Expose the ECStore instance context through a narrow accessor so relocated on-demand migration backfill code no longer reaches into private storage fields.
Declare the faster-hex dependency used by the relocated native HTTP source implementation.
Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
Co-Authored-By: zhi22915 <qiuzgang@gmail.com>
* fix(ecstore): restore odm source contract tests
Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
Co-Authored-By: zhi22915 <qiuzgang@gmail.com>
* test(ci): initialize replication evidence in chain test
Run the replication workflow's evidence initialization before the chain handoff self-test executes the suite step. This keeps the test model aligned with the workflow-provided LOG_FILE and TMPDIR values.
Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
Co-Authored-By: zhi22915 <qiuzgang@gmail.com>
* fix(odm): distinguish missing GCS buckets from object misses (#7221)
---------
Co-authored-by: zhi22915 <qiuzgang@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Zhengchao An <anzhengchao@gmail.com>
test(e2e): prove bucket config survives rc.5 upgrade and rollback
Add two upgrade-compatibility scenarios pinned to the on-demand-migration
series' on-disk surfaces: BucketMetadata's 44 -> 46 msgpack keys, the
fail-closed bucket-config reads of rustfs#7172, the encryption-gated PUT
path of rustfs#7183, and the default-on migration module of rustfs#7089.
The upgrade case writes versioning, SSE-S3 default encryption, a validated
replication target plus rule, lifecycle, tags, quota, a public access block,
a bucket policy and an object lock configuration with the pinned previous
release, then asserts each one reads back unchanged on the current build,
that list-remote-targets still reports the target, that writes to the
encrypted and plain buckets keep their encryption posture, that every
pre-upgrade object including a multipart one is byte-identical, and that an
unconfigured bucket reports no migration and still answers NoSuchKey.
The rollback case is the reverse: the current build writes the 46-key blob
and the previous release must decode it by skipping the two unknown keys.
Resolve scanner complete-publication conflicts by preserving the bucket inventory completeness gate and the current activity-derived execution identity.
Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
Co-Authored-By: zhi22915 <qiuzgang@gmail.com>
* feat(ecstore): add a native azure blob odm source backend
* feat(ecstore): add a native gcs odm source backend and one backend contract
* fix(ecstore): refuse an empty azure account key at client build
* fix(ecstore): probe gcs sources with the listing permission
* fix(app): drop a redundant match guard on the sse config lookup
* fix(ecstore): drop stale rename commit duplicates from local.rs
* test(ecstore): use the sanctioned placeholder key in the gcs fixture
Keep the batch on the frozen main baseline for final target validation.
Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
Co-Authored-By: zhi22915 <qiuzgang@gmail.com>
Keep the batch on the frozen main baseline for final target validation.
Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
Co-Authored-By: zhi22915 <qiuzgang@gmail.com>
* fix(ecstore): correct sealed-credential test helper parameter type
The helper took a HashMap that nothing imports, so the ecstore test target did not compile.
* fix(ecstore): fail closed on an unreadable bucket-targets blob
An undecodable bucket-targets.json was replaced by an empty BucketTargets,
so every replication target of that bucket disappeared, replication stopped,
and no caller saw an error. A missing secretKey alone triggers it, because
Credentials has no struct-level serde(default).
parse_all_configs now retains the failure instead: the raw bytes stay and the
typed field stays None, which BucketMetadata::bucket_targets_unreadable reads
as "exists but cannot be read" — the same distinction the fabricated marker
draws for bucket metadata as a whole. One corrupt sub-config still never fails
the metadata load, so an unreadable bucket cannot take down its neighbours or
the node.
BucketTargetSys records such buckets and answers every targets query with the
new BucketRemoteTargetsUnreadable, leaving any snapshot from an earlier
readable load in place so in-flight replication is not torn down. The
replication heal queue reports Missed rather than scheduling against an empty
target set, and the admin listing surfaces the fault instead of an empty list.
Refs: rustfs/backlog#2282
* fix(ecstore): report corrupt permissive bucket configs as invalid
Audit of the remaining parse_all_configs branches. Policy, versioning, object
lock and replication already fail closed at their accessors; encryption,
public access block and quota did not, and for those three "absent" is exactly
the state that grants something — plaintext storage, anonymous access,
unbounded capacity. They now report a stored-but-undecodable payload as
invalid rather than as ConfigNotFound, matching the guard the versioning and
object-lock accessors already use. The quota enforcement path already refused
such a payload; only the metadata read path was misreporting it.
The branches left degrading, and the concrete reason each is safe, are
recorded in the table on parse_all_configs.
Refs: rustfs/backlog#2282
Refresh compatible dependencies for Scanner/Heal V2 batch 1 and verify
the production S3 retry/signing path with a deterministic clock.
Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
Co-Authored-By: zhi22915 <qiuzgang@gmail.com>
SealScope::encryption_context() returned a HashMap whose key order is
non-deterministic. The FakeSealer test round-trips the context through
JSON serialization, and HashMap's random iteration order caused the
prefix comparison to intermittently fail with 'encryption context mismatch'.
Switch to BTreeMap which guarantees stable key ordering.
houseme