feat(api): wire opt-in per-client S3 API rate limiting (429 + Retry-After) (#4895)

feat(api): wire opt-in per-client S3 API rate limiting (backlog#1191)

RustFS shipped three rate-limiter implementations and none was wired to
any request path: the tower layer never returned 429 (its over-limit
branch passed requests through) and was never instantiated, the console
env switches only logged, and the Swift token bucket was never called.

Replace them with one working, default-off implementation:

- Rewrite rustfs/src/server/rate_limit.rs as a sharded per-client-IP
  token-bucket limiter (32 mutex shards instead of one global RwLock
  write per request), bounded at 100k tracked IPs with lossless
  refilled-idle sweeps, returning 429 + Retry-After + x-ratelimit-*
  headers and an S3-style XML body.
- Key on trusted-proxy-validated ClientInfo.real_ip, else the socket
  peer address; never read spoofable X-Forwarded-For/X-Real-IP headers.
  Requests without a resolvable identity fail open. The echoed request
  id is charset-gated to prevent reflected XML injection.
- Wire the layer once at startup via option_layer between
  CatchPanicLayer and ReadinessGateLayer (external stack only), gated by
  new RUSTFS_API_RATE_LIMIT_ENABLE/_RPM/_BURST constants; health and
  profiling probes, internode RPC/gRPC, and the console are exempt.
- Make RUSTFS_CONSOLE_RATE_LIMIT_ENABLE/_RPM actually enforce by
  reusing the same limiter core through an axum middleware.
- Delete the dead Swift ratelimit module, its isolated tests, and the
  stale logging-guardrail entry; keep the live SwiftError 429 mapping.
- Add unit tests (exhaustion/recovery with injected time, concurrency,
  cap eviction, spoofed-header and fail-open behavior, env matrix) and
  e2e tests proving 429 + Retry-After on the real server and zero
  behavior change with default configuration.
This commit is contained in:
Zhengchao An
2026-07-16 15:09:42 +08:00
committed by GitHub
parent 48b328d0d2
commit c82ee6be58
13 changed files with 997 additions and 607 deletions
+52
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@@ -0,0 +1,52 @@
// Copyright 2024 RustFS Team
//
// Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
// you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
// You may obtain a copy of the License at
//
// http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
//
// Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
// distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
// WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
// See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
// limitations under the License.
/// Enable or disable per-client rate limiting for the S3 API.
///
/// When enabled (and `RUSTFS_API_RATE_LIMIT_RPM` > 0), requests are throttled
/// per client IP using a token bucket; over-limit requests receive
/// `429 Too Many Requests` with a `Retry-After` header. Internode RPC/gRPC,
/// health probes, and the console (which has its own limiter) are exempt.
/// Environment variable: RUSTFS_API_RATE_LIMIT_ENABLE
/// Example: RUSTFS_API_RATE_LIMIT_ENABLE=true
pub const ENV_API_RATE_LIMIT_ENABLE: &str = "RUSTFS_API_RATE_LIMIT_ENABLE";
/// Default for `RUSTFS_API_RATE_LIMIT_ENABLE`.
///
/// Disabled by default: RustFS ships permissive and operators opt in to
/// abuse-protection hardening. When disabled the request path is unchanged.
pub const DEFAULT_API_RATE_LIMIT_ENABLE: bool = false;
/// Sustained S3 API request budget per client IP, in requests per minute.
///
/// `0` means unlimited (rate limiting stays inert even when enabled).
/// Environment variable: RUSTFS_API_RATE_LIMIT_RPM
/// Example: RUSTFS_API_RATE_LIMIT_RPM=6000
pub const ENV_API_RATE_LIMIT_RPM: &str = "RUSTFS_API_RATE_LIMIT_RPM";
/// Default for `RUSTFS_API_RATE_LIMIT_RPM`.
///
/// `0` (unlimited) so that setting only the enable switch cannot throttle
/// traffic by surprise; operators must choose an explicit budget.
pub const DEFAULT_API_RATE_LIMIT_RPM: u32 = 0;
/// Burst capacity per client IP (maximum tokens in the bucket).
///
/// Allows short spikes above the sustained rate. `0` means "same as RPM".
/// Environment variable: RUSTFS_API_RATE_LIMIT_BURST
/// Example: RUSTFS_API_RATE_LIMIT_BURST=200
pub const ENV_API_RATE_LIMIT_BURST: &str = "RUSTFS_API_RATE_LIMIT_BURST";
/// Default for `RUSTFS_API_RATE_LIMIT_BURST` (`0` = same as RPM).
pub const DEFAULT_API_RATE_LIMIT_BURST: u32 = 0;
+1
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@@ -12,6 +12,7 @@
// See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
// limitations under the License.
pub(crate) mod api;
pub(crate) mod app;
pub(crate) mod body_limits;
pub(crate) mod capacity;
+2
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@@ -15,6 +15,8 @@
#[cfg(feature = "constants")]
pub mod constants;
#[cfg(feature = "constants")]
pub use constants::api::*;
#[cfg(feature = "constants")]
pub use constants::app::*;
#[cfg(feature = "constants")]
pub use constants::body_limits::*;
+109
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@@ -0,0 +1,109 @@
// Copyright 2024 RustFS Team
//
// Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
// you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
// You may obtain a copy of the License at
//
// http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
//
// Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
// distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
// WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
// See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
// limitations under the License.
//! E2E coverage for the opt-in per-client S3 API rate limit (backlog#1191):
//! the layer must be wired into the real server stack, reject over-limit
//! clients with `429` + `Retry-After`, keep health probes exempt, and stay
//! completely inert with default configuration.
use crate::common::{RustFSTestEnvironment, init_logging, local_http_client};
use serial_test::serial;
use tracing::info;
type TestResult = Result<(), Box<dyn std::error::Error + Send + Sync>>;
#[tokio::test]
#[serial]
async fn api_rate_limit_enforces_429_with_retry_after_when_enabled() -> TestResult {
init_logging();
let mut env = RustFSTestEnvironment::new().await?;
// Burst 50 leaves headroom for the readiness-poll ListBuckets calls that
// share the loopback client IP; refill (60 rpm = 1/s) is slow enough that
// a rapid burst below reliably exhausts the bucket.
env.start_rustfs_server_with_env(
vec![],
&[
("RUSTFS_API_RATE_LIMIT_ENABLE", "true"),
("RUSTFS_API_RATE_LIMIT_RPM", "60"),
("RUSTFS_API_RATE_LIMIT_BURST", "50"),
],
)
.await?;
let client = local_http_client();
let list_buckets_url = format!("{}/", env.url);
let mut throttled = None;
let mut allowed = 0usize;
for _ in 0..80 {
let response = client.get(&list_buckets_url).send().await?;
if response.status() == reqwest::StatusCode::TOO_MANY_REQUESTS {
throttled = Some(response);
break;
}
allowed += 1;
}
let throttled = throttled.unwrap_or_else(|| panic!("no 429 within 80 rapid requests ({allowed} allowed) at burst 50"));
assert!(allowed > 0, "healthy traffic below the burst must not be throttled");
info!("rate limit engaged after {allowed} allowed requests");
let retry_after = throttled
.headers()
.get(reqwest::header::RETRY_AFTER)
.and_then(|v| v.to_str().ok())
.and_then(|v| v.parse::<u64>().ok())
.expect("429 must carry a numeric Retry-After header");
assert!(retry_after >= 1, "Retry-After must be at least one second, got {retry_after}");
assert_eq!(
throttled.headers().get("x-ratelimit-limit").and_then(|v| v.to_str().ok()),
Some("60"),
"429 must expose the configured limit"
);
let body = throttled.text().await?;
assert!(body.contains("<Code>TooManyRequests</Code>"), "S3-style error body expected: {body}");
// Health probes stay exempt even while the client budget is exhausted.
let health = client.get(format!("{}/health", env.url)).send().await?;
assert_ne!(
health.status(),
reqwest::StatusCode::TOO_MANY_REQUESTS,
"health probes must never be rate limited"
);
Ok(())
}
#[tokio::test]
#[serial]
async fn api_rate_limit_stays_inert_by_default() -> TestResult {
init_logging();
let mut env = RustFSTestEnvironment::new().await?;
env.start_rustfs_server(vec![]).await?;
let client = local_http_client();
let list_buckets_url = format!("{}/", env.url);
for i in 0..80 {
let response = client.get(&list_buckets_url).send().await?;
assert_ne!(
response.status(),
reqwest::StatusCode::TOO_MANY_REQUESTS,
"request {i} was throttled although rate limiting is disabled by default"
);
}
Ok(())
}
+4
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@@ -67,6 +67,10 @@ mod bucket_policy_check_test;
#[cfg(test)]
mod security_boundary_test;
// Opt-in per-client S3 API rate limiting (backlog#1191)
#[cfg(test)]
mod api_rate_limit_test;
// Admin authorization gate: non-admin denial + root-credential lifecycle (backlog#1151 sec-4)
#[cfg(test)]
mod admin_auth_test;
-1
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@@ -46,7 +46,6 @@ pub mod formpost;
pub mod handler;
pub mod object;
pub mod quota;
pub mod ratelimit;
pub mod router;
pub mod slo;
pub mod staticweb;
-434
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@@ -1,434 +0,0 @@
// Copyright 2024 RustFS Team
//
// Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
// you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
// You may obtain a copy of the License at
//
// http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
//
// Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
// distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
// WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
// See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
// limitations under the License.
