A full refresh with partial disk failures used to commit the surviving
subset's sum as a fresh exact cluster total (no field carried the
partial-failure fact), while the complete disk cache kept the failed
disk's old value — so the reported capacity oscillated between the
partial sum and the cache-merged total on alternating refreshes.
- Add a degraded flag to CapacityUpdate/CachedCapacity, set when the
scan behind the update had partial errors; expose it in refresh logs,
admin capacity logs and a new rustfs_capacity_degraded_readings_total
counter.
- On a degraded full refresh, surface only the disks whose own scan
fully succeeded and merge them over a complete disk cache, so failed
disks keep their last-known values and the published total no longer
dips and bounces back. The disk cache is never replaced from a
degraded refresh.
- Without a complete cache, keep the partial sum (unchanged #805
non-pollution behavior) but mark the reading degraded.
Ref: rustfs/backlog#1014 (S06 from audit rustfs/backlog#1010)
* fix(obs): isolate process sampler windows
Refs rustfs/backlog#1004
Refs rustfs/backlog#986
- add a reusable ProcessSampler so callers can own independent sysinfo refresh windows
- wire separate sampler instances for obs metrics scheduling and memory observability
- keep compatibility helpers while avoiding cross-task CPU and disk delta interference
Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
* fix(obs): import process sampler bundle helper
Refs rustfs/backlog#1004
Refs rustfs/backlog#986
- import collect_process_metric_bundle_with in the metrics scheduler
- drop the stale collect_process_metric_bundle import after switching scheduler sampling to independent process samplers
Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
* fix(obs): move process sampler into blocking task
Refs rustfs/backlog#1004
Refs rustfs/backlog#986
- move the memory observability process sampler into the spawn_blocking closure
- satisfy the closure static lifetime required by tokio while keeping the isolated sampler design intact
Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
---------
Co-authored-by: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
perf(ecstore): per-bucket durability tier overrides (HP-5 phase 2)
Let a bucket override the process-wide RUSTFS_DURABILITY_MODE with its own
strict/relaxed/none tier, stored as a durability.json extension entry in the
bucket metadata file and resolved at commit points via effective_durability.
System-critical buckets (.rustfs.sys, .minio.sys) can never carry an override
and stay pinned to strict; the legacy full-off switch keeps its historical
semantics and per-bucket overrides do not apply under it. Overrides are
published and cleared through the existing bucket metadata cache-invalidation
path, and an admin GET/PUT handler exposes the configuration. Default behavior
is unchanged: with no override a bucket follows the global mode, which defaults
to strict and stays byte-for-byte identical to before.
Refs: https://github.com/rustfs/backlog/issues/938, https://github.com/rustfs/backlog/issues/936
Co-authored-by: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
Merge the hotpath-rs wall-time instrumentation from the backlog#936 analysis worktree behind an opt-in 'hotpath' cargo feature, keeping the default build at zero overhead and zero dependency.
- hotpath is an optional dependency everywhere (dep:hotpath feature syntax); the default dependency tree contains no hotpath crate at all
- 40+ measurement points across S3 handlers, ECStore/SetDisks object and multipart ops, erasure encode/decode, bitrot, LocalDisk I/O, FileMeta codec, and HashReader
- attribute sites use #[cfg_attr(feature = "hotpath", hotpath::measure)]; async_trait bodies use per-crate hp_guard! macros (ecstore + rustfs bin); rio gates measure_block! behind hp_measure_block!
- feature chain: rustfs -> rustfs-ecstore -> rustfs-rio / rustfs-filemeta, each crate owning its own gate
- hotpath-alloc is intentionally not wired up (hotpath 0.21.x TLS panic on cross-thread guard drop under tokio, see backlog#935); mimalloc stays the unconditional global allocator
- docs/development/hotpath-profiling.md documents building, HOTPATH_* env vars, SIGTERM report flow, and how to reproduce the backlog#936 timing reports
Refs: https://github.com/rustfs/backlog/issues/935 (HP-14, item 2), https://github.com/rustfs/backlog/issues/936
Co-authored-by: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
fix(lock): renew distributed locks via heartbeat; wire server refresh (backlog#899)
A held distributed write lock had a fixed 30s TTL and was never renewed, so
any operation exceeding it got its per-node lease reclaimed and stolen by a
contender, causing split-brain writes. This implements Phase 0 + Phase 1 of the
#899 design (Phase 2 abort-on-loss is deferred and tracked in code comments).
Phase 0 (server refresh wiring, P0):
- node_service handle_refresh was a no-op stub that parsed args then always
returned success=true. Extract a testable `refresh_lock` free function that
actually delegates to the node's lock backend. Not-found maps to
success=false with no error_info, so RemoteClient::refresh keeps its
Ok(resp.success) semantics and yields a real not_found signal to the
coordinator heartbeat. Without this, client heartbeats were silently no-ops.
