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1.0.0
117 Commits
| Author | SHA1 | Message | Date | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
 Chris
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2bdec2fdcd |
chore(release): merge main into release (#7913)
* feat(nightly): publish packages as assets of the rolling 'nightly' release (sync from release) (#7593) feat(nightly): publish packages as assets of the rolling 'nightly' release (#7592) Replace the assets-branch scheme with a proper GitHub Release on rustfs/auto-testing: a single 'nightly' release whose deb/rpm assets are replaced in place on every build. This is the standard channel — visible on the repo's Releases page, stable download URLs, no git history growth (release assets live outside the repository). - New scripts/release/publish_nightly_assets.sh: resolves-or-creates the 'nightly' release via the REST API, deletes same-name assets, uploads rustfs-nightly-latest.{deb,rpm}, then PATCHes the release body with the build provenance (ref@sha, run link, sizes, SHA256). Plain curl + python3, no gh CLI (the build fleet has none — #7586). - The workflow step shrinks to invoking the script; full flow exercised end-to-end against the real release with probe files (create / upload / overwrite / download round-trip / body update). * fix(ecstore): stop pruning at nonempty directories (#7616) * fix(ecstore): stop pruning at nonempty directories * test(ecstore): release pruning fixtures before temp cleanup * fix(replication): close the pre-stable convergence gaps from backlog#2367 (#7626) * fix(replication): total-order rule sort and honor V1 top-level Prefix Rule matching had two defects from the pre-GA replication audit (rustfs/backlog#2367 C-1 and C-2): - The actionable-rule sort compared same-destination rules by priority but answered Equal for any other pair, which is not a total order; the standard library sort panics on such comparators once a slice exceeds the insertion-sort threshold, so an object matching more than 20 enabled rules across two or more targets could panic the PUT or DELETE task. Rules now sort by priority descending with destination and id as tie-breakers, and filter_target_arns preserves that order instead of draining a HashSet. - A V1 rule written without a <Filter> carries its prefix at the top level; that field was never read, so <Prefix>logs/</Prefix> matched every object. ReplicationRuleExt::prefix now falls back to it, with a <Filter> keeping precedence. The existing prefix fixtures were built this way and had been asserting nothing. * fix(admin): advertise data-usage and listen capabilities to rc The rc client gated `rc du` and `rc watch` on a pinned contract that matched server versions by the string prefix `1.0.0-rc.`; a server that reports `1.0.0` no longer matches, and the dynamic `advertised` list did not carry either name, so `rc du` against a GA server fails with an unsupported-capability error (rustfs/backlog#2367 E-2). Advertise `admin.data-usage` from the admin route inventory like the IAM entries, and `listen_notification` for the bucket `?events=` extension route the admin router dispatches. The client merges advertised entries ahead of its pinned contract, so no version sniffing is needed. * fix(site-replication): stop notifying the local site on remove and rotate The pending-remove and pending-rotation notification loops skipped the local site by endpoint only, while finalization identifies it by deployment id or endpoint. The reconcile tick resolves the local peer from the node's own listen address (and a handler from the request Host), so `remove --all` dialed the site's registered endpoint, waited out the request timeout against the lifecycle lock it was holding, and answered `Partial: failed to notify 1 peer(s)` for a removal that had succeeded (rustfs/backlog#2367 A-4, backlog#2195 item 3). Both loops now iterate the peers still awaiting notification through one helper that applies the finalization identity. * fix(site-replication): promote and settle IAM retries without a tick of slack Two retry-queue behaviours kept an IAM change from converging for ten to twenty minutes after a peer came back (rustfs/backlog#2367 A-1 and A-3, backlog#2305): - The lightweight 30-second pass filtered its reachability probe to bucket ops, so a backed-off IAM or bucket-metadata snapshot waited for the 600-second tick to notice the peer. It now probes every backed-off class and still replays only bounded bucket ops; promotion is a state flip the heavyweight tick acts on. - Backoffs are multiples of the tick interval, so a failure stamped δ seconds after a tick was 600 − δ old at the next tick and slipped a whole extra interval. The heavyweight drain now evaluates backoff halfway to its next tick. - An IAM entry first created by a non-deletion failure (the add bootstrap's snapshot send, the drain's own replay, an import-iam schedule) was never stamped `deletions_recorded`, so a later recorded deletion could not settle it and it escalated to the marker only `replicate repair` clears. Entries created by this binary now start recorded; a row persisted by an older binary keeps the escalation semantics. * fix(site-replication): reload peer node caches after bucket wiring writes Every S3 bucket-config write ends by asking the other nodes of the cluster to reload the bucket's metadata; the site-replication writers never did. On a multi-node site the node that ran the pairing (or applied a peer's bucket-meta item) rewrote the bucket targets and the derived replication rules on disk, while every other node kept serving its cached copy for up to the 15-minute refresh. A `resync start` routed to such a node reported every freshly wired bucket as `Config not found` and a bucket whose operator target the pairing had replaced as `recorded remote target no longer exists` (rustfs/backlog#2367 A-5, backlog#2195 item 2; functional SITE-105). Add one best-effort reload helper in the site-replication hooks and call it after the bucket setup, versioning, peer bucket-meta apply, removed-peer cleanup, make-with-versioning, and endpoint-refresh writes; the ensure helpers now report whether they wrote so unchanged passes stay silent. The resync manifest and start now read the persisted wiring instead of the node-local cache, matching the target read the start path already did. The new four-node e2e pairs two clusters and starts a resync through a non-coordinator node right after pairing; it also covers an IAM user created on a non-coordinator node converging to the peer site. * test(e2e): cover delete-marker replication from a multi-node source The functional suite reported delete markers created on a 3-node source never reaching the target (rustfs/backlog#2195 item 4, REP-105). The report was a probe defect, but the shape had no coverage: the existing delete-marker e2e runs a single-node source. Pin it against a four-node source replicating to a four-node peer and to a single-node target, with the write and the delete issued through different nodes. * ci(e2e): refresh the distributed selection for the new replication cases Four distributed cases were added (two site-replication, two delete-marker replication). The linux digest is derived from the last CI listing of the lane (34 cases, matching the previous pin) plus the four new names; the darwin digest is the local listing, which selects the same 38 cases. * feat(console): support a configurable console URL prefix (#7634) Co-authored-by: houseme <housemecn@gmail.com> * chore(release): merge release into main for rc.6 (#7638) * test(heal): cover MRF manifest CAS legacy transition (#7443) Co-authored-by: zhi22915 <qiuzgang@gmail.com> * fix(ci): enable release branch checks and repair test imports (#7441) * test(scanner): structure heal release evidence lanes (#7442) Co-authored-by: zhi22915 <qiuzgang@gmail.com> * fix(scanner): require segment producer identities (#7444) Co-authored-by: zhi22915 <qiuzgang@gmail.com> * fix(scanner): expose recovery intent identity (#7445) Co-authored-by: zhi22915 <qiuzgang@gmail.com> * test(scanner): summarize failed heal perf reports (#7446) Co-authored-by: zhi22915 <qiuzgang@gmail.com> * fix(common): retain unmatched MRF repair proofs (#7447) Add a recorded verified-repair consumer that discharges only exact retained anchors for the requested bucket while leaving unmatched proofs in the event ring. This gives the future durable successor writer a fail-closed primitive before any tombstone or GC path is enabled. Co-authored-by: zhi22915 <qiuzgang@gmail.com> * fix(ci): route replication read plan through boundary (#7448) * test(scanner): cover flat-bucket quantum fairness (#7449) Add a production-entry scanner cohort regression that combines a wide flat bucket with a small bucket under a fixed object budget. The test keeps partial budgeted rounds unpublished, verifies small buckets are only marked after real execution, and confirms a later unbudgeted round can publish the complete aggregate. Co-authored-by: zhi22915 <qiuzgang@gmail.com> * fix(heal): reuse same admission request id (#7451) Keep a retried heal start with the same request id from bypassing admission deduplication when the transport replay cache is unavailable but the manager still owns the task. Co-authored-by: zhi22915 <qiuzgang@gmail.com> * test(scanner): require perf summary evidence fields (#7453) Fail closed when measured passing Scanner/Heal ABBA summaries omit W10/W11 foreground pressure, lock wait, or attempt-cost evidence. Co-authored-by: zhi22915 <qiuzgang@gmail.com> * test(scanner): bind release evidence fields (#7452) Require explicit scanner/heal release evidence field contracts for the scoped ACK and mixed-version rollback gates. Co-authored-by: zhi22915 <qiuzgang@gmail.com> * fix(scanner): tag dirty usage producer identities (#7454) Record production-facing segment invalidation producer identities when existing object-level dirty usage hooks observe PUT, CopyObject, DeleteObject/DeleteMarker, and CompleteMultipartUpload mutations. Keep the data non-authoritative and process-local so segment reuse activation still requires durable generation-window proof. Co-authored-by: zhi22915 <qiuzgang@gmail.com> * test(scanner): gate release evidence bundles (#7457) Co-authored-by: zhi22915 <qiuzgang@gmail.com> * test(scanner): require hard evidence ABBA manifest (#7459) Co-authored-by: zhi22915 <qiuzgang@gmail.com> * feat(heal): add MRF committed snapshot writer (#7458) Co-authored-by: zhi22915 <qiuzgang@gmail.com> * test(heal): cover EC8+4 restart shard rebuild (#7461) Retry heal-control RPCs once after transport auth rejects a stale replay-scope epoch, and add a distributed EC8+4 restart heal evidence case that rebuilds a replaced drive with exact shard/body assertions. Co-authored-by: zhi22915 <qiuzgang@gmail.com> * test(scanner): echo measured release evidence in ABBA fake adapter (#7460) Keep the synthetic ABBA test adapter aligned with the measured release evidence contract so result validation covers release_evidence drift. Co-authored-by: zhi22915 <qiuzgang@gmail.com> * test(scanner): require complete ABBA summary matrix (#7462) Co-authored-by: zhi22915 <qiuzgang@gmail.com> * heal: retain MRF replay journal after accepted/merged replays Keep startup replay journal until a durable successor snapshot exists after Accepted/Merged admission. Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com> Co-Authored-By: zhi22915 <qiuzgang@gmail.com> * heal: reclaim superseded MRF snapshots after readback Add a committed snapshot predecessor cleanup primitive that deletes only an older slot after the successor is read back as the current committed snapshot. Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com> Co-Authored-By: zhi22915 <qiuzgang@gmail.com> * heal: require exact owner for object receipts Require object heal receipts to match the expected bucket incarnation before they can be recorded as positive repair evidence. This prevents stale or cross-incarnation receipts from clearing the wrong heal responsibility. Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com> Co-Authored-By: zhi22915 <qiuzgang@gmail.com> * heal: latch object receipt owner before repair Capture the expected bucket incarnation before invoking object repair so a post-repair owner change cannot rewrite the responsibility that a storage receipt is allowed to prove. Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com> Co-Authored-By: zhi22915 <qiuzgang@gmail.com> * heal: replay committed MRF checkpoints durably (#7465) Prefer committed MRF checkpoints during startup replay, retain accepted replay responsibilities until exact verified repair proofs arrive, and reclaim committed manifests only after discharge. Co-authored-by: zhi22915 <qiuzgang@gmail.com> * test(scanner): bind hard evidence bundle provenance (#7467) Require Scanner/Heal release bundle fields to carry source, run, window, timestamp, command, and artifact format provenance before a measured gate can pass. Keep EC8+4 and performance gate fields tied to a single measurement window so unrelated artifacts cannot be stitched into a release approval. Co-authored-by: zhi22915 <qiuzgang@gmail.com> * heal: reject dry-run object repair receipts Do not record positive storage repair receipts for dry-run object heal tasks, even if a producer accidentally returns a matching receipt. Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com> Co-Authored-By: zhi22915 <qiuzgang@gmail.com> * heal: reject cancelled object repair receipts Do not record positive storage repair receipts once an object heal task has been cancelled, even if the receipt still matches the requested owner and object identity. Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com> Co-Authored-By: zhi22915 <qiuzgang@gmail.com> * test(heal): reject failed object repair receipts Cover the receipt consumer path where a storage repair result carries both an error and a matching positive receipt. The failure may be recorded, but the receipt must not create repaired, healthy, or absent proof. Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com> Co-Authored-By: zhi22915 <qiuzgang@gmail.com> * test(heal): cover bucket object repair receipts (#7468) Cover bucket and root heal sweeps recording authoritative object outcomes only when storage receipts match the latched bucket incarnation. Verify unavailable or stale receipt ownership keeps object repair execution intact while leaving canonical outcome proof as Unknown. Co-authored-by: zhi22915 <qiuzgang@gmail.com> * test(scanner): add EC8+4 heal restart evidence (#7469) Register and wire Scanner/Heal background target restart and crash evidence cases for the 3x4 EC8+4 topology. Validate the observed data/parity geometry in scanner-heal evidence receipts so multi-drive runs cannot satisfy the gate without proving EC8+4 metadata. Co-authored-by: zhi22915 <qiuzgang@gmail.com> * heal: verify replacement pool metadata repair (#7471) Co-authored-by: zhi22915 <qiuzgang@gmail.com> * test(heal): cover quorum and mixed repair receipts Add focused oracles for transient quorum results that carry a matching receipt and for mixed grace plus repaired receipt batches. Only the repaired object may produce positive proof. Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com> Co-Authored-By: zhi22915 <qiuzgang@gmail.com> * heal: verify admin recreate pool metadata (#7474) Co-authored-by: zhi22915 <qiuzgang@gmail.com> * heal: preserve merged result for duplicate submits Keep same-request-id replay receipts accepted for the receipt API, but preserve the legacy submit_heal_request duplicate admission result as Merged. Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com> Co-Authored-By: zhi22915 <qiuzgang@gmail.com> * test(heal): preserve EC84 restart semantics (#7478) Keep the EC8+4 background restart lane on the graceful-stop path and assert clean-restart marker absence only for restart scenarios. This prevents the hard evidence gate from silently exercising the crash path when it claims restart coverage. Co-authored-by: zhi22915 <qiuzgang@gmail.com> * test(heal): cover MRF snapshot torn successor recovery Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com> Co-Authored-By: zhi22915 <qiuzgang@gmail.com> * test(heal): write EC84 distributed restart oracle (#7481) Bind the distributed EC8+4 restart evidence lane to a scanner/heal oracle artifact so release validation can consume the real nextest run instead of accepting only a passing test. Require the registry to assert 8+4 erasure geometry for the three-node, four-drive case. Co-authored-by: zhi22915 <qiuzgang@gmail.com> * fix(heal): harden MRF replay boundaries (#7483) Reject journal records with unknown version-presence flags even when their CRC is valid, so rollback/future payloads cannot be accepted as known records. Gate committed checkpoint cleanup by the writer owner captured from the replay source, preserving retained manifests from other owners inside the same sequence window. Co-authored-by: zhi22915 <qiuzgang@gmail.com> * test(ecstore): bind MRF manifest CAS dirsync recovery (#7482) Cover the committed MRF manifest path through LocalDisk conditional CAS when the metadata directory fsync fails. The fixture proves the previous manifest anchor survives rollback, an unanchored first successor is removed, and the legacy MRF journal remains readable even while global durability is relaxed. Co-authored-by: zhi22915 <qiuzgang@gmail.com> * test(scanner): derive evidence runner profile from registry (#7484) Co-authored-by: zhi22915 <qiuzgang@gmail.com> * test(scanner): require mixed-version evidence roles (#7485) Tighten the Scanner/Heal release bundle checker so mixed-version, scoped-ACK, and rollback fields cannot reuse a generic versions list without proving the expected evidence role. Require version lists to use source revision identities and include the tested source revision. Also require profile evidence fields to name the core profiling artifacts before release approval. The release gate remains blocked until measured field evidence is present. Co-authored-by: zhi22915 <qiuzgang@gmail.com> * fix(heal): publish committed MRF runtime checkpoints (#7490) Co-authored-by: zhi22915 <qiuzgang@gmail.com> * test(scanner): bind profile artifacts in release evidence (#7487) Require Scanner/Heal release bundles to attach every required profiling artifact to P1 profile evidence with relative paths, artifact formats, non-empty files, hashes, and optional per-artifact measurement-window checks. Document the tightened release bundle profile contract and cover missing, tampered, and mismatched-window profile artifact regressions in the existing checker self-test. Co-authored-by: zhi22915 <qiuzgang@gmail.com> * test(scanner): harden measured ABBA evidence claims (#7491) Reject measured Scanner/Heal ABBA manifests whose mixed-version evidence uses the same baseline and candidate source revision or binary hash. Require crash fault modes and profile artifact names to match the exact supported sets, rejecting missing, duplicate, and unknown values. Update harness fixtures and regression coverage for same-build mixed-version claims and exact-set release evidence fields. Co-authored-by: zhi22915 <qiuzgang@gmail.com> * fix(e2e): group scanner heal evidence payload (#7494) Group the EC8+4 Scanner/Heal evidence writer inputs into a typed payload so the distributed e2e crate stays within the clippy argument limit without weakening the lint. The evidence writer still validates the same S3 bodies, physical shard census, process restart PIDs, and node listings. Co-authored-by: zhi22915 <qiuzgang@gmail.com> * test(scanner): require MRF replay bundle fields (#7486) Bind Scanner/Heal release bundle evidence for MRF durable replay to replay counts, retained responsibility anchors, and successor snapshot publication evidence. Co-authored-by: zhi22915 <qiuzgang@gmail.com> * test(scanner): profile EC84 evidence case runs (#7495) Give Scanner/Heal evidence cases explicit runtime profiles so EC8+4 background restart and crash cases use their own object count, object size, and partial-progress timeout defaults instead of inheriting the legacy 4x1 case assumptions. Expose the runtime profile in plan-only output and cover every registry case in the script self-test. Co-authored-by: zhi22915 <qiuzgang@gmail.com> * test(scanner): reject empty release evidence artifacts (#7496) Require Scanner/Heal release bundle artifact paths to resolve to non-empty files before hashing them. Cover empty hard-gate artifacts in the existing release bundle checker self-test and keep profile artifact size checking on the shared artifact boundary. Co-authored-by: zhi22915 <qiuzgang@gmail.com> * test(scanner): require G14 same-window field coverage (#7489) Tighten the Scanner/Heal release bundle checker so G14 same-window evidence must name the EC8+4, multi-set, and multi-pool fields covered in that measurement window. Keep the release gate blocked when same-window evidence omits one of the required G14 fields, without changing production runtime behavior. Co-authored-by: zhi22915 <qiuzgang@gmail.com> * test(scanner): require two-hour measured ABBA windows (#7493) Reject measured Scanner/Heal release ABBA manifests and summaries whose evidence window is shorter than the W21 two-hour release requirement. Co-authored-by: zhi22915 <qiuzgang@gmail.com> * test(heal): cover MRF idle checkpoint cleanup (#7497) Add a runtime cleanup regression test that publishes both retained replay and runtime committed checkpoints, writes scoped and legacy journals, and verifies idle cleanup removes every recovery anchor from the registered local disks. Co-authored-by: zhi22915 <qiuzgang@gmail.com> * fix(e2e): ignore untracked files in build identity (#7498) Align e2e_test build provenance with Scanner/Heal evidence receipts and server binary provenance by treating only tracked source changes as dirty. This prevents unrelated untracked worktrees or evidence directories from causing compiled test identity mismatches before real evidence cases can run. Co-authored-by: zhi22915 <qiuzgang@gmail.com> * test(scanner): require MRF disk-full evidence fields (#7499) Require the Scanner/Heal release registry and bundle checker to carry explicit G08 MRF capacity, disk-full, and replica-loss evidence fields before release approval can pass. Co-authored-by: zhi22915 <qiuzgang@gmail.com> * test(scanner): bind release JSON artifact provenance (#7500) Require scanner/heal release evidence JSON artifacts to repeat their measured source revision, run identity, measurement window, gate, and field identity inside the artifact payload. This keeps a refreshed outer bundle hash from accepting stale summary or profile JSON from another run. Co-authored-by: zhi22915 <qiuzgang@gmail.com> * test(heal): cover MRF rollback mirror filtering (#7501) Add a regression oracle that keeps scoped-only MRF responsibilities in the authoritative runtime snapshot while omitting them from the v1 legacy rollback mirror. Co-authored-by: zhi22915 <qiuzgang@gmail.com> * test(scanner): require segment activation evidence (#7504) * test(scanner): require segment activation evidence Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com> Co-Authored-By: zhi22915 <qiuzgang@gmail.com> * test(scanner): cover activation proof inputs Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com> Co-Authored-By: zhi22915 <qiuzgang@gmail.com> --------- Co-authored-by: zhi22915 <qiuzgang@gmail.com> * test(scanner): require MRF crash matrix cases (#7505) Co-authored-by: zhi22915 <qiuzgang@gmail.com> * test(scanner): require release bundle domain evidence (#7502) Reject scanner/heal release bundles that omit field-level domain evidence for scoped ACK, durable intent, mixed-version, scheduler pressure, profile cost, and two-hour pressure lanes. Co-authored-by: zhi22915 <qiuzgang@gmail.com> * test(scanner): require MRF retention GC evidence (#7506) Require P4 retained-responsibility release bundle evidence to list the retained replay anchor and idle cleanup cases, prove a two-hour retention window, and record both idle cleanup and verified-proof discharge observations. Co-authored-by: zhi22915 <qiuzgang@gmail.com> * test(scanner): require MRF cleanup GC soak evidence (#7507) Require the P4 release bundle to carry measured cleanup/GC soak evidence for retained MRF replay responsibilities. The bundle now needs a two-hour cleanup window, exact cleanup case coverage, observed verified idle GC, and zero pending responsibilities or stale journals after GC. Co-authored-by: zhi22915 <qiuzgang@gmail.com> * test(heal): cover MRF disk-full commit anchors (#7509) Co-authored-by: zhi22915 <qiuzgang@gmail.com> * test(e2e): report port allocator bind errors (#7510) Surface the scanned port window, attempt count, and last bind error when the e2e port allocator cannot reserve a localhost port. This keeps Scanner/Heal evidence failures actionable when the environment blocks binds before business assertions run. Co-authored-by: zhi22915 <qiuzgang@gmail.com> * fix(sse): resolve 1.0.0 SSE/KMS blockers and P1 findings (#7511) * fix(sse): resolve bucket default encryption per request PUT and the POST-object/extract path resolved a bucket's default encryption with a hard-coded "no explicit SSE-C" flag, so the default was layered onto a request that already carried an SSE-C header triple and then tripped that request's own mutual-exclusion check. Every bucket with default encryption refused SSE-C single PUTs with 400 InvalidArgument, while CreateMultipartUpload on the same bucket succeeded because it resolves SSE elsewhere. Both call sites now derive the flag from the request headers, as COPY already did. The bucket default's KMS key id was also inherited independently of the effective algorithm, so an explicit AES256 request against an aws:kms default bucket produced a self-contradictory algorithm/key-id pair and was rejected. The key id is now inherited only when the effective algorithm is aws:kms, matching the storage-layer resolver. Refs backlog#2368 B1, B2. * fix(sse): refuse SSE-KMS without a running KMS service A write requesting aws:kms on a node with no KMS service fell back to the node-local SSE-S3 provider: the data key was wrapped with RUSTFS_SSE_S3_MASTER_KEY while the object metadata still recorded aws:kms and the requested KMS key id. The stored object claimed a KMS protection it never had, under a key that was never consulted, and no signal distinguished it from a genuine SSE-KMS object. The managed-encryption path now asks the resolved DEK provider whether it wraps with a node-local master key and refuses SSE-KMS in that case: InvalidRequest when KMS was never configured, ServiceUnavailable when a configured service is not running. The check sits after the per-key authorization gate so an unauthorized caller still receives AccessDenied whatever the KMS runtime state is, and asks the provider rather than a parallel availability signal because the provider is what actually wraps the key. A missing master key no longer answers an SSE-KMS request with an SSE-S3-worded configuration error. The SSE-S3 local fallback is unchanged. Refs backlog#2368 B4. * fix(ecstore): restore and archive tiers in stored coordinates Multipart restore addressed the remote tier in plaintext coordinates while the copy-back reads the stored representation. Each part received a misaligned slice of the remote object whose length still satisfied the range, the hash reader and the completion size check, so the restore reported success and silently replaced the object's bytes. Encrypted and compressed multipart objects were both affected. Restore now accumulates stored part sizes, passes the stored length to the hash reader alongside the plaintext length, and validates against the stored size. The copy-back digests stored bytes, so its computed MD5 is not the object's public ETag. Restore now preserves the object ETag on both the single-part and multipart paths, and gives each restored part its own recorded part ETag rather than the object-level value. Transition also handed the tier the object's SSE headers and its RustFS-wrapped data key as request headers. Any S3 target rejected an SSE-C archive outright, an SSE-KMS archive asked the target to encrypt a second time under a key id it does not own, and the wrapped DEK left the cluster. The archive request now strips every SSE header and encryption marker with the predicate the replication path already uses; the local xl.meta keeps all of it, so read-through and restore are unaffected. Objects restored by an affected release are not detected or repaired retroactively and must be re-restored from the tier. Refs backlog#2368 B3, B5; backlog#2369 P7.1. * fix(rio): lock the v1 nonce layout within a segment Decrypting a v1 segment tried three historical nonce layouts per frame, independently for every frame. The last of them exists for streams written before 1.0.0-alpha.91, which reused a segment's part nonce for every block in it; because block zero's derived nonce equals that base nonce, a frame encrypted at index zero authenticated at any position. An attacker able to rewrite the underlying shards could replay it and have the forged plaintext returned with 200 and an unchanged length. Shard integrity uses a keyed-hash-free checksum, which such an attacker can recompute, so it is not a barrier. A segment now locks onto whichever layout decoded its first non-zero-index frame and rejects any later frame needing a different one. That leaves one residual shape: a stream built purely from repeats of frame zero has no later frame to disagree. New RUSTFS_ENCRYPTION_LEGACY_NONCE_FALLBACK (default true, so