fix(bitrot): reject trailing shard data (#5358)

* fix(bitrot): reject trailing shard data

* test(ecstore): align bitrot disk fixture type
This commit is contained in:
cxymds
2026-07-28 17:23:08 +08:00
committed by GitHub
parent 7af92b4f54
commit 45c3386b68
2 changed files with 109 additions and 2 deletions
+47 -2
View File
@@ -443,7 +443,9 @@ pub fn bitrot_shard_file_size(size: usize, shard_size: usize, algo: HashAlgorith
size.div_ceil(shard_size) * algo.size() + size
}
/// Verify an interleaved per-block bitrot shard file.
/// Verify an interleaved per-block bitrot shard file and consume the reader
/// through EOF. Bytes beyond the encoded length are corruption, even when every
/// expected block has a valid hash.
///
/// The read loop below assumes every block on disk is `[hash][data]` (streaming
/// bitrot). It is therefore only valid for the streaming Highway variants, whose
@@ -487,6 +489,11 @@ pub async fn bitrot_verify<R: AsyncRead + Unpin + Send>(
left -= read;
}
let mut trailing = [0u8; 1];
if r.read(&mut trailing).await? != 0 {
return Err(std::io::Error::other("bitrot shard file has trailing data"));
}
Ok(())
}
@@ -860,12 +867,19 @@ mod tests {
.await
.expect("valid bitrot shard file should verify");
let mut truncated = written.clone();
truncated.pop();
let err = bitrot_verify(Cursor::new(truncated), written.len(), data.len(), algo.clone(), shard_size)
.await
.expect_err("one-byte-short shard file must be rejected while reading");
assert_eq!(err.kind(), std::io::ErrorKind::UnexpectedEof);
let err = bitrot_verify(Cursor::new(written.clone()), written.len() - 1, data.len(), algo.clone(), shard_size)
.await
.expect_err("wrong file size must be rejected before reading data");
assert!(err.to_string().contains("size mismatch"));
let mut corrupt = written;
let mut corrupt = written.clone();
let last = corrupt.len() - 1;
corrupt[last] ^= 0x80;
let err = bitrot_verify(
@@ -878,6 +892,21 @@ mod tests {
.await
.expect_err("hash mismatch must reject corrupted data");
assert!(err.to_string().contains("hash mismatch"));
for trailing in [vec![0xa5], vec![0xa5; 17]] {
let mut oversized = written.clone();
oversized.extend_from_slice(&trailing);
let err = bitrot_verify(
Cursor::new(oversized),
written.len(),
data.len(),
HashAlgorithm::HighwayHash256S,
shard_size,
)
.await
.expect_err("trailing bytes after a valid encoded shard must be rejected");
assert!(err.to_string().contains("trailing data"));
}
}
#[tokio::test]
@@ -909,6 +938,22 @@ mod tests {
assert!(err.to_string().contains("hash mismatch"));
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn bitrot_verify_accepts_exact_legacy_streaming_layout() {
let data = b"legacy streaming bitrot";
let shard_size = 8;
let algo = HashAlgorithm::HighwayHash256SLegacy;
let mut writer = BitrotWriter::new(Cursor::new(Vec::new()), shard_size, algo.clone());
for chunk in data.chunks(shard_size) {
writer.write(chunk).await.expect("legacy streaming shard should encode");
}
let written = writer.into_inner().into_inner();
bitrot_verify(Cursor::new(written.clone()), written.len(), data.len(), algo, shard_size)
.await
.expect("exact legacy streaming shard should remain valid");
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn write_all_vectored_retries_partial_hash_and_data_writes_and_rejects_zero_write() {
let mut writer = LimitedVectoredWriter {
@@ -199,6 +199,32 @@ mod tests {
.expect("healthy temp shard should verify");
assert_eq!(verified, 1);
for trailing in [vec![0xa5], vec![0xa5; 17]] {
let mut oversized = encoded.to_vec();
oversized.extend_from_slice(&trailing);
disk.write_all(RUSTFS_META_TMP_BUCKET, path, Bytes::from(oversized))
.await
.expect("oversized temp shard should be staged");
let err = verify_written_bitrot_shards(
&[Some(disk.clone())],
None,
BitrotSelfVerifyTarget {
operation: "put_object",
bucket: "bucket",
object: "object",
part_number: None,
volume: RUSTFS_META_TMP_BUCKET,
path,
logical_shard_size,
shard_size,
write_quorum: 1,
},
)
.await
.expect_err("disk shard with trailing bytes must not be committed");
assert!(err.to_string().contains("trailing data"));
}
let mut corrupt = encoded.to_vec();
let last = corrupt.len() - 1;
corrupt[last] ^= 0x01;
@@ -225,4 +251,40 @@ mod tests {
.expect_err("corrupt no-parity temp shard must not be committed");
assert!(err.to_string().contains("bitrot self-verify failed"));
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn no_parity_inline_self_verify_rejects_trailing_bytes() {
let (_temp_dirs, disks, _set_disks) = hermetic_set_disks_for_pool_with_default_parity(1, 0, 0).await;
let shard_size = 16usize;
let payload = b"inline bitrot payload";
let encoded = encode_streaming_shard(payload, shard_size).await;
let disks = disks.into_iter().map(Some).collect::<Vec<_>>();
for trailing in [vec![0xa5], vec![0xa5; 17]] {
let mut oversized = encoded.to_vec();
oversized.extend_from_slice(&trailing);
let parts = [FileInfo {
data: Some(Bytes::from(oversized)),
..Default::default()
}];
let err = verify_written_bitrot_shards(
&disks,
Some(&parts),
BitrotSelfVerifyTarget {
operation: "put_object",
bucket: "bucket",
object: "inline-object",
part_number: None,
volume: RUSTFS_META_TMP_BUCKET,
path: "unused-for-inline",
logical_shard_size: payload.len(),
shard_size,
write_quorum: 1,
},
)
.await
.expect_err("inline shard with trailing bytes must not be committed");
assert!(err.to_string().contains("trailing data"));
}
}
}