Phase 1 (client heartbeat + safe interval + observability):
- DistributedLockGuard spawns a heartbeat that refreshes every per-client lease
on a derived interval; interval is derived without Duration::clamp
(entries<=1 or interval>=ttl => no spawn), fixing the sub-second-ttl panic.
- Add LockLostSignal: declare the lock lost when not_found exceeds
entries.len() - refresh_quorum; RPC errors are not counted (absorbed by the
ttl > interval margin). Expose is_lock_lost()/lock_lost() for observers.
- disarm(), release(), and Drop now abort the heartbeat before releasing so no
refresh races the unlock (refresh only extends, never creates, a lease).
- Reclaim path stays behaviorally unchanged but now warns with owner/resource/
lease age and records a metric (#698 scavenger preserved).
- Add DEFAULT_LOCK_REFRESH_INTERVAL, LockRequest.refresh_interval (serde default
for RPC back-compat) + builder, and lock lifecycle metrics.
Open questions adopt the design's documented defaults (marked TODO in code):
refresh not-found -> Ok(false)/error_info=None; lost-quorum base entries.len();
DEFAULT_LOCK_REFRESH_INTERVAL=10s.
Tests: heartbeat keepalive/quorum-loss/jitter/boundary/disarm (lock crate),
server refresh delegation (rustfs), and end-to-end survives-past-ttl plus
crashed-owner-reclaim regressions (namespace).
* fix(iam): load IAM bootstrap snapshot without namespace locks
IAM bootstrap (init_iam_sys -> load_all) read every config object with
default ObjectOptions (no_lock=false), so each read acquired a
distributed namespace read lock. Lock quorum is counted over cluster
nodes and unreachable peers are hard failures, so during a sequential
restart the very first read failed with
"Quorum not reached: required 2, achieved 0" and IAM could not come up
until enough peers' lock RPC surfaces converged - even when the storage
read quorum was already satisfiable (rustfs#4304).
Extend the startup contract from rustfs#4056 ("startup metadata I/O must
not require namespace locks") to the IAM bootstrap path:
- Introduce LoadMode {Locked, BootstrapNoLock} and plumb it through the
load_all chain (groups, users, policies, mapped policies and their
concurrent variants) down to the storage read options.
- load_all now performs all reads with no_lock=true; on-line
single-object loads via the Store trait keep locked semantics.
- Fail-closed behavior is unchanged: any loader error still aborts the
whole snapshot load.
Safety: config objects are atomic whole-object writes, so a lock-free
read only observes an old or a new value; staleness is bounded by the
existing periodic IAM reload. Listing (walk) never took namespace locks,
and maybe_schedule_lazy_rewrite stays a best-effort background task.
Verification:
- cargo test -p rustfs-iam --lib (153 passed, incl. new LoadMode tests)
- cargo clippy -p rustfs-iam --all-targets
- cargo check -p rustfs
- make pre-commit
Ref: rustfs#4304; tracking rustfs/backlog#884, rustfs/backlog#885
Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
* test(iam): sequential-restart regression test for lock-free bootstrap
Add an integration test reproducing the rustfs#4304 failure mode against
a real 4-disk temp-dir ECStore:
- Seed IAM group data in single-node mode, then flip the runtime into
distributed-erasure mode. new_ns_lock now builds a distributed lock
over the set's (empty) lock-client list, so every namespace-locked
read fails exactly like a sequential restart with unreachable peers
(lock quorum unavailable, storage read quorum healthy).
- Assert the locked load_group path fails in that state, while the
bulk snapshot load_all (no_lock plumbing from the previous commit)
succeeds, and the data survives intact once single-node mode is
restored.
Reverse-verified: temporarily switching load_all back to the locked
mode makes the test fail, so it genuinely guards the contract.
Verification:
- cargo test -p rustfs-iam --test iam_bootstrap_no_lock_test
- cargo test -p rustfs-iam --lib
Ref: rustfs#4304; tracking rustfs/backlog#886
Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
* test(iam): route test ECStore imports through ecstore_test_compat boundary
The new integration test imported rustfs_ecstore facade paths directly,
tripping three architecture migration rules. Move every ECStore import
behind crates/iam/tests/ecstore_test_compat/mod.rs (the sanctioned
test-compat pattern), and register that module as a reviewed test-only
global-facade boundary in check_architecture_migration_rules.sh: the
sequential-restart regression test needs api::global::update_erasure_type
to flip into distributed-erasure mode for lock-quorum fault injection.