pre-alpha.91 objects keep decrypting) drops the third layout entirely when set to false, which closes it. Turning it off refuses pre-alpha.91 objects, so migrate them first by rewriting in place. Refs backlog#2369 P2. * fix(kms): reload a service that failed to start POST /rustfs/admin/v3/kms/reload short-circuited whenever the persisted configuration matched the in-memory one byte for byte. A node whose KMS failed to start keeps that configuration and sits in Error, so the documented recovery call returned "reloaded successfully" while leaving the node down. Peers reached the same path through the reload broadcast, so a cluster that lost Vault during a rolling restart had no working recovery route other than the node-local start endpoint. Reload now short-circuits only for a service that is actually running, and otherwise reconfigures, which starts a service that is not running. The AWS backend also advertised key-version enumeration through kms/status, which its own documentation says it cannot do; the capability and its golden snapshot now say false. Refs backlog#2369 P1, P7.3. * docs: record the SSE and KMS changes for 1.0.0 The Unreleased changelog section carried no entry for any encryption work merged since 1.0.0-rc.5, including three items with operational impact: the config-secret variable whose absence persists secrets in cleartext with only a warning, the v2 frame write switch and its rolling-upgrade constraint, and per-key authorization making a public bucket incompatible with SSE-KMS objects. Adds those plus this batch, including the SSE-KMS refusal as a breaking change with both routes out. Also corrects four places where documentation contradicted the code: the cleanup register still called encrypted range seek opt-in after its default flipped, the Helm README claimed vault_mount_path only applies to Transit while the template also feeds the KV2 mount, the disaster-recovery drill listed bundle contents for backends whose export is refused with 501, and the Chinese README capability table predated most of the feature set. Documents the SSE-S3 local master key as a first-class operational mode with its rotation dead end, and what the v1 frame layout does and does not authenticate. Refs backlog#2369 P5. * fix(kms): classify data-path KMS failures by what the caller can do Only "key not found" and a backend outage were classified; every other KMS failure that reached the S3 data path fell through to 500 InternalError with a generic message. A disabled or pending-deletion key, a denied KMS grant, an encryption-context mismatch, an unsupported algorithm, a credential or timeout failure, and a capability the configured backend does not have all looked identical to a server fault. SDKs therefore applied exponential backoff to configuration errors no retry can fix, and monitoring counted every one of them against the server's own error rate. Unusable-key and request-side failures now answer 400, a denied grant 403, transient backend failures 503, and a missing backend capability 501. Damaged, unreadable, or unknown-format key material keeps its 500: it is a server-side integrity fault, and existing tests pin it. The classifier is deliberately separate from the admin lifecycle mapping, which answers 404 for a missing key because there a key id is the resource being addressed; on the data path it arrives inside a request header or a bucket default. Messages either name what the caller asked for or stay generic, with deployment-side detail left on the error source the way the storage-IO mapping already does. Refs backlog#2368 B6. * fix(kms): track and renew static Vault tokens Token authentication hard-coded "this token carries no lease", so the renewal task never started, the remaining-TTL gauge was never published, and nothing looked wrong. `vault token create` grants a 768-hour TTL by default, so a cluster that had been healthy for a month turned every KMS call into a 403 and could not recover without a restart or a reconfigure. Production configuration validation only rejects the literal dev-token, so an ordinary expiring token reaches a whole cluster. The source now reads `auth/token/lookup-self` at login and adopts what Vault reports. A token with no expiry behaves exactly as before. An expiring renewable one is picked up by the existing renewal loop and renewed at half TTL like every other auth method. An expiring non-renewable one warns with its remaining lifetime and publishes the gauge, so the fail-closed window is visible before it arrives. The probe never fails the login: a policy that omits lookup-self, or a Vault that is briefly unreachable, warns and falls back to exactly the previous behaviour rather than taking down a deployment that works today. The scripted Vault test double answers the lookup out of band so existing scripts keep describing only the protocol under test. Refs backlog#2369 P3. * feat(sse): report SSE-C requests that arrive without TLS An SSE-C request carries the customer's AES key in a request header, so AWS S3 and MinIO both refuse one that did not arrive over TLS. RustFS accepted them on any transport: a plaintext hop hands the key to anyone on the path, and since the object cannot be read without that same key, the exposure lasts as long as the object does. Refusing outright is the correct end state but not a safe default to adopt inside a release window, because the project's own s3-tests and e2e lanes and most staging deployments speak plain HTTP. This release reports instead: each such request increments rustfs_ssec_plaintext_requests_total and logs one warning per process, so an operator can confirm nothing would break before the default flips. RUSTFS_SSE_C_REQUIRE_TLS=true opts into the AWS 400 now. The verdict is per connection rather than per deployment: the layer is built with whether this listener terminated TLS, and additionally accepts an https protocol forwarded by a proxy the trusted-proxy configuration already vetted. It sits beside the rate limiter, after the layer that makes a forwarded protocol trustworthy and after the request context, so a rejection can echo the request id. Refs backlog#2369 P7.2. * fix(kms): say what a node-local backend means for a cluster The Local backend keeps key material on each node's own disk and generates its Argon2id salt per node, so two nodes derive different keys from the same master_key and an object encrypted on one node cannot be decrypted on another. Behind a load balancer that surfaces as intermittent 500s on reads that succeeded moments earlier, with nothing tying the symptom to the cause: the only signal was a generic "development, testing and demos only" positioning warning that says nothing about what actually breaks. Configuring or reconfiguring Local while the deployment is distributed now logs a dedicated event and appends the consequence to the configure response, so the operator who made the change sees it. The product decision to warn rather than refuse is unchanged. Refs backlog#2369 P7.4. * docs: record the remaining SSE and KMS changes for 1.0.0 Adds changelog entries for the KMS data-path status classification, the Vault static-token lease probe, the SSE-C plaintext-transport report and its switch, and the node-local backend warning. Documents two things the backend security guide never stated: that SSE-C belongs on a secure transport, with the counter and switch to plan the change around, and that the Local backend cannot be shared by a multi-node deployment because each node derives different keys from the same master key. Refs backlog#2368 B6; backlog#2369 P3, P5, P7.2, P7.4. * fix(kms): report an unreadable key store as an outage on the S3 path A backend now distinguishes a key store it could not read from a key that is genuinely absent, but the S3 boundary collapsed the first one back onto 500 InternalError through the fallthrough for integrity faults. The distinction was therefore invisible to the client: a temporary key-directory outage looked exactly like a permanently damaged key record, and neither the status nor the metric said the request was worth retrying. An unreadable key store joins the retryable class and answers 503, next to a backend error and a credential failure. Damaged, unreadable or unknown-format key material keeps its 500. Refs backlog#2368 B6; builds on rustfs/rustfs#7470. * test(storage): cover MRF cleanup delete ENOSPC anchor (#7513) Co-authored-by: zhi22915 <qiuzgang@gmail.com> * test(scanner): require heal retry stats evidence (#7514) Co-authored-by: zhi22915 <qiuzgang@gmail.com> * test(scanner): add release bundle dry-run fixture (#7515) Co-authored-by: zhi22915 <qiuzgang@gmail.com> * fix(scanner): confirm recovery intent accept readback (#7516) Co-authored-by: zhi22915 <qiuzgang@gmail.com> * test(scanner): require MRF cleanup delete ENOSPC evidence (#7518) Co-authored-by: zhi22915 <qiuzgang@gmail.com> * test(scanner): require bounded retry window evidence (#7517) Co-authored-by: zhi22915 <qiuzgang@gmail.com> * test(e2e): emit scanner heal G09 upgrade evidence (#7519) Record measured Scanner/Heal G09 evidence artifacts from the upgrade compatibility lanes when a fresh evidence directory is provided. Co-authored-by: zhi22915 <qiuzgang@gmail.com> * test(heal): persist MRF rollback mirror boundary (#7520) Co-authored-by: zhi22915 <qiuzgang@gmail.com> * test(scanner): add G09 upgrade evidence runner (#7522) * fix(replication): close the GA blocker set from backlog#2366 (#7503) * fix(replication): close GA blockers from backlog#2366 Implements the P1 set from the pre-GA replication audit: - Replication rule tag filters now require every And.Tag to match, replacing the s3s OR semantics with a local AND matcher that fails closed on a malformed tag. - A replicated group membership change no longer writes the group status, so a membership update carrying the default Enabled status cannot silently re-enable a disabled group on the peer. - A successful IAM import schedules one collapsed full-IAM snapshot per remote peer instead of leaving the imported entities local-only. - A pending endpoint refresh is redriven by the heavyweight reconcile tick, carries its own ilm-expiry override, and no longer blocks a remove that drops every unacknowledged peer. - Site metrics expose local replication failure totals and rolling windows; node-level counters no longer report a constructed zero. - set/remove-remote-target notify peer metadata caches before returning, so a follow-up put-bucket-replication on another node sees the target. - Adds the site-replication operations runbook, a docs index, a replication support boundary section, and the Replication changelog section. * fix(site-replication): resume only a locally driven endpoint refresh The peer-side edit handler journals a pending endpoint refresh with an empty `remote_peers` map and commits it inside the same request through `apply_internal_peer_edit`. The reconcile tick could not tell that journal from the coordinator's own: with no required peers it reads as complete on sight, so the tick committed it with `edit_state` - losing the local-name sync - and cleared it under the request that owned it, whose commit then reported the refresh as changed and denied the coordinator the peer acknowledgement it was waiting for. Resume now runs only for a journal that carries the fan-out topology. A receiver's journal stays for the coordinator to redrive with the same refresh id, which is the path that already recovers it. * fix(site-replication): keep an explicit disabled group status on a snapshot Skipping the group-status write whenever an item carries members stopped a membership change from re-enabling a disabled group, but it also silenced the full-IAM snapshot, which always sends members together with the sender's real status. A peer that did not have the group yet created it through `GroupInfo::new` - enabled - so a bootstrap, a repair, or the snapshot an IAM import now schedules handed every member of a frozen group live access there. The madmin wire maps an unset `groupStatus` to Enabled, so only Enabled can be a default. Disabled is always explicit and is applied again. * fix(site-replication): schedule the import snapshot without recording a failure `import-iam` reused the failure-recording path to queue its full-IAM snapshot. That raises `retry_count` on every call, so three imports - the normal shape of a bulk migration done one archive at a time - escalated a healthy peer to `retryStats.failed` with the scheduling note shown as `lastError`, which is exactly the signal the runbook tells operators to repair. A full retry queue also turned a completed import into a 503. Scheduling now only ensures the collapsed entry exists, and a failure to schedule is logged instead of failing the request: the entities are already imported and the reconcile pass still closes the gap. * fix(admin): stop reporting replication failures as retries `retries` is the minio-go counter for redeliveries, and mc prints it as such. Filling it with the failure count claimed a redelivery that never happens: a failed object is not retried by an event today, it waits for the scanner heal pass. `errors` keeps the failure counters; `retries` stays zero until there is a real redelivery to count, and the runbook now says so. * perf(site-replication): aggregate failure windows without cloning bucket stats `site_metrics_snapshot` went through `get_all`, which clones every bucket's stats, and then scanned each target's sample deque twice. That deque is bounded only by the one-hour window, so an unreachable target under load - the case an operator polls this endpoint for - made every `mc admin replicate status` copy the whole backlog and hold the read lock against the failure path while doing it. It now folds under the read lock and takes both windows in one walk. The `max` against the serialized `last_minute` / `last_hour` snapshots is dropped: those are stamped onto per-bucket clones elsewhere and are always zero in this node-local cache. * fix(site-replication): reject a conflicting ilm-expiry override on a re-run The commit now reads the ilm-expiry override back out of the pending refresh journal, so a second edit that asks for a different value had it dropped while the request still reported success. Re-running without the flag keeps pinning the recorded value - that is the documented way to redrive a stuck refresh - but an explicit different value is now rejected instead of ignored. * fix(admin): do not fail a remote-target write on a peer reload error set/remove-remote-target propagated the peer metadata reload error, so a target that was already persisted and live on this node reported a 5xx to the client whenever one peer could not be reached. Every S3 bucket-config write path treats that reload as best effort and only warns; these two admin handlers now do the same, and the reason is logged with the bucket and action. * fix(site-replication): undo every bucket a cut-short refresh rewrote When a remove accepted on another node clears the refresh journal mid-pass, only the bucket holding the lock at that moment had its restored target undone. The buckets rewritten earlier in the same pass kept a target pointing at the removed peer whenever the remove's own cleanup had already walked past them. The undo now covers every bucket this pass rewrote, attempting all of them so one failure does not strand the rest. * fix(site-replication): keep replay running while an endpoint refresh is pending A pending endpoint refresh took the whole heavyweight pass with it, so a peer that never came back froze IAM and bucket replay to every healthy peer too - the stall this journal's resume path was meant to end. The refresh arm now drains the retry queue before returning; it replays per-peer deliveries against the endpoints currently committed in state, so it is unaffected by the edit in flight. Bucket wiring reconciliation still waits, because it rewrites the very targets the refresh is changing, and the runbook now says so. * test(e2e): cover the AND semantics of a two-tag replication filter The acceptance matrix only had a single-tag rule, which matches under both AND and OR semantics and therefore proved nothing about the filter this fix changed. It now also carries a two-tag `And` rule - the shape `mc replicate add --tags "k1=v1&k2=v2"` writes - and asserts that an object with one of the two tags is not admitted while an object with both is. No new test function, so the nightly selection digest is unchanged. * refactor(site-replication): fold the refresh state-change error into one constructor The endpoint-refresh work added three `s3_error!