test(e2e): pin bounded physical reads for compressed multipart range GETs

Byte-exactness tests stay green if the compressed range seek regresses into
decoding from byte zero: the returned bytes are still correct and only the
read amplification explodes. Assert the cost side as well.

The observation reuses rustfs_io_get_object_shard_read_observed_bytes_total,
already emitted per shard read by the erasure layer, so no production code is
instrumented. The OTLP collector learns to accumulate a second counter, keyed
by its path/role/outcome labels rather than by data-point position, which is
not stable across exports.

Two failure modes the assertions guard against:

- With RUSTFS_OBS_METER_INTERVAL=1, treating one unchanged sample as settled
  measures a delta of zero, because the range read's counter has not been
  exported yet. Settling now requires several consecutive equal samples.
- An upper bound alone passes vacuously on a zero delta, so a lower bound
  turns "measured nothing" into a failure instead of a green run.

Refs rustfs/rustfs#5957, backlog#1848.

Cargo.lock

@@ -9825,19 +9825,14 @@ name = "rustfs-madmin"
 version = "1.0.0-rc.2"
 dependencies = [
  "hotpath",
- "http 1.5.0",
  "humantime",
  "hyper",
  "jiff",
- "reqwest",
  "rmp-serde",
- "rustfs-signer",
- "s3s",
  "serde",
  "serde_json",
  "sysinfo",
  "time",
- "tokio",
 ]
 
 [[package]]
@@ -10251,7 +10246,6 @@ dependencies = [
  "rustfs-ecstore",
  "rustfs-filemeta",
  "rustfs-lock",
- "rustfs-s3-types",
  "rustfs-storage-api",
  "rustfs-utils",
  "s3s",

_typos.toml

@@ -40,7 +40,6 @@ mak = "mak"
 gae = "gae"
 GAE = "GAE"
 thr = "thr"
-mis = "mis"
 # s3-tests original test names (cannot be changed)
 nonexisted = "nonexisted"
 consts = "consts"

crates/e2e_test/src/inline_fast_path_cluster_test.rs

@@ -67,6 +67,9 @@ type MetricValues = Arc<Mutex<BTreeMap<String, MetricPointVersions>>>;
 
 const KIB: usize = 1024;
 const READER_PATH_COUNTER: &str = "rustfs_io_get_object_reader_path_by_size_total";
+/// Physical bytes the erasure layer pulled from disk, emitted per shard read by
+/// `crates/ecstore/src/erasure/coding/decode.rs`.
+const SHARD_READ_BYTES_COUNTER: &str = "rustfs_io_get_object_shard_read_observed_bytes_total";
 const MSGPACK_JSON_DECODE_COUNTER: &str = "rustfs_system_network_internode_msgpack_json_decode_total";
 const MSGPACK_JSON_FALLBACK_COUNTER: &str = "rustfs_system_network_internode_msgpack_json_fallback_total";
 const MSGPACK_JSON_DECODE_ERROR_COUNTER: &str = "rustfs_system_network_internode_msgpack_json_decode_error_total";
@@ -146,6 +149,7 @@ struct OtlpMetricCollector {
     decode_values: MetricValues,
     fallback_values: MetricValues,
     decode_error_values: MetricValues,
+    shard_read_values: MetricValues,
     task: JoinHandle<()>,
 }
 
@@ -157,10 +161,12 @@ impl OtlpMetricCollector {
         let decode_values = Arc::new(Mutex::new(BTreeMap::new()));
         let fallback_values = Arc::new(Mutex::new(BTreeMap::new()));
         let decode_error_values = Arc::new(Mutex::new(BTreeMap::new()));
+        let shard_read_values = Arc::new(Mutex::new(BTreeMap::new()));
         let task_values = values.clone();
         let task_decode_values = decode_values.clone();
         let task_fallback_values = fallback_values.clone();
         let task_decode_error_values = decode_error_values.clone();
+        let task_shard_read_values = shard_read_values.clone();
         let task = tokio::spawn(async move {
             loop {
                 let Ok((stream, _)) = listener.accept().await else {
@@ -170,6 +176,7 @@ impl OtlpMetricCollector {
                 let decode_values = task_decode_values.clone();
                 let fallback_values = task_fallback_values.clone();
                 let decode_error_values = task_decode_error_values.clone();
+                let shard_read_values = task_shard_read_values.clone();
                 tokio::spawn(async move {
                     let _ = hyper::server::conn::http1::Builder::new()
                         .serve_connection(
@@ -181,6 +188,7 @@ impl OtlpMetricCollector {
                                     decode_values.clone(),
                                     fallback_values.clone(),
                                     decode_error_values.clone(),
+                                    shard_read_values.clone(),
                                 )
                             }),
                         )
@@ -194,10 +202,48 @@ impl OtlpMetricCollector {
             decode_values,
             fallback_values,
             decode_error_values,
+            shard_read_values,
             task,
         })
     }
 
+    /// Total physical bytes read from disk across every shard-read label set.
+    async fn shard_read_bytes_total(&self) -> u64 {
+        self.shard_read_values
+            .lock()
+            .await
+            .values()
+            .map(|versions| versions.values().map(|(_, value)| *value).sum::<u64>())
+            .sum()
+    }
+
+    /// Waits until the shard-read counter stops advancing so a measurement window
+    /// is not polluted by exports still in flight.
+    ///
+    /// Requires several consecutive equal samples spanning more than one export
+    /// interval (`RUSTFS_OBS_METER_INTERVAL=1`): a single unchanged sample only
+    /// proves the latest export has not landed yet, which silently reads as "no
+    /// disk reads happened" and makes any upper-bound assertion vacuous.
+    async fn wait_for_shard_read_bytes_to_settle(&self) -> TestResult<u64> {
+        const REQUIRED_STABLE_SAMPLES: usize = 5;
+        let mut last = self.shard_read_bytes_total().await;
+        let mut stable = 0;
+        for _ in 0..60 {
+            sleep(Duration::from_millis(500)).await;
+            let current = self.shard_read_bytes_total().await;
+            if current == last {
+                stable += 1;
+                if stable >= REQUIRED_STABLE_SAMPLES {
+                    return Ok(current);
+                }
+            } else {
+                stable = 0;
+                last = current;
+            }
+        }
+        Err("timed out waiting for shard-read byte counter to settle".into())
+    }
+
     async fn reader_path_total(&self, path: &str, object_class: &str, size_bucket: &str) -> u64 {
         self.reader_path_values(path, object_class, size_bucket).await.values().sum()
     }
@@ -321,6 +367,7 @@ async fn handle_metric_export(
     decode_values: MetricValues,
     fallback_values: MetricValues,
     decode_error_values: MetricValues,
+    shard_read_values: MetricValues,
 ) -> Result<Response<Full<Bytes>>, Infallible> {
     if request.uri().path() != "/v1/metrics" {
         return Ok(response(StatusCode::NOT_FOUND));
@@ -354,7 +401,9 @@ async fn handle_metric_export(
             let mut decode_values = decode_values.lock().await;
             let mut fallback_values = fallback_values.lock().await;
             let mut decode_error_values = decode_error_values.lock().await;
+            let mut shard_read_values = shard_read_values.lock().await;
             record_reader_path_metrics(&export, &mut values);
+            record_shard_read_bytes_metrics(&export, &mut shard_read_values);
             record_msgpack_decode_metrics(&export, &mut decode_values);
             record_msgpack_fallback_metrics(&export, &mut fallback_values);
             record_msgpack_decode_error_metrics(&export, &mut decode_error_values);
@@ -375,6 +424,50 @@ fn reader_path_metric_key(path: &str, object_class: &str, size_bucket: &str) ->
     format!("{path}\u{1f}{object_class}\u{1f}{size_bucket}")
 }
 
+/// Accumulates `SHARD_READ_BYTES_COUNTER` across all label sets. Only the total
+/// matters: it is the number of physical bytes the erasure layer actually pulled
+/// from disk, which is what separates a bounded per-part read from a decode of
+/// the whole object.
+fn record_shard_read_bytes_metrics(export: &ExportMetricsServiceRequest, values: &mut BTreeMap<String, MetricPointVersions>) {
+    for resource_metrics in &export.resource_metrics {
+        for scope_metrics in &resource_metrics.scope_metrics {
+            for metric in &scope_metrics.metrics {
+                if metric.name != SHARD_READ_BYTES_COUNTER {
+                    continue;
+                }
+                let Some(metric::Data::Sum(sum)) = &metric.data else {
+                    continue;
+                };
+                for point in &sum.data_points {
+                    let Some(number_data_point::Value::AsInt(value)) = point.value.as_ref() else {
+                        continue;
+                    };
+                    let value = u64::try_from(*value).unwrap_or_default();
+                    // Keyed by labels, not by position: point order within an export
+                    // is not guaranteed stable, so an index key would alias distinct
+                    // series across batches.
+                    let key = format!(
+                        "{}\u{1f}{}\u{1f}{}",
+                        attribute_string(&point.attributes, "path").unwrap_or_default(),
+                        attribute_string(&point.attributes, "role").unwrap_or_default(),
+                        attribute_string(&point.attributes, "outcome").unwrap_or_default(),
+                    );
+                    values
+                        .entry(key)
+                        .or_default()
+                        .entry(point.start_time_unix_nano)
+                        .and_modify(|current| {
+                            if point.time_unix_nano >= current.0 {
+                                *current = (point.time_unix_nano, value);
+                            }
+                        })
+                        .or_insert((point.time_unix_nano, value));
+                }
+            }
+        }
+    }
+}
+
 fn record_reader_path_metrics(export: &ExportMetricsServiceRequest, values: &mut BTreeMap<String, MetricPointVersions>) {
     for resource_metrics in &export.resource_metrics {
         for scope_metrics in &resource_metrics.scope_metrics {
@@ -1864,6 +1957,86 @@ async fn four_node_multipart_disk_compression_roundtrip() -> TestResult {
     Ok(())
 }
 
+/// A tail range over a compressed multipart object must read only the physical
+/// data it needs, not decode the object from byte zero.
+///
+/// The byte-exactness tests around this one stay green even if the seek path
+/// regresses into decoding from the start of the object: the bytes returned are
+/// still correct, only the read amplification explodes. This asserts the cost
+/// side, using `SHARD_READ_BYTES_COUNTER` — already emitted per shard read by the
+/// erasure layer, so no production code is instrumented for the test.
+///
+/// `get_compressed_offsets` skips whole preceding parts by their stored size and
+/// then seeks inside the covering part via its compression index, so a bounded
+/// read costs on the order of the covering part's block size against a ~5 MiB
+/// object.
+#[tokio::test]
+#[serial]
+async fn four_node_compressed_multipart_tail_range_reads_are_bounded() -> TestResult {
+    init_logging();
+
+    let collector = OtlpMetricCollector::start().await?;
+    let mut cluster = RustFSTestClusterEnvironment::new(4).await?;
+    configure_reader_metric_cluster(&mut cluster, &collector);
+    cluster.set_env("RUSTFS_COMPRESSION_ENABLED", "true");
+    cluster.set_env("RUSTFS_COMPRESSION_MULTIPART_ENABLED", "true");
+    cluster.start().await?;
+
+    let bucket = "inline-multipart-compression-tail-range";
+    cluster.create_test_bucket(bucket).await?;
+    let client = cluster.create_s3_client(0)?;
+    let key = "multipart/tail-range.txt";
+    let (body, _second_part, etag) = put_two_part_multipart(&client, bucket, key).await?;
+
+    // Establish that the object really took the compressed read path; otherwise a
+    // small delta below would only prove compression never happened.
+    assert_reader_path(
+        &collector,
+        &client,
+        ReaderPathExpectation::for_class(ReaderObject::new(bucket, key, &body, etag.as_deref(), None), LEGACY_DUPLEX, COMPRESSED),
+    )
+    .await?;
+
+    let baseline = collector.wait_for_shard_read_bytes_to_settle().await?;
+
+    let tail_len = 4 * KIB;
+    let start = body.len() - tail_len;
+    let end = body.len() - 1;
+    let range = client
+        .get_object()
+        .bucket(bucket)
+        .key(key)
+        .range(format!("bytes={start}-{end}"))
+        .send()
+        .await?;
+    let tail = range.body.collect().await?.into_bytes();
+    assert_eq!(tail.as_ref(), &body[start..], "tail range returned wrong bytes");
+
+    let after = collector.wait_for_shard_read_bytes_to_settle().await?;
+    let read_bytes = after.saturating_sub(baseline);
+
+    // A zero delta means the window caught nothing — an unexported counter, or a
+    // read served without touching the erasure layer — which would make the upper
+    // bound vacuously true. Fail instead of passing blind.
+    assert!(
+        read_bytes > 0,
+        "no shard reads observed for the tail range; the budget assertion below would be vacuous"
+    );
+
+    // Part 1 alone is MPU_PART_1_SIZE, so a whole-object decode cannot come in
+    // under it. Half the logical size leaves generous headroom for erasure padding
+    // and unrelated background reads while still failing loudly on a full decode.
+    let budget = (body.len() / 2) as u64;
+    assert!(
+        read_bytes < budget,
+        "tail range read {read_bytes} physical bytes for a {tail_len}-byte range (budget {budget}, object {} bytes): \
+         the read is not bounded to the covering part",
+        body.len()
+    );
+
+    Ok(())
+}
+
 #[tokio::test]
 #[serial]
 async fn four_node_mixed_msgpack_compat_mode_preserves_fallback_controls() -> TestResult {

crates/ecstore/src/api/mod.rs

@@ -373,14 +373,14 @@ pub mod error {
 
 pub mod erasure {
     pub use crate::erasure::coding::{
-        BitrotReader, BitrotSelfTestError, BitrotWriter, BitrotWriterWrapper, CustomWriter, Erasure, ErasureConstructionError,
-        ReedSolomonEncoder, bitrot_self_test, calc_shard_size, calc_shard_size_legacy,
+        BitrotReader, BitrotWriter, BitrotWriterWrapper, CustomWriter, Erasure, ErasureConstructionError, ReedSolomonEncoder,
+        calc_shard_size, calc_shard_size_legacy,
     };
 }
 
 pub mod event {
     pub use crate::event::name::EventName;
-    pub use crate::services::event_notification::{EventArgs, register_event_dispatch_hook, send_event};
+    pub use crate::services::event_notification::{EventArgs, register_event_dispatch_hook};
 }
 
 pub mod global {

crates/ecstore/src/erasure/coding/bitrot.rs

@@ -820,263 +820,10 @@ impl BitrotWriterWrapper {
     }
 }
 
-// --- startup bitrot self-test (rustfs/backlog#1873, MinIO bitrotSelfTest parity) ---
-//
-// A broken hash implementation (bad SIMD feature combination, platform drift, a
-// key-handling regression) fails silently: every shard reads back "corrupt",
-// heal rewrites data that was fine, and cross-platform clusters disagree about
-// which copy is healthy. The self-test below pins the algorithms the moment a
-// process starts, so a drifted build announces itself instead of quietly
-// rewriting objects. See docs/rustfs-heal-scanner-vs-minio-comprehensive-
-// analysis-2026-08-16.md §6 HS-11.
-
-/// Length of the deterministic self-test payload.
-pub const BITROT_SELF_TEST_PAYLOAD_LEN: usize = 4096;
-
-/// Known-answer digest of [`bitrot_self_test_payload`] under `HighwayHash256S`
-/// (the production default). Pinned so any platform or build where the
-/// implementation drifts fails startup instead of miss-hashing shards.
-const BITROT_SELF_TEST_KAT_HIGHWAY_HASH256S: [u8; 32] = [
-    0xb9, 0x32, 0xa2, 0xaa, 0x4a, 0xb7, 0x33, 0x6a, 0xa3, 0xca, 0x7e, 0x61, 0x9d, 0x86, 0x52, 0x14, 0x6e, 0x7f, 0xd8, 0x9e, 0xea,
-    0x08, 0xd9, 0x8c, 0x33, 0x85, 0x87, 0x19, 0x30, 0xd6, 0xed, 0x06,
-];
-
-/// Known-answer digest of the same payload under `HighwayHash256SLegacy`.
-const BITROT_SELF_TEST_KAT_HIGHWAY_HASH256S_LEGACY: [u8; 32] = [
-    0x98, 0x24, 0x71, 0x4f, 0x16, 0xbb, 0x48, 0x39, 0xed, 0x68, 0xfa, 0x63, 0x5e, 0xd9, 0x07, 0x61, 0xdf, 0x0a, 0xff, 0xcf, 0x7d,
-    0x8c, 0xa8, 0xc7, 0xc0, 0xb6, 0x6f, 0x05, 0xdb, 0xda, 0x5a, 0x22,
-];
-
-/// FIPS 180-2 test vector: SHA-256 of the ASCII string "abc". Unlike the
-/// Highway digests above this one is externally verifiable, so it guards the
-/// whole `HashAlgorithm` plumbing even for readers who distrust pinned
-/// self-computed constants.
-const BITROT_SELF_TEST_KAT_SHA256_ABC: [u8; 32] = [
-    0xba, 0x78, 0x16, 0xbf, 0x8f, 0x01, 0xcf, 0xea, 0x41, 0x41, 0x40, 0xde, 0x5d, 0xae, 0x22, 0x23, 0xb0, 0x03, 0x61, 0xa3, 0x96,
-    0x17, 0x7a, 0x9c, 0xb4, 0x10, 0xff, 0x61, 0xf2, 0x00, 0x15, 0xad,
-];
-
-/// Deterministic self-test payload: xorshift64* from a fixed seed, so every
-/// platform and every run hashes the same 4096 bytes.
-fn bitrot_self_test_payload() -> [u8; BITROT_SELF_TEST_PAYLOAD_LEN] {
-    let mut state = 0x9E37_79B9_7F4A_7C15u64;
-    let mut payload = [0u8; BITROT_SELF_TEST_PAYLOAD_LEN];
-    for byte in payload.iter_mut() {
-        state ^= state >> 12;
-        state ^= state << 25;
-        state ^= state >> 27;
-        *byte = state.wrapping_mul(0x2545_F491_4F6C_DD1D) as u8;
-    }
-    payload
-}
-
-/// Why a bitrot self-test failed.
-#[derive(Debug)]
-pub enum BitrotSelfTestError {
-    /// A known-answer digest mismatched the pinned constant.
-    KnownAnswerMismatch {
-        algorithm: &'static str,
-        got: String,
-        want: String,
-    },
-    /// A freshly encoded shard failed `bitrot_verify`.
-    RoundtripVerify { algorithm: &'static str, detail: String },
-    /// A verified roundtrip read back different bytes than were written.
-    RoundtripReadback { algorithm: &'static str },
-    /// A deliberately tampered shard was not rejected by `bitrot_verify`.
-    TamperNotRejected {
-        algorithm: &'static str,
-        tampered: &'static str,
-    },
-}
-
-impl std::fmt::Display for BitrotSelfTestError {
-    fn fmt(&self, f: &mut std::fmt::Formatter<'_>) -> std::fmt::Result {
-        match self {
-            Self::KnownAnswerMismatch { algorithm, got, want } => {
-                write!(f, "known-answer mismatch for {algorithm}: got {got}, want {want}")
-            }
-            Self::RoundtripVerify { algorithm, detail } => write!(f, "{algorithm} roundtrip shard failed verification: {detail}"),
-            Self::RoundtripReadback { algorithm } => write!(f, "{algorithm} roundtrip read back different bytes"),
-            Self::TamperNotRejected { algorithm, tampered } => {
-                write!(f, "{algorithm} tampered shard ({tampered}) was not rejected")
-            }
-        }
-    }
-}
-
-impl std::error::Error for BitrotSelfTestError {}
-
-fn self_test_hex(bytes: &[u8]) -> String {
-    rustfs_utils::hex(bytes)
-}
-
-// (kept as a named one-liner so every KAT failure site reads the same; the
-// underlying formatter is the shared `rustfs_utils::hex`)
-
-/// Compare a digest against its pinned constant. Split out so a test can drive
-/// it with a wrong constant and prove the mismatch path fires.
-fn bitrot_kat_check(
-    algorithm: &'static str,
-    algo: &HashAlgorithm,
-    payload: &[u8],
-    expected: &[u8; 32],
-) -> Result<(), BitrotSelfTestError> {
-    let digest = algo.hash_encode(payload);
-    let digest = digest.as_ref();
-    if digest.len() != expected.len() || digest != expected.as_slice() {
-        return Err(BitrotSelfTestError::KnownAnswerMismatch {
-            algorithm,
-            got: self_test_hex(digest),
-            want: self_test_hex(expected),
-        });
-    }
-    Ok(())
-}
-
-/// Encode `payload` with `shard_size` blocks, verify it end to end, and read
-/// every block back through `BitrotReader` comparing bytes.
-async fn bitrot_roundtrip_check(
-    algorithm: &'static str,
-    algo: HashAlgorithm,
-    payload: &[u8],
-    shard_size: usize,
-) -> Result<(), BitrotSelfTestError> {
-    let mut writer = BitrotWriter::new(std::io::Cursor::new(Vec::<u8>::new()), shard_size, algo.clone());
-    for chunk in payload.chunks(shard_size) {
-        writer
-            .write(chunk)
-            .await
-            .map_err(|err| BitrotSelfTestError::RoundtripVerify {
-                algorithm,
-                detail: format!("encode failed: {err}"),
-            })?;
-    }
-    let encoded = writer.into_inner().into_inner();
-
-    let on_disk = bitrot_shard_file_size(payload.len(), shard_size, algo.clone());
-    if encoded.len() != on_disk {
-        return Err(BitrotSelfTestError::RoundtripVerify {
-            algorithm,
-            detail: format!("encoded {} bytes, size formula says {on_disk}", encoded.len()),
-        });
-    }
-    bitrot_verify(std::io::Cursor::new(encoded.clone()), on_disk, payload.len(), algo.clone(), shard_size)
-        .await
-        .map_err(|err| BitrotSelfTestError::RoundtripVerify {
-            algorithm,
-            detail: err.to_string(),
-        })?;
-
-    let mut reader = BitrotReader::new(std::io::Cursor::new(encoded), shard_size, algo, false);
-    let mut offset = 0usize;
-    while offset < payload.len() {
-        let want = shard_size.min(payload.len() - offset);
-        let mut buf = vec![0u8; want];
-        let read = reader
-            .read(&mut buf)
-            .await
-            .map_err(|err| BitrotSelfTestError::RoundtripVerify {
-                algorithm,
-                detail: format!("read back failed at offset {offset}: {err}"),
-            })?;
-        if read != want || buf[..read] != payload[offset..offset + read] {
-            return Err(BitrotSelfTestError::RoundtripReadback { algorithm });
-        }
-        offset += read;
-    }
-    Ok(())
-}
-
-/// Flip one byte and require `bitrot_verify` to reject the result.
-async fn bitrot_tamper_check(
-    algorithm: &'static str,
-    algo: HashAlgorithm,
-    payload: &[u8],
-    shard_size: usize,
-    tampered: &'static str,
-    flip_at: usize,
-) -> Result<(), BitrotSelfTestError> {
-    let mut writer = BitrotWriter::new(std::io::Cursor::new(Vec::<u8>::new()), shard_size, algo.clone());
-    for chunk in payload.chunks(shard_size) {
-        writer.write(chunk).await.expect("self-test encode should not fail");
-    }
-    let mut corrupt = writer.into_inner().into_inner();
-    let flip_index = flip_at % corrupt.len();
-    corrupt[flip_index] ^= 0x80;
-
-    let on_disk = bitrot_shard_file_size(payload.len(), shard_size, algo.clone());
-    match bitrot_verify(std::io::Cursor::new(corrupt), on_disk, payload.len(), algo, shard_size).await {
-        // The flipped byte must be rejected as a hash mismatch specifically, not
-        // by any incidental read error: an in-memory cursor cannot fail reads,
-        // so accepting any other failure here would mask a verify path that
-        // errors out before it ever compares hashes.
-        Err(err) if err.to_string().contains("hash mismatch") => Ok(()),
-        Ok(()) => Err(BitrotSelfTestError::TamperNotRejected { algorithm, tampered }),
-        Err(err) => Err(BitrotSelfTestError::RoundtripVerify {
-            algorithm,
-            detail: format!("tampered shard rejected with an unexpected error: {err}"),
-        }),
-    }
-}
-
-/// Verify every bitrot algorithm this crate can write or verify in production:
-/// both streaming Highway variants roundtrip end to end (encode → size formula
-/// → `bitrot_verify` → read back) and reject a flipped byte in both the data
-/// and the leading hash, while all three hashed algorithms reproduce their
-/// pinned known-answer digests.
-///
-/// Runs in well under a millisecond on 4 KiB of data; callers may run it inline
-/// at startup. Pure CPU, no allocation beyond a few KiB of scratch.
-pub async fn bitrot_self_test() -> Result<(), BitrotSelfTestError> {
-    let payload = bitrot_self_test_payload();
-
-    // Externally verifiable vector first: it guards the HashAlgorithm plumbing
-    // itself, before any self-pinned constants are consulted.
-    let abc = HashAlgorithm::SHA256.hash_encode(b"abc");
-    if abc.as_ref() != BITROT_SELF_TEST_KAT_SHA256_ABC.as_slice() {
-        return Err(BitrotSelfTestError::KnownAnswerMismatch {
-            algorithm: "SHA256",
-            got: self_test_hex(abc.as_ref()),
-            want: self_test_hex(&BITROT_SELF_TEST_KAT_SHA256_ABC),
-        });
-    }
-
-    bitrot_kat_check(
-        "HighwayHash256S",
-        &HashAlgorithm::HighwayHash256S,
-        &payload,
-        &BITROT_SELF_TEST_KAT_HIGHWAY_HASH256S,
-    )?;
-    bitrot_kat_check(
-        "HighwayHash256SLegacy",
-        &HashAlgorithm::HighwayHash256SLegacy,
-        &payload,
-        &BITROT_SELF_TEST_KAT_HIGHWAY_HASH256S_LEGACY,
-    )?;
-
-    for (algorithm, algo) in [
-        ("HighwayHash256S", HashAlgorithm::HighwayHash256S),
-        ("HighwayHash256SLegacy", HashAlgorithm::HighwayHash256SLegacy),
-    ] {
-        // Full blocks plus a partial tail, exactly like a real part stripe.
-        let tail_len = 2 * 1024 + 333;
-        bitrot_roundtrip_check(algorithm, algo.clone(), &payload, 1024).await?;
-        bitrot_roundtrip_check(algorithm, algo.clone(), &payload[..tail_len], 1024).await?;
-        // One flipped byte in the final data block, one in the first leading
-        // hash: both must fail verification.
-        bitrot_tamper_check(algorithm, algo.clone(), &payload, 1024, "final data byte", payload.len() - 1).await?;
-        bitrot_tamper_check(algorithm, algo, &payload, 1024, "leading hash byte", 0).await?;
-    }
-
-    Ok(())
-}
-
 #[cfg(test)]
 mod tests {
     use super::{
-        BitrotReader, BitrotWriter, BitrotWriterWrapper, CustomWriter, bitrot_kat_check, bitrot_self_test,
-        bitrot_self_test_payload, bitrot_shard_file_size, bitrot_verify, write_all_vectored,
+        BitrotReader, BitrotWriter, BitrotWriterWrapper, CustomWriter, bitrot_shard_file_size, bitrot_verify, write_all_vectored,
     };
     use super::{MAX_RETAINED_CHUNKS_PER_BLOCK, ShardChunkRead, ShardSource};
     use bytes::Bytes;
@@ -1343,32 +1090,6 @@ mod tests {
         }
     }
 
