test(e2e): pin upgrade compatibility to rc.5 and cover bucket configuration (#7217)

test(e2e): prove bucket config survives rc.5 upgrade and rollback

Add two upgrade-compatibility scenarios pinned to the on-demand-migration
series' on-disk surfaces: BucketMetadata's 44 -> 46 msgpack keys, the
fail-closed bucket-config reads of rustfs#7172, the encryption-gated PUT
path of rustfs#7183, and the default-on migration module of rustfs#7089.

The upgrade case writes versioning, SSE-S3 default encryption, a validated
replication target plus rule, lifecycle, tags, quota, a public access block,
a bucket policy and an object lock configuration with the pinned previous
release, then asserts each one reads back unchanged on the current build,
that list-remote-targets still reports the target, that writes to the
encrypted and plain buckets keep their encryption posture, that every
pre-upgrade object including a multipart one is byte-identical, and that an
unconfigured bucket reports no migration and still answers NoSuchKey.

The rollback case is the reverse: the current build writes the 46-key blob
and the previous release must decode it by skipping the two unknown keys.
This commit is contained in:
Zhengchao An
2026-09-06 01:08:22 +08:00
committed by GitHub
parent 8f763fb1a2
commit 8fb335cf19
3 changed files with 711 additions and 9 deletions
@@ -12,19 +12,30 @@
// See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
// limitations under the License.
use crate::common::{RustFSTestClusterEnvironment, RustFSTestEnvironment, init_logging, rustfs_binary_path};
use crate::common::{
RustFSTestClusterEnvironment, RustFSTestEnvironment, admin_request, init_logging, replication_fast_env, rustfs_binary_path,
};
use crate::fake_s3_target::{FAKE_ACCESS_KEY, FAKE_SECRET_KEY, FakeS3Target};
use crate::replication_extension_test::{
LOOPBACK_REPLICATION_TARGET_ENV, ReplicationTargetOptions, put_bucket_replication, set_replication_target_with_options,
};
use aws_sdk_s3::Client;
use aws_sdk_s3::error::ProvideErrorMetadata;
use aws_sdk_s3::primitives::ByteStream;
use aws_sdk_s3::types::{
BucketVersioningStatus, CompletedMultipartUpload, CompletedPart, ServerSideEncryption, VersioningConfiguration,
BucketLifecycleConfiguration, BucketVersioningStatus, CompletedMultipartUpload, CompletedPart, DefaultRetention,
ExpirationStatus, LifecycleExpiration, LifecycleRule, LifecycleRuleFilter, ObjectLockConfiguration, ObjectLockEnabled,
ObjectLockRetentionMode, ObjectLockRule, PublicAccessBlockConfiguration, ServerSideEncryption, ServerSideEncryptionByDefault,
ServerSideEncryptionConfiguration, ServerSideEncryptionRule, Tag, Tagging, VersioningConfiguration,
};
use http::{Method, StatusCode};
use std::path::{Path, PathBuf};
use std::time::Duration;
use tokio::task::JoinSet;
use tokio::time::{Instant, sleep};
type TestResult = Result<(), Box<dyn std::error::Error + Send + Sync>>;
type BoxError = Box<dyn std::error::Error + Send + Sync>;
const SOURCE_BINARY_ENV: &str = "RUSTFS_UPGRADE_SOURCE_BINARY";
const SSE_MASTER_KEY_ENV: &str = "RUSTFS_SSE_S3_MASTER_KEY";
@@ -40,6 +51,32 @@ const MULTIPART_UPLOADS_PER_WORKER: usize = 16;
// comfortably covers that window plus CI scheduling jitter.
const LISTING_CONVERGENCE_TIMEOUT: Duration = Duration::from_secs(30);
// Bucket-configuration upgrade/rollback scenarios (rustfs#7172, #7183, #7089).