` invocation lines, which the s3s footprint ratchet is meant to prevent. Five copies of the same concurrent-change error now share one constructor, so the surface nets one line smaller than main; the baseline is retightened to match. * fix(site-replication): report a peer whose IAM snapshot waits for a repair An escalated snapshot entry records a deletion a snapshot cannot replay, so only a repair settles it and the marker must survive. Scheduling an import snapshot therefore leaves that peer's entry alone - and now says so, instead of returning success while nothing was scheduled for it. * docs(operations): state the group-status and escalation convergence limits Two boundaries the fixes in this branch make load-bearing: a membership change never carries an enable, so a group disabled on one site only has to be re-enabled there explicitly; and a peer holding an escalated IAM entry does not receive a scheduled snapshot, including the one a bulk import schedules, until a repair settles it. * fix(ci): bind performance runs to selected inputs (#7512) * test(scanner): add G09 upgrade evidence runner Add a reusable Linux x86_64 runner for the Scanner/Heal G09 mixed-version and rollback upgrade evidence lanes. The helper reads the pinned previous-release asset metadata from the upgrade workflow, verifies the downloaded binary, builds the current head, runs both ignored E2E tests, and fails unless the expected G09 JSON artifacts exist. Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com> Co-Authored-By: zhi22915 <qiuzgang@gmail.com> --------- Co-authored-by: 唐小鸭 <tangtang1251@qq.com> Co-authored-by: Zhengchao An <anzhengchao@gmail.com> Co-authored-by: zhi22915 <qiuzgang@gmail.com> * feat(scanner): implement V2 evidence preflights (#7523) * feat(scanner): wire dirty usage producer identities Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com> Co-Authored-By: zhi22915 <qiuzgang@gmail.com> * test(scanner): add segment activation preflight proof Keep scanner segment reuse behind a structured activation preflight so release evidence can prove the production gate remains disabled until every producer, generation, overflow, cold-oracle, and distributed invalidation check is satisfied. Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com> Co-Authored-By: zhi22915 <qiuzgang@gmail.com> * feat(scanner): expose distributed invalidation evidence Record an explicit distributed segment invalidation evidence summary when remote dirty usage snapshots are bound to the current activity window and the authenticated scoped ACK capability probe succeeds. Reject peer dirty usage snapshots that contradict the peer activity pending bit so scoped ACKs fail closed instead of clearing an unadvertised remote mutation. Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com> Co-Authored-By: zhi22915 <qiuzgang@gmail.com> --------- Co-authored-by: zhi22915 <qiuzgang@gmail.com> * test(scanner): assemble release evidence bundles (#7526) Co-authored-by: zhi22915 <qiuzgang@gmail.com> * test(scanner): add G09 upgrade evidence runner (#7524) * fix(replication): close the GA blocker set from backlog#2366 (#7503) * fix(replication): close GA blockers from backlog#2366 Implements the P1 set from the pre-GA replication audit: - Replication rule tag filters now require every And.Tag to match, replacing the s3s OR semantics with a local AND matcher that fails closed on a malformed tag. - A replicated group membership change no longer writes the group status, so a membership update carrying the default Enabled status cannot silently re-enable a disabled group on the peer. - A successful IAM import schedules one collapsed full-IAM snapshot per remote peer instead of leaving the imported entities local-only. - A pending endpoint refresh is redriven by the heavyweight reconcile tick, carries its own ilm-expiry override, and no longer blocks a remove that drops every unacknowledged peer. - Site metrics expose local replication failure totals and rolling windows; node-level counters no longer report a constructed zero. - set/remove-remote-target notify peer metadata caches before returning, so a follow-up put-bucket-replication on another node sees the target. - Adds the site-replication operations runbook, a docs index, a replication support boundary section, and the Replication changelog section. * fix(site-replication): resume only a locally driven endpoint refresh The peer-side edit handler journals a pending endpoint refresh with an empty `remote_peers` map and commits it inside the same request through `apply_internal_peer_edit`. The reconcile tick could not tell that journal from the coordinator's own: with no required peers it reads as complete on sight, so the tick committed it with `edit_state` - losing the local-name sync - and cleared it under the request that owned it, whose commit then reported the refresh as changed and denied the coordinator the peer acknowledgement it was waiting for. Resume now runs only for a journal that carries the fan-out topology. A receiver's journal stays for the coordinator to redrive with the same refresh id, which is the path that already recovers it. * fix(site-replication): keep an explicit disabled group status on a snapshot Skipping the group-status write whenever an item carries members stopped a membership change from re-enabling a disabled group, but it also silenced the full-IAM snapshot, which always sends members together with the sender's real status. A peer that did not have the group yet created it through `GroupInfo::new` - enabled - so a bootstrap, a repair, or the snapshot an IAM import now schedules handed every member of a frozen group live access there. The madmin wire maps an unset `groupStatus` to Enabled, so only Enabled can be a default. Disabled is always explicit and is applied again. * fix(site-replication): schedule the import snapshot without recording a failure `import-iam` reused the failure-recording path to queue its full-IAM snapshot. That raises `retry_count` on every call, so three imports - the normal shape of a bulk migration done one archive at a time - escalated a healthy peer to `retryStats.failed` with the scheduling note shown as `lastError`, which is exactly the signal the runbook tells operators to repair. A full retry queue also turned a completed import into a 503. Scheduling now only ensures the collapsed entry exists, and a failure to schedule is logged instead of failing the request: the entities are already imported and the reconcile pass still closes the gap. * fix(admin): stop reporting replication failures as retries `retries` is the minio-go counter for redeliveries, and mc prints it as such. Filling it with the failure count claimed a redelivery that never happens: a failed object is not retried by an event today, it waits for the scanner heal pass. `errors` keeps the failure counters; `retries` stays zero until there is a real redelivery to count, and the runbook now says so. * perf(site-replication): aggregate failure windows without cloning bucket stats `site_metrics_snapshot` went through `get_all`, which clones every bucket's stats, and then scanned each target's sample deque twice. That deque is bounded only by the one-hour window, so an unreachable target under load - the case an operator polls this endpoint for - made every `mc admin replicate status` copy the whole backlog and hold the read lock against the failure path while doing it. It now folds under the read lock and takes both windows in one walk. The `max` against the serialized `last_minute` / `last_hour` snapshots is dropped: those are stamped onto per-bucket clones elsewhere and are always zero in this node-local cache. * fix(site-replication): reject a conflicting ilm-expiry override on a re-run The commit now reads the ilm-expiry override back out of the pending refresh journal, so a second edit that asks for a different value had it dropped while the request still reported success. Re-running without the flag keeps pinning the recorded value - that is the documented way to redrive a stuck refresh - but an explicit different value is now rejected instead of ignored. * fix(admin): do not fail a remote-target write on a peer reload error set/remove-remote-target propagated the peer metadata reload error, so a target that was already persisted and live on this node reported a 5xx to the client whenever one peer could not be reached. Every S3 bucket-config write path treats that reload as best effort and only warns; these two admin handlers now do the same, and the reason is logged with the bucket and action. * fix(site-replication): undo every bucket a cut-short refresh rewrote When a remove accepted on another node clears the refresh journal mid-pass, only the bucket holding the lock at that moment had its restored target undone. The buckets rewritten earlier in the same pass kept a target pointing at the removed peer whenever the remove's own cleanup had already walked past them. The undo now covers every bucket this pass rewrote, attempting all of them so one failure does not strand the rest. * fix(site-replication): keep replay running while an endpoint refresh is pending A pending endpoint refresh took the whole heavyweight pass with it, so a peer that never came back froze IAM and bucket replay to every healthy peer too - the stall this journal's resume path was meant to end. The refresh arm now drains the retry queue before returning; it replays per-peer deliveries against the endpoints currently committed in state, so it is unaffected by the edit in flight. Bucket wiring reconciliation still waits, because it rewrites the very targets the refresh is changing, and the runbook now says so. * test(e2e): cover the AND semantics of a two-tag replication filter The acceptance matrix only had a single-tag rule, which matches under both AND and OR semantics and therefore proved nothing about the filter this fix changed. It now also carries a two-tag `And` rule - the shape `mc replicate add --tags "k1=v1&k2=v2"` writes - and asserts that an object with one of the two tags is not admitted while an object with both is. No new test function, so the nightly selection digest is unchanged. * refactor(site-replication): fold the refresh state-change error into one constructor The endpoint-refresh work added three `s3_error!` invocation lines, which the s3s footprint ratchet is meant to prevent. Five copies of the same concurrent-change error now share one constructor, so the surface nets one line smaller than main; the baseline is retightened to match. * fix(site-replication): report a peer whose IAM snapshot waits for a repair An escalated snapshot entry records a deletion a snapshot cannot replay, so only a repair settles it and the marker must survive. Scheduling an import snapshot therefore leaves that peer's entry alone - and now says so, instead of returning success while nothing was scheduled for it. * docs(operations): state the group-status and escalation convergence limits Two boundaries the fixes in this branch make load-bearing: a membership change never carries an enable, so a group disabled on one site only has to be re-enabled there explicitly; and a peer holding an escalated IAM entry does not receive a scheduled snapshot, including the one a bulk import schedules, until a repair settles it. * fix(ci): bind performance runs to selected inputs (#7512) * test(scanner): add G09 upgrade evidence runner Add a reusable Scanner/Heal G09 runner for Linux PR-head validation. The script downloads the pinned previous release, builds the current checkout, runs the mixed-version and rollback upgrade E2E lanes, and validates the measured raw artifacts before they can be consumed by the release bundle gate. Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com> Co-Authored-By: zhi22915 <qiuzgang@gmail.com> --------- Co-authored-by: 唐小鸭 <tangtang1251@qq.com> Co-authored-by: Zhengchao An <anzhengchao@gmail.com> Co-authored-by: zhi22915 <qiuzgang@gmail.com> * fix(scanner): replay recovery intents while disabled (#7521) Co-authored-by: zhi22915 <qiuzgang@gmail.com> * test(scanner): preflight G09 evidence disk space (#7527) * fix(replication): close the GA blocker set from backlog#2366 (#7503) * fix(replication): close GA blockers from backlog#2366 Implements the P1 set from the pre-GA replication audit: - Replication rule tag filters now require every And.Tag to match, replacing the s3s OR semantics with a local AND matcher that fails closed on a malformed tag. - A replicated group membership change no longer writes the group status, so a membership update carrying the default Enabled status cannot silently re-enable a disabled group on the peer. - A successful IAM import schedules one collapsed full-IAM snapshot per remote peer instead of leaving the imported entities local-only. - A pending endpoint refresh is redriven by the heavyweight reconcile tick, carries its own ilm-expiry override, and no longer blocks a remove that drops every unacknowledged peer. - Site metrics expose local replication failure totals and rolling windows; node-level counters no longer report a constructed zero. - set/remove-remote-target notify peer metadata caches before returning, so a follow-up put-bucket-replication on another node sees the target. - Adds the site-replication operations runbook, a docs index, a replication support boundary section, and the Replication changelog section. * fix(site-replication): resume only a locally driven endpoint refresh The peer-side edit handler journals a pending endpoint refresh with an empty `remote_peers` map and commits it inside the same request through `apply_internal_peer_edit`. The reconcile tick could not tell that journal from the coordinator's own: with no required peers it reads as complete on sight, so the tick committed it with `edit_state` - losing the local-name sync - and cleared it under the request that owned it, whose commit then reported the refresh as changed and denied the coordinator the peer acknowledgement it was waiting for. Resume now runs only for a journal that carries the fan-out topology. A receiver's journal stays for the coordinator to redrive with the same refresh id, which is the path that already recovers it. * fix(site-replication): keep an explicit disabled group status on a snapshot Skipping the group-status write whenever an item carries members stopped a membership change from re-enabling a disabled group, but it also silenced the full-IAM snapshot, which always sends members together with the sender's real status. A peer that did not have the group yet created it through `GroupInfo::new` - enabled - so a bootstrap, a repair, or the snapshot an IAM import now schedules handed every member of a frozen group live access there. The madmin wire maps an unset `groupStatus` to Enabled, so only Enabled can be a default. Disabled is always explicit and is applied again. * fix(site-replication): schedule the import snapshot without recording a failure `import-iam` reused the failure-recording path to queue its full-IAM snapshot. That raises `retry_count` on every call, so three imports - the normal shape of a bulk migration done one archive at a time - escalated a healthy peer to `retryStats.failed` with the scheduling note shown as `lastError`, which is exactly the signal the runbook tells operators to repair. A full retry queue also turned a completed import into a 503. Scheduling now only ensures the collapsed entry exists, and a failure to schedule is logged instead of failing the request: the entities are already imported and the reconcile pass still closes the gap. * fix(admin): stop reporting replication failures as retries `retries` is the minio-go counter for redeliveries, and mc prints it as such. Filling it with the failure count claimed a redelivery that never happens: a failed object is not retried by an event today, it waits for the scanner heal pass. `errors` keeps the failure counters; `retries` stays zero until there is a real redelivery to count, and the runbook now says so. * perf(site-replication): aggregate failure windows without cloning bucket stats `site_metrics_snapshot` went through `get_all`, which clones every bucket's stats, and then scanned each target's sample deque twice. That deque is bounded only by the one-hour window, so an unreachable target under load - the case an operator polls this endpoint for - made every `mc admin replicate status` copy the whole backlog and hold the read lock against the failure path while doing it. It now folds under the read lock and takes both windows in one walk. The `max` against the serialized `last_minute` / `last_hour` snapshots is dropped: those are stamped onto per-bucket clones elsewhere and are always zero in this node-local cache. * fix(site-replication): reject a conflicting ilm-expiry override on a re-run The commit now reads the ilm-expiry override back out of the pending refresh journal, so a second edit that asks for a different value had it dropped while the request still reported success. Re-running without the flag keeps pinning the recorded value - that is the documented way to redrive a stuck refresh - but an explicit different value is now rejected instead of ignored. * fix(admin): do not fail a remote-target write on a peer reload error set/remove-remote-target propagated the peer metadata reload error, so a target that was already persisted and live on this node reported a 5xx to the client whenever one peer could not be reached. Every S3 bucket-config write path treats that reload as best effort and only warns; these two admin handlers now do the same, and the reason is logged with the bucket and action. * fix(site-replication): undo every bucket a cut-short refresh rewrote When a remove accepted on another node clears the refresh journal mid-pass, only the bucket holding the lock at that moment had its restored target undone. The buckets rewritten earlier in the same pass kept a target pointing at the removed peer whenever the remove's own cleanup had already walked past them. The undo now covers every bucket this pass rewrote, attempting all of them so one failure does not strand the rest. * fix(site-replication): keep replay running while an endpoint refresh is pending A pending endpoint refresh took the whole heavyweight pass with it, so a peer that never came back froze IAM and bucket replay to every healthy peer too - the stall this journal's resume path was meant to end. The refresh arm now drains the retry queue before returning; it replays per-peer deliveries against the endpoints currently committed in state, so it is unaffected by the edit in flight. Bucket wiring reconciliation still waits, because it rewrites the very targets the refresh is changing, and the runbook now says so. * test(e2e): cover the AND semantics of a two-tag replication filter The acceptance matrix only had a single-tag rule, which matches under both AND and OR semantics and therefore proved nothing about the filter this fix changed. It now also carries a two-tag `And` rule - the shape `mc replicate add --tags "k1=v1&k2=v2"` writes - and asserts that an object with one of the two tags is not admitted while an object with both is. No new test function, so the nightly selection digest is unchanged. * refactor(site-replication): fold the refresh state-change error into one constructor The endpoint-refresh work added three `s3_error!` invocation lines, which the s3s footprint ratchet is meant to prevent. Five copies of the same concurrent-change error now share one constructor, so the surface nets one line smaller than main; the baseline is retightened to match. * fix(site-replication): report a peer whose IAM snapshot waits for a repair An escalated snapshot entry records a deletion a snapshot cannot replay, so only a repair settles it and the marker must survive. Scheduling an import snapshot therefore leaves that peer's entry alone - and now says so, instead of returning success while nothing was scheduled for it. * docs(operations): state the group-status and escalation convergence limits Two boundaries the fixes in this branch make load-bearing: a membership change never carries an enable, so a group disabled on one site only has to be re-enabled there explicitly; and a peer holding an escalated IAM entry does not receive a scheduled snapshot, including the one a bulk import schedules, until a repair settles it. * fix(ci): bind performance runs to selected inputs (#7512) * fix(targets): reject trailing batch items (#7508) * test(scanner): preflight G09 evidence disk space Fail the Scanner/Heal G09 upgrade evidence runner before downloading or building when the validation host does not have enough free space for a full raw evidence pass. Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com> Co-Authored-By: zhi22915 <qiuzgang@gmail.com> --------- Co-authored-by: 唐小鸭 <tangtang1251@qq.com> Co-authored-by: Zhengchao An <anzhengchao@gmail.com> Co-authored-by: cui fliter <imcusg@gmail.com> Co-authored-by: zhi22915 <qiuzgang@gmail.com> * fix(scanner): respect cargo target dir in G09 runner (#7528) * fix(replication): close the GA blocker set from backlog#2366 (#7503) * fix(replication): close GA blockers from backlog#2366 Implements the P1 set from the pre-GA replication audit: - Replication rule tag filters now require every And.Tag to match, replacing the s3s OR semantics with a local AND matcher that fails closed on a malformed tag. - A replicated group membership change no longer writes the group status, so a membership update carrying the default Enabled status cannot silently re-enable a disabled group on the peer. - A successful IAM import schedules one collapsed full-IAM snapshot per remote peer instead of leaving the imported entities local-only. - A pending endpoint refresh is redriven by the heavyweight reconcile tick, carries its own ilm-expiry override, and no longer blocks a remove that drops every unacknowledged peer. - Site metrics expose local replication failure totals and rolling windows; node-level counters no longer report a constructed zero. - set/remove-remote-target notify peer metadata caches before returning, so a follow-up put-bucket-replication on another node sees the target. - Adds the site-replication operations runbook, a docs index, a replication support boundary section, and the Replication changelog section. * fix(site-replication): resume only a locally driven endpoint refresh The peer-side edit handler journals a pending endpoint refresh with an empty `remote_peers` map and commits it inside the same request through `apply_internal_peer_edit`. The reconcile tick could not tell that journal from the coordinator's own: with no required peers it reads as complete on sight, so the tick committed it with `edit_state` - losing the local-name sync - and cleared it under the request that owned it, whose commit then reported the refresh as changed and denied the coordinator the peer acknowledgement it was waiting for. Resume now runs only for a journal that carries the fan-out topology. A receiver's journal stays for the coordinator to redrive with the same refresh id, which is the path that already recovers it. * fix(site-replication): keep an explicit disabled group status on a snapshot Skipping the group-status write whenever an item carries members stopped a membership change from re-enabling a disabled group, but it also silenced the full-IAM snapshot, which always sends members together with the sender's real status. A peer that did not have the group yet created it through `GroupInfo::new` - enabled - so a bootstrap, a repair, or the snapshot an IAM import now schedules handed every member of a frozen group live access there. The madmin wire maps an unset `groupStatus` to Enabled, so only Enabled can be a default. Disabled is always explicit and is applied again. * fix(site-replication): schedule the import snapshot without recording a failure `import-iam` reused the failure-recording path to queue its full-IAM snapshot. That raises `retry_count` on every call, so three imports - the normal shape of a bulk migration done one archive at a time - escalated a healthy peer to `retryStats.failed` with the scheduling note shown as `lastError`, which is exactly the signal the runbook tells operators to repair. A full retry queue also turned a completed import into a 503. Scheduling now only ensures the collapsed entry exists, and a failure to schedule is logged instead of failing the request: the entities are already imported and the reconcile pass still closes the gap. * fix(admin): stop reporting replication failures as retries `retries` is the minio-go counter for redeliveries, and mc prints it as such. Filling it with the failure count claimed a redelivery that never happens: a failed object is not retried by an event today, it waits for the scanner heal pass. `errors` keeps the failure counters; `retries` stays zero until there is a real redelivery to count, and the runbook now says so. * perf(site-replication): aggregate failure windows without cloning bucket stats `site_metrics_snapshot` went through `get_all`, which clones every bucket's stats, and then scanned each target's sample deque twice. That deque is bounded only by the one-hour window, so an unreachable target under load - the case an operator polls this endpoint for - made every `mc admin replicate status` copy the whole backlog and hold the read lock against the failure path while doing it. It now folds under the read lock and takes both windows in one walk. The `max` against the serialized `last_minute` / `last_hour` snapshots is dropped: those are stamped onto per-bucket clones elsewhere and are always zero in this node-local cache. * fix(site-replication): reject a conflicting ilm-expiry override on a re-run The commit now reads the ilm-expiry override back out of the pending refresh journal, so a second edit that asks for a different value had it dropped while the request still reported success. Re-running without the flag keeps pinning the recorded value - that is the documented way to redrive a stuck refresh - but an explicit different value is now rejected instead of ignored. * fix(admin): do not fail a remote-target write on a peer reload error set/remove-remote-target propagated the… * feat: configure the console base path at build time (#7636) Embed RUSTFS_CONSOLE_BASE_PATH into console routes, browser redirects, and startup URLs so OEM builds can use their own namespace. Preserve the default for an unset or empty build variable and keep route tests prefix-aware. * chore(release): prepare 1.0.0-rc.6 (#7641) * chore(release): prepare 1.0.0-rc.6 * ci: run offline enrollment boundary checks independently * fix(heal): preserve retryable batch failures during recovery (#7642) * fix(heal): preserve retryable batch failures during recovery * test(heal): pin prebuilt hooks binaries in ci * fix(s3): reject oversize single PUT early and map body errors to 4xx (#7635) * fix(s3): reject oversize single PUT early and map body errors to 4xx A single PutObject above the 5 GiB single-request ceiling was only rejected after the client had streamed 5 GiB into s3s's read-time body budget, and the resulting BodySizeLimitExceeded surfaced from the erasure writer as 500 InternalError. A body whose connection hit EOF before Content-Length bytes arrived (hyper's IncompleteBody) was also a 500. SDKs retry 500s, so one oversize upload was resent from offset 0 five times. - PutObject and UploadPart reject a declared length above MAX_SINGLE_PUT_OBJECT_SIZE with 400 EntityTooLarge before reading the body; the constant moves to rustfs_config so the s3s limit and the admission check share one value. - ApiError maps BodySizeLimitExceeded to EntityTooLarge and a hyper body EOF to IncompleteBody across both io::Error conversions. Fixes #7596. * test(s3): cover UploadPart admission, aws-chunked length, real s3s limit - Poll-counting test body proves PutObject and UploadPart reject a declared size above the ceiling with zero body polls; exact-cap and zero-length parts pass admission. - A STREAMING-* aws-chunked PUT whose framed Content-Length exceeds the cap is admitted when the decoded length is within it and rejected when the decoded length is over it. - The display-based BodySizeLimitExceeded matcher is checked against the real error produced by the pinned s3s Body budget. * fix(ecstore): make directory mtime fixture portable (#7623) * fix(ecstore): make directory mtime fixture portable * style(ecstore): format mtime fixture assertion --------- Co-authored-by: houseme <housemecn@gmail.com> Co-authored-by: Zhengchao An <anzhengchao@gmail.com> * fix(storage): prevent readiness after native migration failures (#7652) * fix(storage): prevent readiness after native migration failures * fix(storage): skip unsupported IAM records before reading * fix(storage): use stable typed migration metadata errors * fix(storage): include migration record in startup errors * test(storage): cover native migration startup failures * test(storage): use array chunks in migration fixture --------- Co-authored-by: RJ Regenold <214054+rjregenold@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: cxymds <cxymds@gmail.com> * fix(admin): expose OIDC account display fields (#7654) Expose verified OIDC username and email claims as display-only metadata on self-account responses while preserving the virtual parent as the authorization identity.