-    #[test]
-    fn bitrot_self_test_payload_is_deterministic() {
-        // Two independent builds of the payload must agree byte for byte, or
-        // the pinned known-answer digests below would be meaningless.
-        assert_eq!(bitrot_self_test_payload(), bitrot_self_test_payload());
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn bitrot_self_test_rejects_a_wrong_known_answer_digest() {
-        let payload = bitrot_self_test_payload();
-        let wrong = [0u8; 32];
-        let err = bitrot_kat_check("HighwayHash256S", &HashAlgorithm::HighwayHash256S, &payload, &wrong)
-            .expect_err("a zeroed digest must never match");
-        match err {
-            super::BitrotSelfTestError::KnownAnswerMismatch { algorithm, .. } => assert_eq!(algorithm, "HighwayHash256S"),
-            other => panic!("expected KnownAnswerMismatch, got {other:?}"),
-        }
-    }
-
-    #[tokio::test]
-    async fn bitrot_self_test_passes() {
-        bitrot_self_test()
-            .await
-            .expect("the pinned digests and roundtrip checks must all pass on this platform");
-    }
-
     #[tokio::test]
     async fn vectored_test_writers_cover_fallback_flush_and_shutdown_paths() {
         let mut counting = VectoredCountingWriter::default();
@@ -1468,7 +1189,7 @@ mod tests {
         let last = corrupt.len() - 1;
         corrupt[last] ^= 0x80;
         let err = bitrot_verify(
-            std::io::Cursor::new(corrupt),
+            Cursor::new(corrupt),
             super::bitrot_shard_file_size(data.len(), shard_size, algo.clone()),
             data.len(),
             algo,
@@ -1561,7 +1282,7 @@ mod tests {
 
     #[tokio::test]
     async fn bitrot_reader_rejects_output_buffers_larger_than_shard_size() {
-        let mut reader = BitrotReader::new(std::io::Cursor::new(Vec::<u8>::new()), 4, HashAlgorithm::None, false);
+        let mut reader = BitrotReader::new(Cursor::new(Vec::<u8>::new()), 4, HashAlgorithm::None, false);
         let mut out = [0u8; 5];
         let err = reader
             .read(&mut out)
@@ -1686,7 +1407,7 @@ mod tests {
             (HashAlgorithm::HighwayHash256, true),
         ] {
             let label = format!("{algo:?}");
-            let writer = std::io::Cursor::new(Vec::<u8>::new());
+            let writer = Cursor::new(Vec::<u8>::new());
             let mut w = BitrotWriter::new(writer, shard_size, algo.clone());
             w.write(&[7u8; 16]).await.unwrap();
             let written = w.into_inner().into_inner();
@@ -1771,7 +1492,7 @@ mod tests {
     }
 
     async fn encode_one_block(payload: &[u8], shard_size: usize, algo: HashAlgorithm) -> Vec<u8> {
-        let mut w = BitrotWriter::new(std::io::Cursor::new(Vec::<u8>::new()), shard_size, algo);
+        let mut w = BitrotWriter::new(Cursor::new(Vec::<u8>::new()), shard_size, algo);
         w.write(payload).await.unwrap();
         w.into_inner().into_inner()
     }
@@ -1879,7 +1600,7 @@ mod tests {
         for algo in [HashAlgorithm::HighwayHash256S, HashAlgorithm::HighwayHash256SLegacy] {
             for &size in &[1usize, 16, 17, 32, 40, 48] {
                 let payload: Vec<u8> = (0..size).map(|i| i as u8).collect();
-                let mut w = BitrotWriter::new(std::io::Cursor::new(Vec::<u8>::new()), shard_size, algo.clone());
+                let mut w = BitrotWriter::new(Cursor::new(Vec::<u8>::new()), shard_size, algo.clone());
                 for chunk in payload.chunks(shard_size) {
                     w.write(chunk).await.unwrap();
                 }
@@ -1953,14 +1674,14 @@ mod tests {
             w.write(&data).await.expect("write shard");
 
             let mut via_read = vec![0u8; SHARD];
-            let n1 = BitrotReader::new(std::io::Cursor::new(encoded.clone()), SHARD, algo.clone(), false)
+            let n1 = BitrotReader::new(Cursor::new(encoded.clone()), SHARD, algo.clone(), false)
                 .read(&mut via_read)
                 .await
                 .expect("read");
 
             // A buffer with only capacity — no initialized bytes at all.
             let mut via_append: Vec<u8> = Vec::with_capacity(SHARD);
-            let n2 = BitrotReader::new(std::io::Cursor::new(encoded), SHARD, algo.clone(), false)
+            let n2 = BitrotReader::new(Cursor::new(encoded), SHARD, algo.clone(), false)
                 .read_appending(&mut via_append, SHARD)
                 .await
                 .expect("read_appending");
@@ -1985,7 +1706,7 @@ mod tests {
             encoded.truncate(encoded.len() - 1);
 
             let mut out: Vec<u8> = Vec::with_capacity(SHARD);
-            let err = BitrotReader::new(std::io::Cursor::new(encoded), SHARD, algo.clone(), false)
+            let err = BitrotReader::new(Cursor::new(encoded), SHARD, algo.clone(), false)
                 .read_appending(&mut out, SHARD)
                 .await
                 .expect_err("a truncated shard must not succeed");
@@ -2011,7 +1732,7 @@ mod tests {
         encoded[last] ^= 0xff;
 
         let mut out: Vec<u8> = Vec::with_capacity(SHARD);
-        let err = BitrotReader::new(std::io::Cursor::new(encoded), SHARD, algo, false)
+        let err = BitrotReader::new(Cursor::new(encoded), SHARD, algo, false)
             .read_appending(&mut out, SHARD)
             .await
             .expect_err("a corrupt shard must not verify");
@@ -2123,7 +1844,7 @@ mod tests {
             "Cursor<Bytes> must be able to hand out a block, otherwise the fast path is dead code"
         );
         assert_eq!(mem.position(), 8, "taking a block must advance like a read of the same length");
-        let mut streamed = std::io::Cursor::new(encoded.clone());
+        let mut streamed = Cursor::new(encoded.clone());
         assert!(
             ShardSource::try_take_block(&mut streamed, 8).is_none(),
             "a non-Bytes source must stay on the streaming path"
@@ -2151,7 +1872,7 @@ mod tests {
         );
 
         let mut via_stream: Vec<u8> = Vec::with_capacity(SHARD);
-        BitrotReader::new(std::io::Cursor::new(encoded), SHARD, algo, false)
+        BitrotReader::new(Cursor::new(encoded), SHARD, algo, false)
             .read_appending(&mut via_stream, SHARD)
             .await
             .expect("streaming read");

crates/kms/src/api_types.rs

@@ -293,15 +293,6 @@ enum StrictVaultAuthMethod {
         #[serde(default)]
         refresh_safety_window_secs: Option<u64>,
     },
-    Kubernetes {
-        role: String,
-        #[serde(default)]
-        mount: Option<String>,
-        #[serde(default)]
-        jwt_path: Option<std::path::PathBuf>,
-        #[serde(default)]
-        refresh_safety_window_secs: Option<u64>,
-    },
     TokenFile {
         path: std::path::PathBuf,
         #[serde(default)]
@@ -328,17 +319,6 @@ impl From<StrictVaultAuthMethod> for VaultAuthMethod {
                 mount: mount.unwrap_or_else(|| crate::config::DEFAULT_VAULT_APPROLE_MOUNT.to_string()),
                 refresh_safety_window_secs,
             },
-            StrictVaultAuthMethod::Kubernetes {
-                role,
-                mount,
-                jwt_path,
-                refresh_safety_window_secs,
-            } => Self::Kubernetes {
-                role,
-                mount: mount.unwrap_or_else(|| crate::config::DEFAULT_VAULT_KUBERNETES_MOUNT.to_string()),
-                jwt_path: jwt_path.unwrap_or_else(|| std::path::PathBuf::from(crate::config::DEFAULT_VAULT_KUBERNETES_JWT_PATH)),
-                refresh_safety_window_secs,
-            },
             StrictVaultAuthMethod::TokenFile {
                 path,
                 poll_interval_secs,
@@ -519,7 +499,6 @@ impl From<&KmsConfig> for KmsConfigSummary {
                 auth_method_type: match &vault_config.auth_method {
                     VaultAuthMethod::Token { .. } => "token".to_string(),
                     VaultAuthMethod::AppRole { .. } => "approle".to_string(),
-                    VaultAuthMethod::Kubernetes { .. } => "kubernetes".to_string(),
                     VaultAuthMethod::TokenFile { .. } => "token_file".to_string(),
                 },
                 has_stored_credentials: true,
@@ -534,7 +513,6 @@ impl From<&KmsConfig> for KmsConfigSummary {
                 auth_method_type: match &vault_config.auth_method {
                     VaultAuthMethod::Token { .. } => "token".to_string(),
                     VaultAuthMethod::AppRole { .. } => "approle".to_string(),
-                    VaultAuthMethod::Kubernetes { .. } => "kubernetes".to_string(),
                     VaultAuthMethod::TokenFile { .. } => "token_file".to_string(),
                 },
                 has_stored_credentials: true,
@@ -923,42 +901,6 @@ mod tests {
         assert!(request.to_kms_config().validate().is_ok());
     }
 
-    /// The admin API reaches Kubernetes auth with the role alone; the mount and
-    /// the projected token path fall back to the cluster defaults, so a Tenant
-    /// manifest carries no credential and no cluster-specific paths.
-    #[test]
-    fn test_deserialize_vault_configure_request_accepts_kubernetes_auth() {
-        let raw = serde_json::json!({
-            "backend_type": "vault-transit",
-            "address": "https://vault.example.com:8200",
-            "mount_path": "rustfs",
-            "auth_method": { "Kubernetes": { "role": "rustfs" } }
-        });
-
-        let request: ConfigureKmsRequest = serde_json::from_value(raw).expect("kubernetes auth should deserialize");
-        let config = request.to_kms_config();
-        config.validate().expect("kubernetes auth must validate");
-
-        let vault = config.vault_transit_config().expect("vault transit backend config");
-        let VaultAuthMethod::Kubernetes {
-            role, mount, jwt_path, ..
-        } = &vault.auth_method
-        else {
-            panic!("expected Kubernetes auth, got {:?}", vault.auth_method);
-        };
-        assert_eq!(role, "rustfs");
-        assert_eq!(mount, crate::config::DEFAULT_VAULT_KUBERNETES_MOUNT);
-        assert_eq!(jwt_path, std::path::Path::new(crate::config::DEFAULT_VAULT_KUBERNETES_JWT_PATH));
-
-        let unknown_field = serde_json::json!({
-            "backend_type": "vault-transit",
-            "address": "https://vault.example.com:8200",
-            "auth_method": { "Kubernetes": { "role": "rustfs", "service_account": "rustfs" } }
-        });
-        serde_json::from_value::<ConfigureKmsRequest>(unknown_field)
-            .expect_err("an unknown auth field must be rejected rather than silently dropped");
-    }
-
     #[test]
     fn test_deserialize_aws_configure_request_accepts_type_aliases() {
         for backend_type in ["AWS", "AwsKms", "aws", "aws-kms", "aws_kms"] {

crates/kms/src/backends/vault.rs

@@ -550,7 +550,6 @@ impl VaultKmsClient {
             address: config.address.clone(),
             namespace: config.namespace.clone(),
             attempt_timeout: kms_config.effective_timeout(),
-            skip_tls_verify: config.tls.as_ref().is_some_and(|tls| tls.skip_verify),
         };
         let source = token_source_for(&config.auth_method, &settings)?;
         let policy = VaultCredentialPolicy::from_kms_config(

crates/kms/src/backends/vault_credentials.rs

@@ -326,97 +326,6 @@ impl fmt::Debug for AppRoleLogin {
     }
 }
 
-/// Token source for [`VaultAuthMethod::Kubernetes`]: exchanges the pod's
-/// projected ServiceAccount token for a lease-bound Vault token.
-///
-/// The JWT is re-read on every login because the kubelet rotates a projected
-/// token well inside the pod's lifetime; caching it would strand the source on
-/// an expired assertion once the current Vault token can no longer be renewed.
-///
-/// Unlike [`TokenFileSource`], the file mode is not checked: the kubelet owns
-/// the projected token and mounts it world-readable by default, so rejecting
-/// group/other bits would refuse every standard pod rather than catch a
-/// deployment error.
-pub(crate) struct KubernetesLogin {
-    /// Unauthenticated client used only for the login exchange.
-    login_client: VaultClient,
-    mount: String,
-    role: String,
-    jwt_path: PathBuf,
-}
-
-impl KubernetesLogin {
-    pub(crate) fn new(settings: &VaultConnectionSettings, mount: String, role: String, jwt_path: PathBuf) -> Result<Self> {
-        Ok(Self {
-            login_client: settings.build_login_client()?,
-            mount,
-            role,
-            jwt_path,
-        })
-    }
-
-    /// Read the ServiceAccount token for one login attempt.
-    ///
-    /// Mirrors [`AppRoleLogin::resolve_secret_id`]: a read failure is fatal for
-    /// the attempt but the refresh loop keeps retrying, so a token the kubelet
-    /// has not projected yet heals the source without a restart.
-    async fn resolve_jwt(&self) -> AttemptResult<SecretString> {
-        let mut raw = tokio::fs::read_to_string(&self.jwt_path)
-            .await
-            .map_err(|error| AttemptError {
-                class: ErrorClass::Fatal,
-                error: KmsError::configuration_error(format!(
-                    "Failed to read Kubernetes ServiceAccount token {}: {error}",
-                    self.jwt_path.display()
-                )),
-            })?;
-        let trimmed = raw.trim();
-        if trimmed.is_empty() {
-            raw.zeroize();
-            return Err(AttemptError {
-                class: ErrorClass::Fatal,
-                error: KmsError::configuration_error(format!(
-                    "Kubernetes ServiceAccount token {} is empty",
-                    self.jwt_path.display()
-                )),
-            });
-        }
-        let jwt = SecretString::new(trimmed.to_string());
-        raw.zeroize();
-        Ok(jwt)
-    }
-}
-
-#[async_trait]
-impl TokenSource for KubernetesLogin {
-    async fn acquire(&self) -> AttemptResult<TokenLease> {
-        let jwt = self.resolve_jwt().await?;
-        let auth = vaultrs::auth::kubernetes::login(&self.login_client, &self.mount, &self.role, jwt.expose())
-            .await
-            .map_err(|error| attempt_error("Kubernetes login", error))?;
-        Ok(TokenLease::from_auth(auth))
-    }
-
-    async fn renew(&self, client: &VaultClient) -> AttemptResult<TokenLease> {
-        let auth = vaultrs::token::renew_self(client, None)
-            .await
-            .map_err(|error| attempt_error("token renewal", error))?;
-        Ok(TokenLease::from_auth(auth))
-    }
-}
-
-impl fmt::Debug for KubernetesLogin {
-    fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter<'_>) -> fmt::Result {
-        // The login client embeds Vault client settings and must stay out of
-        // Debug output; the role name is not a secret, and the JWT is never held.
-        f.debug_struct("KubernetesLogin")
-            .field("mount", &self.mount)
-            .field("role", &self.role)
-            .field("jwt_path", &self.jwt_path)
-            .finish_non_exhaustive()
-    }
-}
-
 /// Token source for [`VaultAuthMethod::TokenFile`]: reads an agent-managed
 /// token file (for example a Vault Agent auto-auth sink).
 ///
@@ -555,9 +464,6 @@ pub(crate) fn token_source_for(
             secret_id.clone(),
             secret_id_file.clone(),
         )?)),
-        VaultAuthMethod::Kubernetes {
-            role, mount, jwt_path, ..
-        } => Ok(Box::new(KubernetesLogin::new(settings, mount.clone(), role.clone(), jwt_path.clone())?)),
         VaultAuthMethod::TokenFile {
             path,
             poll_interval_secs,
@@ -580,9 +486,6 @@ pub(crate) struct VaultConnectionSettings {
     pub(crate) namespace: Option<String>,
     /// Per-attempt HTTP timeout applied to the underlying reqwest client.
     pub(crate) attempt_timeout: Duration,
-    /// Whether to accept an unverified Vault server certificate. Gated on
-    /// `allow_insecure_dev_defaults` by `KmsConfig::validate`.
-    pub(crate) skip_tls_verify: bool,
 }
 
 impl VaultConnectionSettings {
@@ -596,11 +499,6 @@ impl VaultConnectionSettings {
         // operation-level retry policy.
         settings_builder.timeout(Some(self.attempt_timeout));
         settings_builder.token(token);
-        // Always set explicitly: left unset, vaultrs derives this from its own
-        // VAULT_SKIP_VERIFY variable, so a stray value in the environment would
-        // disable certificate verification behind the KMS configuration and its
-        // insecure-defaults gate.
-        settings_builder.verify(!self.skip_tls_verify);
 
         if let Some(namespace) = &self.namespace {
             settings_builder.namespace(Some(namespace.clone()));
@@ -653,10 +551,6 @@ impl VaultCredentialPolicy {
                 refresh_safety_window_secs: Some(secs),
                 ..
             }
-            | VaultAuthMethod::Kubernetes {
-                refresh_safety_window_secs: Some(secs),
-                ..
-            }
             | VaultAuthMethod::TokenFile {
                 refresh_safety_window_secs: Some(secs),
                 ..
@@ -690,25 +584,15 @@ pub(crate) struct VaultClientHandle {
 
 impl VaultClientHandle {
     /// Absolute expiry of this generation's token.
-    ///
-    /// `lease.ttl` is built from the `lease_duration` the Vault server sent, so
-    /// a value too large to add to `issued_at` would panic on the bare `+`. A
-    /// TTL that cannot be represented is indistinguishable from no expiry, so it
-    /// collapses to `None` — the same answer already given for the zero-lease
-    /// tokens Vault issues, which keeps the token in use and still fully
-    /// validated by Vault on every call.
     fn expires_at(&self) -> Option<Instant> {
-        self.lease.and_then(|lease| self.issued_at.checked_add(lease.ttl))
+        self.lease.map(|lease| self.issued_at + lease.ttl)
     }
 