const CONFIG_PLAIN_BUCKET: &str = "upgrade-config-plain";
const CONFIG_ENCRYPTED_BUCKET: &str = "upgrade-config-encrypted";
const CONFIG_REPLICATED_BUCKET: &str = "upgrade-config-replicated";
const CONFIG_LOCKED_BUCKET: &str = "upgrade-config-locked";
const CONFIG_REPLICA_BUCKET: &str = "upgrade-config-replica";
const ROLLBACK_BUCKET: &str = "rollback-config-data";
const ROLLBACK_REPLICA_BUCKET: &str = "rollback-config-replica";
const BUCKET_QUOTA_BYTES: u64 = 64 * 1024 * 1024;
const LIFECYCLE_RULE_ID: &str = "upgrade-expire-logs";
const LIFECYCLE_PREFIX: &str = "logs/";
const LIFECYCLE_DAYS: i32 = 30;
const BUCKET_TAG_KEY: &str = "owner";
const BUCKET_TAG_VALUE: &str = "upgrade-compatibility";
const OBJECT_LOCK_DAYS: i32 = 1;
// `set-bucket-quota` answers 503 until the scanner has made the bucket's usage
// authoritative; the quota test uses the same 30s budget.
const QUOTA_READINESS_TIMEOUT: Duration = Duration::from_secs(30);
// Quota admission fails closed while a freshly started server has neither
// authoritative usage nor a persisted degraded baseline for the bucket
// (rustfs#5716), so a write to a quota-enabled bucket is retryable-503 for that
// window. It is a restart property, not an upgrade property — the same window
// opens on the very first start — so the write assertions ride it out instead
// of treating it as an upgrade failure.
const QUOTA_ADMISSION_WARMUP_TIMEOUT: Duration = Duration::from_secs(90);
fn source_binary() -> Result<PathBuf, Box<dyn std::error::Error + Send + Sync>> {
let path = std::env::var_os(SOURCE_BINARY_ENV)
.map(PathBuf::from)
@@ -429,3 +466,653 @@ async fn rolling_upgrade_from_rc2_preserves_mixed_version_contracts() -> TestRes
Ok(())
}
/// Child-process environment shared by both bucket-configuration scenarios.
///
/// The replication target is an in-process fake bound to `127.0.0.1`, which
/// `set-remote-target` rejects as an SSRF risk without the loopback opt-in, and
/// the proxy bypass keeps a developer's `HTTP_PROXY` from intercepting the
/// server's outbound health check.
fn bucket_config_server_env() -> Vec<(&'static str, &'static str)> {
let mut env = vec![
(SSE_MASTER_KEY_ENV, SSE_MASTER_KEY),
("NO_PROXY", "127.0.0.1,localhost"),
("HTTP_PROXY", ""),
("HTTPS_PROXY", ""),
// Shorten the scanner cycle so the bucket's usage becomes authoritative
// in seconds; both `set-bucket-quota` and quota admission block on it.
("RUSTFS_SCANNER_CYCLE", "1"),
("RUSTFS_SCANNER_START_DELAY_SECS", "0"),
];
env.extend_from_slice(LOOPBACK_REPLICATION_TARGET_ENV);
env.extend(replication_fast_env());
env
}
/// Restart `env` in place on the same data directory using an explicit binary.
///
/// [`RustFSTestEnvironment::restart_server_preserving_data`] always relaunches
/// the workspace build, which is the upgrade direction only. The rollback
/// scenario needs the reverse: stop the current build and bring the pinned
/// previous release up on the metadata that build just wrote.
async fn restart_from_binary(env: &mut RustFSTestEnvironment, binary: &Path, server_env: &[(&str, &str)]) -> TestResult {
env.stop_server();
env.start_rustfs_server_from_binary(binary, vec![], server_env).await
}
async fn set_bucket_quota(env: &RustFSTestEnvironment, bucket: &str, quota_bytes: u64) -> TestResult {
let path = format!("/rustfs/admin/v3/quota/{bucket}");
let body = serde_json::json!({ "quota": quota_bytes, "quota_type": "HARD" }).to_string();
let deadline = Instant::now() + QUOTA_READINESS_TIMEOUT;
loop {
let (status, response) =
admin_request(&env.url, Method::PUT, &path, Some(body.clone()), &env.access_key, &env.secret_key).await?;
if status.is_success() {
return Ok(());
}
if status != StatusCode::SERVICE_UNAVAILABLE || Instant::now() >= deadline {
return Err(format!("setting the quota of {bucket} failed: {status} {response}").into());
}
sleep(Duration::from_millis(500)).await;
}
}
/// PUT into a quota-enabled bucket, riding out the post-start quota-admission
/// warm-up described on [`QUOTA_ADMISSION_WARMUP_TIMEOUT`].