\n\nKeep rustfs-madmin public response structs unchanged by adding the optional wire fields through private handler response wrappers. * fix(replication): correct peer joins and remote-state reporting (#7650) * fix(replication): propagate verified peer deployment identities * fix(replication): report actual remote peer state * fix(replication): defer initial sync until all peers join * test(replication): shut down TLS fixtures cleanly --------- Co-authored-by: houseme <housemecn@gmail.com> * feat(ci): add fault-tolerance degradation suite to the functional chain (#7663) Adds a fault-tolerance suite that verifies read/write behavior under drive and node loss against the erasure-coding contract and snapshots health-endpoint responses at every degradation tier. Scenarios derived from product source (default_parity_count, erasure set sizing): - A: single-node 4 drives (EC:2, read quorum 2): hide 1/2/3 drives - B: multi-node 4x1 (one set of 4, EC:2): stop 1/2/3 nodes - C: multi-node 4x4 (one set of 16, EC:4, read quorum 12): 1 node down lands exactly on the read-quorum boundary; 2 nodes down breaks it - C2: multi-node 4x4 with RUSTFS_STORAGE_CLASS_STANDARD=EC:8 (read quorum 8, write quorum 9, lock majority 9): 2 nodes down puts reads inside the reported divergence window (read quorum met while the lock majority is broken) By default a reads-refused-despite-met-read-quorum observation is reported as known-divergence without failing the suite; the strict input escalates it. Chain order becomes: upgrade -> s3 -> kms -> tier -> storage -> heal -> pool -> security -> replication -> fault-tolerance -> performance. * fix(ci): repair functional defaults and chain regression checks (#7664) * fix(ci): default functional suites to nightly packages * test(ci): follow the fault-tolerance chain handoff * "feat(ci): add fault-tolerance degradation suite to the functional chain" (#7667) Revert "feat(ci): add fault-tolerance degradation suite to the functional chain (#7663)" This reverts commit |
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Chris
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b61dc6519f | fix(release): backport IAM migration startup fixes and recent main fixes (#7825) | ||
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houseme
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2231633ae1 | fix: preserve protocol service account claims (#7062) | ||
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Zhengchao An
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ceeff52229 | docs(swift): align README feature lists with router and handler wiring (#7033) | ||
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houseme
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ba7785d61d | chore(deps): migrate direct encoding deps to simd (#6690) | ||
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Zhengchao An
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d269b90201 |
fix(ci): restore main branch checks (#6465)
* fix(protocols): add missing test dependency * style(ecstore): fix decommission formatting |
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houseme
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201c653dcd | fix(ci): restore workspace lint compatibility (#6460) | ||
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GatewayJ
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205337151a |
fix(webdav): allow bucket-scoped root listings (#6298)
* fix(webdav): allow bucket-scoped root listings * test(webdav): use public protocol export * test(webdav): initialize identity inline --------- Co-authored-by: cxymds <cxymds@gmail.com> |
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Zhengchao An
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3bde70d5b4 |
chore(protocols): narrow the SessionDiag blanket to its one unread field (#6266)
The last item-level bare allow of backlog#1823 step 10. `SessionDiag` itself is live — `sftp/server.rs` constructs one per accepted connection and `wedge_watchdog` reads `session_id`, `peer` and `last_activity_ms` off it — so the struct-level blanket was covering exactly one field: `accepted_at`, which is written at accept time and never read back. The allow moves onto that field with a reason. The three remaining `#![allow(dead_code)]` in this crate (`sftp/test_support.rs`, `common/dummy_storage.rs`) are module-root blankets in test-support files, which belong to steps 1-5 rather than step 10. Refs backlog#1823 |
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Zhengchao An
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3ff250f1cd |
chore(protocols): drop 43 no-op dead_code allows from swift (#6157)
backlog#1823 step 8, partial. The swift module carries 43 #[allow(dead_code)] attributes, most with a comment naming a consumer: "Used by handler", "Handler integration: GET container", "Used by handler and object.rs". Every one of them suppresses nothing. crates/protocols/src/lib.rs declares `pub mod swift`, and swift/mod.rs declares all 22 submodules `pub mod`, so every item is publicly reachable and dead_code never applied to it. Removing all 43 leaves the warning count at zero, in both the default and --features swift lanes. That is also why those comments survived. They assert who calls the item — a claim the compiler normally settles on its own — and the compiler had been silenced by the visibility chain. The rest of step 8 needs a decision this PR does not make. Downgrading the 22 submodules to `pub(crate) mod` does restore detection, and it surfaces 39 real items, 16 of them the whole of sync.rs: SyncConfig, SyncStatus, SyncQueueEntry, ConflictResolution and every function and constant around them, i.e. Swift container sync is built and never wired. But the `pub mod` chain is load-bearing. Six integration tests under crates/protocols/tests are separate crates that import the submodules directly (swift::quota, swift::slo, swift::symlink, swift::sync, swift::tempurl, swift::container), and the downgrade fails to compile them. Restoring dead-code detection for this module therefore depends on first deciding whether those tests move in-crate — which is a testing-strategy call, not a cleanup one. Verification: cargo check -p rustfs-protocols warning-free in the default lane and with --features swift (lib and --tests); clippy --features swift --lib --tests -D warnings clean; cargo nextest run -p rustfs-protocols --features swift 441 passed; make pre-commit exit 0. Ref rustfs/backlog#1823 (step 8). |
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cxymds
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d60a77b750 |
fix(quota): enforce durable hard quota reservations (#6058)
* fix(quota): enforce durable hard quota reservations * fix(quota): close reservation bypasses * fix(quota): isolate tests and box object futures * fix(quota): close legacy and deferred settlement bypasses * fix(app): keep object futures off caller stacks * fix(metrics): preserve object operation labels * fix(logging): retain GET trace guard contract |
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houseme
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aa4d3317ed |
perf(ecstore): guard inline data-read metadata early-stop (#6069)
Add a default-off inline-only data-read metadata early-stop gate that verifies inline plaintext before cancelling pending metadata tasks. Keep non-inline, prepared, and request-shape-sensitive reads on full fanout, and record scheduled/completed/cancelled ReadVersion lifecycle metrics for normal fanout completion. Co-authored-by: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com> |
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houseme
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134081b27b |
chore(deps): fix cargo shear dependency metadata (#5854)
Co-authored-by: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com> |
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houseme
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78d6918c52 |
feat: extend hotpath coverage across crates (#5505)
Add opt-in hotpath feature surfaces to every workspace crate and wire the root rustfs feature passthrough for function, allocation, and CPU profiling. Add a focused set of function-level measurements for scanner, heal, lock, target replay, IAM, KMS, Keystone, trusted proxy, and capacity paths without adding request-scoped primitive wrappers. Co-authored-by: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com> |
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GatewayJ
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2dea4a9acf |
fix(s3): correlate server-owned request IDs (#5433)
* fix(s3): correlate server-owned request IDs * fix(server): preserve trace context and Swift routing --------- Co-authored-by: houseme <housemecn@gmail.com> |
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Zhengchao An
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c9397405ed | ci(protocols): inherit workspace lint policy (#5436) | ||
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houseme
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f7c1b13c0f |
refactor(deps): replace md5 crate with md-5 (#5432)
Co-authored-by: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com> |
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Zhengchao An
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3fe74a5019 | fix(swift): merge account and container metadata POSTs (#5414) | ||
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Zhengchao An
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957080bea5 |
fix(swift): persist container and account metadata writes (#5398)
Swift container and account metadata handlers cloned the cached BucketMetadata, set the tagging fields, and called set_bucket_metadata, which only updates the in-memory cache map. Nothing reached .metadata.bin, so every Swift metadata POST was lost on restart and silently overwritten by the next disk-truth reload (a peer LoadBucketMetadata notification or the 15-minute refresh loop) — while the client had already been told 2xx. Route these writes through a new metadata_sys::update_config_with: a read-modify-write that loads the on-disk metadata and persists the result under the same write guard metadata_sys::update uses, so the rewrite merges against disk truth instead of a possibly stale cache and cannot clobber a concurrent update to another config file. Peers are notified afterwards, matching the S3 config handlers. Persisting these writes required hardening the paths that now produce durable state: - Account metadata writes validate account ownership. This metadata holds the account's TempURL signing key, so an unauthenticated write for someone else's account would have become a durable, cluster-wide takeover of that account's pre-signed URLs. Reads stay open because TempURL signature validation runs before credentials exist. - disable_versioning verifies the container exists. Without it the metadata loader's "no metadata on disk" default would be persisted, creating an orphan metadata file and caching a fabricated default as authoritative. - Container and account metadata are size- and count-limited, reusing the Swift limits object metadata already enforces; these tags land in the bucket metadata file that every later config write rewrites whole. - A rewrite refuses to run when the persisted tagging config is unreadable, instead of merging onto an empty set and wiping the container ACL and versioning tags. It reports 409 naming the remedy. - Storage errors are logged in full and reported generically, since they now carry real disk and quorum detail. The tagging arm of BucketMetadata::update_config also clears the parsed config, as the lifecycle arm does: parse_all_configs skips empty XML rather than clearing, so a cleared config kept serving the old tags. Tagging is serialized with the S3 XML serializer the loader can parse back, not quick_xml, whose output was never round-trippable. |
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cxymds
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e822fc1552 | fix(swift): enforce cumulative container quotas (#5378) | ||
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cxymds
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2f6115e058 | fix(swift): enforce TempURL IP restrictions (#5377) | ||
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Zhengchao An
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b2a376c2d2 |
Merge commit from fork
