Configure the s3-tests harness with a local KMS key so SSE-KMS cases run in CI without relying on an external KMS service.
Also move the anonymous POST default SSE-KMS regression onto the shared local KMS test environment.
Co-authored-by: zhi22915 <qiuzgang@gmail.com>
Add a W13 durable MRF evidence runner that emits measured G07, G08, and P4 JSON artifacts and release descriptors through the existing scanner/heal bundle gate.
The runner now executes the ignored MRF replay evidence test with an exact full test path, validates raw artifact kinds and gate decisions, prepares Linux tmpfs-backed ENOSPC roots for G08, and documents the Linux/long-soak boundaries.
Co-authored-by: zhi22915 <qiuzgang@gmail.com>
Refresh the committed e2e-distributed selection digest after the EC8+4 Scanner/Heal evidence case joined the profile, and document the registry-aware runner entry for the distributed case.
Co-authored-by: zhi22915 <qiuzgang@gmail.com>
Linux libtest defaults can abort these deep EC-store futures before the assertions run. Wrap the async scoped fallback cases in the repository's dedicated-stack test pattern so the default cargo test path exercises the oracle directly.
Co-authored-by: zhi22915 <qiuzgang@gmail.com>
* feat(scanner): admit durable segment proof evidence
Validate complete set snapshot segment invalidation proof metadata against the current dirty usage generation window and scanner process epoch before clearing durable producer and restart-gap activation blockers.
Production segment reuse remains gated by the explicit activation flag.
Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
Co-Authored-By: zhi22915 <qiuzgang@gmail.com>
* feat(scanner): replay segment proof from root snapshots
Carry segment invalidation proof metadata into root snapshot set states so a complete published baseline can replay the durable producer evidence recorded by each set cache.
Keep the field additive for older readers and leave incomplete or LKG set states unproven.
Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
Co-Authored-By: zhi22915 <qiuzgang@gmail.com>
---------
Co-authored-by: zhi22915 <qiuzgang@gmail.com>
Add a W16 Scanner/Heal evidence runner that executes the recovery-intent crash-boundary and quota-authority lanes, emits measured G04/G12 JSON artifacts, and validates the resulting single-gate release descriptors.
Wire its shell self-test into script-tests and document the release evidence entry point.
Co-authored-by: zhi22915 <qiuzgang@gmail.com>
Align the Scanner/Heal release requirement registry with the release bundle gate for P4 so the closure checklist advertises MRF scale, replay cost, retained responsibility, and cleanup/GC soak evidence together.
Co-authored-by: zhi22915 <qiuzgang@gmail.com>
Record scanner segment producer identities with the dirty usage generation they invalidated, then expose a cycle-local producer evidence snapshot for segment reuse activation preflight.
Production activation remains fail-closed until durable producer identity and restart-gap proof are available.
Co-authored-by: zhi22915 <qiuzgang@gmail.com>
Require Scanner/Heal release bundle JSON artifacts to carry hard-domain evidence fields for mixed-version, crash, capacity, disk-full, replica-loss, and MRF cleanup gates. This prevents a descriptor from approving a hard gate while pointing at a generic measured artifact that lacks the boundary-specific oracle fields.
Co-authored-by: zhi22915 <qiuzgang@gmail.com>
Exercise the committed MRF replay checkpoint path with a real ECStore-backed bucket incarnation, retain the replay anchor until an exact verified proof arrives, then delete the proof-discharged checkpoint and prove a subsequent restart does not resurrect the replayed work.
Co-authored-by: zhi22915 <qiuzgang@gmail.com>
Keep checksum verification output out of the command substitution that resolves the previous-release binary for the G09 runner.
Also tolerate non-GNU sha256sum in local self-tests by falling back to shasum when GNU --check support is unavailable.
Co-authored-by: zhi22915 <qiuzgang@gmail.com>
Validate the selected G09 evidence lane before process-substitution case expansion so --plan-only cannot turn an unknown --test value into an empty successful plan.
Co-authored-by: zhi22915 <qiuzgang@gmail.com>
* fix(replication): close the GA blocker set from backlog#2366 (#7503)
* fix(replication): close GA blockers from backlog#2366
Implements the P1 set from the pre-GA replication audit:
- Replication rule tag filters now require every And.Tag to match, replacing
the s3s OR semantics with a local AND matcher that fails closed on a
malformed tag.
- A replicated group membership change no longer writes the group status, so
a membership update carrying the default Enabled status cannot silently
re-enable a disabled group on the peer.
- A successful IAM import schedules one collapsed full-IAM snapshot per remote
peer instead of leaving the imported entities local-only.
- A pending endpoint refresh is redriven by the heavyweight reconcile tick,
carries its own ilm-expiry override, and no longer blocks a remove that
drops every unacknowledged peer.
- Site metrics expose local replication failure totals and rolling windows;
node-level counters no longer report a constructed zero.
- set/remove-remote-target notify peer metadata caches before returning, so a
follow-up put-bucket-replication on another node sees the target.
- Adds the site-replication operations runbook, a docs index, a replication
support boundary section, and the Replication changelog section.
* fix(site-replication): resume only a locally driven endpoint refresh
The peer-side edit handler journals a pending endpoint refresh with an empty
`remote_peers` map and commits it inside the same request through
`apply_internal_peer_edit`. The reconcile tick could not tell that journal
from the coordinator's own: with no required peers it reads as complete on
sight, so the tick committed it with `edit_state` - losing the local-name
sync - and cleared it under the request that owned it, whose commit then
reported the refresh as changed and denied the coordinator the peer
acknowledgement it was waiting for.
Resume now runs only for a journal that carries the fan-out topology. A
receiver's journal stays for the coordinator to redrive with the same
refresh id, which is the path that already recovers it.
* fix(site-replication): keep an explicit disabled group status on a snapshot
Skipping the group-status write whenever an item carries members stopped a
membership change from re-enabling a disabled group, but it also silenced the
full-IAM snapshot, which always sends members together with the sender's real
status. A peer that did not have the group yet created it through
`GroupInfo::new` - enabled - so a bootstrap, a repair, or the snapshot an IAM
import now schedules handed every member of a frozen group live access there.
The madmin wire maps an unset `groupStatus` to Enabled, so only Enabled can be
a default. Disabled is always explicit and is applied again.
* fix(site-replication): schedule the import snapshot without recording a failure
`import-iam` reused the failure-recording path to queue its full-IAM
snapshot. That raises `retry_count` on every call, so three imports - the
normal shape of a bulk migration done one archive at a time - escalated a
healthy peer to `retryStats.failed` with the scheduling note shown as
`lastError`, which is exactly the signal the runbook tells operators to
repair. A full retry queue also turned a completed import into a 503.
Scheduling now only ensures the collapsed entry exists, and a failure to
schedule is logged instead of failing the request: the entities are already
imported and the reconcile pass still closes the gap.
* fix(admin): stop reporting replication failures as retries
`retries` is the minio-go counter for redeliveries, and mc prints it as such.
Filling it with the failure count claimed a redelivery that never happens: a
failed object is not retried by an event today, it waits for the scanner heal
pass. `errors` keeps the failure counters; `retries` stays zero until there is
a real redelivery to count, and the runbook now says so.
* perf(site-replication): aggregate failure windows without cloning bucket stats
`site_metrics_snapshot` went through `get_all`, which clones every bucket's
stats, and then scanned each target's sample deque twice. That deque is
bounded only by the one-hour window, so an unreachable target under load -
the case an operator polls this endpoint for - made every
`mc admin replicate status` copy the whole backlog and hold the read lock
against the failure path while doing it.
It now folds under the read lock and takes both windows in one walk. The
`max` against the serialized `last_minute` / `last_hour` snapshots is dropped:
those are stamped onto per-bucket clones elsewhere and are always zero in this
node-local cache.
* fix(site-replication): reject a conflicting ilm-expiry override on a re-run
The commit now reads the ilm-expiry override back out of the pending refresh
journal, so a second edit that asks for a different value had it dropped while
the request still reported success. Re-running without the flag keeps pinning
the recorded value - that is the documented way to redrive a stuck refresh -
but an explicit different value is now rejected instead of ignored.
* fix(admin): do not fail a remote-target write on a peer reload error
set/remove-remote-target propagated the peer metadata reload error, so a
target that was already persisted and live on this node reported a 5xx to the
client whenever one peer could not be reached. Every S3 bucket-config write
path treats that reload as best effort and only warns; these two admin
handlers now do the same, and the reason is logged with the bucket and action.
* fix(site-replication): undo every bucket a cut-short refresh rewrote
When a remove accepted on another node clears the refresh journal mid-pass,
only the bucket holding the lock at that moment had its restored target
undone. The buckets rewritten earlier in the same pass kept a target pointing
at the removed peer whenever the remove's own cleanup had already walked past
them. The undo now covers every bucket this pass rewrote, attempting all of
them so one failure does not strand the rest.
* fix(site-replication): keep replay running while an endpoint refresh is pending
A pending endpoint refresh took the whole heavyweight pass with it, so a peer
that never came back froze IAM and bucket replay to every healthy peer too -
the stall this journal's resume path was meant to end. The refresh arm now
drains the retry queue before returning; it replays per-peer deliveries
against the endpoints currently committed in state, so it is unaffected by the
edit in flight. Bucket wiring reconciliation still waits, because it rewrites
the very targets the refresh is changing, and the runbook now says so.
* test(e2e): cover the AND semantics of a two-tag replication filter
The acceptance matrix only had a single-tag rule, which matches under both AND
and OR semantics and therefore proved nothing about the filter this fix
changed. It now also carries a two-tag `And` rule - the shape
`mc replicate add --tags "k1=v1&k2=v2"` writes - and asserts that an object
with one of the two tags is not admitted while an object with both is.
No new test function, so the nightly selection digest is unchanged.
* refactor(site-replication): fold the refresh state-change error into one constructor
The endpoint-refresh work added three `s3_error!` invocation lines, which the
s3s footprint ratchet is meant to prevent. Five copies of the same
concurrent-change error now share one constructor, so the surface nets one
line smaller than main; the baseline is retightened to match.
* fix(site-replication): report a peer whose IAM snapshot waits for a repair
An escalated snapshot entry records a deletion a snapshot cannot replay, so
only a repair settles it and the marker must survive. Scheduling an import
snapshot therefore leaves that peer's entry alone - and now says so, instead
of returning success while nothing was scheduled for it.
* docs(operations): state the group-status and escalation convergence limits
Two boundaries the fixes in this branch make load-bearing: a membership change
never carries an enable, so a group disabled on one site only has to be
re-enabled there explicitly; and a peer holding an escalated IAM entry does
not receive a scheduled snapshot, including the one a bulk import schedules,
until a repair settles it.
* fix(ci): bind performance runs to selected inputs (#7512)
* fix(targets): reject trailing batch items (#7508)
* test(scanner): emit G09 release bundle gate evidence
Write a bundle-ready G09 gate descriptor from the Linux upgrade evidence runner and validate the single G09 gate with the shared release-bundle rules without approving the full Scanner/Heal release.
Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
Co-Authored-By: zhi22915 <qiuzgang@gmail.com>
---------
Co-authored-by: 唐小鸭 <tangtang1251@qq.com>
Co-authored-by: Zhengchao An <anzhengchao@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: cui fliter <imcusg@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: zhi22915 <qiuzgang@gmail.com>
* fix(replication): close the GA blocker set from backlog#2366 (#7503)
* fix(replication): close GA blockers from backlog#2366
Implements the P1 set from the pre-GA replication audit:
- Replication rule tag filters now require every And.Tag to match, replacing
the s3s OR semantics with a local AND matcher that fails closed on a
malformed tag.
- A replicated group membership change no longer writes the group status, so
a membership update carrying the default Enabled status cannot silently
re-enable a disabled group on the peer.
- A successful IAM import schedules one collapsed full-IAM snapshot per remote
peer instead of leaving the imported entities local-only.
- A pending endpoint refresh is redriven by the heavyweight reconcile tick,
carries its own ilm-expiry override, and no longer blocks a remove that
drops every unacknowledged peer.
- Site metrics expose local replication failure totals and rolling windows;
node-level counters no longer report a constructed zero.
- set/remove-remote-target notify peer metadata caches before returning, so a
follow-up put-bucket-replication on another node sees the target.
- Adds the site-replication operations runbook, a docs index, a replication
support boundary section, and the Replication changelog section.
* fix(site-replication): resume only a locally driven endpoint refresh
The peer-side edit handler journals a pending endpoint refresh with an empty
`remote_peers` map and commits it inside the same request through
`apply_internal_peer_edit`. The reconcile tick could not tell that journal
from the coordinator's own: with no required peers it reads as complete on
sight, so the tick committed it with `edit_state` - losing the local-name
sync - and cleared it under the request that owned it, whose commit then
reported the refresh as changed and denied the coordinator the peer
acknowledgement it was waiting for.
Resume now runs only for a journal that carries the fan-out topology. A
receiver's journal stays for the coordinator to redrive with the same
refresh id, which is the path that already recovers it.
* fix(site-replication): keep an explicit disabled group status on a snapshot
Skipping the group-status write whenever an item carries members stopped a
membership change from re-enabling a disabled group, but it also silenced the
full-IAM snapshot, which always sends members together with the sender's real
status. A peer that did not have the group yet created it through
`GroupInfo::new` - enabled - so a bootstrap, a repair, or the snapshot an IAM
import now schedules handed every member of a frozen group live access there.
The madmin wire maps an unset `groupStatus` to Enabled, so only Enabled can be
a default. Disabled is always explicit and is applied again.
* fix(site-replication): schedule the import snapshot without recording a failure
`import-iam` reused the failure-recording path to queue its full-IAM
snapshot. That raises `retry_count` on every call, so three imports - the
normal shape of a bulk migration done one archive at a time - escalated a
healthy peer to `retryStats.failed` with the scheduling note shown as
`lastError`, which is exactly the signal the runbook tells operators to
repair. A full retry queue also turned a completed import into a 503.
Scheduling now only ensures the collapsed entry exists, and a failure to
schedule is logged instead of failing the request: the entities are already
imported and the reconcile pass still closes the gap.
* fix(admin): stop reporting replication failures as retries
`retries` is the minio-go counter for redeliveries, and mc prints it as such.
Filling it with the failure count claimed a redelivery that never happens: a
failed object is not retried by an event today, it waits for the scanner heal
pass. `errors` keeps the failure counters; `retries` stays zero until there is
a real redelivery to count, and the runbook now says so.
* perf(site-replication): aggregate failure windows without cloning bucket stats
`site_metrics_snapshot` went through `get_all`, which clones every bucket's
stats, and then scanned each target's sample deque twice. That deque is
bounded only by the one-hour window, so an unreachable target under load -
the case an operator polls this endpoint for - made every
`mc admin replicate status` copy the whole backlog and hold the read lock
against the failure path while doing it.
It now folds under the read lock and takes both windows in one walk. The
`max` against the serialized `last_minute` / `last_hour` snapshots is dropped:
those are stamped onto per-bucket clones elsewhere and are always zero in this
node-local cache.
* fix(site-replication): reject a conflicting ilm-expiry override on a re-run
The commit now reads the ilm-expiry override back out of the pending refresh
journal, so a second edit that asks for a different value had it dropped while
the request still reported success. Re-running without the flag keeps pinning
the recorded value - that is the documented way to redrive a stuck refresh -
but an explicit different value is now rejected instead of ignored.
* fix(admin): do not fail a remote-target write on a peer reload error
set/remove-remote-target propagated the peer metadata reload error, so a
target that was already persisted and live on this node reported a 5xx to the
client whenever one peer could not be reached. Every S3 bucket-config write
path treats that reload as best effort and only warns; these two admin
handlers now do the same, and the reason is logged with the bucket and action.
* fix(site-replication): undo every bucket a cut-short refresh rewrote
When a remove accepted on another node clears the refresh journal mid-pass,
only the bucket holding the lock at that moment had its restored target
undone. The buckets rewritten earlier in the same pass kept a target pointing
at the removed peer whenever the remove's own cleanup had already walked past
them. The undo now covers every bucket this pass rewrote, attempting all of
them so one failure does not strand the rest.
* fix(site-replication): keep replay running while an endpoint refresh is pending
A pending endpoint refresh took the whole heavyweight pass with it, so a peer
that never came back froze IAM and bucket replay to every healthy peer too -
the stall this journal's resume path was meant to end. The refresh arm now
drains the retry queue before returning; it replays per-peer deliveries
against the endpoints currently committed in state, so it is unaffected by the
edit in flight. Bucket wiring reconciliation still waits, because it rewrites
the very targets the refresh is changing, and the runbook now says so.
* test(e2e): cover the AND semantics of a two-tag replication filter
The acceptance matrix only had a single-tag rule, which matches under both AND
and OR semantics and therefore proved nothing about the filter this fix
changed. It now also carries a two-tag `And` rule - the shape
`mc replicate add --tags "k1=v1&k2=v2"` writes - and asserts that an object
with one of the two tags is not admitted while an object with both is.
No new test function, so the nightly selection digest is unchanged.
* refactor(site-replication): fold the refresh state-change error into one constructor
The endpoint-refresh work added three `s3_error!` invocation lines, which the
s3s footprint ratchet is meant to prevent. Five copies of the same
concurrent-change error now share one constructor, so the surface nets one
line smaller than main; the baseline is retightened to match.
* fix(site-replication): report a peer whose IAM snapshot waits for a repair
An escalated snapshot entry records a deletion a snapshot cannot replay, so
only a repair settles it and the marker must survive. Scheduling an import
snapshot therefore leaves that peer's entry alone - and now says so, instead
of returning success while nothing was scheduled for it.
* docs(operations): state the group-status and escalation convergence limits
Two boundaries the fixes in this branch make load-bearing: a membership change
never carries an enable, so a group disabled on one site only has to be
re-enabled there explicitly; and a peer holding an escalated IAM entry does
not receive a scheduled snapshot, including the one a bulk import schedules,
until a repair settles it.
* fix(ci): bind performance runs to selected inputs (#7512)
* test(e2e): add G09 upgrade evidence runner
Add a Linux x86_64 runner that downloads the pinned previous release, builds the current RustFS binary, runs the mixed-version and rollback upgrade compatibility lanes, and verifies the required Scanner/Heal G09 raw evidence artifacts.
Document the runner and add a shell self-test for help, dry-run, SHA validation, and non-empty artifact directory guards.
Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
Co-Authored-By: zhi22915 <qiuzgang@gmail.com>
---------
Co-authored-by: 唐小鸭 <tangtang1251@qq.com>
Co-authored-by: Zhengchao An <anzhengchao@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: zhi22915 <qiuzgang@gmail.com>
* fix(replication): close the GA blocker set from backlog#2366 (#7503)
* fix(replication): close GA blockers from backlog#2366
Implements the P1 set from the pre-GA replication audit:
- Replication rule tag filters now require every And.Tag to match, replacing
the s3s OR semantics with a local AND matcher that fails closed on a
malformed tag.
- A replicated group membership change no longer writes the group status, so
a membership update carrying the default Enabled status cannot silently
re-enable a disabled group on the peer.
- A successful IAM import schedules one collapsed full-IAM snapshot per remote
peer instead of leaving the imported entities local-only.
- A pending endpoint refresh is redriven by the heavyweight reconcile tick,
carries its own ilm-expiry override, and no longer blocks a remove that
drops every unacknowledged peer.
- Site metrics expose local replication failure totals and rolling windows;
node-level counters no longer report a constructed zero.
- set/remove-remote-target notify peer metadata caches before returning, so a
follow-up put-bucket-replication on another node sees the target.
- Adds the site-replication operations runbook, a docs index, a replication
support boundary section, and the Replication changelog section.
* fix(site-replication): resume only a locally driven endpoint refresh
The peer-side edit handler journals a pending endpoint refresh with an empty
`remote_peers` map and commits it inside the same request through
`apply_internal_peer_edit`. The reconcile tick could not tell that journal
from the coordinator's own: with no required peers it reads as complete on
sight, so the tick committed it with `edit_state` - losing the local-name
sync - and cleared it under the request that owned it, whose commit then
reported the refresh as changed and denied the coordinator the peer
acknowledgement it was waiting for.
Resume now runs only for a journal that carries the fan-out topology. A
receiver's journal stays for the coordinator to redrive with the same
refresh id, which is the path that already recovers it.
* fix(site-replication): keep an explicit disabled group status on a snapshot
Skipping the group-status write whenever an item carries members stopped a
membership change from re-enabling a disabled group, but it also silenced the
full-IAM snapshot, which always sends members together with the sender's real
status. A peer that did not have the group yet created it through
`GroupInfo::new` - enabled - so a bootstrap, a repair, or the snapshot an IAM
import now schedules handed every member of a frozen group live access there.
The madmin wire maps an unset `groupStatus` to Enabled, so only Enabled can be
a default. Disabled is always explicit and is applied again.
* fix(site-replication): schedule the import snapshot without recording a failure
`import-iam` reused the failure-recording path to queue its full-IAM
snapshot. That raises `retry_count` on every call, so three imports - the
normal shape of a bulk migration done one archive at a time - escalated a
healthy peer to `retryStats.failed` with the scheduling note shown as
`lastError`, which is exactly the signal the runbook tells operators to
repair. A full retry queue also turned a completed import into a 503.
Scheduling now only ensures the collapsed entry exists, and a failure to
schedule is logged instead of failing the request: the entities are already
imported and the reconcile pass still closes the gap.
* fix(admin): stop reporting replication failures as retries
`retries` is the minio-go counter for redeliveries, and mc prints it as such.
Filling it with the failure count claimed a redelivery that never happens: a
failed object is not retried by an event today, it waits for the scanner heal
pass. `errors` keeps the failure counters; `retries` stays zero until there is
a real redelivery to count, and the runbook now says so.
* perf(site-replication): aggregate failure windows without cloning bucket stats
`site_metrics_snapshot` went through `get_all`, which clones every bucket's
stats, and then scanned each target's sample deque twice. That deque is
bounded only by the one-hour window, so an unreachable target under load -
the case an operator polls this endpoint for - made every
`mc admin replicate status` copy the whole backlog and hold the read lock
against the failure path while doing it.
It now folds under the read lock and takes both windows in one walk. The
`max` against the serialized `last_minute` / `last_hour` snapshots is dropped:
those are stamped onto per-bucket clones elsewhere and are always zero in this
node-local cache.
* fix(site-replication): reject a conflicting ilm-expiry override on a re-run
The commit now reads the ilm-expiry override back out of the pending refresh
journal, so a second edit that asks for a different value had it dropped while
the request still reported success. Re-running without the flag keeps pinning
the recorded value - that is the documented way to redrive a stuck refresh -
but an explicit different value is now rejected instead of ignored.
* fix(admin): do not fail a remote-target write on a peer reload error
set/remove-remote-target propagated the peer metadata reload error, so a
target that was already persisted and live on this node reported a 5xx to the
client whenever one peer could not be reached. Every S3 bucket-config write
path treats that reload as best effort and only warns; these two admin
handlers now do the same, and the reason is logged with the bucket and action.
* fix(site-replication): undo every bucket a cut-short refresh rewrote
When a remove accepted on another node clears the refresh journal mid-pass,
only the bucket holding the lock at that moment had its restored target
undone. The buckets rewritten earlier in the same pass kept a target pointing
at the removed peer whenever the remove's own cleanup had already walked past
them. The undo now covers every bucket this pass rewrote, attempting all of
them so one failure does not strand the rest.
* fix(site-replication): keep replay running while an endpoint refresh is pending
A pending endpoint refresh took the whole heavyweight pass with it, so a peer
that never came back froze IAM and bucket replay to every healthy peer too -
the stall this journal's resume path was meant to end. The refresh arm now
drains the retry queue before returning; it replays per-peer deliveries
against the endpoints currently committed in state, so it is unaffected by the
edit in flight. Bucket wiring reconciliation still waits, because it rewrites
the very targets the refresh is changing, and the runbook now says so.
* test(e2e): cover the AND semantics of a two-tag replication filter
The acceptance matrix only had a single-tag rule, which matches under both AND
and OR semantics and therefore proved nothing about the filter this fix
changed. It now also carries a two-tag `And` rule - the shape
`mc replicate add --tags "k1=v1&k2=v2"` writes - and asserts that an object
with one of the two tags is not admitted while an object with both is.
No new test function, so the nightly selection digest is unchanged.
* refactor(site-replication): fold the refresh state-change error into one constructor
The endpoint-refresh work added three `s3_error!` invocation lines, which the
s3s footprint ratchet is meant to prevent. Five copies of the same
concurrent-change error now share one constructor, so the surface nets one
line smaller than main; the baseline is retightened to match.
* fix(site-replication): report a peer whose IAM snapshot waits for a repair
An escalated snapshot entry records a deletion a snapshot cannot replay, so
only a repair settles it and the marker must survive. Scheduling an import
snapshot therefore leaves that peer's entry alone - and now says so, instead
of returning success while nothing was scheduled for it.
* docs(operations): state the group-status and escalation convergence limits
Two boundaries the fixes in this branch make load-bearing: a membership change
never carries an enable, so a group disabled on one site only has to be
re-enabled there explicitly; and a peer holding an escalated IAM entry does
not receive a scheduled snapshot, including the one a bulk import schedules,
until a repair settles it.
* fix(ci): bind performance runs to selected inputs (#7512)
* fix(targets): reject trailing batch items (#7508)
* fix(scanner): respect cargo target dir in G09 runner
Write the RustFS feature stamp under the resolved Cargo target directory so remote validation hosts with CARGO_TARGET_DIR set can reuse the built PR-head binary.
Extend the runner plan/self-test path to cover relative target-dir resolution.
Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
Co-Authored-By: zhi22915 <qiuzgang@gmail.com>
---------
Co-authored-by: 唐小鸭 <tangtang1251@qq.com>
Co-authored-by: Zhengchao An <anzhengchao@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: cui fliter <imcusg@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: zhi22915 <qiuzgang@gmail.com>
* fix(replication): close the GA blocker set from backlog#2366 (#7503)
* fix(replication): close GA blockers from backlog#2366
Implements the P1 set from the pre-GA replication audit:
- Replication rule tag filters now require every And.Tag to match, replacing
the s3s OR semantics with a local AND matcher that fails closed on a
malformed tag.
- A replicated group membership change no longer writes the group status, so
a membership update carrying the default Enabled status cannot silently
re-enable a disabled group on the peer.
- A successful IAM import schedules one collapsed full-IAM snapshot per remote
peer instead of leaving the imported entities local-only.
- A pending endpoint refresh is redriven by the heavyweight reconcile tick,
carries its own ilm-expiry override, and no longer blocks a remove that
drops every unacknowledged peer.
- Site metrics expose local replication failure totals and rolling windows;
node-level counters no longer report a constructed zero.
- set/remove-remote-target notify peer metadata caches before returning, so a
follow-up put-bucket-replication on another node sees the target.
- Adds the site-replication operations runbook, a docs index, a replication
support boundary section, and the Replication changelog section.
* fix(site-replication): resume only a locally driven endpoint refresh
The peer-side edit handler journals a pending endpoint refresh with an empty
`remote_peers` map and commits it inside the same request through
`apply_internal_peer_edit`. The reconcile tick could not tell that journal
from the coordinator's own: with no required peers it reads as complete on
sight, so the tick committed it with `edit_state` - losing the local-name
sync - and cleared it under the request that owned it, whose commit then
reported the refresh as changed and denied the coordinator the peer
acknowledgement it was waiting for.
Resume now runs only for a journal that carries the fan-out topology. A
receiver's journal stays for the coordinator to redrive with the same
refresh id, which is the path that already recovers it.
* fix(site-replication): keep an explicit disabled group status on a snapshot
Skipping the group-status write whenever an item carries members stopped a
membership change from re-enabling a disabled group, but it also silenced the
full-IAM snapshot, which always sends members together with the sender's real
status. A peer that did not have the group yet created it through
`GroupInfo::new` - enabled - so a bootstrap, a repair, or the snapshot an IAM
import now schedules handed every member of a frozen group live access there.
The madmin wire maps an unset `groupStatus` to Enabled, so only Enabled can be
a default. Disabled is always explicit and is applied again.
* fix(site-replication): schedule the import snapshot without recording a failure
`import-iam` reused the failure-recording path to queue its full-IAM
snapshot. That raises `retry_count` on every call, so three imports - the
normal shape of a bulk migration done one archive at a time - escalated a
healthy peer to `retryStats.failed` with the scheduling note shown as
`lastError`, which is exactly the signal the runbook tells operators to
repair. A full retry queue also turned a completed import into a 503.
Scheduling now only ensures the collapsed entry exists, and a failure to
schedule is logged instead of failing the request: the entities are already
imported and the reconcile pass still closes the gap.
* fix(admin): stop reporting replication failures as retries
`retries` is the minio-go counter for redeliveries, and mc prints it as such.
Filling it with the failure count claimed a redelivery that never happens: a
failed object is not retried by an event today, it waits for the scanner heal
pass. `errors` keeps the failure counters; `retries` stays zero until there is
a real redelivery to count, and the runbook now says so.
* perf(site-replication): aggregate failure windows without cloning bucket stats
`site_metrics_snapshot` went through `get_all`, which clones every bucket's
stats, and then scanned each target's sample deque twice. That deque is
bounded only by the one-hour window, so an unreachable target under load -
the case an operator polls this endpoint for - made every
`mc admin replicate status` copy the whole backlog and hold the read lock
against the failure path while doing it.
It now folds under the read lock and takes both windows in one walk. The
`max` against the serialized `last_minute` / `last_hour` snapshots is dropped:
those are stamped onto per-bucket clones elsewhere and are always zero in this
node-local cache.
* fix(site-replication): reject a conflicting ilm-expiry override on a re-run
The commit now reads the ilm-expiry override back out of the pending refresh
journal, so a second edit that asks for a different value had it dropped while
the request still reported success. Re-running without the flag keeps pinning
the recorded value - that is the documented way to redrive a stuck refresh -
but an explicit different value is now rejected instead of ignored.
* fix(admin): do not fail a remote-target write on a peer reload error
set/remove-remote-target propagated the peer metadata reload error, so a
target that was already persisted and live on this node reported a 5xx to the
client whenever one peer could not be reached. Every S3 bucket-config write
path treats that reload as best effort and only warns; these two admin
handlers now do the same, and the reason is logged with the bucket and action.
* fix(site-replication): undo every bucket a cut-short refresh rewrote
When a remove accepted on another node clears the refresh journal mid-pass,
only the bucket holding the lock at that moment had its restored target
undone. The buckets rewritten earlier in the same pass kept a target pointing
at the removed peer whenever the remove's own cleanup had already walked past
them. The undo now covers every bucket this pass rewrote, attempting all of
them so one failure does not strand the rest.
* fix(site-replication): keep replay running while an endpoint refresh is pending
A pending endpoint refresh took the whole heavyweight pass with it, so a peer
that never came back froze IAM and bucket replay to every healthy peer too -
the stall this journal's resume path was meant to end. The refresh arm now
drains the retry queue before returning; it replays per-peer deliveries
against the endpoints currently committed in state, so it is unaffected by the
edit in flight. Bucket wiring reconciliation still waits, because it rewrites
the very targets the refresh is changing, and the runbook now says so.
* test(e2e): cover the AND semantics of a two-tag replication filter
The acceptance matrix only had a single-tag rule, which matches under both AND
and OR semantics and therefore proved nothing about the filter this fix
changed. It now also carries a two-tag `And` rule - the shape
`mc replicate add --tags "k1=v1&k2=v2"` writes - and asserts that an object
with one of the two tags is not admitted while an object with both is.
No new test function, so the nightly selection digest is unchanged.
* refactor(site-replication): fold the refresh state-change error into one constructor
The endpoint-refresh work added three `s3_error!` invocation lines, which the
s3s footprint ratchet is meant to prevent. Five copies of the same
concurrent-change error now share one constructor, so the surface nets one
line smaller than main; the baseline is retightened to match.
* fix(site-replication): report a peer whose IAM snapshot waits for a repair
An escalated snapshot entry records a deletion a snapshot cannot replay, so
only a repair settles it and the marker must survive. Scheduling an import
snapshot therefore leaves that peer's entry alone - and now says so, instead
of returning success while nothing was scheduled for it.
* docs(operations): state the group-status and escalation convergence limits
Two boundaries the fixes in this branch make load-bearing: a membership change
never carries an enable, so a group disabled on one site only has to be
re-enabled there explicitly; and a peer holding an escalated IAM entry does
not receive a scheduled snapshot, including the one a bulk import schedules,
until a repair settles it.
* fix(ci): bind performance runs to selected inputs (#7512)
* fix(targets): reject trailing batch items (#7508)
* test(scanner): preflight G09 evidence disk space
Fail the Scanner/Heal G09 upgrade evidence runner before downloading or building when the validation host does not have enough free space for a full raw evidence pass.
Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
Co-Authored-By: zhi22915 <qiuzgang@gmail.com>
---------
Co-authored-by: 唐小鸭 <tangtang1251@qq.com>
Co-authored-by: Zhengchao An <anzhengchao@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: cui fliter <imcusg@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: zhi22915 <qiuzgang@gmail.com>
* fix(replication): close the GA blocker set from backlog#2366 (#7503)
* fix(replication): close GA blockers from backlog#2366
Implements the P1 set from the pre-GA replication audit:
- Replication rule tag filters now require every And.Tag to match, replacing
the s3s OR semantics with a local AND matcher that fails closed on a
malformed tag.
- A replicated group membership change no longer writes the group status, so
a membership update carrying the default Enabled status cannot silently
re-enable a disabled group on the peer.
- A successful IAM import schedules one collapsed full-IAM snapshot per remote
peer instead of leaving the imported entities local-only.
- A pending endpoint refresh is redriven by the heavyweight reconcile tick,
carries its own ilm-expiry override, and no longer blocks a remove that
drops every unacknowledged peer.
- Site metrics expose local replication failure totals and rolling windows;
node-level counters no longer report a constructed zero.
- set/remove-remote-target notify peer metadata caches before returning, so a
follow-up put-bucket-replication on another node sees the target.
- Adds the site-replication operations runbook, a docs index, a replication
support boundary section, and the Replication changelog section.
* fix(site-replication): resume only a locally driven endpoint refresh
The peer-side edit handler journals a pending endpoint refresh with an empty
`remote_peers` map and commits it inside the same request through
`apply_internal_peer_edit`. The reconcile tick could not tell that journal
from the coordinator's own: with no required peers it reads as complete on
sight, so the tick committed it with `edit_state` - losing the local-name
sync - and cleared it under the request that owned it, whose commit then
reported the refresh as changed and denied the coordinator the peer
acknowledgement it was waiting for.
Resume now runs only for a journal that carries the fan-out topology. A
receiver's journal stays for the coordinator to redrive with the same
refresh id, which is the path that already recovers it.
* fix(site-replication): keep an explicit disabled group status on a snapshot
Skipping the group-status write whenever an item carries members stopped a
membership change from re-enabling a disabled group, but it also silenced the
full-IAM snapshot, which always sends members together with the sender's real
status. A peer that did not have the group yet created it through
`GroupInfo::new` - enabled - so a bootstrap, a repair, or the snapshot an IAM
import now schedules handed every member of a frozen group live access there.
The madmin wire maps an unset `groupStatus` to Enabled, so only Enabled can be
a default. Disabled is always explicit and is applied again.
* fix(site-replication): schedule the import snapshot without recording a failure
`import-iam` reused the failure-recording path to queue its full-IAM
snapshot. That raises `retry_count` on every call, so three imports - the
normal shape of a bulk migration done one archive at a time - escalated a
healthy peer to `retryStats.failed` with the scheduling note shown as
`lastError`, which is exactly the signal the runbook tells operators to
repair. A full retry queue also turned a completed import into a 503.
Scheduling now only ensures the collapsed entry exists, and a failure to
schedule is logged instead of failing the request: the entities are already
imported and the reconcile pass still closes the gap.
* fix(admin): stop reporting replication failures as retries
`retries` is the minio-go counter for redeliveries, and mc prints it as such.
Filling it with the failure count claimed a redelivery that never happens: a
failed object is not retried by an event today, it waits for the scanner heal
pass. `errors` keeps the failure counters; `retries` stays zero until there is
a real redelivery to count, and the runbook now says so.