///
/// Only `ServiceUnavailable` is retried: any other failure, and a warm-up that
/// never ends, is a genuine regression and surfaces as an error.
async fn put_object_through_quota_warmup(client: &Client, bucket: &str, key: &str, body: &'static [u8]) -> TestResult {
let deadline = Instant::now() + QUOTA_ADMISSION_WARMUP_TIMEOUT;
loop {
let result = client
.put_object()
.bucket(bucket)
.key(key)
.body(ByteStream::from_static(body))
.send()
.await;
let error = match result {
Ok(_) => return Ok(()),
Err(error) => error,
};
let retryable = error.as_service_error().and_then(ProvideErrorMetadata::code) == Some("ServiceUnavailable");
if !retryable || Instant::now() >= deadline {
return Err(format!("PUT {bucket}/{key} failed after the quota warm-up window: {error}").into());
}
sleep(Duration::from_millis(500)).await;
}
}
async fn get_bucket_quota(env: &RustFSTestEnvironment, bucket: &str) -> Result<Option<u64>, BoxError> {
let path = format!("/rustfs/admin/v3/quota/{bucket}");
let (status, response) = admin_request(&env.url, Method::GET, &path, None, &env.access_key, &env.secret_key).await?;
if status != StatusCode::OK {
return Err(format!("reading the quota of {bucket} failed: {status} {response}").into());
}
let quota: serde_json::Value = serde_json::from_str(&response)?;
Ok(quota.get("quota").and_then(serde_json::Value::as_u64))
}
/// `GET /rustfs/admin/v3/list-remote-targets?bucket=...`.
///
/// Returns an error for any non-200, because rustfs#7172 made this endpoint
/// fail closed on a `bucket-targets.json` blob the running build cannot parse.
/// An upgrade that misreads a blob written by the previous release therefore
/// shows up here as an error, and a silently dropped target shows up as an
/// empty list — the caller must distinguish the two.
async fn list_remote_targets(env: &RustFSTestEnvironment, bucket: &str) -> Result<Vec<serde_json::Value>, BoxError> {
let path = format!("/rustfs/admin/v3/list-remote-targets?bucket={}", urlencoding::encode(bucket));
let (status, response) = admin_request(&env.url, Method::GET, &path, None, &env.access_key, &env.secret_key).await?;
if status != StatusCode::OK {
return Err(format!("list-remote-targets for {bucket} failed: {status} {response}").into());
}
Ok(serde_json::from_str(&response)?)
}
/// Assert that `bucket` still carries exactly the replication target `arn`.
async fn assert_remote_target_preserved(env: &RustFSTestEnvironment, bucket: &str, arn: &str, context: &str) -> TestResult {
let targets = list_remote_targets(env, bucket).await?;
assert_eq!(
targets.len(),
1,
"{context}: list-remote-targets must still report the single configured target, got {targets:?}"
);
assert_eq!(
targets[0].get("arn").and_then(serde_json::Value::as_str),
Some(arn),
"{context}: the target ARN changed across the restart: {targets:?}"
);
Ok(())
}
/// Configure a replication target on `bucket` pointing at the in-process fake,
/// then attach an enabled replication rule for it. Returns the target ARN.
async fn configure_replication(
env: &RustFSTestEnvironment,
bucket: &str,
target: &FakeS3Target,
target_bucket: &str,
) -> Result<String, BoxError> {
let arn = set_replication_target_with_options(
env,
bucket,
ReplicationTargetOptions {
endpoint: &target.address(),
access_key: FAKE_ACCESS_KEY,
secret_key: FAKE_SECRET_KEY,
target_bucket,
secure: false,
skip_tls_verify: false,
ca_cert_pem: None,
},
)
.await?;
put_bucket_replication(env, bucket, &arn).await?;
Ok(arn)
}
async fn put_default_sse_s3_encryption(client: &Client, bucket: &str) -> TestResult {
let configuration = ServerSideEncryptionConfiguration::builder()
.rules(
ServerSideEncryptionRule::builder()
.apply_server_side_encryption_by_default(
ServerSideEncryptionByDefault::builder()
.sse_algorithm(ServerSideEncryption::Aes256)
.build()?,
)
.build(),
)
.build()?;
client
.put_bucket_encryption()
.bucket(bucket)
.server_side_encryption_configuration(configuration)
.send()
.await?;
Ok(())
}
async fn assert_default_sse_s3_encryption(client: &Client, bucket: &str, context: &str) -> TestResult {
let response = client.get_bucket_encryption().bucket(bucket).send().await?;
let rules = response
.server_side_encryption_configuration()
.ok_or("GetBucketEncryption omitted the configuration")?
