* feat(kms): report configuration references that block a key deletion
Adds a KeyImpactReport that states which configuration still points at a
key, how exhaustively the sources were read, and which sources were not
consulted at all. The report deliberately carries no in-use or
safe-to-delete claim: it covers the configuration layer only, so an empty
reference list means nothing was found in the scanned sources, never that
the key is unreferenced.
Immediate deletion destroys key material without ever reaching the
deletion worker, so it never passed the worker's reference gate. The
manager now consults the same checker on that path and refuses with a
typed KeyStillReferenced error. This only ever adds a refusal; the
scheduled deletion path and the worker's blocking behaviour are
unchanged.
* test(kms): cover the immediate-deletion reference refusal
* feat(kms): surface configuration references on the admin key endpoints
DeleteKey and DescribeKey now return an impact section listing the
configuration that points at the key, so an operator scheduling a
deletion sees what will refuse to destroy the material instead of
learning it from a server-side log once the window has run out.
The section is reported, never acted on: scheduling still succeeds while
references exist, and the deletion worker's gate remains the only thing
that decides whether material is destroyed. An immediate deletion that
the manager refuses for an outstanding reference now answers 409.
* test(kms): pin the impact wire shape and the unreferenced force-delete path
* fix(kms): make the DescribeKey impact section opt-in
Collecting the section lists every bucket, and DescribeKey is polled, so
carrying that fan-out on the default read path trades a hot path's cost
for a diagnostic. It is now collected only for impact=true; without the
parameter the endpoint does exactly the work it did before and returns
no impact field.
A value that is neither true nor false is refused rather than read as
off, so a typo cannot answer a request for the section with a response
that merely lacks one. DeleteKey still reports unconditionally: that is
the request whose consequences the caller cannot otherwise see, and it
is not polled.
* fix(kms): box the query-parse refusal now that responses carry impact
The delete response grew an impact section, which pushed it past the
size clippy accepts inline in a Result. It is a full response body
rather than an error code, so it is boxed at the one place that returns
it as an error; the wire shape and the public field type are unchanged.
* feat(kms): accept the AWS backend through KMS configuration
The AWS KMS backend could be constructed but not selected: the admin
configure API had no AWS variant and startup rejected the backend name.
The configure request pins the region rather than defaulting it, because
that configuration is persisted once and replayed on every node: leaving
the region to each node's ambient provider chain would let nodes address
different regions, and therefore different keys, while reporting an
identical configuration. The request accepts no credential fields, so
credentials stay with the aws-config provider chain on each node, and
`deny_unknown_fields` refuses attempts to submit them anyway.
* test(kms): cover AWS backend selection through the service manager
An end-to-end check that an admin configure request selects the AWS
backend, builds a client, and passes the startup health check. Marked
#[ignore]: it needs real AWS credentials, though it creates no key and
is therefore not billable on its own.
* feat(kms): enforce shared key state machine across backends
Unify the key state x operation matrix behind a single gate in
backends/mod.rs and wire it into the Local, Vault KV2 and Vault Transit
backends: Disabled keys reject encryption, data key generation and
rotation while still allowing decryption and lifecycle recovery;
PendingDeletion keys reject everything except decryption and
cancellation (including repeated deletion scheduling); cancellation now
requires an actual pending deletion everywhere. This closes the missing
gates on KV2 encrypt/generate and Local generate_data_key, and stops
enable_key from silently reverting a pending deletion.
Decryption is deliberately left ungated in Disabled/PendingDeletion — an
explicit, documented and tested deviation from AWS KMS, since gating it
would break reads of existing objects the moment a key is disabled.
Add shared contract tests driving the full matrix offline for Local (and
via ignored tests against a live Vault for KV2/Transit), a stateless
contract for Static, an SSE-shaped regression proving existing envelopes
stay decryptable after disable, and a pin on the known-risk Enabled
default of Transit's synthesized metadata fallback.
Refs rustfs/backlog#1571 (part of rustfs/backlog#1562)
* feat(kms): persist deletion deadlines and run a restartable deletion worker (#5491)
* feat(kms): add AppRole configuration surface for Vault auth
Extend VaultAuthMethod::AppRole with secret_id_file (re-read on every
login so external rotation is picked up), a configurable auth mount
(default "approle"), and an optional fail-closed safety window. All new
fields are serde(default) so previously persisted configurations keep
deserializing, and the strict admin-configure deserializer accepts them
as optional.
