read_guards))
}
async fn reconcile_prepared_tier_delete_journal_entry(api: Arc<ECStore>, je: &Jentry) -> std::io::Result<()> {
let journal_name = tier_delete_journal_object_name(je);
let (data, metadata) = config_boundary::read_config_with_metadata(api.clone(), &journal_name, &ObjectOptions::default())
.await
.map_err(std::io::Error::other)?;
let current = decode_tier_delete_journal_entry(&data).map_err(std::io::Error::other)?;
if tier_delete_journal_object_name(&current) != journal_name {
return Err(std::io::Error::new(
std::io::ErrorKind::InvalidData,
"prepared tier delete journal content does not match its object name",
));
}
if current.state != TierDeleteJournalState::Prepared {
return Err(std::io::Error::new(
std::io::ErrorKind::WouldBlock,
@@ -453,16 +529,21 @@ async fn reconcile_prepared_tier_delete_journal_entry(api: Arc<ECStore>, je: &Je
"prepared tier delete journal has no entity tag",
));
};
let source = je
let source = current
.source
.as_ref()
.ok_or_else(|| std::io::Error::new(std::io::ErrorKind::InvalidData, "prepared tier delete journal has no source"))?;
match api
.get_object_info(&source.bucket, &source.object, &source.lookup_options())
.await
{
Ok(info) if source.matches(&info) => {
match config_boundary::delete_config_if_match(api, &tier_delete_journal_object_name(&current), &etag).await {
match prepared_tier_delete_has_live_source(&api, source, &current).await {
Ok((true, read_guards)) => {
if read_guards.iter().any(crate::store::ObjectLockDiagGuard::is_lock_lost) {
return Err(std::io::Error::new(
std::io::ErrorKind::WouldBlock,
"tier delete journal recovery object read lock was lost before abort",
));
}
let result = config_boundary::delete_config_if_match(api, &tier_delete_journal_object_name(&current), &etag).await;
drop(read_guards);
match result {
Ok(()) => Ok(()),
Err(Error::PreconditionFailed) => Err(std::io::Error::new(
std::io::ErrorKind::WouldBlock,
@@ -471,17 +552,32 @@ async fn reconcile_prepared_tier_delete_journal_entry(api: Arc<ECStore>, je: &Je
Err(err) => Err(std::io::Error::other(err)),
}
}
Ok(_info) if source.has_stable_identity() => {
commit_prepared_tier_delete_journal_entry_if_current(api, current, etag).await
Ok((false, read_guards)) if source.has_stable_identity() => {
if read_guards.iter().any(crate::store::ObjectLockDiagGuard::is_lock_lost) {
return Err(std::io::Error::new(
std::io::ErrorKind::WouldBlock,
"tier delete journal recovery object read lock was lost before commit",
));
}
let mut commit_opts = ObjectOptions::default();
for signal in read_guards
.iter()
.filter_map(crate::store::ObjectLockDiagGuard::lock_lost_signal)
{
commit_opts.add_namespace_lock_lost_signal(signal);
}
let committed =
commit_prepared_tier_delete_journal_entry_if_current(api.clone(), current, etag, &commit_opts).await?;
// Keep namespace locks only through the journal CAS. Remote-tier IO
// must not block writers for the object during recovery.
drop(read_guards);
process_committed_tier_delete_journal_entry(api, &committed).await
}
Ok(_) => Err(std::io::Error::new(
Ok((false, _read_guards)) => Err(std::io::Error::new(
std::io::ErrorKind::WouldBlock,
"prepared tier delete journal source identity is not sufficient to confirm deletion",
)),
Err(Error::ObjectNotFound(_, _)) | Err(Error::FileNotFound) | Err(Error::FileVersionNotFound) => {
commit_prepared_tier_delete_journal_entry_if_current(api, current, etag).await
}
Err(err) => Err(std::io::Error::other(err)),
Err(err) => Err(err),
}
}
@@ -489,7 +585,8 @@ async fn commit_prepared_tier_delete_journal_entry_if_current(
api: Arc<ECStore>,
mut committed: Jentry,
etag: String,
) -> std::io::Result<()> {
lock_opts: &ObjectOptions,
) -> std::io::Result<Jentry> {
committed.state = TierDeleteJournalState::Committed;
let data = encode_tier_delete_journal_entry(&committed).map_err(std::io::Error::other)?;
match config_boundary::save_config_with_opts(
@@ -502,12 +599,13 @@ async fn commit_prepared_tier_delete_journal_entry_if_current(
if_match: Some(etag),
..Default::default()
}),
namespace_lock_fence: lock_opts.namespace_lock_fence.clone(),
..Default::default()
},
)
.await
{
Ok(()) => process_committed_tier_delete_journal_entry(api, &committed).await,
Ok(()) => Ok(committed),
Err(Error::PreconditionFailed) => Err(std::io::Error::new(
std::io::ErrorKind::WouldBlock,
"prepared tier delete journal changed before commit",
@@ -582,6 +680,18 @@ pub async fn recover_tier_delete_journal_entries(
}
};
if tier_delete_journal_object_name(&je) != object.name {
stats.failed += 1;
warn!(
event = EVENT_LIFECYCLE_TIER_DELETE_JOURNAL,
component = LOG_COMPONENT_ECSTORE,
subsystem = LOG_SUBSYSTEM_LIFECYCLE,
journal_object = %object.name,
"Tier delete journal content does not match its object name and will be retained"
);
continue;
}
if je.backend_identity.is_none() {
stats.failed += 1;
warn!(
@@ -699,16 +809,14 @@ where
mod tests {
use super::{
TIER_DELETE_JOURNAL_EXACT_VERSION, TIER_DELETE_JOURNAL_STATE_VERSION, await_tier_delete_journal_recovery,
decode_tier_delete_journal_entry, encode_tier_delete_journal_entry, record_tier_delete_journal_backend_identity,
tier_delete_journal_object_name,
decode_tier_delete_journal_entry, encode_tier_delete_journal_entry, object_info_references_tier_delete,
record_tier_delete_journal_backend_identity, tier_delete_journal_object_name,
};
use crate::bucket::lifecycle::tier_sweeper::{Jentry, TierDeleteJournalState, TierDeleteSourceIdentity};
use crate::error::Result;
use crate::object_api::ObjectInfo;
use std::time::Duration;
use time::OffsetDateTime;
use tokio_util::sync::CancellationToken;
use uuid::Uuid;
fn journal_entry() -> Jentry {
Jentry {
@@ -738,6 +846,16 @@ mod tests {
assert_eq!(decoded.version_state, je.version_state);
}
#[test]
fn tier_delete_journal_object_name_binds_persisted_content() {
let original = journal_entry();
let original_name = tier_delete_journal_object_name(&original);
let mut replaced = original;
replaced.obj_name = "remote/replaced".to_string();
assert_ne!(tier_delete_journal_object_name(&replaced), original_name);
}
#[test]
fn tier_delete_transaction_roundtrips_prepared_source_identity() {
let mut je = journal_entry();
@@ -765,26 +883,35 @@ mod tests {
}
#[test]
fn tier_delete_source_identity_rejects_recreated_object() {
let version_id = Uuid::from_u128(1);
let data_dir = Uuid::from_u128(2);
let mod_time = OffsetDateTime::UNIX_EPOCH + time::Duration::seconds(1);
let info = ObjectInfo {
bucket: "bucket".to_string(),
name: "object".to_string(),
version_id: Some(version_id),
data_dir: Some(data_dir),
mod_time: Some(mod_time),
fn prepared_recovery_blocks_any_live_reference_to_the_remote_version() {
let je = journal_entry();
let mut metadata = std::collections::HashMap::new();
rustfs_utils::http::metadata_compat::insert_str(
&mut metadata,
rustfs_utils::http::metadata_compat::SUFFIX_TRANSITION_TIER_DESTINATION_ID,
rustfs_utils::crypto::hex(je.backend_identity.expect("test journal should bind a backend")),
);
let mut info = ObjectInfo {
user_defined: std::sync::Arc::new(metadata),
transitioned_object: crate::storage_api_contracts::lifecycle::TransitionedObject {
name: je.obj_name.clone(),
version_id: je.version_id.clone(),
tier: je.tier_name.clone(),
status: rustfs_filemeta::TRANSITION_COMPLETE.to_string(),
..Default::default()
},
transition_version_state: rustfs_filemeta::TransitionVersionState::Exact,
..Default::default()
};
let source = TierDeleteSourceIdentity::from_object_info("bucket", "object", &info, true, false);
assert!(source.matches(&info));
let recreated = ObjectInfo {
data_dir: Some(Uuid::from_u128(3)),
..info
};
assert!(!source.matches(&recreated));
assert!(object_info_references_tier_delete(&info, &je).expect("matching reference should be valid"));
info.transitioned_object.version_id = "other-version".to_string();
assert!(!object_info_references_tier_delete(&info, &je).expect("different exact version should be valid"));
info.transition_version_state = rustfs_filemeta::TransitionVersionState::Unknown;
assert!(
object_info_references_tier_delete(&info, &je).expect("legacy unknown reference should fail closed"),
"an unknown live source may still reference the journaled remote version"
);
}
#[test]
@@ -334,32 +334,6 @@ impl TierDeleteSourceIdentity {
}
}
pub(crate) fn lookup_options(&self) -> crate::object_api::ObjectOptions {
crate::object_api::ObjectOptions {
version_id: self.version_id.clone(),
versioned: self.versioned,
version_suspended: self.version_suspended,
..Default::default()
}
}
pub(crate) fn matches(&self, info: &ObjectInfo) -> bool {
if self.bucket != info.bucket {
return false;
}
if let Some(version_id) = &self.version_id {
return info.version_id.map(|id| id.to_string()).as_deref() == Some(version_id.as_str())
&& self.data_dir == info.data_dir.map(|id| id.to_string());
}
if self.data_dir.is_some() {
return self.data_dir == info.data_dir.map(|id| id.to_string());
}
self.etag.is_some()
&& self.etag == info.etag
&& self.mod_time.is_some()
&& self.mod_time == info.mod_time.map(|time| time.to_string())
}
pub(crate) fn has_stable_identity(&self) -> bool {
self.version_id.is_some() || self.data_dir.is_some() || (self.etag.is_some() && self.mod_time.is_some())
}
@@ -1016,7 +1016,7 @@ pub async fn recover_transition_transaction_records(
return Err(Error::other("transition transaction recovery limit must be greater than zero"));
}
let list_limit = i32::try_from(limit).map_or(i32::MAX, |value| value);
let list_limit = i32::try_from(limit).unwrap_or(i32::MAX);
let list = api
.clone()
.list_objects_v2(
+61
View File
@@ -41,6 +41,7 @@ const IAM_FORMAT_FILE_PATH: &str = "config/iam/format.json";
const IAM_USERS_PREFIX: &str = "config/iam/users/";
const IAM_SERVICE_ACCOUNTS_PREFIX: &str = "config/iam/service-accounts/";
const IAM_STS_PREFIX: &str = "config/iam/sts/";
const MINIO_GO_ZERO_TIME: OffsetDateTime = time::macros::datetime!(0001-01-01 00:00 UTC);
const IAM_GROUPS_PREFIX: &str = "config/iam/groups/";
const IAM_POLICIES_PREFIX: &str = "config/iam/policies/";
const IAM_POLICY_DB_PREFIX: &str = "config/iam/policydb/";
@@ -120,6 +121,15 @@ fn normalize_iam_config_blob(path: &str, data: &[u8]) -> std::result::Result<Opt
if is_identity_path(path) {
let mut identity: UserIdentity =