.rules();
assert_eq!(rules.len(), 1, "{context}: expected exactly one encryption rule, got {rules:?}");
assert_eq!(
rules[0]
.apply_server_side_encryption_by_default()
.map(ServerSideEncryptionByDefault::sse_algorithm),
Some(&ServerSideEncryption::Aes256),
"{context}: the default encryption algorithm changed"
);
Ok(())
}
async fn put_bucket_tag(client: &Client, bucket: &str) -> TestResult {
let tagging = Tagging::builder()
.tag_set(Tag::builder().key(BUCKET_TAG_KEY).value(BUCKET_TAG_VALUE).build()?)
.build()?;
client.put_bucket_tagging().bucket(bucket).tagging(tagging).send().await?;
Ok(())
}
async fn assert_bucket_tag(client: &Client, bucket: &str, context: &str) -> TestResult {
let tags = client.get_bucket_tagging().bucket(bucket).send().await?;
let tag_set = tags.tag_set();
assert_eq!(tag_set.len(), 1, "{context}: expected exactly one bucket tag, got {tag_set:?}");
assert_eq!(tag_set[0].key(), BUCKET_TAG_KEY, "{context}: bucket tag key changed");
assert_eq!(tag_set[0].value(), BUCKET_TAG_VALUE, "{context}: bucket tag value changed");
Ok(())
}
async fn assert_versioning_enabled(client: &Client, bucket: &str, context: &str) -> TestResult {
let versioning = client.get_bucket_versioning().bucket(bucket).send().await?;
assert_eq!(
versioning.status(),
Some(&BucketVersioningStatus::Enabled),
"{context}: versioning is no longer Enabled on {bucket}"
);
Ok(())
}
fn bucket_policy_document(bucket: &str) -> serde_json::Value {
serde_json::json!({
"Version": "2012-10-17",
"Statement": [{
"Sid": "UpgradePublicRead",
"Effect": "Allow",
"Principal": { "AWS": ["*"] },
"Action": ["s3:GetObject"],
"Resource": [format!("arn:aws:s3:::{bucket}/public/*")]
}]
})
}
/// `GET .../on-demand-migration/{bucket}/status`.
///
/// The migration module defaults on from rustfs#7089, so a bucket that never
/// configured a source must still answer `configured: false` rather than
/// engaging the migration path.
async fn assert_migration_not_configured(env: &RustFSTestEnvironment, bucket: &str) -> TestResult {
let path = format!("/rustfs/admin/v3/on-demand-migration/{bucket}/status");
let (status, response) = admin_request(&env.url, Method::GET, &path, None, &env.access_key, &env.secret_key).await?;
assert_eq!(
status,
StatusCode::OK,
"the migration status endpoint must answer for an unconfigured bucket: {status} {response}"
);
let body: serde_json::Value = serde_json::from_str(&response)?;
assert_eq!(
body.get("configured"),
Some(&serde_json::Value::Bool(false)),
"a bucket upgraded from the previous release must not look migration-configured: {body}"
);
Ok(())
}
/// A GET for a key that was never written must be a plain `NoSuchKey`.
///
/// With the migration module on by default this is the cheap proof that an
/// unconfigured bucket never consults a source: any migration engagement would
/// surface as a different status or error code here.
async fn assert_missing_key_is_no_such_key(client: &Client, bucket: &str, key: &str) -> TestResult {
let error = client
.get_object()
.bucket(bucket)
.key(key)
.send()
.await
.expect_err("a key that was never written must not be readable");
assert_eq!(
error.raw_response().map(|response| response.status().as_u16()),
Some(404),
"a missing key must stay a 404 on a bucket with no migration configuration"
);
assert_eq!(
error.as_service_error().and_then(ProvideErrorMetadata::code),
Some("NoSuchKey"),
"a missing key must stay NoSuchKey on a bucket with no migration configuration"
);
Ok(())
}
/// Bucket configuration written by the pinned previous release must survive an
/// upgrade to the current build unchanged, and must keep working.