     /// When the renewal task should refresh this generation: half the TTL,
     /// leaving the second half as budget for retries before the fail-closed
     /// window is reached.
-    ///
-    /// Unrepresentable TTLs collapse to `None` as in [`Self::expires_at`],
-    /// leaving a token that never expires with nothing to renew.
     fn renew_at(&self) -> Option<Instant> {
-        self.lease.and_then(|lease| self.issued_at.checked_add(lease.ttl / 2))
+        self.lease.map(|lease| self.issued_at + lease.ttl / 2)
     }
 }
 
@@ -778,7 +662,7 @@ impl VaultCredentialProvider {
         let handle = self.current.load_full();
         if let Some(expires_at) = handle.expires_at() {
             let now = Instant::now();
-            if self.inside_safety_window(now, expires_at) {
+            if now + self.policy.safety_window >= expires_at {
                 return Err(KmsError::credentials_unavailable(format!(
                     "Vault token (generation {}) is within {:?} of expiry and has not been refreshed; refusing to use it",
                     handle.generation, self.policy.safety_window
@@ -788,18 +672,6 @@ impl VaultCredentialProvider {
         Ok(handle)
     }
 
-    /// Whether the token expiring at `expires_at` is close enough to refuse.
-    ///
-    /// `safety_window` reaches here from persisted configuration, so it is not
-    /// guaranteed to have passed this version's validation: a window too large
-    /// to add to the current instant would panic on the bare `+`. Such a window
-    /// means every token is always inside it, so saturating to "refuse" is both
-    /// the fail-closed answer and the one the arithmetic was reaching for.
-    fn inside_safety_window(&self, now: Instant, expires_at: Instant) -> bool {
-        now.checked_add(self.policy.safety_window)
-            .is_none_or(|deadline| deadline >= expires_at)
-    }
-
     /// Publish the credential gauges for the generation currently installed.
     ///
     /// The fail-closed gauge re-evaluates the very gate
@@ -811,7 +683,7 @@ impl VaultCredentialProvider {
         let fail_closed = match handle.expires_at() {
             Some(expires_at) => {
                 metrics::gauge!(METRIC_TOKEN_TTL_SECONDS).set(expires_at.saturating_duration_since(now).as_secs_f64());
-                self.inside_safety_window(now, expires_at)
+                now + self.policy.safety_window >= expires_at
             }
             // A generation without an expiry has no remaining TTL to report
             // and can never lapse, so it can never fail closed either.
@@ -988,7 +860,7 @@ impl Drop for CredentialTaskHandle {
 #[cfg(test)]
 mod tests {
     use super::*;
-    use crate::config::{DEFAULT_VAULT_KUBERNETES_MOUNT, REDACTED_SECRET};
+    use crate::config::REDACTED_SECRET;
     use std::sync::atomic::{AtomicBool, AtomicU32, Ordering};
 
     const TEST_TOKEN: &str = "vault-token-debug-leak-canary";
@@ -999,7 +871,6 @@ mod tests {
             address: "http://127.0.0.1:8200".to_string(),
             namespace: Some("team-namespace".to_string()),
             attempt_timeout: Duration::from_secs(30),
-            skip_tls_verify: false,
         }
     }
 
@@ -1186,143 +1057,6 @@ mod tests {
         assert!(format!("{source:?}").contains("AppRoleLogin"));
     }
 
-    #[tokio::test]
-    async fn test_kubernetes_auth_method_maps_to_login_source() {
-        let settings = test_settings();
-        let source = token_source_for(&VaultAuthMethod::kubernetes("rustfs".to_string()), &settings)
-            .expect("kubernetes auth must map to a login source");
-
-        assert!(format!("{source:?}").contains("KubernetesLogin"));
-    }
-
-    /// `refresh_safety_window_secs` is operator-supplied and reaches the request
-    /// path from persisted configuration, so the fail-closed comparison must
-    /// survive a window too large to add to the current instant. Before the
-    /// checked arithmetic this panicked with "overflow when adding duration to
-    /// instant" on the first request after a lease-bearing login.
-    #[tokio::test]
-    async fn test_current_refuses_rather_than_panics_on_an_unrepresentable_safety_window() {
-        let (provider, _state) = scripted_provider(
-            Duration::from_secs(60),
-            true,
-            test_policy(Duration::from_secs(u64::MAX), Duration::from_secs(5)),
-        )
-        .await;
-
-        let error = provider
-            .current()
-            .expect_err("a window wider than any lease must refuse the token");
-        assert!(
-            matches!(error, KmsError::CredentialsUnavailable { .. }),
-            "expected CredentialsUnavailable, got {error:?}"
-        );
-    }
-
-    /// `lease_duration` is a bare u64 straight off the Vault response and forms
-    /// the other side of the same comparison, so an absurd one must not panic
-    /// either. It is indistinguishable from a non-expiring token, which is how
-    /// the zero-lease case already behaves.
-    #[tokio::test]
-    async fn test_an_unrepresentable_lease_is_treated_as_non_expiring() {
-        let (provider, _state) = scripted_provider(
-            Duration::from_secs(u64::MAX),
-            true,
-            test_policy(Duration::from_secs(30), Duration::from_secs(5)),
-        )
-        .await;
-
-        provider
-            .current()
-            .expect("a token whose expiry cannot be represented must stay usable");
-    }
-
-    /// The configured flag has to reach the HTTP client, not just the config
-    /// struct: every generation (authenticated and login) builds its own client,
-    /// and a Vault with a self-signed certificate fails the handshake unless
-    /// each one carries the setting.
-    #[test]
-    fn test_skip_tls_verify_reaches_every_vault_client_generation() {
-        for skip_tls_verify in [false, true] {
-            let settings = VaultConnectionSettings {
-                address: "https://vault.example.com:8200".to_string(),
-                namespace: None,
-                attempt_timeout: Duration::from_secs(30),
-                skip_tls_verify,
-            };
-
-            let authenticated = settings.build_client(TEST_TOKEN).expect("authenticated client must build");
-            assert_eq!(authenticated.settings.verify, !skip_tls_verify);
-
-            let login = settings.build_login_client().expect("login client must build");
-            assert_eq!(login.settings.verify, !skip_tls_verify);
-        }
-    }
-
-    /// vaultrs derives `verify` from its own VAULT_SKIP_VERIFY variable when the
-    /// builder leaves it unset, which would disable certificate verification
-    /// without passing the KMS insecure-defaults gate.
-    #[test]
-    fn test_vaultrs_skip_verify_env_cannot_override_the_configured_setting() {
-        temp_env::with_var("VAULT_SKIP_VERIFY", Some("true"), || {
-            let client = test_settings().build_client(TEST_TOKEN).expect("client must build");
-            assert!(
-                client.settings.verify,
-                "a stray VAULT_SKIP_VERIFY must not disable verification behind the KMS configuration"
-            );
-        });
-    }
-
-    /// The projected token is read fresh per login attempt and trimmed, so a
-    /// kubelet rotation is picked up without a restart and a trailing newline
-    /// does not corrupt the assertion sent to Vault.
-    #[tokio::test]
-    async fn test_kubernetes_login_rereads_and_trims_the_service_account_token() {
-        let dir = tempfile::tempdir().expect("temp dir");
-        let path = dir.path().join("token");
-        tokio::fs::write(&path, "  first-jwt\n").await.expect("write token");
-
-        let login = KubernetesLogin::new(
-            &test_settings(),
-            DEFAULT_VAULT_KUBERNETES_MOUNT.to_string(),
-            "rustfs".to_string(),
-            path.clone(),
-        )
-        .expect("login source must build");
-
-        assert_eq!(login.resolve_jwt().await.expect("first read").expose(), "first-jwt");
-
-        tokio::fs::write(&path, "rotated-jwt").await.expect("rotate token");
-        assert_eq!(
-            login.resolve_jwt().await.expect("second read").expose(),
-            "rotated-jwt",
-            "a rotated projected token must be picked up without a restart"
-        );
-    }
-
-    /// The ServiceAccount token is re-read per attempt, so an unreadable or
-    /// empty one fails that attempt without reaching Vault; the refresh loop
-    /// keeps retrying, which is what lets a late projection heal the source.
-    #[tokio::test]
-    async fn test_kubernetes_login_rejects_an_unusable_service_account_token() {
-        let dir = tempfile::tempdir().expect("temp dir");
-        let missing = dir.path().join("absent-token");
-        let empty = dir.path().join("empty-token");
-        tokio::fs::write(&empty, "  \n").await.expect("write empty token");
-
-        for (path, expected) in [(missing, "Failed to read"), (empty, "is empty")] {
-            let login =
-                KubernetesLogin::new(&test_settings(), DEFAULT_VAULT_KUBERNETES_MOUNT.to_string(), "rustfs".to_string(), path)
-                    .expect("login source must build");
-
-            let error = login
-                .acquire()
-                .await
-                .expect_err("an unusable ServiceAccount token must fail the attempt");
-            assert!(matches!(error.class, ErrorClass::Fatal));
-            assert!(error.error.to_string().contains(expected), "got {}", error.error);
-        }
-    }
-
     #[tokio::test(start_paused = true)]
     async fn test_renewal_task_renews_at_half_ttl() {
         let (provider, state) = scripted_provider(

crates/kms/src/backends/vault_transit.rs

@@ -415,7 +415,6 @@ impl VaultTransitKmsClient {
             address: config.address.clone(),
             namespace: config.namespace.clone(),
             attempt_timeout: kms_config.effective_timeout(),
-            skip_tls_verify: config.tls.as_ref().is_some_and(|tls| tls.skip_verify),
         };
         let source = token_source_for(&config.auth_method, &settings)?;
         let policy = VaultCredentialPolicy::from_kms_config(

crates/kms/src/backup/vault_restore.rs

@@ -450,10 +450,6 @@ impl VaultRestoreClient {
             address: target.address.clone(),
             namespace: target.namespace.clone(),
             attempt_timeout: kms_config.effective_timeout(),
-            // A restore target carries no TLS settings, so certificates are
-            // always verified: recovery is the last path that should accept an
-            // unauthenticated Vault.
-            skip_tls_verify: false,
         };
         let source = token_source_for(&target.auth_method, &settings)?;
         let policy = VaultCredentialPolicy::from_kms_config(

crates/kms/src/config.rs

@@ -25,10 +25,6 @@ use url::Url;
 
 pub const ENV_KMS_ALLOW_INSECURE_DEV_DEFAULTS: &str = "RUSTFS_KMS_ALLOW_INSECURE_DEV_DEFAULTS";
 pub const ENV_KMS_ALLOW_IMMEDIATE_DELETION: &str = "RUSTFS_KMS_ALLOW_IMMEDIATE_DELETION";
-pub const ENV_KMS_VAULT_ADDRESS: &str = "RUSTFS_KMS_VAULT_ADDRESS";
-pub const ENV_KMS_VAULT_TOKEN: &str = "RUSTFS_KMS_VAULT_TOKEN";
-pub const ENV_KMS_VAULT_NAMESPACE: &str = "RUSTFS_KMS_VAULT_NAMESPACE";
-pub const ENV_KMS_VAULT_MOUNT_PATH: &str = "RUSTFS_KMS_VAULT_MOUNT_PATH";
 pub const ENV_KMS_VAULT_SKIP_TLS_VERIFY: &str = "RUSTFS_KMS_VAULT_SKIP_TLS_VERIFY";
 pub const ENV_KMS_VAULT_TRANSIT_METADATA_KV_MOUNT: &str = "RUSTFS_KMS_VAULT_TRANSIT_METADATA_KV_MOUNT";
 pub const ENV_KMS_VAULT_TRANSIT_METADATA_PREFIX: &str = "RUSTFS_KMS_VAULT_TRANSIT_METADATA_PREFIX";
@@ -39,9 +35,6 @@ pub const ENV_KMS_VAULT_APPROLE_SECRET_ID: &str = "RUSTFS_KMS_VAULT_APPROLE_SECR
 pub const ENV_KMS_VAULT_APPROLE_SECRET_ID_FILE: &str = "RUSTFS_KMS_VAULT_APPROLE_SECRET_ID_FILE";
 pub const ENV_KMS_VAULT_APPROLE_MOUNT: &str = "RUSTFS_KMS_VAULT_APPROLE_MOUNT";
 pub const ENV_KMS_VAULT_TOKEN_FILE: &str = "RUSTFS_KMS_VAULT_TOKEN_FILE";
-pub const ENV_KMS_VAULT_KUBERNETES_ROLE: &str = "RUSTFS_KMS_VAULT_KUBERNETES_ROLE";
-pub const ENV_KMS_VAULT_KUBERNETES_MOUNT: &str = "RUSTFS_KMS_VAULT_KUBERNETES_MOUNT";
-pub const ENV_KMS_VAULT_KUBERNETES_JWT_PATH: &str = "RUSTFS_KMS_VAULT_KUBERNETES_JWT_PATH";
 pub const ENV_KMS_AWS_REGION: &str = "RUSTFS_KMS_AWS_REGION";
 pub const ENV_KMS_AWS_ENDPOINT_URL: &str = "RUSTFS_KMS_AWS_ENDPOINT_URL";
 /// Age in whole seconds beyond which a key is reported as due for rotation;
@@ -52,9 +45,6 @@ pub const ENV_KMS_ROTATION_MAX_WRAPS: &str = "RUSTFS_KMS_ROTATION_MAX_WRAPS";
 pub const DEFAULT_VAULT_TRANSIT_METADATA_KV_MOUNT: &str = "secret";
 pub const DEFAULT_VAULT_TRANSIT_METADATA_KEY_PREFIX: &str = "rustfs/kms/transit-metadata";
 pub const DEFAULT_VAULT_APPROLE_MOUNT: &str = "approle";
-pub const DEFAULT_VAULT_KUBERNETES_MOUNT: &str = "kubernetes";
-/// Where the kubelet projects a pod's ServiceAccount token by default.
-pub const DEFAULT_VAULT_KUBERNETES_JWT_PATH: &str = "/var/run/secrets/kubernetes.io/serviceaccount/token";
 
 /// Upper bound applied to `KmsConfig::timeout` when deriving backend behavior.
 ///
@@ -94,14 +84,6 @@ fn default_vault_approle_mount() -> String {
     DEFAULT_VAULT_APPROLE_MOUNT.to_string()
 }
 
-fn default_vault_kubernetes_mount() -> String {
-    DEFAULT_VAULT_KUBERNETES_MOUNT.to_string()
-}
-
-fn default_vault_kubernetes_jwt_path() -> PathBuf {
-    PathBuf::from(DEFAULT_VAULT_KUBERNETES_JWT_PATH)
-}
-
 pub const KMS_CONFIG_REDACTION_RULES: &[RedactionRule] = &[
     RedactionRule::new("kms.local.master_key", RedactionLevel::Secret, "local backend key encryption material"),
     RedactionRule::new("kms.vault.token", RedactionLevel::Secret, "vault authentication token"),
@@ -508,23 +490,6 @@ pub enum VaultAuthMethod {
         #[serde(default)]
         refresh_safety_window_secs: Option<u64>,
     },
-    /// Kubernetes authentication: the pod's ServiceAccount token is exchanged
-    /// for a lease-bound Vault token that is renewed in the background.
-    Kubernetes {
-        /// Vault role bound to this ServiceAccount.
-        role: String,
-        /// Kubernetes auth engine mount path.
-        #[serde(default = "default_vault_kubernetes_mount")]
-        mount: String,
-        /// Projected ServiceAccount token to present. Re-read on every login so
-        /// a token the kubelet rotates is picked up without a restart.
-        #[serde(default = "default_vault_kubernetes_jwt_path")]
-        jwt_path: PathBuf,
-        /// Fail-closed margin in seconds, as on `AppRole`. Defaults to the
-        /// per-attempt timeout.
-        #[serde(default)]
-        refresh_safety_window_secs: Option<u64>,
-    },
     /// Agent-managed token file (for example a Vault Agent auto-auth sink):
     /// the token is read from `path` and re-read periodically so a token
     /// rotated by the agent is picked up without a restart.
@@ -555,16 +520,6 @@ impl VaultAuthMethod {
         }
     }
 
-    /// Kubernetes authentication with the default mount and projected token path.
-    pub fn kubernetes(role: String) -> Self {
-        Self::Kubernetes {
-            role,
-            mount: default_vault_kubernetes_mount(),
-            jwt_path: default_vault_kubernetes_jwt_path(),
-            refresh_safety_window_secs: None,
-        }
-    }
-
     /// Agent-managed token file with the default poll interval.
     pub fn token_file(path: PathBuf) -> Self {
         Self::TokenFile {
@@ -593,20 +548,6 @@ impl fmt::Debug for VaultAuthMethod {
                 .field("mount", mount)
                 .field("refresh_safety_window_secs", refresh_safety_window_secs)
                 .finish(),
-            // No redaction: the role and mount name a Vault binding, and the
-            // ServiceAccount token itself is never held on this type.
-            Self::Kubernetes {
-                role,
-                mount,
-                jwt_path,
-                refresh_safety_window_secs,
-            } => f
-                .debug_struct("Kubernetes")
-                .field("role", role)
-                .field("mount", mount)
-                .field("jwt_path", jwt_path)
-                .field("refresh_safety_window_secs", refresh_safety_window_secs)
-                .finish(),
             Self::TokenFile {
                 path,
                 poll_interval_secs,
@@ -1087,12 +1028,50 @@ impl KmsConfig {
                 });
             }
             KmsBackend::VaultKv2 => {
-                config.backend_config =
-                    BackendConfig::VaultKv2(Box::new(vault_kv2_config_from_env(VaultCliOverrides::default())?));
+                let address = get_env_str("RUSTFS_KMS_VAULT_ADDRESS", "http://localhost:8200");
+                let auth_method = vault_auth_method_from_env()?;
+                let skip_tls_verify = get_env_bool(ENV_KMS_VAULT_SKIP_TLS_VERIFY, false);
+
+                let mount_path = match get_env_opt_str("RUSTFS_KMS_VAULT_MOUNT_PATH") {
+                    Some(path) => {
+                        tracing::warn!(
+                            "RUSTFS_KMS_VAULT_MOUNT_PATH is deprecated for the Vault KV2 backend: it never calls the Transit engine and the value is stored but unused"
+                        );
+                        path
+                    }
+                    None => default_vault_kv2_mount_path(),
+                };
+
+                config.backend_config = BackendConfig::VaultKv2(Box::new(VaultConfig {
+                    address,
+                    auth_method,
+                    namespace: get_env_opt_str("RUSTFS_KMS_VAULT_NAMESPACE"),
+                    mount_path,
+                    kv_mount: get_env_str("RUSTFS_KMS_VAULT_KV_MOUNT", "secret"),
+                    key_path_prefix: get_env_str("RUSTFS_KMS_VAULT_KEY_PREFIX", "rustfs/kms/keys"),
+                    tls: vault_tls_config(skip_tls_verify),
+                }));
             }
             KmsBackend::VaultTransit => {
-                config.backend_config =
-                    BackendConfig::VaultTransit(Box::new(vault_transit_config_from_env(VaultCliOverrides::default())?));
+                let address = get_env_str("RUSTFS_KMS_VAULT_ADDRESS", "http://localhost:8200");
+                let auth_method = vault_auth_method_from_env()?;
+                let skip_tls_verify = get_env_bool(ENV_KMS_VAULT_SKIP_TLS_VERIFY, false);
+
+                config.backend_config = BackendConfig::VaultTransit(Box::new(VaultTransitConfig {
+                    address,
+                    auth_method,
+                    namespace: get_env_opt_str("RUSTFS_KMS_VAULT_NAMESPACE"),
+                    mount_path: get_env_str("RUSTFS_KMS_VAULT_MOUNT_PATH", "transit"),
+                    metadata_kv_mount: get_env_str(
+                        ENV_KMS_VAULT_TRANSIT_METADATA_KV_MOUNT,
+                        DEFAULT_VAULT_TRANSIT_METADATA_KV_MOUNT,
+                    ),
+                    metadata_key_prefix: get_env_str(
+                        ENV_KMS_VAULT_TRANSIT_METADATA_PREFIX,
+                        DEFAULT_VAULT_TRANSIT_METADATA_KEY_PREFIX,
+                    ),
+                    tls: vault_tls_config(skip_tls_verify),
+                }));
             }
             KmsBackend::Static => {
                 // Read from file first, then fall back to direct env var
@@ -1223,78 +1202,6 @@ fn is_under_temp_dir(path: &Path) -> bool {
     path.starts_with(std::env::temp_dir())
 }
 
