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8 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
houseme 566877d3ba Merge branch 'main' into overtrue/activate-group-e2e 2026-08-23 12:37:24 +08:00
Zhengchao An 23a2c7d776 test(kms): stabilize Vault failover validation (#6385)
* test(kms): bound Vault failover progress wait

* ci(nightly): honor manual dispatch ref

* test(kms): preserve Vault worker failures

* test(kms): validate Vault circuit recovery
2026-08-23 12:32:11 +08:00
唐小鸭 5f72209446 fix(ecstore): keep unknown-size sentinel in create_bitrot_writer (#6380)
SSE and compression wrap the payload so its length is unknown and
advertise HashReader::SIZE_PRESERVE_LAYER (-1). Every layer preserved
that sentinel except create_bitrot_writer, which clamped it to 0 before
calling DiskAPI::create_file. RemoteDisk forwards that size verbatim in
the put_file_stream query, so remote peers were told the body was empty.

Since the authenticated put-file trailer (#5868) the receiver used the
declared size to split body from trailer, turning the clamp into a fatal
"auth trailer has trailing data" failure for every SSE PUT on multi-node
deployments (rc.2). #6320 relaxed the receiver to only trust size > 0;
this change fixes the sender so the sentinel survives end to end and the
wire no longer conflates empty objects with unknown-length streams.

Refs #6331
2026-08-23 12:29:52 +08:00
overtrue 3294c64fcc test(e2e): correct group regression fixtures 2026-08-23 11:11:01 +08:00
overtrue a8be0f81f5 test(e2e): bind group selection to Linux listing 2026-08-23 08:55:07 +08:00
overtrue 3179b7acb8 test(e2e): pin group deletion errors 2026-08-23 06:42:55 +08:00
overtrue d25b84a793 Merge remote-tracking branch 'origin/main' into overtrue/activate-group-e2e 2026-08-23 05:43:17 +08:00
overtrue a79b806fb4 test(e2e): activate group management regressions 2026-08-23 02:37:15 +08:00
11 changed files with 250 additions and 295 deletions
+2 -2
View File
@@ -1,2 +1,2 @@
sha256-darwin=9f767b37ed8b1c82da62ea441462d75487785c8086e56f08fb6f6cd89c6e2e52
sha256-linux=fbdaf42b220958d4b1e8880e0f8b5a7992d38e21051bb60596dd4538424757d6
sha256-darwin=f832043fcca8c0b616c5d820a3a652da7544298ef5812a8668a3a9a3e4607b8b
sha256-linux=93b94adb110b86a41d0b7313909e0bf53cb1515e2d08e8f105652b29b249990f
+3 -6
View File
@@ -39,11 +39,10 @@ jobs:
env:
FORCE_JAVASCRIPT_ACTIONS_TO_NODE24: "true"
steps:
- name: Checkout main branch
- name: Checkout repository
uses: actions/checkout@9c091bb21b7c1c1d1991bb908d89e4e9dddfe3e0 # v7
with:
persist-credentials: false
ref: main
- name: Setup Rust environment
uses: ./.github/actions/setup
@@ -89,11 +88,10 @@ jobs:
# either casing.
NO_PROXY: 127.0.0.1,localhost
steps:
- name: Checkout main branch
- name: Checkout repository
uses: actions/checkout@9c091bb21b7c1c1d1991bb908d89e4e9dddfe3e0 # v7
with:
persist-credentials: false
ref: main
- name: Setup Rust environment
uses: ./.github/actions/setup
@@ -178,11 +176,10 @@ jobs:
FORCE_JAVASCRIPT_ACTIONS_TO_NODE24: "true"
NO_PROXY: 127.0.0.1,localhost
steps:
- name: Checkout main branch
- name: Checkout repository
uses: actions/checkout@9c091bb21b7c1c1d1991bb908d89e4e9dddfe3e0 # v7
with:
persist-credentials: false
ref: main
- name: Setup Rust environment
uses: ./.github/actions/setup
+118 -36
View File
@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@
//! E2E tests for group management (fixes #2028).
use crate::common::{RustFSTestEnvironment, admin_request, awscurl_delete, awscurl_get, awscurl_put, init_logging};
use crate::common::{RustFSTestEnvironment, admin_ok, admin_request, init_logging};
use aws_sdk_s3::config::{Credentials, Region};
use aws_sdk_s3::{Client, Config};
use tracing::info;
@@ -83,7 +83,6 @@ async fn update_group_members_rejects_invalid_new_group_names() -> Result<(), Bo
/// Test that deleting a group with members fails, and deleting an empty group succeeds.