serde_json::from_slice(data).map_err(|err| format!("parse IAM identity failed: {err}"))?;
if (path.starts_with(IAM_USERS_PREFIX) || path.starts_with(IAM_SERVICE_ACCOUNTS_PREFIX))
&& identity
.credentials
.expiration
.as_ref()
.is_some_and(|expiration| *expiration == MINIO_GO_ZERO_TIME || *expiration == OffsetDateTime::UNIX_EPOCH)
{
identity.credentials.expiration = None;
}
if identity.update_at.is_none() {
identity.update_at = Some(OffsetDateTime::now_utc());
}
@@ -441,7 +451,10 @@ mod tests {
use crate::bucket::replication::{
BucketReplicationResyncStatus, ReplicationMigrationBridge, ResyncStatusType, TargetReplicationResyncStatus,
};
use rustfs_policy::auth::UserIdentity;
use std::collections::HashMap;
use time::OffsetDateTime;
use time::format_description::well_known::Rfc3339;
#[test]
fn test_normalize_policy_mapping_legacy_timestamp_and_fields() {
@@ -493,6 +506,54 @@ mod tests {
assert!(v.get("updatedAt").is_some(), "normalize should backfill updatedAt");
}
#[test]
fn test_normalize_minio_permanent_credential_expiration() {
let cases = [
("config/iam/users/alice/identity.json", "0001-01-01T00:00:00Z", true),
("config/iam/users/alice/identity.json", "1970-01-01T00:00:00Z", true),
("config/iam/service-accounts/svc/identity.json", "0001-01-01T00:00:00Z", true),
("config/iam/service-accounts/svc/identity.json", "1970-01-01T00:00:00Z", true),
("config/iam/service-accounts/svc/identity.json", "1970-01-01T00:00:00.000000001Z", false),
("config/iam/sts/temp/identity.json", "0001-01-01T00:00:00Z", false),
("config/iam/sts/temp/identity.json", "1970-01-01T00:00:00Z", false),
("config/iam/users/alice/identity.json", "1969-12-31T23:59:59Z", false),
("config/iam/users/alice/identity.json", "1970-01-01T00:00:00.000000001Z", false),
("config/iam/users/alice/identity.json", "0001-01-01T00:00:00.000000001Z", false),
("config/iam/users/alice/identity.json", "2030-01-01T00:00:00Z", false),
];
for (path, expiration, should_clear) in cases {
let input = serde_json::json!({
"version": 1,
"credentials": {
"accessKey": "test-access",
"secretKey": "test-secret",
"sessionToken": "test-session-token",
"parentUser": "test-parent",
"expiration": expiration,
}
});
let output = normalize_iam_config_blob(path, &serde_json::to_vec(&input).expect("serialize identity fixture"))
.expect("normalize should succeed")
.expect("identity path should be supported");
let identity: UserIdentity = serde_json::from_slice(&output).expect("deserialize normalized identity");
assert_eq!(identity.credentials.access_key, "test-access");
assert_eq!(identity.credentials.secret_key, "test-secret");
assert_eq!(identity.credentials.session_token, "test-session-token");
assert_eq!(identity.credentials.parent_user, "test-parent");
if should_clear {
assert_eq!(identity.credentials.expiration, None, "path: {path}, expiration: {expiration}");
} else {
assert_eq!(
identity.credentials.expiration,
Some(OffsetDateTime::parse(expiration, &Rfc3339).expect("parse expected expiration")),
"path: {path}, expiration: {expiration}"
);
}
}
}
#[test]
fn test_normalize_bucket_meta_blob_resync_reencode() {
let path = ".buckets/test/.replication/resync.bin";
+6 -1
View File
@@ -76,7 +76,12 @@ impl QuotaChecker {
let current_usage = self.get_real_time_usage(bucket).await?;
let admission_size = if uses_durable_reservations { 0 } else { operation_size };
// The reporting path projects this operation; storage mutations reserve it at commit.
let admission_size = if uses_durable_reservations && !force_usage_calculation {
0
} else {
operation_size
};
let expected_usage = match operation {
QuotaOperation::PutObject | QuotaOperation::PostObject | QuotaOperation::CopyObject => {
current_usage.saturating_add(admission_size)
@@ -23,6 +23,8 @@ use super::replication_queue_boundary::DeletedObjectReplicationInfo;
use super::replication_storage_boundary::{
DeletedObject, ObjectInfo, ObjectOptions, ObjectToDelete, deleted_object_for_replication,
};
#[cfg(test)]
use std::sync::Mutex;
#[allow(
dead_code,
@@ -32,6 +34,9 @@ pub(crate) type ReplicationLifecycleConfig = ReplicationConfig;
pub(crate) struct ReplicationLifecycleBridge;
#[cfg(test)]
static SCHEDULED_DELETE_OBJECTS: Mutex<Vec<DeletedObject>> = Mutex::new(Vec::new());
impl ReplicationLifecycleBridge {
#[allow(
dead_code,
@@ -85,6 +90,13 @@ impl ReplicationLifecycleBridge {
}
pub(crate) async fn schedule_delete(bucket: String, delete_object: DeletedObject) {
#[cfg(test)]
{
SCHEDULED_DELETE_OBJECTS
.lock()
.expect("scheduled delete test hook lock should not poison")
.push(delete_object.clone());
}
super::replication_pool::schedule_replication_delete(DeletedObjectReplicationInfo {
delete_object: deleted_object_for_replication(delete_object),
bucket,
@@ -93,6 +105,15 @@ impl ReplicationLifecycleBridge {
})
.await;
}
#[cfg(test)]
pub(crate) fn take_scheduled_deletes_for_test() -> Vec<DeletedObject> {
std::mem::take(
&mut *SCHEDULED_DELETE_OBJECTS
.lock()
.expect("scheduled delete test hook lock should not poison"),
)
}
}
#[cfg(test)]
@@ -52,8 +52,8 @@ use super::replication_storage_boundary::{
ReplicationObjectIO, ReplicationStorage, StatObjectOptions, StorageObjectInfoOrErr, WalkOptions,
};
use super::replication_target_boundary::{
ERR_REPLICATION_SSEC_PASSTHROUGH_UNSUPPORTED, PutObjectOptions, PutObjectPartOptions, ReplicationTargetStore,
SsecPassthroughCapability, SsecPassthroughGate, TargetClient, is_replication_target_offline_error,
ERR_REPLICATION_SSEC_PASSTHROUGH_UNSUPPORTED, HeadObjectSdkError, PutObjectOptions, PutObjectPartOptions,
ReplicationTargetStore, SsecPassthroughCapability, SsecPassthroughGate, TargetClient, is_replication_target_offline_error,
replication_action_for_target_head, replication_complete_multipart_options, replication_delete_marker_purge_remove_options,
replication_delete_remove_options, replication_force_delete_remove_options, replication_object_is_ssec_encrypted,
replication_put_object_header_size, replication_put_object_options, replication_target_head_is_newer_null_version,
@@ -214,7 +214,7 @@ async fn head_object_for_worker(
target_bucket: &str,
object: &str,
version_id: Option<String>,
) -> std::result::Result<HeadObjectOutput, SdkError<HeadObjectError>> {
) -> std::result::Result<HeadObjectOutput, HeadObjectSdkError> {
target_client.head_object(target_bucket, object, version_id).await
}
@@ -233,7 +233,7 @@ async fn mark_replication_target_offline_if_needed(target_client: &Arc<TargetCli
async fn head_object_fallback(
tgt_client: &TargetClient,
object: &str,
) -> std::result::Result<Option<HeadObjectOutput>, SdkError<HeadObjectError>> {
) -> std::result::Result<Option<HeadObjectOutput>, HeadObjectSdkError> {
match head_object_for_worker(tgt_client, &tgt_client.bucket, object, None).await {
Ok(oi) => Ok(Some(oi)),
Err(e) if e.as_service_error().is_some_and(|se| se.is_not_found()) || has_raw_status(&e, 404) => Ok(None),
@@ -1152,11 +1152,11 @@ fn spawn_resync_walk_task<S: ReplicationStorage>(
/// updating the per-object status counters and returning the accounted size
/// together with any verification error.
async fn verify_resync_head_result(
head_result: std::result::Result<HeadObjectOutput, SdkError<HeadObjectError>>,
head_result: std::result::Result<HeadObjectOutput, HeadObjectSdkError>,
roi: &ReplicateObjectInfo,
st: &mut TargetReplicationResyncStatus,
target_client: &Arc<TargetClient>,
) -> (i64, Option<SdkError<HeadObjectError>>) {
) -> (i64, Option<HeadObjectSdkError>) {
match head_result {
Ok(_) => {
st.replicated_count += 1;
@@ -1275,7 +1275,7 @@ async fn resync_worker_process_object<S: ReplicationStorage>(
"Processed resync object"
);
}
st.error = err.as_ref().and_then(resync_target_error_detail);
st.error = err.as_ref().and_then(|err| resync_target_error_detail(err.as_ref()));
st
}
@@ -2467,7 +2467,7 @@ async fn replicate_delete_to_target(dobj: &DeletedObjectReplicationInfo, tgt_cli
Ok(_) => {}
Err(e) => {
let non_retryable = matches!(
&e,
e.as_ref(),
SdkError::ServiceError(service_err)
if is_retryable_delete_replication_head_error(
service_err.err().is_not_found(),
@@ -36,7 +36,8 @@ use time::OffsetDateTime;
use time::format_description::well_known::Rfc3339;
pub(crate) use crate::bucket::bucket_target_sys::{
AdvancedPutOptions, PutObjectOptions, PutObjectPartOptions, RemoveObjectOptions, TargetClient, resolve_read_api_version_id,
AdvancedPutOptions, HeadObjectSdkError, PutObjectOptions, PutObjectPartOptions, RemoveObjectOptions, TargetClient,
resolve_read_api_version_id,
};
#[cfg(test)]
pub(crate) use crate::bucket::target::BucketTarget;
@@ -454,7 +454,7 @@ impl S3PeerSys {
}
}
topology_complete &= bucket_map.values().all(|count| *count >= quorum);
// TODO: MRF
// TODO(backlog): integrate MRF backlog stats into scanner bucket listing
}
let mut buckets: Vec<BucketInfo> = result_map.into_values().collect();
+82 -7
View File
@@ -41,6 +41,10 @@ use bytes::Bytes;
use futures::lock::Mutex;
use metrics::counter;
use rustfs_filemeta::{FileInfo, ObjectPartInfo, RawFileInfo};
use rustfs_io_metrics::internode_metrics::{
INTERNODE_STAGE_READ_VERSION_REQUEST_ENCODE, INTERNODE_STAGE_READ_VERSION_RESPONSE_DECODE,
INTERNODE_STAGE_READ_VERSION_RPC_ROUNDTRIP,
};
use rustfs_protos::ChannelClass;
use rustfs_protos::evict_failed_connection;
use rustfs_protos::proto_gen::node_service::RenamePartRequest;
@@ -64,7 +68,7 @@ use std::{
atomic::{AtomicBool, AtomicU32, Ordering},
},
task::{Context, Poll},
time::Duration,
time::{Duration, Instant},
};
use tokio::time;
use tokio::{
@@ -1790,6 +1794,16 @@ fn decode_msgpack_or_json<T: DeserializeOwned>(binary: &[u8], json: &str, value_
}
}
fn read_version_stage_timer(attribution_enabled: bool) -> Option<Instant> {
attribution_enabled.then(Instant::now)
}
fn record_read_version_stage(stage: &'static str, started_at: Option<Instant>) {
if let Some(started_at) = started_at {
crate::cluster::rpc::runtime_sources::record_remote_disk_grpc_read_version_stage(stage, started_at.elapsed());
}
}
/// Aggregate encoded size (bytes) of a `ReadMultiple` response, preferring the msgpack payloads
/// and falling back to the JSON compatibility strings. Used to size the RPC for the payload
/// histogram / large-payload alerting (grpc-optimization P0 instrumentation).