-/// Command-line values that take precedence over the matching environment
-/// variables when assembling a Vault backend configuration.
-///
-/// Every field has a `RUSTFS_KMS_VAULT_*` equivalent that the CLI layer already
-/// reads, so these are only set when the operator passed an explicit flag.
-///
-/// Deliberately not `Debug`: `token` holds the raw Vault token, and the
-/// redacting `Debug` impls elsewhere in this module exist because a derived one
-/// would print it. Denying the derive makes a future `{overrides:?}` a compile
-/// error instead of a leak.
-#[derive(Default, Clone, Copy)]
-pub struct VaultCliOverrides<'a> {
-    pub address: Option<&'a str>,
-    pub token: Option<&'a str>,
-    pub mount_path: Option<&'a str>,
-}
-
-/// Assemble the Vault KV2 backend configuration from the environment.
-///
-/// Shared by [`KmsConfig::from_env`] and the server's command-line startup path
-/// so both resolve the same auth method, namespace, TLS and mount settings.
-pub fn vault_kv2_config_from_env(overrides: VaultCliOverrides<'_>) -> Result<VaultConfig> {
-    let mount_path = match overrides
-        .mount_path
-        .map(str::to_string)
-        .or_else(|| get_env_opt_str(ENV_KMS_VAULT_MOUNT_PATH))
-    {
-        Some(path) => {
-            tracing::warn!(
-                "RUSTFS_KMS_VAULT_MOUNT_PATH is deprecated for the Vault KV2 backend: it never calls the Transit engine and the value is stored but unused"
-            );
-            path
-        }
-        None => default_vault_kv2_mount_path(),
-    };
-
-    Ok(VaultConfig {
-        address: vault_address_from_env(overrides.address),
-        auth_method: vault_auth_method_from_env(overrides.token)?,
-        namespace: get_env_opt_str(ENV_KMS_VAULT_NAMESPACE),
-        mount_path,
-        kv_mount: get_env_str("RUSTFS_KMS_VAULT_KV_MOUNT", "secret"),
-        key_path_prefix: get_env_str("RUSTFS_KMS_VAULT_KEY_PREFIX", "rustfs/kms/keys"),
-        tls: vault_tls_config(get_env_bool(ENV_KMS_VAULT_SKIP_TLS_VERIFY, false)),
-    })
-}
-
-/// Assemble the Vault Transit backend configuration from the environment.
-///
-/// Companion to [`vault_kv2_config_from_env`]; see there for why both entry
-/// points share it.
-pub fn vault_transit_config_from_env(overrides: VaultCliOverrides<'_>) -> Result<VaultTransitConfig> {
-    Ok(VaultTransitConfig {
-        address: vault_address_from_env(overrides.address),
-        auth_method: vault_auth_method_from_env(overrides.token)?,
-        namespace: get_env_opt_str(ENV_KMS_VAULT_NAMESPACE),
-        mount_path: overrides
-            .mount_path
-            .map(str::to_string)
-            .unwrap_or_else(|| get_env_str(ENV_KMS_VAULT_MOUNT_PATH, "transit")),
-        metadata_kv_mount: get_env_str(ENV_KMS_VAULT_TRANSIT_METADATA_KV_MOUNT, DEFAULT_VAULT_TRANSIT_METADATA_KV_MOUNT),
-        metadata_key_prefix: get_env_str(ENV_KMS_VAULT_TRANSIT_METADATA_PREFIX, DEFAULT_VAULT_TRANSIT_METADATA_KEY_PREFIX),
-        tls: vault_tls_config(get_env_bool(ENV_KMS_VAULT_SKIP_TLS_VERIFY, false)),
-    })
-}
-
-fn vault_address_from_env(override_value: Option<&str>) -> String {
-    override_value
-        .map(str::to_string)
-        .unwrap_or_else(|| get_env_str(ENV_KMS_VAULT_ADDRESS, "http://localhost:8200"))
-}
-
 /// Resolve the Vault auth method from environment variables.
 ///
 /// Setting `RUSTFS_KMS_VAULT_APPROLE_ROLE_ID` selects AppRole authentication;
@@ -1302,59 +1209,27 @@ fn vault_address_from_env(override_value: Option<&str>) -> String {
 /// (re-read on every login, mirroring the `RUSTFS_KMS_STATIC_SECRET_KEY_FILE`
 /// precedent) or inline from `RUSTFS_KMS_VAULT_APPROLE_SECRET_ID`, with the
 /// file taking precedence. Without a role id the legacy token flow applies.
-///
-/// `RUSTFS_KMS_VAULT_KUBERNETES_ROLE` selects Kubernetes authentication, which
-/// presents the pod's projected ServiceAccount token.
-///
-/// `token_override` carries a token supplied on the command line; it stands in
-/// for `RUSTFS_KMS_VAULT_TOKEN` everywhere below, including the conflict checks,
-/// so a flag and the variable it mirrors select the same method.
-fn vault_auth_method_from_env(token_override: Option<&str>) -> Result<VaultAuthMethod> {
-    let token = token_override
-        .map(str::to_string)
-        .or_else(|| get_env_opt_str(ENV_KMS_VAULT_TOKEN));
-    let role_id = get_env_opt_str(ENV_KMS_VAULT_APPROLE_ROLE_ID);
-    let kubernetes_role = get_env_opt_str(ENV_KMS_VAULT_KUBERNETES_ROLE);
-
+fn vault_auth_method_from_env() -> Result<VaultAuthMethod> {
     if let Some(token_file) = get_env_opt_str(ENV_KMS_VAULT_TOKEN_FILE) {
         // A token file names one authoritative credential source; combining it
         // with another one would leave the effective identity ambiguous, so
         // that is a configuration error rather than a precedence rule.
-        for (name, configured) in [
-            (ENV_KMS_VAULT_APPROLE_ROLE_ID, role_id.is_some()),
-            (ENV_KMS_VAULT_KUBERNETES_ROLE, kubernetes_role.is_some()),
-            (ENV_KMS_VAULT_TOKEN, token.is_some()),
-        ] {
-            if configured {
-                return Err(KmsError::configuration_error(format!(
-                    "{ENV_KMS_VAULT_TOKEN_FILE} cannot be combined with {name}; configure exactly one Vault auth method"
-                )));
-            }
+        if get_env_opt_str(ENV_KMS_VAULT_APPROLE_ROLE_ID).is_some() {
+            return Err(KmsError::configuration_error(format!(
+                "{ENV_KMS_VAULT_TOKEN_FILE} cannot be combined with {ENV_KMS_VAULT_APPROLE_ROLE_ID}; configure exactly one Vault auth method"
+            )));
+        }
+        if get_env_opt_str("RUSTFS_KMS_VAULT_TOKEN").is_some() {
+            return Err(KmsError::configuration_error(format!(
+                "{ENV_KMS_VAULT_TOKEN_FILE} cannot be combined with RUSTFS_KMS_VAULT_TOKEN; configure exactly one Vault auth method"
+            )));
         }
         return Ok(VaultAuthMethod::token_file(PathBuf::from(token_file)));
     }
 
-    if let Some(role) = kubernetes_role {
-        // Unlike a leftover static token, a second login method is never a
-        // stale remnant: both were configured deliberately and neither can be
-        // ranked over the other.
-        if role_id.is_some() {
-            return Err(KmsError::configuration_error(format!(
-                "{ENV_KMS_VAULT_KUBERNETES_ROLE} cannot be combined with {ENV_KMS_VAULT_APPROLE_ROLE_ID}; configure exactly one Vault auth method"
-            )));
-        }
-        return Ok(VaultAuthMethod::Kubernetes {
-            role,
-            mount: get_env_str(ENV_KMS_VAULT_KUBERNETES_MOUNT, DEFAULT_VAULT_KUBERNETES_MOUNT),
-            jwt_path: get_env_opt_str(ENV_KMS_VAULT_KUBERNETES_JWT_PATH)
-                .map_or_else(default_vault_kubernetes_jwt_path, PathBuf::from),
-            refresh_safety_window_secs: None,
-        });
-    }
-
-    let Some(role_id) = role_id else {
+    let Some(role_id) = get_env_opt_str(ENV_KMS_VAULT_APPROLE_ROLE_ID) else {
         return Ok(VaultAuthMethod::Token {
-            token: token.unwrap_or_else(|| "dev-token".to_string()),
+            token: get_env_str("RUSTFS_KMS_VAULT_TOKEN", "dev-token"),
         });
     };
 
@@ -1398,22 +1273,6 @@ fn validate_vault_auth_method(backend_name: &str, auth_method: &VaultAuthMethod)
             }
             Ok(())
         }
-        VaultAuthMethod::Kubernetes {
-            role, mount, jwt_path, ..
-        } => {
-            if role.is_empty() {
-                return Err(KmsError::configuration_error(format!("{backend_name} Kubernetes role cannot be empty")));
-            }
-            if mount.is_empty() {
-                return Err(KmsError::configuration_error(format!("{backend_name} Kubernetes mount cannot be empty")));
-            }
-            if jwt_path.as_os_str().is_empty() {
-                return Err(KmsError::configuration_error(format!(
-                    "{backend_name} Kubernetes ServiceAccount token path cannot be empty"
-                )));
-            }
-            Ok(())
-        }
         VaultAuthMethod::TokenFile {
             path,
             poll_interval_secs,
@@ -2117,106 +1976,6 @@ mod tests {
             .expect("well-formed token file auth must validate");
     }
 
-    /// A Kubernetes role alone configures the method: the credential is the
-    /// pod's projected ServiceAccount token, so nothing secret is in the
-    /// environment and the mount and token path fall back to the cluster
-    /// defaults.
-    #[test]
-    fn test_from_env_selects_kubernetes() {
-        with_vars(
-            vec![
-                ("RUSTFS_KMS_BACKEND", Some("vault-transit")),
-                (ENV_KMS_VAULT_ADDRESS, Some("https://vault.example.com")),
-                (ENV_KMS_VAULT_KUBERNETES_ROLE, Some("rustfs")),
-                (ENV_KMS_VAULT_KUBERNETES_MOUNT, None),
-                (ENV_KMS_VAULT_KUBERNETES_JWT_PATH, None),
-                (ENV_KMS_VAULT_TOKEN, None),
-                (ENV_KMS_VAULT_TOKEN_FILE, None),
-                (ENV_KMS_VAULT_APPROLE_ROLE_ID, None),
-            ],
-            || {
-                let config = KmsConfig::from_env().expect("kms config should load from env");
-                let vault = config.vault_transit_config().expect("vault transit backend config");
-                let VaultAuthMethod::Kubernetes {
-                    role,
-                    mount,
-                    jwt_path,
-                    refresh_safety_window_secs,
-                } = &vault.auth_method
-                else {
-                    panic!(
-                        "a kubernetes role in the environment must select Kubernetes auth, got {:?}",
-                        vault.auth_method
-                    );
-                };
-                assert_eq!(role, "rustfs");
-                assert_eq!(mount, DEFAULT_VAULT_KUBERNETES_MOUNT);
-                assert_eq!(jwt_path, Path::new(DEFAULT_VAULT_KUBERNETES_JWT_PATH));
-                assert_eq!(refresh_safety_window_secs, &None);
-            },
-        );
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn test_from_env_kubernetes_is_mutually_exclusive_with_other_auth() {
-        with_vars(
-            vec![
-                ("RUSTFS_KMS_BACKEND", Some("vault-transit")),
-                (ENV_KMS_VAULT_KUBERNETES_ROLE, Some("rustfs")),
-                (ENV_KMS_VAULT_APPROLE_ROLE_ID, Some("env-role-id")),
-                (ENV_KMS_VAULT_TOKEN, None),
-                (ENV_KMS_VAULT_TOKEN_FILE, None),
-            ],
-            || {
-                let error = KmsConfig::from_env().expect_err("kubernetes combined with approle must be rejected");
-                assert!(error.to_string().contains(ENV_KMS_VAULT_KUBERNETES_ROLE));
-                assert!(error.to_string().contains(ENV_KMS_VAULT_APPROLE_ROLE_ID));
-            },
-        );
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn test_validate_rejects_bad_kubernetes_settings() {
-        let vault_config = |auth_method: VaultAuthMethod| KmsConfig {
-            backend: KmsBackend::VaultTransit,
-            backend_config: BackendConfig::VaultTransit(Box::new(VaultTransitConfig {
-                address: "https://vault.example.com:8200".to_string(),
-                auth_method,
-                ..Default::default()
-            })),
-            ..Default::default()
-        };
-
-        let error = vault_config(VaultAuthMethod::kubernetes(String::new()))
-            .validate()
-            .expect_err("an empty kubernetes role must be rejected");
-        assert!(error.to_string().contains("role"), "got {error}");
-
-        let error = vault_config(VaultAuthMethod::Kubernetes {
-            role: "rustfs".to_string(),
-            mount: String::new(),
-            jwt_path: PathBuf::from(DEFAULT_VAULT_KUBERNETES_JWT_PATH),
-            refresh_safety_window_secs: None,
-        })
-        .validate()
-        .expect_err("an empty kubernetes mount must be rejected");
-        assert!(error.to_string().contains("mount"), "got {error}");
-
-        let error = vault_config(VaultAuthMethod::Kubernetes {
-            role: "rustfs".to_string(),
-            mount: DEFAULT_VAULT_KUBERNETES_MOUNT.to_string(),
-            jwt_path: PathBuf::new(),
-            refresh_safety_window_secs: None,
-        })
-        .validate()
-        .expect_err("an empty ServiceAccount token path must be rejected");
-        assert!(error.to_string().contains("token path"), "got {error}");
-
-        vault_config(VaultAuthMethod::kubernetes("rustfs".to_string()))
-            .validate()
-            .expect("well-formed kubernetes auth must validate");
-    }
-
     /// Every KV2 read, write and listing is routed through `kv_mount`, so an
     /// empty one names a path no Vault engine answers. The Transit backend
     /// already rejects its own empty mounts; this closes the same gap on the

crates/madmin/Cargo.toml

@@ -37,11 +37,7 @@ hotpath-cpu = ["hotpath", "hotpath/hotpath-cpu"]
 [dependencies]
 hotpath.workspace = true
 humantime.workspace = true
-http.workspace = true
 hyper = { workspace = true, features = ["http2", "http1", "server"] }
-reqwest = { workspace = true, features = ["json"] }
-rustfs-signer.workspace = true
-s3s.workspace = true
 jiff = { workspace = true, features = ["serde"] }
 serde = { workspace = true, features = ["derive"] }
 serde_json = { workspace = true, features = ["raw_value"] }
@@ -53,4 +49,3 @@ doctest = false
 
 [dev-dependencies]
 rmp-serde.workspace = true
-tokio = { workspace = true, features = ["macros", "rt-multi-thread", "net"] }