//! Rate Limiting Support for Swift API
//!
//! This module implements rate limiting to prevent abuse and ensure fair resource
//! allocation across tenants. Rate limits can be applied per-account, per-container,
//! or per-IP address.
//!
//! # Configuration
//!
//! Rate limits are configured via container metadata:
//!
//! ```bash
//! # Set account-level rate limit: 1000 requests per minute
//! swift post -m "X-Account-Meta-Rate-Limit:1000/60"
//!
//! # Set container-level rate limit: 100 requests per minute
//! swift post container -m "X-Container-Meta-Rate-Limit:100/60"
//! ```
//!
//! # Response Headers
//!
//! Rate limit information is included in all responses:
//!
//! ```http
//! HTTP/1.1 200 OK
//! X-RateLimit-Limit: 1000
//! X-RateLimit-Remaining: 950
//! X-RateLimit-Reset: 1740003600
//! ```
//!
//! When rate limit is exceeded:
//!
//! ```http
//! HTTP/1.1 429 Too Many Requests
//! X-RateLimit-Limit: 1000
//! X-RateLimit-Remaining: 0
//! X-RateLimit-Reset: 1740003600
//! Retry-After: 30
//! ```
//!
//! # Algorithm
//!
//! Uses token bucket algorithm with per-second refill rate:
//! - Each request consumes 1 token
//! - Tokens refill at configured rate
//! - Burst capacity allows temporary spikes
use super::{SwiftError, SwiftResult};
use std::collections::HashMap;
use std::sync::{Arc, Mutex};
use std::time::{SystemTime, UNIX_EPOCH};
use tracing::debug;
const LOG_COMPONENT_PROTOCOLS: &str = "protocols";
const LOG_SUBSYSTEM_SWIFT_RATELIMIT: &str = "swift_ratelimit";
const EVENT_SWIFT_RATELIMIT_STATE: &str = "swift_ratelimit_state";
/// Rate limit configuration
#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq)]
pub struct RateLimit {
/// Maximum requests allowed in time window
pub limit: u32,
/// Time window in seconds
pub window_seconds: u32,
}
impl RateLimit {
/// Parse rate limit from metadata value
///
/// Format: "limit/window_seconds" (e.g., "1000/60" = 1000 requests per 60 seconds)
pub fn parse(value: &str) -> SwiftResult<Self> {
let parts: Vec<&str> = value.split('/').collect();
if parts.len() != 2 {
return Err(SwiftError::BadRequest(format!(
"Invalid rate limit format: {}. Expected format: limit/window_seconds",
value
)));
}
let limit = parts[0]
.parse::<u32>()
.map_err(|_| SwiftError::BadRequest(format!("Invalid rate limit value: {}", parts[0])))?;
let window_seconds = parts[1]
.parse::<u32>()
.map_err(|_| SwiftError::BadRequest(format!("Invalid window value: {}", parts[1])))?;
if window_seconds == 0 {
return Err(SwiftError::BadRequest("Rate limit window cannot be zero".to_string()));
}
Ok(RateLimit { limit, window_seconds })
}
/// Calculate refill rate (tokens per second)
pub fn refill_rate(&self) -> f64 {
self.limit as f64 / self.window_seconds as f64
}
}
/// Token bucket for rate limiting
#[derive(Debug, Clone)]
struct TokenBucket {
/// Maximum tokens (burst capacity)
capacity: u32,
/// Current available tokens
tokens: f64,
/// Refill rate (tokens per second)
refill_rate: f64,
/// Last refill timestamp (Unix seconds)
last_refill: u64,
}
impl TokenBucket {
fn new(rate_limit: &RateLimit) -> Self {
let capacity = rate_limit.limit;
let refill_rate = rate_limit.refill_rate();
TokenBucket {
capacity,
tokens: capacity as f64, // Start full
refill_rate,
last_refill: current_timestamp(),
}
}
/// Try to consume a token
///
/// Returns Ok(remaining_tokens) if successful, Err(retry_after_seconds) if rate limited
fn try_consume(&mut self) -> Result<u32, u64> {
// Refill tokens based on time elapsed
let now = current_timestamp();
let elapsed = now.saturating_sub(self.last_refill);
if elapsed > 0 {
let refill_amount = self.refill_rate * elapsed as f64;
self.tokens = (self.tokens + refill_amount).min(self.capacity as f64);
self.last_refill = now;
}
// Try to consume 1 token
if self.tokens >= 1.0 {
self.tokens -= 1.0;
Ok(self.tokens.floor() as u32)
} else {
// Calculate retry-after: time until 1 token is available
let tokens_needed = 1.0 - self.tokens;
let retry_after = (tokens_needed / self.refill_rate).ceil() as u64;
Err(retry_after)
}
}
/// Get current token count
fn remaining(&mut self) -> u32 {
// Refill tokens based on time elapsed
let now = current_timestamp();
let elapsed = now.saturating_sub(self.last_refill);
if elapsed > 0 {
let refill_amount = self.refill_rate * elapsed as f64;
self.tokens = (self.tokens + refill_amount).min(self.capacity as f64);
self.last_refill = now;
}
self.tokens.floor() as u32
}
/// Get reset timestamp (when bucket will be full)
fn reset_timestamp(&self, now: u64) -> u64 {
if self.tokens >= self.capacity as f64 {
now
} else {
let tokens_to_refill = self.capacity as f64 - self.tokens;
let seconds_to_full = (tokens_to_refill / self.refill_rate).ceil() as u64;
now + seconds_to_full
}
}
}
/// Global rate limiter state (in-memory)
///
/// In production, this should be backed by Redis or similar distributed store
#[derive(Clone)]
pub struct RateLimiter {
buckets: Arc<Mutex<HashMap<String, TokenBucket>>>,
}
impl RateLimiter {
/// Create new rate limiter
pub fn new() -> Self {
RateLimiter {
buckets: Arc::new(Mutex::new(HashMap::new())),
}
}
/// Check and consume rate limit quota
///
/// Returns (remaining, reset_timestamp) if successful,
/// or SwiftError::TooManyRequests if rate limited
pub fn check_rate_limit(&self, key: &str, rate_limit: &RateLimit) -> SwiftResult<(u32, u64)> {
let mut buckets = self.buckets.lock().expect("operation should succeed");
// Get or create bucket for this key
let bucket = buckets.entry(key.to_string()).or_insert_with(|| TokenBucket::new(rate_limit));
let now = current_timestamp();
let reset = bucket.reset_timestamp(now);
match bucket.try_consume() {
Ok(remaining) => {
debug!(event = EVENT_SWIFT_RATELIMIT_STATE, component = LOG_COMPONENT_PROTOCOLS, subsystem = LOG_SUBSYSTEM_SWIFT_RATELIMIT, key = %key, remaining, result = "allowed", "swift ratelimit state changed");
Ok((remaining, reset))
}
Err(retry_after) => {
debug!(event = EVENT_SWIFT_RATELIMIT_STATE, component = LOG_COMPONENT_PROTOCOLS, subsystem = LOG_SUBSYSTEM_SWIFT_RATELIMIT, key = %key, retry_after, result = "limited", "swift ratelimit state changed");
Err(SwiftError::TooManyRequests {
retry_after,
limit: rate_limit.limit,
reset,
})
}
}
}
/// Get current rate limit status without consuming quota
pub fn get_status(&self, key: &str, rate_limit: &RateLimit) -> (u32, u64) {
let mut buckets = self.buckets.lock().expect("operation should succeed");
let bucket = buckets.entry(key.to_string()).or_insert_with(|| TokenBucket::new(rate_limit));
let now = current_timestamp();
let remaining = bucket.remaining();
let reset = bucket.reset_timestamp(now);
(remaining, reset)
}
}
impl Default for RateLimiter {
fn default() -> Self {
Self::new()
}
}
/// Get current Unix timestamp in seconds
fn current_timestamp() -> u64 {
SystemTime::now().duration_since(UNIX_EPOCH).unwrap_or_default().as_secs()
}
/// Extract rate limit from account or container metadata
pub fn extract_rate_limit(metadata: &HashMap<String, String>) -> Option<RateLimit> {
// Check for rate limit in metadata
if let Some(rate_limit_str) = metadata
.get("x-account-meta-rate-limit")
.or_else(|| metadata.get("x-container-meta-rate-limit"))
{
RateLimit::parse(rate_limit_str).ok()
} else {
None
}
}
/// Build rate limit key for tracking
pub fn build_rate_limit_key(account: &str, container: Option<&str>) -> String {
if let Some(cont) = container {
format!("account:{}:container:{}", account, cont)
} else {
format!("account:{}", account)
}
}
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
use super::*;
#[test]
fn test_parse_rate_limit_valid() {
let rate_limit = RateLimit::parse("1000/60").expect("operation should succeed");
assert_eq!(rate_limit.limit, 1000);