Environment selection: setting RUSTFS_KMS_VAULT_APPROLE_ROLE_ID switches
both Vault backends to AppRole; the secret_id comes from
RUSTFS_KMS_VAULT_APPROLE_SECRET_ID_FILE (path stored, file wins) or
RUSTFS_KMS_VAULT_APPROLE_SECRET_ID, following the static secret-key file
precedent. validate() rejects AppRole configs without a role_id, without
any secret_id source, or with an empty mount.
Also append the CredentialsUnavailable error variant used by the
fail-closed credential gate.
* feat(kms): implement AppRole login with background renewal and fail-closed expiry
Implement the AppRoleLogin token source (vaultrs approle login +
renew-self) and wire lease-bound credentials through the provider:
- Each successful login/renewal installs a new client generation in the
ArcSwap; in-flight requests finish on the generation they captured.
- A background renewal task refreshes at half the lease TTL: renewable
tokens are renewed in place, everything else (or a failed renewal)
falls back to a fresh login. Auth exchanges run under the typed retry
policy (OpClass::Auth) and failed cycles retry on a fixed cadence, so
the provider recovers once Vault does.
- Fail-closed: current() refuses to hand out a token inside the
configured safety window of its expiry (default: one attempt timeout),
returning CredentialsUnavailable instead of sending a request whose
token may lapse mid-flight.
- Refreshes are single-flight: concurrent triggers for the same
generation coalesce into one login.
- The renewal task's owner handle lives on the KMS service version:
stop() shuts it down explicitly and reconfigure recycles it via
cancel-on-drop when the old version is discarded.
- The secret_id file is re-read on every login attempt; missing or empty
files fail the attempt without contacting Vault. Crate-owned copies of
tokens and secret_ids are zeroized on drop, and Debug output of every
credential-carrying type stays redacted (leak regression tests).
The renewal machinery is covered by paused-clock tests driving a
scripted token source: renew-at-half-TTL timing, login fallback,
fail-closed window entry and recovery, prompt task recycling, and
coalesced concurrent refreshes.
* feat(kms): add Vault Agent token file authentication
Add the TokenFile source: the token is read from an agent-managed sink
file (RUSTFS_KMS_VAULT_TOKEN_FILE or the TokenFile auth config) and
re-read once per poll interval (default 30s) through the existing
renewal loop, so a token rotated by the agent installs a new client
generation within one poll of the atomic replace. Each successful read
extends the token's observed validity to twice the poll interval; a
file that disappears or turns empty keeps failing the refresh until the
fail-closed window trips, and heals the provider as soon as it is
restored.
Reads are strict and never contact Vault on failure: the file must be
non-empty after trimming, and on Unix group/other permission bits are a
hard error (mirroring the SFTP host-key rule). Rotation detection uses
a content digest; the token itself is never stored on the source and
the crate-owned copy is zeroized.
Configuring the token file together with AppRole or an explicit static
token is rejected as a configuration error. All new config fields are
serde(default) and the strict admin-configure deserializer accepts the
new variant.
Covered by paused-clock tests (atomic replacement installs a new
generation next cycle, deletion fails closed and recovers, prompt task
recycling) plus negatives for missing/empty/over-permissive files and a
Debug leak regression.
* docs(kms): add Vault authentication and credential lifecycle runbook
Cover choosing between static token, AppRole, and Vault Agent token
file auth; AppRole role setup with SecretID delivery and rotation;
Agent sink deployment with the permission requirements; and the
fail-closed window semantics with a troubleshooting table keyed on the
renewal task's log lines.
* refactor(sse): decouple encryption from ecstore
* feat(kms): enhance KMS service manager with runtime state and persistence support
* feat(kms): add local key export functionality for SSE-S3 migration tests
* fix(kms): keep local key export narrowly scoped
* fix(sse): validate copy source customer algorithm
---------
Co-authored-by: Zhengchao An <anzhengchao@gmail.com>
* feat(kms): implement secure handling of static KMS secret keys and enhance encryption context validation
* feat: enhance local SSE DEK handling with JSON envelope format and versioning
* feat(kms): implement key management service with local and vault backends
Signed-off-by: junxiang Mu <1948535941@qq.com>
* feat(kms): enhance security with zeroize for sensitive data and improve key management
Signed-off-by: junxiang Mu <1948535941@qq.com>
* remove Hashi word
Signed-off-by: junxiang Mu <1948535941@qq.com>
* refactor: remove unused request structs from kms handlers
Signed-off-by: junxiang Mu <1948535941@qq.com>
---------
Signed-off-by: junxiang Mu <1948535941@qq.com>
Zhengchao An