* perf(site-replication): aggregate failure windows without cloning bucket stats
`site_metrics_snapshot` went through `get_all`, which clones every bucket's
stats, and then scanned each target's sample deque twice. That deque is
bounded only by the one-hour window, so an unreachable target under load -
the case an operator polls this endpoint for - made every
`mc admin replicate status` copy the whole backlog and hold the read lock
against the failure path while doing it.
It now folds under the read lock and takes both windows in one walk. The
`max` against the serialized `last_minute` / `last_hour` snapshots is dropped:
those are stamped onto per-bucket clones elsewhere and are always zero in this
node-local cache.
* fix(site-replication): reject a conflicting ilm-expiry override on a re-run
The commit now reads the ilm-expiry override back out of the pending refresh
journal, so a second edit that asks for a different value had it dropped while
the request still reported success. Re-running without the flag keeps pinning
the recorded value - that is the documented way to redrive a stuck refresh -
but an explicit different value is now rejected instead of ignored.
* fix(admin): do not fail a remote-target write on a peer reload error
set/remove-remote-target propagated the peer metadata reload error, so a
target that was already persisted and live on this node reported a 5xx to the
client whenever one peer could not be reached. Every S3 bucket-config write
path treats that reload as best effort and only warns; these two admin
handlers now do the same, and the reason is logged with the bucket and action.
* fix(site-replication): undo every bucket a cut-short refresh rewrote
When a remove accepted on another node clears the refresh journal mid-pass,
only the bucket holding the lock at that moment had its restored target
undone. The buckets rewritten earlier in the same pass kept a target pointing
at the removed peer whenever the remove's own cleanup had already walked past
them. The undo now covers every bucket this pass rewrote, attempting all of
them so one failure does not strand the rest.
* fix(site-replication): keep replay running while an endpoint refresh is pending
A pending endpoint refresh took the whole heavyweight pass with it, so a peer
that never came back froze IAM and bucket replay to every healthy peer too -
the stall this journal's resume path was meant to end. The refresh arm now
drains the retry queue before returning; it replays per-peer deliveries
against the endpoints currently committed in state, so it is unaffected by the
edit in flight. Bucket wiring reconciliation still waits, because it rewrites
the very targets the refresh is changing, and the runbook now says so.
* test(e2e): cover the AND semantics of a two-tag replication filter
The acceptance matrix only had a single-tag rule, which matches under both AND
and OR semantics and therefore proved nothing about the filter this fix
changed. It now also carries a two-tag `And` rule - the shape
`mc replicate add --tags "k1=v1&k2=v2"` writes - and asserts that an object
with one of the two tags is not admitted while an object with both is.
No new test function, so the nightly selection digest is unchanged.
* refactor(site-replication): fold the refresh state-change error into one constructor
The endpoint-refresh work added three `s3_error!` invocation lines, which the
s3s footprint ratchet is meant to prevent. Five copies of the same
concurrent-change error now share one constructor, so the surface nets one
line smaller than main; the baseline is retightened to match.
* fix(site-replication): report a peer whose IAM snapshot waits for a repair
An escalated snapshot entry records a deletion a snapshot cannot replay, so
only a repair settles it and the marker must survive. Scheduling an import
snapshot therefore leaves that peer's entry alone - and now says so, instead
of returning success while nothing was scheduled for it.
* docs(operations): state the group-status and escalation convergence limits
Two boundaries the fixes in this branch make load-bearing: a membership change
never carries an enable, so a group disabled on one site only has to be
re-enabled there explicitly; and a peer holding an escalated IAM entry does
not receive a scheduled snapshot, including the one a bulk import schedules,
until a repair settles it.
* fix(ci): bind performance runs to selected inputs (#7512)
* test(scanner): add G09 upgrade evidence runner
Add a reusable Scanner/Heal G09 runner for Linux PR-head validation. The script downloads the pinned previous release, builds the current checkout, runs the mixed-version and rollback upgrade E2E lanes, and validates the measured raw artifacts before they can be consumed by the release bundle gate.
Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
Co-Authored-By: zhi22915 <qiuzgang@gmail.com>
---------
Co-authored-by: 唐小鸭 <tangtang1251@qq.com>
Co-authored-by: Zhengchao An <anzhengchao@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: zhi22915 <qiuzgang@gmail.com>
* fix(replication): close the GA blocker set from backlog#2366 (#7503)
* fix(replication): close GA blockers from backlog#2366
Implements the P1 set from the pre-GA replication audit:
- Replication rule tag filters now require every And.Tag to match, replacing
the s3s OR semantics with a local AND matcher that fails closed on a
malformed tag.
- A replicated group membership change no longer writes the group status, so
a membership update carrying the default Enabled status cannot silently
re-enable a disabled group on the peer.
- A successful IAM import schedules one collapsed full-IAM snapshot per remote
peer instead of leaving the imported entities local-only.
- A pending endpoint refresh is redriven by the heavyweight reconcile tick,
carries its own ilm-expiry override, and no longer blocks a remove that
drops every unacknowledged peer.
- Site metrics expose local replication failure totals and rolling windows;
node-level counters no longer report a constructed zero.
- set/remove-remote-target notify peer metadata caches before returning, so a
follow-up put-bucket-replication on another node sees the target.
- Adds the site-replication operations runbook, a docs index, a replication
support boundary section, and the Replication changelog section.
* fix(site-replication): resume only a locally driven endpoint refresh
The peer-side edit handler journals a pending endpoint refresh with an empty
`remote_peers` map and commits it inside the same request through
`apply_internal_peer_edit`. The reconcile tick could not tell that journal
from the coordinator's own: with no required peers it reads as complete on
sight, so the tick committed it with `edit_state` - losing the local-name
sync - and cleared it under the request that owned it, whose commit then
reported the refresh as changed and denied the coordinator the peer
acknowledgement it was waiting for.
Resume now runs only for a journal that carries the fan-out topology. A
receiver's journal stays for the coordinator to redrive with the same
refresh id, which is the path that already recovers it.
* fix(site-replication): keep an explicit disabled group status on a snapshot
Skipping the group-status write whenever an item carries members stopped a
membership change from re-enabling a disabled group, but it also silenced the
full-IAM snapshot, which always sends members together with the sender's real
status. A peer that did not have the group yet created it through
`GroupInfo::new` - enabled - so a bootstrap, a repair, or the snapshot an IAM
import now schedules handed every member of a frozen group live access there.
The madmin wire maps an unset `groupStatus` to Enabled, so only Enabled can be
a default. Disabled is always explicit and is applied again.
* fix(site-replication): schedule the import snapshot without recording a failure
`import-iam` reused the failure-recording path to queue its full-IAM
snapshot. That raises `retry_count` on every call, so three imports - the
normal shape of a bulk migration done one archive at a time - escalated a
healthy peer to `retryStats.failed` with the scheduling note shown as
`lastError`, which is exactly the signal the runbook tells operators to
repair. A full retry queue also turned a completed import into a 503.
Scheduling now only ensures the collapsed entry exists, and a failure to
schedule is logged instead of failing the request: the entities are already
imported and the reconcile pass still closes the gap.
* fix(admin): stop reporting replication failures as retries
`retries` is the minio-go counter for redeliveries, and mc prints it as such.
Filling it with the failure count claimed a redelivery that never happens: a
failed object is not retried by an event today, it waits for the scanner heal
pass. `errors` keeps the failure counters; `retries` stays zero until there is
a real redelivery to count, and the runbook now says so.
* perf(site-replication): aggregate failure windows without cloning bucket stats
`site_metrics_snapshot` went through `get_all`, which clones every bucket's
stats, and then scanned each target's sample deque twice. That deque is
bounded only by the one-hour window, so an unreachable target under load -
the case an operator polls this endpoint for - made every
`mc admin replicate status` copy the whole backlog and hold the read lock
against the failure path while doing it.
It now folds under the read lock and takes both windows in one walk. The
`max` against the serialized `last_minute` / `last_hour` snapshots is dropped:
those are stamped onto per-bucket clones elsewhere and are always zero in this
node-local cache.
* fix(site-replication): reject a conflicting ilm-expiry override on a re-run
The commit now reads the ilm-expiry override back out of the pending refresh
journal, so a second edit that asks for a different value had it dropped while
the request still reported success. Re-running without the flag keeps pinning
the recorded value - that is the documented way to redrive a stuck refresh -
but an explicit different value is now rejected instead of ignored.
* fix(admin): do not fail a remote-target write on a peer reload error
set/remove-remote-target propagated the peer metadata reload error, so a
target that was already persisted and live on this node reported a 5xx to the
client whenever one peer could not be reached. Every S3 bucket-config write
path treats that reload as best effort and only warns; these two admin
handlers now do the same, and the reason is logged with the bucket and action.
* fix(site-replication): undo every bucket a cut-short refresh rewrote
When a remove accepted on another node clears the refresh journal mid-pass,
only the bucket holding the lock at that moment had its restored target
undone. The buckets rewritten earlier in the same pass kept a target pointing
at the removed peer whenever the remove's own cleanup had already walked past
them. The undo now covers every bucket this pass rewrote, attempting all of
them so one failure does not strand the rest.
* fix(site-replication): keep replay running while an endpoint refresh is pending
A pending endpoint refresh took the whole heavyweight pass with it, so a peer
that never came back froze IAM and bucket replay to every healthy peer too -
the stall this journal's resume path was meant to end. The refresh arm now
drains the retry queue before returning; it replays per-peer deliveries
against the endpoints currently committed in state, so it is unaffected by the
edit in flight. Bucket wiring reconciliation still waits, because it rewrites
the very targets the refresh is changing, and the runbook now says so.
* test(e2e): cover the AND semantics of a two-tag replication filter
The acceptance matrix only had a single-tag rule, which matches under both AND
and OR semantics and therefore proved nothing about the filter this fix
changed. It now also carries a two-tag `And` rule - the shape
`mc replicate add --tags "k1=v1&k2=v2"` writes - and asserts that an object
with one of the two tags is not admitted while an object with both is.
No new test function, so the nightly selection digest is unchanged.
* refactor(site-replication): fold the refresh state-change error into one constructor
The endpoint-refresh work added three `s3_error!` invocation lines, which the
s3s footprint ratchet is meant to prevent. Five copies of the same
concurrent-change error now share one constructor, so the surface nets one
line smaller than main; the baseline is retightened to match.
* fix(site-replication): report a peer whose IAM snapshot waits for a repair
An escalated snapshot entry records a deletion a snapshot cannot replay, so
only a repair settles it and the marker must survive. Scheduling an import
snapshot therefore leaves that peer's entry alone - and now says so, instead
of returning success while nothing was scheduled for it.
* docs(operations): state the group-status and escalation convergence limits
Two boundaries the fixes in this branch make load-bearing: a membership change
never carries an enable, so a group disabled on one site only has to be
re-enabled there explicitly; and a peer holding an escalated IAM entry does
not receive a scheduled snapshot, including the one a bulk import schedules,
until a repair settles it.
* fix(ci): bind performance runs to selected inputs (#7512)
* test(scanner): add G09 upgrade evidence runner
Add a reusable Linux x86_64 runner for the Scanner/Heal G09 mixed-version and rollback upgrade evidence lanes.
The helper reads the pinned previous-release asset metadata from the upgrade workflow, verifies the downloaded binary, builds the current head, runs both ignored E2E tests, and fails unless the expected G09 JSON artifacts exist.
Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
Co-Authored-By: zhi22915 <qiuzgang@gmail.com>
---------
Co-authored-by: 唐小鸭 <tangtang1251@qq.com>
Co-authored-by: Zhengchao An <anzhengchao@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: zhi22915 <qiuzgang@gmail.com>
Record measured Scanner/Heal G09 evidence artifacts from the upgrade compatibility lanes when a fresh evidence directory is provided.
Co-authored-by: zhi22915 <qiuzgang@gmail.com>
* fix(replication): close GA blockers from backlog#2366
Implements the P1 set from the pre-GA replication audit:
- Replication rule tag filters now require every And.Tag to match, replacing
the s3s OR semantics with a local AND matcher that fails closed on a
malformed tag.
- A replicated group membership change no longer writes the group status, so
a membership update carrying the default Enabled status cannot silently
re-enable a disabled group on the peer.
- A successful IAM import schedules one collapsed full-IAM snapshot per remote
peer instead of leaving the imported entities local-only.
- A pending endpoint refresh is redriven by the heavyweight reconcile tick,
carries its own ilm-expiry override, and no longer blocks a remove that
drops every unacknowledged peer.
- Site metrics expose local replication failure totals and rolling windows;
node-level counters no longer report a constructed zero.
- set/remove-remote-target notify peer metadata caches before returning, so a
follow-up put-bucket-replication on another node sees the target.
- Adds the site-replication operations runbook, a docs index, a replication
support boundary section, and the Replication changelog section.
* fix(site-replication): resume only a locally driven endpoint refresh
The peer-side edit handler journals a pending endpoint refresh with an empty
`remote_peers` map and commits it inside the same request through
`apply_internal_peer_edit`. The reconcile tick could not tell that journal
from the coordinator's own: with no required peers it reads as complete on
sight, so the tick committed it with `edit_state` - losing the local-name
sync - and cleared it under the request that owned it, whose commit then
reported the refresh as changed and denied the coordinator the peer
acknowledgement it was waiting for.
Resume now runs only for a journal that carries the fan-out topology. A
receiver's journal stays for the coordinator to redrive with the same
refresh id, which is the path that already recovers it.
* fix(site-replication): keep an explicit disabled group status on a snapshot
Skipping the group-status write whenever an item carries members stopped a
membership change from re-enabling a disabled group, but it also silenced the
full-IAM snapshot, which always sends members together with the sender's real
status. A peer that did not have the group yet created it through
`GroupInfo::new` - enabled - so a bootstrap, a repair, or the snapshot an IAM
import now schedules handed every member of a frozen group live access there.
The madmin wire maps an unset `groupStatus` to Enabled, so only Enabled can be
a default. Disabled is always explicit and is applied again.
* fix(site-replication): schedule the import snapshot without recording a failure
`import-iam` reused the failure-recording path to queue its full-IAM
snapshot. That raises `retry_count` on every call, so three imports - the
normal shape of a bulk migration done one archive at a time - escalated a
healthy peer to `retryStats.failed` with the scheduling note shown as
`lastError`, which is exactly the signal the runbook tells operators to
repair. A full retry queue also turned a completed import into a 503.
Scheduling now only ensures the collapsed entry exists, and a failure to
schedule is logged instead of failing the request: the entities are already
imported and the reconcile pass still closes the gap.
* fix(admin): stop reporting replication failures as retries
`retries` is the minio-go counter for redeliveries, and mc prints it as such.
Filling it with the failure count claimed a redelivery that never happens: a
failed object is not retried by an event today, it waits for the scanner heal
pass. `errors` keeps the failure counters; `retries` stays zero until there is
a real redelivery to count, and the runbook now says so.
* perf(site-replication): aggregate failure windows without cloning bucket stats
`site_metrics_snapshot` went through `get_all`, which clones every bucket's
stats, and then scanned each target's sample deque twice. That deque is
bounded only by the one-hour window, so an unreachable target under load -
the case an operator polls this endpoint for - made every
`mc admin replicate status` copy the whole backlog and hold the read lock
against the failure path while doing it.
It now folds under the read lock and takes both windows in one walk. The
`max` against the serialized `last_minute` / `last_hour` snapshots is dropped:
those are stamped onto per-bucket clones elsewhere and are always zero in this
node-local cache.
* fix(site-replication): reject a conflicting ilm-expiry override on a re-run
The commit now reads the ilm-expiry override back out of the pending refresh
journal, so a second edit that asks for a different value had it dropped while
the request still reported success. Re-running without the flag keeps pinning
the recorded value - that is the documented way to redrive a stuck refresh -
but an explicit different value is now rejected instead of ignored.
* fix(admin): do not fail a remote-target write on a peer reload error
set/remove-remote-target propagated the peer metadata reload error, so a
target that was already persisted and live on this node reported a 5xx to the
client whenever one peer could not be reached. Every S3 bucket-config write
path treats that reload as best effort and only warns; these two admin
handlers now do the same, and the reason is logged with the bucket and action.
* fix(site-replication): undo every bucket a cut-short refresh rewrote
When a remove accepted on another node clears the refresh journal mid-pass,
only the bucket holding the lock at that moment had its restored target
undone. The buckets rewritten earlier in the same pass kept a target pointing
at the removed peer whenever the remove's own cleanup had already walked past
them. The undo now covers every bucket this pass rewrote, attempting all of
them so one failure does not strand the rest.
* fix(site-replication): keep replay running while an endpoint refresh is pending
A pending endpoint refresh took the whole heavyweight pass with it, so a peer
that never came back froze IAM and bucket replay to every healthy peer too -
the stall this journal's resume path was meant to end. The refresh arm now
drains the retry queue before returning; it replays per-peer deliveries
against the endpoints currently committed in state, so it is unaffected by the
edit in flight. Bucket wiring reconciliation still waits, because it rewrites
the very targets the refresh is changing, and the runbook now says so.
* test(e2e): cover the AND semantics of a two-tag replication filter
The acceptance matrix only had a single-tag rule, which matches under both AND
and OR semantics and therefore proved nothing about the filter this fix
changed. It now also carries a two-tag `And` rule - the shape
`mc replicate add --tags "k1=v1&k2=v2"` writes - and asserts that an object
with one of the two tags is not admitted while an object with both is.
No new test function, so the nightly selection digest is unchanged.
* refactor(site-replication): fold the refresh state-change error into one constructor
The endpoint-refresh work added three `s3_error!` invocation lines, which the
s3s footprint ratchet is meant to prevent. Five copies of the same
concurrent-change error now share one constructor, so the surface nets one
line smaller than main; the baseline is retightened to match.
* fix(site-replication): report a peer whose IAM snapshot waits for a repair
An escalated snapshot entry records a deletion a snapshot cannot replay, so
only a repair settles it and the marker must survive. Scheduling an import
snapshot therefore leaves that peer's entry alone - and now says so, instead
of returning success while nothing was scheduled for it.
* docs(operations): state the group-status and escalation convergence limits
Two boundaries the fixes in this branch make load-bearing: a membership change
never carries an enable, so a group disabled on one site only has to be
re-enabled there explicitly; and a peer holding an escalated IAM entry does
not receive a scheduled snapshot, including the one a bulk import schedules,
until a repair settles it.
* fix(sse): resolve bucket default encryption per request
PUT and the POST-object/extract path resolved a bucket's default
encryption with a hard-coded "no explicit SSE-C" flag, so the default was
layered onto a request that already carried an SSE-C header triple and
then tripped that request's own mutual-exclusion check. Every bucket with
default encryption refused SSE-C single PUTs with 400 InvalidArgument,
while CreateMultipartUpload on the same bucket succeeded because it
resolves SSE elsewhere. Both call sites now derive the flag from the
request headers, as COPY already did.
The bucket default's KMS key id was also inherited independently of the
effective algorithm, so an explicit AES256 request against an aws:kms
default bucket produced a self-contradictory algorithm/key-id pair and
was rejected. The key id is now inherited only when the effective
algorithm is aws:kms, matching the storage-layer resolver.
Refs backlog#2368 B1, B2.
* fix(sse): refuse SSE-KMS without a running KMS service
A write requesting aws:kms on a node with no KMS service fell back to the
node-local SSE-S3 provider: the data key was wrapped with
RUSTFS_SSE_S3_MASTER_KEY while the object metadata still recorded
aws:kms and the requested KMS key id. The stored object claimed a KMS
protection it never had, under a key that was never consulted, and no
signal distinguished it from a genuine SSE-KMS object.
The managed-encryption path now asks the resolved DEK provider whether it
wraps with a node-local master key and refuses SSE-KMS in that case:
InvalidRequest when KMS was never configured, ServiceUnavailable when a
configured service is not running. The check sits after the per-key
authorization gate so an unauthorized caller still receives AccessDenied
whatever the KMS runtime state is, and asks the provider rather than a
parallel availability signal because the provider is what actually wraps
the key. A missing master key no longer answers an SSE-KMS request with
an SSE-S3-worded configuration error.
The SSE-S3 local fallback is unchanged.
Refs backlog#2368 B4.
* fix(ecstore): restore and archive tiers in stored coordinates
Multipart restore addressed the remote tier in plaintext coordinates
while the copy-back reads the stored representation. Each part received a
misaligned slice of the remote object whose length still satisfied the
range, the hash reader and the completion size check, so the restore
reported success and silently replaced the object's bytes. Encrypted and
compressed multipart objects were both affected. Restore now accumulates
stored part sizes, passes the stored length to the hash reader alongside
the plaintext length, and validates against the stored size.
The copy-back digests stored bytes, so its computed MD5 is not the
object's public ETag. Restore now preserves the object ETag on both the
single-part and multipart paths, and gives each restored part its own
recorded part ETag rather than the object-level value.
Transition also handed the tier the object's SSE headers and its
RustFS-wrapped data key as request headers. Any S3 target rejected an
SSE-C archive outright, an SSE-KMS archive asked the target to encrypt a
second time under a key id it does not own, and the wrapped DEK left the
cluster. The archive request now strips every SSE header and encryption
marker with the predicate the replication path already uses; the local
xl.meta keeps all of it, so read-through and restore are unaffected.
Objects restored by an affected release are not detected or repaired
retroactively and must be re-restored from the tier.
Refs backlog#2368 B3, B5; backlog#2369 P7.1.
* fix(rio): lock the v1 nonce layout within a segment
Decrypting a v1 segment tried three historical nonce layouts per frame,
independently for every frame. The last of them exists for streams
written before 1.0.0-alpha.91, which reused a segment's part nonce for
every block in it; because block zero's derived nonce equals that base
nonce, a frame encrypted at index zero authenticated at any position. An
attacker able to rewrite the underlying shards could replay it and have
the forged plaintext returned with 200 and an unchanged length. Shard
integrity uses a keyed-hash-free checksum, which such an attacker can
recompute, so it is not a barrier.
A segment now locks onto whichever layout decoded its first non-zero-index
frame and rejects any later frame needing a different one. That leaves one
residual shape: a stream built purely from repeats of frame zero has no
later frame to disagree. New RUSTFS_ENCRYPTION_LEGACY_NONCE_FALLBACK
(default true, so pre-alpha.91 objects keep decrypting) drops the third
layout entirely when set to false, which closes it. Turning it off refuses
pre-alpha.91 objects, so migrate them first by rewriting in place.
Refs backlog#2369 P2.
* fix(kms): reload a service that failed to start
POST /rustfs/admin/v3/kms/reload short-circuited whenever the persisted
configuration matched the in-memory one byte for byte. A node whose KMS
failed to start keeps that configuration and sits in Error, so the
documented recovery call returned "reloaded successfully" while leaving
the node down. Peers reached the same path through the reload broadcast,
so a cluster that lost Vault during a rolling restart had no working
recovery route other than the node-local start endpoint. Reload now
short-circuits only for a service that is actually running, and otherwise
reconfigures, which starts a service that is not running.
The AWS backend also advertised key-version enumeration through
kms/status, which its own documentation says it cannot do; the capability
and its golden snapshot now say false.
Refs backlog#2369 P1, P7.3.
* docs: record the SSE and KMS changes for 1.0.0
The Unreleased changelog section carried no entry for any encryption work
merged since 1.0.0-rc.5, including three items with operational impact:
the config-secret variable whose absence persists secrets in cleartext
with only a warning, the v2 frame write switch and its rolling-upgrade
constraint, and per-key authorization making a public bucket incompatible
with SSE-KMS objects. Adds those plus this batch, including the SSE-KMS
refusal as a breaking change with both routes out.
Also corrects four places where documentation contradicted the code: the
cleanup register still called encrypted range seek opt-in after its
default flipped, the Helm README claimed vault_mount_path only applies to
Transit while the template also feeds the KV2 mount, the disaster-recovery
drill listed bundle contents for backends whose export is refused with
501, and the Chinese README capability table predated most of the feature
set. Documents the SSE-S3 local master key as a first-class operational
mode with its rotation dead end, and what the v1 frame layout does and
does not authenticate.
Refs backlog#2369 P5.
* fix(kms): classify data-path KMS failures by what the caller can do
Only "key not found" and a backend outage were classified; every other
KMS failure that reached the S3 data path fell through to
500 InternalError with a generic message. A disabled or pending-deletion
key, a denied KMS grant, an encryption-context mismatch, an unsupported
algorithm, a credential or timeout failure, and a capability the
configured backend does not have all looked identical to a server fault.
SDKs therefore applied exponential backoff to configuration errors no
retry can fix, and monitoring counted every one of them against the
server's own error rate.
Unusable-key and request-side failures now answer 400, a denied grant
403, transient backend failures 503, and a missing backend capability
501. Damaged, unreadable, or unknown-format key material keeps its 500:
it is a server-side integrity fault, and existing tests pin it.
The classifier is deliberately separate from the admin lifecycle
mapping, which answers 404 for a missing key because there a key id is
the resource being addressed; on the data path it arrives inside a
request header or a bucket default. Messages either name what the caller
asked for or stay generic, with deployment-side detail left on the error
source the way the storage-IO mapping already does.
Refs backlog#2368 B6.
* fix(kms): track and renew static Vault tokens
Token authentication hard-coded "this token carries no lease", so the
renewal task never started, the remaining-TTL gauge was never published,
and nothing looked wrong. `vault token create` grants a 768-hour TTL by
default, so a cluster that had been healthy for a month turned every KMS
call into a 403 and could not recover without a restart or a
reconfigure. Production configuration validation only rejects the
literal dev-token, so an ordinary expiring token reaches a whole cluster.
The source now reads `auth/token/lookup-self` at login and adopts what
Vault reports. A token with no expiry behaves exactly as before. An
expiring renewable one is picked up by the existing renewal loop and
renewed at half TTL like every other auth method. An expiring
non-renewable one warns with its remaining lifetime and publishes the
gauge, so the fail-closed window is visible before it arrives.
The probe never fails the login: a policy that omits lookup-self, or a
Vault that is briefly unreachable, warns and falls back to exactly the
previous behaviour rather than taking down a deployment that works
today. The scripted Vault test double answers the lookup out of band so
existing scripts keep describing only the protocol under test.
Refs backlog#2369 P3.
* feat(sse): report SSE-C requests that arrive without TLS
An SSE-C request carries the customer's AES key in a request header, so
AWS S3 and MinIO both refuse one that did not arrive over TLS. RustFS
accepted them on any transport: a plaintext hop hands the key to anyone
on the path, and since the object cannot be read without that same key,
the exposure lasts as long as the object does.
Refusing outright is the correct end state but not a safe default to
adopt inside a release window, because the project's own s3-tests and
e2e lanes and most staging deployments speak plain HTTP. This release
reports instead: each such request increments
rustfs_ssec_plaintext_requests_total and logs one warning per process, so
an operator can confirm nothing would break before the default flips.
RUSTFS_SSE_C_REQUIRE_TLS=true opts into the AWS 400 now.
The verdict is per connection rather than per deployment: the layer is
built with whether this listener terminated TLS, and additionally accepts
an https protocol forwarded by a proxy the trusted-proxy configuration
already vetted. It sits beside the rate limiter, after the layer that
makes a forwarded protocol trustworthy and after the request context, so
a rejection can echo the request id.
Refs backlog#2369 P7.2.
* fix(kms): say what a node-local backend means for a cluster
The Local backend keeps key material on each node's own disk and
generates its Argon2id salt per node, so two nodes derive different keys
from the same master_key and an object encrypted on one node cannot be
decrypted on another. Behind a load balancer that surfaces as
intermittent 500s on reads that succeeded moments earlier, with nothing
tying the symptom to the cause: the only signal was a generic
"development, testing and demos only" positioning warning that says
nothing about what actually breaks.
Configuring or reconfiguring Local while the deployment is distributed
now logs a dedicated event and appends the consequence to the configure
response, so the operator who made the change sees it. The product
decision to warn rather than refuse is unchanged.
Refs backlog#2369 P7.4.
* docs: record the remaining SSE and KMS changes for 1.0.0
Adds changelog entries for the KMS data-path status classification, the
Vault static-token lease probe, the SSE-C plaintext-transport report and
its switch, and the node-local backend warning.
Documents two things the backend security guide never stated: that SSE-C
belongs on a secure transport, with the counter and switch to plan the
change around, and that the Local backend cannot be shared by a
multi-node deployment because each node derives different keys from the
same master key.
Refs backlog#2368 B6; backlog#2369 P3, P5, P7.2, P7.4.
* fix(kms): report an unreadable key store as an outage on the S3 path
A backend now distinguishes a key store it could not read from a key
that is genuinely absent, but the S3 boundary collapsed the first one
back onto 500 InternalError through the fallthrough for integrity
faults. The distinction was therefore invisible to the client: a
temporary key-directory outage looked exactly like a permanently damaged
key record, and neither the status nor the metric said the request was
worth retrying.
An unreadable key store joins the retryable class and answers 503, next
to a backend error and a credential failure. Damaged, unreadable or
unknown-format key material keeps its 500.
Refs backlog#2368 B6; builds on rustfs/rustfs#7470.
Merge main at 73957d0faf into release. Resolve the multipart test conflict with the current main fixture and remove its superseded ReadPlan test export.
Surface the scanned port window, attempt count, and last bind error when the e2e port allocator cannot reserve a localhost port. This keeps Scanner/Heal evidence failures actionable when the environment blocks binds before business assertions run.
Co-authored-by: zhi22915 <qiuzgang@gmail.com>
Require the P4 release bundle to carry measured cleanup/GC soak evidence for retained MRF replay responsibilities. The bundle now needs a two-hour cleanup window, exact cleanup case coverage, observed verified idle GC, and zero pending responsibilities or stale journals after GC.
Co-authored-by: zhi22915 <qiuzgang@gmail.com>
Require P4 retained-responsibility release bundle evidence to list the retained replay anchor and idle cleanup cases, prove a two-hour retention window, and record both idle cleanup and verified-proof discharge observations.
Co-authored-by: zhi22915 <qiuzgang@gmail.com>
Add a regression oracle that keeps scoped-only MRF responsibilities in the authoritative runtime snapshot while omitting them from the v1 legacy rollback mirror.
Co-authored-by: zhi22915 <qiuzgang@gmail.com>
Require scanner/heal release evidence JSON artifacts to repeat their measured source revision, run identity, measurement window, gate, and field identity inside the artifact payload. This keeps a refreshed outer bundle hash from accepting stale summary or profile JSON from another run.
Co-authored-by: zhi22915 <qiuzgang@gmail.com>
Require the Scanner/Heal release registry and bundle checker to carry explicit G08 MRF capacity, disk-full, and replica-loss evidence fields before release approval can pass.
Co-authored-by: zhi22915 <qiuzgang@gmail.com>
Align e2e_test build provenance with Scanner/Heal evidence receipts and server binary provenance by treating only tracked source changes as dirty.
This prevents unrelated untracked worktrees or evidence directories from causing compiled test identity mismatches before real evidence cases can run.
Co-authored-by: zhi22915 <qiuzgang@gmail.com>
Add a runtime cleanup regression test that publishes both retained replay and runtime committed checkpoints, writes scoped and legacy journals, and verifies idle cleanup removes every recovery anchor from the registered local disks.
Co-authored-by: zhi22915 <qiuzgang@gmail.com>
Tighten the Scanner/Heal release bundle checker so G14 same-window evidence must name the EC8+4, multi-set, and multi-pool fields covered in that measurement window.
Keep the release gate blocked when same-window evidence omits one of the required G14 fields, without changing production runtime behavior.
Co-authored-by: zhi22915 <qiuzgang@gmail.com>
Require Scanner/Heal release bundle artifact paths to resolve to non-empty files before hashing them.
Cover empty hard-gate artifacts in the existing release bundle checker self-test and keep profile artifact size checking on the shared artifact boundary.
Co-authored-by: zhi22915 <qiuzgang@gmail.com>
Give Scanner/Heal evidence cases explicit runtime profiles so EC8+4 background restart and crash cases use their own object count, object size, and partial-progress timeout defaults instead of inheriting the legacy 4x1 case assumptions.
Expose the runtime profile in plan-only output and cover every registry case in the script self-test.
Co-authored-by: zhi22915 <qiuzgang@gmail.com>
Group the EC8+4 Scanner/Heal evidence writer inputs into a typed payload so the distributed e2e crate stays within the clippy argument limit without weakening the lint.
The evidence writer still validates the same S3 bodies, physical shard census, process restart PIDs, and node listings.
Co-authored-by: zhi22915 <qiuzgang@gmail.com>
Reject measured Scanner/Heal ABBA manifests whose mixed-version evidence uses the same baseline and candidate source revision or binary hash.
Require crash fault modes and profile artifact names to match the exact supported sets, rejecting missing, duplicate, and unknown values.
Update harness fixtures and regression coverage for same-build mixed-version claims and exact-set release evidence fields.
Co-authored-by: zhi22915 <qiuzgang@gmail.com>
Tighten the Scanner/Heal release bundle checker so mixed-version, scoped-ACK, and rollback fields cannot reuse a generic versions list without proving the expected evidence role.
Require version lists to use source revision identities and include the tested source revision. Also require profile evidence fields to name the core profiling artifacts before release approval.
The release gate remains blocked until measured field evidence is present.
Co-authored-by: zhi22915 <qiuzgang@gmail.com>
Cover the committed MRF manifest path through LocalDisk conditional CAS when the metadata directory fsync fails. The fixture proves the previous manifest anchor survives rollback, an unanchored first successor is removed, and the legacy MRF journal remains readable even while global durability is relaxed.
Co-authored-by: zhi22915 <qiuzgang@gmail.com>
Reject journal records with unknown version-presence flags even when their CRC is valid, so rollback/future payloads cannot be accepted as known records.
Gate committed checkpoint cleanup by the writer owner captured from the replay source, preserving retained manifests from other owners inside the same sequence window.
Co-authored-by: zhi22915 <qiuzgang@gmail.com>
Bind the distributed EC8+4 restart evidence lane to a scanner/heal oracle artifact so release validation can consume the real nextest run instead of accepting only a passing test.
Require the registry to assert 8+4 erasure geometry for the three-node, four-drive case.
Co-authored-by: zhi22915 <qiuzgang@gmail.com>
* test(kms): cover directory outages and missing keys on main
(cherry picked from commit 8fc1f0c41d)
* fix(kms): preserve directory availability errors on main
(cherry picked from commit c2a8e476f7)
Keep the EC8+4 background restart lane on the graceful-stop path and assert clean-restart marker absence only for restart scenarios. This prevents the hard evidence gate from silently exercising the crash path when it claims restart coverage.
Co-authored-by: zhi22915 <qiuzgang@gmail.com>
* fix(ecstore): attest fresh multi-pool bootstrap per pool creator
A fresh deployment whose pools have their first endpoint on different nodes could never publish its initial pool.bin: each node held fresh-bootstrap proof only for the pool it formatted, combine_across_pools collapsed the deployment-wide proof to None, the elected writer never wrote a pending identity, and startup died with "no durable bootstrap identity or pool.bin replica is available" once the init retry budget ran out.
Track first-hand bootstrap authority per pool. The first pool's creator mints the pending cluster identity on the pool it created, every other creator copies that nonce-bound identity onto the pool it formatted first-hand (a scoped identity write that only ever touches pools the process holds first-hand proof for), and the elected writer publishes pool.bin once it holds first-hand proof for pool 0 and every pool replica carries the same pending identity. Fresh + None is still never promoted, corrupt or disagreeing replicas still fail closed, an initialized deployment never reopens bootstrap for an expansion pool, and an elected restart without first-hand proof still cannot reuse a complete pending set.
Startup classification no longer latches the pool-metadata write gate for the two transient outcomes a healthy bootstrap passes through (a non-elected node waiting for the elected writer, the elected writer waiting for the other creators); recover_pool_meta_transaction never clears write_blocked, so a non-elected node that started before pool.bin existed stayed write-blocked for the life of the process. Genuine recovery-required states still latch.
Refs rustfs/backlog#2375, rustfs/backlog#2338
* fix(lock): contain remote lock RPC timeout storms
A lock RPC deadline evicted the shared internode HTTP/2 channel and re-dialed it unconditionally, so one slow lock endpoint produced a cluster-wide RST_STREAM / GOAWAY too_many_resets / reconnect loop (rustfs#7363).