assert_eq!(rate_limit.window_seconds, 60);
}
#[test]
fn test_parse_rate_limit_invalid_format() {
let result = RateLimit::parse("1000");
assert!(result.is_err());
}
#[test]
fn test_parse_rate_limit_invalid_limit() {
let result = RateLimit::parse("not_a_number/60");
assert!(result.is_err());
}
#[test]
fn test_parse_rate_limit_invalid_window() {
let result = RateLimit::parse("1000/not_a_number");
assert!(result.is_err());
}
#[test]
fn test_parse_rate_limit_zero_window() {
let result = RateLimit::parse("1000/0");
assert!(result.is_err());
}
#[test]
fn test_rate_limit_refill_rate() {
let rate_limit = RateLimit {
limit: 1000,
window_seconds: 60,
};
assert!((rate_limit.refill_rate() - 16.666666).abs() < 0.001);
}
#[test]
fn test_token_bucket_consume() {
let rate_limit = RateLimit {
limit: 10,
window_seconds: 60,
};
let mut bucket = TokenBucket::new(&rate_limit);
// Should be able to consume up to limit
for i in 0..10 {
let result = bucket.try_consume();
assert!(result.is_ok(), "Token {} should succeed", i);
}
// 11th request should fail
let result = bucket.try_consume();
assert!(result.is_err());
}
#[test]
fn test_token_bucket_remaining() {
let rate_limit = RateLimit {
limit: 100,
window_seconds: 60,
};
let mut bucket = TokenBucket::new(&rate_limit);
// Initial: 100 tokens
assert_eq!(bucket.remaining(), 100);
// Consume 10
for _ in 0..10 {
bucket.try_consume().expect("operation should succeed");
}
assert_eq!(bucket.remaining(), 90);
}
#[test]
fn test_rate_limiter() {
let limiter = RateLimiter::new();
let rate_limit = RateLimit {
limit: 5,
window_seconds: 60,
};
// Should allow 5 requests
for _ in 0..5 {
let result = limiter.check_rate_limit("test_key", &rate_limit);
assert!(result.is_ok());
}
// 6th request should fail
let result = limiter.check_rate_limit("test_key", &rate_limit);
assert!(result.is_err());
}
#[test]
fn test_extract_rate_limit_account() {
let mut metadata = HashMap::new();
metadata.insert("x-account-meta-rate-limit".to_string(), "1000/60".to_string());
let rate_limit = extract_rate_limit(&metadata);
assert!(rate_limit.is_some());
let rate_limit = rate_limit.expect("operation should succeed");
assert_eq!(rate_limit.limit, 1000);
assert_eq!(rate_limit.window_seconds, 60);
}
#[test]
fn test_extract_rate_limit_container() {
let mut metadata = HashMap::new();
metadata.insert("x-container-meta-rate-limit".to_string(), "100/60".to_string());
let rate_limit = extract_rate_limit(&metadata);
assert!(rate_limit.is_some());
let rate_limit = rate_limit.expect("operation should succeed");
assert_eq!(rate_limit.limit, 100);
assert_eq!(rate_limit.window_seconds, 60);
}
#[test]
fn test_extract_rate_limit_none() {
let metadata = HashMap::new();
let rate_limit = extract_rate_limit(&metadata);
assert!(rate_limit.is_none());
}
#[test]
fn test_build_rate_limit_key_account() {
let key = build_rate_limit_key("AUTH_test", None);
assert_eq!(key, "account:AUTH_test");
}
#[test]
fn test_build_rate_limit_key_container() {
let key = build_rate_limit_key("AUTH_test", Some("my-container"));
assert_eq!(key, "account:AUTH_test:container:my-container");
}
}
@@ -43,36 +43,4 @@ mod swift_integration {
let parsed = expiration::parse_delete_at(delete_at).unwrap();
assert_eq!(parsed, 1740000000);
}
#[test]
fn test_multiple_rate_limit_keys() {
let limiter = ratelimit::RateLimiter::new();
let rate = ratelimit::RateLimit {
limit: 3,
window_seconds: 60,
};
// Different keys should have separate limits
for _ in 0..3 {
assert!(limiter.check_rate_limit("key1", &rate).is_ok());
assert!(limiter.check_rate_limit("key2", &rate).is_ok());
}
// Both keys should now be exhausted
assert!(limiter.check_rate_limit("key1", &rate).is_err());
assert!(limiter.check_rate_limit("key2", &rate).is_err());
}
#[test]
fn test_rate_limit_metadata_extraction() {
let mut metadata = HashMap::new();
metadata.insert("x-account-meta-rate-limit".to_string(), "1000/60".to_string());
let rate_limit = ratelimit::extract_rate_limit(&metadata);
assert!(rate_limit.is_some());
let rate_limit = rate_limit.unwrap();
assert_eq!(rate_limit.limit, 1000);
assert_eq!(rate_limit.window_seconds, 60);
}
}
@@ -16,7 +16,7 @@
#![cfg(feature = "swift")]
use rustfs_protocols::swift::{quota, ratelimit, slo, symlink, sync, tempurl, versioning};
use rustfs_protocols::swift::{quota, slo, symlink, sync, tempurl, versioning};
use std::collections::HashMap;
/// Test sync configuration parsing
@@ -92,14 +92,6 @@ fn test_symlink_detection() {
let _is_symlink = symlink::is_symlink(&metadata);
}
/// Test rate limit parsing
#[test]
fn test_rate_limit_parsing() {
let rl = ratelimit::RateLimit::parse("100/60").unwrap();
assert_eq!(rl.limit, 100);
assert_eq!(rl.window_seconds, 60);
}
/// Test quota structure
#[test]
fn test_quota_structure() {
+69 -6
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@@ -16,6 +16,10 @@ use crate::admin::runtime_sources::{current_oidc_handle, default_admin_usecase};
use crate::admin::storage_api::access::RequestContext;
use crate::license::has_valid_license;
use crate::server::has_path_prefix;
use crate::server::rate_limit::{
LABEL_RATE_LIMIT_SCOPE, METRIC_HTTP_SERVER_REQUESTS_RATE_LIMITED_TOTAL, RATE_LIMIT_SCOPE_CONSOLE, RateLimitDecision,
RateLimitQuota, RateLimiter, apply_throttle_headers, client_ip,
};
use crate::server::{
CONSOLE_PREFIX, FAVICON_PATH, HEALTH_PREFIX, HEALTH_READY_PATH, HeaderMapCarrier, HealthProbe, LICENSE, RUSTFS_ADMIN_PREFIX,
RequestContextLayer, VERSION, build_health_response_parts, collect_probe_readiness,
@@ -36,7 +40,7 @@ use rust_embed::RustEmbed;
use serde::Serialize;
use std::{
net::{IpAddr, SocketAddr},
sync::OnceLock,
sync::{Arc, OnceLock},
time::Duration,
};
use tower_http::catch_panic::CatchPanicLayer;
@@ -569,12 +573,38 @@ fn setup_console_middleware_stack(
// Add request body limit (10MB for console uploads)
.layer(RequestBodyLimitLayer::new(5 * 1024 * 1024 * 1024));
// Add rate limiting if enabled
// Per-client console rate limiting, sharing the S3 API limiter core
// (`server::rate_limit`). Added last so it is the outermost layer and
// over-limit requests are rejected before any other middleware runs.
// The client identity comes from validated request extensions only
// (trusted-proxy `ClientInfo`, then socket peer address); requests
// without one fail open rather than trusting spoofable headers.
if rate_limit_enable {
info!("Console rate limiting enabled: {} requests per minute", rate_limit_rpm);
// Note: tower-http doesn't provide a built-in rate limiter, but we have the foundation
// For production, you would integrate with a rate limiting service like Redis
// For now, we log that it's configured and ready for integration
if let Some(quota) = RateLimitQuota::per_minute(rate_limit_rpm, 0) {
let limiter = Arc::new(RateLimiter::new(quota));
app = app.layer(middleware::from_fn(move |req: Request, next: middleware::Next| {
let limiter = limiter.clone();
async move {
match client_ip(&req).map(|ip| limiter.check(ip)) {
Some(RateLimitDecision::Limited(throttle)) => {
metrics::counter!(
METRIC_HTTP_SERVER_REQUESTS_RATE_LIMITED_TOTAL,
LABEL_RATE_LIMIT_SCOPE => RATE_LIMIT_SCOPE_CONSOLE
)
.increment(1);
debug!(retry_after_secs = throttle.retry_after_secs, "Console request rejected by rate limit");
let mut response = StatusCode::TOO_MANY_REQUESTS.into_response();
apply_throttle_headers(response.headers_mut(), limiter.quota().requests_per_minute, &throttle);
response
}
_ => next.run(req).await,
}
}
}));
info!("Console rate limiting enabled: {} requests per minute", rate_limit_rpm);
} else {
warn!("Console rate limiting enabled but RPM is 0; it stays inactive");
}
}
app
@@ -864,6 +894,39 @@ mod tests {
);
}
// setup_console_middleware_stack reads ENV_HEALTH_ENDPOINT_ENABLE (see above).