* fix(admin): bound IAM import archive expansion MAX_IAM_IMPORT_SIZE caps the compressed upload at 10 MB, but every member of the archive was then read with read_to_end into an unbounded Vec. Deflate ratios well above 100:1 are easy to construct, so a small authorized upload could expand without limit across the seven members ImportIam reads. Add a shared expansion budget (MAX_IAM_IMPORT_EXPANDED_SIZE, 10x the compressed cap) drawn down by every member, and route all seven reads through one helper that reads a byte past the remaining budget to detect overrun. Sharing the budget bounds the archive as a whole rather than letting each member spend the full limit independently. Covers R03-CAN-024 through R03-CAN-030 plus R04-CAN-077 (backlog #1471) — one fix rather than seven, since all seven call sites were byte-identical. * fix(kms): confine local key paths and refuse silent key replacement Local KMS key identifiers arrive from request input — the `name` tag on CreateKey, the `keyId` body field or query parameter on DeleteKey — and were joined onto `key_dir` with no validation. An identifier such as `../../tmp/evil` escaped the configured directory, making key creation a constrained arbitrary-file write and `DeleteKey` with `force_immediate` a cross-directory delete. Validate in `master_key_path` and make it fallible, so every filesystem path in this backend inherits the guard: decode_stored_key, load_master_key, save_master_key, create_key and delete_key all derive their paths there. The rule is containment rather than a character allowlist, so identifiers already in use keep resolving; only separators, NUL, absolute paths and non-single-component forms are refused. Note `.` and `..` are contained rather than refused — the `.key` suffix turns them into the ordinary filenames `..key` and `...key`. Separately, `LocalKmsBackend::create_key` had no existence check, while the sibling `KmsClient::create_key` has always had one. Since `save_master_key` renames over its destination, creating a key under an existing name silently replaced its material and destroyed the ability to decrypt everything wrapped under it — and the backend path is the one the admin API uses. It now returns KeyAlreadyExists, matching StaticKmsBackend. Covers R03-CAN-072, R03-CAN-073 and R07-CAN-103 (backlog #1475). R03-CAN-073 needed no separate change: delete_key routes both its load and its remove_file through master_key_path. * fix(swift): bound SLO manifest reads to the 2 MiB manifest limit The three Swift SLO handlers that load a stored manifest (handle_slo_get, handle_slo_get_manifest, handle_slo_delete) read the `<object>.slo-manifest` object to EOF with AsyncReadExt::read_to_end. That key is predictable and writable through the ordinary object PUT path, so a tenant can replace the manifest with an arbitrarily large object and then make the server allocate its full size on every SLO GET, multipart-manifest=get, or multipart-manifest=delete request - a memory amplification bounded only by the stored object size (CWE-400 / CWE-770). The 2 MiB manifest limit that handle_slo_put enforces was not applied on the read side. Introduce MAX_SLO_MANIFEST_SIZE (the existing 2 MiB PUT limit, now a named constant) and a shared read_manifest_bytes helper that reads through a `take(limit + 1)` and rejects anything larger, so an oversized manifest is refused instead of being buffered first. All three call sites go through the helper. handle_slo_put now checks the size before parsing the JSON. Regression tests: test_read_manifest_bytes_rejects_oversized_manifest and test_read_manifest_bytes_stops_reading_oversized_manifest (which asserts the reader is not consumed past the limit), plus a boundary test that a manifest at exactly 2 MiB is still accepted. * fix(protocols): authorize every object in FTPS/WebDAV recursive deletes The FTPS and WebDAV gateways authorized only the container before a recursive delete and then destroyed everything inside it without a further check: - FTPS RMD (and DELE on a bucket path ending in '/') cleared s3:DeleteBucket, then delete_bucket_recursively listed the bucket and deleted every object. - WebDAV DELETE on a bucket did the same via its own delete_bucket_recursively. - WebDAV DELETE on a directory cleared s3:DeleteObject for the directory marker key ("dir/") only, then listed that prefix and deleted every child under it. A principal holding s3:DeleteBucket (or s3:DeleteObject on a single marker key) could therefore erase objects it had no s3:DeleteObject permission for, and the operation reported success. Deletion stays recursive - that is the expected behaviour for these protocols - but each object now clears s3:DeleteObject on its own key before it is removed, and the enumeration clears s3:ListBucket. A denial aborts the whole operation with access denied rather than being skipped, so the caller can never be told the delete succeeded while objects were left behind or removed without authorization. The test double gained shared-state cloning, delete_object/delete_bucket call logs, and list/delete queue helpers so the regression tests can observe that nothing is deleted once a deny lands. * fix(server,ecstore): bound TLS handshakes and remote volume RPC waits Three call sites let an unauthenticated client or a misbehaving peer hold server resources with no deadline. TLS listener (R03-CAN-035): process_connection awaited `acceptor.accept(socket)` with no bound. A client that opens a TCP connection and never finishes the handshake parks a Tokio task and a socket forever, and the connection cap (RUSTFS_API_MAX_CONNECTIONS) is unlimited by default, so nothing else sheds it. The handshake now runs under accept_tls_with_deadline(), reusing the existing HTTP/1 header-read budget — the established slow-client bound for the pre-request phase — and the expiry is recorded through the same log/metric path as a handshake error, under a new TIMEOUT failure kind. Remote disk RPCs (R03-CAN-049, R03-CAN-050): list_volumes and delete_volume passed Duration::ZERO, which execute_with_timeout treats as "no deadline", so a peer that accepts the request and never answers stalls the coordinator (and, for delete_volume, the bucket-deletion workflow). Both now pass get_max_timeout_duration(), matching every sibling method in the file. Regression tests: a silent TLS peer must be shed by the handshake deadline; list_volumes/delete_volume against a peer that completes the TCP connect and then goes silent must fail with DiskError::Timeout instead of hanging. * fix(security): stop leaking signed headers and bound OIDC/KMS credentials Three independent hygiene fixes found by the security review. R03-CAN-018 (crates/signer): try_get_canonical_headers and get_signed_headers logged the complete header map at DEBUG before signing. Runtime callers pass session credentials and SSE-C key material through these headers, so anyone able to raise the log level (or read DEBUG logs) recovered X-Amz-Security-Token and SSE-C keys verbatim. The statements were debugging leftovers with no operational value and are deleted rather than redacted. R03-CAN-014 (crates/iam): the OIDC HTTP adapter buffered provider responses with an unbounded Response::bytes(), so a configured, compromised or attacker-pointed IdP endpoint could stream an arbitrarily large or endless body into memory (the ValidateOidcConfig admin handler lets a ServerInfo caller choose the endpoint). Responses are now read incrementally and fail closed past MAX_OIDC_RESPONSE_SIZE, and the already SSRF-hardened client builder gains request and connect timeouts so a stalled provider cannot pin the calling task indefinitely. R07-CAN-105 (helm): the Vault KMS token was serialized into the chart ConfigMap, exposing it to every subject allowed to get ConfigMaps in the namespace. It now renders into a dedicated Secret that the Deployment and StatefulSet consume via envFrom; the Secret is separate from the main credentials Secret so it also works when secret.existingSecret is set. Regression tests: - rustfs-signer: signing_never_logs_signed_header_material - rustfs-iam: oidc_response_body_past_the_limit_is_rejected, oidc_response_body_at_the_limit_is_accepted - scripts/test_helm_templates.sh: KMS token must never render in plaintext * fix(webdav): enforce body limit, request timeout and connection cap The configured WebDAV maximum body size was enforced from Content-Length, so a chunked request declared no length and bypassed it entirely. The configured request timeout was never applied to the connection at all, and the accept loop spawned a task per connection with no bound, so an unauthenticated client could hold resources indefinitely and in unbounded number. Enforce the limit on bytes actually read rather than the declared length, apply the configured timeout to the request, and bound accepted connections with a new RUSTFS_WEBDAV_MAX_CONNECTIONS (default 1024) surfaced in the config report. Covers R03-CAN-051, R03-CAN-052, R03-CAN-067, R04-CAN-089, R05-CAN-094 and R05-CAN-097 (backlog #1471, #1474). * fix(security): stop STS credentials from crossing the parent trust boundary Two related credential-boundary holes let a short-lived STS credential act with the full, unrestricted authority of the long-term user it was minted from. AddUser (R03-CAN-021, CWE-269/863): should_check_deny_only relaxes the admin policy check to deny-only when a Console/STS session targets the IAM user it represents. Nothing then stopped that session from calling AddUser with its own parent's access key, so the handler wrote an attacker-chosen secret key and status over the parent's stored Credentials via create_user -> save_user_identity. A session that expires in minutes became permanent control of the account. AddUser now rejects any temp or service-account requester whose resolved parent equals the target access key, resolving the parent the same way should_check_deny_only does (parent_user field, else the JWT `parent` claim, since some stores persist the parent only in the token). FTPS/SFTP/WebDAV password auth (R04-CAN-086, CWE-287/862): these protocols looked the access key up with check_key, which falls back to the STS account cache, and then compared only the stored secret. An STS access key plus secret therefore authenticated with no session token presented and no session-policy claims applied - the holder got the parent's full permissions. Password authentication now rejects temporary credentials before the secret comparison. The discriminator is is_temp() && !is_service_account(), the same one IamCache::update_user_with_claims uses to route an identity into the STS cache, so service accounts - which resolve policy from stored IAM state rather than a client-presented token - keep working over these protocols. Regression tests cover both predicates and pin the guards to their call sites so neither can be dropped without a test failure. |
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Zhengchao An
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7f19e9a465 |
Merge commit from fork
docs/testing/security-regressions.md requires every fixed advisory to map to a named, greppable regression test. Rename the tests added with the fixes to carry their advisory id so `rg -i ghsa` finds them, and add the four rows to the advisory -> test map. Adds the FTPS MKD regression test that was missing. It primes the dummy backend with a successful create_bucket, so the assertion distinguishes "denied at the authorization boundary" from "backend refused" — without the queued success an unconfigured create_bucket fails on its own and the test would pass even with the authorization check removed. Verified it fails when the check is reverted. DummyBackend gains a Debug impl (FtpsDriver's trait bounds require it) and a queue_create_bucket_ok helper. Records in the CI-execution map why ghsa_g3vq_* runs in the default pass despite sitting behind the ftps feature: the rustfs crate defaults to ["ftps", "webdav"] and cargo unifies features across the workspace build, so the test executes there even though `cargo test -p rustfs-protocols` alone would skip it. |
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Zhengchao An
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92f83bfe15 |
Merge commit from fork
* fix(policy): quantify negated string conditions per value
ForAllValues:/ForAnyValue: negated string operators computed the positive
quantified match and then negated the aggregate. That yields NOT(all match)
and NOT(any match), which is the semantics of the *other* quantifier, so
ForAllValues:StringNotEquals and ForAnyValue:StringNotEquals were exactly
transposed. The same applied to StringNotEqualsIgnoreCase, StringNotLike,
ArnNotEquals and ArnNotLike.
Introduce an explicit Quantifier and push negation into the per-value
predicate for the qualified forms, so ForAllValues requires every request
value to satisfy the operator and ForAnyValue requires at least one.
Unqualified operators keep negating the aggregate, preserving AWS
single-valued-key semantics. Absent keys now follow AWS: ForAllValues is
vacuously satisfied, ForAnyValue is not.
A request value set that is fully contained in or fully disjoint from the
policy set cannot distinguish the two quantifiers, which is why the existing
cases missed this; the new tests use partially overlapping sets.
* fix(auth): keep request headers out of server-derived condition keys
get_condition_values folded every remaining request header into the policy
condition map. HeaderMap lowercases header names, and the server-derived keys
userid, username, principaltype, versionid and signatureversion are lowercase
too, so a header of the same name collided with them. The collision branch used
extend(), and non-quantified string operators match if ANY value in the vector
matches, so sending `userid: admin` was enough to satisfy a condition on
aws:userid. The jwt:/ldap: claim keys were reachable the same way whenever the
credential carried no such claim.
groups was worse than an append: the header loop ran before the cred.groups
block, which is gated on !args.contains_key("groups"), so a `groups:` header
both injected a value and suppressed the credential's real group list.
Resolve claims and group membership before merging headers, then skip any header
naming a key the server already derived or a well-known identity/context key.
The reserved set comes from KeyName so it tracks the key registry; s3:x-amz-*
keys stay mergeable because they mirror request headers by design.
* fix(access): gate the ListBucketVersions fallback on public-access checks
An anonymous request for ListObjectVersions that the bucket policy does not
grant directly falls back to re-checking the grant as s3:ListBucket. That
fallback returned Ok(()) straight away, skipping the two gates the direct grant
passes through: deny_anonymous_table_data_plane_if_needed and the
RestrictPublicBuckets check on the bucket's public-access block.
So a bucket whose policy allows anonymous s3:ListBucket kept serving anonymous
version listings after an operator enabled RestrictPublicBuckets, even though
the equivalent GetObject was correctly denied.
Fold the fallback into policy_allowed so both routes reach the same gates.
* fix(ftps): authorize MKD against the CreateBucket boundary
FTPS MKD creates a bucket but ran no authorization check, so any principal that
could open an FTPS session could create buckets regardless of policy. Every
other operation in this driver authorizes first — LIST, RETR, STOR, DELE and
RMD all call authorize_operation — and the WebDAV gateway checks
S3Action::CreateBucket on the equivalent path.