The remote lock client now keeps a per-peer channel history: a timeout evicts only when the peer has completed no lock RPC for two deadlines, evictions and transport-failure re-dials are rate limited per peer (RUSTFS_OBJECT_LOCK_RPC_EVICTION_COOLDOWN_MS, default 5 s), and a timed-out request is detached instead of cancelled, bounded per peer by RUSTFS_OBJECT_LOCK_RPC_DETACHED_LIMIT (default 256) and by the internode RPC timeout; a lock granted after its caller gave up is released immediately. Unlocks that fail the quick retries continue on a deferred 1/2/4/8/16 s schedule before the server lease reclaims them. New rustfs_remote_lock_* metrics cover timeouts, evictions, suppressed evictions, detached streams, late completions and late releases per peer; docs/operations/lock-rpc-storm-protection.md documents the policy.
Refs rustfs/backlog#2375, rustfs#7363
* ci: refresh nightly test selection digests
The replication nightly membership guard expected the 68-test digest from #7422 while the current listing has 71 tests (additions only: test_bucket_replication_sse_c_compressed_passthrough from #7366, matrix_mint_own_version_ids_addresses_mutations_through_the_ledger and matrix_removed_replication_config_abandons_pending_purge from #7368), and the cluster fault lane expected 50 tests while #7374 added test_cluster_root_heal_recovers_remote_shards_after_background_target_crash. Both lanes have failed before running a single test since 2026-09-07. Bind the Linux digests to the listings from scheduled run 34187469350 and the Darwin e2e-nightly digest to the matching local listing.
Refs rustfs/backlog#2375
Keep same-request-id replay receipts accepted for the receipt API, but preserve the legacy submit_heal_request duplicate admission result as Merged.
Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
Co-Authored-By: zhi22915 <qiuzgang@gmail.com>
Add focused oracles for transient quorum results that carry a matching receipt and for mixed grace plus repaired receipt batches. Only the repaired object may produce positive proof.
Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
Co-Authored-By: zhi22915 <qiuzgang@gmail.com>
Register and wire Scanner/Heal background target restart and crash evidence cases for the 3x4 EC8+4 topology.
Validate the observed data/parity geometry in scanner-heal evidence receipts so multi-drive runs cannot satisfy the gate without proving EC8+4 metadata.
Co-authored-by: zhi22915 <qiuzgang@gmail.com>
Cover bucket and root heal sweeps recording authoritative object outcomes only when storage receipts match the latched bucket incarnation.
Verify unavailable or stale receipt ownership keeps object repair execution intact while leaving canonical outcome proof as Unknown.
Co-authored-by: zhi22915 <qiuzgang@gmail.com>
Cover the receipt consumer path where a storage repair result carries both an error and a matching positive receipt. The failure may be recorded, but the receipt must not create repaired, healthy, or absent proof.
Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
Co-Authored-By: zhi22915 <qiuzgang@gmail.com>
Do not record positive storage repair receipts once an object heal task has been cancelled, even if the receipt still matches the requested owner and object identity.
Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
Co-Authored-By: zhi22915 <qiuzgang@gmail.com>
Do not record positive storage repair receipts for dry-run object heal tasks, even if a producer accidentally returns a matching receipt.
Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
Co-Authored-By: zhi22915 <qiuzgang@gmail.com>
Require Scanner/Heal release bundle fields to carry source, run, window, timestamp, command, and artifact format provenance before a measured gate can pass.
Keep EC8+4 and performance gate fields tied to a single measurement window so unrelated artifacts cannot be stitched into a release approval.
Co-authored-by: zhi22915 <qiuzgang@gmail.com>
Capture the expected bucket incarnation before invoking object repair so a post-repair owner change cannot rewrite the responsibility that a storage receipt is allowed to prove.
Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
Co-Authored-By: zhi22915 <qiuzgang@gmail.com>
Require object heal receipts to match the expected bucket incarnation before they can be recorded as positive repair evidence. This prevents stale or cross-incarnation receipts from clearing the wrong heal responsibility.
Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
Co-Authored-By: zhi22915 <qiuzgang@gmail.com>
Add a committed snapshot predecessor cleanup primitive that deletes only an older slot after the successor is read back as the current committed snapshot.
Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
Co-Authored-By: zhi22915 <qiuzgang@gmail.com>
Keep startup replay journal until a durable successor snapshot exists after Accepted/Merged admission.
Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
Co-Authored-By: zhi22915 <qiuzgang@gmail.com>
Keep the synthetic ABBA test adapter aligned with the measured release evidence contract so result validation covers release_evidence drift.
Co-authored-by: zhi22915 <qiuzgang@gmail.com>
Retry heal-control RPCs once after transport auth rejects a stale replay-scope epoch, and add a distributed EC8+4 restart heal evidence case that rebuilds a replaced drive with exact shard/body assertions.
Co-authored-by: zhi22915 <qiuzgang@gmail.com>
Record production-facing segment invalidation producer identities when existing object-level dirty usage hooks observe PUT, CopyObject, DeleteObject/DeleteMarker, and CompleteMultipartUpload mutations. Keep the data non-authoritative and process-local so segment reuse activation still requires durable generation-window proof.
Co-authored-by: zhi22915 <qiuzgang@gmail.com>
Require explicit scanner/heal release evidence field contracts for the scoped ACK and mixed-version rollback gates.
Co-authored-by: zhi22915 <qiuzgang@gmail.com>
Keep a retried heal start with the same request id from bypassing admission deduplication when the transport replay cache is unavailable but the manager still owns the task.
Co-authored-by: zhi22915 <qiuzgang@gmail.com>
Add a production-entry scanner cohort regression that combines a wide flat bucket with a small bucket under a fixed object budget. The test keeps partial budgeted rounds unpublished, verifies small buckets are only marked after real execution, and confirms a later unbudgeted round can publish the complete aggregate.
Co-authored-by: zhi22915 <qiuzgang@gmail.com>
Add a recorded verified-repair consumer that discharges only exact retained anchors for the requested bucket while leaving unmatched proofs in the event ring. This gives the future durable successor writer a fail-closed primitive before any tombstone or GC path is enabled.
Co-authored-by: zhi22915 <qiuzgang@gmail.com>
* test(scanner): measure heal pacing and cache cost
Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
Co-Authored-By: zhi22915 <qiuzgang@gmail.com>
* fix(error): merge equivalent api message branches
Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
Co-Authored-By: zhi22915 <qiuzgang@gmail.com>
* fix(heal): cleanup consumed MRF replay journals
Do not retain Accepted or Merged replay intents as startup anchors after they have been handed to the heal manager. Only refused or still-pending replay records keep the journal on disk until a successor snapshot can persist them.
This keeps successor snapshots limited to the pending queue, which lets successful replay remove both authoritative and legacy journal paths and restores the crash-boundary tests around successor flush.
Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
Co-Authored-By: zhi22915 <qiuzgang@gmail.com>
(cherry picked from commit d5b8f49c9d)
---------
Co-authored-by: zhi22915 <qiuzgang@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Zhengchao An <anzhengchao@gmail.com>
* test(scanner): report heal release gate status
Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
Co-Authored-By: zhi22915 <qiuzgang@gmail.com>
* fix(error): merge equivalent api message branches
Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
Co-Authored-By: zhi22915 <qiuzgang@gmail.com>
* fix(heal): cleanup consumed MRF replay journals
Do not retain Accepted or Merged replay intents as startup anchors after they have been handed to the heal manager. Only refused or still-pending replay records keep the journal on disk until a successor snapshot can persist them.
This keeps successor snapshots limited to the pending queue, which lets successful replay remove both authoritative and legacy journal paths and restores the crash-boundary tests around successor flush.
Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
Co-Authored-By: zhi22915 <qiuzgang@gmail.com>
(cherry picked from commit d5b8f49c9d)
---------
Co-authored-by: zhi22915 <qiuzgang@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Zhengchao An <anzhengchao@gmail.com>
* fix(scanner): retain raw enumeration quantum
Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
Co-Authored-By: zhi22915 <qiuzgang@gmail.com>
* fix(error): merge equivalent api message branches
Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
Co-Authored-By: zhi22915 <qiuzgang@gmail.com>
* fix(heal): cleanup consumed MRF replay journals
Do not retain Accepted or Merged replay intents as startup anchors after they have been handed to the heal manager. Only refused or still-pending replay records keep the journal on disk until a successor snapshot can persist them.
This keeps successor snapshots limited to the pending queue, which lets successful replay remove both authoritative and legacy journal paths and restores the crash-boundary tests around successor flush.
Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
Co-Authored-By: zhi22915 <qiuzgang@gmail.com>
(cherry picked from commit d5b8f49c9d)
---------
Co-authored-by: zhi22915 <qiuzgang@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Zhengchao An <anzhengchao@gmail.com>
* test(heal): cover admin lock timeout progress
Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
Co-Authored-By: zhi22915 <qiuzgang@gmail.com>
* fix(error): merge equivalent api message branches
Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
Co-Authored-By: zhi22915 <qiuzgang@gmail.com>
* fix(heal): cleanup consumed MRF replay journals
Do not retain Accepted or Merged replay intents as startup anchors after they have been handed to the heal manager. Only refused or still-pending replay records keep the journal on disk until a successor snapshot can persist them.
This keeps successor snapshots limited to the pending queue, which lets successful replay remove both authoritative and legacy journal paths and restores the crash-boundary tests around successor flush.
Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
Co-Authored-By: zhi22915 <qiuzgang@gmail.com>
(cherry picked from commit d5b8f49c9d)
---------
Co-authored-by: zhi22915 <qiuzgang@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Zhengchao An <anzhengchao@gmail.com>
* test: summarize scanner heal perf artifacts
Add a quiet Scanner/Heal performance artifact summarizer that normalizes ABBA report verdicts, key regression metrics, cache-cost profile records, and provenance hashes for CI or PR handoff.
Document the summary command in the scanner benchmark runbook and cover measured, synthetic, pending, and invalid cache-cost paths with focused Python tests.
Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
Co-Authored-By: zhi22915 <qiuzgang@gmail.com>
* fix(error): merge equivalent api message branches
Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
Co-Authored-By: zhi22915 <qiuzgang@gmail.com>
* fix(heal): cleanup consumed MRF replay journals
Do not retain Accepted or Merged replay intents as startup anchors after they have been handed to the heal manager. Only refused or still-pending replay records keep the journal on disk until a successor snapshot can persist them.
This keeps successor snapshots limited to the pending queue, which lets successful replay remove both authoritative and legacy journal paths and restores the crash-boundary tests around successor flush.
Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
Co-Authored-By: zhi22915 <qiuzgang@gmail.com>
(cherry picked from commit d5b8f49c9d)
---------
Co-authored-by: zhi22915 <qiuzgang@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Zhengchao An <anzhengchao@gmail.com>
* feat(heal): publish verified MRF repair events
Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
Co-Authored-By: zhi22915 <qiuzgang@gmail.com>
* feat(common): add durable MRF proof matching (#7429)
Add a fail-closed MRF repair proof adapter that only consumes anchors when the durable anchor and verified proof share the same full identity, ingress lease, and bucket incarnation.
Legacy replay intents without leases cannot become dischargeable anchors, so the current retained journal behavior remains unchanged until a durable writer and producer proof source are connected.
Co-authored-by: zhi22915 <qiuzgang@gmail.com>
* fix(heal): rearm MRF replay leases before admission (#7435)
Co-authored-by: zhi22915 <qiuzgang@gmail.com>
* fix(error): merge equivalent api message branches
Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
Co-Authored-By: zhi22915 <qiuzgang@gmail.com>
* fix(heal): cleanup consumed MRF replay journals
Do not retain Accepted or Merged replay intents as startup anchors after they have been handed to the heal manager. Only refused or still-pending replay records keep the journal on disk until a successor snapshot can persist them.
This keeps successor snapshots limited to the pending queue, which lets successful replay remove both authoritative and legacy journal paths and restores the crash-boundary tests around successor flush.
Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
Co-Authored-By: zhi22915 <qiuzgang@gmail.com>
(cherry picked from commit d5b8f49c9d)
---------
Co-authored-by: zhi22915 <qiuzgang@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: overtrue <anzhengchao@gmail.com>
* fix(kms): report a missing KMS key as 400 KMS.NotFoundException
A PutObject whose resolved SSE-KMS key (request header or bucket default
rule) does not exist in the KMS answered 500 InternalError with a generic
message: KmsError::KeyNotFound fell through to the default arm of the
StorageError-to-ApiError mapping. S3 reports this client mistake as 400
KMS.NotFoundException; the mapping now does the same and names the key.
s3s has no status for a custom code, so the ApiError-to-S3Error conversion
supplies it.
The legacy create-key aliases behind /minio/admin/v3/kms/key/create ignored
the key-id query parameter that mc sends, creating a key under a generated
id instead of the requested name. The alias now honors key-id (and its
keyId/key spellings) alongside the name tag, and refuses a request whose
two sources disagree.
Refs: rustfs/backlog#2330 (KMS-312, KMS-110)
* fix(error): merge equivalent api message branches
Combine the MaxVersionsExceeded and internal IO message branches so Clippy no longer flags identical if blocks while preserving the existing response messages.
Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
Co-Authored-By: zhi22915 <qiuzgang@gmail.com>
* fix(heal): cleanup consumed MRF replay journals
Do not retain Accepted or Merged replay intents as startup anchors after they have been handed to the heal manager. Only refused or still-pending replay records keep the journal on disk until a successor snapshot can persist them.
This keeps successor snapshots limited to the pending queue, which lets successful replay remove both authoritative and legacy journal paths and restores the crash-boundary tests around successor flush.
Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
Co-Authored-By: zhi22915 <qiuzgang@gmail.com>
(cherry picked from commit d5b8f49c9d)
---------
Co-authored-by: houseme <housemecn@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: zhi22915 <qiuzgang@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Zhengchao An <anzhengchao@gmail.com>
* feat(heal): expose admission observability
Track heal admission outcomes and bounded lock-phase latency through the existing operations snapshot so distributed E2E gates can assert duplicate, forceStart, and displacement behavior without relying on logs.
Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
Co-Authored-By: zhi22915 <qiuzgang@gmail.com>
* fix(error): merge equivalent api message branches
Combine the MaxVersionsExceeded and internal IO message branches so Clippy no longer flags identical if blocks while preserving the existing response messages.
Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
Co-Authored-By: zhi22915 <qiuzgang@gmail.com>
---------
Co-authored-by: zhi22915 <qiuzgang@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Zhengchao An <anzhengchao@gmail.com>
* feat(observability): expose pool write-block diagnostics
* fix(error): merge equivalent api message branches
Combine the MaxVersionsExceeded and internal IO message branches so Clippy no longer flags identical if blocks while preserving the existing response messages.
Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
Co-Authored-By: zhi22915 <qiuzgang@gmail.com>
* fix(heal): cleanup consumed MRF replay journals
Do not retain Accepted or Merged replay intents as startup anchors after they have been handed to the heal manager. Only refused or still-pending replay records keep the journal on disk until a successor snapshot can persist them.
This keeps successor snapshots limited to the pending queue, which lets successful replay remove both authoritative and legacy journal paths and restores the crash-boundary tests around successor flush.
Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
Co-Authored-By: zhi22915 <qiuzgang@gmail.com>
(cherry picked from commit d5b8f49c9d)
---------
Signed-off-by: houseme <housemecn@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: houseme <housemecn@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: zhi22915 <qiuzgang@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Zhengchao An <anzhengchao@gmail.com>
* fix(s3): reject unsigned x-amz headers on presigned requests
A SigV4 presigned URL only binds the headers listed in X-Amz-SignedHeaders, but the handlers applied every x-amz-* request header regardless. The holder of a presigned PutObject URL signed with SignedHeaders=host could add x-amz-tagging, x-amz-storage-class, x-amz-website-redirect-location, ACL, metadata, Object Lock or SSE headers and have them applied (GHSA-g8w9-qw9q-fghr). Reject such requests at the S3 access boundary with 403 AccessDenied and the AWS message "There were headers present in the request which were not signed"; x-amz-cf-id stays tolerated for CloudFront. SigV2 and header-signed SigV4 requests are unchanged.
Regression tests are named after the advisory (unit tests in rustfs/src/auth.rs, e2e in crates/e2e_test/src/presigned_negative_test.rs with a signed-tagging positive control); the security smoke floor rises to 20 and the e2e selection digests are refreshed for the two new cases.
* fix(s3): apply presigned signed-header rule to custom routes and harden parsing
Move the GHSA-g8w9-qw9q-fghr check to the first statement of S3Access::check, apply it in S3Router::check_access so admin, console, STS and extension routes that never reach the access hook enforce the same rule, read X-Amz-SignedHeaders with the exact key the verifier uses and treat a duplicate as signing nothing, and log the rejection as a warn event with the repository field shape. Add presigned GET, unsigned x-amz-copy-source and unsigned Content-Type e2e cases plus a router unit test; raise the security smoke floor to 26 and refresh the selection digests.
* docs(testing): list the full GHSA-g8w9 regression set
* fix(error): merge equivalent api message branches
Combine the MaxVersionsExceeded and internal IO message branches so Clippy no longer flags identical if blocks while preserving the existing response messages.
Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
Co-Authored-By: zhi22915 <qiuzgang@gmail.com>
---------
Co-authored-by: houseme <housemecn@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: zhi22915 <qiuzgang@gmail.com>
Keep replayed MRF records crash-replayable after manager admission until a later durable successor proof can tombstone them. Queue-full and transient replay submission failures now also preserve the old journal anchor instead of allowing cleanup to erase the only recovery source.
Co-authored-by: zhi22915 <qiuzgang@gmail.com>
A multipart UploadPart queued for a foreground write permit is not read while it waits, so the client's socket write stalls for the whole wait and the client's own write timeout decides the outcome; botocore reports that as ConnectionClosedError. Lower the default queue wait from 30 s to 10 s so the part receives SlowDown before mainstream SDK timeouts, and stop forcing a 4 MiB SO_RCVBUF on the API listener (new RUSTFS_HTTP_SOCKET_RECV_BUFFER_BYTES restores a fixed size) so a queued connection no longer lets up to 8 MiB of unread body accumulate in kernel memory.
Fixes#7385.
Co-authored-by: houseme <housemecn@gmail.com>
Keep the production scoped scanner test from mutating an unselected bucket during the dirty-only cycle. That cycle intentionally reuses the clean baseline, while the later Deep and full maintenance cycles still mutate cold storage and prove a full walk refreshes it.
Co-authored-by: zhi22915 <qiuzgang@gmail.com>
Pin the star history workflow to the freshly released v1.4.0 of
overtrue/repo-visuals-action, which adds the chart-layout input and a
refreshed editorial chart/contributor-wall style. The workflow keeps its
existing inputs, so chart-layout stays at the editorial default.
Add an MRF pipeline regression that replays a single authoritative journal containing same-object records that differ by kind and erasure-set scope while a stale legacy mirror is present. The test proves restart replay admits each authoritative responsibility independently and never merges the stale mirror epoch.
Co-authored-by: zhi22915 <qiuzgang@gmail.com>
Introduce an object heal receipt wrapper so storage owners can report a positive repaired or verified result without changing legacy heal consumers.
Task-level object heal now records only receipts that match the requested object identity, version, pool, set, and carry a bucket incarnation. Legacy and mismatched receipts still fall back to unknown outcome accounting.
Co-authored-by: zhi22915 <qiuzgang@gmail.com>
Require scanner/heal ABBA adapters to emit foreground pressure, heal lock wait p99, and heal attempt counters before a measured W10/W11 run can be accepted.
Report per-leg pressure ratios, lock p99 samples, and attempt cost per healed object so synthetic harness runs remain evidence-contract validation rather than performance proof.
Co-authored-by: zhi22915 <qiuzgang@gmail.com>
Extend the segment observation fixture with durable activation prerequisites and add scanner oracles for cold segment zero-walk and distributed invalidation fallback.
Co-authored-by: zhi22915 <qiuzgang@gmail.com>
Add a Unix process-kill fixture for the authoritative successor fsync boundary where the scoped journal is durable while the legacy mirror still contains the startup epoch. Also extend heal-control transport replay coverage so a duplicate producer after a lost response receives the canonical merged receipt without creating another task.
Co-authored-by: zhi22915 <qiuzgang@gmail.com>
Treat persisted raw page owner entries as a validated set, not a read_dir-order prefix, so restart scans can consume committed owner pages without recounting them against the raw enumeration budget. Commit checkpointed partial pages, validate owner parent/generation/digests before the skip oracle, and fail closed on duplicate/corrupt page state.
Extend the real scanner restart driver to enforce fixed raw-entry and object budgets across fresh OS processes, and report owner-index coverage in each worker round.
Co-authored-by: zhi22915 <qiuzgang@gmail.com>
Add a scoped dirty-usage ACK confirmation fixture for transport failures after the send attempt. The test confirms that same-instance clean activity can reconcile a lost response, while peer restart and concurrent dirty usage stay pending.
Co-authored-by: zhi22915 <qiuzgang@gmail.com>
* fix(replication): resolve drifted replicas via a target version ledger
A replication target that mints its own version ids (Wasabi, AWS S3)
never answers to the source uuid, so every version-addressed mutation
after the initial PUT failed forever: permanent version deletes answered
NoSuchVersion every heal cycle, and tag / retention / legal-hold updates
re-PUT the object, minting one more target version per update
(rustfs/backlog#2340).
Record the id the target assigned as a per-target ledger on the source
version (replication-target-version-<arn>, written through the existing
status writeback) and resolve every later mutation through it: version
deletes DELETE the ledger id, metadata updates go through the
metadata-only Object Lock and tagging APIs. Replicas written before the
ledger existed are located by exact key and ETag, minus the candidates
other generations of the key already claim through their own ledgers; an
ambiguous remainder is refused with a backoff instead of guessed, since a
wrong pick would destroy a live generation. A fresh write never consults
content identity. NoSuchVersion on a version-addressed DELETE counts as
purged.
The fake target gains the Wasabi shape (404 NoSuchVersion on an unknown
id, per-version Object Lock APIs) and the matrix covers the three
mutation classes plus the same-bytes generation case.
* fix(scanner): drop the unused Digest import
Same one-line change as rustfs/rustfs#7366 (main is red with it under -D warnings); carried here so the stacked PRs' merge commits compile until that fix lands.
* fix(admin): probe replication-check mutations by the assigned version id (#7373)
On a target that mints its own version ids the DeleteMarker and
VersionDelete phases of ?replication-check were skipped: they addressed
the source id, which such a target never had. The replication worker now
addresses the id the target assigned (the target-version ledger), and
the probe already holds that id from its own PUT, so run both phases
against it. VersionFidelity keeps failing with the mismatch code and the
target stays FAILED; the phases report whether ledger-addressed purges
work against this endpoint (rustfs/backlog#2340).
* fix(replication): abandon purges to targets the bucket no longer names (#7377)
* fix(admin): probe replication-check mutations by the assigned version id
On a target that mints its own version ids the DeleteMarker and
VersionDelete phases of ?replication-check were skipped: they addressed
the source id, which such a target never had. The replication worker now
addresses the id the target assigned (the target-version ledger), and
the probe already holds that id from its own PUT, so run both phases
against it. VersionFidelity keeps failing with the mismatch code and the
target stays FAILED; the phases report whether ledger-addressed purges
work against this endpoint (rustfs/backlog#2340).
* fix(replication): abandon purges to targets the bucket no longer names
A permanent version delete whose replication keeps failing stays in
xl.meta as a PENDING purge, hidden from listings, until every target
confirms it. Once the operator removes the replication configuration or
the rule naming that target nothing ever confirms it: the heal path
derived its delete decision from the configuration (the decision string
is not persisted) and skipped the version forever, so DeleteBucket
answered BucketNotEmpty for a residue the client could neither list nor
remove (rustfs/backlog#2340).
Owe a version purge to the targets its purge state names, let the heal
path through without a configuration, and have the delete worker settle
a target the configuration no longer names as abandoned: the purge is
reported complete locally through the normal writeback, the replica on
the former target is left alone, and the event
replication_purge_abandoned plus a counter are the record.
* fix(admin): send replication-check marker creation without a version id
Running the DeleteMarker / VersionDelete phases on a target that mints
its own version ids exposed two probe-shape bugs on real Wasabi:
- the DeleteMarker phase put the assigned version id on its DELETE. A
RustFS peer reads the source-deletemarker header and creates a marker,
but a generic S3 target executes it as a permanent delete of the probe
version, so VersionDelete then answered NoSuchVersion. Use the same wire
shape as live delete replication: no versionId on a marker creation.
- cleanup treated NoSuchVersion on the version the VersionDelete phase had
already removed as a failure (RustFS/MinIO answer 204 there).
Also gate the no-configuration heal pass-through for pending purges on a
purge state that actually names targets, so a purge without a recorded
target keeps the ordinary skip (scanner unit test), and merge origin/main
(#7365 settles the pool-metadata probe test that failed in CI).
---------
Co-authored-by: houseme <housemecn@gmail.com>
* fix: reject unsupported pool expansion with actionable errors
Report singleton-pool and persisted-topology constraints before misleading startup retries. Preserve single-node multi-drive admission and existing parity policies, and cover format preservation plus operator recovery guidance for issue #6186.
* fix: keep pool layout errors typed
Preserve actionable pool layout diagnostics without adding generic formatted errors. Tighten the shrink-only baseline and assert that both typed payloads survive the I/O boundary.
---------
Co-authored-by: houseme <housemecn@gmail.com>
* fix(scanner): remove unused digest import
Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
Co-Authored-By: zhi22915 <qiuzgang@gmail.com>
* feat(scanner): add raw page owner index (#7375)
* feat(scanner): add raw page owner index
Add a serializable raw enumeration page owner index for scanner resume work.
The index exposes unsupported, building, and ready states, validates committed page identity by recomputing digests, and uses generation checks for CAS-style page commits.
Focused tests cover small-budget restart progress, page digest/source drift rejection, corrupt deserialized state, CAS failure, precommit crash, empty sources, and invalid entry boundaries.
Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
Co-Authored-By: zhi22915 <qiuzgang@gmail.com>
* feat(scanner): persist raw page owner resume state (#7379)
Wire the scanner raw enumeration partial-cache writer to the raw page owner index so interrupted bucket walks can retain validated page-builder state across scanner restarts.
Keep complete owner sources terminal-only, add partial-source ingestion for in-progress raw directory reads, and validate the persisted page index through bucket checkpoint preparation.
Co-authored-by: zhi22915 <qiuzgang@gmail.com>
---------
Co-authored-by: zhi22915 <qiuzgang@gmail.com>
* test(scanner): fence segment producer observations (#7381)
Require the segment observation fixture to carry source, incarnation, key-format, baseline, process epoch, generation-window, gap, overflow, and producer-coverage proof before accepting a narrowed proposal. Keep the diagnostic path fixture-only and remove its ordinary stderr output.
Co-authored-by: zhi22915 <qiuzgang@gmail.com>
* fix(ecstore): isolate pool metadata read probes (#7367)
Co-authored-by: zhi22915 <qiuzgang@gmail.com>
* test(heal): cover MRF crash successor matrix (#7369)
* test(heal): cover MRF crash successor matrix
Add process-boundary MRF replay coverage for the successor snapshot window after a retained startup journal is flushed but before cleanup deletes it. Extend the mixed authoritative/legacy reader fixture with a scoped v2 journal epoch to pin the no-merge contract.
Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
Co-Authored-By: zhi22915 <qiuzgang@gmail.com>
* test(heal): cover service-kill MRF replay (#7380)
Add a Unix process fixture that waits after publishing the pending MRF successor snapshot, then is terminated by the parent before restart replay.
Co-authored-by: zhi22915 <qiuzgang@gmail.com>
---------
Co-authored-by: zhi22915 <qiuzgang@gmail.com>
* test(heal): cover transport-lost start receipts (#7371)
Add gRPC transport fault fixtures for heal-control start admission. The tests distinguish pre-admission transport loss from post-admission response loss, then verify exact envelope retries reuse the canonical receipt while fresh forceStart requests create distinct tasks.
Co-authored-by: zhi22915 <qiuzgang@gmail.com>
* test(scanner): add crash-restart heal evidence case (#7370)
* test(scanner): add crash-restart heal evidence case
Add a distinct W21 background target crash case to the scanner/heal evidence registry and oracle path.
Keep the existing restart lane on graceful process restart, keep the crash lane on hard kill, and make the wiring checker reject evidence/oracle mismatches.
Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
Co-Authored-By: zhi22915 <qiuzgang@gmail.com>
* test(scanner): support older Python wiring checks
Let the scanner/heal evidence wiring checker run under Python 3.9/3.10 by falling back to tomli and chunked SHA-256 hashing when the Python 3.11 standard APIs are unavailable.
Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
Co-Authored-By: zhi22915 <qiuzgang@gmail.com>
---------
Co-authored-by: zhi22915 <qiuzgang@gmail.com>
* fix(scanner): reject stale raw page source seeds (#7382)
Do not prefill a resumed raw page owner with previously indexed entries when starting a new raw directory observation pass. The next pass must observe the same prefix again before the page index can advance; otherwise the index is discarded fail-closed.
Co-authored-by: zhi22915 <qiuzgang@gmail.com>
* fix(scanner): defer raw page revalidation until observed (#7384)
A resumed raw page owner index must not prefill entries from older cache state, but it also must not discard a valid multi-entry index before the current raw directory pass has observed enough entries to prove identity. Track the persisted index floor and only run the strict owner identity check once the current pass reaches that floor.
Co-authored-by: zhi22915 <qiuzgang@gmail.com>
---------
Co-authored-by: zhi22915 <qiuzgang@gmail.com>
* fix(scanner): drop the unused Digest import
* fix(replication): carry the compression layout through SSE-C passthrough (#7372)
* fix(replication): queue an in-flight version only once (#7376)
Align the suspended-owner heal regression with read-only pool metadata admission semantics. The quorum-boundary case now asserts that heal fails the current capacity admission without latching the global pool metadata writer.
Co-authored-by: zhi22915 <qiuzgang@gmail.com>
Evaluate read-only pool metadata planning probes through an isolated write-state clone so transient unreadable replicas fail the current admission without permanently latching the shared writer gate.
Co-authored-by: zhi22915 <qiuzgang@gmail.com>
Return a partial data-usage cache when raw filesystem enumeration is cancelled before object progress can be written. The partial cache now carries a validated raw enumeration cursor for V2 checkpoint scans while keeping the snapshot incomplete and clearing older frontier/checkpoint metadata.
Co-authored-by: zhi22915 <qiuzgang@gmail.com>
When the remote dirty-usage ACK response is lost, re-probe scanner activity once and accept the ACK only if every target host still reports the same scanner instance with no dirty usage pending. Duplicate targets, restarted peers, unverified activity, and concurrent writes remain pending.
Co-authored-by: zhi22915 <qiuzgang@gmail.com>
Add an ECStore-backed child-process fixture that publishes the MRF journal in one OS process, then verifies a restarted manager can replay the complete snapshot while retaining the journal when bounded admission accepts only a prefix.
Co-authored-by: zhi22915 <qiuzgang@gmail.com>
Discover durable scanner recovery intents during startup and sequentially re-drive accepted or running usage full-rebuild work. Disabled scanner startup also replays existing durable intents without enabling the normal scanner loop.
Co-authored-by: zhi22915 <qiuzgang@gmail.com>
Record bounded first/last raw entry markers in the restart diagnostic worker and have the driver classify repeated raw windows when retained coverage does not advance.
Co-authored-by: zhi22915 <qiuzgang@gmail.com>
Keep the startup journal on disk when replay cannot fully re-arm or the heal manager refuses a replayed intent with Full/QueueFull. The next live snapshot can still advance the journal after the retry anchor is durable again.
Co-authored-by: zhi22915 <qiuzgang@gmail.com>
Restore the previous control-file bytes, or remove a newly created file, when the Unix compare-and-update path reaches the rename but then fails to fsync the parent directory. This keeps failed metadata CAS publications from advancing recovery anchors.
Co-authored-by: zhi22915 <qiuzgang@gmail.com>
Allow the scanner/heal release evidence e2e helper to bind the active case identity and oracle file through an explicit descriptor instead of hard-coding the background target restart artifact. Extend the checker self-test so a single run can finish multiple registry-declared oracles while release gates remain pending until every required lane is complete.
Co-authored-by: zhi22915 <qiuzgang@gmail.com>
Add a durable raw enumeration cursor shape to scanner usage metadata and validate it against bucket identity, source, bounds, version, and page digest before preserving it across checkpoint preparation.
Keep empty cursor metadata omitted so existing pinned .usage-cache.bin bytes stay unchanged, while legacy readers still ignore the additive field when it is present.
Co-authored-by: zhi22915 <qiuzgang@gmail.com>
The never-versioned listing fast path emitted any non-empty directory
without xl.meta as a prefix, which surfaced the data dirs deleted
versions leave behind as phantom folders that HEAD, listing and
recursive remove could not touch. Probe such directories for the
delete-residue shape before emitting them, and let any complete empty
first page of a prefix listing trigger the existing fail-closed orphan
purge so ordinary browse and remove traffic reclaims committed residue.
The admin storage walk probed a set's drives one after another, each
bounded by the disk_info timeout, so a few drives still recovering
after a power cut pushed the local snapshot past the peer probe budget
and healthy peers rendered as unknown. Probe all drives at once so the
walk costs one timeout at most, and add a test-only probe delay hook to
pin that bound.
Multipart parts shared the 250 ms direct-PutObject wait on the foreground
write permit pool, so SDK-default concurrency (many parts per upload in
flight at once) was rejected wholesale with SlowDown at stock settings.
Keep the pool that bounds in-flight bodies, but let parts wait in a
bounded queue with their own timeout before body ingest, report the
queue depth in the ForegroundWrite admission snapshot, and document the
foreground write admission environment variables.
Since rc.1 the latest tag has been frozen at 1.0.0-beta.12 because the
docker workflow only allowed alpha/beta prereleases to update latest
(#2732 dropped the rc case). Before 1.0.0 GA, latest is expected to
track the newest test build.
- Prereleases (alpha/beta/rc) now update latest as long as no stable
vX.Y.Z tag exists on origin, so the rule retires itself at GA.
- Channel tags (alpha/beta/rc) are now always added for prereleases;
the previous if/elif skipped the channel tag whenever latest was
created, which is why no :beta tag was ever published.
fix(heal): fall back to set-wide format for directory-backed replacement targets
Since #7018 `renew_disk` routes an unformatted local endpoint through the automatic replacement heal, which requires the target to be an independently mounted disk. Directory-backed deployments (the operator set `RUSTFS_UNSAFE_BYPASS_DISK_CHECK`, which the startup disk-independence check already requires for endpoints sharing a device) can never pass that admission, so a runtime-wiped or replaced directory disk stayed unformatted forever: the heal task failed with "replacement target is not a stable mounted disk" and the auto-scan kept deferring the endpoint. This broke the Issue #1533 contract and the `heal_erasure_disk_rebuild_test` lane on main since 2026-09-02.
When the disk-check bypass is set and the replacement target fails admission, the erasure-set heal now logs a warning and downgrades to the ordinary set-wide `heal_format` path that predated replacement admission, and the auto-scan no longer defers such endpoints. The mount admission itself is unchanged and still cannot be bypassed by any environment variable; deployments without the bypass keep failing closed.
The endpoint-blackhole heal scenario now probes whether `iptables` can read the OUTPUT chain and logs an explicit skip when the host lacks `CAP_NET_ADMIN` (containerised runners report "Permission denied" from the nf_tables backend even under sudo); `RUSTFS_E2E_REQUIRE_NET_FAULT_INJECTION=1` turns that into a failure for lanes that provision the capability. The CI full-gate job surfaces the missing capability as a workflow warning, and the runtime-wipe fixture retries `remove_dir_all` on the listing race macOS surfaces as `DirectoryNotEmpty`.
Refs rustfs/backlog#2357.
Commit 086ee8e48 moved authorize_recovery_admin_request above authorize_transition_admin_request and left the transition gate's doc comment attached to the recovery gate, which returns a hashed actor rather than the masked access key the comment describes. Move the comment back onto the transition gate and give the recovery gate its own accurate description. No behavior change.
* del go code
* chore: record ILM lifecycle validation on go-del (#7318)
Co-authored-by: zhi22915 <qiuzgang@gmail.com>
---------
Co-authored-by: zhi22915 <qiuzgang@gmail.com>
Add a real ECStore reopen regression for scanner usage-state reset cleanup boundaries. The fixture seeds each partially completed cleanup state, recreates the store, then verifies the reset resumes without rewriting the bootstrap intent or deleting unrelated metadata.