///
/// This pins the three on-disk surfaces the on-demand-migration series moved:
///
/// * `BucketMetadata` grew two msgpack keys (encoded map length 44 -> 46), so
/// every configuration read below decodes a 44-key blob on 46-key code.
/// * rustfs#7172 made an unreadable `bucket-targets.json` / encryption /
/// public-access-block / quota blob "present but unreadable" instead of
/// silently defaulting, and made `list-remote-targets` fail closed on it. A
/// replication target configured by the old release must therefore still be
/// *listed*, not dropped and not an error.
/// * rustfs#7183 made the object write path refuse a PUT when the bucket's
/// encryption configuration cannot be read, so a misparsed SSE config would
/// turn every PUT to that bucket into a 500.
///
/// Not covered on purpose: on-demand-migration configuration itself, which the
/// previous release has no public API for — the reverse direction is asserted
/// instead (an upgraded bucket reports `configured: false`).
#[tokio::test]
#[ignore = "requires a pinned previous RustFS release binary"]
async fn direct_upgrade_from_previous_release_preserves_bucket_configuration() -> TestResult {
init_logging();
let previous_binary = source_binary()?;
// In-process: the fake target outlives both server processes, so the
// replication target stays reachable across the upgrade.
let replication_target = FakeS3Target::start().await?;
replication_target.create_bucket(CONFIG_REPLICA_BUCKET);
let mut env = RustFSTestEnvironment::new().await?;
let server_env = bucket_config_server_env();
env.start_rustfs_server_from_binary(&previous_binary, vec![], &server_env)
.await?;
let old_client = env.create_s3_client();
env.create_test_bucket(CONFIG_PLAIN_BUCKET).await?;
env.create_test_bucket(CONFIG_ENCRYPTED_BUCKET).await?;
env.create_test_bucket(CONFIG_REPLICATED_BUCKET).await?;
old_client
.create_bucket()
.bucket(CONFIG_LOCKED_BUCKET)
.object_lock_enabled_for_bucket(true)
.send()
.await?;
// Plain bucket: policy, tags, lifecycle, quota.
let policy = bucket_policy_document(CONFIG_PLAIN_BUCKET);
old_client
.put_bucket_policy()
.bucket(CONFIG_PLAIN_BUCKET)
.policy(policy.to_string())
.send()
.await?;
put_bucket_tag(&old_client, CONFIG_PLAIN_BUCKET).await?;
old_client
.put_bucket_lifecycle_configuration()
.bucket(CONFIG_PLAIN_BUCKET)
.lifecycle_configuration(
BucketLifecycleConfiguration::builder()
.rules(
LifecycleRule::builder()
.id(LIFECYCLE_RULE_ID)
.status(ExpirationStatus::Enabled)
.filter(LifecycleRuleFilter::builder().prefix(LIFECYCLE_PREFIX).build())
.expiration(LifecycleExpiration::builder().days(LIFECYCLE_DAYS).build())
.build()?,
)
.build()?,
)
.send()
.await?;
set_bucket_quota(&env, CONFIG_PLAIN_BUCKET, BUCKET_QUOTA_BYTES).await?;
// Encrypted bucket: SSE-S3 default encryption plus a fully restrictive
// public access block, both of which rustfs#7172 now fails closed on.
put_default_sse_s3_encryption(&old_client, CONFIG_ENCRYPTED_BUCKET).await?;
old_client
.put_public_access_block()
.bucket(CONFIG_ENCRYPTED_BUCKET)
.public_access_block_configuration(
PublicAccessBlockConfiguration::builder()
.block_public_acls(true)
.ignore_public_acls(true)
.block_public_policy(true)
.restrict_public_buckets(true)
.build(),
)
.send()
.await?;
// Replicated bucket: versioning, a validated remote target, a rule.
enable_versioning(&old_client, CONFIG_REPLICATED_BUCKET).await?;
let target_arn = configure_replication(&env, CONFIG_REPLICATED_BUCKET, &replication_target, CONFIG_REPLICA_BUCKET).await?;
assert_remote_target_preserved(&env, CONFIG_REPLICATED_BUCKET, &target_arn, "before the upgrade").await?;
// Object-lock bucket: a default GOVERNANCE retention on a fresh bucket.
