P-A (`read_appending`) and P-C (the in-memory fast path) each copied the
hashed-read logic, so `BitrotReader` ended up with the hash verification, the
short-read error, and the scratch-buffer fill written three times across
`read` and `read_appending`'s two branches. That is patch-on-patch: a change
to the bitrot contract would have to be made in three places and kept in
sync by hand.
Collapse the duplication onto three single-source pieces:
- `split_and_verify` — a free function that splits `[hash][data]`, verifies
(unless skip_verify), and returns the data slice plus the hash time. Free
rather than a method so it can run while `self` is borrowed for the block.
- `read_scratch_block` — the single-pass fill of `self.buf` with the
short-read-to-UnexpectedEof contract.
- `short_shard_read` / `begin_read` — the shared error and preamble.
`read` and `read_appending` now differ only in what they must: how the block
is acquired (caller's slice vs `try_take_block` vs scratch fill) and where the
verified shard lands (`copy_from_slice` vs `extend_from_slice`).
This also fixes a latent inconsistency the duplication hid: the old `read`
did `copy_from_slice` *before* verifying, so on a hash mismatch it left the
corrupt bytes in the caller's buffer before returning the error, while
`read_appending` verified first. Both now verify before writing, so a shard
that fails the hash never reaches the caller's buffer on either method — the
stronger of the two behaviors.
Net -19 lines; behavior otherwise unchanged. Verified: `erasure::` 215
passed, 0 failed (including the fast-path equivalence and corrupt-shard tests,
and the existing `test_bitrot_read_hash_mismatch`); clippy --all-targets
-D warnings clean.
Co-authored-by: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
* perf(ecstore): slice in-memory shards instead of copying them twice (backlog#1159)
The GET path reads a shard out of the page cache into a `Bytes`, then
`open_disk_reader` erased it behind `Box<dyn AsyncRead>` by wrapping it in
a `Cursor`. Downstream, `BitrotReader` could only get it back by copying:
once out of the `Cursor` into its scratch buffer, and once from there into
the caller's buffer. CPU profiling of a cached 1 MiB GET (device reads = 0)
attributed 8.23% of the whole server to `Cursor::poll_read` alone — a copy
of data that was already sitting in memory.
Keep the source concrete instead of erasing it. `ShardReader` is an enum of
`InMemory(Cursor<Bytes>)` and `Stream(Box<dyn AsyncRead ...>)`, and the new
`ShardSource::try_take_block(n)` lets an in-memory source hand over the
`[hash][data]` block as a slice. `read_appending` uses it to verify the hash
on the slice and `extend_from_slice` the shard straight into the caller's
buffer: one copy instead of two.
`try_take_block` defaults to `None`, so a streaming source keeps the old
path byte for byte, along with its short-read and EOF semantics. A source
that cannot serve `n` bytes declines rather than truncating, so a partial
block still becomes UnexpectedEof rather than a short shard. The hash is
still checked before anything is appended, so a corrupt shard never reaches
the caller's buffer on either path. The deferred parity reader opens its
source lazily and stays on the streaming path; parity is only read when a
data shard fails.
Tests gate equivalence and non-vacuity:
* `try_take_block` fires for `Cursor<Bytes>`, advances the position exactly
as a read of the same length would, declines when fewer than `n` bytes
remain, and returns `None` for a non-`Bytes` source — without this the
equivalence test below would silently compare one path against itself;
* both paths return identical bytes for the same shard;
* a corrupt shard fails on the fast path too, appending nothing.
Verified: clippy --tests -D warnings clean; `erasure::` 215 passed, 0 failed;
`set_disk::core::io_primitives` 49 and `io_support::` 22 pass.
Stacked on #4681 (`read_appending`), which this builds on.
Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
* fix(ecstore): implement ShardSource for Cursor<&[u8]> used by the erasure bench
`crates/ecstore/benches/erasure_benchmark.rs` builds
`BitrotReader<Cursor<&[u8]>>`, which the new `ShardSource` bound on
`ParallelReader`/`decode` does not accept. `cargo clippy --tests` does not
compile bench targets, so this only surfaced in CI's `--all-targets` run.
A borrowed slice carries no `Bytes` to hand out, so it takes the default
`try_take_block` and keeps the old streaming copy path — no behavior change.
Verified with the same target set CI uses:
`cargo clippy -p rustfs-ecstore --all-targets -- -D warnings` clean.
Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
---------
Co-authored-by: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
`ShardBufferPool::take` handed out a `resize(len, 0)`-ed buffer, and the
reader then overwrote every byte of it. CPU profiling of a cached 1 MiB
GET (device reads = 0, so all cost is CPU) attributed 4.81% of the whole
server to that memset — a buffer pool exists to reuse an allocation, and
memsetting it gives the saving straight back.
The zeroing was load-bearing only because `BitrotReader::read` takes
`&mut [u8]`, which must be initialized. But the reader never reads what
the caller put there, and never returns a partially filled buffer: both
the hashed and the no-hash path either fill the whole shard or fail with
UnexpectedEof, and a hash mismatch is an error rather than a short read.
So the initialization bought nothing observable.
Add `BitrotReader::read_appending(&mut Vec<u8>, want)`, which appends into
the buffer's spare capacity instead of demanding initialized bytes:
* hashed path — unchanged single copy, `extend_from_slice(data)` in place
of `copy_from_slice` into a pre-zeroed buffer, and only after the hash
verifies, so corrupt bytes never reach the caller's buffer;
* no-hash path — `read_buf` writes straight into the spare capacity and
advances the length only over bytes the reader actually wrote, so an
uninitialized tail can never be exposed.
`ShardBufferPool::take` now yields an empty buffer with capacity, and
`read_shard` no longer needs to `truncate`. `read` keeps its old signature
for the remaining callers.
Four tests gate the contract rather than the call:
* `read_appending` is byte-for-byte identical to `read` on both paths;
* a truncated shard is UnexpectedEof, never a partially filled buffer;
* bytes that fail the bitrot hash never reach the caller's buffer;
* `want > shard_size` is rejected;
plus the pool test now asserts the allocation is reused (same pointer) and
never zeroed.
Verified: `erasure::` 213 passed, 0 failed; on a real Linux host
`erasure::` 209 and `disk::local::` 143 pass serially, and the failures
seen in a parallel full-suite run reproduce identically on unmodified main
(they are ENOSPC from a full root filesystem plus pre-existing flakes).
Not claimed: an end-to-end throughput number. The A/B on the bench host was
too noisy to attribute (one rep pair was not fully cached, and its root
filesystem filled mid-run); what is measured is that the removed memset was
4.81% of GET CPU in the pre-change profile.
Co-authored-by: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
bitrot_shard_file_size only counts per-block checksum bytes for the two
streaming Highway variants, while BitrotWriter::write interleaves a hash
for any hash_algo.size() > 0 and bitrot_verify's read loop assumes an
interleaved hash per block. The three disagree for non-streaming
algorithms (SHA256/HighwayHash256/BLAKE2b512/Md5), but the divergence is
unreachable in production: every write path hardcodes HighwayHash256S and
ErasureInfo::get_checksum_info defaults to HighwayHash256S.
Per the audit decision (backlog#959), do NOT change the size formula:
it is a byte-for-byte port of MinIO's bitrotShardFileSize and its bare
return for non-streaming algorithms is correct for MinIO whole-file
bitrot; changing it would break legacy interop. Instead, document the
per-algorithm layout contract at bitrot_shard_file_size, BitrotWriter,
and bitrot_verify, and add regression tests that pin the invariants:
get_checksum_info defaults to HighwayHash256S, and the size formula
counts per-block hash bytes for streaming variants only while returning
the bare size for non-streaming ones. No disk layout or formula change.
Co-authored-by: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
* perf(ecstore): read bitrot hash+data in one pass on the shard path
BitrotReader::read issued two reads per block: one read_exact for the
32-byte hash, then a separate loop for the shard data. On the streaming
disk reader (a raw tokio File whose every read is a spawn_blocking
round-trip) that is two dispatches per block. Since the on-disk layout is
a contiguous [hash][data] run, pull both in a single pass into a reused
scratch buffer and split afterwards, halving the per-block dispatch count
on the streaming path. The no-hash path still reads straight into the
caller buffer with no extra copy, and an in-memory Cursor (inline/mmap)
just does a slice copy.
All existing invariants are preserved: a short read of either the hash or
the data maps to UnexpectedEof before and independent of the hash check
(backlog#799 B2), and the hash-mismatch / InvalidData semantics are
unchanged.
Correctness-only change; the per-dispatch latency win is platform
dependent and its default reliance is left to the warp size-bucket
benchmark gate tracked by backlog#935, per the backlog#933 acceptance
note.