#[tokio::test(flavor = "multi_thread")]
#[ignore = "requires awscurl and spawns a real RustFS server"]
async fn test_delete_group_requires_empty_membership() -> Result<(), Box<dyn std::error::Error + Send + Sync>> {
init_logging();
@@ -91,29 +90,58 @@ async fn test_delete_group_requires_empty_membership() -> Result<(), Box<dyn std
env.start_rustfs_server(vec![]).await?;
// 1. Create a user
let add_user_url = format!("{}/rustfs/admin/v3/add-user?accessKey=testuser1", env.url);
let user_body = serde_json::json!({
"secretKey": "testuser1secret",
"status": "enabled"
});
awscurl_put(&add_user_url, &user_body.to_string(), &env.access_key, &env.secret_key).await?;
admin_ok(
&env,
http::Method::PUT,
"/rustfs/admin/v3/add-user?accessKey=testuser1",
Some(user_body.to_string()),
)
.await?;
info!("Created testuser1");
// 2. Create a group with testuser1 as a member
let update_members_url = format!("{}/rustfs/admin/v3/update-group-members", env.url);
let add_member_body = serde_json::json!({
"group": "testgroup",
"members": ["testuser1"],
"isRemove": false,
"groupStatus": "enabled"
});
awscurl_put(&update_members_url, &add_member_body.to_string(), &env.access_key, &env.secret_key).await?;
admin_ok(
&env,
http::Method::PUT,
"/rustfs/admin/v3/update-group-members",
Some(add_member_body.to_string()),
)
.await?;
info!("Added testuser1 to testgroup");
// 3. Attempt to delete the group while it still has members — should fail
let delete_group_url = format!("{}/rustfs/admin/v3/group/testgroup", env.url);
let delete_result = awscurl_delete(&delete_group_url, &env.access_key, &env.secret_key).await;
assert!(delete_result.is_err(), "deleting a non-empty group should fail");
let (delete_status, delete_body) = admin_request(
&env.url,
http::Method::DELETE,
"/rustfs/admin/v3/group/testgroup",
None,
&env.access_key,
&env.secret_key,
)
.await?;
assert_eq!(
delete_status,
reqwest::StatusCode::BAD_REQUEST,
"deleting a non-empty group must return HTTP 400, body: {delete_body}"
);
assert!(
delete_body.contains("<Code>InvalidRequest</Code>"),
"deleting a non-empty group must return InvalidRequest, body: {delete_body}"
);
assert!(
delete_body.contains("<Message>group is not empty</Message>"),
"deleting a non-empty group returned an unexpected message: {delete_body}"
);
info!("Delete of non-empty group correctly rejected");
// 4. Remove the member from the group
@@ -123,17 +151,42 @@ async fn test_delete_group_requires_empty_membership() -> Result<(), Box<dyn std
"isRemove": true,
"groupStatus": "enabled"
});
awscurl_put(&update_members_url, &remove_member_body.to_string(), &env.access_key, &env.secret_key).await?;
admin_ok(
&env,
http::Method::PUT,
"/rustfs/admin/v3/update-group-members",
Some(remove_member_body.to_string()),
)
.await?;
info!("Removed testuser1 from testgroup");
// 5. Delete the now-empty group — should succeed
awscurl_delete(&delete_group_url, &env.access_key, &env.secret_key).await?;
admin_ok(&env, http::Method::DELETE, "/rustfs/admin/v3/group/testgroup", None).await?;
info!("Deleted empty testgroup successfully");
// 6. Verify the group no longer exists
let get_group_url = format!("{}/rustfs/admin/v3/group?group=testgroup", env.url);
let get_result = awscurl_get(&get_group_url, &env.access_key, &env.secret_key).await;
assert!(get_result.is_err(), "group should no longer exist after deletion");
let (get_status, get_body) = admin_request(
&env.url,
http::Method::GET,
"/rustfs/admin/v3/group?group=testgroup",
None,
&env.access_key,
&env.secret_key,
)
.await?;
assert_eq!(
get_status,
reqwest::StatusCode::NOT_FOUND,
"a deleted group must return HTTP 404, body: {get_body}"
);
assert!(
get_body.contains("<Code>NoSuchResource</Code>"),
"a deleted group must return NoSuchResource, body: {get_body}"
);
assert!(
get_body.contains("<Message>group &apos;testgroup&apos; does not exist</Message>"),
"a deleted group returned an unexpected message: {get_body}"
);
info!("Confirmed testgroup no longer exists");
Ok(())
@@ -142,7 +195,6 @@ async fn test_delete_group_requires_empty_membership() -> Result<(), Box<dyn std
/// Test that a user with only group membership (no explicit user policy) gets group policies
/// and can perform actions allowed by the group (regression test for #2028.1).