#[tokio::test]
#[serial]
async fn console_rate_limit_rejects_over_limit_clients_with_429() {
let app = setup_console_middleware_stack(parse_cors_origins(None), true, 1, 30);
let request_for = |last_octet: u8| {
let mut request = Request::builder()
.uri(format!("{CONSOLE_PREFIX}/index.html"))
.body(Body::empty())
.expect("failed to build request");
request.extensions_mut().insert(crate::server::RemoteAddr(SocketAddr::new(
IpAddr::from([198, 51, 100, last_octet]),
50000,
)));
request
};
let first = app.clone().oneshot(request_for(7)).await.expect("request should succeed");
assert_ne!(first.status(), StatusCode::TOO_MANY_REQUESTS);
let second = app.clone().oneshot(request_for(7)).await.expect("request should succeed");
assert_eq!(second.status(), StatusCode::TOO_MANY_REQUESTS);
assert!(
second.headers().contains_key(http::header::RETRY_AFTER),
"console 429 must carry Retry-After"
);
// A different client IP has its own budget.
let other = app.oneshot(request_for(8)).await.expect("request should succeed");
assert_ne!(other.status(), StatusCode::TOO_MANY_REQUESTS);
}
#[tokio::test(flavor = "current_thread")]
async fn console_trace_layer_records_request_id_on_current_span() {
let writer = SharedWriter::default();
+59 -17
View File
@@ -27,6 +27,7 @@ use crate::server::{
RedirectLayer, RequestContextLayer, RequestLoggingLayer, S3ErrorMessageCompatLayer, VirtualHostStyleHintLayer,
redact_sensitive_uri_query,
},
rate_limit::{RateLimitLayer, api_rate_limit_layer_from_env},
tls_material::{
TlsAcceptorHolder, TlsHandshakeFailureKind, build_acceptor_from_loaded, load_tls_material, spawn_reload_loop,
},
@@ -111,6 +112,7 @@ const EVENT_HTTP_BIND_FAILED: &str = "http_bind_failed";
const EVENT_HTTP_STARTUP_ENDPOINTS: &str = "http_startup_endpoints";
const EVENT_HTTP_HOST_ROUTING: &str = "http_host_routing";
const EVENT_HTTP_COMPRESSION_STATE: &str = "http_compression_state";
const EVENT_API_RATE_LIMIT_STATE: &str = "api_rate_limit_state";
const EVENT_HTTP_TRANSPORT_PARAMETERS: &str = "http_transport_parameters";
const EVENT_HTTP_ACCEPT_LOOP_STATE: &str = "http_accept_loop_state";
const EVENT_HTTP_CONNECTION_DRAIN: &str = "http_connection_drain";
@@ -700,6 +702,34 @@ pub async fn start_http_server(
);
}
// Per-client S3 API rate limiting (backlog#1191). Built once so every
// connection's stack shares the same limiter state; `None` (the default)
// leaves the request path unchanged.
let api_rate_limit_layer = api_rate_limit_layer_from_env();
match &api_rate_limit_layer {
Some(layer) => {
let quota = layer.quota();
info!(
event = EVENT_API_RATE_LIMIT_STATE,
component = LOG_COMPONENT_SERVER,
subsystem = LOG_SUBSYSTEM_HTTP,
state = "enabled",
requests_per_minute = quota.requests_per_minute,
burst = quota.burst,
"API rate limit state changed"
);
}
None => {
debug!(
event = EVENT_API_RATE_LIMIT_STATE,
component = LOG_COMPONENT_SERVER,
subsystem = LOG_SUBSYSTEM_HTTP,
state = "disabled",
"API rate limit state changed"
);
}
}
let is_console = config.console_enable;
let server_domains_configured = !config.server_domains.is_empty();
let task_handle = tokio::spawn(async move {
@@ -890,6 +920,7 @@ pub async fn start_http_server(
readiness: readiness.clone(),
keystone_auth: auth_keystone::get_keystone_auth(),
trusted_proxy_layer: rustfs_trusted_proxies::is_enabled().then(|| rustfs_trusted_proxies::layer().clone()),
rate_limit_layer: api_rate_limit_layer.clone(),
};
process_connection(socket, tls_acceptor.clone(), connection_ctx, graceful.watcher());
@@ -946,6 +977,9 @@ struct ConnectionContext {
keystone_auth: Option<Arc<rustfs_keystone::KeystoneAuthProvider>>,
/// Pre-computed trusted proxy layer (avoids per-connection is_enabled() check).
trusted_proxy_layer: Option<rustfs_trusted_proxies::TrustedProxyLayer>,
/// Per-client API rate limit layer; `None` when disabled (the default).
/// All clones share one limiter, keeping budgets global across connections.
rate_limit_layer: Option<RateLimitLayer>,
}
#[derive(Clone)]
@@ -1130,6 +1164,7 @@ fn process_connection(
readiness,
keystone_auth,
trusted_proxy_layer,
rate_limit_layer,
} = context;
// Build the hybrid service per-connection.
@@ -1183,23 +1218,24 @@ fn process_connection(
// 5. RequestContextLayer — creates RequestContext in extensions
// 6. EmptyBodyContentLengthCompatLayer — adds Content-Length: 0 for known empty-body API routes
// 7. CatchPanicLayer — panic → 500
// 8. ReadinessGateLayer — blocks until ready
// 9. KeystoneAuthLayer X-Auth-Token validation
// 10. TraceLayer — request span creation + metrics
// 11. RequestLoggingLayer — single completion event per request
// 12. PropagateRequestIdLayer — X-Request-ID → response
// 13. CompressionLayer — response compression (whitelist, path-aware)
// 14. PathCategoryInjectionLayer — injects path category for compression predicate
// 15. S3ErrorMessageCompatLayer missing S3 error message compatibility
// 16. IcebergRestErrorCompatLayer — Iceberg REST JSON error compatibility
// 17. ObjectAttributesEtagFixLayer — ETag fix for GetObjectAttributes
// 18. ConditionalCorsLayer — S3 API CORS
// 19. RedirectLayer — console redirect (conditional)
// 20. BodylessStatusFixLayer — clears body for 1xx/204/205/304 responses
// 21. HeadRequestBodyFixLayer — strips actual body bytes from HEAD responses
// 22. PublicHealthEndpointLayer — handles public health before s3s host parsing
// 23. VirtualHostStyleHintLayer — actionable error for unroutable virtual-hosted-style (conditional)
// 24. DoubleSlashListBucketsCompatLayer — rewrites `GET //` to `GET /` for ListBuckets (MinIO browser compat)
// 8. RateLimitLayer — conditional (external stack only), per-client 429 throttling
// 9. ReadinessGateLayer — blocks until ready
// 10. KeystoneAuthLayer — X-Auth-Token validation
// 11. TraceLayer — request span creation + metrics
// 12. RequestLoggingLayer — single completion event per request
// 13. PropagateRequestIdLayer — X-Request-ID → response
// 14. CompressionLayer — response compression (whitelist, path-aware)
// 15. PathCategoryInjectionLayer — injects path category for compression predicate
// 16. S3ErrorMessageCompatLayer — missing S3 error message compatibility
// 17. IcebergRestErrorCompatLayer Iceberg REST JSON error compatibility
// 18. ObjectAttributesEtagFixLayer — ETag fix for GetObjectAttributes
// 19. ConditionalCorsLayer — S3 API CORS
// 20. RedirectLayer — console redirect (conditional)
// 21. BodylessStatusFixLayer clears body for 1xx/204/205/304 responses
// 22. HeadRequestBodyFixLayer — strips actual body bytes from HEAD responses
// 23. PublicHealthEndpointLayer — handles public health before s3s host parsing
// 24. VirtualHostStyleHintLayer — actionable error for unroutable virtual-hosted-style (conditional)
// 25. DoubleSlashListBucketsCompatLayer — rewrites `GET //` to `GET /` for ListBuckets (MinIO browser compat)
// ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
// Batch 1 intentionally keeps the external and internode stacks behaviorally
// identical while giving each path family a named construction boundary.
@@ -1223,6 +1259,12 @@ fn process_connection(
.layer(InternodeRequestContextLiteLayer)
.layer(EmptyBodyContentLengthCompatLayer)
.layer(CatchPanicLayer::new())
// Per-client API rate limit (backlog#1191): rejects over-limit
// requests with 429 before readiness/auth/tracing spend any
// work on them, but after the trusted-proxy layer has resolved
// a spoof-proof client IP. Absent (None) unless enabled via
// RUSTFS_API_RATE_LIMIT_ENABLE with a non-zero RPM.
.option_layer(rate_limit_layer.clone())
// CRITICAL: Insert ReadinessGateLayer before business logic
// This stops requests from hitting IAMAuth or Storage if they are not ready.
.layer(ReadinessGateLayer::new(readiness.clone()))
+700 -107
View File
@@ -12,124 +12,391 @@
// See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
// limitations under the License.