Verification:
- ./scripts/check_architecture_migration_rules.sh
- cargo test -p rustfs-iam --test iam_bootstrap_no_lock_test
- make pre-commit
Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
* feat(server): expose readiness blocking reason + rolling-restart runbook
Operators hitting the rustfs#4304 sequential cold start could not tell
from the outside why a node stayed unavailable. Three additions:
- The readiness gate's 503 now names the blocking dependency in both the
body ("Service not ready: waiting for storage_quorum") and a new
x-rustfs-readiness-pending header (storage_quorum | iam |
startup_finalization), derived from the current startup stage.
/health/ready already returned details + degradedReasons; this covers
the plain S3 requests that hit the gate.
- IAM bootstrap retry logs now carry an actionable `hint` field that
classifies the failure (storage read quorum vs lock quorum vs
uninitialized metadata) instead of only echoing the storage error.
- New docs/operations/rolling-restart.md runbook: correct rolling
restart procedure, sequential cold-start expectations (degraded ->
auto-recovery), readiness signal reference, and
RUSTFS_STARTUP_READINESS_MAX_WAIT_SECS guidance.
Verification:
- cargo test -p rustfs --lib -- hint_tests service_not_ready readiness_pending
- make pre-commit
Ref: rustfs#4304; tracking rustfs/backlog#887
Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
* upgrade deps version and improve import
* feat(iam): notification-path cache refreshes read without namespace locks (#4368)
P3 step 1 of rustfs/backlog#884 (scoped down from full MinIO readConfig
alignment after review): cross-node notification handlers
(group/policy/policy-mapping/user) refresh the local IAM cache with
single-object reads that previously took distributed namespace read
locks. These refreshes are asynchronous, best-effort, and already
stale-tolerant (the periodic reload converges them), so a node-counted
lock quorum failure or lock RPC hiccup on a peer must not fail them —
the same rationale as the lock-free bootstrap load_all (rustfs#4304).
- Store trait: add load_user_no_lock / load_group_no_lock /
load_policy_doc_no_lock / load_mapped_policy_no_lock with defaults
forwarding to the locked variants, so existing implementations and
test mocks keep their behavior.
- ObjectStore overrides them via the existing LoadMode::BootstrapNoLock
plumbing. Deletions triggered by the handlers keep locked writes.
- manager.rs: the four *_notification_handler paths (8 call sites)
switch to the lock-free variants.
- Integration test: while the lock quorum is unavailable (DistErasure
with empty lockers), load_group_no_lock must succeed exactly where
the locked load_group fails.
Request-path loads (check_key, verify_temp_user_persistence) and admin
write-then-reload paths intentionally stay locked: load_user_identity
embeds expiry deletions, so those need the side-effect extraction
tracked in rustfs/backlog#884 before going lock-free.
Verification:
- cargo test -p rustfs-iam --lib (156 passed)
- cargo test -p rustfs-iam --test iam_bootstrap_no_lock_test
- make pre-commit
Ref: rustfs/backlog#884, rustfs#4304
Co-authored-by: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
* fix(server): drop unused iam_bootstrap_failure_hint import in tests
The hint tests live in their own hint_tests module with a local import;
the stale re-import in mod tests failed clippy's -D warnings on the
Test and Lint CI variants.
Verification:
- cargo clippy -p rustfs --all-targets
Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
* fix
---------
Co-authored-by: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
Drop the [target.'cfg(target_os = "linux")'.dependencies] tokio
"io-uring" feature from 6 crates and the rustfs binary. Because
.cargo/config.toml enables --cfg tokio_unstable globally, this feature
switched every Linux build's file I/O onto tokio's io_uring runtime
backend. Restricted Linux environments (Docker default seccomp, gVisor,
proot, old kernels) reject io_uring_setup with EACCES/ENOSYS, which
tokio surfaced as PermissionDenied and RustFS reported as
DiskAccessDenied at startup.
Add scripts/check_no_tokio_io_uring.sh so the feature cannot silently
return: it fails on any tokio dependency line enabling "io-uring", while
still allowing a future application-level io-uring crate dependency.
Wire it into make pre-commit/pre-pr/dev-check and CI.
Tracking: rustfs/backlog#890 (parent rustfs/backlog#897)
Co-authored-by: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
* fix(migration): decrypt MinIO IAM & server config on drop-in migration
MinIO encrypts IAM identity/service-account files and the server config at
rest with a key derived from the root credentials. The drop-in migration
paths read those blobs from the legacy `.minio.sys` bucket and parsed them
as plaintext JSON, so any encrypted blob failed to parse and was silently
skipped with "incompatible format". This is why users migrating from MinIO
kept their buckets/objects/policies but lost users and access keys (#2212).