Refs: rustfs/backlog#933 (HP-12 item 2), rustfs/backlog#936
Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
* docs: reword bitrot test comment to satisfy typos check
Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
---------
Co-authored-by: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
Merge the hotpath-rs wall-time instrumentation from the backlog#936 analysis worktree behind an opt-in 'hotpath' cargo feature, keeping the default build at zero overhead and zero dependency.
- hotpath is an optional dependency everywhere (dep:hotpath feature syntax); the default dependency tree contains no hotpath crate at all
- 40+ measurement points across S3 handlers, ECStore/SetDisks object and multipart ops, erasure encode/decode, bitrot, LocalDisk I/O, FileMeta codec, and HashReader
- attribute sites use #[cfg_attr(feature = "hotpath", hotpath::measure)]; async_trait bodies use per-crate hp_guard! macros (ecstore + rustfs bin); rio gates measure_block! behind hp_measure_block!
- feature chain: rustfs -> rustfs-ecstore -> rustfs-rio / rustfs-filemeta, each crate owning its own gate
- hotpath-alloc is intentionally not wired up (hotpath 0.21.x TLS panic on cross-thread guard drop under tokio, see backlog#935); mimalloc stays the unconditional global allocator
- docs/development/hotpath-profiling.md documents building, HOTPATH_* env vars, SIGTERM report flow, and how to reproduce the backlog#936 timing reports
Refs: https://github.com/rustfs/backlog/issues/935 (HP-14, item 2), https://github.com/rustfs/backlog/issues/936
Co-authored-by: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
Two compounding defects let a truncated shard corrupt a GET (ranged GET could
return HTTP 200 with wrong bytes):
- `BitrotReader::read` returned `Ok(short_len)` when the shard stream hit EOF
before filling the caller's buffer. With `skip_verify` /
`HashAlgorithm::None` / parity=0 there is no hash to catch it, so the short
shard was accepted and every downstream byte shifted.
- `ParallelReader.offset` was set once and never advanced per stripe, so every
stripe after the first reused the first stripe's geometry and the last-stripe
length clamp was wrong.
Fix both (they are mutually required):
- `BitrotReader::read` now errors (`UnexpectedEof`) on a short read, before and
independent of the bitrot hash check, so it fires under skip-verify/no-hash
too. The caller sizes the buffer to the expected per-stripe shard length, so
"buffer not filled" == "shard truncated". A short read routes through the
existing `errs[i]` path, dropping that reader from the stripe so parity
reconstruction engages; with parity=0 the stripe fails read quorum and the GET
errors loudly instead of streaming shifted bytes. Mirrors MinIO's
`parallelReader.Read` (`n != shardSize` -> reader failed).
- `ParallelReader::read` / `read_lockstep` advance `self.offset += shard_size`
per stripe so the per-stripe expected length (incl. the shorter final stripe)
is exact, matching the correct pattern already used by heal.
Updates three bitrot tests that used an obsolete oversized-buffer pattern to
size per-stripe (as the real decode/heal paths do), and adds a regression test
that a truncated shard errors under None/HighwayHash + skip_verify.
Refs backlog#799 (B2), issue rustfs/backlog#851. Design converged by two
independent expert reviews referencing MinIO cmd/erasure-decode.go.
Second TODO-convergence round over the current tree (backlog#646). All
line numbers in the old inventory had gone stale after the set_disk /
diagnostics / cluster refactors, so this re-scans and reduces the marker
count from 144 to 99.
STALE removals (comment describes already-implemented behavior, or dead
commented-out blocks) across ecstore (set_disk ops/core, store,
cluster/rpc, bucket/metadata_sys, services), iam, filemeta, s3select and
rustfs auth/object_usecase. No behavior change.
Safe fills, each verified:
- filemeta: replication_info_equals now also compares
replication_state_internal (function currently has no callers; adds a
regression test).
- bitrot: drop the confirmed-unused `_want` parameter from bitrot_verify
and the now-unused `sum` on LocalDisk::bitrot_verify, removing a
Bytes::copy_from_slice allocation. Streaming verify uses the file's
embedded per-shard hash, never the passed sum.
- signer: rename v4_ignored_headers -> V4_IGNORED_HEADERS and drop the
non_upper_case_globals allow.
- admin/heal: test_decode was #[ignore]d and used serde_urlencoded on a
JSON body (would panic); rewire to serde_json::from_slice to match the
production decode path, add assertions, un-ignore.
Verified: cargo fmt; cargo check on touched crates; tests pass
(filemeta, signer, bitrot, heal::test_decode); arch guardrail scripts
pass.