old_client
.put_object_lock_configuration()
.bucket(CONFIG_LOCKED_BUCKET)
.object_lock_configuration(
ObjectLockConfiguration::builder()
.object_lock_enabled(ObjectLockEnabled::Enabled)
.rule(
ObjectLockRule::builder()
.default_retention(
DefaultRetention::builder()
.mode(ObjectLockRetentionMode::Governance)
.days(OBJECT_LOCK_DAYS)
.build(),
)
.build(),
)
.build(),
)
.send()
.await?;
let plain_key = "plain/written-by-previous";
let plain_bytes = b"plain object written by the previous RustFS release";
put_object_through_quota_warmup(&old_client, CONFIG_PLAIN_BUCKET, plain_key, plain_bytes).await?;
let encrypted_key = "encrypted/written-by-previous";
let encrypted_bytes = b"default-encrypted object written by the previous RustFS release";
old_client
.put_object()
.bucket(CONFIG_ENCRYPTED_BUCKET)
.key(encrypted_key)
.body(ByteStream::from_static(encrypted_bytes))
.send()
.await?;
assert_eq!(
read_object(&old_client, CONFIG_ENCRYPTED_BUCKET, encrypted_key, None)
.await?
.0,
Some(ServerSideEncryption::Aes256),
"the previous release must apply the bucket default encryption it just accepted"
);
// The multipart object lives in the default-encrypted bucket so the
// upgraded build has to reassemble parts *and* re-derive the object key.
let multipart_key = "encrypted/multipart-written-by-previous";
let multipart_parts = vec![vec![b'm'; 5 * 1024 * 1024], b"final multipart bytes".to_vec()];
let multipart_bytes = multipart_parts.concat();
write_multipart(&old_client, CONFIG_ENCRYPTED_BUCKET, multipart_key, &multipart_parts).await?;
let versioned_key = "versioned/written-by-previous";
let versioned_bytes = b"versioned object written by the previous RustFS release";
let versioned_id = old_client
.put_object()
.bucket(CONFIG_REPLICATED_BUCKET)
.key(versioned_key)
.body(ByteStream::from_static(versioned_bytes))
.send()
.await?
.version_id()
.ok_or("versioned PUT omitted version ID")?
.to_string();
env.restart_server_preserving_data(vec![], &server_env).await?;
let new_client = env.create_s3_client();
// Every configuration must read back unchanged on the upgraded build.
let upgraded_policy = new_client.get_bucket_policy().bucket(CONFIG_PLAIN_BUCKET).send().await?;
let upgraded_policy: serde_json::Value =
serde_json::from_str(upgraded_policy.policy().ok_or("GetBucketPolicy omitted the document")?)?;
assert_eq!(upgraded_policy, policy, "the bucket policy changed across the upgrade");
assert_bucket_tag(&new_client, CONFIG_PLAIN_BUCKET, "after the upgrade").await?;
let lifecycle = new_client
.get_bucket_lifecycle_configuration()
.bucket(CONFIG_PLAIN_BUCKET)
.send()
.await?;
let rules = lifecycle.rules();
assert_eq!(rules.len(), 1, "the lifecycle rule count changed across the upgrade: {rules:?}");
assert_eq!(rules[0].id(), Some(LIFECYCLE_RULE_ID));
assert_eq!(rules[0].status(), &ExpirationStatus::Enabled);
assert_eq!(
rules[0].expiration().and_then(LifecycleExpiration::days),
Some(LIFECYCLE_DAYS),
"the lifecycle expiration changed across the upgrade"
);
assert_eq!(
get_bucket_quota(&env, CONFIG_PLAIN_BUCKET).await?,
Some(BUCKET_QUOTA_BYTES),
"the bucket quota changed across the upgrade"
);
assert_default_sse_s3_encryption(&new_client, CONFIG_ENCRYPTED_BUCKET, "after the upgrade").await?;
let public_access_block = new_client
.get_public_access_block()
.bucket(CONFIG_ENCRYPTED_BUCKET)
.send()
.await?;
let public_access_block = public_access_block
.public_access_block_configuration()
.ok_or("GetPublicAccessBlock omitted the configuration")?;
assert_eq!(public_access_block.block_public_acls(), Some(true));
assert_eq!(public_access_block.ignore_public_acls(), Some(true));
assert_eq!(public_access_block.block_public_policy(), Some(true));
assert_eq!(public_access_block.restrict_public_buckets(), Some(true));
assert_versioning_enabled(&new_client, CONFIG_REPLICATED_BUCKET, "after the upgrade").await?;
// rustfs#7172: neither an empty list nor an error is acceptable here.