Co-authored-by: zhi22915 <qiuzgang@gmail.com>
* fix(scanner): require root publication proof before dirty ack
Bind ACK expectations to validated scan candidates and confirm the actual primary-root revision and readback. Retain saved outcomes and dirty responsibility when stronger evidence is unavailable. Isolate CAS attempt confirmation and invalidate proof after scope mutations.
Revalidate observed candidate reuse before issuing a new publication proof, preserve the exact validated authoritative baseline work digest, and settle fixture commit tails before stable maintenance scans. Keep scoped ACK production disabled.
Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
Co-Authored-By: zhi22915 <qiuzgang@gmail.com>
* fix: restore ILM transition and lifecycle validation (#7316)
Co-authored-by: zhi22915 <qiuzgang@gmail.com>
---------
Co-authored-by: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: zhi22915 <qiuzgang@gmail.com>
Treat a negative wall-clock age as zero without bypassing count or byte eviction. Cover canonical and alias queries, terminal outcomes, exact TTL expiry, and capacity limits during rollback.
Co-authored-by: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: zhi22915 <qiuzgang@gmail.com>
chore(deps): update Crossbeam, Redis, DER, and ipnet
Refresh the shared concurrency, Redis client, DER decoding and IP network dependencies while retaining existing feature selections and the hotpath pin.
Co-authored-by: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: zhi22915 <qiuzgang@gmail.com>
feat(scanner): retain bounded bootstrap admission fairness
Keep a leader-local bounded cohort across scanner retries and preserve
waiting bucket priority during dirty arrivals and capacity overflow.
Order source permits in the dispatcher without changing result identity,
parent budgets, explicit cycle timing, or persistent coverage evidence.
Co-authored-by: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: zhi22915 <qiuzgang@gmail.com>
Retain failed identities in an execution-local count and byte bounded window so healthy later pages can advance. Preserve retry jitter, deadlines, terminal accounting and pressure pacing, with deterministic head-of-line and capacity regressions.
Co-authored-by: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: zhi22915 <qiuzgang@gmail.com>
Run one supervised cleanup attempt for an existing operator reset, with
strict phase and revision checks under the original leader lock. Keep v3
reset authorization and responses unchanged, report deferred status, and
bound probe and shutdown waits without aborting in-flight reset ownership.
Co-authored-by: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: zhi22915 <qiuzgang@gmail.com>
Stop task completion and legacy notices from discharging scanner retry hints. Preserve existing hints and their retry due time across admission observations, bound retry scheduling, and synchronize changed batches once even on cancellation.
Exercise the production MRF consumer, manager, event channel and scanner ledger. Document producer durability gaps without enabling successor activation or garbage collection.
Co-authored-by: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: zhi22915 <qiuzgang@gmail.com>
* test(e2e): add distributed 4x4 validation
* ci(e2e): use tmpfs for distributed pool isolation
sm-standard-4 is an ARC pod without usable loop devices, so
mount -o loop fails with ENOENT before any pool filesystem is
attached. Sized tmpfs still gives each pool a distinct st_dev
and independent 1G statfs capacity.
Co-authored-by: RustFS <hello@rustfs.com>
* test(e2e): prove operations overlap data movement
---------
Co-authored-by: Zhengchao An <anzhengchao@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Cursor Agent <cursoragent@cursor.com>
* fix(ecstore): retain namespace owners through local physical tails
(cherry picked from commit a2f242463316e87604feadbdac5e4148140e72c0)
* test(ecstore): expose stale fsync group cleanup
* fix(ecstore): capture complete fsync worker guard
(cherry picked from commit 1dc90bb836e20ea9ee45d0a629a9201e20d231c4)
* fix(ecstore): preserve successor fsync group registration
(cherry picked from commit c7dfaad90526052e56c57dafffa4813bdcde46ca)
* test(ecstore): mark physical owner fixtures as inline
* test(ecstore): wait for namespace owner release before asserting
The namespace owner tests decided that ownership had ended when the Weak probe stopped upgrading or when the mutation lease could be reacquired. Both signals fire before the owner guard's Drop decrements the pending counter: Arc releases its strong count before running Drop, and the lease drops its locks before its owner field. The rio-v2 lane hit that window in undo_fresh_version_keeps_physical_namespace_owner_after_timeout.
Extend every drain wait to also require namespace_commits_pending() to be false, so the assertions observe the completed release instead of racing it.
* test(odm): pin gcs source status-to-error-class mapping
The native GCS backend classifies every failure from the HTTP status
alone, because GCS states its error code in a body this backend never
reads. Only NotFound is negative-cached and only a retryable class may be
re-sent, so cover 401/403 -> AccessDenied, 429/503 -> Throttled,
500/502 -> ServerError and 404 -> NotFound over both HEAD and GET.
* ci(odm): require the source-backend contract tests in test-and-lint
The shared contract tests already run in ci/test-and-lint, but only
because gcs is a rustfs default feature; nothing failed if that
selection went away. Pin the S3, Azure and native GCS contracts in the
core required-test manifest so a lost selection fails the lane.
* chore(deps): refresh SDKs and pin clock skew regression coverage
Refresh compatible dependencies for Scanner/Heal V2 batch 1 and verify
the production S3 retry/signing path with a deterministic clock.
Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
Co-Authored-By: zhi22915 <qiuzgang@gmail.com>
* fix(scanner): require complete publication coverage
Refs rustfs/backlog#2261 and rustfs/backlog#2240.
Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
Co-Authored-By: zhi22915 <qiuzgang@gmail.com>
* fix(ci): keep s3s footprint ratchet tight
Route bucket list-through test-only S3 wire types through the app storage facade again so the PR does not add a direct s3s-importing file.
Retighten the s3_error! footprint baseline to the current lower count.
Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
Co-Authored-By: zhi22915 <qiuzgang@gmail.com>
* fix(odm): expose store context after relocation
Expose the ECStore instance context through a narrow accessor so relocated on-demand migration backfill code no longer reaches into private storage fields.
Declare the faster-hex dependency used by the relocated native HTTP source implementation.
Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
Co-Authored-By: zhi22915 <qiuzgang@gmail.com>
* test(scanner): stabilize usage and ODM regressions
Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
Co-Authored-By: zhi22915 <qiuzgang@gmail.com>
---------
Co-authored-by: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: zhi22915 <qiuzgang@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: overtrue <anzhengchao@gmail.com>
* fix(ilm): reject invalid retention counts and validate lifecycle filters
`NewerNoncurrentVersions` had no lower bound at PUT, and evaluation read a
negative count through `usize::try_from(...).unwrap_or(usize::MAX)`. An
HTTP-accepted rule therefore retained (almost) everything and silently
stopped expiring versions — the one outcome a retention rule must never
produce by accident.
Reject a negative count during validation, and stop reading one as
"retain everything" anywhere it can still arrive from older persistence
or an import: evaluation takes no action for such a rule and says so in a
diagnostic, the batch limit path yields no event, and `Evaluator::eval`
reports a typed corruption error to callers that can surface one.
A count-only noncurrent expiration is a MinIO extension, not an AWS form.
It used to be rejected as an actionless rule and was never executed. It
is now accepted and honoured with the semantics MinIO gives it: the
newest N noncurrent versions are kept and every older one is due as soon
as it became noncurrent. Zero keeps the meaning the batch limit path has
always given it — no count constraint — so a zero-count rule with no age
condition still has no action.
`LifecycleRuleFilter` is an all-`Option` DTO, so the schema constraints
were not checked anywhere: validate at most one top-level predicate, an
`And` that combines at least two, no repeated tag key, tag key/value
limits, non-negative sizes, and `ObjectSizeGreaterThan <
ObjectSizeLessThan`. An empty filter stays valid — AWS documents it as
"every object in the bucket".
Schema-shape violations are reported with a distinct `ErrorKind` so the
S3 boundary answers them with `MalformedXML`; rejected values keep the
`InvalidArgument` this path has always returned.
backlog#2201
* fix(ilm): satisfy lifecycle clippy checks
* fix(ilm): fail closed on invalid lifecycle rules
* fix: initialize optional migration source fields
---------
Co-authored-by: cxymds <cxymds@gmail.com>
* fix(ecstore): restore odm source contract tests
Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
Co-Authored-By: zhi22915 <qiuzgang@gmail.com>
* test(ci): initialize replication evidence in chain test
Run the replication workflow's evidence initialization before the chain handoff self-test executes the suite step. This keeps the test model aligned with the workflow-provided LOG_FILE and TMPDIR values.
Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
Co-Authored-By: zhi22915 <qiuzgang@gmail.com>
* fix(odm): distinguish missing GCS buckets from object misses (#7221)
---------
Co-authored-by: zhi22915 <qiuzgang@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Zhengchao An <anzhengchao@gmail.com>
test(e2e): prove bucket config survives rc.5 upgrade and rollback
Add two upgrade-compatibility scenarios pinned to the on-demand-migration
series' on-disk surfaces: BucketMetadata's 44 -> 46 msgpack keys, the
fail-closed bucket-config reads of rustfs#7172, the encryption-gated PUT
path of rustfs#7183, and the default-on migration module of rustfs#7089.
The upgrade case writes versioning, SSE-S3 default encryption, a validated
replication target plus rule, lifecycle, tags, quota, a public access block,
a bucket policy and an object lock configuration with the pinned previous
release, then asserts each one reads back unchanged on the current build,
that list-remote-targets still reports the target, that writes to the
encrypted and plain buckets keep their encryption posture, that every
pre-upgrade object including a multipart one is byte-identical, and that an
unconfigured bucket reports no migration and still answers NoSuchKey.
The rollback case is the reverse: the current build writes the 46-key blob
and the previous release must decode it by skipping the two unknown keys.
* fix(ci): preserve reported functional suite failures
* fix(ci): isolate functional evidence and preserve every result
* fix(ci): exclude sensitive scratch files from suite artifacts
Two fixes for the functional test chain:
1. Report upload fails with 'jq: Argument list too long' when the base64
report is passed through '--arg content' (pool reports exceed the OS
argv limit; last night's pool run lost its Step Results report this
way). Write the base64 payload to a temp file and load it in jq via
--rawfile instead. Applied uniformly to all nine suite workflows
that share this upload step.
2. The security workflow cloned rustfs/auto-testing into the workspace
and then ran actions/checkout at the workspace root for the OIDC
live gate script, which wiped the auto-testing clone and killed the
suite with 'chmod: cannot access auto-testing/rustfs-security-test.sh'.
Check out the repository into the rustfs-repo/ subdirectory instead
and point RUSTFS_SECURITY_OIDC_LIVE_SCRIPT there.
Co-authored-by: rustfs-ci <ci@rustfs.com>
* feat(ecstore): add a native azure blob odm source backend
* feat(ecstore): add a native gcs odm source backend and one backend contract
* fix(ecstore): refuse an empty azure account key at client build
* fix(ecstore): probe gcs sources with the listing permission
* fix(app): drop a redundant match guard on the sse config lookup
* fix(ecstore): drop stale rename commit duplicates from local.rs
* test(ecstore): use the sanctioned placeholder key in the gcs fixture
chore(deps): refresh SDKs and pin clock skew regression coverage
Refresh compatible dependencies for Scanner/Heal V2 batch 1 and verify
the production S3 retry/signing path with a deterministic clock.
Co-authored-by: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: zhi22915 <qiuzgang@gmail.com>
The workflow_dispatch inputs already accept arbitrary release tags, but
the run failed late and unclearly when a tag had no .deb asset, and the
from_version default pointed at 1.0.0-rc.4-preview.1, whose release
ships no .deb at all - so scheduled runs died on a 404 while installing
the old package.
- Add a fail-fast preflight that resolves each requested tag via the
GitHub release API and verifies the rustfs_<tag>_amd64.deb asset
exists before the suite starts, with an actionable error message
otherwise (e.g. 1.0.0-rc.4 ships only zip/sbom assets).
- Change the from_version default to 1.0.0-rc.3, the newest release
that actually ships a .deb asset.
- Reword the from_version/to_version descriptions so manual triggers
state the .deb-asset requirement and the nightly fallback.
- Pass PF_TESTING_GH_TOKEN as GH_TOKEN to the suite step for the gh api
release lookups, matching the other functional workflows.
Co-authored-by: Zhengchao An <anzhengchao@gmail.com>
* test(ecstore): require core invariant tests in existing CI lane
* test(ci): require a fresh core JUnit report
* test(ecstore): match sealed context fixture map type
The object write path read the bucket default encryption configuration
with `.ok()`, which made "this bucket has no default encryption" and "the
encryption configuration cannot be read" the same value. A bucket whose
encryption blob is damaged therefore stored plaintext objects the
operator had mandated be encrypted, with nothing returned to the client
and nothing in the object to tell those writes apart afterwards.
PUT, COPY and the snowball extract path now share one resolver: an
absent configuration still writes plaintext exactly as before, and every
other outcome refuses the write, carrying the accessor's typed error so
a damaged blob surfaces as a deterministic InternalError while a
transient metadata read failure surfaces as the retryable
ServiceUnavailable. A missing bucket and a cold metadata cache both
still resolve to "no configuration", so neither becomes a refusal. This
matches `prepare_sse_configuration` in `storage::sse`, the resolver the
multipart writer has always used, which fails closed on this lookup.
* fix(ecstore): correct sealed-credential test helper parameter type
The helper took a HashMap that nothing imports, so the ecstore test target did not compile.
* fix(ecstore): fail closed on an unreadable bucket-targets blob
An undecodable bucket-targets.json was replaced by an empty BucketTargets,
so every replication target of that bucket disappeared, replication stopped,
and no caller saw an error. A missing secretKey alone triggers it, because
Credentials has no struct-level serde(default).
parse_all_configs now retains the failure instead: the raw bytes stay and the
typed field stays None, which BucketMetadata::bucket_targets_unreadable reads
as "exists but cannot be read" — the same distinction the fabricated marker
draws for bucket metadata as a whole. One corrupt sub-config still never fails
the metadata load, so an unreadable bucket cannot take down its neighbours or
the node.
BucketTargetSys records such buckets and answers every targets query with the
new BucketRemoteTargetsUnreadable, leaving any snapshot from an earlier
readable load in place so in-flight replication is not torn down. The
replication heal queue reports Missed rather than scheduling against an empty
target set, and the admin listing surfaces the fault instead of an empty list.
Refs: rustfs/backlog#2282
* fix(ecstore): report corrupt permissive bucket configs as invalid
Audit of the remaining parse_all_configs branches. Policy, versioning, object
lock and replication already fail closed at their accessors; encryption,
public access block and quota did not, and for those three "absent" is exactly
the state that grants something — plaintext storage, anonymous access,
unbounded capacity. They now report a stored-but-undecodable payload as
invalid rather than as ConfigNotFound, matching the guard the versioning and
object-lock accessors already use. The quota enforcement path already refused
such a payload; only the metadata read path was misreporting it.
The branches left degrading, and the concrete reason each is safe, are
recorded in the table on parse_all_configs.
Refs: rustfs/backlog#2282
SealScope::encryption_context() returned a HashMap whose key order is
non-deterministic. The FakeSealer test round-trips the context through
JSON serialization, and HashMap's random iteration order caused the
prefix comparison to intermittently fail with 'encryption context mismatch'.
Switch to BTreeMap which guarantees stable key ordering.
* ci(upgrade): render an upgrade matrix in the report; fix from default
The upgrade report only ever showed the requested deb URLs and a case
table. The nightly chain runs died installing the OLD package (default
from_version 1.0.0-rc.4-preview.1 has no .deb asset on its release, and
release 1.0.0-rc.4 ships none either), leaving an empty Total: 0 report
with no indication of what was upgraded.
- Default from_version is now 1.0.0-rc.3 (ships rustfs_1.0.0.rc.3_amd64.deb).
Matches the auto-testing default from PR #32.
- The report generator also parses the [UPG-TOPO] lines the suite now
emits and renders an 'Upgrade Matrix' section: per topology and KMS
backend, the versions actually in place before/after (captured via
'rustfs --version' on the node) and the aggregated result. When the
suite dies before any topology completes, the matrix says so instead
of silently showing nothing.
* fix(ci): use English headers in the upgrade matrix table
* ci(heal,pool): render step results and version in the reports
The heal and pool-expansion reports were only a raw log tail: no
structured indication of which steps passed, no overall verdict, and no
version information for the cluster under test.
The suites now emit machine-readable lines (auto-testing PR):
[HEAL-STEP] <n> <desc> PASS|FAIL [POOL-STEP] <n> <desc> PASS|FAIL
[HEAL-VERSION] <ver> (node <n>) [POOL-VERSION] <ver> (node <n>)
[HEAL-RESULT] PASS|FAIL <detail> [POOL-RESULT] PASS|FAIL <detail>
Both report generators parse them and emit a '## Step Results' section
before the log tail: the version captured in place via 'rustfs --version'
on a node, the overall verdict, and a per-step table. When a run dies
before any step reports (old script or early crash), the table shows a
NOT RUN placeholder row instead of silently showing nothing.
* feat(ecstore): add the sealed remote credential seam
Replication targets, remote tiers and on-demand migration sources will all
seal their stored secrets through one envelope rather than three
(rustfs/backlog#2168, design in docs/architecture/remote-credential-sealing-adr.md).
Adds the versioned envelope, the seal scope that binds a ciphertext to the
store, owner and field it belongs to, the sealer registration point, and the
fail-closed error type. ECStore still has no rustfs-kms dependency: the binary
installs a sealer the way it installs the event dispatch hook.
Nothing is wired to a consumer yet, so no stored format changes.
* docs(ecstore): name the event dispatch hook by module, not by symbol
The architecture guard keeps EVENT_DISPATCH_HOOK references inside the
event-notification owner module; the module doc cited the symbol only as an
example of the hook shape, so cite its file instead.
* fix(restore): reject SELECT restore and keep typed S3 errors
RestoreObject accepted `Type=SELECT` requests, but the restore path can
only write the retrieved bytes back to the source key: `put_restore_opts`
built SELECT output options and `restore_transitioned_object` then PUT
them over the source bucket/object. On an unversioned bucket that dropped
`x-amz-restore`, user metadata and tags from the live object; on a
versioned bucket it published a bogus latest version. Nothing was ever
written to `OutputLocation.S3`, yet the response still carried a
fabricated `x-amz-restore-output-path`.
Reject SELECT at the API boundary with a typed NotImplemented, before any
guard or metadata write, and fail closed in `put_restore_opts` as the
backstop for any other caller.
Every other RestoreObject failure was collapsed into a `Custom` error
code, which serializes as a generic retryable 500: a missing key or
version, a malformed version-id, an object that was never transitioned,
an illegal `Days`, and authorization or storage failures all looked the
same to a client. Map them to their S3 identities instead — NoSuchKey,
NoSuchVersion, InvalidArgument, InvalidObjectState, InvalidRequest,
MalformedXML — by preserving `StorageError` through `post_restore_opts`
and letting `ApiError` do the mapping. The intentional 409
RestoreAlreadyInProgress and 503 SlowDown behaviour is unchanged, and
request validation now runs before any lock is taken.
backlog#1341, backlog#2205
* test(restore): give the typed-error regression the ecstore test stack
`execute_restore_object_maps_failures_to_typed_s3_errors` builds a real
ECStore fixture, and under nextest each test runs in a spawned thread with
libtest's 2 MiB stack. On Linux CI that overflowed: the test aborted with
SIGABRT / "fatal runtime error: stack overflow" while every other test in
the run passed.
Add it to the `ecstore-base-stack` filter in both the default and ci
profiles, alongside the other `package(rustfs)` tests that drive the same
store fixture. 4 MiB matches what the deeper multipart and access
roundtrips already use.
The batch `NewerNoncurrentVersions` expiry path took a lifecycle event
argument and ignored it: after `delete_objects` committed it only evicted
the cache and scheduled replication deletes, so a successful noncurrent
version expiry was invisible to notification subscribers while the
equivalent current-version path emitted a lifecycle expiration event.
Emit that event from the batch path too, reusing the existing lifecycle
audit sink and event contract. Only entries that actually mutated
something are announced, and cache eviction and replication scheduling
keep their existing order and admission — the event is derived from the
committed result and a send failure never rolls back a delete.
"No error" is not enough to prove a mutation: the disk layer skips an
absent version and reports success, so a batch entry for a version that
was already gone came back indistinguishable from a committed delete.
The delete plan already resolves whether the source exists, so carry that
`source_missing` result on `DeletedObject` and let the lifecycle path
stay silent for versions it did not remove.
backlog#2202
Replication targets, remote tiers and on-demand migration sources each store a
remote secret in clear text under .rustfs.sys today. Record one design for all
three before any of them invents its own: seal only the secret fields, into an
added field so an old reader finds the credential absent rather than a
ciphertext it would sign with, unseal at remote-client construction, and reach
KMS through an installed hook because ECStore does not depend on rustfs-kms.
Covers the envelope format and its encryption context, the mixed-version
compatibility matrix, the rollout gate, rotation ownership and the fail-closed
rules.
* test(odm): drive the migration cases from an env-named source
The ODM e2e suite only ever migrates from the in-process fake source, so
path-style addressing, region handling, ETag shape and list pagination on
real implementations stay untested. OdmInteropEnv resolves the source from
RUSTFS_ODM_INTEROP_*, seeding into a per-run source_prefix so a shared real
bucket can host concurrent runs and every seeded key is removed afterwards.
A named provider with a missing variable is an error, never a silent
fallback to the fake source.
interop_test holds the four cases that run against either source, and the
e2e-odm-interop profile is the lane that selects them; e2e-full excludes
them, so its committed selection is unchanged. wait_until_odm_engaged
replaces the fake source's journal probe for the readiness wait, since a
real source keeps no journal.
* ci(odm): add the scheduled provider interop lane
on-demand-migration-interop.yml runs the interop cases against a pinned
MinIO container with a 5,000-object backfill - past the fake source's 4,096
version and journal caps - and the three-case minimum against AWS, R2 and
GCS when their ODM_INTEROP_* secrets exist, skipping with a summary note
when they do not. Each provider gets one JSON report merging the per-case
entries with the nextest JUnit, which stays authoritative for what ran.
Report-only and never required: it depends on third-party endpoints and on
secrets a fork does not have.
`GET /v3/tier-stats` answered from whichever process received the
request, returning that node's rolling 24-hour transition counters as
if they were cluster totals, and the `TierRequestsSuccess` and
`TierRequestsFailure` metric names had no producer at all.
The body now separates the two quantities a tier carries. Stored
inventory comes from the persisted scanner usage snapshot, which is
already cluster-wide; rolling activity is summed over every member
through a new read-only `TierDailyStats` peer RPC. Rings are merged
rather than added, so an idle node's expired hours age out, and each
node counts only its own committed transitions, so a retry is counted
once. Coverage travels with the numbers: `activity.status` names the
reporting members and the ones that could not be asked, timed out, or
answered with a ring this build refuses to merge, and per-tier
inventory is absent rather than zero when the snapshot has no
accounting. The version 1 body stays reachable at `?format=legacy`.
Tier request counters are recorded at the two seams every remote
request passes through, so a new provider is counted by construction,
with a closed operation/outcome label set that can never grow a tier
name, endpoint or object key.
Closesrustfs/backlog#2207
Co-authored-by: cxymds <cxymds@gmail.com>
* feat(odm): merge the source listing into ListObjectsV2
Adds policy.list_through: ListObjectsV2 merges the local and source
listings into one ordered page so clients see the whole namespace during
an on-demand migration. Local entries win a key both sides hold,
CommonPrefixes are unioned under a delimiter, and the continuation token
is an opaque versioned envelope carrying both cursors.
A source listing failure or an open breaker follows policy.source_error:
propagate answers 424, not_found answers from local state and marks the
response x-rustfs-on-demand-migration-list: local_only. Source listings
are capped at 10 per second per bucket.
* test(odm): refresh the e2e-full darwin selection digest
The list-through e2e module adds seven cases to the merge lane.
* fix(odm): declare the remote client retry policy per consumer
The SDK retry policy was an inherited default: one logical call could cost
three wire requests, so the migration breaker counted logical calls on top
of a threefold amplification against a source that was already failing.
Make it an explicit RemoteS3EndpointSpec field. Replication targets declare
today's standard three attempts and keep their behaviour; the on-demand
migration source and its admin probe declare a disabled policy, so one
counted failure is exactly one source request and pull.rs owns the only
retry budget.
* fix(odm): count a stalled inline source as a source timeout
The inline tee wraps its source body in the idle guard, but the tee turns a
stalled source into an ordinary body read error, so the write-back reported
it as a local write failure. Hand commit_inline the guard so the pull is
counted under source_timeout instead.
The background pump now enforces the idle budget through the same guard
rather than a second copy of the timeout loop.
* test(odm): cover a stalled source body end to end
The fake target can now deliver a GetObject body in slices with a pause
between them, so the inline abort can be driven by a stalled source instead
of a truncated one. Two fault cases drop the workarounds they carried for
the SDK's retries: the scripted fault count and the observed source request
count now have to agree.
The operations guide records the retry and idle-timeout guarantees.
* fix(replication): send an integrity header on Object Lock replication PUTs
AWS S3, MinIO and most compatible targets reject a PutObject that carries
x-amz-object-lock-* headers unless it also carries Content-MD5 or an
x-amz-checksum-* header. Since rustfs#6895 the replication client sends
plain signed payloads with no SDK checksum, so every replicated object
with a retention period or legal hold failed against such targets.
TargetClient::put_object now decides per request through the pure
rustfs_replication::object_lock_put_integrity: a plaintext single-part
object whose source ETag is its MD5 gets Content-MD5 derived from the
ETag (no body pass, framing unchanged); a multipart-layout ETag, managed
SSE or SSE-C passthrough falls back to an SDK CRC32; a forwarded source
checksum or an unlocked PUT is left alone.
The outbound target matrix flips its two KnownFailing(rustfs#7082) cells
to Completed and every Completed cell now asserts that a locked
PutObject carried an integrity header.
Fixes rustfs#7082.
* test(e2e): keep the matrix expectation table clippy-clean under -D warnings
The CI lint runs cargo clippy --all-targets -- -D warnings. With every cell
green the single-arm match tripped match_single_binding and the unused
KnownFailing variant tripped dead_code, and the target-client tests tripped
field_reassign_with_default. Drive the expectation table from a
KNOWN_FAILING_CELLS constant (so the variant stays live and adding a red
cell is a one-line entry), build the test options as struct literals, and
refresh the e2e-repl-nightly selection digest for the renamed table test.
The scenario keeps the shared gating ECStore, a live RestoreObject
authorization hook and the RestoreObject usecase future alive at once, which
left the 2 MiB test-thread stack a few KiB from overflowing on Linux; pinning a
single future was not enough. Run the whole scenario through the existing
run_large_stack_test helper instead.
test(e2e): add the outbound target matrix and the replication checksum postmortem
Defense work for rustfs#7082, the regression rustfs#6895 introduced while
fixing rustfs#6853: a fix for one target class changed a client default for
every target class and nothing in tree modeled the other classes.
- docs/postmortems: timeline, root cause, why four defense layers missed
it, and the SOP for changing any outbound client default; AGENTS.md and
the adversarial compatibility lens point at it; the two env knobs from
rustfs#6895 are documented in docs/operations.
- fake_s3_target: reject_aws_chunked_uploads, require_checksum_for_object_lock
(Content-MD5 always verified), create_bucket_with_object_lock with a
GetObjectLockConfiguration handler, and a TransportSnapshot on every
journal record.
- replication_target_matrix_test: six object shapes against four target
modes with an explicit expectation table; the two rustfs#7082 cells are
pinned KnownFailing and fail with an XPASS message once the fix lands.
Wired into e2e-repl-nightly, excluded from e2e-full.
* feat(odm): enable on-demand migration by default
The module switch RUSTFS_ON_DEMAND_MIGRATION_ENABLED now defaults to true,
so the feature is reachable without an opt-in; setting it to false still
keeps the module out of the read path entirely. A bucket without an
on-demand-migration.json is never resolved by the runtime and makes no
source call, so the flip changes nothing for unconfigured buckets.
The admin plane now reads the switch through the predicate published by
module_switches.rs instead of its own duplicated env constant; the
behaviour (an environment read per call) is unchanged.
* test(e2e): wire three on-demand migration cases into e2e-smoke
The PR smoke lane gains one case per user-visible contract: a GET miss
that pulls and persists, a HEAD miss that answers from the source and
stores nothing, and the admin config/status pair that must redact the
source secret. The HEAD case did not exist outside the nightly
real-source lane, so it is added to get_basic_test.
Measured on darwin: the lane goes from 168 tests in 101.98 s to 171
tests in 101.92 s, since the three cases overlap the lane's existing
work. The darwin selection digests for e2e-smoke and e2e-full are
regenerated; the e2e-full linux digest still needs a Linux runner.
* docs(changelog): record the on-demand migration feature
* fix(ecstore): stop scan_dir emitting entries past a limit hit inside a subdirectory
scan_dir's flush loop recurses into a pending subdirectory when the
current sibling entry's page limit is reached mid-recursion, but kept
writing the current (later-sorting) entry regardless. gather_results
then builds the next page's continuation marker from that later entry,
which permanently skips the still-unscanned tail of the subdirectory
on resume instead of just deferring it to the next page.
Add a limit re-check right after the flush loop, before the current
entry is written, so scan_dir stops cleanly at the true last-written
key. Reproduces and fixes the rc.5 recursive ListObjectsV2 data-loss
report (7826/7881 keys, contiguous 55-key block silently dropped).
Adds scan_dir_does_not_emit_entries_past_a_limit_hit_inside_a_subdirectory.
* fix(ecstore): re-check the page limit on every dir_stack flush iteration
The flush loop that drains dir_stack can pop and recurse into more than
one pending subdirectory per outer iteration (whenever more than one
stack entry sorts below the current sibling entry). The limit re-check
added in the previous commit only ran once, after the whole flush loop
exited - so if the first recursive scan_dir call already exhausted the
page limit, the loop's next pop+recurse still went ahead and scanned
(and emitted entries for) another subdirectory beyond where the page
was supposed to stop.
Confirmed against production data: a bucket with ~1.17M objects under
one prefix still cut a recursive ListObjectsV2 listing short (825 of an
expected much larger next page, IsTruncated=false) even with the first
fix deployed, at a two-level-nested subdirectory. Move the check inside
the while loop so it runs before every pop, not just once after.
---------
Co-authored-by: Claude Agent <agent@local>
* feat(ecstore): add on-demand migration backfill job core
Add the background backfill job for on-demand migration
(rustfs/backlog#2159): a durable checkpoint under
buckets/<bucket>/on-demand-migration-backfill.json saved by If-Match
compare-and-set every 1000 keys or 10 s, a 60 s owner lease renewed by
every save, a recovery pass that takes over expired leases (or jobs this
node owned before a restart) and cancels jobs whose config changed, and a
main loop over the source ListObjectsV2 pages with the skip_existing
policy, dry runs, bounded outstanding pulls and wait-on-full enqueueing.
The pull queue gains per-job completion reports so the job can count
pulled/failed keys (hashes only), and pull permits become two-tier so an
online miss is never queued behind a backfill pull.
* feat(admin): expose on-demand migration backfill job
Wire the ODM-12 backfill job (rustfs/backlog#2159) to its operators:
POST /v3/on-demand-migration/{bucket}/backfill?op=start|cancel and
GET .../backfill return the checkpoint document, GET .../status gains a
backfill summary, and the recovery loop plus the process-wide runner are
installed at startup. Backfill control reuses
Set/GetBucketOnDemandMigrationAction and is recorded in the route policy,
the registration matrix and the admin route snapshot.
Add the rustfs-madmin wire types and client methods with golden fixtures
shared by the server tests, the backfill_* metric descriptors and their
collector, and three e2e scenarios: a full backfill across list pages,
cancellation, and resuming from the persisted continuation token after a
server restart.
* docs(odm): add the on-demand migration operations guide
Positioning against replication, site replication, tiering and the
replication read-proxy; the admin API walkthrough; the full config field
table with defaults and bounds; the semantics table with the test that
pins each row; provider presets and least-privilege source permissions;
integrity, ETag and metadata mapping; protections, error codes,
observability with PromQL, troubleshooting, known limitations and
security notes.
Adds docs/architecture/background-services-inventory.md with the
write-back pipeline, backfill job and backfill recovery loop rows, and
registers it in the architecture index.
Refs rustfs/backlog#2160, rustfs/backlog#2147.
* docs(odm): note migration sources on the replication egress guard
Refs rustfs/backlog#2160.
* test(odm): add the fault, concurrency, interaction and real-source e2e
Twenty-one scenarios for on-demand migration: source failures and the
circuit breaker, single-flight and the pull-concurrency limits, how a
pulled object composes with encryption, Object Lock, quota, events,
replication, delete markers and the disable switch, and two cases against
a real second RustFS as the source.
Every assertion carries a source-request-count dimension so a case cannot
pass by serving the client while quietly re-reading the source.
* ci(odm): route the slow on-demand-migration e2e to the nightly lane
The fault, concurrency and real-source modules wait out the 30 s breaker
window, drive 100-deep bursts, or start extra RustFS processes, so they
join e2e-nightly and are subtracted from the e2e-full merge budget. The
e2e-smoke selection is unchanged.
feat(rustfs): serve GET misses from the migration source
Wire the on-demand migration read-through into the GET path, after the
local read and the replication proxy have both missed (rustfs/backlog#2156).
A source HEAD supplies size, validators and metadata. Conditional headers
are evaluated locally against it and never forwarded, so a source 304/412
cannot be mistaken for a source failure. An object within inline_max_bytes
is teed: the primary streams to the client while the secondary commits the
local copy in a background task, so a client disconnect still stores the
whole object and a failed write-back never touches the client stream.
Range reads and larger objects stream straight through and queue a
background pull per policy. Concurrent misses of one key share the
singleflight slot: the leader tees, followers re-read local after it
commits or degrade to passthrough after first_byte_ms.
Version reads, partNumber reads, anti-loop marked requests and a respected
local delete marker keep their original 404. Source answers carry
x-rustfs-on-demand-migration: source; local hits are untouched, and the
local hit path gains no await or lock.
The guard added in #7021 fails a >5 GiB single-PutObject replication up
front instead of streaming the body to a target that must reject it. Its
message asserted a conclusion: "was not written as multipart on the
source ... re-upload it with multipart". That text is only as right as
the transport decision feeding it, and until #7047 that decision was
wrong for multipart objects carrying a full-object checksum. On 1.0.0-rc.5
a 768-part object was misrouted to the single-PUT path, and the new
default-level error line told the operator to re-upload as multipart an
object whose own ETag ended in -768.
State the evidence instead of the conclusion. The message now quotes the
ETag the decision was read from and says what was read from it (no
part-count suffix), so an operator can check the line against the
object's listing. A misroute then reads as a visible contradiction --
a suffixed ETag on a single-PUT line -- and the message says that case is
a transport-selection defect to report, not something to fix by
re-uploading. A missing or empty ETag is printed as <none> rather than
hidden.
The routing itself is already fixed by #7047; this changes only what the
guard says when it fires.
* fix(ecstore): persist merged checksum type for full-object multipart
complete_multipart_upload built the object-level checksum record from a
ChecksumType copied before the MULTIPART / INCLUDES_MULTIPART flags were
merged in. ChecksumType::merge takes &mut self, so the merge updated the
local variable while the copy already inside the Checksum struct stayed
behind. The composite branch rebuilt the Checksum from the merged type
and was unaffected; the full-object branch never rebuilt it, so those
flags never reached disk.
rustfs_rio::read_checksums only sets its multipart flag and only emits
the "x-amz-checksum-type" = "FULL_OBJECT" entry inside its MULTIPART
branch, so a full-object multipart object read back as non-multipart with
no type entry, and GetObject and HeadObject answered with no
x-amz-checksum-type header at all where AWS returns FULL_OBJECT.
Hand the full-object branch the merged type instead of rebuilding the
Checksum: the value must stay the running merge produced by add_part,
because hashing the concatenated part digests would yield the COMPOSITE
value, a different number than the one the client sent. The serialization
now lives in multipart_object_checksum_record so both shapes are covered
by unit tests.
Records written by earlier builds carry the bare algorithm type with no
MULTIPART flags and no trailing part block; they keep reading back to the
same checksum value, and the FULL_OBJECT reader arm predates this change
so older peers parse the new record shape correctly too.
Found while root-causing rustfs#6825.