The IAM load path already knows how to decrypt these blobs (RustFS master
keys plus MinIO-compatible legacy keys derived from the root credentials),
but that logic lived behind a private method and was never used by the
migration paths. Expose it as `rustfs_iam::try_decrypt_iam_blob` and inject
it into both migration paths via a `LegacyBlobDecryptFn` callback (ecstore
cannot depend on the IAM crate, so the closure is wired in the binary crate).
When a blob cannot be decrypted the raw bytes are used as-is, preserving the
previous plaintext-only behavior with no regression.
Also improve object-layer migration observability without changing control
flow: `try_migrate_format` now distinguishes "no legacy format" (a normal
fresh install) from "legacy format present but incompatible", and the caller
logs a loud error before initializing a fresh format that would leave the
existing MinIO objects unreadable. Topology/version skip reasons are promoted
from debug to warn.
Fixes a pre-existing test isolation race by marking
`test_recovery_falls_back_to_default_config_when_blob_stays_corrupt` serial,
since it reads a process-wide env var toggled by a sibling test.
Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
* fix(migration): box FormatV3 in LegacyFormatOutcome to satisfy clippy
Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
* test(ecstore): stabilize concurrent multipart resend lock timeout
concurrent_resend_same_part_commits_one_generation spawns 6 same-part
resends whose cross-disk commits serialize on the per-uploadId commit
lock. Under the full nextest suite the parallel disk load pushes those
serialized commits past the small default lock-acquire timeout (5s),
producing a spurious `Lock(Timeout ...)` unrelated to the property under
test (observed on CI at 5.775s vs ~0.5s in isolation).
Raise RUSTFS_OBJECT_LOCK_ACQUIRE_TIMEOUT to the production default (30s)
for the concurrent-commit section via temp_env, so the regression guard
reflects correctness (exactly one intact generation) rather than disk
latency under CI load. The meaningful assertions are unchanged, and
#[serial] keeps the process-wide env override isolated.
Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
* fix(lock): bound fast-lock notification wait to prevent lost-wakeup stall
The real cause of the concurrent_resend_same_part_commits_one_generation
failures was a lost wakeup in the fast-lock slow path, not disk latency:
raising the acquire timeout to 30s only delayed the failure (it then timed
out at 30s), proving a genuine stall rather than overload.
In acquire_lock_slow_path a waiter that reaches the notification phase did a
single `timeout(remaining, wait_for_write())` spanning the whole acquire
budget, and treated that wait's elapse as a hard `Timeout`. But the release
path only notifies when `writer_waiters > 0`, so if the holder releases in
the gap after the waiter's `try_acquire` fails and before it registers as a
waiter, no notification (and no stored permit, since the pooled `Notify` is
gated) is produced. The waiter then blocks until the deadline even though the
lock is free and stays free — a spurious lock-acquire timeout. The shared
process-wide notify pool makes it worse: a wakeup can be consumed by a waiter
of a different lock hashing to the same slot.
Bound each notification wait (NOTIFY_WAIT_CAP = 50ms) and, on elapse, loop
back and re-`try_acquire` instead of returning `Timeout`; the deadline check
at the top of the loop is the single source of truth for timing out. A
lost/stolen wakeup now degrades to bounded re-polling (acquire within ~50ms
of the lock becoming free) instead of stalling for the whole timeout.
Correctness (mutual exclusion) is unchanged — acquisition still only happens
via `try_acquire_*`.
Add a regression test that reproduces the stall (holder + late waiter across
many keys): it times out without the fix and passes in ~1s with it. Revert
the earlier acquire-timeout workaround in the multipart test now that the
underlying stall is fixed, so it runs under the default timeout again.
Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
---------
Co-authored-by: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
* fix(server): raise default HTTP/1.1 idle keep-alive timeout for proxies
In hyper's HTTP/1.1 stack `header_read_timeout` is armed as soon as the
connection is ready to read the next request head, so on a keep-alive
connection it also bounds how long an idle upstream connection may sit
before RustFS closes it. The previous 5s default meant RustFS FIN'd pooled
upstream connections while reverse proxies (Caddy ~2min, Nginx 60s) still
believed they were alive. The proxy then reused a dead socket and clients
saw `socket hang up` / connection reset, most visibly on non-idempotent
`PUT` uploads that proxies will not transparently retry (issue #3076).
Raise DEFAULT_HTTP1_HEADER_READ_TIMEOUT to 75s (above common proxy
idle-keepalive windows) and document the coupling. Still overridable via
RUSTFS_HTTP1_HEADER_READ_TIMEOUT for deployments that expose RustFS
directly to untrusted slow clients and want tighter slowloris protection.
Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
* docs(operations): add reverse-proxy deployment guide
Document the request/body semantics RustFS expects from a proxy layer, the
idle keep-alive mismatch that causes `socket hang up` on large PutObject
writes, and known-good Caddy/Nginx configs plus Cloudflare caveats. Closes
the documentation gap called out in issue #3076 and consolidates the
scattered findings from #609/#934/#1492/#1766.
Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
* feat(object): bound stalled PutObject request-body reads with diagnostics
When a reverse proxy or CDN forwards a partial request body and then goes
silent without closing the connection, the inner body stream neither yields
more bytes nor reports EOF, so RustFS waited forever for bytes that never
arrive and the client saw a silent hang/abort (issue #3076). A short body
that ends with a proper EOF was already rejected promptly; the gap was the
no-EOF stall case.
Add a single-point request-body guard on the PutObject path that wraps the
incoming StreamingBlob with an inter-chunk read timeout. The timer resets on
every chunk, so slow-but-progressing uploads are unaffected; it only fires
after RUSTFS_HTTP_REQUEST_BODY_READ_TIMEOUT (default 300s, 0 disables) of
complete silence. On timeout it logs a structured `put_object_body_read_stalled`
event with received/expected byte counts and fails the read with
ErrorKind::TimedOut instead of hanging. remaining_length/size_hint are
forwarded so wrapping is transparent to downstream length handling.
Covered by unit tests for the stall path, length-preserving pass-through, and
the disabled (timeout=0) pass-through.
Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
---------
Co-authored-by: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
* fix(server): make startup readiness wait configurable and raise default (#4264)
The startup runtime-readiness wait was a hardcoded 30s constant with no env
override. On slow multi-node cold starts (Docker/K8s/Synology NAS) this window
is shorter than the internal startup budgets it depends on — the endpoint
DNS-retry window (~90s) and the format-load retry loop (~100s worst case) — so
readiness times out and the node exits with
`startup readiness timed out after 30s: storage_ready=false, lock_quorum_ready=false`
before storage/lock quorum can converge, feeding the restart storm reported in
the issue.
- Add `RUSTFS_STARTUP_READINESS_MAX_WAIT_SECS` (default 120s), documented in
rustfs-config health constants.
- Resolve the wait at runtime via `startup_runtime_readiness_max_wait()`; a
value of `0` falls back to the default instead of timing out instantly.
- Repoint `STARTUP_RUNTIME_READINESS_MAX_WAIT` at the shared config default so
there is a single source of truth, and cover the getter with unit tests.
Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
* fix(ecstore): stop peer/disk background monitors on graceful shutdown (#4264)
Long-lived peer health/recovery and remote-disk monitors are detached
`tokio::spawn` tasks that each hold a `tracing::Span` via `.instrument(..)` for
their whole lifetime. Nothing cancelled them at shutdown, so on the normal
return path the Tokio runtime was dropped while they were still alive and their
`Span`s were dropped during worker-thread thread-local-storage (TLS)
destruction. At that point `tracing-subscriber`'s fmt `on_close` can touch an
already-destroyed TLS slot and panic with
`cannot access a Thread Local Storage value during or after destruction`, which
escalates to a panic-during-panic abort (SIGILL / exit 132) — the crash
reported on Synology in issue #4264, amplified by the restart storm.
- Add `cluster::rpc::background_monitor` with a process-global shutdown token,
`spawn_background_monitor()` (races the monitor future against that token so
its span drops while the runtime is alive), and public
`shutdown_background_monitors()`.
- Route every span-holding peer_s3 / peer_rest / remote_disk monitor spawn
through `spawn_background_monitor` instead of `tokio::spawn(..).instrument()`.
- Expose `rustfs_ecstore::shutdown_background_monitors()` and call it from the
graceful shutdown sequence (right after `ctx.cancel()`, before runtime
teardown) via the `storage_api` compatibility boundary.
Existing recovery-probe span-context tests still pass, confirming log
correlation is preserved.
Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
---------
Co-authored-by: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
* fix(ecstore): make delete_volume non-recursive by default to prevent bucket-heal wipe (backlog#799 B1)
`delete_volume` unconditionally `remove_dir_all`'d the whole bucket tree, and the
bucket-heal "remove" branch called it fire-and-forget on every local disk. A
mis-classified "dangling" bucket (or a non-force S3 DeleteBucket on a populated
bucket) was therefore recursively wiped — a potential whole-bucket data loss.
The `VolumeNotEmpty` -> recreate/`BucketNotEmpty` handling already present in
both delete_bucket paths was dead code because the primitive never refused.