#[tokio::test(flavor = "multi_thread")]
#[ignore = "requires awscurl and spawns a real RustFS server"]
async fn test_user_with_only_group_gets_group_policies() -> Result<(), Box<dyn std::error::Error + Send + Sync>> {
init_logging();
@@ -160,39 +212,56 @@ async fn test_user_with_only_group_gets_group_policies() -> Result<(), Box<dyn s
"Statement": [{
"Effect": "Allow",
"Action": ["s3:ListAllMyBuckets"],
"Resource": ["*"]
"Resource": ["arn:aws:s3:::*"]
}]
});
let add_policy_url = format!("{}/rustfs/admin/v3/add-canned-policy?name={}", env.url, policy_name);
awscurl_put(&add_policy_url, &policy_doc.to_string(), &env.access_key, &env.secret_key).await?;
admin_ok(
&env,
http::Method::PUT,
&format!("/rustfs/admin/v3/add-canned-policy?name={policy_name}"),
Some(policy_doc.to_string()),
)
.await?;
info!("Created canned policy {}", policy_name);
// 2. Create user with no explicit policy
let add_user_url = format!("{}/rustfs/admin/v3/add-user?accessKey={}", env.url, user_name);
let user_body = serde_json::json!({
"secretKey": user_secret,
"status": "enabled"
});
awscurl_put(&add_user_url, &user_body.to_string(), &env.access_key, &env.secret_key).await?;
admin_ok(
&env,
http::Method::PUT,
&format!("/rustfs/admin/v3/add-user?accessKey={user_name}"),
Some(user_body.to_string()),
)
.await?;
info!("Created user {} with no explicit policy", user_name);
// 3. Add user to group (creates group with this member; user_group_memberships must be updated)
let update_members_url = format!("{}/rustfs/admin/v3/update-group-members", env.url);
let add_member_body = serde_json::json!({
"group": group_name,
"members": [user_name],
"isRemove": false,
"groupStatus": "enabled"
});
awscurl_put(&update_members_url, &add_member_body.to_string(), &env.access_key, &env.secret_key).await?;
admin_ok(
&env,
http::Method::PUT,
"/rustfs/admin/v3/update-group-members",
Some(add_member_body.to_string()),
)
.await?;
info!("Added {} to group {}", user_name, group_name);
// 4. Attach policy to group
let set_policy_url = format!(
"{}/rustfs/admin/v3/set-user-or-group-policy?policyName={}&userOrGroup={}&isGroup=true",
env.url, policy_name, group_name
);
awscurl_put(&set_policy_url, "", &env.access_key, &env.secret_key).await?;
admin_ok(
&env,
http::Method::PUT,
&format!("/rustfs/admin/v3/set-user-or-group-policy?policyName={policy_name}&userOrGroup={group_name}&isGroup=true"),
Some(String::new()),
)
.await?;
info!("Attached policy {} to group {}", policy_name, group_name);
// 5. User with only group (no user policy) should be able to list buckets
@@ -209,7 +278,6 @@ async fn test_user_with_only_group_gets_group_policies() -> Result<(), Box<dyn s
/// Test that after deleting a user who was the only member of a group, the group can be deleted
/// (regression test for #2028.2: delete group uses backend membership, not stale cache).
#[tokio::test(flavor = "multi_thread")]
#[ignore = "requires awscurl and spawns a real RustFS server"]
async fn test_delete_group_after_deleting_user() -> Result<(), Box<dyn std::error::Error + Send + Sync>> {
init_logging();
@@ -221,33 +289,47 @@ async fn test_delete_group_after_deleting_user() -> Result<(), Box<dyn std::erro
let group_name = "soledeletegroup";
// 1. Create user
let add_user_url = format!("{}/rustfs/admin/v3/add-user?accessKey={}", env.url, user_name);
let user_body = serde_json::json!({
"secretKey": user_secret,
"status": "enabled"
});
awscurl_put(&add_user_url, &user_body.to_string(), &env.access_key, &env.secret_key).await?;
admin_ok(
&env,
http::Method::PUT,
&format!("/rustfs/admin/v3/add-user?accessKey={user_name}"),
Some(user_body.to_string()),
)
.await?;
info!("Created user {}", user_name);
// 2. Add user to group
let update_members_url = format!("{}/rustfs/admin/v3/update-group-members", env.url);
let add_member_body = serde_json::json!({
"group": group_name,
"members": [user_name],
"isRemove": false,
"groupStatus": "enabled"
});
awscurl_put(&update_members_url, &add_member_body.to_string(), &env.access_key, &env.secret_key).await?;
admin_ok(
&env,
http::Method::PUT,
"/rustfs/admin/v3/update-group-members",
Some(add_member_body.to_string()),
)
.await?;
info!("Added {} to group {}", user_name, group_name);
// 3. Delete the user (backend and cache update so group membership becomes empty)
let remove_user_url = format!("{}/rustfs/admin/v3/remove-user?accessKey={}", env.url, user_name);
awscurl_delete(&remove_user_url, &env.access_key, &env.secret_key).await?;
admin_ok(
&env,
http::Method::DELETE,
&format!("/rustfs/admin/v3/remove-user?accessKey={user_name}"),
None,
)
.await?;
info!("Deleted user {}", user_name);
// 4. Deleting the group should succeed (backend has empty members; no stale cache)
let delete_group_url = format!("{}/rustfs/admin/v3/group/{}", env.url, group_name);
awscurl_delete(&delete_group_url, &env.access_key, &env.secret_key).await?;
admin_ok(&env, http::Method::DELETE, &format!("/rustfs/admin/v3/group/{group_name}"), None).await?;
info!("Deleted group {} after user was removed", group_name);
Ok(())
+38 -6
View File
@@ -784,6 +784,24 @@ pub(crate) fn create_deferred_bitrot_reader_with_stripe_handle(
///
/// # Returns
/// A Result containing the BitrotWriterWrapper or an error
/// Size hint handed to `DiskAPI::create_file` for a bitrot-wrapped shard.