* fix(s3): reject contradicting multipart checksum type as client error
A CompleteMultipartUpload declaring an x-amz-checksum-type that
contradicts the type recorded at CreateMultipartUpload answered 500
InternalError, telling the caller to retry a request that can only ever
fail. The storage layer does refuse the combination, but through a
generic error that maps to InternalError.
Validate the header against the recorded type in the usecase, where the
upload metadata returned by get_multipart_info is already in hand, and
answer InvalidRequest naming both types, matching AWS. The storage-layer
check stays as a backstop for non-HTTP callers.
Uploads created without a checksum algorithm record no type, so there is
nothing to contradict and the header is left alone rather than newly
rejected. Replication is unaffected: replication_put_object_options
already excludes x-amz-checksum-type from the metadata it forwards.
* test(e2e): cover full-object multipart checksum type round-trip
Adds an end-to-end test that a CRC32 FULL_OBJECT multipart upload reports
x-amz-checksum-type: FULL_OBJECT and the unsuffixed full-object value on
both GetObject and HeadObject, and one that a CompleteMultipartUpload
contradicting the recorded type is rejected as InvalidRequest while
leaving the upload intact. Extends the existing CRC64NVME multipart test
with the same checksum-type assertion.
* fix(s3): keep checksum-type validation off the s3s error macro
The s3s footprint ratchet (scripts/check_s3s_footprint.sh) counts
s3_error! invocation lines and is lower-only: new code must route
through the gateway abstractions rather than widen the direct s3s
surface the s3gate migration is shrinking.
Raise the contradiction through ApiError::invalid_request instead. The
response is byte-for-byte identical -- From<ApiError> for S3Error carries
the InvalidRequest code and the message through unchanged -- and the
usecase already returns ApiError elsewhere, so this is the idiomatic
path rather than a way around the counter.
The explanatory comment deliberately says "the s3s error macro" instead
of naming the macro: the ratchet counts raw matches, so spelling it out
in a comment tripped the same check.
* feat(obs): export on-demand migration bucket metrics
Add the on_demand_migration metric subsystem: per-bucket request,
pull, failure, inflight, queue depth, source latency distribution and
breaker state series fed from the ODM runtime snapshot through the
storage boundary, collected alongside bucket replication metrics, and
retired once a bucket's config disappears.
* feat(admin): report the full on-demand migration status snapshot
Extend GET /v3/on-demand-migration/{bucket}/status with provider,
endpoint host, breaker state, runtime counters, last source error,
inflight and queue gauges and the config timestamp. served_by_source_ratio
stays null: no per-bucket GET total exists to divide by. Update the
madmin status type and golden fixture together.
* feat(ecstore): add on-demand migration pull queue and write-back pipeline
Background pull queue per bucket (bounded by pull_queue_capacity, concurrency via the state's pull slot), OdmWriteBack/PullSource traits, single-part and multipart write-back with a pumped body that enforces idle timeout, cancel and content length, retry policy for retryable source errors, inline commit helper, and stats accounting (rustfs/backlog#2153).
* feat(object): implement on-demand migration write-back over internal put
OdmWriteBack impl mapping source heads onto InternalPutContext (content-header allowlist, x-amz-meta copy, tags, dual-prefix odm-* provenance, ETag policy), injected into OnDemandMigrationSys at startup; removes the dead-code gates left by ODM-06a (rustfs/backlog#2153).
feat(object): proxy HEAD misses to the on-demand migration source
Add the ODM HEAD passthrough (rustfs/backlog#2155): after the local lookup
and the replication proxy both miss, resolve the bucket through
OnDemandMigrationSys and answer from the source's HEAD without writing back
or queueing a pull. Versioned reads, requests carrying the source-proxy
anti-loop marker, and a respected latest delete marker never consult the
source; policy.head=local_only, the negative cache and an open breaker
answer 404 locally. Source 404 feeds the negative cache; other source
failures map to 424 SourceUnavailable (class only) or 404 per
policy.source_error, and unsupported source objects always map to 424.
Source answers carry x-rustfs-on-demand-migration: source and omit version,
SSE and replication headers.
The delete-marker probe, request gate, 424 constructor and response marker
live in shared.rs for the GET passthrough to reuse.
* feat(ecstore): add on-demand migration bucket config model
Introduce OnDemandMigrationConfig (deny_unknown_fields, version 1) with typed validation, credential redaction, a secret-free Debug impl, and the OnceLock publish hook the runtime registers into. Exported through the api facade.
* feat(ecstore): persist on-demand migration config in bucket metadata
Store the config as a RustFS extension entry (on-demand-migration.json) with its update time in .metadata.bin, add the typed BucketMetadataSys accessor, and publish the config through the hook on every cache-install path alongside the durability sync.
* refactor(ecstore): extract shared remote S3 client builder
Move the aws_sdk_s3 client construction out of bucket_target_sys into
bucket/remote_s3_client.rs: endpoint assembly, credential provider,
path-style selection, custom CA / skip-TLS transports and the outbound
SSRF gate now build from a neutral RemoteS3EndpointSpec so replication
targets and the upcoming on-demand migration source client share one
policy. Replication builds its client through From<&BucketTarget>; the
gate keeps its relaxed semantics (private allowed, loopback only behind
RUSTFS_REPLICATION_ALLOW_LOOPBACK_TARGET) verbatim. The builder also
gains optional connect/read timeouts and a User-Agent suffix
interceptor, both unset for replication.
Refs rustfs/backlog#2149
* feat(ecstore): add on-demand migration SourceClient
Add bucket/on_demand_migration/source_client.rs on top of the shared
remote S3 builder: HEAD, ranged streaming GET, ListObjectsV2 with
source-prefix mapping, GetObjectTagging and an admin probe. Every request
carries the x-rustfs-/x-minio-source-proxy-request anti-loop markers and
a RustFS-OnDemandMigration/<version> User-Agent suffix; SSE-C source
objects are rejected as unsupported. SourceError classifies SDK failures
(not found, access denied, throttled, timeout, connect, server error)
with retryability and a stable metrics label. Debug output redacts
credentials.
Refs rustfs/backlog#2149
* docs(operations): point outbound policy at shared remote S3 client builder
* chore: integrate ODM-01 and ODM-02 as B1 base (fix facade merge)
* feat(admin): add on-demand migration bucket admin API
Add the management plane for On-Demand Migration (ODM-07,
rustfs/backlog#2154): PUT/GET/DELETE /v3/on-demand-migration/{bucket},
PUT ?dry-run=true, and a GET .../status skeleton.
- PUT authorizes SetBucketOnDemandMigration, checks the bucket, the
RUSTFS_ON_DEMAND_MIGRATION_ENABLED switch and the license, validates the
ODM-01 config against local endpoints and replication targets, probes the
source with SourceClient::probe(), then persists through the incarnation
gate and asks peers to reload. Responses carry the redacted config and a
probe summary; probe failures name only the error class.
- GET answers 404 NoSuchConfiguration when unset; DELETE is idempotent (204).
- New AdminAction variants admin:SetBucketOnDemandMigration and
admin:GetBucketOnDemandMigration, route policy matrix rows, registration
and MinIO alias coverage, and a doc row for the extra handler gates.
- rustfs-madmin gains on_demand_migration wire types and client methods;
golden fixtures under crates/madmin/fixtures/on_demand_migration/ are
asserted byte-for-byte by both the handler and the client tests.
Anonymous sources still map to a 400 naming source.credentials until the
runtime slice adds the credential-less path.
* refactor(admin): route on-demand migration handler errors through the s3 facade
* feat(ecstore): add on-demand migration bucket config model
Introduce OnDemandMigrationConfig (deny_unknown_fields, version 1) with typed validation, credential redaction, a secret-free Debug impl, and the OnceLock publish hook the runtime registers into. Exported through the api facade.
* feat(ecstore): persist on-demand migration config in bucket metadata
Store the config as a RustFS extension entry (on-demand-migration.json) with its update time in .metadata.bin, add the typed BucketMetadataSys accessor, and publish the config through the hook on every cache-install path alongside the durability sync.
* refactor(ecstore): extract shared remote S3 client builder
Move the aws_sdk_s3 client construction out of bucket_target_sys into
bucket/remote_s3_client.rs: endpoint assembly, credential provider,
path-style selection, custom CA / skip-TLS transports and the outbound
SSRF gate now build from a neutral RemoteS3EndpointSpec so replication
targets and the upcoming on-demand migration source client share one
policy. Replication builds its client through From<&BucketTarget>; the
gate keeps its relaxed semantics (private allowed, loopback only behind
RUSTFS_REPLICATION_ALLOW_LOOPBACK_TARGET) verbatim. The builder also
gains optional connect/read timeouts and a User-Agent suffix
interceptor, both unset for replication.
Refs rustfs/backlog#2149
* feat(ecstore): add on-demand migration SourceClient
Add bucket/on_demand_migration/source_client.rs on top of the shared
remote S3 builder: HEAD, ranged streaming GET, ListObjectsV2 with
source-prefix mapping, GetObjectTagging and an admin probe. Every request
carries the x-rustfs-/x-minio-source-proxy-request anti-loop markers and
a RustFS-OnDemandMigration/<version> User-Agent suffix; SSE-C source
objects are rejected as unsupported. SourceError classifies SDK failures
(not found, access denied, throttled, timeout, connect, server error)
with retryability and a stable metrics label. Debug output redacts
credentials.
Refs rustfs/backlog#2149
* docs(operations): point outbound policy at shared remote S3 client builder
* chore: integrate ODM-01 and ODM-02 as B1 base (fix facade merge)
* feat(ecstore): add on-demand migration runtime OnDemandMigrationSys
Per-node runtime for On-Demand Migration (rustfs/backlog#2152): turns each
bucket's persisted config into a live SourceClient guarded by a three-state
circuit breaker, a TTL negative cache, per-key singleflight, a pull
concurrency semaphore and lock-free counters with a serializable snapshot.
- sys.rs: OnceLock singleton; `apply` installs/rebuilds/removes bucket state
(config compared by value, counters preserved across rebuilds, old
cancellation token fired); `publish` is the metadata publish-hook entry
(sync removal, spawned install, generation-ordered so a slow older install
cannot overwrite a newer one); `resolve(bucket, key)` judges module switch,
bucket state, prefix filter, client availability, negative cache, breaker.
- breaker.rs: Closed/Open/HalfOpen with fixed constants (5 failures / 30 s
window / 30 s open / 1 probe); NotFound resets, AccessDenied is neutral.
- negative_cache.rs: moka sync cache keyed by local key, ttl=0 disables.
- stats.rs: requests_total{op,outcome}, pulled_bytes/objects, pull_failures,
inflight/queue gauges, log-bucket latency histogram, last_source_error;
snake_case snapshot pinned by a golden JSON test.
- Anonymous sources surface as a typed `OdmStateError::AnonymousUnsupported`
until the shared client builder gains an anonymous mode.
- rustfs: `RUSTFS_ON_DEMAND_MIGRATION_ENABLED` module switch (default false)
published to module_switches and injected into ecstore before bucket
metadata loads; hook registered at the same point.
* feat(ecstore): add on-demand migration bucket config model
Introduce OnDemandMigrationConfig (deny_unknown_fields, version 1) with typed validation, credential redaction, a secret-free Debug impl, and the OnceLock publish hook the runtime registers into. Exported through the api facade.
* feat(ecstore): persist on-demand migration config in bucket metadata
Store the config as a RustFS extension entry (on-demand-migration.json) with its update time in .metadata.bin, add the typed BucketMetadataSys accessor, and publish the config through the hook on every cache-install path alongside the durability sync.
* test(e2e): rename stall timing variable flagged by typos
* test(storage): heap-pin the RestoreObject usecase future in the generation guard test
Add `tee_reader` / `tee_reader_with_options` in `rustfs-rio`: a
`TeePrimary` that drives the source and a `TeeSecondary` that observes
an identical copy of every chunk through a byte-bounded queue. The
primary returns `Pending` when the queue is full, so both sides advance
at the pace of the slowest consumer; it is meant for small objects only.
Termination: source EOF and errors propagate to the secondary with the
same `io::ErrorKind`; dropping the secondary turns the primary into a
pass-through; dropping the primary early fails the secondary with
`BrokenPipe` by default, or hands the remaining source to a background
drain task bounded by `max_drain_bytes` when
`TeeOptions::drain_on_primary_drop` is set. `TeeSecondary::into_stream`
exposes the queued `Bytes` chunks without an extra copy.
Includes a proptest equivalence test, backpressure, error, drop,
drain-limit and cancel-safety tests, and a criterion bench comparing
tee throughput against a direct read (64 MiB in 1 MiB chunks).
* test(e2e): extend fake S3 target as an on-demand migration source
Add ListObjectsV2 paging, Range GET/HEAD, unversioned buckets, standard
and user metadata replay, ResponseStatus/TruncateBodyAt/Stall fault
actions, Range/User-Agent/prefix/continuation-token journal fields,
count_requests, direct seeding, and a configurable object cap to the
programmable fake S3 target, and add the on_demand_migration e2e
harness (OdmTestEnv, admin wrappers, source seeding, local-state
assertions, second RustFS source) with its self-test.
* test(ci): refresh darwin e2e-full selection for ODM harness
* refactor(ecstore): extract shared remote S3 client builder
Move the aws_sdk_s3 client construction out of bucket_target_sys into
bucket/remote_s3_client.rs: endpoint assembly, credential provider,
path-style selection, custom CA / skip-TLS transports and the outbound
SSRF gate now build from a neutral RemoteS3EndpointSpec so replication
targets and the upcoming on-demand migration source client share one
policy. Replication builds its client through From<&BucketTarget>; the
gate keeps its relaxed semantics (private allowed, loopback only behind
RUSTFS_REPLICATION_ALLOW_LOOPBACK_TARGET) verbatim. The builder also
gains optional connect/read timeouts and a User-Agent suffix
interceptor, both unset for replication.
Refs rustfs/backlog#2149
* feat(ecstore): add on-demand migration SourceClient
Add bucket/on_demand_migration/source_client.rs on top of the shared
remote S3 builder: HEAD, ranged streaming GET, ListObjectsV2 with
source-prefix mapping, GetObjectTagging and an admin probe. Every request
carries the x-rustfs-/x-minio-source-proxy-request anti-loop markers and
a RustFS-OnDemandMigration/<version> User-Agent suffix; SSE-C source
objects are rejected as unsupported. SourceError classifies SDK failures
(not found, access denied, throttled, timeout, connect, server error)
with retryability and a stable metrics label. Debug output redacts
credentials.
Refs rustfs/backlog#2149
* docs(operations): point outbound policy at shared remote S3 client builder
* fix(ilm): enqueue committed tier free versions
* fix(ilm): stabilize causal cleanup CI coverage
* test(ilm): make expire GET race deterministic
* test(ilm): synchronize expiry with active GET
A 6 GiB object uploaded to the source as a 768-part multipart upload was
replicated to a generic S3 target with a single PutObject, and the target
rejected the body with EntityTooLarge. No CreateMultipartUpload was ever
issued, so the multipart replication transport never ran for the object
it exists for.
`replication_put_object_options` seeded the transport from
`object_info.is_multipart()` and then overwrote it with the second
return value of `decrypt_checksums`. Those two booleans do not mean the
same thing: the first is the object's storage shape, read from the ETag,
while the second reports whether the stored *checksum record* carries
per-part data. A full-object checksum -- what `aws s3 cp` writes by
default for a CRC algorithm -- is serialized with no MULTIPART flag even
on a multipart upload, so the record reports false and the object was
routed as a single PUT. `decrypt_checksums` documents this in
object_api/types.rs: callers that need routing must consult
`is_multipart()`. Replication did the opposite.
Route on the object's own shape, and let the checksum record only add
multipart-ness, never take it away. Objects already stored with such a
record are fixed too: the ETag was always right.
This also repairs the diagnosis of rustfs#6825, where the single-PUT
5 GiB guard fired against an object that was multipart all along and
told the operator to re-upload it as multipart.
Tests cover the three shapes the router has to separate: a multipart
object with a full-object checksum record (the regression, which fails
without this change), a multipart object with a composite record, and a
single-part object that must not be promoted onto multipart.
DeleteBucket answers from a raw per-disk residue scan rather than from a
listing, so it can refuse for a reason no S3 request can observe: the
client drains every version the API will show, DeleteBucket still returns
BucketNotEmpty, and the client-visible message is the generic "The bucket
you tried to delete is not empty" for every blocker kind.
The server does know which residue blocked it, and where — that is what
`bucket_delete_blocked` carries. But it was emitted at `debug`, below
both the `error` DEFAULT_LOG_LEVEL and the `info` the CI s3-tests lane
runs at, so it was never actually written down. An intermittent
BucketNotEmpty in that lane leaves a server log with no trace of the
refusal at all, which is not a diagnosable state: confirmed against the
artifact log of a failing run, where the rejected bucket appears only in
span-close lines and the blocker event is absent entirely.
Split the blocker kinds by whether the client can still reach the
residue. A visible version or a tier free-version is an ordinary 409 —
the bucket really is not empty and the caller can list and delete what is
left — so that stays at `warn`. UnknownXlMeta, OrphanDirectory, and
DiagnosticBudgetExceeded are on-disk state no S3 request can remove; that
is a server-side integrity problem and is now reported at `error`, with
the blocker kind, the residue counts, and the sample path.
This does not change what DeleteBucket accepts or rejects, and does not
retry or suppress anything — it makes the existing diagnosis reachable.
Refs #7005, #7010
fix(docs): update stale docs/README.md references to docs/architecture/README.md
The file docs/README.md was removed in a previous commit but references
in AGENTS.md, ARCHITECTURE.md, and CLAUDE.md were not updated. The
expanded check_doc_paths.sh now catches these stale references.
Update the workspace s3s pin and refresh the lockfile with cargo update/upgrade.
Remove the unused lifecycle url dependency reported by cargo shear.
Tighten the s3s footprint ratchet to the current observed baseline.
* fix(http): drain request bodies after early responses
* fix(http): log early response body drain failures
---------
Co-authored-by: houseme <housemecn@gmail.com>
PR #7023 rewrote the handoff retry scripts with shell parameter
expansions collapsed into Actions expression syntax: ${GH_TOKEN:-},
${{attempt}}, ${{DISPATCHED:-0}}, ${{TITLE}} etc. GitHub parses
${{...}} as workflow expressions, and bare identifiers are invalid
there, so all seven shared-VM suite workflows (upgrade, s3-compat, kms,
tier, storage, heal, pool-expand) were rejected as invalid workflow
files on main.
Symptoms since 2026-09-01 23:11 +0800 (bba9347):
- every push to any branch produced 'failure' runs with no jobs
('This run likely failed because of a workflow file issue')
- the nightly functional chain dispatched rustfs-chain-upgrade at
17:08Z but the event was silently dropped: zero repository_dispatch
runs for all eight shared-VM suites overnight (only performance,
whose file was untouched, ran)
- the workflows API listed them by path instead of name
Fix: restore the shell expansions (${VAR}, ${VAR:-default}); quote the
expected-event name without legacy backticks; render the markdown fence
via printf so shellcheck can parse the block. actionlint and YAML
validation now pass clean on all eleven rustfs-*.yml workflows.
Relocate issue-triage and pr-review from the tool-specific .mimocode
directory into the shared .agents/skills tree that every agent already
reads (AGENTS.md, .claude/skills symlink), and ignore .mimocode/ so a
local copy never gets recommitted.
- New RustFS Replication Test workflow (rustfs-replication-test.yml):
standalone workflow_dispatch (suite selector bucket/site/all) and
repository_dispatch rustfs-chain-replication; runs on the shared
smoke-testing runner under the shared functional concurrency group.
- Suite never fails the workflow (continue-on-error): failures are filed
as redacted issues in rustfs/backlog (deduped per run) and the report is
uploaded to rustfs/dashboard functional-reports/replication/<date>.md.
- Security now hands off to Replication, making it the tenth and final
link: upgrade -> s3 -> kms -> tier -> storage -> heal -> pool ->
security -> replication (performance stays parallel on pf-testing).
- Depends on rustfs/auto-testing#27 (rustfs-replication-test.sh).
Co-authored-by: houseme <housemecn@gmail.com>
Replication could fail an object with nothing in the server log an
operator could act on. Every failure branch in the resyncer is quieter
than `error` on purpose — most sit on the hot path and fire once per
object per ARN — but `DEFAULT_LOG_LEVEL` is `error`, so on a stock
deployment a failed object produced no line at all. Raising those
branches to `warn` (#6840) did not close this: the default filter still
dropped them.
Report the terminal outcome instead of the branches. `replicate_object_
with_outcome` and `replicate_delete_with_outcome` now emit one `error`
per failed (object, target) once the per-target results are merged,
carrying the object key, version id, target ARN and endpoint, and the
target's own error, redacted through `sanitize_resync_error_detail` so
an echoed credential cannot reach the log. Volume is bounded by objects
that actually fail rather than by attempts inside a transfer.
Also state the single-PutObject size limit instead of discovering it at
the target. Replication picks its transport from the source object's
storage shape, not its size, so an object written with one PutObject
replicates with one PutObject however large it is — and S3 caps that at
5 GiB. Such an object could never reach a generic S3 target, and only
found out after streaming the whole body. `replication_single_put_size_
error` fails it up front with a message naming the size, the limit, and
the remedy.
Version-identity drift moves to `error` on a 10-minute per-ARN throttle.
It was `warn` deduped once per ARN per process, so the one line
explaining why a purged version is still on the target was both filtered
out by default and gone for good after it first fired.
Fixes#6825
Refs #6822
`build_metrics_summary` emitted a single metric entry for the local
deployment with `online` hardcoded to `true` and `last_online` stamped
with the current time, so `mc admin replicate status` reported "I am
online" rather than whether the remote site was reachable. A peer could
be down for minutes with replication failing while the status page
stayed green, leaving operators with no signal that the link had
dropped.
Emit an entry for every peer instead, deriving `online` from the
`reachable_peers` set the handler already computes by probing each peer,
and take `total_downtime`/`last_online` from the replication heartbeat's
existing `EpHealth` tracking. Node-local replication counters stay on
the local entry so a two-site cluster does not double-count its own
traffic.
The new `BucketTargetSys::endpoint_health` accessor deliberately does not
call `init_hc`: unlike `is_offline` it must not create health entries as
a side effect, or merely rendering the status page would mark an unknown
peer online.
Failure counters (`Errors`) are unchanged and still read zero; that is a
separate defect in the bucket-level statistics path and is not addressed
here.
The repository_dispatch handoff step was continue-on-error with a single
attempt: if the call failed (token lacking contents:write, transient API
error), the chain stalled silently while every job stayed green.
Each handoff now retries 3x and, if all attempts fail, files an alert
issue in rustfs/backlog with the exact recovery command before exiting 1
(still continue-on-error, so suite workflows themselves never fail).
`local_idp_settings` stamped the site region into the reported OpenID
settings whenever the federated identity service was published, which it
is even with OpenID disabled and no provider configured. The add
preflight compares those settings verbatim, so two sites in different
regions could never be paired: `replicate add` failed with `IDP settings
mismatch` while both sites reported an identical, empty `identity_openid`
config.
Report the empty OpenID settings when no provider is configured, so the
region only qualifies real provider identities, and name the diverging
field in the rejection instead of emitting a bare mismatch. Scalar values
are echoed; nested objects and credential-derived leaves are reported by
presence only.
Fixes#7003
Problem: the nightly functional chain has not completed end-to-end.
Evidence from recent runs:
- workflow_run events are fire-and-forget: after KMS finished at 17:09Z
on 8/31 no tier run was created; rustfs-storage-test.yml has never run.
- 'if: conclusion == success' gates skip downstream suites on any
failure (security was skipped after pool failed on 9/1 01:48Z).
- rustfs-pool-expand-test.yml embedded a heal pass without
continue-on-error, so a heal failure failed the whole workflow.
Fixes:
- Add rustfs-functional-chain.yml: entry point that dispatches the first
suite via repository_dispatch; each suite hands off to the next with an
explicit, re-drivable API call instead of workflow_run triggers.
- Split heal out of the pool workflow (renamed to RustFS Pool Expansion
Test): heal now runs exactly once per chain, in rustfs-heal-test.yml
(storage -> heal -> pool).
- Every suite job gets continue-on-error so a failing test never fails
the workflow; failures are filed as issues in rustfs/backlog (report
+ redacted log tail) and the chain moves on.
- Clone rustfs/auto-testing with the PF token via 'gh repo clone' plus a
5-attempt retry loop (transient clone failures aborted whole suites).
- Stop rewriting functional/index.html from every suite (divergent
copies raced each other with stale SHAs); the canonical index now
lives in the dashboard repo.
- Standalone workflow_dispatch runs are unchanged and never forward the
chain; performance runs on its own runner, dispatched in parallel.
Six set_disk::ops tests failed non-deterministically only under
concurrent full-suite load, rotating between runs while each passed in
isolation. All six share one root cause: a lock-owning put_object
quorum-acks once the rename fanout reaches write quorum and lets a
detached tail task finish the lagging disks, so a fixture that inspects
per-disk state immediately after PUT can observe a disk the tail has not
reached yet.
The two heal report fixtures, the inline-commit fixture, and the
transaction-fencing fixture read or delete physical shards right after
PUT, and hit FileNotFound on a lagging disk. The two metadata-cache
fixtures prime the cache after PUT, and the read fanout refuses to publish
a cache entry while any disk still reports an error, so the priming read
observably published nothing.
Keep every affected setup PUT on the full-fanout commit path with
no_lock: true, following the existing precedent in this module, so PUT
returns only after every disk has committed. The option only governs lock
acquisition, so it does not weaken what any of these fixtures assert; the
transaction-fencing gate in particular is driven by the fleet proof and
env vars, never by the lock option. Where a fixture also depends on cache
publication, re-prime until the current generation is observably cached
instead of asserting on a single read that a loaded host can stall past
the cache TTL. The heal race fixture's shard damage injection is
best-effort by construction, so it now skips injection when the previous
round's tail still lags rather than unwrapping a read that may
legitimately race.
No production code changes, and no retries or sleeps added.
* test(ecstore): retain final decommission capacity snapshot override
take_decommission_capacity_info_override_for_test used to pop the queue
to exhaustion, after which get_decommission_all_pool_capacity_infos
silently fell back to the host's real statfs numbers. Any new sampling
point added to the decommission start paths re-introduced that host
dependency and broke tests on some dev machines (#6989 patched one
instance by topping up snapshot counts, but the coupling remained).
Keep the final queued snapshot and replay it for every subsequent
sample so tests always observe injected capacity once an override is
installed. All existing injection patterns (single snapshot, repeated
identical snapshots, decreasing sequences ending at the post-operation
state) keep their semantics.
* test(ci): serialize load-sensitive heal and cache-generation tests
Under a heavily parallel nextest run (~792 ecstore tests), two tests of
set_disk::ops::heal::heal_result_report_tests failed nondeterministically
per round (different members each time; all 29 pass standalone). Every
test in the module builds a TempDir-backed 4-disk hermetic erasure set
and drives MiB-scale writes plus deep-scan heal: under load a single
disk's IO can fail while write quorum still holds, flipping per-disk
readback and aggregate-outcome assertions. The module's #[serial]
markers do not serialize across nextest's process-per-test boundary.
Verification also caught complete_multipart_generation_retires_cached_snapshot
failing once under the same load; it and its object.rs sibling carry
#[serial(metadata_cache_invalidation_probe)] and assert
get_object_metadata_cache generation semantics - the same shape that
forced the transition matrix tests into the serial group.
Add both families to the ecstore-serial-flaky test-group in the default
and ci profiles. Preventive serialization only, no retries. Three full
parallel rounds after the change: 792/792 passed each round.
A completed multipart upload's staging cleanup prunes empty parent
directories up to the volume root, which removes shared prefixes such as
`data-movement/` and the per-object `<sha>/` while a concurrent
new_multipart_upload builds its destination chain below them. The writer
holds a descriptor to the pruned component, so its next handle-relative
mkdirat fails NotFound. Because rename never retried NotFound, the cleanup
fan-out failed several disks in the same window and broke write quorum.
Give rename preparation its own retry rule: a NotFound is retried once per
component below the base directory, so a rebuilt walk outlasts a pruning
walk, which removes ancestors monotonically upward and stops at the base.
A destination whose parent is the base keeps NotFound terminal, so
speculative cleanup renames still fail fast, and the base is only ever
opened, never created, so a genuinely missing base still fails. The rename
itself keeps its own budget and its unchanged NotFound-is-terminal rule.
scripts/check_test_wiring.py and scripts/check_security_coverage.py import
tomllib, which landed in Python 3.11. macOS ships /usr/bin/python3 at 3.9, so
`make pre-commit` failed on a clean machine with `ModuleNotFoundError: No
module named 'tomllib'` in test-wiring-check, even though the checkers
themselves are fine.
Add scripts/python_bin.sh, which resolves an interpreter (explicit
RUSTFS_PYTHON, then python3.14..3.11/python3/python on PATH, then a
`uv run --python 3.12 --no-project` fallback) and execs it, failing with the
concrete remediation when nothing usable exists. Route the Make call sites
through RUSTFS_PYTHON_BIN. CI workflows keep calling python3 directly because
their runners already provide 3.11+.
The mixed-version rolling upgrade suite asserted a single list_objects_v2
snapshot seconds after restarting a node. Peers keep a restarted node's
drive in Suspect/Returning for ~probe_interval(2s) x success_threshold(3),
and while one drive is excluded the strict listing quorum (write quorum,
3 of 4) drops objects that were themselves legally written at 3/4 during
an earlier node's identical post-restart window, under-counting the
listing (observed as 254 vs 258 in CI) even though every object still
GETs correctly. Replace the snapshot asserts with a bounded convergence
poll; a real upgrade data-loss regression still fails after the deadline.
* fix(release): normalize development package versions
* ci: build only the rustfs release binary
---------
Co-authored-by: Zhengchao An <anzhengchao@gmail.com>
test(ecstore): assert inline fanout gate on deterministic scheduled metric
non_inline_data_read_early_stop_does_not_add_inline_fanout_on_unequal_layout
compared disk_call_counters::KIND_READ_VERSION totals between the two-phase
read-plan gate being off and on. That counter records inside each spawned
fanout task, so the single-pending inline hedge read races the early-stop
abort_all(): whether the hedge task gets its first poll before cancellation
decides a 4-vs-5 count per read. Under concurrent nextest load the two reads
can disagree (reproduced locally at ~5% when run beside one other test,
matching the CI failure on PR #6961).
Assert on the rustfs_io_get_object_metadata_fanout_scheduled histogram
instead, which records the scheduling decision synchronously in the fanout
loop and is deterministic, using the CapturingRecorder + current-thread
runtime pattern already used by the neighboring tests in this module.
Allow release builds to set RUSTFS_BUILD_VERSION at compile time while keeping the existing tag, short commit, and package-version fallback when the variable is unset or empty.
Co-authored-by: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
Add an authenticated scanner usage-state reset endpoint that publishes a fenced bootstrap marker for full rebuilds instead of requiring operators to delete usage metadata by hand.
Guard the reset with the scanner leader lock, storage publication epoch, and per-slot revision preconditions, and make startup resumable across stale cleanup leftovers while still rejecting newer conflicting usage state.
Co-authored-by: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Zhengchao An <anzhengchao@gmail.com>
The add preflight unconditionally rejected any topology with data on
more than one site, which made `replicate remove` a one-way door: a DR
cluster whose sites both hold data could never be re-paired, and the
only way out was wiping one side by hand.
Admit a multi-non-empty add when every bucket held by more than one
requested site is provably safe to merge through the existing
backfill/resync convergence: versioning must be Enabled on every holder
(so a same-key object from the peer lands as another version instead of
replacing the only copy) and object-lock enablement must match (lock
cannot be toggled after bucket creation). Incompatible adds are still
rejected, now with the operator recovery steps (empty one side, re-run
replicate add, resync) instead of a bare refusal. Bucket configs that
fail to decode fail the preflight closed.
A committed add now also clears this site's own half-finished
pending_remove, mirroring the join receiver (rustfs/rustfs#5963);
otherwise the reconcile tick would replay the stale removal against the
freshly re-paired peer and dismantle the new pairing.
Refs rustfs/backlog#2070
Lower the default scanner cache save timeout so the derived usage persistence budget stays inside the effective distributed publication lease window.
Add focused regressions for the default publication budget and bootstrap-pending observational baselines, and update operator docs with the new default.
Co-authored-by: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
* fix(admin): replay recorded IAM deletions in site replication retry drain
An IAM deletion whose peer delivery failed during an outage window was
previously unrecoverable without a manual repair: the collapsed retry
entry carries no body, the snapshot resend cannot express "this entity
no longer exists", and the drain escalated the entry into a permanent
marker. The deleted user kept working credentials on the peer until an
operator intervened — a security exposure (backlog#2071).
Record the verbatim deletion body (user/policy/group-removal/
policy-mapping-clear/service-account) in the persisted state, in the
same transaction as the retry-event upsert. The drain now replays the
recorded deletions before the snapshot resend — snapshot-after ordering
restores any entity recreated locally in the meantime — and settles the
collapsed entry when its whole liability is provably replayed. Entries
that predate recording, merge with legacy rows, or overflow the
per-peer record cap keep the escalation semantics: only explicitly
recorded deletion events are ever replayed, never a cross-site diff.
The peer apply handlers become idempotent for deletion shapes (missing
policy/group/member tolerated, matching the existing user-delete
tolerance), so a replayed deletion that already converged settles
instead of wedging the drain. The IAM change hook now attempts every
peer instead of failing fast, so a multi-site broadcast books a retry
entry (and deletion record) for each unreachable peer rather than only
the first. Repair success and peer removal clear the affected peer's
records alongside the entries they accompany.
* fix(admin): probe recovered peers to lift retry drain backoff
A bucket created while a peer was unreachable accumulated three failed
deliveries and entered exponential backoff (2400s and up, capped at a
day). After the peer recovered, the reconcile tick's drain kept
skipping the entry until the backoff elapsed, so the site stayed
diverged — NoSuchBucket resync noise on the source, missing bucket on
the peer — for up to 24 hours with nothing else driving convergence
(backlog#2071, round-four R1.6).
Split reachability from replay: the drain now probes each peer whose
replayable backlog is held back only by backoff (one cheap devnull POST
per peer per tick) and promotes the backlog when the peer answers, so a
recovered peer converges at the next 600s tick. A failed probe advances
nothing — retry counts only move on real delivery attempts, keeping the
exponential schedule intact for a peer that is genuinely down. The base
backoff still floors re-attempts against a reachable peer that keeps
rejecting a delivery. SITE_REPLICATION_RETRY_FAILED_AFTER stays at 3:
the flag is retryStats visibility only, and with the probe in place an
early failed mark is a timely operator signal rather than a dead end.
The drain tick also logs an operator-visible warning whenever the queue
holds failed or escalated entries, instead of backing off in silence.
A replicated version purge reaches the peer without the governance
bypass header, so a GOVERNANCE-retained version deleted on the source
with x-amz-bypass-governance-retention was rejected by the peer's WORM
deletion gate forever: retryStats ended at a permanent failed count and
the sites stayed diverged (issue #6850).
The source is authoritative for such a purge: the same WORM gate
already ran there, and GOVERNANCE retention with an authorized bypass
is the only lock state it can purge through. The peer's commit-time
deletion gate now treats an authorized replication delete addressed to
an explicit version as carrying that judged bypass, reusing the same
trust judgment as the replication write exemption
(ObjectOptions::replication_request, set only after the handler
authorized ReplicateDeleteAction). COMPLIANCE retention and legal hold
keep blocking replicated purges, and a plain client delete without the
bypass header stays rejected.
New RustFS Upgrade Test workflow (SUITE: upgrade) runs first in the
nightly functional chain:
- Nightly GNU Build -> Upgrade -> S3 -> KMS -> Tier -> Pool/Heal -> Security
- S3 compatibility now triggers on "RustFS Upgrade Test" completion, so an
upgrade regression gates the rest of the chain.
- Security suite moves to the end, after pool/heal, on the shared VMs.
- The upgrade suite drives auto-testing's rustfs-upgrade-test.sh
(UPG-101..402): seed golden data/identity/config on the OLD deb, upgrade
in place to the NEW deb, verify byte-identical preservation, and publish
functional-reports/upgrade/<date>.md.
- Add the Upgrade tab to every dashboard index writer so the shared
functional/index.html stays consistent.
Under the cargo test fallback (threads in one process), tests that touch
the process-global scanner cycle recovery status or the global usage-save
metrics raced each other and failed randomly in full-suite runs.