crates/madmin/src/client.rs

@@ -1,851 +0,0 @@
-// Copyright 2024 RustFS Team
-//
-// Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
-// you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
-// You may obtain a copy of the License at
-//
-//     http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
-//
-// Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
-// distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
-// WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
-// See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
-// limitations under the License.
-
-//! Admin API HTTP client for heal and scanner management (rustfs/backlog#1869).
-//!
-//! [`AdminClient`] speaks the `/rustfs/admin/v3` surface with S3 SigV4
-//! request signing (the same scheme the server's admin router authenticates),
-//! so `mc`-style tooling and automation can drive heal start/query/cancel and
-//! read background-heal / scanner status without hand-rolling HTTP.
-//!
-//! Wire structs in this module mirror the server-side shapes
-//! (`rustfs/src/admin/handlers/heal.rs`, `handlers/scanner.rs`,
-//! `rustfs-common/src/heal_channel.rs`), following the madmin-go model where
-//! the SDK owns its own copies and round-trip tests pin the encoding. Deeply
-//! nested status payloads that the server composes from runtime types are
-//! carried through as `serde_json::Value` and flattened maps rather than
-//! duplicated field-for-field, so the client cannot silently drift on fields
-//! it never interprets.
-
-use crate::heal_commands::HealResultItem;
-use http::Method;
-use serde::{Deserialize, Serialize, de};
-use std::time::Duration;
-
-/// Default admin API path prefix on a RustFS endpoint.
-pub const DEFAULT_ADMIN_API_PREFIX: &str = "/rustfs/admin";
-/// Default SigV4 region when the server has no explicit region configured.
-pub const DEFAULT_REGION: &str = "us-east-1";
-
-/// Scan mode for a heal request, mirroring the server's numeric-or-name wire
-/// encoding (`0` unknown/default, `1` normal, `2` deep).
-#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, Default, PartialEq, Eq)]
-pub enum HealScanMode {
-    /// Server default; behaves as [`HealScanMode::Normal`].
-    #[default]
-    Unknown,
-    /// Metadata-level checks only.
-    Normal,
-    /// Full bitrot verification while healing.
-    Deep,
-}
-
-impl HealScanMode {
-    fn wire_number(self) -> u8 {
-        match self {
-            Self::Unknown => 0,
-            Self::Normal => 1,
-            Self::Deep => 2,
-        }
-    }
-
-    fn from_wire_number(value: u8) -> Option<Self> {
-        match value {
-            0 => Some(Self::Unknown),
-            1 => Some(Self::Normal),
-            2 => Some(Self::Deep),
-            _ => None,
-        }
-    }
-
-    fn from_wire_name(value: &str) -> Option<Self> {
-        match value {
-            "unknown" => Some(Self::Unknown),
-            "normal" => Some(Self::Normal),
-            "deep" => Some(Self::Deep),
-            _ => None,
-        }
-    }
-}
-
-impl Serialize for HealScanMode {
-    fn serialize<S: serde::Serializer>(&self, serializer: S) -> Result<S::Ok, S::Error> {
-        serializer.serialize_u8(self.wire_number())
-    }
-}
-
-impl<'de> Deserialize<'de> for HealScanMode {
-    fn deserialize<D: serde::Deserializer<'de>>(deserializer: D) -> Result<Self, D::Error> {
-        struct HealScanModeVisitor;
-
-        impl de::Visitor<'_> for HealScanModeVisitor {
-            type Value = HealScanMode;
-
-            fn expecting(&self, formatter: &mut std::fmt::Formatter<'_>) -> std::fmt::Result {
-                formatter.write_str("a heal scan mode number or name")
-            }
-
-            fn visit_u64<E: de::Error>(self, value: u64) -> Result<Self::Value, E> {
-                u8::try_from(value)
-                    .ok()
-                    .and_then(HealScanMode::from_wire_number)
-                    .ok_or_else(|| E::custom(format!("unknown heal scan mode number: {value}")))
-            }
-
-            fn visit_str<E: de::Error>(self, value: &str) -> Result<Self::Value, E> {
-                HealScanMode::from_wire_name(value).ok_or_else(|| E::custom(format!("unknown heal scan mode name: {value}")))
-            }
-        }
-
-        deserializer.deserialize_any(HealScanModeVisitor)
-    }
-}
-
-/// Heal options for an admin heal request (mirror of the server body type).
-/// Fields default on decode: a client should tolerate a server response whose
-/// settings object omits fields it never set.
-#[derive(Debug, Clone, Default, Serialize, Deserialize)]
-pub struct HealOpts {
-    #[serde(default)]
-    pub recursive: bool,
-    #[serde(rename = "dryRun", default)]
-    pub dry_run: bool,
-    #[serde(default)]
-    pub remove: bool,
-    #[serde(default)]
-    pub recreate: bool,
-    #[serde(rename = "scanMode", default)]
-    pub scan_mode: HealScanMode,
-    #[serde(rename = "updateParity", default)]
-    pub update_parity: bool,
-    #[serde(rename = "nolock", default)]
-    pub no_lock: bool,
-    #[serde(rename = "pool", default)]
-    pub pool: Option<usize>,
-    #[serde(rename = "set", default)]
-    pub set: Option<usize>,
-}
-
-/// Successful heal start / path-scoped cancel response.
-#[derive(Debug, Clone, Deserialize)]
-#[serde(rename_all = "camelCase")]
-pub struct HealStartSuccess {
-    pub client_token: String,
-    pub client_address: String,
-    #[serde(default)]
-    pub start_time: String,
-}
-
-/// Heal task status response (query, cancel-with-token, start-then-poll).
-#[derive(Debug, Clone, Deserialize)]
-#[serde(rename_all = "camelCase")]
-pub struct HealTaskStatus {
-    /// `running` | `finished` | `stopped` | `notFound`.
-    pub summary: String,
-    /// Failure detail for stopped tasks; empty otherwise.
-    #[serde(rename = "detail", default)]
-    pub failure_detail: String,
-    #[serde(default)]
-    pub start_time: String,
-    #[serde(default)]
-    pub settings: HealOpts,
-    #[serde(default)]
-    pub items: Vec<HealResultItem>,
-    #[serde(default)]
-    pub truncated: bool,
-    /// Live progress snapshot; the exact shape is owned by the heal runtime.
-    #[serde(default)]
-    pub progress: Option<serde_json::Value>,
-}
-
-/// `POST /v3/background-heal/status` response. Known top-level fields are
-/// typed; the flattened heal info and operations matrix pass through verbatim.
-#[derive(Debug, Clone, Deserialize)]
-#[serde(rename_all = "camelCase")]
-pub struct BackgroundHealStatus {
-    /// `disabled` | `uninitialized` | `idle` | `active` | `degraded`.
-    pub state: String,
-    #[serde(default)]
-    pub heal_queue_length: u64,
-    #[serde(default)]
-    pub heal_active_tasks: u64,
-    #[serde(default)]
-    pub cluster_status_complete: bool,
-    #[serde(default)]
-    pub progress: Option<serde_json::Value>,
-    /// Remaining wire fields (flattened `BackgroundHealInfo` plus the
-    /// priority-by-source operations matrix), carried verbatim.
-    #[serde(flatten)]
-    pub extra: serde_json::Map<String, serde_json::Value>,
-}
-
-/// `GET /v3/scanner/status` response, typed at the fields operators branch
-/// on; everything else passes through verbatim.
-#[derive(Debug, Clone, Deserialize)]
-#[serde(rename_all = "camelCase")]
-pub struct ScannerStatus {
-    pub enabled: bool,
-    /// `fresh` | `stale` | `unknown`; absent when the scanner never completed
-    /// a cycle.
-    #[serde(default)]
-    pub freshness: Option<ScannerFreshness>,
-    #[serde(flatten)]
-    pub extra: serde_json::Map<String, serde_json::Value>,
-}
-
-/// Freshness block of the scanner status response.
-#[derive(Debug, Clone, Deserialize)]
-#[serde(rename_all = "camelCase")]
-pub struct ScannerFreshness {
-    /// `fresh` | `stale` | `unknown`.
-    pub state: String,
-}
-
-impl ScannerStatus {
-    /// Convenience accessor for the freshness state string.
-    pub fn freshness(&self) -> &str {
-        self.freshness
-            .as_ref()
-            .map(|freshness| freshness.state.as_str())
-            .unwrap_or("unknown")
-    }
-}
-
-/// Everything that can go wrong in an admin client call.
-#[derive(Debug)]
-pub enum AdminClientError {
-    /// The endpoint URL could not be parsed.
-    InvalidEndpoint(String),
-    /// Request build/send failed (DNS, connect, timeout, body read).
-    Transport(reqwest::Error),
-    /// The server answered a non-2xx status.
-    HttpStatus { status: u16, body: String },
-    /// The response body did not decode into the expected shape.
-    Decode { message: String },
-}
-
-impl std::fmt::Display for AdminClientError {
-    fn fmt(&self, f: &mut std::fmt::Formatter<'_>) -> std::fmt::Result {
-        match self {
-            Self::InvalidEndpoint(message) => write!(f, "invalid admin endpoint: {message}"),
-            Self::Transport(err) => write!(f, "admin request transport failure: {err}"),
-            Self::HttpStatus { status, body } => write!(f, "admin request failed with HTTP {status}: {body}"),
-            Self::Decode { message } => write!(f, "admin response decode failure: {message}"),
-        }
-    }
-}
-
-impl std::error::Error for AdminClientError {}
-
-impl From<reqwest::Error> for AdminClientError {
-    fn from(err: reqwest::Error) -> Self {
-        Self::Transport(err)
-    }
-}
-
-/// A signed client for a RustFS admin API.
-#[derive(Debug, Clone)]
-pub struct AdminClient {
-    endpoint: reqwest::Url,
-    access_key: String,
-    secret_key: String,
-    session_token: String,
-    region: String,
-    api_prefix: String,
-    http: reqwest::Client,
-}
-
-impl AdminClient {
-    /// Build a client for `endpoint` (e.g. `http://127.0.0.1:9000`) using root
-    /// or admin credentials. Requests are SigV4-signed with the same scheme
-    /// the server's admin router authenticates.
-    pub fn new(endpoint: &str, access_key: &str, secret_key: &str) -> Result<Self, AdminClientError> {
-        let url = reqwest::Url::parse(endpoint).map_err(|err| AdminClientError::InvalidEndpoint(err.to_string()))?;
-        if url.host_str().is_none() {
-            return Err(AdminClientError::InvalidEndpoint("endpoint has no host".to_string()));
-        }
-        let http = reqwest::Client::builder()
-            .connect_timeout(Duration::from_secs(10))
-            .timeout(Duration::from_secs(30))
-            .build()
-            .map_err(AdminClientError::Transport)?;
-        Ok(Self {
-            endpoint: url,
-            access_key: access_key.to_string(),
-            secret_key: secret_key.to_string(),
-            session_token: String::new(),
-            region: DEFAULT_REGION.to_string(),
-            api_prefix: DEFAULT_ADMIN_API_PREFIX.to_string(),
-            http,
-        })
-    }
-
-    /// Attach an STS session token (signed as `x-amz-security-token`).
-    pub fn with_session_token(mut self, session_token: impl Into<String>) -> Self {
-        self.session_token = session_token.into();
-        self
-    }
-
-    /// Override the SigV4 region (defaults to `us-east-1`, matching a
-    /// region-less RustFS deployment).
-    pub fn with_region(mut self, region: impl Into<String>) -> Self {
-        self.region = region.into();
-        self
-    }
-
-    /// Override the admin API path prefix (defaults to `/rustfs/admin`).
-    pub fn with_api_prefix(mut self, prefix: impl Into<String>) -> Self {
-        self.api_prefix = prefix.into();
-        self
-    }
-
-    /// Start a heal. `bucket` empty and `prefix` empty heals the whole
-    /// deployment (requires `recursive` or a `pool`/`set` pair in `opts`,
-    /// enforced server-side); a bucket alone heals the bucket (the server
-    /// forces `recursive` for bucket heals).
-    pub async fn heal_start(
-        &self,
-        bucket: Option<&str>,
-        prefix: Option<&str>,
-        opts: &HealOpts,
-        force_start: bool,
-    ) -> Result<HealStartSuccess, AdminClientError> {
-        let body = serde_json::to_vec(opts).map_err(|err| AdminClientError::Decode {
-            message: err.to_string(),
-        })?;
-        let mut query = Vec::new();
-        if force_start {
-            query.push(("forceStart", "true".to_string()));
-        }
-        self.post_json(&heal_path(bucket, prefix), &query, body).await
-    }
-
-    /// Query the status of the heal identified by `client_token` (the token
-    /// returned by [`Self::heal_start`]) at the path it was started on.
-    pub async fn heal_status(
-        &self,
-        bucket: Option<&str>,
-        prefix: Option<&str>,
-        client_token: &str,
-    ) -> Result<HealTaskStatus, AdminClientError> {
-        self.post_json(&heal_path(bucket, prefix), &[("clientToken", client_token.to_string())], Vec::new())
-            .await
-    }
-
-    /// Stop a heal: with a `client_token` only that task is cancelled and its
-    /// final status returned; without one, every heal task at the path is
-    /// cancelled (the server answers with a start-success-shaped receipt).
-    pub async fn heal_stop(
-        &self,
-        bucket: Option<&str>,
-        prefix: Option<&str>,
-        client_token: Option<&str>,
-    ) -> Result<HealStopOutcome, AdminClientError> {
-        let mut query = vec![("forceStop", "true".to_string())];
-        if let Some(token) = client_token {
-            query.push(("clientToken", token.to_string()));
-        }
-        match client_token {
-            Some(_) => {
-                let status: HealTaskStatus = self.post_json(&heal_path(bucket, prefix), &query, Vec::new()).await?;
-                Ok(HealStopOutcome::Stopped(status))
-            }
-            None => {
-                let success: HealStartSuccess = self.post_json(&heal_path(bucket, prefix), &query, Vec::new()).await?;
-                Ok(HealStopOutcome::PathStopped(success))
-            }
-        }
-    }
-
-    /// Cluster-aggregated background heal status.
-    pub async fn background_heal_status(&self) -> Result<BackgroundHealStatus, AdminClientError> {
-        self.get_json("/v3/background-heal/status").await
-    }
-
-    /// Data scanner status (enabled state, freshness, runtime config).
-    pub async fn scanner_status(&self) -> Result<ScannerStatus, AdminClientError> {
-        self.get_json("/v3/scanner/status").await
-    }
-
-    /// ILM expiry worker status. The payload is owned by the expiry
-    /// subsystem and still evolving; returned verbatim.
-    pub async fn ilm_expiry_status(&self) -> Result<serde_json::Value, AdminClientError> {
-        self.get_json("/v3/ilm/expiry/status").await
-    }
-
-    /// Durable replacement-recovery status (admin v4). The payload is owned
-    /// by the heal runtime; returned verbatim.
-    pub async fn replacement_recovery_status(&self) -> Result<serde_json::Value, AdminClientError> {
-        self.get_json("/v4/heal/replacement-recovery").await
-    }
-
-    /// Signed GET returning a decoded JSON body; escape hatch for endpoints
-    /// this client does not wrap yet.
-    pub async fn get_json<T: for<'de> Deserialize<'de>>(&self, path: &str) -> Result<T, AdminClientError> {
-        let url = self.url_for(path, &[])?;
-        let request = self.sign_and_build(Method::GET, url, Vec::new(), None).await?;
-        self.execute(request).await
-    }
-
-    /// Signed POST returning a decoded JSON body.
-    async fn post_json<T: for<'de> Deserialize<'de>>(
-        &self,
-        path: &str,
-        query: &[(&str, String)],
-        body: Vec<u8>,
-    ) -> Result<T, AdminClientError> {
-        let content_type = if body.is_empty() { None } else { Some("application/json") };
-        let url = self.url_for(path, query)?;
-        let request = self.sign_and_build(Method::POST, url, body, content_type).await?;
-        self.execute(request).await
-    }
-
-    fn url_for(&self, path: &str, query: &[(&str, String)]) -> Result<reqwest::Url, AdminClientError> {
-        let mut url = self
-            .endpoint
-            .join(&format!("{}{}", self.api_prefix.trim_end_matches('/'), path))
-            .map_err(|err| AdminClientError::InvalidEndpoint(err.to_string()))?;
-        if !query.is_empty() {
-            let mut pairs = url.query_pairs_mut();
-            for (key, value) in query {
-                pairs.append_pair(key, value);
-            }
-        }
-        Ok(url)
-    }
-
-    /// Build a SigV4-signed request via the same signer the server trusts,
-    /// then hand the signed headers to the HTTP client. The signature covers
-    /// method, path, query, and an unsigned-payload marker — the same shape
-    /// RustFS itself sends for peer admin calls.
-    async fn sign_and_build(
-        &self,
-        method: Method,
-        url: reqwest::Url,
-        body: Vec<u8>,
-        content_type: Option<&str>,
-    ) -> Result<reqwest::Request, AdminClientError> {
-        let authority = match (url.host_str(), url.port_or_known_default()) {
-            (Some(host), Some(port)) => format!("{host}:{port}"),
-            _ => return Err(AdminClientError::InvalidEndpoint("endpoint has no authority".to_string())),
-        };
-        let mut builder = http::Request::builder()
-            .method(method.clone())
-            .uri(url.as_str())
-            .header(http::header::HOST, &authority)
-            .header("x-amz-content-sha256", rustfs_signer::constants::UNSIGNED_PAYLOAD);
-        if let Some(content_type) = content_type {
-            builder = builder.header(http::header::CONTENT_TYPE, content_type);
-        }
-        let unsigned = builder
-            .body(s3s::Body::empty())
-            .map_err(|err| AdminClientError::InvalidEndpoint(format!("build request failed: {err}")))?;
-        let signed = rustfs_signer::sign_v4(
-            unsigned,
-            body.len() as i64,
-            &self.access_key,
-            &self.secret_key,
-            &self.session_token,
-            &self.region,
-        );
-
-        let mut request = self
-            .http
-            .request(method, url)
-            .body(body)
-            .build()
-            .map_err(AdminClientError::Transport)?;
-        let headers = request.headers_mut();
-        for (name, value) in signed.headers().iter() {
-            // HOST is owned by the HTTP client; the signed value above was
-            // built from the same URL authority, so they always agree.
-            if name == http::header::HOST {
-                continue;
-            }
-            headers.insert(name, value.clone());
-        }
-        Ok(request)
-    }
-
-    async fn execute<T: for<'de> Deserialize<'de>>(&self, request: reqwest::Request) -> Result<T, AdminClientError> {
-        let response = self.http.execute(request).await?;
-        let status = response.status();
-        let bytes = response.bytes().await?;
-        if !status.is_success() {
-            return Err(AdminClientError::HttpStatus {
-                status: status.as_u16(),
-                body: String::from_utf8_lossy(&bytes).into_owned(),
-            });
-        }
-        serde_json::from_slice(&bytes).map_err(|err| AdminClientError::Decode {
-            message: err.to_string(),
-        })
-    }
-}
-
-/// Response of [`AdminClient::heal_stop`]: cancelling a single tokened task
-/// answers with that task's status, cancelling a whole path answers with a
-/// start-success-shaped receipt.
-#[derive(Debug, Clone)]
-pub enum HealStopOutcome {
-    Stopped(HealTaskStatus),
-    PathStopped(HealStartSuccess),
-}
-
-fn heal_path(bucket: Option<&str>, prefix: Option<&str>) -> String {
-    match (bucket, prefix) {
-        (Some(bucket), Some(prefix)) if !bucket.is_empty() && !prefix.is_empty() => {
-            format!("/v3/heal/{}/{}", percent_encode_path_segment(bucket), percent_encode_path_segment(prefix))
-        }
-        (Some(bucket), Some(_)) | (Some(bucket), None) if !bucket.is_empty() => {
-            format!("/v3/heal/{}", percent_encode_path_segment(bucket))
-        }
-        _ => "/v3/heal/".to_string(),
-    }
-}
-
-/// Encode a single path segment (slashes are content, not separators, inside
-/// bucket/prefix path params).
-fn percent_encode_path_segment(segment: &str) -> String {
-    let mut out = String::with_capacity(segment.len());
-    for byte in segment.bytes() {
-        match byte {
-            b'A'..=b'Z' | b'a'..=b'z' | b'0'..=b'9' | b'-' | b'_' | b'.' | b'~' => out.push(byte as char),
-            _ => out.push_str(&format!("%{byte:02X}")),
-        }
-    }
-    out
-}
-
-#[cfg(test)]
-mod tests {
-    use super::{
-        AdminClient, AdminClientError, BackgroundHealStatus, HealOpts, HealScanMode, HealStartSuccess, HealTaskStatus,
-        ScannerStatus, heal_path, percent_encode_path_segment,
-    };
-    use serde_json::json;
-    use std::sync::{Arc, Mutex};
-
-    #[test]
-    fn heal_paths_cover_root_bucket_and_prefix() {
-        assert_eq!(heal_path(None, None), "/v3/heal/");
-        assert_eq!(heal_path(Some(""), Some("")), "/v3/heal/");
-        assert_eq!(heal_path(Some("bucket"), None), "/v3/heal/bucket");
-        assert_eq!(heal_path(Some("bucket"), Some("pre/fix")), "/v3/heal/bucket/pre%2Ffix");
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn path_segments_percent_encode_reserved_characters() {
-        assert_eq!(percent_encode_path_segment("a b"), "a%20b");
-        assert_eq!(percent_encode_path_segment("a/b"), "a%2Fb");
-        assert_eq!(percent_encode_path_segment("ü"), "%C3%BC");
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn heal_opts_round_trip_through_the_server_wire_shape() {
-        let opts = HealOpts {
-            recursive: true,
-            dry_run: false,
-            remove: true,
-            recreate: false,
-            scan_mode: HealScanMode::Deep,
-            update_parity: true,
-            no_lock: false,
-            pool: Some(1),
-            set: Some(2),
-        };
-        let wire = serde_json::to_value(&opts).unwrap();
-        assert_eq!(wire["scanMode"], json!(2), "the server body decodes scanMode as a number");
-        let back: HealOpts = serde_json::from_value(wire).unwrap();
-        assert_eq!(back.scan_mode, HealScanMode::Deep);
-        assert_eq!(back.pool, Some(1));
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn heal_scan_mode_accepts_both_wire_encodings() {
-        assert_eq!(serde_json::from_value::<HealScanMode>(json!(1)).unwrap(), HealScanMode::Normal);
-        assert_eq!(serde_json::from_value::<HealScanMode>(json!("deep")).unwrap(), HealScanMode::Deep);
-        assert!(serde_json::from_value::<HealScanMode>(json!(9)).is_err());
-        assert!(serde_json::from_value::<HealScanMode>(json!("sideways")).is_err());
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn heal_task_status_decodes_the_server_response_shape() {
-        let raw = json!({
-            "summary": "finished",
-            "detail": "",
-            "startTime": "2026-08-17T00:00:00Z",
-            "settings": {"recursive": false, "scanMode": 1},
-            "items": [{
-                "resultId": 1, "type": "object", "bucket": "b", "object": "o", "versionId": "", "detail": "",
-                "parityBlocks": 2, "dataBlocks": 2, "diskCount": 4, "setCount": 1,
-                "before": {"drives": []}, "after": {"drives": []}, "objectSize": 128
-            }],
-            "truncated": false
-        });
-        let status: HealTaskStatus = serde_json::from_value(raw).unwrap();
-        assert_eq!(status.summary, "finished");
-        assert_eq!(status.items.len(), 1);
-        assert_eq!(status.settings.scan_mode, HealScanMode::Normal);
-        assert!(status.progress.is_none());
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn background_heal_status_types_known_fields_and_passes_the_rest_through() {
-        let raw = json!({
-            "state": "active",
-            "bitrotStartTime": "t",
-            "healQueueLength": 3,
-            "healActiveTasks": 1,
-            "healOperations": {"queueLength": 3},
-            "clusterStatusComplete": true
-        });
-        let status: BackgroundHealStatus = serde_json::from_value(raw).unwrap();
-        assert_eq!(status.state, "active");
-        assert_eq!(status.heal_queue_length, 3);
-        assert!(status.cluster_status_complete);
-        assert!(status.extra.contains_key("healOperations"), "unknown nested payloads must pass through");
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn scanner_status_defaults_freshness_to_unknown() {
-        let raw = json!({"enabled": true, "freshness": {"state": "stale"}, "metrics": {}});
-        let status: ScannerStatus = serde_json::from_value(raw).unwrap();
-        assert_eq!(status.freshness(), "stale");
-        let bare: ScannerStatus = serde_json::from_value(json!({"enabled": false})).unwrap();
-        assert_eq!(bare.freshness(), "unknown");
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn invalid_endpoint_is_rejected_without_io() {
-        let err = AdminClient::new("not a url", "ak", "sk").unwrap_err();
-        assert!(matches!(err, AdminClientError::InvalidEndpoint(_)));
-    }
-
-    #[tokio::test]
-    async fn signed_requests_carry_sigv4_authorization_and_correct_target() {
-        let server = TestServer::spawn(r#"{"clientToken":"token-1","clientAddress":"127.0.0.1:9","startTime":"t"}"#, 200).await;
-        let client = AdminClient::new(&format!("http://{}", server.addr), "minioadmin", "minioadmin")
-            .expect("client builds against the test server");
-
-        let start: HealStartSuccess = client
-            .heal_start(
-                Some("bucket"),
-                None,
-                &HealOpts {
-                    recursive: true,
-                    ..Default::default()
-                },
-                false,
-            )
-            .await
-            .expect("signed heal start decodes");
-
-        assert_eq!(start.client_token, "token-1");
-        let request = server.recorded();
-        assert_eq!(request.method, "POST");
-        assert_eq!(request.path, "/rustfs/admin/v3/heal/bucket");
-        assert!(!request.query.contains("forceStart"), "absent flags must not be sent");
-        let auth = request.header("authorization").expect("request must be signed");
-        assert!(auth.starts_with("AWS4-HMAC-SHA256"), "SigV4 scheme, got: {auth}");
-        assert!(auth.contains("Credential=minioadmin/"), "credentials must be in the Authorization header");
-        assert_eq!(
-            request.header("x-amz-content-sha256").as_deref(),
-            Some("UNSIGNED-PAYLOAD"),
-            "the client signs the same payload marker RustFS peer calls use"
-        );
-        assert_eq!(request.header("content-type").as_deref(), Some("application/json"));
-        assert!(request.body.contains("\"recursive\":true"));
-    }
-
-    #[tokio::test]
-    async fn query_sends_client_token_on_the_same_path() {
-        let body = r#"{"summary":"running","detail":"","settings":{"recursive":false},"items":[],"truncated":false}"#;
-        let server = TestServer::spawn(body, 200).await;
-        let client = AdminClient::new(&format!("http://{}", server.addr), "ak", "sk").unwrap();
-
-        let status = client
-            .heal_status(Some("bucket"), None, "token-1")
-            .await
-            .expect("status decodes");
-        assert_eq!(status.summary, "running");
-        let request = server.recorded();
-        assert_eq!(request.path, "/rustfs/admin/v3/heal/bucket");
-        assert!(request.query.contains("clientToken=token-1"));
-        assert!(!request.query.contains("forceStop"));
-    }
-
-    #[tokio::test]
-    async fn stop_without_token_takes_the_path_cancel_branch() {
-        let server = TestServer::spawn(r#"{"clientToken":"path","clientAddress":"c","startTime":"t"}"#, 200).await;
-        let client = AdminClient::new(&format!("http://{}", server.addr), "ak", "sk").unwrap();
-
-        let outcome = client.heal_stop(Some("bucket"), None, None).await.expect("path stop decodes");
-        assert!(matches!(outcome, super::HealStopOutcome::PathStopped(_)));
-        let request = server.recorded();
-        assert!(request.query.contains("forceStop=true"));
-        assert!(!request.query.contains("clientToken"));
-    }
-
-    #[tokio::test]
-    async fn http_error_status_maps_to_a_typed_error_with_body() {
-        let server = TestServer::spawn(r#"{"code":"AccessDenied","message":"denied"}"#, 403).await;
-        let client = AdminClient::new(&format!("http://{}", server.addr), "ak", "sk").unwrap();
-        let err = client.scanner_status().await.unwrap_err();
-        match err {
-            AdminClientError::HttpStatus { status, body } => {
-                assert_eq!(status, 403);
-                assert!(body.contains("AccessDenied"));
-            }
-            other => panic!("expected HttpStatus, got {other:?}"),
-        }
-    }
-
-    #[tokio::test]
-    async fn malformed_success_body_maps_to_a_decode_error() {
-        let server = TestServer::spawn("not json", 200).await;
-        let client = AdminClient::new(&format!("http://{}", server.addr), "ak", "sk").unwrap();
-        assert!(matches!(client.scanner_status().await.unwrap_err(), AdminClientError::Decode { .. }));
-    }
-
-    /// One recorded request, parsed off the wire with the minimum needed for
-    /// assertions: method, path, query, headers, body.
-    #[derive(Debug, Clone)]
-    struct RecordedRequest {
-        method: String,
-        path: String,
-        query: String,
-        headers: Vec<(String, String)>,
-        body: String,
-    }
-
-    impl RecordedRequest {
-        fn header(&self, name: &str) -> Option<String> {
-            self.headers
-                .iter()
-                .find(|(key, _)| key.eq_ignore_ascii_case(name))
-                .map(|(_, value)| value.clone())
-        }
-    }
-
-    /// Minimal HTTP/1.1 server: one canned response per connection, every
-    /// request recorded behind an `Arc<Mutex>`. Deliberately dependency-free —
-    /// the assertions only need the raw request bytes.
-    struct TestServer {
-        addr: std::net::SocketAddr,
-        requests: Arc<Mutex<Vec<RecordedRequest>>>,
-    }
-
-    impl TestServer {
-        async fn spawn(response_body: &'static str, status: u16) -> Self {
-            use tokio::io::{AsyncReadExt, AsyncWriteExt};
-
-            let listener = tokio::net::TcpListener::bind("127.0.0.1:0")
-                .await
-                .expect("bind ephemeral port");
-            let addr = listener.local_addr().expect("local addr");
-            let requests: Arc<Mutex<Vec<RecordedRequest>>> = Arc::new(Mutex::new(Vec::new()));
-
-            let recorded = requests.clone();
-            tokio::spawn(async move {
-                let reason = if status == 200 { "OK" } else { "Forbidden" };
-                let response = format!(
-                    "HTTP/1.1 {status} {reason}\r\ncontent-type: application/json\r\ncontent-length: {}\r\nconnection: close\r\n\r\n{response_body}",
-                    response_body.len()
-                );
-                // Each request is a fresh connection (connection: close); a
-                // bounded loop serves every call a test makes while letting
-                // the task exit instead of lingering for the whole process.
-                for _ in 0..16 {
-                    let Ok((mut stream, _)) = listener.accept().await else {
-                        break;
-                    };
-                    let mut buffer = Vec::with_capacity(2048);
-                    let mut chunk = [0u8; 2048];
-                    // Read headers plus content-length body, or stop on close.
-                    loop {
-                        if let Some(end) = find_header_end(&buffer) {
-                            let content_length = extract_content_length(&buffer[..end]);
-                            if buffer.len() >= end + content_length {
-                                break;
-                            }
-                        }
-                        let n = match stream.read(&mut chunk).await {
-                            Ok(0) | Err(_) => break,
-                            Ok(n) => n,
-                        };
-                        buffer.extend_from_slice(&chunk[..n]);
-                        if buffer.len() > 64 * 1024 {
-                            break;
-                        }
-                    }
-                    if let Some(request) = parse_request(&buffer) {
-                        recorded.lock().expect("recorded lock").push(request);
-                    }
-                    let _ = stream.write_all(response.as_bytes()).await;
-                    let _ = stream.shutdown().await;
-                }
-            });
-
-            Self { addr, requests }
-        }
-
-        fn recorded(&self) -> RecordedRequest {
-            self.requests
-                .lock()
-                .expect("recorded lock")
-                .last()
-                .cloned()
-                .expect("the client call must have produced one recorded request")
-        }
-    }
-
-    fn find_header_end(buffer: &[u8]) -> Option<usize> {
-        buffer.windows(4).position(|window| window == b"\r\n\r\n").map(|pos| pos + 4)
-    }
-
-    fn extract_content_length(headers: &[u8]) -> usize {
-        let text = String::from_utf8_lossy(headers).to_ascii_lowercase();
-        text.lines()
-            .find_map(|line| line.strip_prefix("content-length:"))
-            .and_then(|value| value.trim().parse().ok())
-            .unwrap_or(0)
-    }
-
-    fn parse_request(raw: &[u8]) -> Option<RecordedRequest> {
-        let end = find_header_end(raw)?;
-        let head = String::from_utf8_lossy(&raw[..end]);
-        let body = String::from_utf8_lossy(&raw[end..]).into_owned();
-        let mut lines = head.lines();
-        let request_line = lines.next()?;
-        let mut parts = request_line.split_whitespace();
-        let method = parts.next()?.to_string();
-        let target = parts.next()?.to_string();
-        let (path, query) = match target.split_once('?') {
-            Some((path, query)) => (path.to_string(), query.to_string()),
-            None => (target, String::new()),
-        };
-        let headers = lines
-            .filter_map(|line| line.split_once(':'))
-            .map(|(name, value)| (name.trim().to_string(), value.trim().to_string()))
-            .collect();
-        Some(RecordedRequest {
-            method,
-            path,
-            query,
-            headers,
-            body,
-        })
-    }
-}

crates/madmin/src/lib.rs

@@ -12,7 +12,6 @@
 // See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
 // limitations under the License.
 