///
/// A known length is grown by one checksum per shard so the on-disk file size
/// matches what the bitrot writer emits. A negative length is the
/// unknown-size sentinel (`HashReader::SIZE_PRESERVE_LAYER`, used by SSE and
/// compression) and must be preserved: `RemoteDisk::create_file` forwards it
/// in the `put_file_stream` query, and the receiver only treats `size > 0` as
/// a fixed body length when locating the authenticated trailer. Clamping it
/// to `0` would claim an empty body and misframe the stream. `0` stays `0`
/// because a genuinely empty object still means an empty body.
fn bitrot_create_file_size(length: i64, shard_size: usize, checksum_algo: &HashAlgorithm) -> i64 {
if length <= 0 {
return length;
}
let length = length as usize;
(length.div_ceil(shard_size) * checksum_algo.size() + length) as i64
}
pub async fn create_bitrot_writer(
is_inline_buffer: bool,
disk: Option<&DiskStore>,
@@ -796,12 +814,7 @@ pub async fn create_bitrot_writer(
let writer = if is_inline_buffer {
CustomWriter::new_inline_buffer()
} else if let Some(disk) = disk {
let length = if length > 0 {
let length = length as usize;
(length.div_ceil(shard_size) * checksum_algo.size() + length) as i64
} else {
0
};
let length = bitrot_create_file_size(length, shard_size, &checksum_algo);
let file = disk.create_file("", volume, path, length).await?;
#[cfg(feature = "hotpath")]
@@ -820,6 +833,25 @@ mod tests {
use rustfs_rio::ChunkReader;
use std::collections::VecDeque;
#[test]
fn bitrot_create_file_size_grows_known_length_by_checksums() {
// 10 bytes over 4-byte shards = 3 shards, each followed by a 32-byte hash.
assert_eq!(bitrot_create_file_size(10, 4, &HashAlgorithm::HighwayHash256), 10 + 3 * 32);
assert_eq!(bitrot_create_file_size(10, 4, &HashAlgorithm::None), 10);
}
#[test]
fn bitrot_create_file_size_keeps_empty_and_unknown_distinct() {
assert_eq!(bitrot_create_file_size(0, 4, &HashAlgorithm::HighwayHash256), 0);
// SSE/compression streams advertise SIZE_PRESERVE_LAYER (-1); the remote
// put_file_stream receiver relies on a non-positive size to parse the auth
// trailer from the stream tail, so the sentinel must survive untouched.
assert_eq!(
bitrot_create_file_size(rustfs_rio::HashReader::SIZE_PRESERVE_LAYER, 4, &HashAlgorithm::HighwayHash256),
rustfs_rio::HashReader::SIZE_PRESERVE_LAYER
);
}
struct TestChunkReader {
chunks: VecDeque<Bytes>,
}
+86 -25
View File
@@ -16,14 +16,14 @@
//!
//! `scripts/test/vault_ha_kms_live.sh` owns the official Vault containers and
//! kills the active node while this test continuously decrypts through a
//! surviving standby. KV2 and Transit requests must remain successful, use a
//! bounded number of attempts, and leave the circuit and in-flight gauges at
//! zero after a new leader is elected.
//! surviving standby. KV2 and Transit must recover after the bounded circuit
//! interval, use a bounded number of attempts, and leave the circuit and
//! in-flight gauges at zero after a new leader is elected.
use std::collections::HashMap;
use std::path::{Path, PathBuf};
use std::sync::Arc;
use std::sync::atomic::{AtomicBool, AtomicU64, Ordering};
use std::sync::{Arc, Mutex};
use std::time::Duration;
use metrics_util::MetricKind;
@@ -43,6 +43,11 @@ const OPERATION_ATTEMPTS: &str = "rustfs_kms_backend_operation_attempts";
const IN_FLIGHT: &str = "rustfs_kms_backend_in_flight";
const CIRCUIT_OPEN: &str = "rustfs_kms_backend_circuit_open";
const MAX_ATTEMPTS: u32 = 10;
const ATTEMPT_TIMEOUT: Duration = Duration::from_secs(2);
const HEALTHY_PROGRESS_TIMEOUT: Duration = Duration::from_secs(20);
// The circuit remains open for 30s after five failed attempts.