@@ -2392,7 +2406,7 @@ impl DiskAPI for RemoteDisk {
return errors;
}
// TODO: use Error not string
// TODO(backlog): replace string errors with typed `StorageError` variants
let result = self
.execute_with_timeout(
@@ -2705,8 +2719,11 @@ impl DiskAPI for RemoteDisk {
state = "started",
"Remote disk RPC started"
);
let opts_str = compat_json(opts)?;
let opts_bin = encode_msgpack(opts)?;
let read_version_attribution_enabled = rustfs_io_metrics::get_stage_metrics_enabled();
let encode_started = read_version_stage_timer(read_version_attribution_enabled);
let encoded_opts = compat_json(opts).and_then(|opts_str| encode_msgpack(opts).map(|opts_bin| (opts_str, opts_bin)));
record_read_version_stage(INTERNODE_STAGE_READ_VERSION_REQUEST_ENCODE, encode_started);
let (opts_str, opts_bin) = encoded_opts?;
// Idempotent version read: eligible for the bounded transient-network retry so a single
// reset-by-peer during the read-after-write window does not erode the metadata read
@@ -2722,6 +2739,14 @@ impl DiskAPI for RemoteDisk {
.get_client()
.await
.map_err(|err| Error::other(format!("can not get client, err: {err}")))?;
let request_payload_bytes = read_version_attribution_enabled.then(|| {
disk.len()
.saturating_add(volume.len())
.saturating_add(path.len())
.saturating_add(version_id.len())
.saturating_add(opts_str.len())
.saturating_add(opts_bin.len())
});
let request = Request::new(ReadVersionRequest {
disk,
volume: volume.to_string(),
@@ -2731,14 +2756,47 @@ impl DiskAPI for RemoteDisk {
opts_bin: opts_bin.into(),
});
let response = client.read_version(request).await?.into_inner();
crate::cluster::rpc::runtime_sources::record_remote_disk_grpc_read_version_request();
if let Some(request_payload_bytes) = request_payload_bytes {
crate::cluster::rpc::runtime_sources::record_remote_disk_grpc_read_version_sent_bytes(request_payload_bytes);
}
let rpc_started = read_version_stage_timer(read_version_attribution_enabled);
let response = match client.read_version(request).await {
Ok(response) => {
record_read_version_stage(INTERNODE_STAGE_READ_VERSION_RPC_ROUNDTRIP, rpc_started);
response.into_inner()
}
Err(err) => {
record_read_version_stage(INTERNODE_STAGE_READ_VERSION_RPC_ROUNDTRIP, rpc_started);
crate::cluster::rpc::runtime_sources::record_remote_disk_grpc_read_version_error();
return Err(err.into());
}
};
if !response.success {
crate::cluster::rpc::runtime_sources::record_remote_disk_grpc_read_version_error();
return Err(response.error.unwrap_or_default().into());
}
let file_info = decode_msgpack_or_json::<FileInfo>(&response.file_info_bin, &response.file_info, "FileInfo")?;
validate_decoded_file_info(&file_info)?;
crate::cluster::rpc::runtime_sources::record_remote_disk_grpc_read_version_recv_bytes(
response.file_info.len().saturating_add(response.file_info_bin.len()),
);
let decode_started = read_version_stage_timer(read_version_attribution_enabled);
let file_info = match decode_msgpack_or_json::<FileInfo>(&response.file_info_bin, &response.file_info, "FileInfo")
.and_then(|file_info| {
validate_decoded_file_info(&file_info)?;
Ok(file_info)
}) {
Ok(file_info) => {
record_read_version_stage(INTERNODE_STAGE_READ_VERSION_RESPONSE_DECODE, decode_started);
file_info
}
Err(err) => {
record_read_version_stage(INTERNODE_STAGE_READ_VERSION_RESPONSE_DECODE, decode_started);
crate::cluster::rpc::runtime_sources::record_remote_disk_grpc_read_version_error();
return Err(err);
}
};
Ok(file_info)
},
@@ -7931,12 +7989,17 @@ mod tests {
}
#[tokio::test]
#[serial]
async fn read_version_uses_the_metadata_timeout_on_a_stalled_peer() {
runtime_sources::ensure_test_rpc_secret();
let Some((base_addr, accept_task)) = spawn_stalled_grpc_peer().await else {
return;
};
let remote_disk = remote_disk_for_addr(&base_addr).await;
let metrics = rustfs_io_metrics::internode_metrics::global_internode_metrics();
let previous_stage_metrics = rustfs_io_metrics::get_stage_metrics_enabled();
metrics.reset_for_test();
rustfs_io_metrics::set_get_stage_metrics_enabled(true);
temp_env::async_with_vars(
[
@@ -7960,6 +8023,18 @@ mod tests {
)
.await;
rustfs_io_metrics::set_get_stage_metrics_enabled(previous_stage_metrics);
let snapshot = metrics.snapshot();
assert!(
snapshot.outgoing_requests_total >= 1,
"ReadVersion call site should record outgoing attempts when attribution is enabled"
);
assert!(
snapshot.sent_bytes_total > 0,
"ReadVersion call site should record request payload bytes when attribution is enabled"
);
metrics.reset_for_test();
remote_disk.cancel_token.cancel();
accept_task.abort();
}
@@ -14,10 +14,11 @@
use rustfs_io_metrics::internode_metrics::{
INTERNODE_MSGPACK_CODEC_JSON, INTERNODE_MSGPACK_CODEC_MSGPACK, INTERNODE_MSGPACK_DIRECTION_RESPONSE,
INTERNODE_OPERATION_GRPC_READ_ALL, INTERNODE_OPERATION_GRPC_READ_MULTIPLE, INTERNODE_OPERATION_GRPC_WRITE_ALL,
INTERNODE_OPERATION_PUT_FILE_STREAM, INTERNODE_OPERATION_READ_FILE_STREAM, INTERNODE_TRANSPORT_BACKEND_GRPC,
INTERNODE_TRANSPORT_BACKEND_TCP_HTTP, global_internode_metrics,
INTERNODE_OPERATION_GRPC_READ_ALL, INTERNODE_OPERATION_GRPC_READ_MULTIPLE, INTERNODE_OPERATION_GRPC_READ_VERSION,
INTERNODE_OPERATION_GRPC_WRITE_ALL, INTERNODE_OPERATION_PUT_FILE_STREAM, INTERNODE_OPERATION_READ_FILE_STREAM,
INTERNODE_TRANSPORT_BACKEND_GRPC, INTERNODE_TRANSPORT_BACKEND_TCP_HTTP, global_internode_metrics,
};
use std::time::Duration;
#[cfg(test)]
use rustfs_io_metrics::internode_metrics::InternodeMetricsSnapshot;
@@ -82,6 +83,59 @@ pub(crate) fn record_remote_disk_grpc_read_all_request() {
.record_outgoing_request_for_operation_and_backend(INTERNODE_OPERATION_GRPC_READ_ALL, INTERNODE_TRANSPORT_BACKEND_GRPC);
}
pub(crate) fn record_remote_disk_grpc_read_version_request() {
if !rustfs_io_metrics::get_stage_metrics_enabled() {
return;
}
global_internode_metrics().record_outgoing_request_for_operation_and_backend(
INTERNODE_OPERATION_GRPC_READ_VERSION,
INTERNODE_TRANSPORT_BACKEND_GRPC,
);
}
pub(crate) fn record_remote_disk_grpc_read_version_error() {
if !rustfs_io_metrics::get_stage_metrics_enabled() {
return;
}
global_internode_metrics()
.record_error_for_operation_and_backend(INTERNODE_OPERATION_GRPC_READ_VERSION, INTERNODE_TRANSPORT_BACKEND_GRPC);
}
pub(crate) fn record_remote_disk_grpc_read_version_sent_bytes(bytes: usize) {
if !rustfs_io_metrics::get_stage_metrics_enabled() {
return;
}
global_internode_metrics().record_sent_bytes_for_operation_and_backend(
INTERNODE_OPERATION_GRPC_READ_VERSION,
INTERNODE_TRANSPORT_BACKEND_GRPC,
bytes,
);
}
pub(crate) fn record_remote_disk_grpc_read_version_recv_bytes(bytes: usize) {
if !rustfs_io_metrics::get_stage_metrics_enabled() {
return;
}
global_internode_metrics().record_recv_bytes_for_operation_and_backend(
INTERNODE_OPERATION_GRPC_READ_VERSION,
INTERNODE_TRANSPORT_BACKEND_GRPC,
bytes,
);
record_grpc_payload_size(INTERNODE_OPERATION_GRPC_READ_VERSION, bytes);
}
pub(crate) fn record_remote_disk_grpc_read_version_stage(stage: &'static str, duration: Duration) {
if !rustfs_io_metrics::get_stage_metrics_enabled() {
return;
}
global_internode_metrics().record_stage_duration_for_operation_and_backend(
INTERNODE_OPERATION_GRPC_READ_VERSION,
INTERNODE_TRANSPORT_BACKEND_GRPC,
stage,
duration,
);
}
pub(crate) fn record_remote_disk_grpc_read_all_recv_bytes(bytes: usize) {
global_internode_metrics().record_recv_bytes_for_operation_and_backend(
INTERNODE_OPERATION_GRPC_READ_ALL,
+250 -25
View File
@@ -36,7 +36,8 @@ use crate::disk::error::DiskError;
use crate::disk::{BUCKET_META_PREFIX, RUSTFS_META_BUCKET};
use crate::error::{Error, Result};
use crate::error::{
StorageError, is_err_bucket_exists, is_err_bucket_not_found, is_err_object_not_found, is_err_version_not_found,
StorageError, is_err_bucket_exists, is_err_bucket_not_found, is_err_object_not_found, is_err_operation_canceled,
is_err_version_not_found,
};
use crate::layout::endpoints::EndpointServerPools;
use crate::object_api::{GetObjectReader, ObjectOptions};
@@ -94,6 +95,9 @@ const DECOMMISSION_BUCKET_CONCURRENCY_DEFAULT_CAP: usize = 4;
const DECOMMISSION_TARGET_CAPACITY_OVERHEAD_PERCENT: usize = 30;
const DECOMMISSION_LISTING_MAX_ATTEMPTS: usize = 3;
const DECOMMISSION_LISTING_RETRY_DELAY: std::time::Duration = std::time::Duration::from_secs(5);
/// Background decommission walks must tolerate slow object migrations; the
/// stall timeout is the drive-health bound, not the total listing duration.