assert_remote_target_preserved(&env, CONFIG_REPLICATED_BUCKET, &target_arn, "after the upgrade").await?;
let replication = new_client
.get_bucket_replication()
.bucket(CONFIG_REPLICATED_BUCKET)
.send()
.await?;
let replication_rules = replication
.replication_configuration()
.ok_or("GetBucketReplication omitted the configuration")?
.rules();
assert_eq!(
replication_rules.len(),
1,
"the replication rule count changed across the upgrade: {replication_rules:?}"
);
assert_eq!(
replication_rules[0].destination().map(|destination| destination.bucket()),
Some(target_arn.as_str()),
"the replication rule no longer points at the configured target"
);
let object_lock = new_client
.get_object_lock_configuration()
.bucket(CONFIG_LOCKED_BUCKET)
.send()
.await?;
let object_lock = object_lock
.object_lock_configuration()
.ok_or("GetObjectLockConfiguration omitted the configuration")?;
assert_eq!(object_lock.object_lock_enabled(), Some(&ObjectLockEnabled::Enabled));
let retention = object_lock
.rule()
.and_then(ObjectLockRule::default_retention)
.ok_or("the object lock configuration lost its default retention")?;
assert_eq!(retention.mode(), Some(&ObjectLockRetentionMode::Governance));
assert_eq!(retention.days(), Some(OBJECT_LOCK_DAYS));
// rustfs#7183: a PUT into the default-encrypted bucket must still succeed
// and still come back encrypted.
let post_upgrade_encrypted_key = "encrypted/written-after-upgrade";
let post_upgrade_encrypted_bytes = b"default-encrypted object written by the current RustFS build";
new_client
.put_object()
.bucket(CONFIG_ENCRYPTED_BUCKET)
.key(post_upgrade_encrypted_key)
.body(ByteStream::from_static(post_upgrade_encrypted_bytes))
.send()
.await?;
let (encryption, body) = read_object(&new_client, CONFIG_ENCRYPTED_BUCKET, post_upgrade_encrypted_key, None).await?;
assert_eq!(
encryption,
Some(ServerSideEncryption::Aes256),
"a PUT after the upgrade lost the bucket default encryption"
);
assert_eq!(body, post_upgrade_encrypted_bytes);
let post_upgrade_plain_key = "plain/written-after-upgrade";
let post_upgrade_plain_bytes = b"plain object written by the current RustFS build";
put_object_through_quota_warmup(&new_client, CONFIG_PLAIN_BUCKET, post_upgrade_plain_key, post_upgrade_plain_bytes).await?;
let (encryption, body) = read_object(&new_client, CONFIG_PLAIN_BUCKET, post_upgrade_plain_key, None).await?;
assert_eq!(encryption, None, "a bucket without default encryption must not encrypt a PUT");
assert_eq!(body, post_upgrade_plain_bytes);
// Every object written by the previous release reads back byte-identical.
assert_eq!(read_object(&new_client, CONFIG_PLAIN_BUCKET, plain_key, None).await?.1, plain_bytes);
let (encryption, body) = read_object(&new_client, CONFIG_ENCRYPTED_BUCKET, encrypted_key, None).await?;
assert_eq!(encryption, Some(ServerSideEncryption::Aes256));
assert_eq!(body, encrypted_bytes);
let (encryption, body) = read_object(&new_client, CONFIG_ENCRYPTED_BUCKET, multipart_key, None).await?;
assert_eq!(encryption, Some(ServerSideEncryption::Aes256));
assert_eq!(body, multipart_bytes, "the multipart object did not survive the upgrade");
assert_eq!(
read_object(&new_client, CONFIG_REPLICATED_BUCKET, versioned_key, Some(&versioned_id))
.await?
.1,
versioned_bytes
);
// rustfs#7089: the migration module is on by default, but a bucket that
// never configured a source behaves exactly as before.
assert_migration_not_configured(&env, CONFIG_PLAIN_BUCKET).await?;
assert_missing_key_is_no_such_key(&new_client, CONFIG_PLAIN_BUCKET, "plain/never-written").await?;
replication_target.shutdown().await;
Ok(())
}
/// Rolling back to the pinned previous release must still read the bucket
/// metadata the current build wrote.