//! Rate limiting middleware for RustFS
//! Per-client request rate limiting for the S3 API (backlog#1191).
//!
//! This module provides per-client request rate limiting using a token bucket algorithm.
//! It helps protect against DoS attacks by limiting the number of requests per client.
//! A token-bucket limiter keyed by client IP. Over-limit requests are rejected
//! with `429 Too Many Requests`, a `Retry-After` header, and the
//! `x-ratelimit-*` headers already used by the Swift protocol error mapping.
//!
//! Scope and invariants:
//! - **Opt-in, default off.** [`api_rate_limit_layer_from_env`] returns `None`
//! unless `RUSTFS_API_RATE_LIMIT_ENABLE=true` and `RUSTFS_API_RATE_LIMIT_RPM > 0`;
//! the layer is then absent from the service stack and the request path is
//! unchanged.
//! - **Client identity is never taken from request headers.** The key is the
//! validated [`ClientInfo::real_ip`] inserted by the trusted-proxy layer
//! (which only honors `X-Forwarded-For` from configured proxies) or, absent
//! that, the socket peer address ([`RemoteAddr`]). A raw `X-Forwarded-For`
//! header can therefore not be used to escape into an attacker-chosen bucket.
//! - **Infra traffic is exempt** ([`is_rate_limit_exempt_path`]): health and
//! profiling probes, internode RPC/gRPC, and the console (which has its own
//! limiter, sharing this module's [`RateLimiter`] core).
//! - This is client-facing abuse protection, not internal backpressure — it is
//! unrelated to `workload_admission`, which schedules already-admitted work.
//!
//! Memory is bounded: buckets live in [`SHARD_COUNT`] independently locked
//! shards, each capped and periodically swept. A bucket that has been idle
//! long enough to have refilled completely is indistinguishable from a fresh
//! one, so eviction never makes the limiter more permissive than a restart.
use http::{Request, Response};
use crate::server::{
CONSOLE_PREFIX, FAVICON_PATH, HEALTH_COMPAT_LIVE_PATH, HEALTH_PREFIX, HEALTH_READY_PATH, MINIO_HEALTH_CLUSTER_PATH,
MINIO_HEALTH_CLUSTER_READ_PATH, MINIO_HEALTH_LIVE_PATH, MINIO_HEALTH_READY_PATH, PROFILE_CPU_PATH, PROFILE_MEMORY_PATH,
RPC_PREFIX, RemoteAddr, TONIC_PREFIX, has_path_prefix,
};
use bytes::Bytes;
use futures::future::{Either, Ready, ready};
use http::{HeaderMap, HeaderValue, Request, Response, StatusCode};
use http_body_util::{BodyExt, Full};
use metrics::counter;
use rustfs_trusted_proxies::ClientInfo;
use std::collections::HashMap;
use std::hash::{BuildHasher, RandomState};
use std::net::IpAddr;
use std::sync::{Arc, RwLock};
use std::time::{Duration, Instant};
use std::sync::{Arc, Mutex, PoisonError};
use std::time::{Duration, Instant, SystemTime, UNIX_EPOCH};
use tower::{Layer, Service};
use tracing::{debug, warn};
/// Configuration for rate limiting
#[derive(Debug, Clone)]
pub struct RateLimitConfig {
/// Maximum number of requests per window
pub max_requests: u32,
/// Time window duration
pub window_duration: Duration,
const LOG_COMPONENT_SERVER: &str = "server";
const LOG_SUBSYSTEM_RATE_LIMIT: &str = "rate_limit";
const EVENT_REQUEST_RATE_LIMITED: &str = "request_rate_limited";
pub(crate) const METRIC_HTTP_SERVER_REQUESTS_RATE_LIMITED_TOTAL: &str = "rustfs_http_server_requests_rate_limited_total";
pub(crate) const LABEL_RATE_LIMIT_SCOPE: &str = "scope";
pub(crate) const RATE_LIMIT_SCOPE_S3_API: &str = "s3_api";
pub(crate) const RATE_LIMIT_SCOPE_CONSOLE: &str = "console";
// Header names shared with the Swift error mapping (crates/protocols swift/errors.rs).
const X_RATE_LIMIT_LIMIT: &str = "x-ratelimit-limit";
const X_RATE_LIMIT_REMAINING: &str = "x-ratelimit-remaining";
const X_RATE_LIMIT_RESET: &str = "x-ratelimit-reset";
const X_REQUEST_ID: &str = "x-request-id";
/// Shards bound lock contention: each request locks 1/32 of the key space.
const SHARD_COUNT: usize = 32;
/// Upper bound on tracked client IPs across all shards (~100 bytes each, so
/// worst case a few MiB). Real distinct-IP cardinality is bounded by actual
/// TCP peers (or validated proxy clients), never by spoofable headers.
const MAX_TRACKED_CLIENTS: usize = 100_000;
/// Per-shard sweep cadence for dropping refilled-idle buckets.
const CLEANUP_INTERVAL: Duration = Duration::from_secs(30);
/// Sustained-plus-burst request budget for one client.
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub struct RateLimitQuota {
/// Sustained budget in requests per minute.
pub requests_per_minute: u32,
/// Bucket capacity (maximum burst).
pub burst: u32,
}
impl Default for RateLimitConfig {
fn default() -> Self {
Self {
max_requests: 100,
window_duration: Duration::from_secs(60),
impl RateLimitQuota {
/// Build a quota from operator configuration. `rpm == 0` means unlimited
/// (`None`); `burst == 0` means "same as RPM".
pub fn per_minute(rpm: u32, burst: u32) -> Option<Self> {
if rpm == 0 {
return None;
}
Some(Self {
requests_per_minute: rpm,
burst: if burst == 0 { rpm } else { burst },
})
}
}
/// Token bucket for rate limiting
/// Delay hints for a rejected request, in whole seconds (both at least 1).
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub struct ThrottleInfo {
/// Seconds until at least one token is available again (`Retry-After`).
pub retry_after_secs: u64,
/// Seconds until the bucket is completely full (`x-ratelimit-reset`).
pub reset_after_secs: u64,
}
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub enum RateLimitDecision {
Allowed,
Limited(ThrottleInfo),
}
/// One client's bucket. Capacity and refill rate are limiter-wide (single
/// quota for all clients), so they are not duplicated per entry.
#[derive(Debug)]
struct TokenBucket {
/// Maximum number of tokens
max_tokens: u32,
/// Current number of tokens
tokens: f64,
/// Rate at which tokens are refilled (tokens per second)
refill_rate: f64,
/// Last time tokens were refilled
last_refill: Instant,
}
impl TokenBucket {
fn new(max_tokens: u32, window_duration: Duration) -> Self {
fn full(capacity: f64, now: Instant) -> Self {
Self {
max_tokens,
tokens: max_tokens as f64,
refill_rate: max_tokens as f64 / window_duration.as_secs_f64(),
last_refill: Instant::now(),
tokens: capacity,
last_refill: now,
}
}
fn try_consume(&mut self) -> bool {
self.refill();
fn try_consume(&mut self, capacity: f64, refill_per_sec: f64, now: Instant) -> RateLimitDecision {
let elapsed = now.saturating_duration_since(self.last_refill).as_secs_f64();
self.tokens = (self.tokens + elapsed * refill_per_sec).min(capacity);
self.last_refill = now;
if self.tokens >= 1.0 {
self.tokens -= 1.0;
true
RateLimitDecision::Allowed
} else {
false
let retry_after_secs = (((1.0 - self.tokens) / refill_per_sec).ceil() as u64).max(1);
let reset_after_secs = (((capacity - self.tokens) / refill_per_sec).ceil() as u64).max(1);
RateLimitDecision::Limited(ThrottleInfo {
retry_after_secs,
reset_after_secs,
})
}
}
fn refill(&mut self) {
let now = Instant::now();
let elapsed = now.duration_since(self.last_refill).as_secs_f64();
self.tokens = (self.tokens + elapsed * self.refill_rate).min(self.max_tokens as f64);
self.last_refill = now;
/// Idle long enough that refill would have restored a full bucket: the
/// entry carries no information a fresh one would not, so it can be
/// dropped losslessly.
fn is_refilled_idle(&self, capacity: f64, refill_per_sec: f64, now: Instant) -> bool {
now.saturating_duration_since(self.last_refill).as_secs_f64() * refill_per_sec >= capacity
}
}
/// Rate limiter state
#[derive(Debug)]
struct RateLimiterState {
/// Per-client token buckets
struct Shard {
clients: HashMap<IpAddr, TokenBucket>,
/// Configuration
config: RateLimitConfig,
next_cleanup: Instant,
}
impl RateLimiterState {
fn new(config: RateLimitConfig) -> Self {
/// Sharded per-IP token-bucket limiter. Shared by the S3 API tower layer and
/// the console middleware (each with its own instance and quota).