const DECOMMISSION_BACKGROUND_WALKDIR_STALL_TIMEOUT: std::time::Duration = std::time::Duration::from_secs(60);
pub const POOL_META_NAME: &str = "pool.bin";
pub const POOL_META_FORMAT: u16 = 1;
@@ -770,7 +774,76 @@ async fn load_decommission_entry_exact_versions(
}
fn resolve_decommission_check_after_list_result(list_result: Result<()>, entry_error: Option<Error>) -> Result<()> {
if let Some(err) = entry_error { Err(err) } else { list_result }
match list_result {
Ok(()) => entry_error.map_or(Ok(()), Err),
Err(list_err) => resolve_decommission_listing_error(Some(list_err), entry_error).map_or(Ok(()), Err),
}
}
fn resolve_decommission_listing_error(listing_error: Option<Error>, entry_error: Option<Error>) -> Option<Error> {
match (listing_error, entry_error) {
(Some(listing_error), Some(entry_error)) if is_err_operation_canceled(&listing_error) => Some(entry_error),
(Some(listing_error), Some(entry_error)) if is_err_operation_canceled(&entry_error) => Some(listing_error),
(Some(listing_error), _) => Some(listing_error),
(None, entry_error) => entry_error,
}
}
fn decommission_unresolved_listing_error(
bucket: &str,
prefix: &str,
candidate: Option<&str>,
candidate_count: usize,
disk_error_count: usize,
pool_index: usize,
set_index: usize,
) -> Error {
let location = candidate.unwrap_or(prefix);
Error::other(format!(
"decommission listing could not resolve metadata for {bucket}/{location} on pool {pool_index} set {set_index} ({candidate_count} candidate(s), {disk_error_count} disk error(s))"
))
}
fn resolve_decommission_partial_listing_entry(
entries: MetaCacheEntries,
resolver: MetadataResolutionParams,
bucket: &str,
prefix: &str,
disk_error_count: usize,
pool_index: usize,
set_index: usize,
) -> Result<MetaCacheEntry> {
let candidate_count = entries.as_ref().iter().flatten().count();
if let Some(entry) = entries.resolve(resolver) {
return Ok(entry);
}
let candidate = entries.as_ref().iter().flatten().map(|entry| entry.name.as_str()).next();
Err(decommission_unresolved_listing_error(
bucket,
prefix,
candidate,
candidate_count,
disk_error_count,
pool_index,
set_index,
))
}
async fn record_decommission_entry_error(
entry_error: &Arc<tokio::sync::Mutex<Option<Error>>>,
rx: &CancellationToken,
err: Error,
) {
if rx.is_cancelled() {
return;
}
let mut first_err = entry_error.lock().await;
if first_err.is_none() && !rx.is_cancelled() {
*first_err = Some(err);
rx.cancel();
}
}
fn resolve_decommission_pool_meta_reload_result(result: Result<()>, stage: &str) -> Result<()> {
@@ -1041,7 +1114,13 @@ fn should_count_decommission_version_complete(ignore: bool, cleanup_ignored: boo
fn is_decommission_copy_cleanup_safe_error(err: &Error) -> bool {
// DataMovementOverwriteErr only means source and destination pool resolved to
// the same pool. Without a target equivalence check it is not cleanup-safe.
is_err_object_not_found(err) || is_err_version_not_found(err)
if is_err_object_not_found(err) || is_err_version_not_found(err) {
return true;
}
// A not-found surfacing from inside a data-movement stage is the same
// condition once the wrapper is unwrapped (backlog#1827 T2).
crate::data_movement::data_movement_stage_source(err).is_some_and(is_decommission_copy_cleanup_safe_error)
}
fn is_decommission_target_capacity_error(err: &Error) -> bool {
@@ -1049,6 +1128,13 @@ fn is_decommission_target_capacity_error(err: &Error) -> bool {
return true;
}
// A stage failure keeps the error it wrapped, so classify by type rather
// than by the rendered message (backlog#1827 T2). The substring fallback
// stays for errors that reached here through some other wrapper.
if let Some(source) = crate::data_movement::data_movement_stage_source(err) {
return is_decommission_target_capacity_error(source);
}
let message = err.to_string();
let disk_full = Error::DiskFull.to_string();
let storage_full = Error::StorageFull.to_string();
@@ -3522,6 +3608,7 @@ impl ECStore {
let rx_clone = rx.clone();
let bi = bi.clone();
let set_id = set_idx;
let listing_entry_error = entry_error.clone();
let worker = tokio::spawn(async move {
let _listing_permit = listing_permit;
run_decommission_listing_with_retry(
@@ -3535,7 +3622,11 @@ impl ECStore {
let set = set.clone();
let rx = rx_clone.clone();
let bucket = bi.clone();
async move { set.list_objects_to_decommission(rx, bucket, callback).await }
let entry_error = listing_entry_error.clone();
async move {
set.list_objects_to_decommission(rx, bucket, callback, entry_error.clone(), idx, set_id)
.await
}
},
)
.await
@@ -3565,11 +3656,7 @@ impl ECStore {
wait_decommission_worker_drain(&workers, worker_limit).await?;
if let Some(err) = listing_worker_error {
return Err(err);
}
if let Some(err) = entry_error.lock().await.clone() {
if let Some(err) = resolve_decommission_listing_error(listing_worker_error, entry_error.lock().await.clone()) {
return Err(err);
}
@@ -4175,7 +4262,7 @@ impl ECStore {
let buckets = self.get_buckets_to_decommission().await?;
let pool = self.pools[idx].clone();
for set in &pool.disk_set {
for (set_index, set) in pool.disk_set.iter().enumerate() {
for bucket_info in &buckets {
let mut lifecycle_config = None;
let mut object_lock_config = None;
@@ -4270,7 +4357,7 @@ impl ECStore {
});
let list_result = set
.list_objects_to_decommission(callback_rx, bucket_info.clone(), callback)
.list_objects_to_decommission(callback_rx, bucket_info.clone(), callback, entry_error.clone(), idx, set_index)
.await;
let entry_error = entry_error.lock().await.clone();
resolve_decommission_check_after_list_result(list_result, entry_error)?;
@@ -4427,6 +4514,36 @@ mod tests {
assert!(is_decommission_target_capacity_error(&Error::StorageFull));
}
/// The decommission loop classifies errors that came back through a
/// data-movement stage wrapper. Before backlog#1827 T2 the wrapper flattened
/// everything into `Error::other(String)`, so these two classifiers had to
/// match on rendered text; now the wrapped error is recoverable by type.
#[test]
fn decommission_classifiers_see_through_a_stage_wrapper() {
let wrap = |inner: Error| {
crate::data_movement::data_movement_stage_error_for_test(
"decommission_object",
"put_object",
"bucket-a",
"object-a",
inner,
)
};
// Capacity: the target pool filling up must still stop the loop.
assert!(is_decommission_target_capacity_error(&wrap(Error::DiskFull)));
assert!(is_decommission_target_capacity_error(&wrap(Error::StorageFull)));
assert!(!is_decommission_target_capacity_error(&wrap(Error::SlowDown)));
// Cleanup safety: a not-found surfacing from inside a stage is the same
// condition as one surfacing directly, so the source entry stays
// eligible for cleanup.
let not_found = Error::ObjectNotFound("bucket-a".to_string(), "object-a".to_string());
assert!(is_decommission_copy_cleanup_safe_error(&not_found));
assert!(is_decommission_copy_cleanup_safe_error(&wrap(not_found)));
assert!(!is_decommission_copy_cleanup_safe_error(&wrap(Error::SlowDown)));
}
#[test]
fn decommission_target_capacity_error_accepts_wrapped_capacity_errors() {
let disk_full = Error::other(format!("decommission_object: put_object failed for bucket/object: {}", Error::DiskFull));
@@ -4975,12 +5092,15 @@ mod tests {
pub type ListCallback = Arc<dyn Fn(MetaCacheEntry) -> BoxFuture<'static, ()> + Send + Sync + 'static>;
impl SetDisks {
#[tracing::instrument(skip(self, rx, cb_func))]
#[tracing::instrument(skip(self, rx, cb_func, entry_error))]
async fn list_objects_to_decommission(
self: &Arc<Self>,
rx: CancellationToken,
bucket_info: DecomBucketInfo,
cb_func: ListCallback,
entry_error: Arc<tokio::sync::Mutex<Option<Error>>>,
pool_index: usize,
set_index: usize,
) -> Result<()> {
let (disks, _) = self.get_online_disks_with_healing(false).await;
ensure_decommission_listing_disks_available(!disks.is_empty(), &bucket_info.name)?;
@@ -4995,6 +5115,12 @@ impl SetDisks {
};
let cb1 = cb_func.clone();
let unresolved_error = entry_error.clone();
let unresolved_rx = rx.clone();
let unresolved_bucket = bucket_info.name.clone();
let unresolved_prefix = bucket_info.prefix.clone();
let unresolved_pool_index = pool_index;
let unresolved_set_index = set_index;
list_path_raw(
rx,
@@ -5004,21 +5130,54 @@ impl SetDisks {
path: bucket_info.prefix.clone(),
recursive: true,
min_disks: listing_quorum,
skip_walkdir_total_timeout: true,
walkdir_stall_timeout: Some(DECOMMISSION_BACKGROUND_WALKDIR_STALL_TIMEOUT),
agreed: Some(Box::new(move |entry: MetaCacheEntry| Box::pin(cb1(entry)))),
partial: Some(Box::new(move |entries: MetaCacheEntries, _: &[Option<DiskError>]| {
partial: Some(Box::new(move |entries: MetaCacheEntries, errs: &[Option<DiskError>]| {
let resolver = resolver.clone();
let cb_func = cb_func.clone();
match entries.resolve(resolver) {
Some(entry) => {
let bucket = unresolved_bucket.clone();
let prefix = unresolved_prefix.clone();
let unresolved_error = unresolved_error.clone();
let unresolved_rx = unresolved_rx.clone();
let pool_index = unresolved_pool_index;
let set_index = unresolved_set_index;
let disk_error_count = errs.iter().flatten().count();
if unresolved_rx.is_cancelled() {
return Box::pin(async {});
}
match resolve_decommission_partial_listing_entry(
entries,
resolver,
&bucket,
&prefix,
disk_error_count,
pool_index,
set_index,
) {
Ok(entry) => {
warn!("decommission_pool: list_objects_to_decommission get {}", &entry.name);
Box::pin(async move {
cb_func(entry).await;
})
}
None => {
warn!("decommission_pool: list_objects_to_decommission get none");
Box::pin(async {})
}
Err(err) => Box::pin(async move {
if unresolved_rx.is_cancelled() {
return;
}
warn!(
event = EVENT_DECOMMISSION_BUCKET,
component = LOG_COMPONENT_ECSTORE,
subsystem = LOG_SUBSYSTEM_POOLS,
bucket = %bucket,
prefix = %prefix,
state = "unresolved_entry",
error = %err,
"Decommission listing failed closed on unresolved metadata"
);
record_decommission_entry_error(&unresolved_error, &unresolved_rx, err).await;
}),
}
})),
..Default::default()
@@ -5026,6 +5185,10 @@ impl SetDisks {