Add the matching check so MKD clears the same boundary as an S3 CreateBucket.
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Zhengchao An
|
c82ee6be58 |
feat(api): wire opt-in per-client S3 API rate limiting (429 + Retry-After) (#4895)
feat(api): wire opt-in per-client S3 API rate limiting (backlog#1191) RustFS shipped three rate-limiter implementations and none was wired to any request path: the tower layer never returned 429 (its over-limit branch passed requests through) and was never instantiated, the console env switches only logged, and the Swift token bucket was never called. Replace them with one working, default-off implementation: - Rewrite rustfs/src/server/rate_limit.rs as a sharded per-client-IP token-bucket limiter (32 mutex shards instead of one global RwLock write per request), bounded at 100k tracked IPs with lossless refilled-idle sweeps, returning 429 + Retry-After + x-ratelimit-* headers and an S3-style XML body. - Key on trusted-proxy-validated ClientInfo.real_ip, else the socket peer address; never read spoofable X-Forwarded-For/X-Real-IP headers. Requests without a resolvable identity fail open. The echoed request id is charset-gated to prevent reflected XML injection. - Wire the layer once at startup via option_layer between CatchPanicLayer and ReadinessGateLayer (external stack only), gated by new RUSTFS_API_RATE_LIMIT_ENABLE/_RPM/_BURST constants; health and profiling probes, internode RPC/gRPC, and the console are exempt. - Make RUSTFS_CONSOLE_RATE_LIMIT_ENABLE/_RPM actually enforce by reusing the same limiter core through an axum middleware. - Delete the dead Swift ratelimit module, its isolated tests, and the stale logging-guardrail entry; keep the live SwiftError 429 mapping. - Add unit tests (exhaustion/recovery with injected time, concurrency, cap eviction, spoofed-header and fail-open behavior, env matrix) and e2e tests proving 429 + Retry-After on the real server and zero behavior change with default configuration. |
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houseme
|
48b328d0d2 |
chore(deps): tighten crate dependency features (#4896)
* chore(deps): tighten crate dependency features Narrow Tokio and dependency feature declarations for protocols, TLS runtime, utils, targets, and replication based on direct crate usage. Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com> * chore(deps): trim hyper-rustls features Keep direct hyper-rustls features aligned with the actual RustFS call sites. rustfs-targets only needs native root loading and the rustls provider/TLS policy features for MQTT TLS config construction, while rustfs-ecstore needs the HTTP connector protocol features but not webpki roots. Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com> --------- Co-authored-by: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com> |
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houseme
|
56179210ab |
chore(deps): simplify dependency features (#4890)
* chore(deps): remove redundant dependency features Remove manifest feature entries that are implied by other requested features in the same dependency declaration. Verified that the resolved Cargo feature graph is unchanged after the cleanup. Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com> * chore(deps): narrow tokio and reqwest features Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com> --------- Co-authored-by: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com> |
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houseme
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f3a7a4b0da |
chore(deps): localize workspace dependency features (#4888)
Move workspace-level dependency feature lists into the member crates that consume each dependency while keeping required default-features flags at the workspace root. Also refresh starshard to 2.2.2 via cargo update and cargo upgrade --exclude ratelimit. Co-authored-by: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com> |
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Zhengchao An
|
c41062f278 | fix(protocols): constant-time FormPost signature check and guard DLO/SLO range underflow (#4519) | ||
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Zhengchao An
|
87357a0fdd | fix(swift): escape static-website listing to prevent stored/reflected XSS (#4515) | ||
|
Henry Guo
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506cd156bb |
fix(scanner): scope long walk timeouts (#4376)
* fix(scanner): scope long walk timeouts * fix(scanner): bound IAM config walks --------- Co-authored-by: Henry Guo <marshawcoco@users.noreply.github.com> |
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Zhengchao An
|
b06f3df6b6 |
fix: repair main build (swift clippy assert + ecstore multipart test ctx) (#4441)
* fix(swift): replace assert!(false) with panic! in expiration_worker test clippy::assertions_on_constants fails the swift clippy CI job under -D warnings. * fix(ecstore): add missing ctx field to multipart lock test store The multipart list-parts lock test (#4437) constructs ECStore without the ctx field added by the Phase 5 InstanceContext work (backlog#939). Both landed on main independently, leaving a semantic conflict that breaks the ecstore lib-test build (E0063). Adopt the process bootstrap context, matching the existing bootstrap_ctx() test in store/mod.rs. |
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Zhengchao An
|
7cd7c84e71 |
feat(swift): track object expiration (#4409)
fix(swift): wire object expiration tracking |
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Zhengchao An
|
3c3113619e |
fix(protocols): use constant-time secret comparison in FTPS and WebDAV auth (#4403)
The FTPS and WebDAV authentication handlers compared the client-supplied secret key against the stored secret with `String::eq`, which short-circuits on the first differing byte. A network attacker who knows (or enumerates) a valid access key can recover the secret key byte-by-byte via response-timing analysis; neither path is rate limited. Switch both to a constant-time comparison using `subtle::ConstantTimeEq`, the same primitive the SFTP handler and `rustfs/src/auth.rs::constant_time_eq` already use. `subtle` is added to the `ftps` and `webdav` feature dependency sets (it was previously gated on `sftp` only). Addresses GHSA-3p3x-734c-h5vx. |
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Zhengchao An
|
07324e268b |
fix(protocols): allow clippy::type_complexity in expiration worker tests (#4395)
fix(protocols): allow clippy type_complexity in test mock struct The MockExpirationObjectBackend test struct uses a nested generic type that triggers clippy::type_complexity. Add #[allow(clippy::type_complexity)] since this is test-only code where the type is inherent to the mock design. Co-authored-by: houseme <housemecn@gmail.com> |
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Zhengchao An
|
f021e4f321 | fix(protocols): simplify swift expiration test types (#4385) | ||
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houseme
|
86940a9452 |
fix(protocols): resolve clippy type_complexity in swift expiration worker tests (#4393)
fix(protocols): factor swift expiration mock result type into alias The swift feature clippy matrix on main fails with clippy::type_complexity on the MockExpirationObjectBackend test struct introduced with the expiration worker tests, blocking CI for every open PR. Introduce a MetadataResult type alias in the test module; no behavior change. Co-authored-by: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com> |
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Zhengchao An
|
62a31e4ec4 | fix(storage): address pending metadata and health gaps (#4380) | ||
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houseme
|
2247823200 |
fix(runtime): remove tokio io-uring feature and add regression guard (#4364)
Drop the [target.'cfg(target_os = "linux")'.dependencies] tokio "io-uring" feature from 6 crates and the rustfs binary. Because .cargo/config.toml enables --cfg tokio_unstable globally, this feature switched every Linux build's file I/O onto tokio's io_uring runtime backend. Restricted Linux environments (Docker default seccomp, gVisor, proot, old kernels) reject io_uring_setup with EACCES/ENOSYS, which tokio surfaced as PermissionDenied and RustFS reported as DiskAccessDenied at startup. Add scripts/check_no_tokio_io_uring.sh so the feature cannot silently return: it fails on any tokio dependency line enabling "io-uring", while still allowing a future application-level io-uring crate dependency. Wire it into make pre-commit/pre-pr/dev-check and CI. Tracking: rustfs/backlog#890 (parent rustfs/backlog#897) Co-authored-by: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com> |
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Zhengchao An
|
eb02486574 |
chore(swift): remove placeholder SSE module (#4330)
security(swift): remove placeholder SSE module (backlog#646)
The Swift `encryption` module was a non-functional stub: `encrypt_data`
returned the plaintext unchanged while labeling it AES-256-GCM in the
object metadata, and `generate_iv` derived the IV from a timestamp
rather than a CSPRNG. It had no production caller (only a `pub mod`
declaration and one integration test), so wiring it in as-is would have
silently shipped plaintext advertised as ciphertext.
We are not supporting Swift server-side encryption for now, so remove
the module outright rather than keep a dangerous stub around:
- delete crates/protocols/src/swift/encryption.rs
- drop `pub mod encryption;` from swift/mod.rs
- remove the encryption case (and unused import) from the swift
integration test
The module reached main dubiously: it was introduced together with the
whole Swift API in commit
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houseme
|
9b69c6d14c |
fix(s3): preserve metadata listing extensions (#4261)
* chore(deps): update s3s to 0.14.1 * fix(s3): preserve metadata listing extensions * fix(swift): make version names monotonic * fix(s3): preserve v1 list pagination markers |
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|
houseme
|
25d80d7c60 |
feat(storage): harden internode data-path controls (#4224)
* fix(rio): propagate http writer shutdown errors * fix(ecstore): unify remote lock rpc deadlines * fix(storage): reject corrupt read multiple payloads * feat(rio): add internode http tuning profiles * feat(metrics): add internode baseline signals * feat(ecstore): observe shard locality topology * feat(ecstore): gate shard locality scheduling * feat(ecstore): gate batch read version rpc * feat(ecstore): observe batch processor adaptation * feat(ecstore): gate batch processor observation * docs: add get benchmark regression analysis * docs: add issue 797 execution plan status * fix(ecstore): require explicit batch rpc support * fix(ecstore): honor documented batch read gate * fix(ecstore): keep batch read gate stable per call * chore: update workspace dependencies * feat(ecstore): log batch read gate decisions * feat(ecstore): count batch read gate decisions * test(issue-797): add local internode A/B runner * test(rio): fix tuning profile spelling fixture * fix(protocols): adapt sftp channel open callbacks * fix(metrics): wrap batch processor observation args * chore(docs): keep issue notes local only * fix(storage): address internode review feedback * fix(storage): address internode data-path review findings - Run the BatchReadVersion auto-mode unary fallback outside the batch RPC deadline so each read_version keeps its own per-op timeout and health accounting instead of racing the whole batch against one drive timeout. - Cap adaptive batch-processor concurrency growth at a hard multiple of the configured baseline so sustained fast batches cannot ratchet past the configured limit. - Parse RUSTFS_INTERNODE_HTTP_* tuning, RUSTFS_BATCH_PROCESSOR_ADAPTIVE, and RUSTFS_METADATA_BATCH_READ once per process instead of re-reading the environment on hot paths. - Skip shard read-cost collection in observe mode when stage metrics are disabled, and cache the local endpoint host list instead of rebuilding it on every read. - Allow --warp-extra-args values starting with -- and drop the unused warp_hosts_csv helper in the issue-797 A/B runner. * fix(storage): address internode data-path review findings - Run the BatchReadVersion auto-mode unary fallback outside the batch RPC deadline so each read_version keeps its own per-op timeout and health accounting instead of racing the whole batch against one drive timeout. - Cap adaptive batch-processor concurrency growth at a hard multiple of the configured baseline so sustained fast batches cannot ratchet past the configured limit. - Parse RUSTFS_INTERNODE_HTTP_* tuning, RUSTFS_BATCH_PROCESSOR_ADAPTIVE, and RUSTFS_METADATA_BATCH_READ once per process instead of re-reading the environment on hot paths. - Skip shard read-cost collection in observe mode when stage metrics are disabled, and cache the local endpoint host list instead of rebuilding it on every read. - Allow --warp-extra-args values starting with -- and drop the unused warp_hosts_csv helper in the issue-797 A/B runner. Co-Authored-By: heihutu<heihutu@gmail.com> * fix(storage): align buffer clamp test with media cap * fix(ecstore): release optimized read locks before streaming --------- Co-authored-by: Zhengchao An <anzhengchao@gmail.com> |
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Zhengchao An
|
710ae74cde | perf: add S3 operations benchmark framework (#738) (#4005) | ||
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Zhengchao An
|
05d201679c | fix: replace unwrap() with expect() in more files (#729 batch 13) (#3993) | ||
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Zhengchao An
|
f0ab812213 | fix: replace unwrap() with expect() in remaining files (#729 batch 12) (#3992) | ||
|
Zhengchao An
|
1b3dea012e | refactor: route ecstore runtime globals through facade (#3941) | ||
|
Zhengchao An
|
72ae43cb90 | refactor: segment external storage contract imports (#3908) | ||
|
Zhengchao An
|
1f7e159388 | refactor: segment external storage api boundaries (#3903) | ||
|
Zhengchao An
|
c9614eb7cb | refactor: route ecstore storage api boundaries (#3892) | ||
|
Zhengchao An
|
e37e367390 | refactor: route remaining external storage boundaries (#3889) |