Mark all touchers with #[serial] per docs/testing/README.md:
- 22 tests reading or writing scanner_cycle_recovery_status() via
load_scanner_cycle_state_for_startup / reset_scanner_cycle_recovery
- 24 tests mutating global_metrics() usage-save counters via
store_data_usage_in_backend*, which raced the existing serial
test_deferred_usage_save_keeps_last_real_save_metric
No-op under nextest, which isolates each test in its own process.
Align object-capacity refresh defaults with the production-oriented environment values and keep docs, script examples, and tests in sync.
Co-authored-by: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
fix(ecstore): require verification source for degraded GET
Fail closed when reconstruction has only an exact decode quorum, because no surplus source remains to validate the rebuilt data. Cover both erasure engines and the data-shards-only rollout gate.
Co-authored-by: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
fix(ecstore): hedge data-only GET with parity
Route the opt-in data-shards-only lockstep path through the bounded parity race and preserve deferred parity reserves across canceled hedges.
Co-authored-by: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
The transition_matrix_tests use #[serial_test::serial] which has no
effect under nextest (each test runs in a separate process). When running
alongside thousands of other ecstore tests, the shared metadata cache
generation counter can race, causing intermittent 'metadata read should
publish the generation under test' panics.
Add both tests to the ecstore-serial-flaky test group in both default
and ci nextest profiles so they run single-threaded.
Use the seqlock version as the publication fence and keep payload reads relaxed while validating the final version. This reduces ordering overhead in disk metric recording and snapshot collection without changing the rolling-window contract.
Co-authored-by: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
fix(ecstore): classify system metadata volume failures
Preserve retryable quorum errors when system metadata reads or writes encounter missing volumes, and cover the create-bucket data-usage path with regressions.
Co-authored-by: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
The check_preview_release_workflow.sh script uses exact line matching
(grep -Fxq) to verify the cleanup-preview-releases job contains:
gh release delete "$preview_tag" --yes
The extra --repo flag is unnecessary in GitHub Actions context since
gh auto-detects the repository from GITHUB_REPOSITORY, and it causes
the Workflow Pin Report check to fail on all PRs.
* fix(kms): restore persisted configuration after restart
* docs(kms): cover the reload route and startup load states
The admin contract matrix pins every dynamic KMS route for the rc and
console handoff, so the new POST /kms/reload needs a row there, and the
reload response reuses the configure snapshot shape rather than adding a
wire type. The observability runbook gains the operator procedure the
reload exists for: telling a load_failed startup apart from a server
that was never configured, and recovering without resubmitting secrets.
fix(replication): surface per-object failures and abort orphaned multipart uploads
Replication could mark an object FAILED with no server-log line naming
the object: the target-offline skip paths logged at debug without the
object key, and several failure branches omitted the key entirely. A
failed multipart transfer also leaked its incomplete upload on the
target, since nothing ever aborted it after CreateMultipartUpload
succeeded.
Log the offline skips at warn with the object key (they report the
object FAILED, matching the per-object put_object failure level), add
the object field to the remaining failure branches, and abort the
target-side multipart upload best-effort on any post-create failure
without masking the original transfer error.
Fixes#6825
fix(replication): never mint delete markers when replicating a version purge
Heal/resync/MRF rebuilds of a delete-marker version purge carry
delete_marker: true together with a purge-shaped entry. Passing that flag
straight into replication_delete_remove_options made the target DELETE
omit the versionId (marker-creation semantics), so a generic S3 target
that ignores the internal source-version headers minted a fresh delete
marker on every retry instead of purging one — the marker count on the
target grew monotonically (rustfs#6823).
- Gate marker-creation semantics on the new pure helper
delete_replication_creates_marker (delete_marker && !version purge) so
a purge always addresses the exact version.
- Stop falling through to the marker-creation send when the pre-send
source delete-marker verification fails with a transient error; fail
the entry instead so the MRF replay / heal scanner retries without
minting a marker on the target.
- Pin the purge-shape contract with unit tests in
crates/replication/src/delete.rs.
Also replace deprecated Atomic::fetch_update calls with try_update so the
current Rust toolchain keeps lint and CI jobs warning-clean.
Co-authored-by: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
The test workflows checkout the private rustfs/auto-testing repository, but
the default GITHUB_TOKEN only has access to rustfs/rustfs, so every checkout
failed with 'repository ... not found' (nightly runs on 2026-08-28).
Pass secrets.PF_TESTING_GH_TOKEN (the existing cross-repo PAT already used
by the performance workflow) to the auto-testing checkout steps in all three
workflows.
Triages the three divergences backlog#2054 found between the audit and
notify default KVS tables, cross-checked against MinIO upstream
(internal/logger/config.go, internal/config/notify/parse.go):
- webhook: audit's extra batch_size/max_retry/retry_interval/http_timeout
keys match MinIO's DefaultAuditWebhookKVS byte-for-byte, while notify's
table matches MinIO's notify DefaultWebhookKVS (which lacks them).
Intentional, not a copy/paste gap — documented with a doc comment on
each table instead of changed.
- mqtt: audit's stronger QoS/keep-alive/reconnect defaults have no MinIO
precedent (MinIO's audit logging has no MQTT target at all), while
notify's 0/0s/0s defaults match MinIO's DefaultMQTTKVS exactly.
Documented as an intentional RustFS-original choice, not changed.
- auth_token hidden_if_empty: audit had false, notify had true, with no
MinIO precedent either way (this KVS version has no per-key hidden
flag upstream). Fixed audit to true, matching notify and every other
sensitive key in both files (MQTT_PASSWORD, *_TLS_*). Non-empty tokens
were already redacted identically on both sides via ends_with("_token")
pattern matching in config_admin.rs — this only changes how an *unset*
audit webhook auth_token renders in admin config output (omitted
instead of shown as an empty value).
Refs rustfs/backlog#2054
TierAzure.storage_class and .sp_auth round-trip faithfully through the
admin API and on-disk config (ExternalTierAzure encode/decode in
tier.rs), so an operator can configure them, read them back via
ListTier, and never learn they do nothing. They are dropped only at the
WarmBackendAzure construction boundary: the Azure warm backend goes
through the same S3-compatible TransitionClient as every other
provider and has no Azure Blob-native client or Azure AD dependency
(confirmed: no azure_* crate anywhere in the workspace), so neither
field can actually be honored today. MinIO's reference implementation
(cmd/warm-backend-azure.go) treats both as first-class: storage_class
sets the blob access tier on every PUT, and sp_auth is a full
alternative to access/secret-key auth via azidentity, mutually
exclusive with it.
Rather than the larger, riskier options (add a native Azure SDK
dependency and a parallel non-S3 client path, or break the persisted
config format by removing the fields), this closes the silent-failure
gap with the minimal safe fix: TierConfigMgr::add now rejects an Azure
tier config with either field set, before backend construction,
returning ERR_TIER_INVALID_CONFIG with an explicit message instead of
accepting and ignoring. The fields stay in the config type (no format
break); already-persisted tiers with these fields set are grandfathered
in un-rejected (edit does not touch sp_auth or storage_class either).
Full support remains a larger follow-up if ever prioritized.
Also removes TierAzure::is_sp_enabled(), which had zero callers
repo-wide (backlog#2055 flagged this) and would have been misleading
dead weight once this decision was made — reusing it for the new gate
would also have been wrong, since it requires *all three* sp_auth
fields non-empty (&&), while the gate must reject on *any* one being set.
Refs rustfs/backlog#2055
(cherry picked from commit 8d148c4e9b2507a1c5075e3d9513adb8b5851ef5)
Merge newer partial observed usage into the complete authoritative admin baseline instead of replacing the full bucket set.
Keep the merged view partial and non-converged so shared consumers do not treat it as quota-authoritative.
Co-authored-by: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
A PUT with HTTP preconditions took the per-object namespace write lock
before ingesting the request body and held it until commit, so any
concurrent read of the same object queued behind client-paced body
ingestion until the 5s acquire timeout and surfaced as 503. Exposed as
a deterministic S3 Implemented Tests gate failure when #6770 routed
1 MB conditional writes onto the streaming path (rustfs/backlog#2074).
Keep a lock-free advisory precondition check before the body for fast
412/404, and evaluate the authoritative check under the put_object
commit lock, reusing the deferred shape data movement already uses.
Reads during ingestion now return the last committed version, and a
precondition invalidated mid-stream fails closed with 412 at commit.
Validate lifecycle tier references through the tier reference proof path, preserve S3 list CommonPrefix XML compatibility, and make GetObject audit completion use real S3 error status codes.
Co-authored-by: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
refactor(ecstore): huaweicloud/tencent reuse the shared S3 constructor
Migrates the Huaweicloud and Tencent tier warm backends onto the shared
S3-compatible constructor (backlog#2040). Also makes the shared
constructor's outbound-URL validation injectable per provider
(S3CompatibleWarmBackendParams::validate_endpoint) so it can centralize
rustfs/rustfs#6764's SSRF check for the providers that don't need an
exception, while accommodating rustfs/rustfs#6773's RustFS-specific
debug-only loopback opt-in without weakening the other six providers.
Updates scripts/error-other-format-baseline.txt: the one ::other(format!)
call site moves from the two per-provider files into the new shared
call site in warm_backend.rs (net call-site count unchanged).
Refs rustfs/backlog#2042
Update the s3s git dependency to 6e7b41252c7ba218a90886f58d297716ddf68acf.
This pulls the upstream SelectRequest XML alias compatibility fix while keeping the RustFS s3s compatibility boundary intact.
Co-authored-by: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
The heal manager carried its own byte-identical copy of the foreground pressure type and threshold computation that ecstore's data-movement backpressure also carries, so every change to the admission-utilization rules had to be mirrored by hand across two crates. The shared `ForegroundPressure` and `foreground_pressure` added to `rustfs-concurrency` now own that logic, and heal already depends on that crate, so this removes the duplicate without adding a crate edge.
`mainline_throttle_active` keeps the parts that are specific to this call site: the `mainline_throttle_enable` and both-thresholds-zero short circuit that avoids touching the provider at all, the optional-provider unwrap, and the heal-side threshold fields. Everything downstream is untouched — the `reason()` labels `foreground_read_pressure`, `foreground_write_pressure`, and `foreground_pressure` are byte-identical to the removed implementation, so the `rustfs_heal_mainline_throttle_total` reason label and the `heal_mainline_throttle` log fields keep their observability contract.
Refs rustfs/backlog#2049
(cherry picked from commit ec491bcbd8939e5978cd94f9a44cffb70d09fade)
(cherry picked from commit e800f29d6806591689204b3712300800b480beae)
Co-authored-by: houseme <housemecn@gmail.com>
refactor(ecstore): use shared ForegroundPressure for data movement
The data movement backpressure module carried its own byte-identical copy of ForegroundPressure, its reason() label mapping, and the foreground utilization computation. rustfs-concurrency now owns that logic as workload::ForegroundPressure and workload::foreground_pressure, so the local copy was a cross-crate synchronization point that could silently drift from the heal-side and admission-side behavior.
Delete the local type and computation and call the shared function instead. The call site keeps what is specific to data movement: the config.enabled short circuit, the optional provider unwrap, and the read/write threshold percentages read from DataMovementBackpressureConfig. The reason() labels emitted into the rustfs_data_movement_backpressure_total metric and the data_movement_backpressure log event are unchanged, as are the existing tests and their assertions.
Refs rustfs/backlog#2048
(cherry picked from commit 6a26e144e06ced53a8dfd1712ab7aa24589646ff)
(cherry picked from commit ab5ab417e80179265c32b22a5e671eac0b9e43ae)
refactor(ecstore): migrate notify default KVS to shared constructors
The amqp, nats, pulsar, redis, postgres, kafka and mysql default KVS tables in config/notify.rs duplicated the corresponding tables in config/audit.rs literally, leaving seven cross-file sync points that a future default or key-order edit had to keep aligned by hand. Replace those seven table bodies with calls to the shared constructors added in config/target_defaults.rs, passing the notify-side literals where the two subsystems genuinely differ: NOTIFY_REDIS_DEFAULT_CHANNEL for the redis channel and "rustfs_events" for the mysql table.
Key order is part of the admin config contract, so this is a pure restructuring: for all seven tables the ordered key sequence and every key's value and hidden_if_empty flag are unchanged.
DEFAULT_NOTIFY_WEBHOOK_KVS and DEFAULT_NOTIFY_MQTT_KVS are deliberately left untouched. Those two tables really do diverge between audit and notify, so folding them into shared constructors would change runtime behavior; the divergence is tracked separately in rustfs/backlog#2054.
Refs rustfs/backlog#2046
(cherry picked from commit 6df9b53027ef2f0cf9aa7b82ecb2af8c5108f11f)
(cherry picked from commit 14bbf756bea2ee6daacbfdc7d7a452effa649cff)
refactor(ecstore): migrate audit KVS defaults to shared constructors
The amqp, nats, pulsar, redis, postgres, kafka and mysql default KVS tables in config/audit.rs duplicated the corresponding tables in config/notify.rs, leaving seven cross-file sync points where a default could silently drift between the two subsystems. Build them from the shared constructors added in config/target_defaults.rs instead, passing in the two literals that are genuinely audit-specific: the redis pub/sub channel (AUDIT_REDIS_DEFAULT_CHANNEL) and the mysql destination table ("rustfs_audit_logs").
Key order, every default value and every hidden_if_empty flag are preserved exactly, since the key order drives the order admin config output lists keys in. DEFAULT_AUDIT_WEBHOOK_KVS and DEFAULT_AUDIT_MQTT_KVS are left untouched: those two tables really do differ from their notify counterparts, so unifying them would change runtime behavior.
Refs rustfs/backlog#2045
(cherry picked from commit 4de580e6d8901485eef268191924e035322d4d4e)
(cherry picked from commit e5e301fa78e7f27ffa85b05cf5e7962301a5ff00)
warp is killed at the write threshold and can leave in-flight multipart
uploads behind. rc.4-preview.1's decommission post-check refuses to
finalize a pool that still contains one (data is already moved, then the
pool is marked failed with 'resolve it before retrying'). Abort any
multipart uploads in the test bucket before starting decommission
(ListMultipartUploads + AbortMultipartUpload via the admin API).
- common.rs gains an AdminTransport knob (Signed | Awscurl) with admin_execute_at plus three family wrappers: admin_create_user_via, admin_add_canned_policy_via, admin_attach_user_policy_via; the existing admin_create_user now delegates over the Signed transport.
- Deleted the four signed admin request clones in admin_mfa_test, admin_auth_test, reliant/tiering, and inline_fast_path_cluster_test; each keeps a thin local wrapper over common::admin_request so call sites keep their Option<&str> body shape.
- Deduped the notification_webhook signer onto common::signed_request and the webdav_core signer plus its three admin helpers onto the shared _via helpers.
- Consolidated the S3-client-with-credentials builders: admin_auth s3_client_with, existing_object_tag user_client/sts_session_client, bucket_policy_check create_user_client, and the create_user_s3_client copies in group_delete_test and replication_extension_test now delegate to create_s3_client_with_credentials / build_test_s3_config; replication_extension admin_add_canned_policy and admin_attach_policy_to_user route through the _via helpers on the Signed transport.
- The awscurl-gated suites (existing_object_tag_policy, bucket_policy_check, policy/policy_variables) keep going through the external awscurl binary via AdminTransport::Awscurl, preserving their wire behavior.
Part of rustfs/backlog#1846 (cluster 2).
* fix(s3): round-trip null-version delete-marker identity through listing and delete responses
On a versioning-suspended bucket, a null delete marker's identity was lost on the way back to the client at three points (issue #6745): ListObjectVersions advertised the marker's VersionId as the literal nil UUID instead of null; deleting by that id succeeded but the DeleteObjects/DeleteObject response reported the identity as null with no way to correlate it to the request; and the response lacked DeleteMarker/DeleteMarkerVersionId because the marker-ness comparison mixed the client-facing identity (Some(nil)) with the storage identity (None), so the removal also mis-recorded accounting and fired DeleteMarkerCreated semantics on later paths.
- Listing (bucket_usecase, s3_api/bucket, build_list_versions_next_marker) now maps the synthesized nil UUID to the literal null everywhere it reaches the wire, and VersionMarker::parse folds a nil-UUID marker from older listings into VersionMarker::Null so pagination resumes correctly.
- delete_objects normalizes both sides of the marker-ness comparison via delete_file_info_version_id (matching the adjacent explicit_delete_marker admission check) and reports DeleteMarkerVersionId as null for an explicit null-marker removal.
- resolve_delete_version_state reports delete_marker for an explicit-version delete whose target is a delete marker even when the bucket is versioning-suspended, fixing x-amz-delete-marker on the single-object path.
- The DeleteObjects response entry echoes the version identity the request addressed for marker removals, marker-removal accounting no longer records a marker creation, and notification events fire DeleteMarkerCreated only for actual marker creation.
Fixes#6745
* fix(s3): keep null-marker removal write shape undeleted and report marker semantics response-side
The first cut marked the storage delete request deleted for a null-marker removal, which FileMeta::delete_version interprets as the suspended-bucket delete-mints-a-marker write and re-creates the marker just removed. Carry marker-ness to responses via explicit_delete_removed_marker (single path) and a response-only branch flag (batch path) instead, keeping every storage write shape byte-identical to the pre-fix behavior. Adds an embedded end-to-end regression test covering the full issue #6745 round trip.
WarmBackendS3::new already rejects loopback, private, link-local, and
cloud metadata-service endpoints via validate_outbound_url, but the
Aliyun, Azure, Huaweicloud, Tencent, MinIO, R2, RustFS, and GCS warm
backend constructors built their transition clients directly from
conf.endpoint without the same check.
The endpoint comes from the AddTier admin API, gated only by
SetTierAction, which can be a narrower IAM grant than root. Any
principal holding it could point one of these eight tier types at an
internal address (loopback, RFC1918, link-local, or a cloud metadata
IP) and have the server issue authenticated outbound requests to it, a
server-side SSRF vector that the S3 and Wasabi tier types were already
closed against.
Apply the same validate_outbound_url check at construction time for
all eight providers, before any credentials or network client are
built, mirroring the existing WarmBackendS3 pattern. GCS keeps its
default-endpoint behavior when conf.endpoint is empty and only
validates an explicitly configured endpoint.
Add a regression test per provider asserting that a loopback endpoint
is rejected before any backend/network setup, matching the existing
WarmBackendS3 coverage.
Update the error(format!) ratchet baseline: these are one-shot admin
tier-configuration validation errors returned once per AddTier call,
not per-disk I/O errors that flow through reduce_errs quorum
aggregation (backlog#1845), so the new ::other(format!) call sites do
not introduce a quorum-bucketing hazard. They mirror the pre-existing,
already-baselined warm_backend_s3.rs call site.
TransitionClient::new() in crates/s3-client/src/transition_api.rs computes
trailing_header_support = opts.trailing_headers && override_signer_type == SignatureV4,
but override_signer_type is hardcoded to SignatureDefault at construction
and never mutated afterwards, so the expression is always false regardless
of opts.trailing_headers. The resulting field also has no live reader: its
only reference is inside PutObjectOptions::validate() in
crates/s3-client/src/api_put_object.rs, which is itself
#[allow(dead_code, reason = "MinIO-parity ... no caller in this port")],
and even there the reference to trailing_header_support is commented out.
So trailing_headers: true in the seven warm_backend_*.rs constructors has
never had any effect on request signing or chunked/trailing-header
behavior (stream_sha256 signing is gated separately by
metadata.stream_sha256 && !self.secure). Remove the misleading dead
configuration from the seven provider constructors so it doesn't look
like intentional, load-bearing behavior to future readers.
Found during adversarial self-check while implementing rustfs/backlog#2040 (out of that issue's scope).
* refactor(ecstore,rustfs): reuse canonical starts_with_ignore_ascii_case
`crates/utils/src/http/metadata_compat.rs` owns the internal metadata key helpers, including `starts_with_ignore_ascii_case`. Two files carried their own byte-identical copies of that predicate: `SetDisks::starts_with_ignore_ascii_case` in ecstore and a free function in the S3 options layer. Both drive internal metadata key classification (`internal_metadata_suffix` and quorum hashing on one side, `should_skip_object_metadata_key` and `is_reserved_user_metadata_key` on the other), so keeping three implementations of one predicate is an avoidable drift risk on a path that decides whether an internal key is treated as user metadata.
Delete both local copies and call the canonical implementation. Every prefix used at these call sites is an ASCII constant or literal, where the canonical byte-slice comparison and the removed `str::get(..n)` form are equivalent; that equivalence was checked differentially over 4.6M (key, prefix) pairs, including keys with multi-byte characters straddling the prefix boundary. No other logic in `internal_metadata_suffix` or `should_skip_object_metadata_key` changed.
Add regression tests on both sides pinning the two properties the switch depends on: internal prefixes match case-insensitively (a mixed-case `X-RustFS-Internal-*` key stays internal), and keys shorter than a prefix never match (they stay ordinary user metadata).
Refs rustfs/backlog#2051
* fix(rustfs): avoid typos-checker false positive in prefix-length test
The test literal "x-rustfs-encryptio" (a deliberate truncation of the
x-rustfs-encryption- prefix, used to assert that a key shorter than every
internal prefix falls through to user metadata) reads as a likely typo of
"encryption" to the repo's typos CI check. Derive it from
RUSTFS_ENCRYPTION_PREFIX via slicing instead of a hand-typed literal, which
both satisfies the linter and ties the truncation to the real constant
instead of a copy-typed guess.
Refs rustfs/backlog#2051
chacha20 0.10.1 was yanked on crates.io today, which fails the Cargo Deny gate (error[yanked]) on every branch. cargo update -p chacha20 to 0.10.2; no API change, all dependents are semver-compatible.
Verification: cargo check -p rustfs-crypto; the Cargo Deny job on this PR is the authoritative gate.
`crates/lifecycle/src/tagging.rs` carried a byte-identical copy of the `form_urlencoded` tag decoder already owned by `rustfs-replication`, plus a duplicate of its test. Since `crates/lifecycle` already depends on `rustfs-replication`, replace the copy with a `pub(crate) use` re-export: no new crate edge, one parser, and no second implementation to drift from the replication contract. The `rule.rs` call site is unchanged.
Also drop `crates/ecstore/src/bucket/lifecycle/tagging_boundary.rs`, a migration-era boundary shim with zero call sites in the tree.
The import_bucket_metadata handler carried eight match arms whose bodies were
byte-identical apart from the type a payload is validated against and the pair
of BucketMetadata fields it lands in, so every arm repeated the same warn! call
and the same metadata lookup. Fold them into one or-pattern arm backed by
apply_imported_bucket_config, where a single conf_name match owns both the
validated type and the destination field pair and can no longer drift apart.
Validation still runs before the metadata lookup, the warn! event, fields, and
label are unchanged, and the BUCKET_POLICY_CONFIG and BUCKET_QUOTA_CONFIG_FILE
arms keep their own handling. Regression tests drive the full mapping table:
each config file's payload lands only in the field it owns, an unparsable
payload leaves the field untouched, and a rejected entry does not stop the
remaining ones from being imported.
Refs rustfs/backlog#2052
crates/s3-client/src/utils.rs carried a verbatim copy of the header
classification tables and predicates owned by
crates/utils/src/http/headers.rs: SUPPORTED_HEADERS (same 11 keys),
SUPPORTED_QUERY_VALUES (same 9 keys), and is_standard_header /
is_storageclass_header / is_amz_header / is_rustfs_header /
is_minio_header with byte-identical bodies. The duplication was already
half-resolved and inconsistent — the local is_amz_header called
rustfs_utils::http::is_sse_header while consulting its own tables — and
s3-client already depends on rustfs-utils with the "full" feature, so
reusing the canonical owner adds no crate edge.
The sole caller, PutObjectOptions::header(), now imports the five
predicates from rustfs_utils::http. Semantics are unchanged: both sides
normalize with to_lowercase(), return false for unknown keys, and the
storage-class constants are the same string ("x-amz-storage-class" from
s3s::header::X_AMZ_STORAGE_CLASS vs rustfs_utils AMZ_STORAGE_CLASS), so
the set of user-metadata headers passed through verbatim rather than
prefixed with x-amz-meta- is identical.
SUPPORTED_QUERY_VALUES is deleted outright: s3-client had no reader for
it (utils consumes its own copy via is_standard_query_value). The
base64_encode/base64_decode helpers and their rustfs/rustfs#4811
regression test stay untouched, and lazy_static remains a dependency
because crates/s3-client/src/constants.rs still uses it.
Refs rustfs/backlog#2050
ForegroundPressure had two definitions with byte-identical pressure computation: one in ecstore data-movement backpressure and one in the heal manager queue. That duplication is a violation of the ARCHITECTURE.md invariant that each type has exactly one definition, and it means any future change to the utilization math has to land twice.
Add the canonical `ForegroundPressure` and a `foreground_pressure(snapshot, read_threshold_pct, write_threshold_pct)` function to `crates/concurrency/src/workload.rs`, which already owns `WorkloadClass`, `AdmissionState`, and the admission snapshot contract. Both existing consumers already depend on `rustfs-concurrency`, so no crate edge is added.
The filter_map pipeline is transferred verbatim, preserving all five boundary behaviors (zero threshold, zero limit, missing entry, missing active count, and the `Saturated` full-utilization special case), the mul-before-div percentage normalization, the `>=` threshold comparison, and the read-then-write ordering that makes `max_by_key` break utilization ties toward the write class. The enable switch is deliberately left out: ecstore gates on `config.enabled` while heal gates on `mainline_throttle_enable` plus a both-thresholds-zero check, so each call site keeps its own condition.
This is the expand step only. The ecstore and heal copies are untouched and are removed by the follow-up migrate task.
Refs rustfs/backlog#2047
The seven S3-compatible warm backend providers (Aliyun, Azure, Huaweicloud, Tencent, MinIO, R2, RustFS) each carry a byte-identical copy of the same statically-credentialed TransitionClient construction and of the same optimal_part_size helper. Add both to the module that already owns the WarmBackend trait and WarmBackendS3, so the per-provider migrate step can drop its duplicate without redesigning anything.
bucket_lookup is a parameter rather than a constant because the providers split into two families: Aliyun, Azure, Huaweicloud, and Tencent pin BucketLookupDNS, while MinIO, R2, and RustFS leave it at the BucketLookupAuto default. Hardcoding either value would silently change bucket addressing for the other family during the migrate step.
Error texts, validation order, prefix and host/port normalization are reproduced exactly from the Aliyun/MinIO family. No provider file is touched and no production caller exists yet, so the new unit tests are the first callers.
Refs rustfs/backlog#2040
The audit and notify subsystems each declare their own default KVS table for the same nine delivery targets. For amqp, nats, pulsar, postgres and kafka the two declarations are byte-identical; for redis and mysql they differ only in a single default literal (the pub/sub channel and the destination table). Keeping two copies means every default or key-order change has to be made twice, and a missed edit silently changes what admin config reports for one subsystem only.
Add `config::target_defaults` with one constructor per shared table, taking the diverging literal as a parameter for redis and mysql, plus a small `kv` helper that replaces the repeated `KV { .. }` literals. Key order is reproduced exactly because it drives the order the admin API lists keys in. Unit tests pin the full ordered key/value/hidden_if_empty triple of every table against hard-coded literals, and cover both the audit and the notify literal for the two parameterized tables.
Webhook and mqtt are deliberately left out: audit's webhook table carries extra batching and retry keys, both webhook tables disagree on key order and on the auth-token hidden_if_empty flag, and mqtt disagrees on qos, keep-alive interval and reconnect interval. Those are real behavioral forks, not duplication, so they stay declared in place.
This is the expand step only. Nothing calls the new module yet, so audit.rs and notify.rs are untouched and no default changes; the constructors carry an item-level allow(dead_code) until the migrate step points both files at them.
Refs rustfs/backlog#2044
* test(heal): relative disk target and fail fast on terminal-but-short
The absolute 40 GiB heal target was calibrated to the background scanner
(auto-heal), which is now disabled for determinism; with only the explicit
heal the recovered node lands at ~36 GiB for 40 GiB survivors. Make the
success criterion relative: the outage node must reach at least 90% of the
least-used surviving node (absolute HEAL_TARGET_GB floor optional, default
0 = relative only).
Also fail fast when the heal task reaches a terminal success but the disk
target is not met (previously the monitor kept polling until timeout), and
drop the misleading 'progress absent' warning on the final (cleaned) task
response — mid-run progress is reported correctly.
Validated live: heal summary=finished, 0 failed, vm000/vm001=40GB,
vm002=40GB (target 36GB), test PASSED.
* test(heal): gate success on server verdict + data read-back, drop disk GB gate
The per-node disk-usage target (40 GiB / 90% of survivors) is not a
code-level invariant: EC distributes different shards per node, so the
final GB per node depends on the layout, not on heal correctness. Gate the
test on what the server actually verifies:
- Heal task terminal success (finished/completed) with objectsFailed == 0
(the server's per-object scan/repair verdict).
- S3 read-back verification: list the test bucket and GET a sample of
objects, requiring HTTP 200 for every read (end-to-end proof the data is
still reconstructable after repair). The GET uses a discard mode so
binary bodies are not captured (no null-byte warnings / SIGPIPE).
Per-node disk usage stays in the output as observability (with a warning if
the outage node gained no usage), not as the pass/fail gate. Removes the
heal_target_gb input and the relative-target logic.
Validated live: heal summary=finished, 0 failed, 20/20 objects read back,
vm002_used=40GB, PASS.
description: Review a final RustFS diff adversarially when the user requests adversarial review, the root AGENTS.md classifies the change as high risk, or a substantial PR is being reviewed. Do not use for ordinary questions, diagnosis, planning, status, documentation-only work, or routine low-risk implementation.
description: Review RustFS diffs or designs for explicit adversarial requests, high-risk changes under the repository review policy, or substantial PR reviews. Skip ordinary questions, diagnosis, planning, status, routine low-risk implementation, and prose with no execution effect.
---
# RustFS Adversarial Validation
Use the risk tier and review shape defined in the root `AGENTS.md`. This skill
Use the [repository risk tiers and review shape](../../references/adversarial-validation.md). This skill
routes a review to RustFS-specific probes without loading unrelated domains.
## Select Lenses
@@ -31,15 +31,18 @@ adversarial review.
## Review Protocol
1. Freeze the exact final diff/head and list the selected lenses.
2. Run the review shape required by root `AGENTS.md`.
1. Freeze the exact final diff/head (or the design under review) and list the
selected lenses.
2. Run the review shape required by the repository risk tier.
3. For each selected lens, either report a concrete finding or a null verdict
naming the attacks performed.
4. A finding needs `file:line`, a triggering input/state/interleaving, the wrong
outcome, and a focused fix or missing regression check.
5. Fix or rebut every finding with code-path, test, or invariant evidence.
4. Apply root `AGENTS.md`'s finding standard. Test each candidate against callers,
existing coverage, and invariants before accepting it; an adversarial role
does not have to produce a defect.
5. Fix or rebut supported findings with code-path, test, or invariant evidence.
6. After a non-trivial edit, rerun only lenses affected by that edit against the
new exact diff.
Do not turn a null verdict into a long checklist. Record concise evidence that
the relevant failure classes were attacked.
the relevant failure classes were attacked, then stop under the root completion
rule. Keep the required per-lens verdicts for high-risk PRs.
description: Resolve failures from the repository's architecture guard scripts — check_layer_dependencies.sh, check_architecture_migration_rules.sh, check_unsafe_code_allowances.sh, check_logging_guardrails.sh, check_doc_paths.sh. Use when make pre-commit / pre-pr or CI fails on one of these checks.
description: Diagnose failures from check_layer_dependencies.sh, check_architecture_migration_rules.sh, check_unsafe_code_allowances.sh, check_logging_guardrails.sh, check_doc_paths.sh, or check_no_planning_docs.sh. Use when one of these guards fails, not for every architecture question or documentation edit.
---
# Architecture Guard Checks
All five run in `make pre-commit` / `make pre-pr` and in CI. Fix the cause;
never weaken a check to get green.
Read only the section for the failing guard. Use `.config/make/` and the current
workflow to verify its wiring; not every guard is part of every gate. Fix the
cause and rerun the failed guard; never weaken a check to get green.
## `check_layer_dependencies.sh` — layer DAG in `rustfs/src`
@@ -50,10 +51,12 @@ consider adding it to the script's `checked_files` list.
- If context is missing, state assumptions before deeper analysis.
-Derive the change source, target branch, and relevant runtime/version from the
supplied diff and metadata. Ask only when missing context could change the verdict.
- Focus only on requested scope; avoid reviewing unrelated files.
### 2) Risk map
@@ -40,43 +32,20 @@ for adversarial validation, use `adversarial-validation` instead of running both
- unchecked assumptions and null/empty/error-path handling
- stale tests, fixtures, and configs
- hidden coupling to shared helpers/constants/features
-If a point is uncertain, mark it as an open question instead of guessing.
-Apply root `AGENTS.md`'s finding standard: try to disprove a candidate before
reporting it. Mention an unresolved question only when it could materially
change the verdict; do not fill the report with speculative possibilities.
#### Rust-specific checks (apply to all Rust changes)
#### Rust-specific checks
Run the full checklist in [rust-code-quality](../rust-code-quality/SKILL.md) — the canonical Rust review checklist for the unwrap/casting/cloning/locking/recursion/error-type/serde/test rules and the reuse-and-necessity checks (duplicated helpers, defensive branches without a nameable trigger, redundant error wrapping). Do not restate those rules here; carry its P0–P3 ratings over unchanged and use this skill's output format.
For changed Rust behavior, use the matching sections of [rust-code-quality](../rust-code-quality/SKILL.md). Reuse checks already performed by the selected review workflow. Comment-only or formatting-only Rust diffs do not require the full Rust checklist. Carry its P0–P3 ratings over unchanged and use this skill's output format.
### 4) Findings-first output
- Order findings by severity:
- P0: critical failure, security breach, or data loss risk
- P1: high-impact regression
- P2: medium risk correctness gap
- P3: low risk/quality debt
- For each finding include:
- Severity
-`path:line` reference
- concise issue statement
- impact and likely failure mode
- specific fix or mitigation
- validation step to confirm
- If no issues exist, explicitly state `No findings` and why.
- Order supported findings by P0–P3 severity; preserve the Rust ratings above.
Include `path:line`, the failure and impact, a focused fix, and its validation.
- If no supported issues remain, state `No findings` with the reviewed scope and
any material verification limitation. Do not append optional improvements to
description: Assess whether a GitHub issue is fixed, needs implementation, or can be closed by checking related work and current code. Use for issue completion/triage requests. Status questions are read-only; comment, close, or change labels only when the conversation authorizes that action.
---
# Issue Triage
Use this skill when the user provides a GitHub issue URL and asks "can this be closed?", "is this already implemented?", "check completion status", or similar triage questions.
Read the issue body to understand what was requested. Extract:
- The specific feature/fix/behavior described.
- Any linked PRs or commits mentioned in the body or comments.
- Any checklist items or sub-issues.
Resolve the issue repository and implementation repository separately (for example, `rustfs/backlog` tracks work in `rustfs/rustfs`). Pass the implementation repository explicitly to PR queries; the current checkout may belong to another repository.
### 2. Search for related work
Search git history for commits referencing the issue:
```bash
git log --oneline --all --grep="<N>"| head -30
```
Search for related PRs:
```bash
gh pr list --repo <implementation-repo> --search "<issue-url>" --state all --json number,title,state,mergedAt
```
Also search qualified issue references and subject keywords; for same-repository
issues, include `#<N>`. Follow explicit links even without a text match. A search
page with no match does not prove the work is absent.
If the issue mentions specific PRs, check their status:
Fetch the implementation repository's current base branch. For each merged candidate, verify its merge commit is present and inspect the current code for the claimed behavior; a commit message match alone is not proof:
If the issue describes a specific defect, inspect the fetched base's code rather than assuming the current checkout contains it:
```bash
git show <implementation-remote>/<base-branch>:crates/<relevant>/src/<file>.rs
```
For issues with checklists, verify each item individually. If sub-items are tracked as separate issues, check those too:
```bash
gh issue view <SUB_N> --repo <owner/repo> --json state
```
### 4. Determine verdict
- **All items fixed and merged**: Recommend closing; name the verified PRs and behavior.