)
.await?;
if let Some(err) = entry_error.lock().await.clone() {
return Err(err);
}
Ok(())
}
}
@@ -5231,11 +5394,12 @@ mod pools_tests {
has_active_decommission_canceler, is_decommission_active, is_decommission_cancel_requested,
load_decommission_entry_versions, local_decommission_queue_prefix, mark_decommission_bucket_done,
merge_pool_status_refresh, missing_decommission_worker_prefix, observe_decommission_terminal_reload_result,
pool_meta_has_active_decommission, require_decommission_store, resolve_decommission_bucket_done_save_result,
resolve_decommission_bucket_state, resolve_decommission_check_after_list_result,
resolve_decommission_entry_cleanup_delete_result, resolve_decommission_entry_exact_versions,
resolve_decommission_entry_reload_result, resolve_decommission_listing_worker_result,
resolve_decommission_optional_bucket_config_result, resolve_decommission_pool_meta_reload_result,
pool_meta_has_active_decommission, record_decommission_entry_error, require_decommission_store,
resolve_decommission_bucket_done_save_result, resolve_decommission_bucket_state,
resolve_decommission_check_after_list_result, resolve_decommission_entry_cleanup_delete_result,
resolve_decommission_entry_exact_versions, resolve_decommission_entry_reload_result, resolve_decommission_listing_error,
resolve_decommission_listing_worker_result, resolve_decommission_optional_bucket_config_result,
resolve_decommission_partial_listing_entry, resolve_decommission_pool_meta_reload_result,
resolve_decommission_preflight_heal_result, resolve_decommission_progress_save_result,
resolve_decommission_spawn_failure_result, resolve_decommission_terminal_mark_after_error_result,
resolve_decommission_terminal_mark_result, resolve_decommission_update_after_result,
@@ -5254,7 +5418,9 @@ mod pools_tests {
use crate::error::{Error, StorageError};
use crate::layout::endpoints::{EndpointServerPools, Endpoints, PoolEndpoints};
use crate::services::rebalance::{RebalStatus, RebalanceInfo, RebalanceMeta, RebalanceStats};
use rustfs_filemeta::{FileInfo, FileInfoVersions, MetaCacheEntry, ObjectPartInfo};
use rustfs_filemeta::{
FileInfo, FileInfoVersions, MetaCacheEntries, MetaCacheEntry, MetadataResolutionParams, ObjectPartInfo,
};
use rustfs_rio::Index;
use std::sync::{
Arc,
@@ -6273,6 +6439,65 @@ mod pools_tests {
assert!(matches!(err, Error::SlowDown));
}
#[test]
fn test_resolve_decommission_partial_listing_entry_rejects_unresolved_metadata() {
let err = resolve_decommission_partial_listing_entry(
MetaCacheEntries(vec![None]),
MetadataResolutionParams {
dir_quorum: 2,
obj_quorum: 2,
bucket: "bucket-a".to_string(),
..Default::default()
},
"bucket-a",
"prefix/",
1,
2,
3,
)
.expect_err("unresolved partial listing must fail closed");
let message = err.to_string();
assert!(message.contains("decommission listing could not resolve metadata"));
assert!(message.contains("bucket-a/prefix/"));
assert!(message.contains("pool 2 set 3"));
assert!(message.contains("1 disk error(s)"));
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn test_record_decommission_entry_error_cancels_listing_and_preserves_first_error() {
let entry_error = Arc::new(tokio::sync::Mutex::new(None));
let rx = CancellationToken::new();
record_decommission_entry_error(&entry_error, &rx, Error::SlowDown).await;
record_decommission_entry_error(&entry_error, &rx, Error::OperationCanceled).await;
assert!(rx.is_cancelled());
assert!(matches!(*entry_error.lock().await, Some(Error::SlowDown)));
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn test_record_decommission_entry_error_ignores_already_canceled_listing() {
let entry_error = Arc::new(tokio::sync::Mutex::new(None));
let rx = CancellationToken::new();
rx.cancel();
record_decommission_entry_error(&entry_error, &rx, Error::SlowDown).await;
assert!(entry_error.lock().await.is_none());
}
#[test]
fn test_resolve_decommission_listing_error_preserves_real_listing_failure() {
let err = resolve_decommission_listing_error(Some(Error::SlowDown), Some(Error::OperationCanceled))
.expect("listing failure should be returned");
assert!(matches!(err, Error::SlowDown));
let err = resolve_decommission_listing_error(Some(Error::OperationCanceled), Some(Error::SlowDown))
.expect("entry failure should be returned");
assert!(matches!(err, Error::SlowDown));
}
#[test]
fn test_resolve_decommission_check_after_list_result_returns_list_result_without_entry_error() {
let err = resolve_decommission_check_after_list_result(Err(Error::OperationCanceled), None)
+1 -1
View File
@@ -249,7 +249,7 @@ impl Sets {
self.connect_disks().await;
// TODO: config interval
// TODO(backlog): make monitor_and_connect interval configurable instead of hardcoded 15s
let mut interval = tokio::time::interval(Duration::from_secs(15));
loop {
tokio::select! {
+88 -2
View File
@@ -471,8 +471,60 @@ fn resolve_data_movement_abort_result(
))
}
fn data_movement_stage_error(op_label: &str, stage: &str, bucket: &str, object: &str, err: impl std::fmt::Display) -> Error {
Error::other(format!("{op_label}: {stage} failed for {bucket}/{object}: {err}"))
/// A data-movement stage failure that keeps the error it wrapped.
///
/// The rendered message is byte-identical to the `format!` this replaced, so
/// logs and any message-matching callers are unaffected. What changes is that
/// the original error stays reachable through `source()`, which is what lets
/// the decommission loop classify by type instead of by substring
/// (backlog#1827 T2).
#[derive(Debug)]
struct DataMovementStageError {
rendered: String,
source: Box<dyn std::error::Error + Send + Sync>,
}
impl std::fmt::Display for DataMovementStageError {
fn fmt(&self, f: &mut std::fmt::Formatter<'_>) -> std::fmt::Result {
f.write_str(&self.rendered)
}
}
impl std::error::Error for DataMovementStageError {
fn source(&self) -> Option<&(dyn std::error::Error + 'static)> {
Some(self.source.as_ref())
}
}
fn data_movement_stage_error<E>(op_label: &str, stage: &str, bucket: &str, object: &str, err: E) -> Error
where
E: std::error::Error + Send + Sync + 'static,
{
let rendered = format!("{op_label}: {stage} failed for {bucket}/{object}: {err}");
Error::other(DataMovementStageError {
rendered,
source: Box::new(err),
})
}
#[cfg(test)]
pub(crate) fn data_movement_stage_error_for_test(op_label: &str, stage: &str, bucket: &str, object: &str, err: Error) -> Error {
data_movement_stage_error(op_label, stage, bucket, object, err)
}
/// Recover the error a [`data_movement_stage_error`] wrapped, if this is one.
///
/// `Error::other` boxes through `std::io::Error`, so the chain is
/// `StorageError::Io` -> `DataMovementStageError` -> the original error.
pub(crate) fn data_movement_stage_source(err: &Error) -> Option<&Error> {
let Error::Io(io_err) = err else {
return None;
};
io_err
.get_ref()?
.downcast_ref::<DataMovementStageError>()?
.source
.downcast_ref::<Error>()
}
fn schedule_data_movement_multipart_abort_cleanup(
@@ -1865,6 +1917,40 @@ mod tests {
assert!(message.contains(Error::SlowDown.to_string().as_str()));
}
#[test]
fn stage_error_renders_exactly_as_the_format_it_replaced() {
// The wrapper gained a source; its message must not have moved, or log
// scrapers and any message-matching caller would break (backlog#1827 T2).
// `Error::other` renders through `StorageError::Io`, which prefixes
// "Io error: " — that was true of the `format!` this replaced too, so
// the full string is what must stay stable.
let err = data_movement_stage_error("rebalance_object", "put_object", "bucket-a", "object-a", Error::SlowDown);
assert_eq!(
err.to_string(),
format!("Io error: rebalance_object: put_object failed for bucket-a/object-a: {}", Error::SlowDown)
);
assert_eq!(
err.to_string(),
Error::other(format!("rebalance_object: put_object failed for bucket-a/object-a: {}", Error::SlowDown)).to_string()
);
}
#[test]
fn stage_error_keeps_the_wrapped_error_recoverable() {
for original in [Error::DiskFull, Error::StorageFull, Error::FileNotFound, Error::SlowDown] {
let wrapped =
data_movement_stage_error("decommission_object", "put_object", "bucket-a", "object-a", original.clone());
let recovered = data_movement_stage_source(&wrapped).expect("the wrapped error must be recoverable");
assert_eq!(recovered.to_string(), original.to_string());
}
}
#[test]
fn stage_source_ignores_errors_it_did_not_wrap() {
assert!(data_movement_stage_source(&Error::DiskFull).is_none());
assert!(data_movement_stage_source(&Error::other("plain io error")).is_none());
}
#[test]
fn test_data_movement_part_stage_error_includes_stage_object_and_part() {
let err =
+7 -7
View File
@@ -5215,8 +5215,8 @@ impl LocalDisk {
let cache = Cache::new(update_fn, Duration::from_secs(1), Opts::default());
// TODO: DIRECT support
// TODD: DiskInfo
// TODO(backlog): add O_DIRECT I/O support for performance-critical paths
// TODO(backlog): populate DiskInfo in constructor
let mut disk = Self {
root: root.clone(),
publication_root,
@@ -5751,7 +5751,7 @@ impl LocalDisk {
// return Ok(());
// TODO: async notifications for disk space checks and trash cleanup
// TODO(backlog): make disk space checks and trash cleanup event-driven instead of poll-based
let trash_path = self.io_get_object_path(RUSTFS_META_TMP_DELETED_BUCKET, Uuid::new_v4().to_string().as_str())?;
// if let Some(parent) = trash_path.parent() {
@@ -5997,7 +5997,7 @@ impl LocalDisk {
#[hotpath::measure(impl_type = "LocalDisk")]
async fn read_all_data(&self, volume: &str, volume_dir: impl AsRef<Path>, file_path: impl AsRef<Path>) -> Result<Vec<u8>> {
// TODO: timeout support
// TODO(backlog): add configurable timeout for read_all_data operations
let (data, _) = self.read_all_data_with_dmtime(volume, volume_dir, file_path).await?;
Ok(data)
}
@@ -6674,7 +6674,7 @@ impl LocalDisk {
return Ok(());
}
// TODO: add lock
// TODO(backlog): add directory listing lock to prevent concurrent enumeration
let stall = opts.stall_timeout_duration();
@@ -8796,7 +8796,7 @@ impl DiskAPI for LocalDisk {