-pub mod client;
 pub mod group;
 pub mod heal_commands;
 pub mod health;
@@ -26,7 +25,6 @@ pub mod trace;
 pub mod user;
 pub mod utils;
 
-pub use client::*;
 pub use group::*;
 pub use info_commands::*;
 pub use policy::*;

crates/madmin/src/site_replication.rs

@@ -258,7 +258,7 @@ pub struct SRLDAPUser {
     pub api_version: Option<String>,
 }
 
-#[derive(Debug, Clone, Serialize, Deserialize, Default)]
+#[derive(Debug, Serialize, Deserialize, Default)]
 pub struct SRIAMUser {
     #[serde(rename = "accessKey", default)]
     pub access_key: String,
@@ -270,7 +270,7 @@ pub struct SRIAMUser {
     pub api_version: Option<String>,
 }
 
-#[derive(Debug, Clone, Serialize, Deserialize, Default)]
+#[derive(Debug, Serialize, Deserialize, Default)]
 pub struct SRGroupInfo {
     #[serde(rename = "updateReq", default)]
     pub update_req: GroupAddRemove,
@@ -346,7 +346,7 @@ pub struct SRCredInfo {
     pub api_version: Option<String>,
 }
 
-#[derive(Debug, Clone, Serialize, Deserialize, Default)]
+#[derive(Debug, Serialize, Deserialize, Default)]
 pub struct SRIAMItem {
     #[serde(default)]
     pub r#type: String,

crates/scanner/Cargo.toml

@@ -108,9 +108,6 @@ temp-env = { workspace = true }
 tempfile = { workspace = true }
 uuid = { workspace = true, features = ["v4", "serde", "fast-rng", "macro-diagnostics"] }
 tokio = { workspace = true, features = ["test-util", "fs", "rt-multi-thread"] }
-# Test-only: pins the emitted scanner alert wire names against the canonical
-# EventName string forms subscribers configure (rustfs/backlog#1868).
-rustfs-s3-types.workspace = true
 # Enables the shared MockWarmBackend / xl.meta assertion helpers exposed via
 # the ecstore `api::tier::test_util` facade module (rustfs/backlog#1148 ilm-6).
 rustfs-ecstore = { workspace = true, features = ["test-util"] }

crates/scanner/src/scanner_folder.rs

@@ -12,10 +12,10 @@
 // See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
 // limitations under the License.
 
-use std::collections::{HashMap, HashSet};
+use std::collections::HashSet;
 use std::fs::FileType;
 use std::io::ErrorKind;
-use std::sync::{Arc, Mutex, Once};
+use std::sync::{Arc, Once};
 use std::time::{Duration, Instant, SystemTime};
 
 use crate::ReplTargetSizeSummary;
@@ -32,7 +32,6 @@ use crate::scanner_io::{
     SCANNER_SKIP_FILE_ERROR, ScannerIODisk as _, is_scanner_metadata_corrupt_error, is_scanner_metadata_transient_error,
 };
 use crate::sleeper::DynamicSleeper;
-use crate::storage_api::owner::{EcstoreEventArgs, ecstore_send_event};
 use metrics::{counter, describe_counter};
 use rustfs_common::heal_channel::{
     HEAL_DELETE_DANGLING, HealAdmissionDropReason, HealAdmissionResult, HealChannelPriority, HealChannelRequest,
@@ -98,101 +97,6 @@ const METRIC_SCANNER_EXCESS_FOLDERS_TOTAL: &str = "rustfs_scanner_excess_folders
 const METRIC_SCANNER_PENDING_HEAL_PRUNE_TOTAL: &str = "rustfs_scanner_pending_heal_prune_total";
 const METRIC_SCANNER_PENDING_HEAL_MALFORMED_TOTAL: &str = "rustfs_scanner_pending_heal_malformed_total";
 const MAX_PENDING_SCANNER_HEAL_RETRIES_PER_BUCKET: usize = 128;
-
-// --- scanner excess alerts as S3 notification events (rustfs/backlog#1868) --
-//
-// The excess-versions / excess-version-size / excess-folders alerts were
-// metrics-and-logs only; subscribers (consoles, external auditors) had no way
-// to hear them. MinIO emits s3:ObjectManyVersions / s3:ObjectLargeVersions /
-// s3:PrefixManyFolders for the same conditions — RustFS carries those as
-// EventName::Scanner* with the wire names below. Without a cooldown a single
-// over-threshold object would re-emit on every scan cycle (~a minute), so
-// emissions are edge-held per (kind, bucket, object) for 24h.
-
-/// `s3:Scanner:ManyVersions` (MinIO `s3:ObjectManyVersions`).
-pub const EVENT_SCANNER_MANY_VERSIONS: &str = "s3:Scanner:ManyVersions";
-/// `s3:Scanner:LargeVersions` (MinIO `s3:ObjectLargeVersions`).
-pub const EVENT_SCANNER_LARGE_VERSIONS: &str = "s3:Scanner:LargeVersions";
-/// `s3:Scanner:BigPrefix` (MinIO `s3:PrefixManyFolders`).
-pub const EVENT_SCANNER_BIG_PREFIX: &str = "s3:Scanner:BigPrefix";
-const ENV_SCANNER_ALERT_COOLDOWN_SECS: &str = "RUSTFS_SCANNER_ALERT_COOLDOWN_SECS";
-const DEFAULT_SCANNER_ALERT_COOLDOWN_SECS: u64 = 86_400;
-/// Hard cap on distinct cooldown keys; a pathological number of over-threshold
-/// objects clears the map wholesale instead of growing without bound (the
-/// worst case is one re-emission per still-hot key per scan cycle).
-const MAX_SCANNER_ALERT_COOLDOWN_KEYS: usize = 4096;
-
-/// Distinct alert kinds sharing one cooldown map.
-#[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, PartialEq, Eq, Hash)]
-enum ScannerAlertKind {
-    ManyVersions,
-    LargeVersions,
-    BigPrefix,
-}
-
-type ScannerAlertCooldownKey = (ScannerAlertKind, String, String);
-type ScannerAlertCooldownMap = HashMap<ScannerAlertCooldownKey, Instant>;
-
-static SCANNER_ALERT_EMISSION_COOLDOWN: Mutex<Option<ScannerAlertCooldownMap>> = Mutex::new(None);
-
-fn scanner_alert_cooldown() -> Duration {
-    let raw = std::env::var(ENV_SCANNER_ALERT_COOLDOWN_SECS)
-        .ok()
-        .and_then(|v| v.parse::<u64>().ok());
-    Duration::from_secs(raw.unwrap_or(DEFAULT_SCANNER_ALERT_COOLDOWN_SECS))
-}
-
-/// Edge-held emission gate: returns `true` (and records the cooldown) only
-/// when this (kind, bucket, object) last fired longer than the cooldown ago —
-/// or never. Metrics and logs stay level-triggered every cycle; only the
-/// notification events are held back.
-fn scanner_alert_emission_allows(kind: ScannerAlertKind, bucket: &str, object: &str, cooldown: Duration) -> bool {
-    let key = (kind, bucket.to_string(), object.to_string());
-    let mut guard = SCANNER_ALERT_EMISSION_COOLDOWN
-        .lock()
-        .unwrap_or_else(|poison| poison.into_inner());
-    let guard = guard.get_or_insert_with(ScannerAlertCooldownMap::new);
-    let now = Instant::now();
-    // Expired entries leave first; the cap is still exceeded only when live
-    // keys alone overflow it, in which case a wholesale clear trades one
-    // extra emission per hot key for a hard memory bound.
-    if guard.len() >= MAX_SCANNER_ALERT_COOLDOWN_KEYS {
-        guard.retain(|_, fired_at| now.duration_since(*fired_at) < cooldown);
-        if guard.len() >= MAX_SCANNER_ALERT_COOLDOWN_KEYS {
-            guard.clear();
-        }
-    }
-    match guard.get(&key) {
-        Some(fired_at) if now.duration_since(*fired_at) < cooldown => false,
-        _ => {
-            guard.insert(key, now);
-            true
-        }
-    }
-}
-
-/// Emit a scanner alert as an S3 notification event through the standard
-/// dispatch pipeline. Fire-and-forget: the notify layer owns delivery,
-/// retry, and target filtering; the scanner never waits on it.
-fn emit_scanner_alert_event(event_name: &str, bucket: &str, object: &str, size: i64, details: &[(&str, String)]) {
-    let mut req_params = HashMap::with_capacity(details.len());
-    for (key, value) in details {
-        req_params.insert((*key).to_string(), value.clone());
-    }
-    ecstore_send_event(EcstoreEventArgs {
-        event_name: event_name.to_string(),
-        bucket_name: bucket.to_string(),
-        object: crate::ScannerObjectInfo {
-            bucket: bucket.to_string(),
-            name: object.to_string(),
-            size,
-            ..Default::default()
-        },
-        req_params,
-        user_agent: "Scanner".to_string(),
-        ..Default::default()
-    });
-}
 const MAX_PENDING_SCANNER_HEALS_PER_BUCKET: usize = 10_000;
 
 static SCANNER_INLINE_HEAL_WARN_ONCE: Once = Once::new();
@@ -1293,7 +1197,6 @@ impl ScannerItem {
     fn alert_excessive_versions(&self, remaining_versions: usize, cumulative_size: i64) {
         ensure_scanner_alert_metrics_registered();
         let (too_many_versions, too_large_versions) = should_alert_excessive_versions(remaining_versions, cumulative_size);
-        let object_path = self.object_path();
         if too_many_versions {
             global_metrics().record_scanner_source_executed(ScannerWorkSource::Alerts, 1);
             counter!(
@@ -1301,26 +1204,13 @@ impl ScannerItem {
                 "bucket" => self.bucket.clone()
             )
             .increment(1);
-            if scanner_alert_emission_allows(ScannerAlertKind::ManyVersions, &self.bucket, &object_path, scanner_alert_cooldown())
-            {
-                emit_scanner_alert_event(
-                    EVENT_SCANNER_MANY_VERSIONS,
-                    &self.bucket,
-                    &object_path,
-                    cumulative_size,
-                    &[
-                        ("versions", remaining_versions.to_string()),
-                        ("threshold", scanner_excess_versions_threshold().to_string()),
-                    ],
-                );
-            }
             warn!(
                 target: "rustfs::scanner::folder",
                 event = EVENT_SCANNER_ALERT_STATE,
                 component = LOG_COMPONENT_SCANNER,
                 subsystem = LOG_SUBSYSTEM_FOLDER,
                 bucket = %self.bucket,
-                object = %object_path,
+                object = %self.object_path(),
                 versions = remaining_versions,
                 threshold = scanner_excess_versions_threshold(),
                 state = "excess_versions",
@@ -1334,31 +1224,13 @@ impl ScannerItem {
                 "bucket" => self.bucket.clone()
             )
             .increment(1);
-            if scanner_alert_emission_allows(
-                ScannerAlertKind::LargeVersions,
-                &self.bucket,
-                &object_path,
-                scanner_alert_cooldown(),
-            ) {
-                emit_scanner_alert_event(
-                    EVENT_SCANNER_LARGE_VERSIONS,
-                    &self.bucket,
-                    &object_path,
-                    cumulative_size,
-                    &[
-                        ("versions", remaining_versions.to_string()),
-                        ("cumulativeSize", cumulative_size.to_string()),
-                        ("threshold", scanner_excess_version_size_threshold().to_string()),
-                    ],
-                );
-            }
             warn!(
                 target: "rustfs::scanner::folder",
                 event = EVENT_SCANNER_ALERT_STATE,
                 component = LOG_COMPONENT_SCANNER,
                 subsystem = LOG_SUBSYSTEM_FOLDER,
                 bucket = %self.bucket,
-                object = %object_path,
+                object = %self.object_path(),
                 versions = remaining_versions,
                 cumulative_size,
                 threshold = scanner_excess_version_size_threshold(),
@@ -1739,15 +1611,6 @@ impl FolderScanner {
             "root" => self.root.clone()
         )
         .increment(1);
-        if scanner_alert_emission_allows(ScannerAlertKind::BigPrefix, &self.root, folder, scanner_alert_cooldown()) {
-            emit_scanner_alert_event(
-                EVENT_SCANNER_BIG_PREFIX,
-                &self.root,
-                folder,
-                0,
-                &[("folders", total_folders.to_string()), ("threshold", threshold.to_string())],
-            );
-        }
         warn!(
             target: "rustfs::scanner::folder",
             event = EVENT_SCANNER_ALERT_STATE,
@@ -3213,90 +3076,6 @@ mod tests {
     #[cfg(unix)]
     use std::os::unix::fs::{PermissionsExt, symlink};
     use std::sync::Mutex;
-
-    /// Reset the process-global alert cooldown map; test-only.
-    fn reset_alert_cooldowns() {
-        *SCANNER_ALERT_EMISSION_COOLDOWN
-            .lock()
-            .unwrap_or_else(|poison| poison.into_inner()) = Some(ScannerAlertCooldownMap::new());
-    }
-
-    /// The emitted event-name strings must be exactly what `EventName`
-    /// serializes, or a bucket notification subscribed to the documented name
-    /// would silently never match (rustfs/backlog#1868).
-    #[test]
-    fn scanner_alert_wire_names_match_canonical_event_names() {
-        use rustfs_s3_types::EventName;
-        assert_eq!(EVENT_SCANNER_MANY_VERSIONS, EventName::ScannerManyVersions.to_string());
-        assert_eq!(EVENT_SCANNER_LARGE_VERSIONS, EventName::ScannerLargeVersions.to_string());
-        assert_eq!(EVENT_SCANNER_BIG_PREFIX, EventName::ScannerBigPrefix.to_string());
-    }
-
-    fn cooldown_map_len() -> usize {
-        SCANNER_ALERT_EMISSION_COOLDOWN
-            .lock()
-            .unwrap_or_else(|poison| poison.into_inner())
-            .as_ref()
-            .map(|map| map.len())
-            .unwrap_or(0)
-    }
-
-    /// Backdate every recorded cooldown so the next check fires again.
-    fn expire_all_alert_cooldowns(cooldown: Duration) {
-        let now = Instant::now();
-        let mut guard = SCANNER_ALERT_EMISSION_COOLDOWN
-            .lock()
-            .unwrap_or_else(|poison| poison.into_inner());
-        if let Some(map) = guard.as_mut() {
-            for fired_at in map.values_mut() {
-                if let Some(expired) = now.checked_sub(cooldown + Duration::from_secs(1)) {
-                    *fired_at = expired;
-                }
-            }
-        }
-    }
-
-    /// The emission gate is the only thing standing between an over-threshold
-    /// object and one S3 event per scan cycle, so its edge semantics get
-    /// pinned directly. All scenarios share one #[test] because the cooldown
-    /// map is process-global and parallel tests would read each other's
-    /// firings.
-    #[test]
-    fn scanner_alert_emission_is_edge_held_per_key_and_bounded() {
-        reset_alert_cooldowns();
-        let cooldown = Duration::from_secs(3600);
-
-        // First firing allows, an immediate re-check is held.
-        assert!(scanner_alert_emission_allows(ScannerAlertKind::ManyVersions, "bkt", "obj", cooldown));
-        assert!(!scanner_alert_emission_allows(ScannerAlertKind::ManyVersions, "bkt", "obj", cooldown));
-
-        // Different kind, object, and bucket are independent keys.
-        assert!(scanner_alert_emission_allows(ScannerAlertKind::LargeVersions, "bkt", "obj", cooldown));
-        assert!(scanner_alert_emission_allows(ScannerAlertKind::ManyVersions, "bkt", "other", cooldown));
-        assert!(scanner_alert_emission_allows(ScannerAlertKind::ManyVersions, "other", "obj", cooldown));
-        assert_eq!(cooldown_map_len(), 4);
-
-        // After the cooldown elapses the same key fires again.
-        expire_all_alert_cooldowns(cooldown);
-        assert!(scanner_alert_emission_allows(ScannerAlertKind::ManyVersions, "bkt", "obj", cooldown));
-
-        // A zero cooldown degenerates to always-emit (operators may want that).
-        assert!(scanner_alert_emission_allows(ScannerAlertKind::BigPrefix, "bkt", "dir", Duration::ZERO));
-        assert!(scanner_alert_emission_allows(ScannerAlertKind::BigPrefix, "bkt", "dir", Duration::ZERO));
-
-        // Hard bound: overflow the cap with zero-cooldown keys and confirm the
-        // map clears rather than growing past it.
-        reset_alert_cooldowns();
-        for index in 0..=(MAX_SCANNER_ALERT_COOLDOWN_KEYS + 8) {
-            let _ = scanner_alert_emission_allows(ScannerAlertKind::BigPrefix, "bkt", &format!("dir-{index}"), Duration::ZERO);
-        }
-        assert!(
-            cooldown_map_len() <= MAX_SCANNER_ALERT_COOLDOWN_KEYS,
-            "cooldown map must stay bounded, got {}",
-            cooldown_map_len()
-        );
-    }
-
     use std::sync::atomic::{AtomicBool, AtomicUsize, Ordering};
     use temp_env::{with_var, with_var_unset};
     use tracing_subscriber::fmt::MakeWriter;

crates/scanner/src/storage_api.rs

@@ -78,7 +78,6 @@ pub(crate) use rustfs_ecstore::api::disk::{
 pub(crate) use rustfs_ecstore::api::error::{
     Error as EcstoreErrorType, Result as EcstoreResultType, StorageError as EcstoreStorageError,
 };
-pub(crate) use rustfs_ecstore::api::event::{EventArgs as EcstoreEventArgs, send_event as ecstore_send_event};
 #[cfg(test)]
 pub(crate) use rustfs_ecstore::api::layout::{
     EndpointServerPools as EcstoreEndpointServerPools, Endpoints as EcstoreEndpoints, PoolEndpoints as EcstorePoolEndpoints,
@@ -111,8 +110,8 @@ pub(crate) mod owner {
         ECSTORE_BUCKET_META_PREFIX, ECSTORE_RUSTFS_META_BUCKET, ECSTORE_STORAGE_FORMAT_FILE, ECSTORE_STORAGECLASS_RRS,
         ECSTORE_STORAGECLASS_STANDARD, ECSTORE_TRANSITION_COMPLETE, EcstoreBucketTargetSys, EcstoreBucketVersioningSys,
         EcstoreDisk, EcstoreDiskAPI, EcstoreDiskBytes, EcstoreDiskError, EcstoreDiskInfo, EcstoreDiskInfoOptions,
-        EcstoreDiskLocation, EcstoreDiskResult, EcstoreErrorType, EcstoreEvaluator, EcstoreEvent, EcstoreEventArgs,
-        EcstoreLcEventSrc, EcstoreLifecycle, EcstoreListPathRawOptions, EcstoreNsScannerOpenRequest, EcstoreObjectOpts,
+        EcstoreDiskLocation, EcstoreDiskResult, EcstoreErrorType, EcstoreEvaluator, EcstoreEvent, EcstoreLcEventSrc,
+        EcstoreLifecycle, EcstoreListPathRawOptions, EcstoreNsScannerOpenRequest, EcstoreObjectOpts,
         EcstoreReplicationConfigurationExt, EcstoreReplicationScannerBridge, EcstoreResultType, EcstoreScanGuard,
         EcstoreSetDisks, EcstoreStorageError, EcstoreStore, EcstoreTierConfig, EcstoreVersioningApi,
         ScannerReplicationHealObject, ScannerReplicationHealResult, ScannerReplicationQueueAdmission, ecstore_apply_expiry_rule,
@@ -122,7 +121,7 @@ pub(crate) mod owner {
         ecstore_is_erasure_sd, ecstore_is_reserved_or_invalid_bucket, ecstore_list_path_raw,
         ecstore_object_opts_from_object_info, ecstore_path2_bucket_object, ecstore_path2_bucket_object_with_base_path,
         ecstore_read_config, ecstore_replace_bucket_usage_memory_from_info, ecstore_resolve_object_store_handle,
-        ecstore_save_config, ecstore_send_event, scanner_replication_config_for_lifecycle_eval,
+        ecstore_save_config, scanner_replication_config_for_lifecycle_eval,
     };
 
     #[cfg(test)]

docs/operations/kms-backend-security.md

@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
 
 RustFS ships several KMS backends. They differ not only in deployment effort but in **where master key material lives and who can read it**. Pick a backend based on the confidentiality boundary you need, not on the name alone.
 
-For how the Vault backends authenticate (static token, AppRole, Kubernetes, Vault Agent token file) and how credential refresh and the fail-closed window behave, see the [Vault KMS authentication runbook](vault-kms-authentication.md). For what may be claimed about the cryptographic implementations themselves, see [Cryptographic compliance positioning](kms-cryptographic-compliance.md). For which RustFS identities may manage or use a given key, see [Per-key KMS authorization](kms-per-key-authorization.md). If you are migrating from MinIO, read [Migrating from MinIO: encrypted objects do not carry over](#migrating-from-minio-encrypted-objects-do-not-carry-over) first.
+For how the Vault backends authenticate (static token, AppRole, Vault Agent token file) and how credential refresh and the fail-closed window behave, see the [Vault KMS authentication runbook](vault-kms-authentication.md). For what may be claimed about the cryptographic implementations themselves, see [Cryptographic compliance positioning](kms-cryptographic-compliance.md). For which RustFS identities may manage or use a given key, see [Per-key KMS authorization](kms-per-key-authorization.md). If you are migrating from MinIO, read [Migrating from MinIO: encrypted objects do not carry over](#migrating-from-minio-encrypted-objects-do-not-carry-over) first.
 