- **Some items fixed, some remaining**: Keep open; report each remaining item.
- **Not yet implemented**: Keep open; report what remains.
- **Superseded or no longer relevant**: Recommend closing with evidence.
### 5. Take action
For a status-only request, return the assessment without GitHub writes. If commenting, closing, or label edits are authorized, perform only those actions; do not ask again for authority already given. Prepare the final assessment before asking for any missing authority. Write `rustfs/backlog` issue content in Chinese.
Close with comment:
```bash
gh issue close <N> --repo <owner/repo> --comment "<body>"
Always use `--body-file` for multiline content, never inline `--body`.
### 6. Handle multi-issue batches
When the user asks to check multiple issues (e.g., "check all issues by user X" or "scan backlog for closable issues"):
1. List the full requested scope with pagination (for example `gh api --paginate 'repos/<repo>/issues?state=open&per_page=100'`, excluding entries with `pull_request`). Add an author filter only when the user requested one; the default page/limit is not evidence that all issues were checked.
2. For each issue, run steps 1-5 above.
3. Report a summary table of all triaged issues with verdicts.
## Report
Identify the issue and current state, verified implementation/PR evidence,
remaining items, verdict, and action actually taken. Use a table for batches;
a single issue does not require a heading for each field. Follow step 4's
verdicts without repeating the assessment in another template.
## Notes
- The user may ask in Chinese ("是否可以关闭", "检查完成情况"); respond in the same language.
- When closing, always include a summary of what was fixed and which PRs resolved it — this creates a useful audit trail.
- For issues in `rustfs/backlog`, use `--repo rustfs/backlog`.
- For issues in `rustfs/rustfs`, use `--repo rustfs/rustfs`.
- If the issue has sub-issues (GitHub sub-issues API), check each one's state before declaring the parent complete.
description: Invariants and change procedure for the target-plugin / extension system — plugin manifests, admin plugin/extension catalog and instance APIs, secret redaction, external-plugin install policy. Use when editing crates/targets (manifest, plugin, control_plane, catalog, runtime), crates/extension-schema, or rustfs/src/admin plugin_contract.rs / plugins_*.rs / extensions.rs / target_descriptor.rs.
description: Guard changes to target-plugin manifests, extension schemas, admin catalog/instance contracts, secret redaction, and external-plugin install policy. Use when a diff changes those contracts in crates/targets, crates/extension-schema, or admin plugin/extension handlers; path membership alone, comments, and unrelated runtime internals do not trigger it.
description: Perform the final RustFS PR preflight and draft compliant English title/body metadata immediately before creating or updating a PR. Do not use during implementation or as a second general code review.
---
# PR Creation Checker
Use this skill only at the PR boundary. Reuse completed diff review and
verification evidence; do not reread the repository or rerun equivalent checks.
## Preflight
1. Confirm the branch is based on current `origin/main` and contains only the
intended task diff.
2. Inspect `git diff --stat`, `git diff --check`, and changed file names for
secrets, logs, generated artifacts, or unrelated edits.
3. Confirm the checks selected by root `AGENTS.md` passed on the final diff.
Do not replace focused behavioral tests with a generic gate or rerun checks
description: Review a GitHub PR from a URL or number using its actual base/head and risk-appropriate code review. Use when the user asks for a PR review, not a status lookup or PR wording edit. Publish a review only when authorized; delegation and monitoring follow the requested scope and root AGENTS.md.
---
# PR Review
Use this skill for PR context and review delivery. An ordinary review request is read-only unless the conversation also authorizes posting or fixes. Reuse that authorization without asking again; prepare the review before requesting any missing publication approval.
## Prerequisites
- Follow root `AGENTS.md`; classify risk with the [review policy](../../references/adversarial-validation.md) and consult relevant [change-style and boundary rules](../../references/implementation.md).
- Select `code-change-verification` for ordinary review or `adversarial-validation` for explicitly adversarial, substantial, or high-risk review; do not run both on the same diff.
Resolve `<repo-remote>` to the PR repository; do not assume the current checkout's `origin` or `main` matches. Record the exact base/head used. If either moved during fetching, refresh the snapshot before reviewing. Classify using the repository review policy; instruction changes that affect agent execution are mechanical, not exempt.
### 3. Review the changed behavior
Group files by functional area to trace callers and invariants. Use the root risk tier's review shape and only matching lenses. File count does not authorize delegation. When delegation is explicitly authorized, high-risk/substantial reviews use exactly two independent reviewers with the applicable lenses split between them; otherwise use two fresh sequential passes. Reviewers do not spawn further agents.
Findings need a concrete failure scenario with `file:line`; a null verdict briefly names the relevant probes. Reuse existing evidence and choose local checks from the final diff under the root verification policy.
### 4. Check CI status
```bash
gh pr checks <N> --repo <owner/repo>
```
Investigate a failed check when it bears on a finding or the user requested CI diagnosis/merge readiness:
```bash
gh run view --repo <owner/repo> --log-failed --job=<JOB_ID>
```
Use current evidence to distinguish pre-existing, flaky, and PR-caused failures. Do not classify them by guesswork or turn a code-only review into unrelated CI repair.
### 5. Synthesize findings
Report the PR, reviewed base/head, and risk tier, then summarize the assessment.
Use the selected review's P0–P3 ratings and root finding standard: supported
findings with `file:line`, failure scenario, and fix, or `No findings`.
State the observed check status, including pending or unavailable checks, and
the verdict (`APPROVE`, `REQUEST_CHANGES`, or `COMMENT`). Do not infer a pass
from missing checks or add style nits to populate a clean review.
### 6. Post the review
Only when posting is authorized, write the review body to a temp file and post via CLI. Refresh the PR head first; if it changed, review the delta and update the verdict before posting:
For authorized inline comments, use [the submission example](references/posting.md).
Always use `--body-file` or `--input`, never inline multiline `--body`.
### 7. Handle follow-up
Follow the [PR lifecycle](../../references/pull-requests.md) and any explicit monitoring request. For follow-up, fetch the new head and compare the recorded reviewed SHA with the new SHA; revisit affected callers and findings. Never use an unfetched `origin/pull/<N>/head` ref as evidence. Update the posted review or resolve addressed threads only within existing authorization.
## Notes
- The user may ask for review in Chinese; respond in the same language but keep the review body in English per AGENTS.md rules.
- When the user asks for "多角色对抗 review", run the full adversarial validation protocol — this skill's step 3 covers that.
- If the PR is from a fork, check `maintainerCanModify` before attempting to push fixes.
- For very large PRs, batch the review by functional area while keeping the same bounded review shape.
description: Run a focused Rust quality review when the user requests one, when reviewing a Rust PR/commit, or when another selected review workflow delegates Rust-specific checks. Do not auto-load for every implementation edit.
description: Run a focused Rust quality review when the user requests one or a selected review workflow needs Rust-specific checks for changed behavior. Do not auto-load for every implementation edit, comment-only or formatting-only Rust diff, or repeat an already completed review.
---
# Rust Code Quality Gate
@@ -8,12 +8,18 @@ description: Run a focused Rust quality review when the user requests one, when
Use this skill for a dedicated Rust review to cover rules that `cargo clippy`
does not catch.
Search matches and checklist items are candidates, not findings. Apply the root
finding standard; distinguish a demonstrated bug, an explicit rule violation,
and an optional preference. P2/P3 suggestions do not need to be invented or
included in an otherwise clean correctness review.
## Quick Start
1. Identify changed `.rs` files.
2. Run automated checks on changed files.
3.Run manual review checklist on the diff.
4. Resolve or rebut every finding with evidence; P0/P1 findings cannot be deferred.
2. Run the matching candidate searches on changed files.
3.Apply the manual checklist sections whose behavior the diff touches.
4. Report or rebut every finding with evidence; P0/P1 findings block approval.
Fix them when implementation is authorized; a read-only review reports them.
# 6. Ordering::Relaxed usage (verify each is intentional)
rg -n 'Ordering::Relaxed' <changed-files>
@@ -80,7 +86,7 @@ For the Rust diff under review, verify:
- [ ] Test volume and line count are never treated as production-code growth
### Serde
- [ ] Structs from untrusted input have `#[serde(deny_unknown_fields)]`
- [ ] Structs from untrusted input reject unknown fields where the compatibility contract permits; otherwise validate security-critical fields explicitly and test the supported input shape
- [ ]`#[serde(default)]` not used on security-critical fields without validation
### Code Hygiene
@@ -104,20 +110,7 @@ For the Rust diff under review, verify:
## Output Template
```
## Rust Code Quality Report
### Automated Scan
- unwrap/expect candidates inspected: N
- numeric-cast candidates inspected: N
- error-type candidates inspected: N
- output-macro candidates inspected: N
### Findings
- [P1] `path:line` — description
- Fix: ...
- Validation: ...
### Verdict
PASS / BLOCKED (list blocking findings)
```
Use the calling review's output format. For a standalone review, report supported
findings with severity, location, impact, fix, and validation, or `No findings`.
Include only material unverified checks. Candidate counts are not a quality
This skill orchestrates a full release. It wraps `rustfs-release-version-bump` (which only edits version files and opens the PR) with a mandatory preview-tag validation loop before the final tag is published.
This skill orchestrates a full release. It wraps `rustfs-release-version-bump` (invoked here with the authorized commit/push/PR scope) with a mandatory preview-tag validation loop before the final tag is published.
Core design: **version files never carry a `-preview.N` suffix**. The preview suffix exists only in tag names. A preview tag creates a visible GitHub Release marked Prerelease and uploads versioned assets, but it never becomes GitHub Latest and never updates `*-latest`, `latest.json`, R2, Docker, or Helm channels. That Release is temporary: `build.yml` deletes it automatically once the final tag's Release is published, so the Releases page ends up carrying deliverables only while the `-preview.N` tags stay behind as the traceability record. This works because the binary self-reports the git tag it was built from (`build::TAG` via shadow_rs, see `rustfs/src/config/cli.rs``SHORT_VERSION`), and `build.yml` derives artifact names and preview classification from the tag name — Cargo.toml's version is only a no-tag fallback. Therefore the preview tag and the final tag can (and MUST) point at the exact same commit: what you validated is byte-for-byte the source that ships.
The binary reports its build tag (`build::TAG` via shadow_rs; `SHORT_VERSION` in
`rustfs/src/config/cli.rs`), and `build.yml` derives asset names and preview
classification from that tag. Cargo.toml supplies only the no-tag fallback.
Preview and final tags must therefore share the validated source commit;
their tag-dependent version and asset names differ. The channel and cleanup
constraints are defined once under Preview tag naming and Hard rules below.
Pipeline shape:
@@ -29,9 +34,9 @@ On validation failure: fix lands on main via normal PR (version files are alread
- Final target version, for example `1.0.0-beta.10`.
- Preview iteration `N` (default: next unused preview tag for that target; check with `git tag -l '<target>-preview.*'` after `git fetch --tags`).
If the target version is missing or ambiguous, stop and ask before doing anything (see the semver gate below).
If the target version is missing or ambiguous, collect the current release/tag baseline and ask before version edits or publication. Continue independent read-only preflight while the answer is pending (see the semver gate below).
## Semver gate — confirm the target version before touching anything
## Semver gate — resolve the target before version edits or publication
- A request like "发个版" / "release the next version" without an exact version string is ALWAYS ambiguous. Derive the current latest tag (`git tag --sort=-v:refname | head`), then ask the user to choose via AskUserQuestion with concrete candidates, e.g. from `1.0.0-beta.10`: next prerelease `1.0.0-beta.11`, promote to `1.0.0-rc.1`, promote to stable `1.0.0`. Never guess between these — they have very different meanings (channel promotion vs. iteration) and different CI classification consequences.
- A request like "发个版" / "release the next version" without an exact version string is ALWAYS ambiguous. Derive the current latest tag (`git tag --sort=-v:refname | head`), then ask the user to choose with concrete candidates, e.g. from `1.0.0-beta.10`: next prerelease `1.0.0-beta.11`, promote to `1.0.0-rc.1`, promote to stable `1.0.0`. Never guess between these — they have very different meanings (channel promotion vs. iteration) and different CI classification consequences.
- After a stable `X.Y.Z` exists, the next version must state which component bumps: patch `X.Y.(Z+1)` for fixes only, minor `X.(Y+1).0` for backward-compatible features, major `(X+1).0.0` for breaking changes. If the user names a bump type but not a number, compute it from the latest stable tag and echo the exact resulting version back for confirmation.
- Echo the final confirmed version string verbatim in your first status report; every later phase must use exactly that string. If at any point the user's wording and the confirmed version diverge, stop and re-confirm.
@@ -77,58 +82,7 @@ Rules:
### Console release gate
Complete this gate before changing any RustFS version file or creating any RustFS tag. RustFS `build.yml` downloads the asset returned by `repos/rustfs/console/releases/latest`, so a successful Console build alone is insufficient.
1. Read the latest published Console tag and compare it with Console `main`:
```bash
CONSOLE_REPO="rustfs/console"
CONSOLE_LATEST=$(gh api "repos/${CONSOLE_REPO}/releases/latest" --jq .tag_name)
gh api "repos/${CONSOLE_REPO}/compare/${CONSOLE_LATEST}...main"\
-`ahead_by == 0`: no merged Console change is waiting for release. Still verify the current latest asset using step 4, then continue to Phase 1.
-`ahead_by > 0` and `behind_by == 0`: publish Console before continuing. Report the merged commits and select the next unused `vX.Y.Z` tag. Default to the next patch version when the changes are fixes or backward-compatible UI work; stop for confirmation if a minor/major bump is plausible.
- Any diverged history or `behind_by > 0`: stop and resolve the Console release baseline explicitly. Do not guess a range or publish RustFS.
2. Clone/fetch `rustfs/console` into a scratch directory and record its exact `main` commit. Before creating a tag, check for a `v*` tag or Release workflow already associated with that hash. If one is in progress, wait for it instead of creating another version:
Console tags include the `v` prefix. Pushing the tag triggers `.github/workflows/release.yml` (`🚀 Release`). Remove `CONSOLE_SCRATCH` after the gate completes.
3. Find the exact tag run and wait for completion:
```bash
gh run list -R "$CONSOLE_REPO" --workflow release.yml --branch "<console-tag>" --limit 1
gh run watch -R "$CONSOLE_REPO""<console-run-id>" --exit-status
```
4. Block until the published Release is non-draft, the latest endpoint returns the expected tag, and `rustfs-console-<console-tag>.zip` is uploaded, non-empty, and carries a `sha256:` digest:
test"$(gh api "repos/${CONSOLE_REPO}/releases/latest" --jq .tag_name)"="<console-tag>"
test"$(gh api "repos/${CONSOLE_REPO}/releases/tags/<console-tag>"\
--jq '[.assets[] | select(.name == "rustfs-console-<console-tag>.zip" and .state == "uploaded" and .size > 0 and (.digest | startswith("sha256:")))] | length')" -eq 1
```
Treat a missing/mismatched asset, digest, latest tag, or failed/cancelled workflow as BLOCKED. Do not start Phase 1 until the Console gate passes. Record `CONSOLE_TAG`, `CONSOLE_HASH`, Console run URL, and Release URL for the final report.
Read and complete [the Console gate](references/console-gate.md) before Phase 1. Verify the latest published Console asset and exact commit; if Console main is ahead, complete its release and asset verification first. A successful build alone does not satisfy this gate.
## Phase 1 — Version bump to the final target (once)
@@ -164,54 +118,9 @@ On a restart (N+1), refresh `PREVIEW_HASH=$(git rev-parse origin/main)` first
- Record `PREVIOUS_DELIVERABLE`, selected from published Releases by `publishedAt` after excluding the current tag and every `-preview.N` tag. Verify `gh release view "<preview-tag>" --json body --jq .body` contains `## What's Changed` and, when `PREVIOUS_DELIVERABLE` exists, `**Full Changelog**: https://github.com/rustfs/rustfs/compare/<PREVIOUS_DELIVERABLE>...<preview-tag>`. For a repository with no previous deliverable, verify a Full Changelog link exists and record the GitHub baseline fallback.
- Confirm preview-triggered Docker and Helm jobs are skipped. Preview validation covers the built RustFS binaries, embedded console, and rc compatibility; Docker image construction and Helm publication are deferred to the final tag because the Dockerfiles consume GitHub Release assets.
## Phase 4 — Run the artifact locally, verify the console
## Phases 4–5 — Local artifact, Console, and rc acceptance
Work inside the session scratchpad directory; never leave stray data dirs.
-`./rustfs --version` reports the preview tag name and the short SHA of `PREVIEW_HASH`. Reporting `<target>` without the `-preview.N` suffix means the build did not embed the tag — treat as FAIL and investigate before proceeding.
- Startup log shows the embedded console being served (this was the regression that `fix(release): require embedded console assets` guards).
- Open `http://localhost:9001` in the browser: login with `rustfsadmin`/`rustfsadmin`; dashboard renders without JS console errors; create a bucket, upload a file, download it back (byte-identical), delete the object and bucket. Keep the server running for Phase 5.
## Phase 5 — Validate with the latest rc client
`rc` is the RustFS CLI client from <https://github.com/rustfs/cli>.
- Ensure the latest release is installed: compare `rc --version` against `gh api repos/rustfs/cli/releases/latest --jq .tag_name`; update via `brew upgrade rustfs/tap/rc` (or download the release binary).
- Point it at the preview server and run the command matrix, recording PASS/FAIL per command:
rc admin user add preview/ relcheckuser relchecksecret12
rc admin user remove preview/ relcheckuser
rc alias remove preview
```
- Any FAIL blocks the release. Afterwards stop the server and delete the scratch data directory.
Read and complete [preview acceptance](references/preview-acceptance.md): verify the downloaded binary's tag/SHA and readiness, exercise Console CRUD with byte-identical download, and pass the full latest-rc command matrix. Any failure blocks final publication. Retain the results for the confirmation gate below.
Read during Phase 0, before changing RustFS version files or tags. Follow the parent skill's release scope and authorization rules.
### Console release gate
Complete this gate before changing any RustFS version file or creating any RustFS tag. RustFS `build.yml` downloads the asset returned by `repos/rustfs/console/releases/latest`, so a successful Console build alone is insufficient.
1. Read the latest published Console tag and compare it with Console `main`:
```bash
CONSOLE_REPO="rustfs/console"
CONSOLE_LATEST=$(gh api "repos/${CONSOLE_REPO}/releases/latest" --jq .tag_name)
gh api "repos/${CONSOLE_REPO}/compare/${CONSOLE_LATEST}...main"\
-`ahead_by == 0`: no merged Console change is waiting for release. Still verify the current latest asset using step 4, then continue to Phase 1.
-`ahead_by > 0` and `behind_by == 0`: publish Console before continuing. Report the merged commits and select the next unused `vX.Y.Z` tag. Default to the next patch version when the changes are fixes or backward-compatible UI work; stop for confirmation if a minor/major bump is plausible.
- Any diverged history or `behind_by > 0`: stop and resolve the Console release baseline explicitly. Do not guess a range or publish RustFS.
2. Clone/fetch `rustfs/console` into a scratch directory and record its exact `main` commit. Before creating a tag, check for a `v*` tag or Release workflow already associated with that hash. If one is in progress, wait for it instead of creating another version:
Console tags include the `v` prefix. Pushing the tag triggers `.github/workflows/release.yml` (`🚀 Release`). Remove `CONSOLE_SCRATCH` after the gate completes.
3. Find the exact tag run and wait for completion:
```bash
gh run list -R "$CONSOLE_REPO" --workflow release.yml --branch "<console-tag>" --limit 1
gh run watch -R "$CONSOLE_REPO""<console-run-id>" --exit-status
```
4. Block until the published Release is non-draft, the latest endpoint returns the expected tag, and `rustfs-console-<console-tag>.zip` is uploaded, non-empty, and carries a `sha256:` digest:
test"$(gh api "repos/${CONSOLE_REPO}/releases/latest" --jq .tag_name)"="<console-tag>"
test"$(gh api "repos/${CONSOLE_REPO}/releases/tags/<console-tag>"\
--jq '[.assets[] | select(.name == "rustfs-console-<console-tag>.zip" and .state == "uploaded" and .size > 0 and (.digest | startswith("sha256:")))] | length')" -eq 1
```
Treat a missing/mismatched asset, digest, latest tag, or failed/cancelled workflow as BLOCKED. Do not start Phase 1 until the Console gate passes. Record `CONSOLE_TAG`, `CONSOLE_HASH`, Console run URL, and Release URL for the final report.
Read after Phase 3 succeeds. Complete every check below before the parent skill's manual confirmation gate. These checks cover the downloaded artifact, embedded Console, and latest rc client.
## Phase 4 — Run the artifact locally, verify the console
Work inside the session scratchpad directory; never leave stray data dirs.
-`./rustfs --version` reports the preview tag name and the short SHA of `PREVIEW_HASH`. Reporting `<target>` without the `-preview.N` suffix means the build did not embed the tag — treat as FAIL and investigate before proceeding.
- Startup log shows the embedded console being served (this was the regression that `fix(release): require embedded console assets` guards).
- Open `http://localhost:9001` in the browser: login with `rustfsadmin`/`rustfsadmin`; dashboard renders without JS console errors; create a bucket, upload a file, download it back (byte-identical), delete the object and bucket. Keep the server running for Phase 5.
## Phase 5 — Validate with the latest rc client
`rc` is the RustFS CLI client from <https://github.com/rustfs/cli>.
- Ensure the latest release is installed: compare `rc --version` against `gh api repos/rustfs/cli/releases/latest --jq .tag_name`; update via `brew upgrade rustfs/tap/rc` (or download the release binary).
- Point it at the preview server and run the command matrix, recording PASS/FAIL per command:
@@ -4,17 +4,16 @@ description: "Prepare the version-file and release-asset bump for an exact RustF
---
# RustFS Release Version Bump
Use this skill to publish a RustFS release (alpha, beta, or stable) with a minimal, auditable diff and a complete ship flow (`edit -> verify -> commit -> push -> PR`).
Use this skill to prepare and verify release version files. Commit, push, and PR steps apply only when included in the user's delivery scope; publishing release tags belongs to `rustfs-release-publish`.
Validated baseline: release pattern used in PR `#2957`.
## Required inputs
- Exact target version, for example `1.0.0-beta.4`.
- Delivery scope:
- Local only (`edit/verify`).
- Local + git (`commit/push`).
- Full GitHub flow (`commit/push/PR`).
- Delivery scope: local (`edit/verify`), git (`commit/push`), or GitHub
(`commit/push/PR`). Derive it from the conversation; when unspecified, prepare
and verify locally without blocking on a delivery question.
If target version is missing or ambiguous, stop and ask before editing.
@@ -23,7 +22,7 @@ Reject any target version containing `-preview`: preview identifiers are tag-onl
## Read before editing
-`AGENTS.md` (root and nearest path-specific files).
-`.github/pull_request_template.md`.
-`.github/pull_request_template.md` only when preparing a PR.
- Current branch status and diff against `origin/main`.
## Default release file scope
@@ -50,8 +49,7 @@ Only drop a file when the current repository release process clearly no longer r
## Step-by-step workflow
1. Confirm intent and isolate scope
-Confirm target version string exactly.
- Confirm whether user requested local-only or full GitHub flow.
-Use the exact target and delivery scope already supplied; ask only for a missing or ambiguous target or a material release-policy choice.
- Inspect current branch and ensure only release-related files are touched for this task.
2. Update workspace versions
@@ -82,18 +80,18 @@ Only drop a file when the current repository release process clearly no longer r
4. Verify before shipping
- Run:
-`make pre-commit`
- If `make pre-commit` fails, return `BLOCKED` with root cause and do not silently widen scope to fix unrelated issues unless user asks.
- If `make pre-commit` fails, fix task-attributable failures and rerun affected checks. Report unresolved required checks as `BLOCKED`; do not silently widen scope to fix unrelated issues.
5. Commit strategy
5. Commit strategy (only when committing is authorized)
- Preferred split when both parts changed:
-`chore(release): prepare <version>` for `Cargo.toml` and `Cargo.lock`.
-`chore(release): align release assets for <version>` for docs and packaging files.
- If user asks for one commit, use one commit.
- Stage only intended release files; do not include unrelated working tree changes.
6. Push and PR
6. Push and PR (only for the authorized delivery scope)
- Use the user-requested or configured push remote:`git push -u <push-remote> <branch>` (first push), or `git push`when tracking is already configured.
@@ -48,6 +48,7 @@ Update this file only when an advisory adds or changes a reusable lesson, affect
### S3 object actions, copy, multipart, and upload policy validation
-`GHSA-g8w9-qw9q-fghr`: a valid presigned `PutObject` accepted extra `x-amz-tagging`, website redirect, and storage-class headers omitted from `SignedHeaders`. Lesson: a presigned URL is a bounded capability; reject `x-amz-*` headers that are not cryptographically bound by the signature so unsigned metadata cannot change authorization, lifecycle, redirect, cost, or durability semantics.
-`GHSA-3ppv-fx5m-m749`: explicit `versionId` reads and copy sources authorized `s3:GetObject` instead of `s3:GetObjectVersion`. Lesson: version-specific object access must select version-specific actions for direct reads, `CopyObject`, and `UploadPartCopy`, with tests proving the backend is not reached on denial.
-`GHSA-x298-9x87-fvjq`: anonymous `ListObjectVersions` fell back to `ListBucket` and returned before public-access-block gates. Lesson: compatibility fallbacks must converge on the same post-authorization checks as direct grants, especially `RestrictPublicBuckets` and anonymous data-plane denies.
-`GHSA-mx42-j6wv-px98`: `UploadPartCopy` missed source authorization and allowed cross-bucket object exfiltration. Lesson: multipart copy must enforce the same source and destination contract as `CopyObject`.
@@ -107,9 +108,9 @@ Update this file only when an advisory adds or changes a reusable lesson, affect
### Serde deserialization and input validation
-No `#[serde(deny_unknown_fields)]` found across the entire codebase. Lesson: all structs deserialized from untrusted input (S3 API XML/JSON, lifecycle rules, bucket policies, replication configs) should have `#[serde(deny_unknown_fields)]` to reject malformed or adversarial payloads.
-Reject unknownfields in untrusted S3 API XML/JSON, lifecycle, policy, and replication input where compatibility permits. Check the current type and supported payload fixtures; do not infer the repository's current coverage from an older audit. Where extra fields are part of the compatibility contract, validate security-critical values explicitly.
-`#[serde(default)]` on security-critical fields silently accepts missing values as zero/empty. Lesson: when a field has security implications (retention days, permissions, limits), validate the deserialized value explicitly rather than relying on defaults.
- Integer fields deserialized from user input and cast with `as` (e.g., `i32 as u32`) can wrap negative values to large positives. Lesson: validate ranges before casting; use `try_into()`or clamp.
- Integer fields deserialized from user input and cast with `as` (e.g., `i32 as u32`) can wrap negative values to large positives. Lesson: validate ranges before casting; use `try_into()`with a typed error, or clamp only when the domain explicitly requires saturation.
- XML config typos (e.g., `"NoncurentDays"` instead of `"NoncurrentDays"`) are silently accepted when `deny_unknown_fields` is absent. Lesson: strict deserialization prevents silent misconfiguration that could cause data loss or unexpected retention behavior.
## Useful Search Seeds
@@ -119,7 +120,7 @@ Use these targeted searches when a diff touches security-sensitive code:
- Protocol frontend authz fixes: include denied `RETR`, `SIZE`/`MDTM`, `MKD`, bucket probe, and sibling allowed-operation cases, and assert denied paths do not reach the storage backend.
- IAM fixes: include import/update/list service-account cases with attacker-controlled parent, claims, access key, secret key, and policy.
- Copy/upload fixes: include cross-bucket, cross-user, source-denied, destination-denied, copy-source-condition, and multipart completion cases.
- Presigned upload fixes: include a valid presign with extra unsigned tagging, redirect, and storage-class headers; require rejection before storage access, and verify explicitly signed equivalents still work.
- Version-action fixes: include historical UUID, explicit current version, `null`, range, partNumber, presigned, STS/session, service-account, anonymous bucket-policy, copy source, and multipart-copy source cases.
- Policy-condition fixes: include reserved-key header collisions, missing keys, partially overlapping multi-value sets, plugin mode, and built-in policy mode.
- Path fixes: include encoded traversal, absolute path, nested traversal, archive entries with `..`, valid object keys that resemble traversal text but should be rejected, and canonical bucket/prefix boundary checks.
description: Run project coverage checks, rank high-risk gaps, and propose high-impact tests to improve regression confidence for changed and critical code paths before release.
description: Analyze a supplied coverage report or perform an explicitly requested RustFS coverage assessment, rank uncovered risks, and propose focused tests. Do not trigger for ordinary implementation verification, a single regression test, documentation wording, or release preparation without a coverage request.
---
# Test Coverage Improver
@@ -9,58 +9,49 @@ Use this skill when you need a prioritized, risk-aware plan to improve tests fro
## Usage assumptions
- Focus scope is either changed lines/files, a module, or the whole repository.
-Coverage artifact must be generated or provided in a supported format.
-Reuse a supplied coverage artifact when its revision, scope, and format match.
- If required context is missing, call out assumptions explicitly before proposing work.
## Workflow
1. Define scope and baseline
-Confirm target language, framework, and branch.
-Confirm whether the scope is changed files only or full-repo.
-Derive the revision and scope from the request, diff, or supplied report.
-Default to the affected files/module; whole-workspace coverage requires that
scope in the request. Ask only if a wrong scope would change the result.
2.Produce coverage snapshot
-Rust: `cargo llvm-cov` (or `cargo tarpaulin`) with existing repo config.
- JavaScript/TypeScript: `npm test -- --coverage` and read `coverage/coverage-final.json`.
-Python: `pytest --cov=<pkg> --cov-report=json` and read `coverage.json`.
- Collect total, per-file, and changed-line coverage.
2.Obtain coverage evidence
-First inspect a matching existing artifact; do not regenerate it merely
because this skill was selected.
-If measurement is needed, read the Coverage section of
[the testing guide](../../../docs/testing/README.md#coverage), check disk
space/tool availability, and select package/test-scoped `cargo llvm-cov`
using the repository's nextest configuration. `make coverage` measures the
whole workspace (excluding E2E) and is only for that requested scope.
- Collect only metrics the report supports. Missing branch/changed-line
coverage is unknown, not zero.
- If measurement cannot run, continue with code-based test proposals and
mark measured coverage unverified; do not invent a coverage percentage.
3. Rank highest-risk gaps
- Prioritize changed code, branch coverage gaps, and low-confidence boundaries.
- Apply the risk rubric in [coverage-prioritization.md](references/coverage-prioritization.md).
-Keep shortlist to 5–8 gaps.
-Report up to 5–8 evidenced gaps; do not pad a small scope.
- For each gap, capture: file, lines, uncovered branches, and estimated risk score.
short_description:"Find top uncovered risk areas and propose high-impact tests."
default_prompt:"Run coverage checks, identify largest gaps, and recommend highest-impact test cases to improve risk coverage."
default_prompt:"Use $test-coverage-improver to analyze coverage for the requested scope, reuse matching reports, and propose tests for evidenced risks."
"scope":"Target process killed during partial background rebuild, real unclean-shutdown marker, exact unversioned S3 bodies and replacement-disk shards; not power loss or EC8+4."
"scope":"Target process restart during partial background rebuild on a single 3x4 EC8+4 set; exact unversioned S3 bodies and replacement-drive shards; not power loss, multi-set, or multi-pool."
"scope":"Target process killed during partial background rebuild on a single 3x4 EC8+4 set; real unclean-shutdown marker, exact unversioned S3 bodies and replacement-drive shards; not power loss, multi-set, or multi-pool."
@@ -10,16 +10,16 @@ Use N/A when there is no related issue.
## Summary of Changes
<!--
Briefly explain what changed and why reviewers should accept it.
Focus on behavior, compatibility, and review-relevant context.
Describe the concrete problem and resulting behavior. For a behavior change, name the input or state that triggers it and the expected outcome. Explain any new dependency or abstraction that the change needs.
-->
## Verification
<!--
List the commands or checks you ran, for example:
-`make pre-commit`
Give 1–3 concrete pieces of evidence for the changed behavior: the test or command, its observed result, and the regression it catches. For a bug fix, record a failing-before/passing-after check or explain why it was unavailable.
Use N/A only when verification is not applicable.
Identify the tested commit and any local changes. When testing a prebuilt binary or external service, include its source/version and artifact identity; a successful run against a different build is not evidence for this change.
List relevant checks not run and the remaining risk. Use the validation tier in AGENTS.md; do not run broader checks solely to fill this section. For documentation-only changes, list the applicable documentation checks. Use N/A only when verification is not applicable.
# Docs-only PRs skip the full code CI, but they are exactly where a
# planning-type document could be slipped in (git add -f bypasses
# .gitignore). Run the guard here so the required "Test and Lint" check
# stays meaningful for docs-only changes.
- name:Check no planning docs committed
run:./scripts/check_no_planning_docs.sh
- name:Satisfy required check for docs-only changes
run:echo "Docs-only change — code CI is skipped by paths-ignore; planning-docs guard passed, reporting success for the required 'Test and Lint' check."
"build_flags": {key: os.environ[key] for key in ("RUSTFLAGS", "CARGO_ENCODED_RUSTFLAGS", "CARGO_BUILD_TARGET", "CARGO_TARGET_DIR", "RUSTUP_TOOLCHAIN") if key in os.environ},
selected="$(python3 -c 'import json,sys; d=json.load(open(sys.argv[1])); print(sum(1 for suite in d.get("rust-suites", {}).values() for test in suite.get("testcases", {}).values() if test.get("filter-match", {}).get("status") == "matches"))' "${NEXTEST_LISTING}")"
echo "cloud interop cases selected: ${selected}"
if [ "${selected}" != "${CLOUD_CASE_COUNT}" ]; then
echo "::error::CLOUD_CASE_FILTER selected ${selected} cases, expected ${CLOUD_CASE_COUNT}; the interop cases were renamed or moved. Context: rustfs/backlog#2167."
exit 1
fi
- name:Run the three-case minimum
if:steps.credentials.outputs.present == 'true'
run:|
cargo nextest run --profile e2e-odm-interop -p e2e_test \
-E "${CLOUD_CASE_FILTER}" --no-tests=fail
- name:Build the ${{ matrix.provider }} interop report
description: Triage a GitHub issue — determine if it is already fixed, needs implementation, or should be closed. Searches related commits and PRs, verifies implementation status, and posts a triage comment or closes the issue. Use when the user provides an issue URL and asks whether it can be closed or needs work.
---
# Issue Triage
Use this skill when the user provides a GitHub issue URL and asks "can this be closed?", "is this already implemented?", "check completion status", or similar triage questions.
description: Review a GitHub PR end-to-end from a URL or number — fetch metadata, inspect the diff, run multi-role adversarial review, check CI status, and post the review comment. Use when the user provides a PR link and asks to review it.
---
# PR Review
Use this skill when the user provides a GitHub PR URL or number and asks to review it. This covers the full review lifecycle: data gathering, code review, CI verification, and posting the result.
## Prerequisites
- Read `AGENTS.md` for the repository's adversarial validation policy and change-style rules.
- The `adversarial-validation` skill handles the review role playbooks; this skill orchestrates the workflow around it.
Group the changed files into logical clusters (by crate or functional area). For each cluster, spawn a subagent with a focused review prompt that includes:
- The cluster's changed files and their diffs.
- The applicable adversarial role probes (from the `adversarial-validation` skill).
- The repository's AGENTS.md rules relevant to that domain.
For standard-tier changes: correctness adversary + simplicity adversary + test-coverage skeptic, plus every role whose domain the diff touches.
For high-risk changes: run all seven roles.
Each subagent must produce findings (concrete failure scenario with file:line) or a null report ("attacked X, Y, Z — no break found").
### 4. Check CI status
```bash
gh pr checks <N>
```
If any checks fail, investigate:
```bash
gh run view --log-failed --job=<JOB_ID>
```
Determine whether failures are pre-existing (on main), flaky, or caused by the PR.
### 5. Synthesize findings
Combine all subagent findings into a structured review:
- **Summary**: one-paragraph overview of the change and overall assessment.
- **Findings**: each finding with severity (critical/major/minor/nit), file:line, concrete failure scenario, and suggested fix.
- **CI status**: pass/fail with notes on any failures.
- **Verdict**: APPROVE, REQUEST_CHANGES, or COMMENT.