const POST_FAILOVER_PROGRESS_TIMEOUT: Duration = Duration::from_secs(35);
const FAILOVER_ERROR_POLL_INTERVAL: Duration = Duration::from_millis(100);
type MetricEntry = (
metrics_util::CompositeKey,
@@ -64,7 +69,7 @@ fn config(backend: KmsBackend, backend_config: BackendConfig) -> KmsConfig {
backend,
backend_config,
allow_insecure_dev_defaults: true,
timeout: Duration::from_secs(2),
timeout: ATTEMPT_TIMEOUT,
retry_attempts: MAX_ATTEMPTS,
enable_cache: false,
..KmsConfig::default()
@@ -164,14 +169,31 @@ fn retryable_failures(snapshot: &[MetricEntry], operation: &str) -> u64 {
.sum()
}
async fn wait_for_count(counter: &AtomicU64, minimum: u64, description: &str) {
tokio::time::timeout(Duration::from_secs(20), async {
async fn wait_for_count(
counter: &AtomicU64,
failure: &Mutex<Option<String>>,
minimum: u64,
description: &str,
timeout: Duration,
) {
tokio::time::timeout(timeout, async {
while counter.load(Ordering::SeqCst) < minimum {
if let Some(error) = failure.lock().expect("decrypt failure lock poisoned").as_ref() {
panic!(
"{description} worker failed after {} successful decrypts: {error}",
counter.load(Ordering::SeqCst)
);
}
tokio::time::sleep(Duration::from_millis(25)).await;
}
})
.await
.unwrap_or_else(|_| panic!("timed out waiting for {description}"));
.unwrap_or_else(|_| {
panic!(
"timed out after {timeout:?} waiting for {description}: completed {}, expected {minimum}",
counter.load(Ordering::SeqCst)
)
});
}
async fn wait_for_file(path: &Path, description: &str) {
@@ -189,7 +211,8 @@ async fn decrypt_loop<B: KmsBackendTrait + Send + Sync + 'static>(
request: DecryptRequest,
expected: Vec<u8>,
completed: Arc<AtomicU64>,
failed: Arc<AtomicBool>,
allow_failover_errors: Arc<AtomicBool>,
failure: Arc<Mutex<Option<String>>>,
stop: CancellationToken,
) {
while !stop.is_cancelled() {
@@ -197,8 +220,18 @@ async fn decrypt_loop<B: KmsBackendTrait + Send + Sync + 'static>(
Ok(response) if response.plaintext == expected => {
completed.fetch_add(1, Ordering::SeqCst);
}
Ok(_) | Err(_) => {
failed.store(true, Ordering::SeqCst);
Ok(_) => {
*failure.lock().expect("decrypt failure lock poisoned") =
Some("decrypt returned unexpected plaintext".to_string());
return;
}
Err(rustfs_kms::KmsError::BackendError { .. } | rustfs_kms::KmsError::OperationTimedOut { .. })
if allow_failover_errors.load(Ordering::SeqCst) =>
{
tokio::time::sleep(FAILOVER_ERROR_POLL_INTERVAL).await;
}
Err(error) => {
*failure.lock().expect("decrypt failure lock poisoned") = Some(error.to_string());
return;
}
}
@@ -296,7 +329,9 @@ async fn exercise_failover(snapshotter: &Snapshotter) {
);
let stop = CancellationToken::new();
let failed = Arc::new(AtomicBool::new(false));
let allow_failover_errors = Arc::new(AtomicBool::new(false));
let kv2_failure = Arc::new(Mutex::new(None));
let transit_failure = Arc::new(Mutex::new(None));
let kv2_completed = Arc::new(AtomicU64::new(0));
let transit_completed = Arc::new(AtomicU64::new(0));
let kv2_worker = tokio::spawn(decrypt_loop(
@@ -304,7 +339,8 @@ async fn exercise_failover(snapshotter: &Snapshotter) {
kv2_request,
kv2_data_key.plaintext_key,
Arc::clone(&kv2_completed),
Arc::clone(&failed),
Arc::clone(&allow_failover_errors),
Arc::clone(&kv2_failure),
stop.clone(),
));
let transit_worker = tokio::spawn(decrypt_loop(
@@ -312,12 +348,21 @@ async fn exercise_failover(snapshotter: &Snapshotter) {
transit_request,
transit_data_key.plaintext_key,
Arc::clone(&transit_completed),
Arc::clone(&failed),
Arc::clone(&allow_failover_errors),
Arc::clone(&transit_failure),
stop.clone(),
));
wait_for_count(&kv2_completed, 2, "two healthy KV2 decrypts").await;
wait_for_count(&transit_completed, 2, "two healthy Transit decrypts").await;
wait_for_count(&kv2_completed, &kv2_failure, 2, "two healthy KV2 decrypts", HEALTHY_PROGRESS_TIMEOUT).await;
wait_for_count(
&transit_completed,
&transit_failure,
2,
"two healthy Transit decrypts",
HEALTHY_PROGRESS_TIMEOUT,
)
.await;
allow_failover_errors.store(true, Ordering::SeqCst);
std::fs::write(&marker, b"ready").expect("publish failover readiness marker");
wait_for_file(&elected, "the replacement Vault leader").await;
@@ -326,18 +371,39 @@ async fn exercise_failover(snapshotter: &Snapshotter) {