Ok(entries)
}
// FIXME: TODO: io.writer TODO cancel
// TODO(backlog): support io.writer cancellation and early termination in walk_dir
#[tracing::instrument(level = "trace", skip_all)]
async fn walk_dir<W: AsyncWrite + Unpin + Send>(&self, opts: WalkDirOptions, wr: &mut W) -> Result<()> {
self.wait_for_startup_cleanup().await;
@@ -9880,7 +9880,7 @@ impl DiskAPI for LocalDisk {
);
return Err(e);
}
// TODO: health check
// TODO(backlog): add post-setup disk health verification
}
Ok(())
}
+751
View File
@@ -23,6 +23,7 @@ use std::{
io,
path::{Component, Path, PathBuf},
sync::{Arc, LazyLock, Weak},
time::{Duration, Instant},
};
use tokio::fs;
use tokio::sync::{
@@ -325,6 +326,11 @@ pub async fn fsync_dir(dir: impl AsRef<Path>) -> io::Result<()> {
const ENV_DST_DIR_FSYNC_GROUP_COMMIT_ENABLE: &str = "RUSTFS_EXPERIMENTAL_DST_DIR_FSYNC_GROUP_COMMIT_ENABLE";
const DEFAULT_DST_DIR_FSYNC_GROUP_COMMIT_ENABLE: bool = false;
const ENV_FILE_FDATASYNC_GROUP_COMMIT_ENABLE: &str = "RUSTFS_EXPERIMENTAL_FILE_FDATASYNC_GROUP_COMMIT_ENABLE";
const DEFAULT_FILE_FDATASYNC_GROUP_COMMIT_ENABLE: bool = false;
const ENV_FILE_FDATASYNC_GROUP_COMMIT_WAIT_MICROS: &str = "RUSTFS_EXPERIMENTAL_FILE_FDATASYNC_GROUP_COMMIT_WAIT_MICROS";
const DEFAULT_FILE_FDATASYNC_GROUP_COMMIT_WAIT_MICROS: u64 = 0;
const MAX_FILE_FDATASYNC_GROUP_COMMIT_WAIT_MICROS: u64 = 1_000;
#[cfg(not(test))]
const MAX_DST_DIR_FSYNC_GROUPS: usize = 1024;
#[cfg(test)]
@@ -333,9 +339,34 @@ const MAX_DST_DIR_FSYNC_GROUPS: usize = 4;
const MAX_DST_DIR_FSYNC_WAITERS: usize = 8192;
#[cfg(test)]
const MAX_DST_DIR_FSYNC_WAITERS: usize = 8;
#[cfg(not(test))]
const MAX_FILE_FDATASYNC_GROUPS: usize = 1024;
#[cfg(test)]
const MAX_FILE_FDATASYNC_GROUPS: usize = 4;
#[cfg(not(test))]
const MAX_FILE_FDATASYNC_WAITERS: usize = 8192;
#[cfg(test)]
const MAX_FILE_FDATASYNC_WAITERS: usize = 8;
#[cfg(not(test))]
const MAX_FILE_FDATASYNC_BATCH_FILES: usize = 1024;
#[cfg(test)]
const MAX_FILE_FDATASYNC_BATCH_FILES: usize = 8;
static DST_DIR_FSYNC_GROUP_COMMIT_ENABLED: LazyLock<bool> = LazyLock::new(|| {
rustfs_utils::get_env_bool(ENV_DST_DIR_FSYNC_GROUP_COMMIT_ENABLE, DEFAULT_DST_DIR_FSYNC_GROUP_COMMIT_ENABLE)
});
static FILE_FDATASYNC_GROUP_COMMIT_ENABLED: LazyLock<bool> = LazyLock::new(|| {
rustfs_utils::get_env_bool(ENV_FILE_FDATASYNC_GROUP_COMMIT_ENABLE, DEFAULT_FILE_FDATASYNC_GROUP_COMMIT_ENABLE)
});
fn file_fdatasync_group_commit_wait_duration(wait_micros: u64) -> Duration {
Duration::from_micros(wait_micros.min(MAX_FILE_FDATASYNC_GROUP_COMMIT_WAIT_MICROS))
}
static FILE_FDATASYNC_GROUP_COMMIT_WAIT: LazyLock<Duration> = LazyLock::new(|| {
file_fdatasync_group_commit_wait_duration(rustfs_utils::get_env_u64(
ENV_FILE_FDATASYNC_GROUP_COMMIT_WAIT_MICROS,
DEFAULT_FILE_FDATASYNC_GROUP_COMMIT_WAIT_MICROS,
))
});
#[cfg(test)]
mod dst_dir_fsync_group_commit_override {
@@ -379,6 +410,72 @@ fn dst_dir_fsync_group_commit_enabled() -> bool {
*DST_DIR_FSYNC_GROUP_COMMIT_ENABLED
}
#[cfg(test)]
mod file_fdatasync_group_commit_override {
use std::sync::{Mutex, MutexGuard, PoisonError, RwLock};
static OVERRIDE: RwLock<Option<bool>> = RwLock::new(None);
static WAIT_OVERRIDE_MICROS: RwLock<Option<u64>> = RwLock::new(None);
static SERIAL: Mutex<()> = Mutex::new(());
pub(crate) fn get() -> Option<bool> {
*OVERRIDE.read().unwrap_or_else(PoisonError::into_inner)
}
pub(crate) struct OverrideGuard {
_serial: MutexGuard<'static, ()>,
}
impl Drop for OverrideGuard {
fn drop(&mut self) {
*OVERRIDE.write().unwrap_or_else(PoisonError::into_inner) = None;
*WAIT_OVERRIDE_MICROS.write().unwrap_or_else(PoisonError::into_inner) = None;
}
}
pub(crate) fn set(enabled: bool) -> OverrideGuard {
let serial = SERIAL.lock().unwrap_or_else(PoisonError::into_inner);
*OVERRIDE.write().unwrap_or_else(PoisonError::into_inner) = Some(enabled);
OverrideGuard { _serial: serial }
}
pub(crate) fn set_wait_micros(wait_micros: u64) {
*WAIT_OVERRIDE_MICROS.write().unwrap_or_else(PoisonError::into_inner) = Some(wait_micros);
}
pub(crate) fn wait_micros() -> Option<u64> {
*WAIT_OVERRIDE_MICROS.read().unwrap_or_else(PoisonError::into_inner)
}
}
#[cfg(test)]
pub(crate) fn set_file_fdatasync_group_commit_for_test(enabled: bool) -> file_fdatasync_group_commit_override::OverrideGuard {
file_fdatasync_group_commit_override::set(enabled)
}
#[cfg(test)]
fn set_file_fdatasync_group_commit_wait_for_test(wait_micros: u64) {
file_fdatasync_group_commit_override::set_wait_micros(wait_micros);
}
fn file_fdatasync_group_commit_enabled() -> bool {
#[cfg(test)]
if let Some(enabled) = file_fdatasync_group_commit_override::get() {
return enabled;
}
*FILE_FDATASYNC_GROUP_COMMIT_ENABLED
}
fn file_fdatasync_group_commit_wait() -> Duration {
#[cfg(test)]
if let Some(wait_micros) = file_fdatasync_group_commit_override::wait_micros() {
return file_fdatasync_group_commit_wait_duration(wait_micros);
}
*FILE_FDATASYNC_GROUP_COMMIT_WAIT
}
#[derive(Clone, Eq, Hash, PartialEq)]
struct DstDirFsyncGroupKey {
canonical_path: PathBuf,
@@ -703,6 +800,273 @@ fn clear_dst_dir_fsync_group_commit_for_test() {
DST_DIR_FSYNC_GROUP_COMMIT.clear_for_test();
}
type FileFdatasyncGroupKey = usize;
struct FileFdatasyncWaiter {
files: Vec<PathBuf>,
enqueued_at: Option<Instant>,
wait_role: &'static str,
result_tx: oneshot::Sender<SharedFileFdatasyncResult>,
}
#[derive(Clone)]
struct SharedFileFdatasyncError {
kind: io::ErrorKind,
message: Arc<str>,
}
impl SharedFileFdatasyncError {
fn from_error(err: io::Error) -> Self {
Self {
kind: err.kind(),
message: Arc::from(err.to_string()),
}
}
fn into_error(self) -> io::Error {
io::Error::new(self.kind, self.message.to_string())
}
}
type SharedFileFdatasyncResult = std::result::Result<(), SharedFileFdatasyncError>;
struct FileFdatasyncGroup {
key: FileFdatasyncGroupKey,
disk_permits: Weak<Semaphore>,
inner: Mutex<FileFdatasyncGroupInner>,
}
#[derive(Default)]
struct FileFdatasyncGroupInner {
worker_running: bool,
pending_files: usize,
pending: VecDeque<FileFdatasyncWaiter>,
}
#[derive(Default)]
struct FileFdatasyncGroupCommit {
inner: Mutex<FileFdatasyncGroupCommitInner>,
}
#[derive(Default)]
struct FileFdatasyncGroupCommitInner {
groups: HashMap<FileFdatasyncGroupKey, Arc<FileFdatasyncGroup>>,
total_waiters: usize,
total_files: usize,
}
static FILE_FDATASYNC_GROUP_COMMIT: LazyLock<FileFdatasyncGroupCommit> = LazyLock::new(FileFdatasyncGroupCommit::default);
impl FileFdatasyncGroupCommit {
// Lock order: registry first, then per-group state. No path may hold a
// group lock while acquiring the registry lock.
fn enqueue(
&self,
disk_permits: Arc<Semaphore>,
files: Vec<PathBuf>,
) -> io::Result<(oneshot::Receiver<SharedFileFdatasyncResult>, Option<Arc<FileFdatasyncGroup>>)> {
if files.is_empty() {
return Err(io::Error::new(
io::ErrorKind::InvalidInput,
"file fdatasync group commit needs at least one file",
));
}
let (result_tx, result_rx) = oneshot::channel();
let key = Arc::as_ptr(&disk_permits) as FileFdatasyncGroupKey;
let mut registry = self.inner.lock();
registry.groups.retain(|_, group| group.disk_permits.strong_count() > 0);
if registry.total_waiters >= MAX_FILE_FDATASYNC_WAITERS {
return Err(io::Error::new(
io::ErrorKind::WouldBlock,
"file fdatasync group commit waiter limit reached",
));
}
if registry.total_files.saturating_add(files.len()) > MAX_FILE_FDATASYNC_BATCH_FILES {
return Err(io::Error::new(
io::ErrorKind::WouldBlock,
"file fdatasync group commit file limit reached",
));
}
let group = if let Some(group) = registry.groups.get(&key) {
group.clone()
} else {
if registry.groups.len() >= MAX_FILE_FDATASYNC_GROUPS {
return Err(io::Error::new(
io::ErrorKind::WouldBlock,
"file fdatasync group commit active group limit reached",
));
}
let group = Arc::new(FileFdatasyncGroup {
key,
disk_permits: Arc::downgrade(&disk_permits),
inner: Mutex::new(FileFdatasyncGroupInner::default()),
});
registry.groups.insert(key, group.clone());
group
};
let file_count = files.len();
let mut group_state = group.inner.lock();
let start_worker = !group_state.worker_running;
let wait_role = if start_worker {
rustfs_io_metrics::PUT_RENAME_FDATASYNC_GROUP_WAIT_ROLE_LEADER
} else {
rustfs_io_metrics::PUT_RENAME_FDATASYNC_GROUP_WAIT_ROLE_FOLLOWER
};
group_state.pending.push_back(FileFdatasyncWaiter {
files,
enqueued_at: rustfs_io_metrics::put_stage_timer(),
wait_role,
result_tx,
});
group_state.pending_files += file_count;
if start_worker {
group_state.worker_running = true;
}
rustfs_io_metrics::record_put_rename_fdatasync_group_outstanding(
rustfs_io_metrics::PUT_RENAME_FDATASYNC_GROUP_OUTSTANDING_STATE_ENQUEUE_WAITERS,
group_state.pending.len(),
);
rustfs_io_metrics::record_put_rename_fdatasync_group_outstanding(
rustfs_io_metrics::PUT_RENAME_FDATASYNC_GROUP_OUTSTANDING_STATE_ENQUEUE_FILES,
group_state.pending_files,
);
registry.total_waiters += 1;
registry.total_files += file_count;
drop(group_state);
drop(registry);
Ok((result_rx, start_worker.then_some(group)))
}
fn complete_batch(&self, waiters: usize, files: usize) {
let mut registry = self.inner.lock();
registry.total_waiters = registry.total_waiters.saturating_sub(waiters);
registry.total_files = registry.total_files.saturating_sub(files);
}
fn remove_idle_group(&self, group: &Arc<FileFdatasyncGroup>) {
let mut registry = self.inner.lock();
let group_state = group.inner.lock();
if !group_state.worker_running && group_state.pending.is_empty() {
registry.groups.remove(&group.key);
}
}
#[cfg(test)]
fn counts_for_test(&self) -> (usize, usize, usize) {
let registry = self.inner.lock();
(registry.groups.len(), registry.total_waiters, registry.total_files)
}
#[cfg(test)]
fn clear_for_test(&self) {
let mut registry = self.inner.lock();
registry.groups.clear();
registry.total_waiters = 0;
registry.total_files = 0;
}
}
async fn run_file_fdatasync_group_worker(group: Arc<FileFdatasyncGroup>) {
loop {
#[cfg(test)]
file_sync_probe::run_before_group_batch();
tokio::task::yield_now().await;