///
/// This is the other half of the `BucketMetadata` 44 -> 46 key change: the
/// current build writes a 46-key msgpack map with `OnDemandMigrationConfigJSON`
/// and `OnDemandMigrationConfigUpdatedAt`, and the previous release's decoder
/// has to skip those two unknown keys instead of failing the whole blob. If it
/// did not, every configuration read below would come back empty or error and
/// the rollback would silently discard the bucket's configuration.
#[tokio::test]
#[ignore = "requires a pinned previous RustFS release binary"]
async fn rollback_to_previous_release_reads_current_bucket_metadata() -> TestResult {
init_logging();
let previous_binary = source_binary()?;
let replication_target = FakeS3Target::start().await?;
replication_target.create_bucket(ROLLBACK_REPLICA_BUCKET);
let mut env = RustFSTestEnvironment::new().await?;
let server_env = bucket_config_server_env();
env.start_rustfs_server_with_env(vec![], &server_env).await?;
let new_client = env.create_s3_client();
env.create_test_bucket(ROLLBACK_BUCKET).await?;
enable_versioning(&new_client, ROLLBACK_BUCKET).await?;
put_default_sse_s3_encryption(&new_client, ROLLBACK_BUCKET).await?;
put_bucket_tag(&new_client, ROLLBACK_BUCKET).await?;
let target_arn = configure_replication(&env, ROLLBACK_BUCKET, &replication_target, ROLLBACK_REPLICA_BUCKET).await?;
assert_remote_target_preserved(&env, ROLLBACK_BUCKET, &target_arn, "before the rollback").await?;
let single_key = "rollback/single";
let single_bytes = b"single-part object written by the current RustFS build";
let single_version = new_client
.put_object()
.bucket(ROLLBACK_BUCKET)
.key(single_key)
.body(ByteStream::from_static(single_bytes))
.send()
.await?
.version_id()
.ok_or("versioned PUT omitted version ID")?
.to_string();
let multipart_key = "rollback/multipart";
let multipart_parts = vec![vec![b'r'; 5 * 1024 * 1024], b"final rollback bytes".to_vec()];
let multipart_bytes = multipart_parts.concat();
write_multipart(&new_client, ROLLBACK_BUCKET, multipart_key, &multipart_parts).await?;
restart_from_binary(&mut env, &previous_binary, &server_env).await?;
let old_client = env.create_s3_client();
assert_versioning_enabled(&old_client, ROLLBACK_BUCKET, "after the rollback").await?;
assert_default_sse_s3_encryption(&old_client, ROLLBACK_BUCKET, "after the rollback").await?;
assert_bucket_tag(&old_client, ROLLBACK_BUCKET, "after the rollback").await?;
assert_remote_target_preserved(&env, ROLLBACK_BUCKET, &target_arn, "after the rollback").await?;
let (encryption, body) = read_object(&old_client, ROLLBACK_BUCKET, single_key, Some(&single_version)).await?;
assert_eq!(encryption, Some(ServerSideEncryption::Aes256));
assert_eq!(body, single_bytes);
let (encryption, body) = read_object(&old_client, ROLLBACK_BUCKET, multipart_key, None).await?;
assert_eq!(encryption, Some(ServerSideEncryption::Aes256));
assert_eq!(body, multipart_bytes, "the multipart object did not survive the rollback");
// A PUT on the rolled-back release must still honour the encryption
// configuration it decoded out of the current build's metadata blob.
let post_rollback_key = "rollback/written-after-rollback";
let post_rollback_bytes = b"object written by the previous RustFS release after the rollback";
old_client
.put_object()
.bucket(ROLLBACK_BUCKET)
.key(post_rollback_key)
.body(ByteStream::from_static(post_rollback_bytes))
.send()
.await?;
let (encryption, body) = read_object(&old_client, ROLLBACK_BUCKET, post_rollback_key, None).await?;
assert_eq!(
encryption,
Some(ServerSideEncryption::Aes256),
"the rolled-back release lost the bucket default encryption"
);
assert_eq!(body, post_rollback_bytes);
replication_target.shutdown().await;
Ok(())
}