 ## Backend comparison
 

docs/operations/scanner-excess-alerts.md

@@ -1,37 +0,0 @@
-# Scanner Excess Alerts: Metrics, S3 Events, and Thresholds
-
-> 中文版：[scanner-excess-alerts_zh.md](scanner-excess-alerts_zh.md)
-
-Date: 2026-08-18 (rustfs/backlog#1868 / HS-04; includes the HS-15 threshold-delta notes)
-
-The background scanner detects three classes of "excess" conditions while it walks buckets and surfaces them as alerts. This page documents each alert's trigger condition, the subscribable S3 event, the cooldown semantics, and the threshold differences versus MinIO — for operators debugging alerts and for event consumers wiring up subscriptions.
-
-## The three alerts
-
-| Alert | Trigger (per scan cycle) | Metric | S3 event (RustFS wire name) | MinIO event name |
-|---|---|---|---|---|
-| Excess versions | Retained versions of one object ≥ `scanner:alert_excess_versions` | `rustfs_scanner_excess_object_versions_total{bucket}` | `s3:Scanner:ManyVersions` | `s3:ObjectManyVersions` |
-| Excess version size | Cumulative bytes of all versions of one object ≥ `scanner:alert_excess_version_size` | `rustfs_scanner_excess_object_version_size_total{bucket}` | `s3:Scanner:LargeVersions` | `s3:ObjectLargeVersions` |
-| Excess folders | Direct subfolders of one directory > `scanner:alert_excess_folders` | `rustfs_scanner_excess_folders_total{root}` | `s3:Scanner:BigPrefix` | `s3:PrefixManyFolders` |
-
-Subscribe like any bucket notification: configure a notification on the target bucket with the RustFS wire name above (or the `s3:Scanner:*` wildcard). Events carry `UserAgent: Scanner` as their origin marker, and `req_params` holds the observed value and the threshold (`versions` / `cumulativeSize` / `folders` / `threshold`), so consumers can judge severity directly.
-
-## Metrics and events fire on different cadences
-
-- **Metrics and structured logs are level-triggered**: as long as the object stays over the threshold, every scan cycle counts and logs it (default cycle ≈ 60s; see `scanner:speed`).
-- **S3 events are edge-triggered with a cooldown**: the same (alert kind, bucket, object) emits at most once per cooldown window — 24 hours by default (`RUSTFS_SCANNER_ALERT_COOLDOWN_SECS`; set it to 0 to emit every cycle). When the window lapses and the object is still over the threshold, the event fires again. The cooldown table lives in process memory with a 4096-entry hard cap; on overflow it is cleared and rebuilt (worst case: one extra emission per still-hot key).
-- A process restart resets the cooldown (every still-over-threshold object emits once more after a restart) — deliberately: restarts usually accompany incident response, and the re-emission buys visibility.
-
-## Threshold defaults and the MinIO deltas (HS-15)
-
-| Config key | ENV | RustFS default | MinIO default | Notes |
-|---|---|---|---|---|
-| `scanner:alert_excess_versions` | `RUSTFS_SCANNER_ALERT_EXCESS_VERSIONS` | 100 | 100 | Identical |
-| `scanner:alert_excess_version_size` | `RUSTFS_SCANNER_ALERT_EXCESS_VERSION_SIZE` | 1 TiB | 1 TB | Same order of magnitude; different unit basis (TiB vs TB) |
-| `scanner:alert_excess_folders` | `RUSTFS_SCANNER_ALERT_EXCESS_FOLDERS` | 65538 | 50000 | **Deliberate divergence**: 65538 tolerates the Proxmox Backup Server chunk layout (65536 chunks per directory plus the directory's own entries); MinIO's 50000 would fire continuously for PBS users. Set it to 50000 explicitly to match MinIO behavior |
-
-All three keys accept both env and admin config (`PUT /rustfs/admin/v3/config`, `scanner` subsystem); hot updates take effect immediately.
-
-## Why the event names are mapped
-
-RustFS's event enum (`rustfs_s3_types::EventName::ScannerManyVersions/LargeVersions/BigPrefix`) keeps the repo's established `s3:Scanner:*` wire names (literally different from MinIO's `s3:ObjectManyVersions`; the enum comments preserve the mapping). Subscribers should use the RustFS wire names in this page. If you need MinIO-literal compatibility, map the names on the console/consumer side — do not change the published wire names.

docs/operations/scanner-excess-alerts_zh.md

@@ -1,37 +0,0 @@
-# Scanner 超限告警：指标、S3 事件与阈值
-
-> English version: [scanner-excess-alerts.md](scanner-excess-alerts.md)
-
-日期：2026-08-18（rustfs/backlog#1868 / HS-04，含 HS-15 阈值差异说明）
-
-后台 scanner 在扫描过程中检测三类"超限"状态并对外告警。本文说明每类告警的触发条件、可订阅的 S3 事件、冷却语义，以及与 MinIO 的阈值差异，供运维排障与事件消费方对接。
-
-## 三类告警
-
-| 告警 | 触发条件（任一扫描周期） | 指标 | S3 事件（RustFS wire 名） | MinIO 对应事件名 |
-|---|---|---|---|---|
-| 版本数超限 | 单对象保留版本数 ≥ `scanner:alert_excess_versions` | `rustfs_scanner_excess_object_versions_total{bucket}` | `s3:Scanner:ManyVersions` | `s3:ObjectManyVersions` |
-| 版本总大小超限 | 单对象全部版本累计字节 ≥ `scanner:alert_excess_version_size` | `rustfs_scanner_excess_object_version_size_total{bucket}` | `s3:Scanner:LargeVersions` | `s3:ObjectLargeVersions` |
-| 子目录数超限 | 单目录直接子目录数 > `scanner:alert_excess_folders` | `rustfs_scanner_excess_folders_total{root}` | `s3:Scanner:BigPrefix` | `s3:PrefixManyFolders` |
-
-订阅方式与普通桶通知一致：对目标桶配置 notification，事件名填上表 RustFS wire 名（或通配 `s3:Scanner:*`）。事件以 `UserAgent: Scanner` 标记来源，`req_params` 携带实际值与阈值（`versions` / `cumulativeSize` / `folders` / `threshold`），便于消费方直接判断严重程度。
-
-## 指标与事件的触发节奏不同
-
-- **指标与结构化日志是电平触发**：只要对象仍在阈值之上，每个扫描周期都会计数/打日志（默认周期约 60s，见 `scanner:speed`）。
-- **S3 事件是边沿触发 + 冷却**：同一 (告警类型， 桶, 对象) 在冷却窗口内只发一次，默认 24 小时（`RUSTFS_SCANNER_ALERT_COOLDOWN_SECS`，设 0 表示每周期都发）。窗口过后对象仍超限会再次发出。冷却表在进程内有 4096 条硬顶，超限清空重建（最坏情况是每个仍超限的 key 多发一次）。
-- 进程重启会重置冷却（重启后每个仍超限的对象会再发一次）——这是有意为之：重启常伴随排障，重发提供可见性。
-
-## 阈值默认值与 MinIO 差异（HS-15）
-
-| 配置键 | ENV | RustFS 默认 | MinIO 默认 | 差异说明 |
-|---|---|---|---|---|
-| `scanner:alert_excess_versions` | `RUSTFS_SCANNER_ALERT_EXCESS_VERSIONS` | 100 | 100 | 一致 |
-| `scanner:alert_excess_version_size` | `RUSTFS_SCANNER_ALERT_EXCESS_VERSION_SIZE` | 1 TiB | 1 TB | 语义同量级，单位口径不同（TiB vs TB） |
-| `scanner:alert_excess_folders` | `RUSTFS_SCANNER_ALERT_EXCESS_FOLDERS` | 65538 | 50000 | **有意差异**：65538 兼容 Proxmox Backup Server 的 chunk 布局（每目录 65536 个 chunk + 目录自身条目），按 MinIO 的 50000 会对 PBS 用户持续误报。如需与 MinIO 行为一致可显式配置为 50000 |
-
-三个键均支持 env 与 admin config（`PUT /rustfs/admin/v3/config` 的 `scanner` 子系统）双通道，热更新即时生效。
-
-## 事件名映射的由来
-
-RustFS 的事件枚举（`rustfs_s3_types::EventName::ScannerManyVersions/LargeVersions/BigPrefix`）沿用仓库既有 wire 名 `s3:Scanner:*`（与 MinIO 的 `s3:ObjectManyVersions` 字面不同，枚举注释中保留了映射关系）。订阅方应以本文的 RustFS wire 名为准；如需 MinIO 字面兼容，请在 console/消费侧做名称映射，不要修改已发布的 wire 名。

docs/operations/vault-kms-authentication.md

@@ -8,12 +8,9 @@ This runbook covers how the RustFS Vault KMS backends (KV2 and Transit) authenti
 | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
 | Static token | `Token` | Whatever the operator provisioned; RustFS never renews it | None | Development; short-lived experiments |
 | AppRole | `AppRole` | Lease-bound token obtained by login; renewed by RustFS | Renew at half TTL, re-login on failure | Production without a Vault Agent sidecar |
-| Kubernetes | `Kubernetes` | Lease-bound token obtained by login; renewed by RustFS | Renew at half TTL, re-login on failure | Production on Kubernetes, with no credential to distribute |
 | Agent token file | `TokenFile` | Owned by Vault Agent; RustFS only re-reads the sink file | File re-read once per poll interval | Production with a Vault Agent (or equivalent) managing auth |
 
-Exactly one method must be configured. Setting `RUSTFS_KMS_VAULT_TOKEN_FILE` together with any other method, or `RUSTFS_KMS_VAULT_KUBERNETES_ROLE` together with `RUSTFS_KMS_VAULT_APPROLE_ROLE_ID`, is rejected at startup with a configuration error, because the effective identity would be ambiguous. A leftover `RUSTFS_KMS_VAULT_TOKEN` alongside a configured login method is tolerated and ignored, so a stale variable cannot silently downgrade the identity.
-
-All of these are read the same way whether the service is started with `RUSTFS_KMS_ENABLE=true` or configured later through `POST /rustfs/admin/v3/kms/configure`.
+Exactly one method must be configured. Setting `RUSTFS_KMS_VAULT_TOKEN_FILE` together with `RUSTFS_KMS_VAULT_APPROLE_ROLE_ID` or an explicit `RUSTFS_KMS_VAULT_TOKEN` is rejected at startup with a configuration error, because the effective identity would be ambiguous.
 
 The default `dev-token` fallback for `RUSTFS_KMS_VAULT_TOKEN` is rejected outside explicit development mode (`RUSTFS_KMS_ALLOW_INSECURE_DEV_DEFAULTS=true`), as are plain-HTTP Vault addresses and disabled TLS verification.
 
@@ -59,44 +56,7 @@ Deliver the SecretID out of band — a secrets-manager-mounted file, an init-con
 
 The secret_id file is re-read on every login attempt, so rotating the SecretID is a two-step operation with no restart: generate a new SecretID (`vault write -f auth/approle/role/rustfs-kms/secret-id`), atomically replace the file, then revoke the old SecretID accessor. The already-issued token keeps renewing; the new SecretID is only needed at the next full re-login.
 
-An empty or missing secret_id file fails the login attempt immediately (no Vault round trip). At startup the error is fatal — provider construction fails and the process exits — so a file missing at boot is recovered by restarting the process, not by an in-process retry. Once RustFS is running, the same failure is retried on the normal refresh cadence, so repairing the file mid-run heals the backend without a restart.
-
-## Kubernetes authentication
-
-On Kubernetes this is the method to prefer: the pod's own ServiceAccount is the identity, so there is no credential to distribute, rotate, or leak into a Secret.
-
-### Vault-side setup
-
-```shell
-vault auth enable kubernetes
-
-vault write auth/kubernetes/config \
-    kubernetes_host="https://$KUBERNETES_SERVICE_HOST:$KUBERNETES_SERVICE_PORT"
-
-vault write auth/kubernetes/role/rustfs \
-    bound_service_account_names=rustfs \
-    bound_service_account_namespaces=rustfs \
-    token_policies=rustfs-kms \
-    token_ttl=1h
-```
-
-As with AppRole, keep `token_ttl` comfortably above the RustFS per-attempt timeout (default 30s).
-
-### RustFS configuration
-
-```shell
-RUSTFS_KMS_BACKEND=vault-transit            # or "vault" for the KV2 backend
-RUSTFS_KMS_VAULT_ADDRESS=https://vault.vault.svc.cluster.local:8200
-RUSTFS_KMS_VAULT_KUBERNETES_ROLE=rustfs
-# Optional, defaults to "kubernetes":
-# RUSTFS_KMS_VAULT_KUBERNETES_MOUNT=kubernetes
-# Optional, defaults to the kubelet's projected token path:
-# RUSTFS_KMS_VAULT_KUBERNETES_JWT_PATH=/var/run/secrets/kubernetes.io/serviceaccount/token
-```
-
-RustFS logs in at startup and renews the token at half its TTL, falling back to a fresh login exactly as AppRole does. The ServiceAccount token is re-read from disk on every login rather than cached, so a projected token the kubelet rotates is picked up without a restart.
-
-A missing or empty token file fails the login attempt immediately (no Vault round trip). At startup the error is fatal — provider construction fails and the process exits — so a token projected late during a slow pod start is recovered by the pod restart loop, not by an in-process retry. Once RustFS is running, a token file that goes missing or turns empty is retried on the normal refresh cadence and heals the backend on its own.
+An empty or missing secret_id file fails the login attempt immediately (no Vault round trip) and is retried on the normal refresh cadence, so repairing the file heals the backend without a restart.
 
 ## Vault Agent token file
 
@@ -141,13 +101,13 @@ If the agent stops refreshing the file that is fine — RustFS re-reads the same
 
 ## Fail-closed window
 
-For lease-bound credentials (AppRole and Kubernetes tokens, token files), `current()` refuses to hand out a token that is within the safety window of its expiry and has not been refreshed. Requests then fail with `KMS credentials unavailable: ...` instead of being sent with a token that could lapse mid-flight and fail unpredictably on the Vault side.
+For lease-bound credentials (AppRole tokens, token files), `current()` refuses to hand out a token that is within the safety window of its expiry and has not been refreshed. Requests then fail with `KMS credentials unavailable: ...` instead of being sent with a token that could lapse mid-flight and fail unpredictably on the Vault side.
 
 - Default window: one per-attempt timeout (`RUSTFS_KMS_TIMEOUT_SECS`, default 30s) — a request issued now can legitimately stay in flight that long, so the token must outlive it.
-- Override: `refresh_safety_window_secs` on the `AppRole`, `Kubernetes` or `TokenFile` auth configuration.
+- Override: `refresh_safety_window_secs` on the `AppRole` or `TokenFile` auth configuration.
 - Static tokens never trip the window: they carry no lease and are assumed valid until Vault says otherwise.
 
-The window is a symptom threshold, not the fault itself: by the time it trips, refresh has been failing for roughly half the token TTL (AppRole, Kubernetes) or two poll intervals (token file).
+The window is a symptom threshold, not the fault itself: by the time it trips, refresh has been failing for roughly half the token TTL (AppRole) or two poll intervals (token file).
 
 ### Troubleshooting
 
@@ -157,8 +117,6 @@ The window is a symptom threshold, not the fault itself: by the time it trips, r
 | Renewal succeeded but re-login later fails | `Vault token renewal failed; falling back to a fresh login` followed by login errors | SecretID expired/revoked or AppRole role changed; rotate the secret_id file |
 | Token file mode error at startup or during polls | `has insecure permissions` in the error | Fix the sink `mode` (0600) and the file owner; the next poll heals the provider |
 | Token file missing/empty errors | `Failed to read Vault token file` / `token file ... is empty` | Vault Agent down or sink misconfigured; restart the agent, the next poll heals the provider |
-| Kubernetes login fails with a permission error | `Vault Kubernetes login failed` | The pod's ServiceAccount is not in the role's `bound_service_account_names`/`_namespaces`, or `auth/kubernetes/config` names the wrong API server |
-| Kubernetes ServiceAccount token errors | `Failed to read Kubernetes ServiceAccount token` / `ServiceAccount token ... is empty` | The token is not projected into the pod (check `automountServiceAccountToken` and the volume mount); the next refresh cycle heals the provider |
-| Startup fails immediately with a configuration error naming two env vars | — | Two auth methods configured at once; keep exactly one of token, AppRole, Kubernetes, token file |
+| Startup fails immediately with a configuration error naming two env vars | — | Two auth methods configured at once; keep exactly one of token, AppRole, token file |
 
 When diagnosing, confirm three clocks/lifetimes in order: the Vault token TTL (`vault token lookup` with the token's accessor), the RustFS refresh cadence (half TTL or the poll interval), and the fail-closed window. The renewal task logs every failed cycle, so a silent gap in warnings combined with `CredentialsUnavailable` errors points at the process clock or a paused runtime rather than Vault.

rustfs/src/admin/handlers/kms_backup.rs

@@ -286,7 +286,6 @@ fn auth_method_kind(auth: &VaultAuthMethod) -> String {
     match auth {
         VaultAuthMethod::Token { .. } => "token",
         VaultAuthMethod::AppRole { .. } => "approle",
-        VaultAuthMethod::Kubernetes { .. } => "kubernetes",
         VaultAuthMethod::TokenFile { .. } => "token-file",
     }
     .to_string()
@@ -485,10 +484,7 @@ fn business_trust_root_secrets(config: &KmsConfig) -> Vec<Zeroizing<String>> {
             secrets.push(Zeroizing::new(role_id.clone()));
             secrets.push(Zeroizing::new(secret_id.clone()));
         }
-        // Kubernetes and TokenFile hold no inline plaintext credential: the
-        // ServiceAccount token and the agent-managed token live in files, and
-        // the role names a Vault binding rather than half a credential pair.
-        VaultAuthMethod::Kubernetes { .. } | VaultAuthMethod::TokenFile { .. } => {}
+        VaultAuthMethod::TokenFile { .. } => {}
     };
 
     match &config.backend_config {

rustfs/src/admin/handlers/system.rs

@@ -417,13 +417,6 @@ struct SystemAdminDiscovery {
 struct ServerInfoResponse {
     info: InfoMessage,
     admin_discovery: SystemAdminDiscovery,
-    /// Startup bitrot algorithm self-test outcome (rustfs/backlog#1873):
-    /// `passed` (algorithms verified at boot), `failed` (a drifted hash
-    /// implementation — the process is serving with degraded integrity
-    /// checking unless `RUSTFS_BITROT_SELFTEST_STRICT` aborted it), or
-    /// `unknown` (not yet run or disabled).
-    #[serde(rename = "bitrotSelftest")]
-    bitrot_selftest: &'static str,
 }
 
 #[derive(Serialize)]
@@ -440,14 +433,6 @@ fn system_admin_discovery(usecase: &DefaultAdminUsecase) -> SystemAdminDiscovery
     }
 }
 
-fn bitrot_selftest_status_str() -> &'static str {
-    match crate::bitrot_selftest::bitrot_selftest_passed() {
-        Some(true) => "passed",
-        Some(false) => "failed",
-        None => "unknown",
-    }
-}
-
 #[async_trait::async_trait]
 impl Operation for ServerInfoHandler {
     async fn call(&self, req: S3Request<Body>, _params: Params<'_, '_>) -> S3Result<S3Response<(StatusCode, Body)>> {
@@ -479,7 +464,6 @@ impl Operation for ServerInfoHandler {
         let response = ServerInfoResponse {
             info,
             admin_discovery: system_admin_discovery(&usecase),
-            bitrot_selftest: bitrot_selftest_status_str(),
         };
 
         let data = serde_json::to_vec(&response).map_err(|e| {
@@ -1551,18 +1535,6 @@ mod tests {
         );
     }
 
-    /// The startup bitrot self-test outcome must surface in server info as one
-    /// of three closed-set strings, never an internal enum or a null
-    /// (rustfs/backlog#1873). This test pins the string mapping; whether the
-    /// process-global cell holds Some(true)/Some(false)/None is owned by
-    /// `crate::bitrot_selftest`'s own tests.
-    #[test]
-    fn bitrot_selftest_status_str_is_a_closed_set_of_operators_strings() {
-        let rendered = super::bitrot_selftest_status_str();
-        assert!(matches!(rendered, "passed" | "failed" | "unknown"));
-        assert_eq!(super::bitrot_selftest_status_str(), rendered);
-    }
-
     #[test]
     fn server_info_response_exposes_admin_discovery_paths() {
         let usecase = DefaultAdminUsecase::without_context();
@@ -1584,7 +1556,6 @@ mod tests {
                 pools: None,
             },
             admin_discovery: system_admin_discovery(&usecase),
-            bitrot_selftest: super::bitrot_selftest_status_str(),
         };
 
         let value = serde_json::to_value(response).expect("server info response should serialize");