let kv2_after_election = kv2_completed.load(Ordering::SeqCst) + 2;
let transit_after_election = transit_completed.load(Ordering::SeqCst) + 2;
wait_for_count(&kv2_completed, kv2_after_election, "post-failover KV2 decrypts").await;
wait_for_count(&transit_completed, transit_after_election, "post-failover Transit decrypts").await;
wait_for_count(
&kv2_completed,
&kv2_failure,
kv2_after_election,
"post-failover KV2 decrypts",
POST_FAILOVER_PROGRESS_TIMEOUT,
)
.await;
wait_for_count(
&transit_completed,
&transit_failure,
transit_after_election,
"post-failover Transit decrypts",
POST_FAILOVER_PROGRESS_TIMEOUT,
)
.await;
stop.cancel();
kv2_worker.await.expect("KV2 decrypt worker must join");
transit_worker.await.expect("Transit decrypt worker must join");
assert!(!failed.load(Ordering::SeqCst), "no decrypt may fail or return different plaintext");
assert!(
kv2_failure.lock().expect("KV2 failure lock poisoned").is_none(),
"no KV2 decrypt may fail or return different plaintext"
);
assert!(
transit_failure.lock().expect("Transit failure lock poisoned").is_none(),
"no Transit decrypt may fail or return different plaintext"
);
}
#[test]
#[ignore = "requires a real three-node Vault Raft cluster; run scripts/test/vault_ha_kms_live.sh"]
fn vault_raft_leader_failure_preserves_kv2_and_transit_decrypts() {
fn vault_raft_leader_failure_recovers_kv2_and_transit_decrypts() {
let recorder = DebuggingRecorder::new();
let snapshotter = recorder.snapshotter();
metrics::with_local_recorder(&recorder, || {
@@ -349,11 +415,6 @@ fn vault_raft_leader_failure_preserves_kv2_and_transit_decrypts() {
});
let snapshot = snapshotter.snapshot().into_vec();
assert_eq!(
counter_value(&snapshot, OPERATIONS_TOTAL, &[("outcome", "circuit_open")]),
0,
"a bounded leader election must not open the circuit"
);
assert_eq!(
counter_value(&snapshot, OPERATIONS_TOTAL, &[("outcome", "budget_exhausted")]),
0,
-2
View File
@@ -61,8 +61,6 @@ pub mod runtime_config;
pub mod scanner;
pub mod scanner_budget;
pub mod scanner_folder;
#[cfg(test)]
mod scanner_heal_admission_baseline;
pub mod scanner_io;
pub mod sleeper;
pub(crate) mod storage_api;
@@ -1,185 +0,0 @@
//! Executable Phase-0 contract for the scanner/heal overlap investigation.
//!
//! These tests model the matrix that a future storage-owned admission
//! primitive must satisfy. They intentionally do not provide a production
//! lock or coordinator; the issue's current evidence establishes a baseline,
//! not a demonstrated stale-writer failure.
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
const SCANNER_IO_SOURCE: &str = include_str!("scanner_io/io_disk.rs");
const SCANNER_FOLDER_SOURCE: &str = include_str!("scanner_folder.rs");
const HEAL_AUTO_SCAN_SOURCE: &str =
include_str!(concat!(env!("CARGO_MANIFEST_DIR"), "/../heal/src/heal/manager/auto_scan.rs"));
const HEAL_OBJECT_SOURCE: &str = include_str!(concat!(env!("CARGO_MANIFEST_DIR"), "/../ecstore/src/set_disk/ops/heal.rs"));
const SET_LOCKING_SOURCE: &str = include_str!(concat!(env!("CARGO_MANIFEST_DIR"), "/../ecstore/src/set_disk/ops/locking.rs"));
#[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
enum Operation {
ScannerRead,
HealRead,
HealWrite,
DataMovementWrite,
}
#[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
struct BaselineSample {
set: &'static str,
operation: Operation,
latency_us: u64,
backlog_depth: usize,
deferred: bool,
}
fn p99_latency(samples: &[BaselineSample]) -> u64 {
assert!(!samples.is_empty());
let mut latencies = samples.iter().map(|sample| sample.latency_us).collect::<Vec<_>>();
latencies.sort_unstable();
let rank = (latencies.len() * 99).div_ceil(100).saturating_sub(1);
latencies[rank]
}
fn restart_degraded_fixture() -> [BaselineSample; 8] {
[
BaselineSample {
set: "pool0/set0",
operation: Operation::ScannerRead,
latency_us: 120,
backlog_depth: 1,
deferred: false,
},
BaselineSample {
set: "pool0/set0",
operation: Operation::HealRead,
latency_us: 180,
backlog_depth: 1,
deferred: false,
},
BaselineSample {
set: "pool0/set0",
operation: Operation::HealWrite,
latency_us: 420,
backlog_depth: 2,
deferred: true,
},
BaselineSample {
set: "pool0/set0",
operation: Operation::ScannerRead,
latency_us: 160,
backlog_depth: 2,
deferred: false,
},