#[derive(Debug)]
pub struct RateLimiter {
shards: Vec<Mutex<Shard>>,
shard_hasher: RandomState,
quota: RateLimitQuota,
capacity: f64,
refill_per_sec: f64,
max_clients_per_shard: usize,
}
impl RateLimiter {
pub fn new(quota: RateLimitQuota) -> Self {
Self::with_limits(quota, SHARD_COUNT, MAX_TRACKED_CLIENTS)
}
fn with_limits(quota: RateLimitQuota, shard_count: usize, max_clients: usize) -> Self {
let now = Instant::now();
Self {
clients: HashMap::new(),
config,
shards: (0..shard_count.max(1))
.map(|_| {
Mutex::new(Shard {
clients: HashMap::new(),
next_cleanup: now + CLEANUP_INTERVAL,
})
})
.collect(),
shard_hasher: RandomState::new(),
quota,
capacity: f64::from(quota.burst.max(1)),
refill_per_sec: f64::from(quota.requests_per_minute) / 60.0,
max_clients_per_shard: (max_clients / shard_count.max(1)).max(1),
}
}
fn check_rate_limit(&mut self, client_ip: IpAddr) -> bool {
let bucket = self
.clients
.entry(client_ip)
.or_insert_with(|| TokenBucket::new(self.config.max_requests, self.config.window_duration));
bucket.try_consume()
pub fn quota(&self) -> RateLimitQuota {
self.quota
}
fn cleanup_expired(&mut self) {
let now = Instant::now();
let window = self.config.window_duration;
self.clients
.retain(|_, bucket| now.duration_since(bucket.last_refill) < window * 2);
/// Consume one token for `ip`, creating its bucket on first sight.
pub fn check(&self, ip: IpAddr) -> RateLimitDecision {
self.check_at(ip, Instant::now())
}
fn check_at(&self, ip: IpAddr, now: Instant) -> RateLimitDecision {
let shard = &self.shards[self.shard_index(ip)];
let mut shard = shard.lock().unwrap_or_else(PoisonError::into_inner);
if now >= shard.next_cleanup {
let (capacity, refill) = (self.capacity, self.refill_per_sec);
shard
.clients
.retain(|_, bucket| !bucket.is_refilled_idle(capacity, refill, now));
shard.next_cleanup = now + CLEANUP_INTERVAL;
}
if let Some(bucket) = shard.clients.get_mut(&ip) {
return bucket.try_consume(self.capacity, self.refill_per_sec, now);
}
if shard.clients.len() >= self.max_clients_per_shard {
// At capacity: reclaim the most idle entry (closest to full, so the
// least information is lost). O(shard len) but only under a
// distinct-IP flood, where correctness beats micro-latency.
if let Some(stalest) = shard
.clients
.iter()
.min_by_key(|(_, bucket)| bucket.last_refill)
.map(|(ip, _)| *ip)
{
shard.clients.remove(&stalest);
}
}
shard
.clients
.entry(ip)
.or_insert_with(|| TokenBucket::full(self.capacity, now))
.try_consume(self.capacity, self.refill_per_sec, now)
}
fn shard_index(&self, ip: IpAddr) -> usize {
(self.shard_hasher.hash_one(ip) as usize) % self.shards.len()
}
#[cfg(test)]
fn tracked_clients(&self) -> usize {
self.shards
.iter()
.map(|shard| shard.lock().unwrap_or_else(PoisonError::into_inner).clients.len())
.sum()
}
}
/// Rate limiting layer
/// Resolve the client identity for rate limiting.
///
/// Only trusted sources are consulted: `ClientInfo` is inserted by the
/// trusted-proxy layer after validating the proxy chain, and `RemoteAddr` is
/// the raw socket peer. Spoofable headers (`X-Forwarded-For`, `X-Real-IP`)
/// are deliberately never read here.
pub(crate) fn client_ip<B>(req: &Request<B>) -> Option<IpAddr> {
if let Some(info) = req.extensions().get::<ClientInfo>() {
return Some(info.real_ip);
}
req.extensions().get::<RemoteAddr>().map(|remote| remote.0.ip())
}
/// Paths exempt from S3 API rate limiting.
///
/// - Health/profiling probes: kubelet and load-balancer checks must never be
/// throttled, or the limiter itself becomes an availability risk.
/// - Internode RPC/gRPC: cluster-internal traffic; throttling it would let an
/// external flood starve replication and heal.
/// - Console: has its own dedicated limiter (`RUSTFS_CONSOLE_RATE_LIMIT_*`).
fn is_rate_limit_exempt_path(path: &str) -> bool {
matches!(
path,
HEALTH_PREFIX
| HEALTH_COMPAT_LIVE_PATH
| HEALTH_READY_PATH
| MINIO_HEALTH_LIVE_PATH
| MINIO_HEALTH_READY_PATH
| MINIO_HEALTH_CLUSTER_PATH
| MINIO_HEALTH_CLUSTER_READ_PATH
| PROFILE_CPU_PATH
| PROFILE_MEMORY_PATH
| FAVICON_PATH
) || has_path_prefix(path, RPC_PREFIX)
|| has_path_prefix(path, TONIC_PREFIX)
|| has_path_prefix(path, CONSOLE_PREFIX)
}
/// Apply the standard throttling headers shared by every rate-limited scope.
pub(crate) fn apply_throttle_headers(headers: &mut HeaderMap, limit_rpm: u32, throttle: &ThrottleInfo) {
let reset_unix = SystemTime::now()
.duration_since(UNIX_EPOCH)
.unwrap_or_default()
.as_secs()
.saturating_add(throttle.reset_after_secs);
headers.insert(http::header::RETRY_AFTER, u64_header(throttle.retry_after_secs));
headers.insert(X_RATE_LIMIT_LIMIT, u64_header(u64::from(limit_rpm)));
headers.insert(X_RATE_LIMIT_REMAINING, HeaderValue::from_static("0"));
headers.insert(X_RATE_LIMIT_RESET, u64_header(reset_unix));
}
fn u64_header(value: u64) -> HeaderValue {
HeaderValue::from_str(&value.to_string()).unwrap_or_else(|_| HeaderValue::from_static("0"))
}
type BoxError = Box<dyn std::error::Error + Send + Sync>;
type BoxBody = http_body_util::combinators::UnsyncBoxBody<Bytes, BoxError>;
/// Build the S3-style `429` rejection. The request id (already generated by
/// `SetRequestIdLayer`, which sits outside this layer) is echoed manually
/// because the rejection short-circuits below `PropagateRequestIdLayer`.
fn s3_too_many_requests_response(request_id: Option<&HeaderValue>, limit_rpm: u32, throttle: &ThrottleInfo) -> Response<BoxBody> {
// The header may be client-supplied (SetRequestIdLayer only fills it when
// absent), so gate the XML interpolation on a UUID-safe charset instead of
// reflecting arbitrary bytes into the body.
let request_id_xml = request_id
.and_then(|value| value.to_str().ok())
.filter(|id| !id.is_empty() && id.bytes().all(|b| b.is_ascii_alphanumeric() || b == b'-'))
.map(|id| format!("<RequestId>{id}</RequestId>"))
.unwrap_or_default();
let body = format!(
"<?xml version=\"1.0\" encoding=\"UTF-8\"?>\
<Error><Code>TooManyRequests</Code>\
<Message>Request rate limit exceeded. Reduce your request rate and retry after the indicated delay.</Message>\
{request_id_xml}</Error>"
);
let body: BoxBody = Full::new(Bytes::from(body))
.map_err(|e| -> BoxError { Box::new(e) })
.boxed_unsync();
let mut response = Response::new(body);
*response.status_mut() = StatusCode::TOO_MANY_REQUESTS;
response
.headers_mut()
.insert(http::header::CONTENT_TYPE, HeaderValue::from_static("application/xml"));
apply_throttle_headers(response.headers_mut(), limit_rpm, throttle);
if let Some(id) = request_id {
response.headers_mut().insert(X_REQUEST_ID, id.clone());
}
response
}
/// Build the S3 API rate limit layer from `RUSTFS_API_RATE_LIMIT_*`.
///
/// Returns `None` (no layer in the stack, zero request-path change) unless
/// explicitly enabled with a non-zero RPM.
pub fn api_rate_limit_layer_from_env() -> Option<RateLimitLayer> {
if !rustfs_utils::get_env_bool(rustfs_config::ENV_API_RATE_LIMIT_ENABLE, rustfs_config::DEFAULT_API_RATE_LIMIT_ENABLE) {
return None;
}
let rpm = rustfs_utils::get_env_u32(rustfs_config::ENV_API_RATE_LIMIT_RPM, rustfs_config::DEFAULT_API_RATE_LIMIT_RPM);
let burst = rustfs_utils::get_env_u32(rustfs_config::ENV_API_RATE_LIMIT_BURST, rustfs_config::DEFAULT_API_RATE_LIMIT_BURST);
let Some(quota) = RateLimitQuota::per_minute(rpm, burst) else {
warn!(
component = LOG_COMPONENT_SERVER,
subsystem = LOG_SUBSYSTEM_RATE_LIMIT,
"{} is enabled but {} is 0; API rate limiting stays inactive",
rustfs_config::ENV_API_RATE_LIMIT_ENABLE,
rustfs_config::ENV_API_RATE_LIMIT_RPM
);
return None;
};
Some(RateLimitLayer::new(quota))
}
/// Tower layer enforcing the per-IP quota on the external S3 service stack.