### 6. Post the review
Write the review body to a temp file and post via CLI:
@@ -7,11 +7,45 @@ and this project adheres to [Semantic Versioning](https://semver.org/spec/v2.0.0
## [Unreleased]
### Replication
- Object Lock replication PUTs now carry a required integrity header, fixing target rejection introduced by the plain-payload default ([#7097](https://github.com/rustfs/rustfs/pull/7097)). This changes the default outbound request for locked objects but adds no persisted format.
- Multipart source objects stay on the multipart transport even when their checksum record is a whole-object checksum, so objects above the single-PUT limit remain replicable ([#7047](https://github.com/rustfs/rustfs/pull/7047)).
- Targets that mint their own version IDs now use a per-target version ledger for tag, retention, legal-hold, and permanent-delete mutations; ambiguous pre-ledger matches fail with backoff instead of guessing ([#7368](https://github.com/rustfs/rustfs/pull/7368)). This adds dual-prefixed internal metadata keys that older readers ignore.
- Single-part source checksums are forwarded as `x-amz-checksum-*` headers instead of user metadata, so the replica preserves checksum responses ([#7313](https://github.com/rustfs/rustfs/pull/7313)). This changes the default outbound headers for checksummed objects.
- Site-replication outage recovery now uses a bounded 30-second retry drain plus the 600-second full reconciliation pass, persists destructive liabilities before local deletion, and fences replay settlement and peer edits ([#7148](https://github.com/rustfs/rustfs/pull/7148)). Persisted additions are optional and ignored by older readers.
- IAM snapshot/deletion replay, target-assigned delete-marker purges, timestamp ordering, and best-effort peer broadcast now close the control-plane gaps found by the R6 review ([#7195](https://github.com/rustfs/rustfs/pull/7195)).
- Upgrade and rollback: upgrade every node in one site consecutively and verify reconciliation before moving to the next site; do not intentionally run a site mixed-version. Target-version ledger keys are harmless on rollback, although old code cannot use their routing. Before rolling back past [#7307](https://github.com/rustfs/rustfs/pull/7307), drain or repair every pending version purge: older code can free a retained version's data directory before its remote purge is acknowledged. See `docs/operations/site-replication-operations.md`.
### Security
- **Presigned URLs honour only signed headers** (GHSA-g8w9-qw9q-fghr): a SigV4 presigned request that carries an `x-amz-*` request header not listed in `X-Amz-SignedHeaders` is now rejected with `403 AccessDenied` ("There were headers present in the request which were not signed"), matching AWS S3. Previously the holder of a presigned `PutObject` URL could add unsigned `x-amz-tagging`, `x-amz-storage-class`, `x-amz-website-redirect-location`, ACL, metadata, Object Lock or SSE headers and have them applied. Presigners that intend a property must set it before signing so the SDK lists the header in `SignedHeaders`; `x-amz-cf-id` (CloudFront) remains tolerated unsigned. Header-signed SigV4 and SigV2 requests are unchanged.
### Fixed
- **Fresh multi-pool bootstrap with distinct format creators**: a new deployment whose pools have their first endpoint on different nodes (for example two single-node pools) could never publish its initial `pool.bin`: each node held fresh-bootstrap proof only for the pool it formatted, the deployment-wide proof collapsed to none, and every node died with `pool metadata recovery required: no durable bootstrap identity or pool.bin replica is available` after the startup retry budget. The first pool's creator now mints the pending cluster identity on its own pool, every other creator copies that nonce-bound identity onto the pool it formatted first-hand, and the elected writer publishes `pool.bin` once every pool replica carries the same pending identity. Corrupt or disagreeing replicas, pools that merely have a format, expansion pools joining an initialized deployment, and restarts without first-hand proof still fail closed. Non-elected nodes that start before `pool.bin` exists, and the elected writer while it waits for the other creators, no longer latch their pool-metadata write gate for the life of the process. Refs rustfs/backlog#2338, rustfs/backlog#2375.
- **Lock RPC timeout storms** (#7363): the remote lock client no longer evicts and re-dials the shared internode HTTP/2 channel on every request deadline. A timeout evicts only when the peer has not completed any lock RPC for two deadlines, evictions and transport-failure re-dials are rate limited per peer (`RUSTFS_OBJECT_LOCK_RPC_EVICTION_COOLDOWN_MS`, default 5 s), and a timed-out request is left running instead of being reset (bounded per peer by `RUSTFS_OBJECT_LOCK_RPC_DETACHED_LIMIT`, default 256), so a slow lock endpoint can no longer drive the `RST_STREAM`/`GOAWAY too_many_resets`/reconnect loop. A lock granted after its caller timed out is released immediately, and unlocks that fail the quick retries continue on a deferred 1/2/4/8/16 s schedule before the server lease reclaims them. New `rustfs_remote_lock_*` metrics cover timeouts, evictions, suppressed evictions, detached streams, late completions and late releases per peer. Operator guide at `docs/operations/lock-rpc-storm-protection.md`.
- **KMS failures on the S3 data path carry an actionable status**: only "key not found" and a backend outage were classified; every other KMS failure — a disabled or pending-deletion key, a denied KMS grant, an encryption-context mismatch, an unsupported algorithm, a credential or timeout failure, a capability the backend does not have — collapsed onto `500 InternalError`. SDKs therefore applied exponential backoff to configuration errors that no retry can fix, and monitoring filed every one of them as a server fault. Unusable-key and request-side failures now return `400`, a denied grant `403`, transient backend failures `503` — including a key store the backend could not read, so an outage stays distinguishable from a missing key all the way to the client — and a missing backend capability `501`. Damaged or unreadable key material still returns `500`, which is what it is.
- **SSE-C on buckets with default encryption**: a `PutObject` carrying a valid SSE-C header triple on a bucket that has default encryption configured no longer fails with `400 InvalidArgument` ("The SSE-C and managed server-side encryption headers cannot be used together"). PUT and the POST-object/extract path resolved the bucket default with a hard-coded "no explicit SSE-C" flag, so the default was layered onto the request and then tripped the request's own mutual-exclusion check; an SSE-C request now suppresses the bucket default on all three write paths, matching COPY and AWS S3. Every bucket with default encryption previously refused SSE-C single PUTs outright, while `CreateMultipartUpload` on the same bucket succeeded.
- **Explicit SSE-S3 on SSE-KMS-default buckets**: `x-amz-server-side-encryption: AES256` against a bucket whose default is `aws:kms` no longer fails with `400 InvalidArgument`. The bucket default's KMS key id was inherited independently of the effective algorithm, producing a self-contradictory `AES256` + key-id pair; the key id is now inherited only when the effective algorithm is `aws:kms`. `PutBucketEncryption` fills in a default key id automatically, so this affected nearly every SSE-KMS-default bucket.
- **Restore of encrypted or compressed multipart objects (silent data corruption)**: restoring a multipart object from a remote tier addressed the tier in *plaintext* coordinates while the copy-back reads the *stored* representation. Every part received a misaligned slice of the remote object whose length still satisfied the range, the hash reader and the completion size check, so the restore reported success and replaced the object's bytes. Restore now accumulates stored part sizes, passes the stored length to the hash reader alongside the plaintext length, and validates against the stored size. Objects restored by an affected release must be re-restored from the tier or recovered from a backup — this release does not detect or repair them retroactively.
- **Restore no longer drifts the object ETag**: the copy-back digests stored (encrypted or compressed) bytes, so the recomputed MD5 is not the object's public ETag. Single-part and multipart restores now preserve the original object ETag, and each restored part keeps its own recorded part ETag.
- **ILM archive no longer forwards encryption metadata to the tier**: transition requests carried the object's SSE headers and the RustFS-wrapped data key as request headers. Any S3 target rejected an SSE-C archive outright (`400`, no key supplied), an SSE-KMS archive asked the target to encrypt a second time under a key id it does not own, and the wrapped DEK left the cluster. The archive request now strips every SSE header and encryption marker using the same predicate the replication path uses; the local `xl.meta` keeps all of it, so read-through and restore are unaffected.
- **KMS reload is no longer a no-op on a node whose KMS failed to start**: `POST /rustfs/admin/v3/kms/reload` short-circuited whenever the persisted configuration matched the in-memory one byte for byte. A node whose KMS failed to start (for example Vault briefly unreachable during a rolling restart) keeps that configuration and sits in `Error`, so the documented recovery call returned "reloaded successfully" while leaving the node down — and did the same on every peer through the reload broadcast. Reload now short-circuits only for a service that is actually running, and otherwise reconfigures, which starts the service.
- **AWS KMS capability reporting**: the AWS backend no longer advertises `versioning` support through `GET /rustfs/admin/v3/kms/status`. AWS KMS key versions are not enumerable through this backend, as the backend documentation already stated.
- **Multipart admission queue**: an `UploadPart` waiting for a foreground write permit now waits at most 10 s by default (`RUSTFS_PUT_MULTIPART_FOREGROUND_ADMISSION_WAIT_TIMEOUT_MS`, previously 30 s), so a queued part returns S3 `SlowDown` before the client's socket write timeout drops the connection. Separately, the API listener no longer forces a 4 MiB `SO_RCVBUF` on every accepted socket (kernel autotuning applies; `RUSTFS_HTTP_SOCKET_RECV_BUFFER_BYTES` restores a fixed size), so a queued part no longer lets up to 8 MiB of unread body accumulate in kernel memory per connection, which is what throttled whole nodes under SDK-default multipart concurrency. Fixes #7385.
- **Helm Ingress**: `customAnnotations` are now merged with class-specific annotations (nginx/traefik) instead of being ignored when `ingress.className` is set.
- **Per-pool erasure parity**: Erasure parity (STANDARD and reduced-redundancy) is now resolved independently for every pool instead of reusing the first pool's value. A heterogeneous topology — for example a 4-drive pool plus a 2-drive pool created during expansion — previously inherited the first pool's parity and could resolve to zero data shards in the smaller pool, panicking Reed-Solomon construction on write. Automatic parity now resolves per pool (for example `2+2` in the 4-drive pool and `1+1` in the 2-drive pool). Fixes #4801.
### Added
- **On-Demand Migration**: Lazy, pull-style migration of an existing S3-compatible bucket into RustFS. A local bucket is attached to an external source bucket; a GET for a key that does not exist locally fetches it from the source, streams it to the client, and stores it locally in the same pass, so every later read is served locally. The module is on by default; set `RUSTFS_ON_DEMAND_MIGRATION_ENABLED=false` on every node to turn it off. A bucket with no source configured behaves exactly as before — the runtime never intervenes on its reads and makes no outbound call. Operator guide at `docs/operations/on-demand-migration.md`.
- Per-bucket configuration persisted as `on-demand-migration.json` in the bucket metadata: source provider (`s3`, `aws`, `minio`, `rustfs`, `r2`, `gcs`), endpoint, region, addressing style, credentials and TLS material, an optional key-prefix filter and source-prefix rewrite, and a policy block covering the inline size threshold, multipart part size, concurrency, queue capacity, timeouts, bandwidth limit and negative-cache TTL
- Admin routes under `/rustfs/admin/v3/on-demand-migration/{bucket}`: `PUT` (with `?dry-run=true` to validate and probe the source without saving), `GET`, `DELETE`, `GET .../status`, plus `POST .../backfill?op=start|cancel` and `GET .../backfill` for the background full-backfill job with its resumable checkpoint. Authorized by the new `admin:GetBucketOnDemandMigration` and `admin:SetBucketOnDemandMigration` actions; every response redacts `secret_key` and `session_token`
- Read paths: an object at or below `policy.inline_max_bytes` (16 MiB by default) is teed to the client and to the local store in a single source read; a larger object or a Range read streams through and a background pull stores the whole object. A HEAD miss is proxied to the source and stores nothing (`policy.head = local_only` disables it). Every source-backed response carries `x-rustfs-on-demand-migration: source`
- Protections: a per-source circuit breaker, a per-key negative cache, singleflight per key, a concurrency limit and a bounded pull queue shared by the inline and background paths, an optional bandwidth limit, an anti-loop request marker, and the shared outbound-endpoint (SSRF) policy
- Metrics under `rustfs_on_demand_migration_*` (`requests_total`, `pulled_bytes_total`, `pulled_objects_total`, `pull_failures_total`, `inflight_pulls`, `queue_depth`, `source_latency_seconds_*`, `breaker_state`), mirrored per node by the admin status route
- Listings: `ListObjects` v1 remains local with ordinary key markers. `ListObjectsV2` can merge source objects when `policy.list_through = true`; this is off by default
- Upgrade and rollback: finish upgrading every node before enabling ODM. An rc.5 node that writes bucket configuration drops the ODM fields from metadata; neither a later restart nor moving the service out of ECStore recovers them. Before rollback, disable ODM and securely retain the original full configuration and credentials. After every node returns to a compatible version, restore and validate that configuration. Redacted exports cannot replace the credential backup; source-only objects are unavailable through RustFS while ODM is disabled. See the upgrade and rollback section of `docs/operations/on-demand-migration.md`
- Optional Google dependencies: default and `full` server builds retain native GCS support. `cargo build -p rustfs --no-default-features --features ftps,webdav` excludes Google SDKs while preserving configuration decoding and redaction; native GCS ODM and tier operations require the `gcs` feature. Do not use that build with existing GCS-tiered data
- Limitations: PUT and DELETE never reach the source; a source object updated after it was pulled is not re-fetched; SSE-C source objects are unsupported and answer 424; `Last-Modified` on a pulled object is the local write time, with the source timestamp kept in metadata
- **NATS JetStream Publish Path**: Opt-in at-least-once delivery for the NATS notify and audit targets. A NATS Core publish flushes to the connection without awaiting a broker acknowledgement, so an event can be lost across a broker restart or a reconnect after the send queue has already cleared it. A queued event now clears only after the JetStream `PublishAck`, so bucket notifications survive those interruptions. Off by default and byte-identical to the NATS Core path when disabled.
- Three configuration keys per target: `JETSTREAM_ENABLE`, `JETSTREAM_STREAM_NAME`, and `JETSTREAM_ACK_TIMEOUT_SECS`, under the `RUSTFS_NOTIFY_NATS_` and `RUSTFS_AUDIT_NATS_` prefixes
- Durable store-and-forward with a stable dedup id sent as the `Nats-Msg-Id` header, so a replay after a crash is collapsed by the server duplicate window
@@ -38,6 +72,18 @@ and this project adheres to [Semantic Versioning](https://semver.org/spec/v2.0.0
- Four-layer regression-prevention tests guard against silent feature deletion: compile-time module assertion, module-presence unit test, cross-module `Protocol` enum assertion, end-to-end SSH banner test against the running binary
### Changed
- **Encryption and KMS work merged since `1.0.0-rc.5`** (entries were missing from this section):
- **Persisted KMS configuration secrets** are sealed field-by-field with `RUSTFS_KMS_CONFIG_SECRET`. **When the variable is unset the secrets are persisted in cleartext and the server only warns** (`persisted KMS configuration carries cleartext secrets`); it never refuses the write. Set it, identically, on every node, and re-save the configuration to seal an existing one.
- **New v2 ciphertext frame format** with per-frame index binding and final-frame authentication. Its write switch `RUSTFS_ENCRYPTION_FRAME_V2` is **off by default**: v2 frames are unreadable by nodes without v2 read support, and encrypted ciphertext travels verbatim through transition, decommission and SSE-C replication passthrough, so turn it on only after every node — and every RustFS warm/replication target that receives raw ciphertext — runs a release with v2 read support. Reading v2 objects needs no switch.
- **Per-key SSE-KMS authorization** (`RUSTFS_KMS_ENFORCE_SSE_KEY_POLICY`, default `false`). With it on, anonymous callers hold no KMS grants, so **a public bucket serving SSE-KMS objects is an incompatible combination** and those reads return `AccessDenied`.
- Envelope context binding as KMS AAD (`ENV_KMS_ENVELOPE_AAD`, off by default; a node that predates the field cannot open bound envelopes).
- Vault custom CA and mutual TLS; object-level DEK rewrap plus a batch rekey admin API; a backend-locality runtime signal on `kms/status`.
- Single-pass decryption for encrypted GET, and encrypted single-part closed-range seek — the latter is now **on by default** (`RUSTFS_ENCRYPTED_RANGE_SEEK`, default `true`; the switch remains as a kill switch).
- **Vault static tokens are now tracked and renewed**: with `Token` authentication RustFS hard-coded "this token has no lease", so the renewal task never started and no remaining-TTL gauge was published. `vault token create` grants a 768-hour TTL by default, which turned a healthy-looking cluster into one where every KMS call returned 403 about a month later, with no self-healing short of a restart or reconfigure. RustFS now calls `auth/token/lookup-self` at login and adopts what Vault reports: a non-expiring token behaves exactly as before, an expiring renewable one is renewed at half TTL like the other auth methods, and an expiring non-renewable one logs `vault_static_token_not_renewable` and publishes its remaining TTL. The probe never fails the login: a token whose policy omits `lookup-self` (Vault's `default` policy grants it), or a Vault that is unreachable at that moment, logs `vault_static_token_lookup_failed` and falls back to the previous no-lease behaviour, so no deployment that works today stops working.
- **SSE-C over a plaintext transport is reported**: AWS S3 and MinIO refuse an SSE-C request that did not arrive over TLS, because the customer key travels in a request header. RustFS accepted them on any transport and still does by default — flipping to a rejection inside a release window would break plaintext staging and test deployments. Each such request now increments `rustfs_ssec_plaintext_requests_total` and logs one `ssec_request_without_tls` warning per process, and `RUSTFS_SSE_C_REQUIRE_TLS=true` opts into the AWS `400` now. The default is expected to flip in a later release; confirm the counter reads zero first. The verdict is per connection: a TLS listener satisfies it, and so does an `https` protocol forwarded by a proxy the trusted-proxy configuration accepts.
- **Local KMS backend on a distributed deployment says what actually breaks**: the backend keeps key material and its Argon2id salt on each node's own disk, so two nodes derive different keys from the same `master_key` and an object encrypted on one node cannot be decrypted on another — intermittent 500s behind a load balancer. Configuring it while the deployment is distributed now logs `kms_node_local_backend_in_distributed_deployment` and appends that consequence to the `kms/configure` response, instead of only the generic "development only" positioning warning. It remains a warning, not a gate.
- **SSE-KMS is refused when no KMS is running (breaking)**: a write requesting `x-amz-server-side-encryption: aws:kms` on a node with no KMS service no longer succeeds. Earlier releases wrapped the data key with the node-local `RUSTFS_SSE_S3_MASTER_KEY` while still writing `aws:kms` and the requested key id into the object metadata — metadata that claimed a KMS protection the object never had, under a key that was never consulted. Such a request now returns `400 InvalidRequest` when KMS was never configured and `503` when a configured service is not running; the refusal is evaluated after the per-key authorization gate, so an unauthorized caller still receives `403 AccessDenied`. **Upgrade note:** a deployment that relied on this write succeeding will start receiving 4xx/503. Either configure a KMS, or request `AES256` and keep the documented SSE-S3 local-master-key fallback, which is unchanged. Objects already written this way remain readable.
- **Legacy ciphertext nonce layouts are now locked per segment**: while decrypting a v1 segment, the reader locks onto whichever of the three historical nonce layouts decoded the segment's first non-zero-index frame and rejects any later frame that needs a different one. Because a frame encrypted at block index zero authenticates under the pre-`1.0.0-alpha.91` reused-part-nonce layout at any position, an attacker able to rewrite the underlying shards could previously replay it and have the forged plaintext returned with `200`. New `RUSTFS_ENCRYPTION_LEGACY_NONCE_FALLBACK` (default `true`) drops that third layout entirely when set to `false`, which closes the residual case of a stream built purely from repeats of frame zero. Turn it off only after migrating pre-alpha.91 encrypted objects (rewrite in place with CopyObject); see [KMS backend security properties](docs/operations/kms-backend-security.md) for what the v1 frame layout does and does not authenticate.
- **HTTP Server Stack**: Integrated `KeystoneAuthLayer` middleware from `rustfs-keystone` crate into service stack (positioned after ReadinessGateLayer)
- **Storage-class validation on startup (upgrade note)**: A persisted explicit storage class (`RUSTFS_STORAGE_CLASS_STANDARD` / `RUSTFS_STORAGE_CLASS_RRS`, for example `EC:2`) is now validated against the actual per-pool drive counts at startup and rejected when a pool cannot satisfy it. This is fail-closed and correct, but a cluster that persisted a storage class larger than a small or heterogeneous pool can hold (for example `EC:2` alongside a 2-drive pool), which earlier releases accepted and silently resolved to an invalid layout, will now refuse to start after upgrade. To recover, unset `RUSTFS_STORAGE_CLASS_STANDARD` so the server derives a valid per-pool default automatically, or set it to a value every pool can satisfy.
- **IAMAuth**: Enhanced `get_secret_key()` to return empty secret for Keystone credentials (bypasses signature validation)
# Fast pre-commit gate — see below for exactly what it runs
make pre-commit
# Full pre-PR gate (pre-commit gates + clippy + tests)
# Optional full gate for broad cross-module changes (pre-commit + clippy + tests)
make pre-pr
```
> `make test` requires [cargo-nextest](https://nexte.st) (CI runs it and only nextest honours `.config/nextest.toml` test-groups). Install it with `cargo install cargo-nextest --locked` or a prebuilt binary (see https://nexte.st/docs/installation/). To run the plain `cargo test` fallback anyway (results not authoritative — serialization semantics differ from CI), set `RUSTFS_ALLOW_CARGO_TEST_FALLBACK=1`.
> Some guard checks are Python (`test-wiring-check` in `make pre-commit`, plus the
> security-coverage and scheduled-validation self-tests in `make test`) and import
> `tomllib`, so they need **Python 3.11+**. Make resolves the interpreter through
> `scripts/python_bin.sh`, which prefers a `python3.11`+ on `PATH` and otherwise falls
> back to `uv run --python 3.12`. macOS ships `/usr/bin/python3` at 3.9, so install a
> newer one (`brew install python@3.12`) or [uv](https://docs.astral.sh/uv/); pin a
> specific interpreter with `RUSTFS_PYTHON=/path/to/python3.12`.
> For the full test-layer taxonomy (unit / ecstore black-box / e2e / s3s-e2e / S3 compatibility / chaos / fuzz / bench), each layer's entry command, the naming conventions the migration gate depends on, and the serial/nextest rules, see [docs/testing/README.md](docs/testing/README.md).
> For the event, timeout, required-status, and local reproduction matrix, see [docs/testing/ci-gates.md](docs/testing/ci-gates.md).
**`make pre-commit` does NOT run clippy and does NOT run any tests.**
A green `make pre-commit` is not enough to open a pull request.
It does not replace the scoped Clippy and test checks applicable to a change.
`make pre-pr` is the **full** gate: it runs all of the guard checks above,
then `clippy-check` (`cargo clippy --all-targets --all-features -- -D warnings`)
and `test` (shell script tests, workspace tests excluding `e2e_test`, and doc
tests). Complete the applicable multi-role adversarial review described in
`AGENTS.md` before running `make pre-pr`; then run the gate before opening or
updating a pull request. This is what CI enforces.
`AGENTS.md` first. Do not run `make pre-pr` locally by default before opening or
updating a pull request. Consider it only for a broad change that spans multiple
modules and whose impact cannot be bounded by targeted checks; decide from the
affected boundaries and risks. CI still runs its configured repository gates.
### 🔒 Git Pre-commit Hooks (optional)
Git hooks are **not** versioned in this repository, so a fresh clone has no
active pre-commit hook. If you add your own `.git/hooks/pre-commit` (a good
choice is a one-liner that runs `make pre-commit`), you can mark it executable
with:
The optional hook uses the checked-in `.pre-commit-config.yaml`. Install [pre-commit](https://pre-commit.com/#installation), then run this from the checkout or a linked worktree:
```bash
make setup-hooks
```
Or manually:
The hook runs `cargo fmt --all --check` when staged files include Rust source. It does not compile the workspace or run tests. Fix formatting with `cargo fmt --all`, inspect and stage the result, then commit again.
```bash
chmod +x .git/hooks/pre-commit
```
`pre-commit install` resolves Git's hook directory for linked worktrees and preserves an existing hook in migration mode. If you use `core.hooksPath`, keep that hook manager and integrate `pre-commit run` there; the installer refuses to silently replace that configuration.
With or without a hook, the expectation is the same: run `make pre-commit`
before committing and `make pre-pr` before opening a pull request.
A local hook provides early formatting feedback. With or without it, follow the verification tiers in `AGENTS.md`, run relevant behavioral tests, and satisfy the CI merge gates. `make pre-commit` and `make dev-check` remain explicit broader commands.
### 📝 Formatting Configuration
@@ -127,34 +131,16 @@ fn_call_width = 90
single_line_let_else_max_width = 100
```
### 🚫 Commit Prevention
If you set up a pre-commit hook and your code doesn't meet the formatting requirements, the hook will:
1. **Block the commit** and show clear error messages
2. **Provide exact commands** to fix the issues
3. **Guide you through** the resolution process
Example output when formatting fails:
```
❌ Code formatting check failed!
💡 Please run 'cargo fmt --all' to format your code before committing.
🔧 Quick fix:
cargo fmt --all
git add .
git commit
```
### 🔄 Development Workflow
1. **Make your changes**
2. **Format your code**: `make fmt` or `cargo fmt --all`
3. **Run the fast gate**: `make pre-commit` (no clippy, no tests)
3. **Select relevant checks** using the validation tier in `AGENTS.md`; use `make pre-commit` when its broader fast gate adds useful coverage
4. **Commit your changes**: `git commit -m "your message"`
5. **Complete the applicable multi-role adversarial review** for non-exempt changes (see `AGENTS.md`)
6. **Run the full gate before opening/updating a PR**: `make pre-pr` (clippy + tests)
6. **Run applicable scoped checks before opening/updating a PR**; consider
`make pre-pr` only for broad cross-module changes whose impact cannot be
bounded by targeted checks
7. **Push to your branch**: `git push`
### 🛠️ IDE Integration
@@ -193,11 +179,12 @@ Configure your IDE to:
#### Pre-commit hook not running?
```bash
# Check if hook is executable
ls -la .git/hooks/pre-commit
# Make it executable if needed
chmod +x .git/hooks/pre-commit
pre-commit validate-config
pre-commit run --all-files
# Inspect any configured hook manager; do not overwrite it.
git config --get core.hooksPath
# Install if no separate hook manager is configured.
# RUSTFS_COMPAT_TODO(tokio-tar-extension-limits): keep the fork pin while Snowball and Swift still depend on it. Remove after Snowball uses a released tar-codec/tar-framing API that exposes precedence-resolved MinIO vendor records, RustFS preserves cancellation-safe ownership of large streamed members, footerless minio-go input is accepted only at an authenticated complete request boundary, the existing resource-limit, cancellation, and error-fuse regressions pass, and Swift no longer needs this fork.
- **RustFS KMS**: Vault (KV2 / Transit) and AWS KMS backends are supported for production. The `Local` and `Static` backends are for development and testing only. See [KMS backend security properties](docs/operations/kms-backend-security.md).
- **Swift API / SFTP**: opt-in cargo features (`--features swift`, `--features sftp`, or `full`). FTPS and WebDAV are enabled in the default build.
- **S3 Tables**: ships as an Iceberg REST Catalog with automated PyIceberg and DuckDB coverage; other engines and vendor profiles carry bounded claims listed in the [S3 Tables support matrix](docs/architecture/s3-tables-support-matrix.md).
- **MinIO On-Disk Compatibility**: gated behind the `rio-v2` feature and not part of the default build. Objects MinIO encrypted are not readable by RustFS. See [MinIO file-format interoperability](docs/architecture/minio-file-format-compat.md).
## RustFS vs MinIO Performance
@@ -92,6 +109,15 @@ Star RustFS on GitHub and be instantly notified of new releases.
## Quickstart
> [!IMPORTANT]
> **Pool expansion notice:**
>
> - A single-node single-drive (SNSD) deployment is supported only as a standalone local path. It cannot expand in place or be added as a Pool. To move to a multi-drive topology, create a new deployment and migrate data through S3.
> - Keep an existing multi-drive Pool's endpoints and Erasure Set width unchanged; expand by appending a new Pool. With ellipsis-based expansion, every Pool argument must contain an ellipsis expression and expand to at least two drive endpoints.
> - Single-node multi-drive Pools and multi-node Pools with one drive per node are allowed, subject to valid Erasure Set geometry and EC settings; acceptance does not guarantee host-failure tolerance.
>
> These topology rules follow MinIO, but automatic parity selection differs between the projects. See the [Pool layout compatibility and regression tests](docs/testing/pool-layout-compatibility.md) before expanding a deployment.
To get started with RustFS, follow these steps:
### 1. One-click Installation (Option 1)
@@ -115,7 +141,7 @@ chown -R 10001:10001 data logs
@@ -33,8 +33,11 @@ Applies to all paths under `crates/`.
## Type Casting
- Never use `as` for numeric conversions that may truncate or overflow. Use`try_into()` with explicit error handling, or clamp with `value.max(0) as usize` when the domain is bounded.
-`f64 as usize` saturates but is fragile; clamp to `[0, usize::MAX as f64]` first.
- Never use `as` for numeric conversions that may truncate or overflow. Use
`try_into()` with typed error handling; clamp or saturate only when the domain
explicitly requires it.
- Before converting floating-point input to an integer, validate finiteness,
sign, and the destination range. A lower-bound clamp alone is insufficient.
- Treat every `as` cast in a PR review as a potential bug; require justification.
- `RUSTFS_BROWSER_REDIRECT_URL` sets the externally reachable browser origin used for OIDC callback, console success redirect, and logout fallback URLs. Configure it to the public scheme and authority without a path, for example `https://console.example.com`. In load-balancer deployments, keep OIDC authorize and callback requests on the same backend node because the in-flight OIDC `state` is local to the RustFS node.
## S3 API environment variables
- `RUSTFS_API_OBJECT_MAX_VERSIONS` caps the number of retained versions for a single object. It defaults to `9223372036854775807`, matching MinIO's practical-unlimited default. Set a positive integer to enforce a lower per-object metadata bound.
- `MINIO_API_OBJECT_MAX_VERSIONS` is accepted as a compatibility alias when the canonical RustFS variable is not set.
## Distributed endpoint locality
- `RUSTFS_LOCAL_ENDPOINT_HOST` identifies this server's host in a distributed `RUSTFS_VOLUMES` topology without resolving every peer during startup. Set it to exactly one host, without a scheme, port, or path. It is accepted only for orchestrated URL topologies and must match at least one endpoint on the RustFS server port; invalid or unmatched values fail startup. Leave it unset to retain DNS-based locality discovery.
- how long an `UploadPart` waits in the bounded queue for a permit before returning S3 `SlowDown`; `0` rejects immediately when the pool is full.
- default is `10000`. Parts wait before body ingest, so SDK-default clients that send every part of an upload concurrently drain through the pool instead of failing on a full pool.
- RustFS does not read the request body while a part is queued, so the client's socket write stalls for the whole wait and whatever timeout the client or an intermediary has configured competes with this value. Keep it with margin below the shortest such timeout in use (botocore applies its 60 s `connect_timeout` to the body write; the AWS SDK for Java v2 has a 30 s socket write timeout; reverse proxies add their own body timeouts); a wait that outlives the client timeout surfaces as a dropped connection instead of `SlowDown`.
- maximum `UploadPart` requests waiting for a permit at once; parts beyond it return `SlowDown` without waiting.
- default is `0`, which derives 16 times the permit limit (512 at stock settings).
- each queued HTTP/1 part holds whatever unread body the client already pushed into the connection's kernel receive buffer (an HTTP/2 part holds up to its flow-control window in process memory), so this depth also bounds that memory. RustFS leaves the receive buffer to kernel autotuning (see `RUSTFS_HTTP_SOCKET_RECV_BUFFER_BYTES` below), which keeps an unread connection at the kernel's initial size (128 KiB on current Linux).
- experimental strict gate that applies to every foreground write regardless of size and replaces the pool above when enabled.
- default is disabled; enabling it with limit `0` disables foreground write admission entirely.
## HTTP listener socket environment variables
- `RUSTFS_HTTP_SOCKET_RECV_BUFFER_BYTES`
- fixed `SO_RCVBUF` for the API listener, inherited by every accepted socket; `0` leaves the receive buffer to kernel autotuning.
- default is `0`. Earlier releases hard-coded 4 MiB, which Linux doubles to 8 MiB and which disables autotuning, so every connection whose body was not being read yet (a multipart part queued for a foreground write permit) could accumulate up to 8 MiB of unread body in kernel memory; at SDK-default multipart concurrency that was enough to push a node into TCP memory pressure.
- with autotuning the per-connection receive ceiling is the kernel's (`net.ipv4.tcp_rmem` max, 6 MiB on stock Linux) instead of the former fixed 8 MiB, so a single very high-bandwidth-delay connection may see a somewhat lower ceiling; raise `net.ipv4.tcp_rmem` first, and set this variable only on kernels without receive-buffer autotuning (illumos/Solaris) or where the sysctl cannot be changed.
- the send buffer stays fixed at 4 MiB because the stock Linux send autotuning ceiling (`net.ipv4.tcp_wmem` max, 4 MiB) is lower than a GB-level response stream needs.
## Remote tier timeout environment variables
- `RUSTFS_TIER_REMOTE_CONNECT_TIMEOUT_SECS`
- remote tier TCP connect timeout.
- default is `10`.
- must be positive; zero fails tier client initialization, while an invalid integer is logged and falls back to the default.
- `RUSTFS_TIER_REMOTE_REQUEST_TIMEOUT_SECS`
- remote tier request timeout through response headers.
- default is `86400` so large transition uploads keep a production-safe budget.
- must be positive; zero fails tier client initialization, while an invalid integer is logged and falls back to the default. Very large values are accepted and act as a correspondingly long budget.
- Then `RUSTFS_DRIVE_MAX_TIMEOUT_DURATION` legacy fallback.
- Then the profile-derived default (`default` or `high_latency`).
## Admin peer probe timeout
- `RUSTFS_ADMIN_PEER_PROBE_TIMEOUT_SECS`
- total per-peer budget for the `server_info`/`storage_info` admin probe round; `server_info` may reconnect once and `storage_info` remains a single attempt.
- default is `10` seconds, preserving the previous two-attempt worst-case budget.
- values must be positive; `0` or an invalid value falls back to the default, and values above `60` are clamped to `60`.
- the setting is read by the aggregating node only; it does not change the internode RPC wire contract. Any retry shares one round deadline rather than receiving a fresh timeout.
## Startup filesystem boundary policy
- `RUSTFS_UNSUPPORTED_FS_POLICY` controls startup behavior when RustFS detects local endpoint filesystems that are outside the supported production boundary.
| **reliant** | [`src/reliant/`](src/reliant) | Tests that reuse an **externally started** server (SQL/select, conditional writes, lifecycle, deleted-object reads, node-interact). Run via [`scripts/run_e2e_tests.sh`](../../scripts/run_e2e_tests.sh); see [`src/reliant/README.md`](src/reliant/README.md) |
| **upgrade compatibility** | `upgrade_compatibility_test` | Pinned previous-release writes followed by current-build reads on the same data directory |
@@ -169,8 +170,9 @@ the same profile for membership and execution with one nightly worker.
@@ -182,6 +184,8 @@ the wiring source of truth. Committed test-ID digests under
## Troubleshooting
**Endpoint blackhole scenario skipped** — `heal_erasure_disk_rebuild_test::tests::test_cluster_root_heal_recovers_after_target_endpoint_blackhole` installs a loopback `iptables` DROP rule and therefore needs `CAP_NET_ADMIN` (root or passwordless `sudo -n iptables`). A host where `iptables` is missing or cannot read the OUTPUT chain (typical inside an unprivileged container, where the nf_tables backend reports "Permission denied" even under `sudo`) logs a `heal_interruption_skipped` warning and returns without exercising heal. Set `RUSTFS_E2E_REQUIRE_NET_FAULT_INJECTION=1` on lanes that do provision the capability so a broken runner fails instead of skipping.
**Reproduce a CI failure locally** — run the exact profile/lane:
/// A fully authenticated but non-admin credential must be rejected with
Some files were not shown because too many files have changed in this diff
Show More
Reference in New Issue
Block a user
Blocking a user prevents them from interacting with repositories, such as opening or commenting on pull requests or issues. Learn more about blocking a user.