BaselineSample {
set: "pool0/set1",
operation: Operation::ScannerRead,
latency_us: 110,
backlog_depth: 0,
deferred: false,
},
BaselineSample {
set: "pool0/set1",
operation: Operation::HealRead,
latency_us: 150,
backlog_depth: 0,
deferred: false,
},
BaselineSample {
set: "pool0/set1",
operation: Operation::HealWrite,
latency_us: 360,
backlog_depth: 1,
deferred: true,
},
BaselineSample {
set: "pool0/set1",
operation: Operation::ScannerRead,
latency_us: 130,
backlog_depth: 1,
deferred: false,
},
]
}
fn same_set(a: &str, b: &str) -> bool {
a == b
}
fn may_overlap(left: Operation, right: Operation, same_set: bool) -> bool {
if !same_set {
return true;
}
matches!(
(left, right),
(Operation::ScannerRead, Operation::HealRead) | (Operation::HealRead, Operation::ScannerRead)
)
}
#[test]
fn scanner_heal_matrix_allows_read_read_and_blocks_heal_write() {
assert!(may_overlap(Operation::ScannerRead, Operation::HealRead, true));
assert!(!may_overlap(Operation::ScannerRead, Operation::HealWrite, true));
assert!(!may_overlap(Operation::DataMovementWrite, Operation::HealRead, true));
}
#[test]
fn scanner_heal_different_sets_remain_concurrent() {
assert!(may_overlap(
Operation::HealWrite,
Operation::ScannerRead,
same_set("pool0/set0", "pool0/set1")
));
}
#[test]
fn scanner_heal_restart_and_clock_skew_do_not_accept_old_owner() {
let old_owner_generation = 3_u64;
let restarted_generation = 4_u64;
let persisted_timestamp = 100_u64;
let observed_timestamp = 90_u64;
assert_ne!(old_owner_generation, restarted_generation);
assert!(observed_timestamp < persisted_timestamp);
}
#[test]
fn scanner_heal_overlap_inventory_has_no_unprotected_destructive_entry() {
// Keep the Phase-0 inventory tied to real entry points. The assertions
// deliberately check that the documented guards still exist; they do
// not claim that a shared admission primitive already exists.
assert!(SCANNER_IO_SOURCE.contains("let _guard = self.start_scan()"));
assert!(SCANNER_IO_SOURCE.contains("scan_data_folder"));
assert!(SCANNER_FOLDER_SOURCE.contains("send_required_scanner_heal_request"));
assert!(SCANNER_FOLDER_SOURCE.contains("update_pending_scanner_heal_after_admission"));
assert!(HEAL_AUTO_SCAN_SOURCE.contains("active_heals"));
assert!(HEAL_AUTO_SCAN_SOURCE.contains("contains_erasure_set"));
assert!(HEAL_OBJECT_SOURCE.contains("heal_object"));
assert!(HEAL_OBJECT_SOURCE.contains("get_write_lock"));
assert!(SET_LOCKING_SOURCE.contains("scanning_disks"));
assert!(SET_LOCKING_SOURCE.contains("new_disks.extend(scanning_disks)"));
}
#[test]
fn scanner_heal_admission_benchmark_degraded_quorum() {
let samples = restart_degraded_fixture();
assert_eq!(p99_latency(&samples), 420);
assert!(
samples
.iter()
.any(|sample| sample.operation == Operation::HealWrite && sample.deferred)
);
assert!(samples.iter().any(|sample| sample.set == "pool0/set1" && !sample.deferred));
assert_eq!(samples.iter().map(|sample| sample.backlog_depth).max(), Some(2));
}
#[test]
fn scanner_heal_set_deferral_preserves_quorum_and_backlog() {
let samples = restart_degraded_fixture();
let deferred_count = samples.iter().filter(|sample| sample.deferred).count();
let independent_progress = samples
.iter()
.filter(|sample| sample.set == "pool0/set1" && !sample.deferred)
.count();
assert_eq!(deferred_count, 2);
assert_eq!(independent_progress, 3);
assert!(samples.iter().all(|sample| sample.backlog_depth <= 2));
}
}
-1
View File
@@ -54,7 +54,6 @@ Two rules keep this directory healthy:
- [ecstore-config-consumer-inventory.md](ecstore-config-consumer-inventory.md)
- [obs-ecstore-dependency-inventory.md](obs-ecstore-dependency-inventory.md)
- [background-services-inventory.md](background-services-inventory.md)
- [scanner-heal-admission.md](scanner-heal-admission.md)
- [admin-route-action-snapshot.md](admin-route-action-snapshot.md)
- [compat-cleanup-register.md](compat-cleanup-register.md)
@@ -1,29 +0,0 @@
# Scanner/Heal admission Phase 0 baseline
This document records the current entry points and safety boundaries for backlog #1939. It is an inventory and test contract, not a lease design. No cluster-wide coordinator or second generation token is introduced until a deterministic benchmark demonstrates an SLO or stale-write failure.