rustfs/src/bitrot_selftest.rs

@@ -1,181 +0,0 @@
-// Copyright 2024 RustFS Team
-//
-// Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
-// you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
-// You may obtain a copy of the License at
-//
-//     http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
-//
-// Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
-// distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
-// WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
-// See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
-// limitations under the License.
-
-//! Startup bitrot algorithm self-test (rustfs/backlog#1873).
-//!
-//! A drifted hash implementation fails silently in production: every shard
-//! reads back "corrupt", heal rewrites healthy data, and cross-platform
-//! clusters disagree about which copy is good. [`run_startup_bitrot_self_test`]
-//! pins the algorithms once at process start — the check itself runs in well
-//! under a millisecond on 4 KiB, so it executes inline before background
-//! services come up and the result is published before the server accepts
-//! traffic.
-//!
-//! Outcome surface:
-//! - one structured `bitrot_selftest` log event (`passed`/`failed`/`skipped`),
-//! - the `rustfs_bitrot_selftest_status` gauge (1=passed, 0=failed, 2=skipped),
-//! - [`bitrot_selftest_passed`] for admin/health surfaces,
-//! - `RUSTFS_BITROT_SELFTEST_STRICT=on` turns a failure into a startup error
-//!   (MinIO `bitrotSelfTest` Fatal parity); the default only degrades the
-//!   status so a bad build cannot brick an existing fleet on upgrade.
-
-use crate::storage_api::startup::background::{BitrotSelfTestError, bitrot_self_test};
-use metrics::gauge;
-use std::future::Future;
-use std::io;
-use std::sync::atomic::{AtomicU8, Ordering};
-use std::time::Instant;
-use tracing::{debug, error, info};
-
-const LOG_COMPONENT_MAIN: &str = "main";
-const LOG_SUBSYSTEM_STARTUP: &str = "startup";
-const EVENT_BITROT_SELFTEST: &str = "bitrot_selftest";
-const METRIC_BITROT_SELFTEST_STATUS: &str = "rustfs_bitrot_selftest_status";
-
-/// Gauge values for [`METRIC_BITROT_SELFTEST_STATUS`].
-const STATUS_PASSED: f64 = 1.0;
-const STATUS_FAILED: f64 = 0.0;
-const STATUS_SKIPPED: f64 = 2.0;
-
-/// Internal cell values for [`BITROT_SELF_TEST_STATUS`].
-const STATUS_CELL_UNSET: u8 = 0;
-const STATUS_CELL_PASSED: u8 = 1;
-const STATUS_CELL_FAILED: u8 = 2;
-
-static BITROT_SELF_TEST_STATUS: AtomicU8 = AtomicU8::new(STATUS_CELL_UNSET);
-
-/// Last recorded self-test outcome: `None` before the first run, then
-/// `Some(true)` on a passing check and `Some(false)` on a failed one (a
-/// skipped check never publishes, so it cannot read as a pass). The cell is
-/// last-writer-wins rather than set-once: production runs the self-test once,
-/// and last-writer-wins keeps tests that exercise both outcomes
-/// order-independent.
-pub fn bitrot_selftest_passed() -> Option<bool> {
-    match BITROT_SELF_TEST_STATUS.load(Ordering::Acquire) {
-        STATUS_CELL_UNSET => None,
-        STATUS_CELL_PASSED => Some(true),
-        STATUS_CELL_FAILED => Some(false),
-        _ => None,
-    }
-}
-
-/// Run the bitrot self-test and publish the outcome. In strict mode a failure
-/// is returned as an error so the caller aborts startup.
-pub(crate) async fn run_startup_bitrot_self_test(enabled: bool, strict: bool) -> io::Result<()> {
-    run_startup_bitrot_self_test_with(enabled, strict, bitrot_self_test).await
-}
-
-async fn run_startup_bitrot_self_test_with<F, Fut>(enabled: bool, strict: bool, run_check: F) -> io::Result<()>
-where
-    F: FnOnce() -> Fut,
-    Fut: Future<Output = Result<(), BitrotSelfTestError>>,
-{
-    if !enabled {
-        gauge!(METRIC_BITROT_SELFTEST_STATUS).set(STATUS_SKIPPED);
-        debug!(
-            target: "rustfs::main::run",
-            event = EVENT_BITROT_SELFTEST,
-            component = LOG_COMPONENT_MAIN,
-            subsystem = LOG_SUBSYSTEM_STARTUP,
-            state = "skipped",
-            reason = "disabled",
-            "Bitrot self-test skipped"
-        );
-        return Ok(());
-    }
-
-    let started = Instant::now();
-    match run_check().await {
-        Ok(()) => {
-            BITROT_SELF_TEST_STATUS.store(STATUS_CELL_PASSED, Ordering::Release);
-            gauge!(METRIC_BITROT_SELFTEST_STATUS).set(STATUS_PASSED);
-            info!(
-                target: "rustfs::main::run",
-                event = EVENT_BITROT_SELFTEST,
-                component = LOG_COMPONENT_MAIN,
-                subsystem = LOG_SUBSYSTEM_STARTUP,
-                state = "passed",
-                duration_us = started.elapsed().as_micros() as u64,
-                "Bitrot self-test passed"
-            );
-        }
-        Err(err) => {
-            BITROT_SELF_TEST_STATUS.store(STATUS_CELL_FAILED, Ordering::Release);
-            gauge!(METRIC_BITROT_SELFTEST_STATUS).set(STATUS_FAILED);
-            error!(
-                target: "rustfs::main::run",
-                event = EVENT_BITROT_SELFTEST,
-                component = LOG_COMPONENT_MAIN,
-                subsystem = LOG_SUBSYSTEM_STARTUP,
-                state = "failed",
-                duration_us = started.elapsed().as_micros() as u64,
-                error = %err,
-                "Bitrot self-test failed"
-            );
-            if strict {
-                return Err(io::Error::other(format!("bitrot self-test failed: {err}")));
-            }
-        }
-    }
-    Ok(())
-}
-
-#[cfg(test)]
-mod tests {
-    use super::{BITROT_SELF_TEST_STATUS, STATUS_CELL_UNSET, bitrot_selftest_passed, run_startup_bitrot_self_test_with};
-    use crate::storage_api::startup::background::BitrotSelfTestError;
-    use std::future::ready;
-    use std::sync::atomic::Ordering;
-
-    fn failing_check() -> impl Future<Output = Result<(), BitrotSelfTestError>> {
-        ready(Err(BitrotSelfTestError::RoundtripReadback {
-            algorithm: "HighwayHash256S",
-        }))
-    }
-
-    /// All scenarios run sequentially inside one test: the status cell is
-    /// process-global, so parallel per-scenario tests would race the reset and
-    /// read each other's outcomes (the exact order-dependent flake class this
-    /// module exists to avoid).
-    #[tokio::test]
-    async fn startup_self_test_publishes_outcome_and_strict_gates_abort() {
-        BITROT_SELF_TEST_STATUS.store(STATUS_CELL_UNSET, Ordering::Release);
-
-        // Skipped: publishes nothing, never fails, never aborts.
-        run_startup_bitrot_self_test_with(false, true, || async { Ok(()) })
-            .await
-            .expect("a disabled self-test must not fail even in strict mode");
-        assert_eq!(bitrot_selftest_passed(), None, "a skipped run must leave the status unset");
-
-        // Passing: publishes Some(true), never fails.
-        run_startup_bitrot_self_test_with(true, false, || async { Ok(()) })
-            .await
-            .expect("a passing check must never fail startup");
-        assert_eq!(bitrot_selftest_passed(), Some(true), "a passing run must publish Some(true)");
-
-        // Failing, non-strict: publishes Some(false) but startup continues.
-        run_startup_bitrot_self_test_with(true, false, failing_check)
-            .await
-            .expect("a failed check must not abort startup in non-strict mode");
-        assert_eq!(bitrot_selftest_passed(), Some(false), "a failing run must publish Some(false)");
-
-        // Failing, strict: startup error carries the failure and the published
-        // outcome stays a failure.
-        let err = run_startup_bitrot_self_test_with(true, true, failing_check)
-            .await
-            .expect_err("strict mode must turn a failed check into a startup error");
-        assert!(err.to_string().contains("bitrot self-test failed"));
-        assert_eq!(bitrot_selftest_passed(), Some(false));
-    }
-}

rustfs/src/init.rs

@@ -304,37 +304,30 @@ fn build_local_kms_config(cfg: &config::Config) -> std::io::Result<rustfs_kms::c
     Ok(kms_config)
 }
 
-/// Collect the Vault settings the command line owns.
-///
-/// Everything else — auth method, namespace, TLS, KV mount and metadata paths —
-/// is resolved from the environment by the KMS crate, so this path and
-/// [`rustfs_kms::config::KmsConfig::from_env`] cannot drift apart. The address
-/// stays required here so a missing one is still named instead of silently
-/// falling back to the crate's localhost default.
-fn vault_cli_overrides<'a>(
-    cfg: &'a config::Config,
-    backend_name: &str,
-) -> std::io::Result<rustfs_kms::config::VaultCliOverrides<'a>> {
-    let address = cfg
-        .kms_vault_address
-        .as_deref()
-        .ok_or_else(|| Error::other(format!("Vault address is required for {backend_name} backend")))?;
-
-    Ok(rustfs_kms::config::VaultCliOverrides {
-        address: Some(address),
-        token: cfg.kms_vault_token.as_deref(),
-        mount_path: cfg.kms_vault_mount_path.as_deref(),
-    })
-}
-
 /// Build KMS configuration for Vault backend
 fn build_vault_kms_config(cfg: &config::Config) -> std::io::Result<rustfs_kms::config::KmsConfig> {
-    let backend_config = rustfs_kms::config::vault_kv2_config_from_env(vault_cli_overrides(cfg, "vault")?)
-        .map_err(|e| Error::other(format!("Vault KMS configuration failed: {e}")))?;
+    let vault_address = cfg
+        .kms_vault_address
+        .as_ref()
+        .ok_or_else(|| Error::other("Vault address is required for vault backend"))?;
+    let vault_token = cfg
+        .kms_vault_token
+        .as_ref()
+        .ok_or_else(|| Error::other("Vault token is required for vault backend"))?;
 
     let kms_config = rustfs_kms::config::KmsConfig {
         backend: rustfs_kms::config::KmsBackend::VaultKv2,
-        backend_config: rustfs_kms::config::BackendConfig::VaultKv2(Box::new(backend_config)),
+        backend_config: rustfs_kms::config::BackendConfig::VaultKv2(Box::new(rustfs_kms::config::VaultConfig {
+            address: vault_address.clone(),
+            auth_method: rustfs_kms::config::VaultAuthMethod::Token {
+                token: vault_token.clone(),
+            },
+            namespace: None,
+            mount_path: cfg.kms_vault_mount_path.clone().unwrap_or_else(|| "transit".to_string()),
+            kv_mount: "secret".to_string(),
+            key_path_prefix: "rustfs/kms/keys".to_string(),
+            tls: None,
+        })),
         allow_insecure_dev_defaults: cfg.kms_allow_insecure_dev_defaults,
         allow_immediate_deletion: rustfs_kms::config::allow_immediate_deletion_from_env(),
         default_key_id: cfg.kms_default_key_id.clone(),
@@ -351,12 +344,26 @@ fn build_vault_kms_config(cfg: &config::Config) -> std::io::Result<rustfs_kms::c
 
 /// Build KMS configuration for Vault Transit backend
 fn build_vault_transit_kms_config(cfg: &config::Config) -> std::io::Result<rustfs_kms::config::KmsConfig> {
-    let backend_config = rustfs_kms::config::vault_transit_config_from_env(vault_cli_overrides(cfg, "vault-transit")?)
-        .map_err(|e| Error::other(format!("Vault Transit KMS configuration failed: {e}")))?;
+    let vault_address = cfg
+        .kms_vault_address
+        .as_ref()
+        .ok_or_else(|| Error::other("Vault address is required for vault-transit backend"))?;
+    let vault_token = cfg
+        .kms_vault_token
+        .as_ref()
+        .ok_or_else(|| Error::other("Vault token is required for vault-transit backend"))?;
 
     let kms_config = rustfs_kms::config::KmsConfig {
         backend: rustfs_kms::config::KmsBackend::VaultTransit,
-        backend_config: rustfs_kms::config::BackendConfig::VaultTransit(Box::new(backend_config)),
+        backend_config: rustfs_kms::config::BackendConfig::VaultTransit(Box::new(rustfs_kms::config::VaultTransitConfig {
+            address: vault_address.clone(),
+            auth_method: rustfs_kms::config::VaultAuthMethod::Token {
+                token: vault_token.clone(),
+            },
+            namespace: None,
+            mount_path: cfg.kms_vault_mount_path.clone().unwrap_or_else(|| "transit".to_string()),
+            ..rustfs_kms::config::VaultTransitConfig::default()
+        })),
         allow_insecure_dev_defaults: cfg.kms_allow_insecure_dev_defaults,
         allow_immediate_deletion: rustfs_kms::config::allow_immediate_deletion_from_env(),
         default_key_id: cfg.kms_default_key_id.clone(),
@@ -1398,10 +1405,7 @@ pub async fn init_sftp_system() -> Result<Option<ShutdownHandle>, Box<dyn std::e
 
 #[cfg(test)]
 mod tests {
-    use super::{
-        build_aws_kms_config, build_vault_kms_config, build_vault_transit_kms_config, notification_config_to_event_rules,
-        resolve_buffer_profile_config,
-    };
+    use super::{build_aws_kms_config, notification_config_to_event_rules, resolve_buffer_profile_config};
     use crate::config::{BufferConfig, WorkloadProfile};
     use rustfs_config::KI_B;
     use rustfs_s3_types::EventName;
@@ -1495,151 +1499,6 @@ mod tests {
         assert!(err.to_string().contains("Invalid ARN"), "unexpected error: {err}");
     }
 
-    fn vault_kms_test_config(backend: &str) -> crate::config::Config {
-        let mut config = crate::config::Config::new("127.0.0.1:9000", vec!["/tmp/rustfs-vault-kms".to_string()]);
-        config.kms_enable = true;
-        config.kms_backend = backend.to_string();
-        config.kms_vault_address = Some("https://vault.example.com:8200".to_string());
-        config
-    }
-
-    /// The Vault auth method and the settings the CLI has no flag for come from
-    /// the environment, so startup and `KmsConfig::from_env` cannot disagree.
-    /// Regression: startup used to hardcode token auth and require a token,
-    /// which made every non-token method unreachable through `RUSTFS_KMS_ENABLE`.
-    #[test]
-    fn build_vault_transit_kms_config_resolves_auth_and_mounts_from_env() {
-        let config = temp_env::with_vars(
-            [
-                ("RUSTFS_KMS_VAULT_TOKEN", None),
-                ("RUSTFS_KMS_VAULT_TOKEN_FILE", None),
-                ("RUSTFS_KMS_VAULT_KUBERNETES_ROLE", None),
-                ("RUSTFS_KMS_VAULT_APPROLE_ROLE_ID", Some("env-role-id")),
-                ("RUSTFS_KMS_VAULT_APPROLE_SECRET_ID", Some("env-secret-id")),
-                ("RUSTFS_KMS_VAULT_APPROLE_SECRET_ID_FILE", None),
-                ("RUSTFS_KMS_VAULT_NAMESPACE", Some("team-a")),
-                ("RUSTFS_KMS_VAULT_TRANSIT_METADATA_KV_MOUNT", Some("rustfs-kv")),
-            ],
-            || {
-                build_vault_transit_kms_config(&vault_kms_test_config("vault-transit"))
-                    .expect("vault transit KMS configuration should build")
-            },
-        );
-
-        let vault = config.vault_transit_config().expect("vault transit backend config");
-        let rustfs_kms::config::VaultAuthMethod::AppRole { role_id, secret_id, .. } = &vault.auth_method else {
-            panic!("approle in the environment must select AppRole auth, got {:?}", vault.auth_method);
-        };
-        assert_eq!(role_id, "env-role-id");
-        assert_eq!(secret_id, "env-secret-id");
-        assert_eq!(vault.namespace.as_deref(), Some("team-a"));
-        assert_eq!(vault.metadata_kv_mount, "rustfs-kv");
-    }
-
-    /// Kubernetes auth needs no credential in the environment at all: the role
-    /// selects it and the pod's projected ServiceAccount token supplies the rest.
-    #[test]
-    fn build_vault_transit_kms_config_selects_kubernetes_auth() {
-        let config = temp_env::with_vars(
-            [
-                ("RUSTFS_KMS_VAULT_TOKEN", None),
-                ("RUSTFS_KMS_VAULT_TOKEN_FILE", None),
-                ("RUSTFS_KMS_VAULT_APPROLE_ROLE_ID", None),
-                ("RUSTFS_KMS_VAULT_KUBERNETES_ROLE", Some("rustfs")),
-                ("RUSTFS_KMS_VAULT_KUBERNETES_MOUNT", None),
-                ("RUSTFS_KMS_VAULT_KUBERNETES_JWT_PATH", None),
-            ],
-            || {
-                build_vault_transit_kms_config(&vault_kms_test_config("vault-transit"))
-                    .expect("vault transit KMS configuration should build")
-            },
-        );
-
-        let vault = config.vault_transit_config().expect("vault transit backend config");
-        let rustfs_kms::config::VaultAuthMethod::Kubernetes {
-            role, mount, jwt_path, ..
-        } = &vault.auth_method
-        else {
-            panic!(
-                "a kubernetes role in the environment must select Kubernetes auth, got {:?}",
-                vault.auth_method
-            );
-        };
-        assert_eq!(role, "rustfs");
-        assert_eq!(mount, rustfs_kms::config::DEFAULT_VAULT_KUBERNETES_MOUNT);
-        assert_eq!(jwt_path, std::path::Path::new(rustfs_kms::config::DEFAULT_VAULT_KUBERNETES_JWT_PATH));
-    }
-
-    /// Two credential sources leave the effective identity ambiguous, so
-    /// startup refuses rather than picking one.
-    #[test]
-    fn build_vault_kms_config_refuses_two_auth_methods() {
-        temp_env::with_vars(
-            [
-                ("RUSTFS_KMS_VAULT_TOKEN", None),
-                ("RUSTFS_KMS_VAULT_TOKEN_FILE", Some("/run/vault-agent/token")),
-                ("RUSTFS_KMS_VAULT_APPROLE_ROLE_ID", None),
-                ("RUSTFS_KMS_VAULT_KUBERNETES_ROLE", Some("rustfs")),
-            ],
-            || {
-                let error = build_vault_kms_config(&vault_kms_test_config("vault"))
-                    .expect_err("two Vault auth methods must not start the server");
-                assert!(error.to_string().contains("exactly one"), "unexpected error: {error}");
-            },
-        );
-    }
-
-    /// The KV2 backend has its own builder, so the key-location settings have
-    /// to be proven separately from the Transit one: pointing at the wrong KV
-    /// mount or prefix makes existing keys look absent.
-    #[test]
-    fn build_vault_kms_config_resolves_kv_mount_and_prefix_from_env() {
-        let config = temp_env::with_vars(
-            [
-                ("RUSTFS_KMS_VAULT_TOKEN", Some("a-real-token")),
-                ("RUSTFS_KMS_VAULT_TOKEN_FILE", None),
-                ("RUSTFS_KMS_VAULT_APPROLE_ROLE_ID", None),
-                ("RUSTFS_KMS_VAULT_KUBERNETES_ROLE", None),
-                ("RUSTFS_KMS_VAULT_KV_MOUNT", Some("rustfs-kv")),
-                ("RUSTFS_KMS_VAULT_KEY_PREFIX", Some("tenant/keys")),
-            ],
-            || build_vault_kms_config(&vault_kms_test_config("vault")).expect("vault KV2 KMS configuration should build"),
-        );
-
-        let vault = config.vault_config().expect("vault kv2 backend config");
-        assert_eq!(vault.kv_mount, "rustfs-kv");
-        assert_eq!(vault.key_path_prefix, "tenant/keys");
-    }
-
-    /// Skipping TLS verification was silently dropped on this path before, so
-    /// an operator who asked for it still got a verified connection. Now that it
-    /// is honoured it must fail closed without the development opt-in, rather
-    /// than quietly downgrading the Vault connection.
-    #[test]
-    fn build_vault_transit_kms_config_refuses_skip_tls_verify_without_opt_in() {
-        let vars = [
-            ("RUSTFS_KMS_VAULT_TOKEN", Some("a-real-token")),
-            ("RUSTFS_KMS_VAULT_TOKEN_FILE", None),
-            ("RUSTFS_KMS_VAULT_APPROLE_ROLE_ID", None),
-            ("RUSTFS_KMS_VAULT_KUBERNETES_ROLE", None),
-            ("RUSTFS_KMS_VAULT_SKIP_TLS_VERIFY", Some("true")),
-        ];
-
-        temp_env::with_vars(vars, || {
-            let error = build_vault_transit_kms_config(&vault_kms_test_config("vault-transit"))
-                .expect_err("skipping TLS verification must not start the server");
-            assert!(error.to_string().contains("TLS"), "unexpected error: {error}");
-        });
-
-        temp_env::with_vars(vars, || {
-            let mut cfg = vault_kms_test_config("vault-transit");
-            cfg.kms_allow_insecure_dev_defaults = true;
-            let config = build_vault_transit_kms_config(&cfg).expect("the development opt-in should accept skip-verify");
-            let vault = config.vault_transit_config().expect("vault transit backend config");
-            assert!(vault.tls.as_ref().is_some_and(|tls| tls.skip_verify));
-        });
-    }
-
     fn aws_kms_test_config() -> crate::config::Config {
         let mut config = crate::config::Config::new("127.0.0.1:9000", vec!["/tmp/rustfs-aws-kms".to_string()]);
         config.kms_enable = true;

rustfs/src/lib.rs

@@ -76,7 +76,6 @@ pub mod allocator_reclaim;
 pub mod app;
 pub mod auth;
 pub mod auth_keystone;
-pub(crate) mod bitrot_selftest;
 pub mod capacity;
 pub mod cluster_snapshot;
 pub mod config;

rustfs/src/module_switches.rs

@@ -33,8 +33,6 @@ pub(crate) const ENV_SCANNER_ENABLED: &str = "RUSTFS_SCANNER_ENABLED";
 pub(crate) const ENV_SCANNER_ENABLED_DEPRECATED: &str = "RUSTFS_ENABLE_SCANNER";
 pub(crate) const ENV_HEAL_ENABLED: &str = "RUSTFS_HEAL_ENABLED";
 pub(crate) const ENV_HEAL_ENABLED_DEPRECATED: &str = "RUSTFS_ENABLE_HEAL";
-pub(crate) const ENV_BITROT_SELFTEST_ENABLE: &str = "RUSTFS_BITROT_SELFTEST_ENABLE";
-pub(crate) const ENV_BITROT_SELFTEST_STRICT: &str = "RUSTFS_BITROT_SELFTEST_STRICT";
 
 static AUDIT_MODULE_ENABLED: AtomicBool = AtomicBool::new(rustfs_config::DEFAULT_AUDIT_ENABLE);
 static NOTIFY_MODULE_ENABLED: AtomicBool = AtomicBool::new(rustfs_config::DEFAULT_NOTIFY_ENABLE);
@@ -49,18 +47,6 @@ pub(crate) fn heal_enabled_from_env() -> bool {
     get_env_bool_with_aliases(ENV_HEAL_ENABLED, &[ENV_HEAL_ENABLED_DEPRECATED], true)
 }
 
-/// Whether the startup bitrot algorithm self-test runs, defaulting to on
-/// (rustfs/backlog#1873).
-pub(crate) fn bitrot_selftest_enabled_from_env() -> bool {
-    rustfs_utils::get_env_bool(ENV_BITROT_SELFTEST_ENABLE, true)
-}
-
-/// Whether a failed bitrot self-test aborts startup instead of only logging
-/// and exposing a failed status, defaulting to off.
-pub(crate) fn bitrot_selftest_strict_from_env() -> bool {
-    rustfs_utils::get_env_bool(ENV_BITROT_SELFTEST_STRICT, false)
-}
-
 /// Last published audit-module state.
 pub fn is_audit_module_enabled() -> bool {
     AUDIT_MODULE_ENABLED.load(Ordering::Relaxed)

rustfs/src/startup_background.rs

@@ -12,10 +12,7 @@
 // See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
 // limitations under the License.
 
-use crate::bitrot_selftest::run_startup_bitrot_self_test;
-use crate::module_switches::{
-    bitrot_selftest_enabled_from_env, bitrot_selftest_strict_from_env, heal_enabled_from_env, scanner_enabled_from_env,
-};
+use crate::module_switches::{heal_enabled_from_env, scanner_enabled_from_env};
 use crate::storage_api::startup::background::{ECStore, set_workload_admission_snapshot_provider};
 use crate::workload_admission::RustFsWorkloadAdmissionSnapshotProvider;
 use rustfs_concurrency::WorkloadAdmissionSnapshotProvider;
@@ -30,12 +27,6 @@ const LOG_SUBSYSTEM_STARTUP: &str = "startup";
 const EVENT_BACKGROUND_SERVICES_CONFIGURED: &str = "background_services_configured";
 
 pub(crate) async fn init_background_service_runtime(store: Arc<ECStore>) -> Result<bool> {
-    // Pin the bitrot algorithms before anything can write or verify a shard:
-    // the check costs well under a millisecond, and in strict mode a drifted
-    // build must abort here rather than after it has touched data
-    // (rustfs/backlog#1873).
-    run_startup_bitrot_self_test(bitrot_selftest_enabled_from_env(), bitrot_selftest_strict_from_env()).await?;
-
     let _ = create_ahm_services_cancel_token();
 
     let enable_scanner = scanner_enabled_from_env();

rustfs/src/storage/storage_api.rs

@@ -569,10 +569,6 @@ pub(crate) mod ecstore_erasure {
     pub(crate) use rustfs_ecstore::api::erasure::{BitrotReader, Erasure};
 }
 
-/// Startup bitrot algorithm self-test (rustfs/backlog#1873), re-exported for
-/// the root facade's background-startup section.
-pub(crate) use rustfs_ecstore::api::erasure::{BitrotSelfTestError, bitrot_self_test};
-
 pub(crate) mod ecstore_storage {
     #[cfg(test)]
     pub(crate) use rustfs_ecstore::api::storage::init_local_disks;

rustfs/src/storage_api.rs

@@ -214,9 +214,7 @@ pub(crate) mod startup {
     }
 
     pub(crate) mod background {
-        pub(crate) use crate::storage::storage_api::{
-            BitrotSelfTestError, ECStore, bitrot_self_test, set_workload_admission_snapshot_provider,
-        };
+        pub(crate) use crate::storage::storage_api::{ECStore, set_workload_admission_snapshot_provider};
     }
 
     pub(crate) mod bucket_metadata {