let wait = file_fdatasync_group_commit_wait();
if !wait.is_zero() {
tokio::time::sleep(wait).await;
}
let (batch, batch_file_count): (Vec<FileFdatasyncWaiter>, usize) = {
let mut group_state = group.inner.lock();
let batch_file_count = group_state.pending_files;
group_state.pending_files = 0;
(group_state.pending.drain(..).collect(), batch_file_count)
};
if batch.is_empty() {
let mut group_state = group.inner.lock();
group_state.worker_running = false;
drop(group_state);
FILE_FDATASYNC_GROUP_COMMIT.remove_idle_group(&group);
return;
}
rustfs_io_metrics::record_put_rename_fdatasync_group_outstanding(
rustfs_io_metrics::PUT_RENAME_FDATASYNC_GROUP_OUTSTANDING_STATE_BATCH_WAITERS,
batch.len(),
);
rustfs_io_metrics::record_put_rename_fdatasync_group_outstanding(
rustfs_io_metrics::PUT_RENAME_FDATASYNC_GROUP_OUTSTANDING_STATE_BATCH_FILES,
batch_file_count,
);
for waiter in &batch {
if let Some(enqueued_at) = waiter.enqueued_at {
rustfs_io_metrics::record_put_rename_fdatasync_group_wait(
waiter.wait_role,
enqueued_at.elapsed().as_secs_f64() * 1000.0,
);
}
}
let batch_files: Vec<PathBuf> = batch.iter().flat_map(|waiter| waiter.files.iter().cloned()).collect();
#[cfg(test)]
file_sync_probe::record_group_batch(batch_file_count);
rustfs_io_metrics::record_put_rename_fdatasync_batch(
rustfs_io_metrics::PUT_RENAME_FDATASYNC_BATCH_MODE_PARALLEL,
batch_file_count,
);
let result = if let Some(disk_permits) = group.disk_permits.upgrade() {
run_file_sync_blocking(disk_permits, move || sync_files(&batch_files))
.await
.map_err(SharedFileFdatasyncError::from_error)
} else {
Err(SharedFileFdatasyncError::from_error(io::Error::other(
"file fdatasync group commit limiter dropped",
)))
};
FILE_FDATASYNC_GROUP_COMMIT.complete_batch(batch.len(), batch_file_count);
let should_stop = {
let mut group_state = group.inner.lock();
if group_state.pending.is_empty() {
group_state.worker_running = false;
true
} else {
false
}
};
if should_stop {
FILE_FDATASYNC_GROUP_COMMIT.remove_idle_group(&group);
}
for waiter in batch {
let _ = waiter.result_tx.send(result.clone());
}
if should_stop {
return;
}
}
}
async fn sync_files_group_commit(files: Vec<PathBuf>, disk_permits: Arc<Semaphore>) -> io::Result<()> {
let (result_rx, worker) = FILE_FDATASYNC_GROUP_COMMIT.enqueue(disk_permits, files)?;
if let Some(group) = worker {
tokio::spawn(run_file_fdatasync_group_worker(group));
}
match result_rx.await {
Ok(Ok(())) => Ok(()),
Ok(Err(err)) => Err(err.into_error()),
Err(_) => Err(io::Error::other("file fdatasync group worker dropped the waiter")),
}
}
#[cfg(test)]
pub(crate) fn file_fdatasync_group_commit_counts_for_test() -> (usize, usize, usize) {
FILE_FDATASYNC_GROUP_COMMIT.counts_for_test()
}
#[cfg(test)]
fn clear_file_fdatasync_group_commit_for_test() {
FILE_FDATASYNC_GROUP_COMMIT.clear_for_test();
}
// Small object directories are cheaper to flush in one blocking task. Multipart
// directories fan out only once enough files can amortize per-task scheduling.
const PARALLEL_FILE_SYNC_THRESHOLD: usize = 16;
@@ -880,6 +1244,8 @@ pub(crate) mod file_sync_probe {
static ATTEMPTS: AtomicUsize = AtomicUsize::new(0);
static FAIL_ON_ATTEMPT: AtomicUsize = AtomicUsize::new(usize::MAX);
static BLOCK: AtomicBool = AtomicBool::new(false);
static GROUP_BATCHES: Mutex<Vec<usize>> = Mutex::new(Vec::new());
static BEFORE_GROUP_BATCH: Mutex<Option<Box<dyn FnOnce() + Send>>> = Mutex::new(None);
const WAIT_TIMEOUT: Duration = Duration::from_secs(30);
pub(crate) struct ProbeGuard;
@@ -905,6 +1271,8 @@ pub(crate) mod file_sync_probe {
fn drop(&mut self) {
release();
FAIL_ON_ATTEMPT.store(usize::MAX, Ordering::SeqCst);
GROUP_BATCHES.lock().expect("file sync group batch recorder poisoned").clear();
BEFORE_GROUP_BATCH.lock().expect("file sync group batch hook poisoned").take();
ROOTS.write().expect("file sync probe lock poisoned").clear();
}
}
@@ -914,6 +1282,8 @@ pub(crate) mod file_sync_probe {
PEAK.store(0, Ordering::SeqCst);
ATTEMPTS.store(0, Ordering::SeqCst);
FAIL_ON_ATTEMPT.store(fail_on_attempt.unwrap_or(usize::MAX), Ordering::SeqCst);
GROUP_BATCHES.lock().expect("file sync group batch recorder poisoned").clear();
BEFORE_GROUP_BATCH.lock().expect("file sync group batch hook poisoned").take();
{
let _guard = BLOCK_MUTEX.lock().expect("file sync probe blocker poisoned");
BLOCK.store(block, Ordering::SeqCst);
@@ -1025,6 +1395,27 @@ pub(crate) mod file_sync_probe {
BLOCK.store(false, Ordering::SeqCst);
BLOCK_CONDVAR.notify_all();
}
pub(super) fn record_group_batch(batch_len: usize) {
GROUP_BATCHES
.lock()
.expect("file sync group batch recorder poisoned")
.push(batch_len);
}
pub(crate) fn group_batches() -> Vec<usize> {
GROUP_BATCHES.lock().expect("file sync group batch recorder poisoned").clone()
}
pub(crate) fn set_before_group_batch(hook: impl FnOnce() + Send + 'static) {
*BEFORE_GROUP_BATCH.lock().expect("file sync group batch hook poisoned") = Some(Box::new(hook));
}
pub(super) fn run_before_group_batch() {
if let Some(hook) = BEFORE_GROUP_BATCH.lock().expect("file sync group batch hook poisoned").take() {
hook();
}
}
}
pub(crate) fn sync_file(path: &Path) -> io::Result<()> {
@@ -1095,9 +1486,17 @@ pub async fn sync_dir_files(dir: impl AsRef<Path>) -> io::Result<()> {
pub(crate) async fn sync_dir_files_with_limiter(dir: impl AsRef<Path>, disk_permits: Arc<Semaphore>) -> io::Result<()> {
let dir = dir.as_ref().to_path_buf();
let scan_dir = dir.clone();
let group_file_fdatasync = file_fdatasync_group_commit_enabled();
let files = run_file_sync_blocking(disk_permits.clone(), move || {
let files = regular_files(&scan_dir)?;
if files.len() < PARALLEL_FILE_SYNC_THRESHOLD {
if group_file_fdatasync && !files.is_empty() {
return Ok(Some(files));
}
rustfs_io_metrics::record_put_rename_fdatasync_batch(
rustfs_io_metrics::PUT_RENAME_FDATASYNC_BATCH_MODE_SERIAL,
files.len(),
);
sync_files(&files)?;
let fsync_started = rustfs_io_metrics::put_stage_timer();
let result = fsync_dir_std(scan_dir);
@@ -1115,6 +1514,23 @@ pub(crate) async fn sync_dir_files_with_limiter(dir: impl AsRef<Path>, disk_perm
let Some(files) = files else {
return Ok(());
};
if group_file_fdatasync && files.len() < PARALLEL_FILE_SYNC_THRESHOLD {
sync_files_group_commit(files, disk_permits.clone()).await?;
return run_file_sync_blocking(disk_permits, move || {
let fsync_started = rustfs_io_metrics::put_stage_timer();
let result = fsync_dir_std(dir);
rustfs_io_metrics::record_put_object_stage_duration_from(
rustfs_io_metrics::PUT_STAGE_SET_DISK_RENAME_SRC_DIR_FSYNC,
fsync_started,
);
result
})
.await;
}
rustfs_io_metrics::record_put_rename_fdatasync_batch(
rustfs_io_metrics::PUT_RENAME_FDATASYNC_BATCH_MODE_PARALLEL,
files.len(),
);
futures::stream::iter(files.into_iter().map(Ok::<_, io::Error>))
.try_for_each_concurrent(MAX_PARALLEL_FILE_SYNCS, |path| {
let disk_permits = disk_permits.clone();
@@ -5667,6 +6083,341 @@ mod tests {
.expect("sequential file sync must succeed");
}
#[tokio::test(flavor = "multi_thread", worker_threads = 2)]
#[serial_test::serial(file_sync_probe)]
async fn file_fdatasync_group_commit_default_off_keeps_small_directory_serial() {
let _group_commit = set_file_fdatasync_group_commit_for_test(false);
let temp_dir = tempdir().expect("create temp dir");
std::fs::write(temp_dir.path().join("part.1"), b"shard").expect("write part");
let _probe = file_sync_probe::set_blocking(temp_dir.path());
let path = temp_dir.path().to_path_buf();
let task = tokio::spawn(async move { sync_dir_files_with_limiter(path, file_sync_limiter()).await });
file_sync_probe::wait_for_active(1).await;
assert_eq!(
file_sync_probe::group_batches(),
Vec::<usize>::new(),
"default-off small directory sync must not enter the file fdatasync group coordinator"
);
file_sync_probe::release();
task.await
.expect("join default-off file sync")
.expect("default-off file sync must succeed");
assert!(
fsync_dir_recorder::was_fsynced(temp_dir.path()),
"default-off successful sync must fsync the source directory"
);
assert_eq!(file_fdatasync_group_commit_counts_for_test(), (0, 0, 0));
}
#[tokio::test(flavor = "multi_thread", worker_threads = 2)]
#[serial_test::serial(file_sync_probe)]
async fn file_fdatasync_group_commit_batches_same_disk_small_directories() {
use std::sync::mpsc;
let _group_commit = set_file_fdatasync_group_commit_for_test(true);
set_file_fdatasync_group_commit_wait_for_test(0);
clear_file_fdatasync_group_commit_for_test();
let temp_dir = tempdir().expect("create temp dir");
let first_dir = temp_dir.path().join("first");
let second_dir = temp_dir.path().join("second");
std::fs::create_dir(&first_dir).expect("create first dir");
std::fs::create_dir(&second_dir).expect("create second dir");
std::fs::write(first_dir.join("part.1"), b"first").expect("write first part");
std::fs::write(second_dir.join("part.1"), b"second").expect("write second part");
let _probe = file_sync_probe::set_blocking(temp_dir.path());
let (entered_tx, entered_rx) = mpsc::channel();
let (release_batch_tx, release_batch_rx) = mpsc::channel();
file_sync_probe::set_before_group_batch(move || {
entered_tx.send(()).expect("signal first file fdatasync group worker");
release_batch_rx.recv().expect("wait until second waiter is queued");
});
let limiter = file_sync_limiter();
let first_limiter = limiter.clone();
let first_path = first_dir.clone();
let first = tokio::spawn(async move { sync_dir_files_with_limiter(first_path, first_limiter).await });
tokio::task::spawn_blocking(move || entered_rx.recv_timeout(Duration::from_secs(30)))
.await
.expect("group worker hook waiter should run")
.expect("first file fdatasync group worker should start");
let second_limiter = limiter.clone();
let second_path = second_dir.clone();
let second = tokio::spawn(async move { sync_dir_files_with_limiter(second_path, second_limiter).await });
tokio::time::timeout(Duration::from_secs(30), async {
loop {
if file_fdatasync_group_commit_counts_for_test().1 == 2 {
return;
}
tokio::task::yield_now().await;