///
/// All clones share one [`RateLimiter`], so per-connection stack construction
/// keeps a single global view of client budgets.
#[derive(Debug, Clone)]
pub struct RateLimitLayer {
state: Arc<RwLock<RateLimiterState>>,
limiter: Arc<RateLimiter>,
}
impl RateLimitLayer {
pub fn new(config: RateLimitConfig) -> Self {
pub fn new(quota: RateLimitQuota) -> Self {
Self {
state: Arc::new(RwLock::new(RateLimiterState::new(config))),
limiter: Arc::new(RateLimiter::new(quota)),
}
}
pub fn quota(&self) -> RateLimitQuota {
self.limiter.quota()
}
}
impl<S> Layer<S> for RateLimitLayer {
@@ -138,75 +405,401 @@ impl<S> Layer<S> for RateLimitLayer {
fn layer(&self, inner: S) -> Self::Service {
RateLimitService {
inner,
state: self.state.clone(),
limiter: self.limiter.clone(),
}
}
}
/// Rate limiting service
/// See [`RateLimitLayer`]. The response type is pinned to the stack's
/// `BoxBody` so the layer composes with `option_layer` at its position just
/// outside `ReadinessGateLayer` (which already boxes response bodies).
#[derive(Debug, Clone)]
pub struct RateLimitService<S> {
inner: S,
state: Arc<RwLock<RateLimiterState>>,
limiter: Arc<RateLimiter>,
}
impl<S, ReqBody, ResBody> Service<Request<ReqBody>> for RateLimitService<S>
impl<S, ReqBody> Service<Request<ReqBody>> for RateLimitService<S>
where
S: Service<Request<ReqBody>, Response = Response<ResBody>>,
S: Service<Request<ReqBody>, Response = Response<BoxBody>>,
{
type Response = S::Response;
type Response = Response<BoxBody>;
type Error = S::Error;
type Future = S::Future;
type Future = Either<S::Future, Ready<Result<Response<BoxBody>, S::Error>>>;
fn poll_ready(&mut self, cx: &mut std::task::Context<'_>) -> std::task::Poll<Result<(), Self::Error>> {
self.inner.poll_ready(cx)
}
fn call(&mut self, req: Request<ReqBody>) -> Self::Future {
// Extract client IP from request
let client_ip = extract_client_ip(&req);
// Check rate limit
let allowed = {
let mut state = self.state.write().unwrap_or_else(|e| e.into_inner());
// Periodically cleanup expired entries
if rand::random::<u32>().is_multiple_of(100) {
state.cleanup_expired();
}
state.check_rate_limit(client_ip)
if is_rate_limit_exempt_path(req.uri().path()) {
return Either::Left(self.inner.call(req));
}
let Some(ip) = client_ip(&req) else {
// Fail open: without a socket peer address there is no trustworthy
// client identity, and deriving one from spoofable headers would
// let clients pick their own bucket.
return Either::Left(self.inner.call(req));
};
if allowed {
self.inner.call(req)
} else {
// Return 429 Too Many Requests
// Note: In a real implementation, you'd want to return a proper 429 response.
// For now, we just pass the request through to the inner service.
// The rate limiting is enforced at the application level.
self.inner.call(req)
match self.limiter.check(ip) {
RateLimitDecision::Allowed => Either::Left(self.inner.call(req)),
RateLimitDecision::Limited(throttle) => {
counter!(
METRIC_HTTP_SERVER_REQUESTS_RATE_LIMITED_TOTAL,
LABEL_RATE_LIMIT_SCOPE => RATE_LIMIT_SCOPE_S3_API
)
.increment(1);
debug!(
event = EVENT_REQUEST_RATE_LIMITED,
component = LOG_COMPONENT_SERVER,
subsystem = LOG_SUBSYSTEM_RATE_LIMIT,
scope = RATE_LIMIT_SCOPE_S3_API,
client_ip = %ip,
retry_after_secs = throttle.retry_after_secs,
"Request rejected by API rate limit"
);
let limit_rpm = self.limiter.quota().requests_per_minute;
Either::Right(ready(Ok(s3_too_many_requests_response(
req.headers().get(X_REQUEST_ID),
limit_rpm,
&throttle,
))))
}
}
}
}
/// Extract client IP from request headers or connection info
fn extract_client_ip<ReqBody>(req: &Request<ReqBody>) -> IpAddr {
// Try X-Forwarded-For header first
if let Some(forwarded) = req.headers().get("x-forwarded-for")
&& let Ok(forwarded_str) = forwarded.to_str()
&& let Some(first_ip) = forwarded_str.split(',').next()
&& let Ok(ip) = first_ip.trim().parse::<IpAddr>()
{
return ip;
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
use super::*;
use http_body_util::BodyExt;
use serial_test::serial;
use std::net::{Ipv4Addr, SocketAddr};
use std::task::{Context, Poll};
fn quota(rpm: u32, burst: u32) -> RateLimitQuota {
RateLimitQuota::per_minute(rpm, burst).expect("non-zero rpm")
}
// Try X-Real-IP header
if let Some(real_ip) = req.headers().get("x-real-ip")
&& let Ok(ip_str) = real_ip.to_str()
&& let Ok(ip) = ip_str.parse::<IpAddr>()
{
return ip;
fn ip(last: u8) -> IpAddr {
IpAddr::V4(Ipv4Addr::new(203, 0, 113, last))
}
// Default to localhost
IpAddr::V4(std::net::Ipv4Addr::LOCALHOST)
#[test]
fn quota_zero_rpm_means_unlimited_and_zero_burst_defaults_to_rpm() {
assert_eq!(RateLimitQuota::per_minute(0, 50), None);
assert_eq!(quota(120, 0).burst, 120);
assert_eq!(quota(120, 10).burst, 10);
assert_eq!(quota(120, 500).burst, 500);
}
#[test]
fn bucket_exhaustion_returns_429_hints_and_window_recovers() {
let limiter = RateLimiter::new(quota(60, 5)); // 1 token/sec, burst 5
let start = Instant::now();
for _ in 0..5 {
assert_eq!(limiter.check_at(ip(1), start), RateLimitDecision::Allowed);
}
let RateLimitDecision::Limited(throttle) = limiter.check_at(ip(1), start) else {
panic!("sixth request within the same instant must be limited");
};
assert_eq!(throttle.retry_after_secs, 1);
assert_eq!(throttle.reset_after_secs, 5);
// One refill interval restores exactly one token.
assert_eq!(limiter.check_at(ip(1), start + Duration::from_secs(1)), RateLimitDecision::Allowed);
assert!(matches!(
limiter.check_at(ip(1), start + Duration::from_secs(1)),
RateLimitDecision::Limited(_)
));
// A full window restores the full burst.
let later = start + Duration::from_secs(61);
for _ in 0..5 {
assert_eq!(limiter.check_at(ip(1), later), RateLimitDecision::Allowed);
}
assert!(matches!(limiter.check_at(ip(1), later), RateLimitDecision::Limited(_)));
}
#[test]
fn clients_have_independent_buckets() {
let limiter = RateLimiter::new(quota(60, 1));
let now = Instant::now();
assert_eq!(limiter.check_at(ip(1), now), RateLimitDecision::Allowed);
assert!(matches!(limiter.check_at(ip(1), now), RateLimitDecision::Limited(_)));
assert_eq!(limiter.check_at(ip(2), now), RateLimitDecision::Allowed);
}
#[test]
fn tracked_clients_stay_bounded_under_distinct_ip_flood() {
let limiter = RateLimiter::with_limits(quota(60, 1), 4, 64);
let now = Instant::now();
for i in 0..10_000u32 {
limiter.check_at(IpAddr::V4(Ipv4Addr::from(i)), now);
}
assert!(
limiter.tracked_clients() <= 64,
"tracked {} clients, cap is 64",
limiter.tracked_clients()
);
}
#[test]
fn refilled_idle_buckets_are_swept() {
let limiter = RateLimiter::with_limits(quota(60, 5), 1, 100);
let start = Instant::now();
limiter.check_at(ip(1), start);
assert_eq!(limiter.tracked_clients(), 1);
// After burst/rate = 5s the bucket is full again; the next request past
// the cleanup deadline sweeps it.
let after_sweep = start + CLEANUP_INTERVAL + Duration::from_secs(6);
limiter.check_at(ip(2), after_sweep);
assert_eq!(limiter.tracked_clients(), 1, "idle refilled bucket must be dropped");
}
#[test]
fn concurrent_hammering_never_exceeds_burst() {
let limiter = Arc::new(RateLimiter::new(quota(60, 100)));
let now = Instant::now();
let allowed = Arc::new(std::sync::atomic::AtomicUsize::new(0));
std::thread::scope(|scope| {
for _ in 0..8 {
let limiter = Arc::clone(&limiter);
let allowed = Arc::clone(&allowed);
scope.spawn(move || {
for _ in 0..50 {
if limiter.check_at(ip(9), now) == RateLimitDecision::Allowed {
allowed.fetch_add(1, std::sync::atomic::Ordering::Relaxed);
}
}
});
}
});
// 8 threads × 50 attempts = 400 attempts at the same instant: exactly
// the burst may pass, regardless of interleaving.