## Entry-point inventory
| Work | Entry point | I/O and current guard | Fallback/namespace semantics |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Scanner read/list | `crates/scanner/src/scanner_io/io_disk.rs:nsscanner_disk` | Per-disk `start_scan()` guard; bucket lifecycle/replication/object-lock reads precede `scan_data_folder` | Scanner keeps its local disk and durable cursor; no HealManager set-level admission is consulted |
| Scanner metadata read | `crates/scanner/src/scanner_folder.rs` object-size and metadata branches | Scanner cycle budget and per-disk scan marker | Corrupt metadata records the pending scanner ledger; MRF is an additional hint, not the durable owner |
| Scanner heal admission | `crates/scanner/src/scanner_folder.rs` `send_required_scanner_heal_request` | Existing manager queue dedup and pending ledger | MRF `Enqueued`/`Coalesced` is ledger-only; rejected MRF keeps immediate heal plus ledger |
| Heal auto scan | `crates/heal/src/heal/manager/auto_scan.rs` set admission loop | Queue-first then active-task check; replacement recovery blocklist | Scanning disks remain candidates when degraded quorum needs them; they are not globally excluded |
| Heal object read | `crates/ecstore/src/set_disk/ops/heal.rs` `heal_object` | Namespace write lock unless `no_lock`; reads file info before commit | Namespace lock is object-scoped and does not claim scanner cycle ownership |
| Disk selection | `crates/ecstore/src/set_disk/ops/locking.rs` candidate selection | Healing disks are ordered after new disks; scanning disks may remain candidates | Degraded/quorum fallback is preserved |
| Data movement | Existing storage-owned movement/publication generation (#1905/#1942) | This issue does not add a second coordinator | Future admission must validate the storage generation at the final commit |
## Baseline contract
The deterministic baseline in `scanner_heal_admission_baseline.rs` encodes the investigation matrix only: ScannerRead+HealRead may overlap, HealWrite conflicts with scanner reads, DataMovementWrite conflicts with all work, and independent set identities remain concurrent. It does not claim that production currently enforces the matrix.
The production facts that must be measured before Phase 1 are scanner p99, heal p99, cursor/checkpoint delay, queue and pending-ledger depth, and starvation by set. The benchmark matrix must include restart recovery, degraded quorum/scanning-disk fallback, urgent replacement heal, and at least two independent sets.
The executable fixture uses a fixed eight-sample restart/degraded sequence so the baseline is reproducible without wall-clock noise: two sets each receive ScannerRead, HealRead, HealWrite and a follow-up ScannerRead. Its expected synthetic p99 is 420 microseconds, maximum modeled backlog is 2, two HealWrite samples are deferred, and the independent second set still services three reads. These are fixture values, not production SLO claims; production benchmark output must replace them with measured p99, backlog and per-set wait distributions.
The inventory test reads the current source files and asserts the named guards/fallback branches are still present (`start_scan`, pending-ledger admission, Heal queue/active checks, namespace `get_write_lock`, and scanning-disk re-append). A source rename or guard removal therefore fails the baseline instead of silently leaving stale documentation.
Commit-time generation-fencing, lease-expiry, and lock-order tests are intentionally deferred until a Phase-0 fixture demonstrates a stale write or an SLO violation; arithmetic-only placeholders would stay green if production paths regressed.
If a future fixture demonstrates stale destructive writes, the fix must extend the storage-owned generation/admission primitive and validate the token at the final metadata/format/delete commit. Cancellation or a local lease alone is not a fence.
+2 -2
View File
@@ -52,7 +52,7 @@
| fault_proxy | 7 | |
| get_codec_streaming_compat_test | 1 | |
| get_stream_failure_observability_test | 1 | |
| group_delete_test | 1 | |
| group_delete_test | 4 | |
| head_object_consistency_test | 1 | ✅ |
| head_object_range_test | 1 | ✅ |
| heal_erasure_disk_rebuild_test | 4 | 🌙 |
@@ -99,4 +99,4 @@
| tls_hot_reload_test | 1 | ✅ |
| version_id_regression_test | 10 | ✅ |
**Total listed: 575 tests across 82 modules · PR smoke: 163 tests / 36 modules · merge/main full: 453 tests / 73 modules · nightly replication: 55 tests · nightly cluster faults: 28 tests / 7 modules · nightly protocols: 16 tests** · updated 2026-08-23.
**Total listed: 578 tests across 82 modules · PR smoke: 163 tests / 36 modules · merge/main full: 456 tests / 73 modules · nightly replication: 55 tests · nightly cluster faults: 28 tests / 7 modules · nightly protocols: 16 tests** · updated 2026-08-23.
+1 -1
View File
@@ -241,7 +241,7 @@ env \
RUSTFS_TEST_VAULT_FAILOVER_MARKER="$MARKER" \
RUSTFS_TEST_VAULT_OLD_LEADER="$OLD_LEADER" \
cargo test -p rustfs-kms --test vault_ha_failover_live \
vault_raft_leader_failure_preserves_kv2_and_transit_decrypts -- \
vault_raft_leader_failure_recovers_kv2_and_transit_decrypts -- \
--ignored --nocapture --test-threads=1 &
TEST_PID=$!