}
})
.await
.expect("second waiter should enqueue before releasing the grouped batch");
release_batch_tx.send(()).expect("release group batch hook");
file_sync_probe::wait_for_active(1).await;
assert_eq!(
file_sync_probe::group_batches(),
vec![2],
"same-disk small directory fdatasync waiters must share one observable batch"
);
file_sync_probe::release();
first
.await
.expect("join first grouped file sync")
.expect("first grouped file sync must succeed");
second
.await
.expect("join second grouped file sync")
.expect("second grouped file sync must succeed");
assert!(
fsync_dir_recorder::was_fsynced(&first_dir),
"first source directory must still be fsynced"
);
assert!(
fsync_dir_recorder::was_fsynced(&second_dir),
"second source directory must still be fsynced"
);
assert_eq!(file_fdatasync_group_commit_counts_for_test(), (0, 0, 0));
}
#[test]
fn file_fdatasync_group_commit_wait_duration_uses_default_and_cap() {
assert_eq!(DEFAULT_FILE_FDATASYNC_GROUP_COMMIT_WAIT_MICROS, 0);
assert_eq!(
file_fdatasync_group_commit_wait_duration(DEFAULT_FILE_FDATASYNC_GROUP_COMMIT_WAIT_MICROS),
Duration::ZERO
);
assert_eq!(file_fdatasync_group_commit_wait_duration(250), Duration::from_micros(250));
assert_eq!(
file_fdatasync_group_commit_wait_duration(MAX_FILE_FDATASYNC_GROUP_COMMIT_WAIT_MICROS),
Duration::from_micros(MAX_FILE_FDATASYNC_GROUP_COMMIT_WAIT_MICROS)
);
assert_eq!(
file_fdatasync_group_commit_wait_duration(u64::MAX),
Duration::from_micros(MAX_FILE_FDATASYNC_GROUP_COMMIT_WAIT_MICROS)
);
}
#[tokio::test(flavor = "current_thread", start_paused = true)]
#[serial_test::serial(file_sync_probe)]
async fn file_fdatasync_group_commit_wait_budget_batches_late_follower() {
use std::sync::mpsc;
let _group_commit = set_file_fdatasync_group_commit_for_test(true);
let wait_budget_micros = 1_000;
let wait_budget = file_fdatasync_group_commit_wait_duration(wait_budget_micros);
set_file_fdatasync_group_commit_wait_for_test(wait_budget_micros);
clear_file_fdatasync_group_commit_for_test();
let temp_dir = tempdir().expect("create temp dir");
let first_dir = temp_dir.path().join("first");
let second_dir = temp_dir.path().join("second");
std::fs::create_dir(&first_dir).expect("create first dir");
std::fs::create_dir(&second_dir).expect("create second dir");
std::fs::write(first_dir.join("part.1"), b"first").expect("write first part");
std::fs::write(second_dir.join("part.1"), b"second").expect("write second part");
let _probe = file_sync_probe::set_blocking(temp_dir.path());
let (entered_tx, entered_rx) = mpsc::channel();
file_sync_probe::set_before_group_batch(move || {
entered_tx.send(()).expect("signal first file fdatasync group worker");
});
let limiter = file_sync_limiter();
let first_limiter = limiter.clone();
let first_path = first_dir.clone();
let first = tokio::spawn(async move { sync_dir_files_with_limiter(first_path, first_limiter).await });
tokio::task::spawn_blocking(move || entered_rx.recv_timeout(Duration::from_secs(30)))
.await
.expect("group worker hook waiter should run")
.expect("first file fdatasync group worker should start");
let second_limiter = limiter.clone();
let second_path = second_dir.clone();
let second = tokio::spawn(async move { sync_dir_files_with_limiter(second_path, second_limiter).await });
tokio::time::timeout(Duration::from_secs(30), async {
loop {
if file_fdatasync_group_commit_counts_for_test().1 == 2 {
return;
}
tokio::task::yield_now().await;
}
})
.await
.expect("second waiter should enqueue during the configured wait budget");
tokio::time::advance(wait_budget).await;
tokio::task::yield_now().await;
file_sync_probe::wait_for_active(1).await;
assert_eq!(
file_sync_probe::group_batches(),
vec![2],
"configured wait budget should let a follower join the leader's batch"
);
file_sync_probe::release();
first
.await
.expect("join first wait-budget file sync")
.expect("first wait-budget file sync must succeed");
second
.await
.expect("join second wait-budget file sync")
.expect("second wait-budget file sync must succeed");
assert!(
fsync_dir_recorder::was_fsynced(&first_dir),
"first source directory must still be fsynced"
);
assert!(
fsync_dir_recorder::was_fsynced(&second_dir),
"second source directory must still be fsynced"
);
assert_eq!(file_fdatasync_group_commit_counts_for_test(), (0, 0, 0));
}
#[tokio::test(flavor = "multi_thread", worker_threads = 2)]
#[serial_test::serial(file_sync_probe)]
async fn file_fdatasync_group_commit_failure_fails_all_waiters_before_dir_fsync() {
use std::sync::mpsc;
let _group_commit = set_file_fdatasync_group_commit_for_test(true);
set_file_fdatasync_group_commit_wait_for_test(0);
clear_file_fdatasync_group_commit_for_test();
let temp_dir = tempdir().expect("create temp dir");
let first_dir = temp_dir.path().join("first");
let second_dir = temp_dir.path().join("second");
std::fs::create_dir(&first_dir).expect("create first dir");
std::fs::create_dir(&second_dir).expect("create second dir");
std::fs::write(first_dir.join("part.1"), b"first").expect("write first part");
std::fs::write(second_dir.join("part.1"), b"second").expect("write second part");
let _probe = file_sync_probe::set_failing_blocking(temp_dir.path());
let (entered_tx, entered_rx) = mpsc::channel();
let (release_batch_tx, release_batch_rx) = mpsc::channel();
file_sync_probe::set_before_group_batch(move || {
entered_tx.send(()).expect("signal first file fdatasync group worker");
release_batch_rx.recv().expect("wait until second waiter is queued");
});
let limiter = file_sync_limiter();
let first_limiter = limiter.clone();
let first_path = first_dir.clone();
let first = tokio::spawn(async move { sync_dir_files_with_limiter(first_path, first_limiter).await });
tokio::task::spawn_blocking(move || entered_rx.recv_timeout(Duration::from_secs(30)))
.await
.expect("group worker hook waiter should run")
.expect("first file fdatasync group worker should start");
let second_limiter = limiter.clone();
let second_path = second_dir.clone();
let second = tokio::spawn(async move { sync_dir_files_with_limiter(second_path, second_limiter).await });
tokio::time::timeout(Duration::from_secs(30), async {
loop {
if file_fdatasync_group_commit_counts_for_test().1 == 2 {
return;
}
tokio::task::yield_now().await;
}
})
.await
.expect("second waiter should enqueue before releasing the grouped batch");
release_batch_tx.send(()).expect("release group batch hook");
let first_err = first
.await
.expect("join first grouped file sync")
.expect_err("first grouped waiter must fail closed");
let second_err = second
.await
.expect("join second grouped file sync")
.expect_err("second grouped waiter must fail closed");
assert_eq!(first_err.kind(), io::ErrorKind::Other);
assert_eq!(second_err.kind(), io::ErrorKind::Other);
assert_eq!(file_sync_probe::group_batches(), vec![2]);
assert!(
!fsync_dir_recorder::was_fsynced(&first_dir) && !fsync_dir_recorder::was_fsynced(&second_dir),
"source directories must not be fsynced after grouped file fdatasync failure"
);
assert_eq!(file_fdatasync_group_commit_counts_for_test(), (0, 0, 0));
file_sync_probe::release();
file_sync_probe::wait_for_idle().await;
}
#[test]
#[serial_test::serial(file_sync_probe)]
fn file_fdatasync_group_commit_rejects_active_group_overflow() {
let _group_commit = set_file_fdatasync_group_commit_for_test(true);
clear_file_fdatasync_group_commit_for_test();
let mut receivers = Vec::new();
let mut limiters = Vec::new();
for index in 0..MAX_FILE_FDATASYNC_GROUPS {
let limiter = Arc::new(Semaphore::new(1));
let (result_rx, _worker) = FILE_FDATASYNC_GROUP_COMMIT
.enqueue(limiter.clone(), vec![PathBuf::from(format!("part-{index}"))])
.expect("group below cap should enqueue");
limiters.push(limiter);
receivers.push(result_rx);
}
let overflow_limiter = Arc::new(Semaphore::new(1));
let err = match FILE_FDATASYNC_GROUP_COMMIT.enqueue(overflow_limiter, vec![PathBuf::from("overflow")]) {
Ok(_) => panic!("active group max+1 must fail closed"),
Err(err) => err,
};
assert_eq!(err.kind(), io::ErrorKind::WouldBlock);
clear_file_fdatasync_group_commit_for_test();
assert_eq!(file_fdatasync_group_commit_counts_for_test(), (0, 0, 0));
drop(receivers);
drop(limiters);
}
#[test]
#[serial_test::serial(file_sync_probe)]
fn file_fdatasync_group_commit_rejects_waiter_and_file_overflow() {
let _group_commit = set_file_fdatasync_group_commit_for_test(true);
clear_file_fdatasync_group_commit_for_test();
let limiter = Arc::new(Semaphore::new(1));
let mut receivers = Vec::new();
for index in 0..MAX_FILE_FDATASYNC_WAITERS {
let (result_rx, _worker) = FILE_FDATASYNC_GROUP_COMMIT
.enqueue(limiter.clone(), vec![PathBuf::from(format!("part-{index}"))])
.expect("waiter below cap should enqueue");
receivers.push(result_rx);
}
let waiter_err = match FILE_FDATASYNC_GROUP_COMMIT.enqueue(limiter, vec![PathBuf::from("overflow-waiter")]) {
Ok(_) => panic!("waiter max+1 must fail closed"),
Err(err) => err,
};
assert_eq!(waiter_err.kind(), io::ErrorKind::WouldBlock);
clear_file_fdatasync_group_commit_for_test();
drop(receivers);
let mut receivers = Vec::new();
let file_limit_limiter = Arc::new(Semaphore::new(1));
let (result_rx, _worker) = FILE_FDATASYNC_GROUP_COMMIT
.enqueue(
file_limit_limiter.clone(),
(0..MAX_FILE_FDATASYNC_BATCH_FILES)
.map(|index| PathBuf::from(format!("part-{index}")))
.collect(),
)
.expect("file count up to cap should enqueue");
receivers.push(result_rx);
let file_err = match FILE_FDATASYNC_GROUP_COMMIT.enqueue(file_limit_limiter, vec![PathBuf::from("overflow-file")]) {
Ok(_) => panic!("file max+1 must fail closed"),
Err(err) => err,
};
assert_eq!(file_err.kind(), io::ErrorKind::WouldBlock);
clear_file_fdatasync_group_commit_for_test();
assert_eq!(file_fdatasync_group_commit_counts_for_test(), (0, 0, 0));
drop(receivers);
}
#[tokio::test]
#[serial_test::serial(file_sync_probe)]
async fn sync_dir_files_bounds_concurrency_across_directories() {

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