assert_eq!(allowed.load(std::sync::atomic::Ordering::Relaxed), 100);
}
#[test]
fn exempt_paths_cover_probes_internode_and_console_only() {
for path in [
"/health",
"/health/ready",
"/minio/health/live",
"/minio/health/cluster/read",
"/profile/cpu",
"/favicon.ico",
"/rustfs/rpc/anything",
"/node_service.NodeService/Ping",
"/rustfs/console/index.html",
] {
assert!(is_rate_limit_exempt_path(path), "{path} must be exempt");
}
for path in [
"/bucket/object",
"/",
"/rustfs/admin/v3/info",
"/minio/admin/v3/info",
"/healthy-bucket/object", // prefix boundary: not /health
"/iceberg/v1/config",
] {
assert!(!is_rate_limit_exempt_path(path), "{path} must be limited");
}
}
// ---- service-level tests ----
#[derive(Clone)]
struct OkService;
impl<ReqBody> Service<Request<ReqBody>> for OkService {
type Response = Response<BoxBody>;
type Error = std::convert::Infallible;
type Future = Ready<Result<Self::Response, Self::Error>>;
fn poll_ready(&mut self, _cx: &mut Context<'_>) -> Poll<Result<(), Self::Error>> {
Poll::Ready(Ok(()))
}
fn call(&mut self, _req: Request<ReqBody>) -> Self::Future {
let body: BoxBody = Full::new(Bytes::from_static(b"ok"))
.map_err(|e| -> BoxError { Box::new(e) })
.boxed_unsync();
ready(Ok(Response::new(body)))
}
}
fn service_with_quota(rpm: u32, burst: u32) -> RateLimitService<OkService> {
RateLimitLayer::new(quota(rpm, burst)).layer(OkService)
}
fn request_from(peer: IpAddr, path: &str) -> Request<()> {
let mut req = Request::builder().uri(path).body(()).expect("request");
req.extensions_mut().insert(RemoteAddr(SocketAddr::new(peer, 51000)));
req
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn over_limit_returns_429_with_retry_after_and_ratelimit_headers() {
let mut service = service_with_quota(60, 2);
for _ in 0..2 {
let resp = service.call(request_from(ip(1), "/bucket/object")).await.expect("ok");
assert_eq!(resp.status(), StatusCode::OK);
}
let mut req = request_from(ip(1), "/bucket/object");
req.headers_mut().insert(X_REQUEST_ID, HeaderValue::from_static("req-123"));
let resp = service.call(req).await.expect("ok");
assert_eq!(resp.status(), StatusCode::TOO_MANY_REQUESTS);
assert_eq!(resp.headers().get(http::header::RETRY_AFTER).and_then(|v| v.to_str().ok()), Some("1"));
assert_eq!(resp.headers().get(X_RATE_LIMIT_LIMIT).and_then(|v| v.to_str().ok()), Some("60"));
assert_eq!(resp.headers().get(X_RATE_LIMIT_REMAINING).and_then(|v| v.to_str().ok()), Some("0"));
assert!(resp.headers().contains_key(X_RATE_LIMIT_RESET));
assert_eq!(resp.headers().get(X_REQUEST_ID).and_then(|v| v.to_str().ok()), Some("req-123"));
assert_eq!(
resp.headers().get(http::header::CONTENT_TYPE).and_then(|v| v.to_str().ok()),
Some("application/xml")
);
let body = resp.into_body().collect().await.expect("body").to_bytes();
let body = String::from_utf8_lossy(&body);
assert!(body.contains("<Code>TooManyRequests</Code>"), "body: {body}");
assert!(body.contains("<RequestId>req-123</RequestId>"), "body: {body}");
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn hostile_request_id_is_not_reflected_into_the_429_body() {
let mut service = service_with_quota(60, 1);
let _ = service.call(request_from(ip(3), "/bucket/object")).await.expect("ok");
let mut req = request_from(ip(3), "/bucket/object");
req.headers_mut()
.insert(X_REQUEST_ID, HeaderValue::from_static("<Code>evil</Code>"));
let resp = service.call(req).await.expect("ok");
assert_eq!(resp.status(), StatusCode::TOO_MANY_REQUESTS);
let body = resp.into_body().collect().await.expect("body").to_bytes();
let body = String::from_utf8_lossy(&body);
assert!(!body.contains("evil"), "client-controlled request id must not be reflected: {body}");
assert!(!body.contains("<RequestId>"), "malformed id must be omitted entirely: {body}");
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn exempt_paths_are_never_limited() {
let mut service = service_with_quota(60, 1);
for _ in 0..5 {
let resp = service.call(request_from(ip(1), "/health/ready")).await.expect("ok");
assert_eq!(resp.status(), StatusCode::OK);
}
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn forwarded_for_header_cannot_choose_the_bucket() {
let mut service = service_with_quota(60, 1);
// Same socket peer, rotating spoofed headers: still one bucket.
let mut first = request_from(ip(1), "/bucket/object");
first
.headers_mut()
.insert("x-forwarded-for", HeaderValue::from_static("10.0.0.1"));
assert_eq!(service.call(first).await.expect("ok").status(), StatusCode::OK);
let mut second = request_from(ip(1), "/bucket/object");
second
.headers_mut()
.insert("x-forwarded-for", HeaderValue::from_static("10.0.0.2"));
second.headers_mut().insert("x-real-ip", HeaderValue::from_static("10.0.0.3"));
assert_eq!(service.call(second).await.expect("ok").status(), StatusCode::TOO_MANY_REQUESTS);
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn validated_client_info_takes_precedence_over_socket_peer() {
let mut service = service_with_quota(60, 1);
// Two clients behind the same trusted proxy socket: distinct buckets.
for client in [ip(10), ip(11)] {
let mut req = request_from(ip(1), "/bucket/object");
req.extensions_mut().insert(ClientInfo::direct(SocketAddr::new(client, 443)));
assert_eq!(service.call(req).await.expect("ok").status(), StatusCode::OK);
}
// And the validated identity is throttled independently of the socket.
let mut req = request_from(ip(2), "/bucket/object");
req.extensions_mut().insert(ClientInfo::direct(SocketAddr::new(ip(10), 443)));
assert_eq!(service.call(req).await.expect("ok").status(), StatusCode::TOO_MANY_REQUESTS);
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn missing_client_identity_fails_open() {
let mut service = service_with_quota(60, 1);
for _ in 0..3 {
let req = Request::builder().uri("/bucket/object").body(()).expect("request");
assert_eq!(service.call(req).await.expect("ok").status(), StatusCode::OK);
}
}
#[test]
#[serial]
fn env_constructor_defaults_to_disabled() {
temp_env::with_vars(
[
(rustfs_config::ENV_API_RATE_LIMIT_ENABLE, None::<&str>),
(rustfs_config::ENV_API_RATE_LIMIT_RPM, None),
(rustfs_config::ENV_API_RATE_LIMIT_BURST, None),
],
|| {
assert!(api_rate_limit_layer_from_env().is_none());
},
);
}
#[test]
#[serial]
fn env_constructor_requires_enable_and_nonzero_rpm() {
temp_env::with_vars(
[
(rustfs_config::ENV_API_RATE_LIMIT_ENABLE, Some("true")),
(rustfs_config::ENV_API_RATE_LIMIT_RPM, None),
(rustfs_config::ENV_API_RATE_LIMIT_BURST, None),
],
|| {
assert!(api_rate_limit_layer_from_env().is_none(), "enabled with rpm=0 stays inactive");
},
);
temp_env::with_vars(
[
(rustfs_config::ENV_API_RATE_LIMIT_ENABLE, Some("false")),
(rustfs_config::ENV_API_RATE_LIMIT_RPM, Some("600")),
(rustfs_config::ENV_API_RATE_LIMIT_BURST, None),
],
|| {
assert!(api_rate_limit_layer_from_env().is_none(), "rpm without enable stays inactive");
},
);
temp_env::with_vars(
[
(rustfs_config::ENV_API_RATE_LIMIT_ENABLE, Some("true")),
(rustfs_config::ENV_API_RATE_LIMIT_RPM, Some("600")),
(rustfs_config::ENV_API_RATE_LIMIT_BURST, Some("50")),
],
|| {
let layer = api_rate_limit_layer_from_env().expect("enabled with rpm");
assert_eq!(
layer.quota(),
RateLimitQuota {
requests_per_minute: 600,
burst: 50
}
);
},
);
}
}
-1
View File
@@ -88,7 +88,6 @@ checked_files=(
"crates/protocols/src/swift/container.rs"
"crates/protocols/src/swift/object.rs"
"crates/protocols/src/swift/formpost.rs"
"crates/protocols/src/swift/ratelimit.rs"
"crates/protocols/src/swift/expiration.rs"
"crates/protocols/src/swift/cors.rs"
"crates/protocols/src/swift/quota.rs"