Add an explicit `force_delete` flag to `DiskAPI::delete_volume` and default the
non-force path to a non-recursive `remove_dir` (rmdir), which fails atomically
with `VolumeNotEmpty` if the bucket still holds any object data. Only an explicit
force delete (S3 force bucket delete) removes recursively. Mirrors MinIO's
`xlStorage.DeleteVol` (`Remove` vs `RemoveAll`).
- Trait + all impls (local behavior, dispatch, disk_store, remote RPC) take the
flag; the gRPC `DeleteVolumeRequest` gains a `force` field (proto3 default
false → old peers get the safe non-recursive behavior on rolling upgrade).
- Heal remove branch passes `false` and no longer discards the result: a
`VolumeNotEmpty` refusal is logged (the bucket is not dangling) instead of
wiping data.
- Both `delete_bucket` paths pass `opts.force`, activating the previously-dead
`VolumeNotEmpty` -> `BucketNotEmpty`/recreate handling (correct S3 semantics).
Adds a regression test: non-force delete of a non-empty bucket returns
VolumeNotEmpty and preserves the data; force delete removes it.
Design converged by two independent expert reviews (MinIO-fidelity +
defense-in-depth) referencing MinIO xl-storage.go. Refs backlog#799 (B1),
issue rustfs/backlog#850. The safety expert's deeper hardening (typed
capability instead of a bool, trash-instead-of-in-place for force, quorum
re-verification of dangling) is noted on #850 as follow-up.
* fix(ecstore): reword 'mis-classified' -> 'misclassified' to satisfy typos (backlog#799 B1)
* fix(rustfs): thread force_delete through StorageDiskRpcExt::delete_volume + test literal (backlog#799 B1)
* feat(internode): P0 gRPC transport tuning, message limits, payload metrics
Land the P0 subtask from docs/grpc-optimization: close the client-vs-server
transport gaps and add instrumentation to size which unary RPCs need channel
isolation in P1.
Transport tuning (G3): the client `Endpoint` now disables Nagle and raises the
HTTP/2 stream/connection flow-control windows to mirror the server socket, so
small lock/health RPCs are not batched and larger metadata responses are not
throttled by the 64KiB default window. All env-overridable, 0 opts out.
Message-size limits (G1): both `NodeServiceClient` and `NodeServiceServer` set
max decode/encode size (default 100MiB) instead of tonic's silent 4MiB cap, so a
large multi-version xl.meta or aggregated ReadMultiple no longer fails
out_of_range. The server limit is set on `NodeServiceServer` before wrapping in
the auth `InterceptedService` (the interceptor type does not expose it).
Payload instrumentation (P1 prep): ReadAll/ReadMultiple record a payload-size
histogram plus a large-payload counter when a response crosses the configured
threshold (default 8MiB), feeding alerting on paths that contend with
latency-sensitive control-plane traffic on the shared channel. Threshold-only
counter, no per-call hot-path log.
Verification: cargo check/test on config, io-metrics, ecstore, rustfs; clippy
clean on touched files; make pre-commit green.
Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
* feat(internode): P1 control/bulk gRPC channel isolation (opt-in)
Land the P1 subtask from docs/grpc-optimization: physically separate large
bytes-carrying unary RPCs from latency-sensitive control-plane RPCs so a big
transfer can no longer head-of-line block a lock/health RPC on the shared
HTTP/2 connection (G2/G5).
Introduce ChannelClass { Control, Bulk } and get_channel_for_class in protos.
Control RPCs keep the per-peer connection keyed by the bare address; Bulk RPCs
(ReadAll/WriteAll/ReadMultiple/BatchReadVersion, via a new get_bulk_client) are
round-robined across a small per-peer bulk pool.
Rather than restructuring the global GLOBAL_CONN_MAP (and every consumer), bulk
channels are cached under a composite key (addr\0bulk\0idx). The NUL separator
cannot appear in a URL, so bulk keys never collide with the control key. This
keeps the blast radius small on a consistency-sensitive path. create_new_channel
is refactored into build_channel(dial_addr, cache_key) so several physically
distinct channels to one peer cache independently while dialing/TLS still use
the real address.
Gated by RUSTFS_INTERNODE_CHANNEL_ISOLATION (default OFF) so the default build
is byte-for-byte the pre-P1 behavior: bulk resolves to the control channel and
the switch is a single-env rollback. RUSTFS_INTERNODE_BULK_CHANNELS (default 2,
clamped >=1) sizes the pool. On failure, evict_failed_connection drops the whole
bulk pool for the peer (round-robin hides which index was used), avoiding
half-dead cached channels.
Lock RPCs (remote_locker) already use the default Control path, so lock
semantics and retry behavior are unchanged.
Verification: cargo check/test on config, protos, ecstore, rustfs; new protos
tests for bulk key routing and isolation-off passthrough; clippy clean on
touched files; make pre-commit green.
Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
* feat(internode): P2 msgpack/JSON codec observability + encode buffer presizing
Land the safe, wire-compatible slice of P2 from docs/grpc-optimization: the
observability prerequisite for retiring the redundant JSON fields, plus a codec
micro-optimization. No proto/wire-format change; JSON is still dual-written.
Internode RPCs today dual-encode each metadata value as both msgpack (`*_bin`)
and a JSON compatibility string, and decoders prefer `_bin` with a JSON
fallback. Before the JSON fields can ever be dropped (a cross-version change),
that fallback must be proven unused in production.
Add rustfs_system_network_internode_msgpack_json_fallback_total{direction,
message}: incremented whenever a decode falls back to the JSON field because the
msgpack payload was absent. Wired into both directions — the client decoding
peer responses (remote_disk.rs, incl. the list-level read_multiple/batch
fallbacks) and the server decoding peer requests (node_service/disk.rs). This
counter must read zero across a release window before send paths stop writing
JSON and the proto text fields are reserved/removed (the deferred P2-1 steps).
Also pre-size the msgpack encode buffers (Vec::with_capacity(512)) on both
sides, eliminating the repeated growth reallocations for typical FileInfo
payloads with zero added copy. Full thread_local buffer pooling is deferred: it
needs either an extra copy (unclear net win) or a send-path buffer-return
lifecycle, to be justified by a codec microbenchmark first.
Verification: cargo check/test on io-metrics, ecstore, rustfs; new fallback
counter smoke test; existing codec decode tests green; clippy clean on touched
files; make pre-commit green.
Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
* docs(internode): add msgpack/JSON convergence observation runbook
Runbook driving the observation-gated retirement of the redundant JSON
compatibility fields on internode gRPC metadata RPCs (grpc-optimization P2-1).
Documents the shipped fallback counter
(rustfs_system_network_internode_msgpack_json_fallback_total{direction,message}),
the PromQL to confirm it reads zero across a release window, a standing alert,
and the staged flip/rollback procedure (env-gated msgpack-only send, then proto
field removal in N+1).
Includes the verified field -> peer-decoder audit: only fields whose peer
decodes _bin first may be converged. Notes DeleteVersion.opts (DeleteOptions) is
NOT convergence-ready — its server handler is not _bin-first and must gain a
decode_msgpack_or_json path first. This gates the send-side change so it cannot
empty a JSON field an old peer still needs.
Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
* feat(internode): env-gated msgpack-only send + DeleteVersion _bin support (P2-1)
Implements the send-side lever for retiring the redundant JSON compatibility
fields on internode gRPC metadata RPCs, plus the missing `_bin` support on the
delete path that it depends on (grpc-optimization P2-1). Default-off: the base
build is byte-for-byte the prior dual-write behavior.
Gated msgpack-only send (RUSTFS_INTERNODE_RPC_MSGPACK_ONLY, default false):
- New rustfs_protos::internode_rpc_msgpack_only() reads the flag.
- Client (remote_disk.rs) compat_json() and server (node_service/disk.rs)
compat_response_json() emit an empty JSON string when the flag is on, so only
the msgpack _bin payload is sent. The _bin field is always sent; decoders keep
the JSON read fallback. Applied only to fields with a confirmed _bin-first peer
decoder (WriteMetadata/UpdateMetadata/RenameData file_info, UpdateMetadata opts,
ReadOptions, ReadMultipleReq, BatchReadVersionReq; ReadVersion/ReadXL/RenameData
responses and the ReadMultiple/BatchReadVersion response lists).
- Only enable after the P2 fallback counter has read zero across a release window
(see docs/operations/internode-msgpack-json-convergence-runbook.md). Single-env
rollback; no wire-format break.
DeleteVersion(s) _bin support (prerequisite):
- The DeleteVersion/DeleteVersions protos had NO _bin fields. Add additive
(backward-compatible) bytes file_info_bin/opts_bin (DeleteVersion) and repeated
bytes versions_bin + bytes opts_bin (DeleteVersions); regenerate the checked-in
prost struct.
- Client dual-writes them; server decodes them _bin-first with JSON fallback.
- These delete fields are kept OUT of the msgpack-only set (always dual-write)
until their own fallback counter reads zero across a window with the new
decoders fully deployed. DeleteVersion.raw_file_info stays JSON-only (no _bin
field yet).
Verification: cargo check/test on protos, config, ecstore, rustfs (incl. the six
delete request handler tests and a compat_json default-path test); clippy clean
on touched files; make pre-commit green.
Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
* feat(internode): P3 cluster peer online/offline health metric
Land the safe observability core of P3 (grpc-optimization G6/G8): track each
internode peer's reachability and expose the offline count, for parity with
MinIO's minio_cluster_servers_offline_total. Pure instrumentation — peer
selection and quorum are unchanged.
- io-metrics: per-peer PeerHealthState { online, consecutive_failures } registry
plus record_peer_reachable/record_peer_unreachable. A peer flips offline after
N consecutive failures (dial failures or RPC-triggered evictions) and back
online on the next successful dial; the count of offline peers is published to
the rustfs_cluster_servers_offline_total gauge.
- config: RUSTFS_INTERNODE_OFFLINE_FAILURE_THRESHOLD (default 3, clamped >= 1).
- protos: build_channel marks the peer reachable on a successful dial and
unreachable on a dial failure; evict_failed_connection feeds the failure signal
too. Keyed by the real peer address, so control and bulk channels to one peer
share health state.
Deferred (documented in docs/grpc-optimization P3): startup prewarm (no clean
topology-ready hook yet), the offline fast-bypass in peer routing (consistency-
sensitive; must not change quorum), and idempotent-read-only retry. This commit
is observability only.
Verification: cargo check/test on io-metrics, config, protos (new peer-health
state-machine and threshold-clamp tests); clippy clean on touched files; make
pre-commit green.
Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
* feat(internode): P3 control-channel prewarm + self-healing offline bypass
Add the remaining P3 connection-lifecycle levers (grpc-optimization G6/G8), both
env-gated and default-off so the base build is unchanged.
Prewarm (RUSTFS_INTERNODE_PREWARM, default off): RemoteDisk::new spawns a
best-effort background dial of the peer's control channel, deduped per peer
address, moving the connect cost off the first RPC. Failures fall through to the
existing lazy connect + recovery monitor.
Offline bypass (RUSTFS_INTERNODE_OFFLINE_BYPASS, default off): remote_disk
get_client/get_bulk_client fast-fail a peer already marked offline instead of
paying the connect timeout, so the erasure layer proceeds on quorum sooner. This
does NOT change quorum. It is self-healing: cluster_peer_should_bypass lets one
request per RUSTFS_INTERNODE_OFFLINE_REPROBE_SECS (default 5s) through to recover
the peer even with no background monitor, and the recovery monitor's own probe
path calls the client directly so it is never bypassed.
io-metrics gains cluster_peer_is_offline / cluster_peer_should_bypass (with a
per-peer re-probe timestamp). Scope: data path only — remote_locker (lock RPCs,
most consistency-sensitive) is left dual-writing/unbypassed as a follow-up.
Verification: cargo check/test on io-metrics, config, ecstore (new self-healing
bypass tests; all 105 rpc tests green); clippy clean on touched files; make
pre-commit green.
Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
* docs(internode): add A/B benchmark runbook for gRPC optimization stages
Reproducible before/after collection procedure for grpc-optimization P0–P3.
Since every stage is env-gated, before/after is the same binary with different
env — no rebuild. Documents, per stage: the exact env toggles (baseline vs
enabled column), which existing bench script to run
(run_internode_transport_baseline.sh / run_four_node_cluster_failover_bench.sh),
the Prometheus metrics to capture, and the acceptance gates from the design docs
(e.g. lock p99 down >= 20% for P1, msgpack fallback counter = 0 before enabling
P2, correct rustfs_cluster_servers_offline_total for P3).
Live runs require a multi-node cluster + load tool + Prometheus scrape and cannot
be produced in a single-process sandbox; artifacts land under target/bench
(gitignored) and attach to the PR.
Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
* feat(internode): P3-2 lock-path offline bypass + P3-3 idempotent read retry
Extend the offline bypass to the lock path and add opt-in retries for idempotent
reads (grpc-optimization P3-2/P3-3). Both env-gated and default-off/zero.
Offline bypass (lock path): factor the bypass decision into a shared pub(crate)
internode_offline_bypass_reason(addr) and call it from remote_locker::get_client
too, so lock RPCs to an offline peer fast-fail (letting dsync reach quorum
sooner) instead of paying the connect timeout. Does not change quorum; the
self-healing re-probe keeps peers recoverable. Gated by
RUSTFS_INTERNODE_OFFLINE_BYPASS (default off).
Idempotent read retry (P3-3): add execute_read_with_retry — a bounded,
exponential-backoff retry for read-only/reentrant RPCs on transient network
errors — and route disk_info through it. RUSTFS_INTERNODE_IDEMPOTENT_READ_RETRIES
defaults to 0 (disabled). Write/lock RPCs are never retried (quorum/idempotency
safety, per CLAUDE.md); the wrapper requires an Fn closure so only reads that
rebuild their request from borrowed inputs qualify.
Deferred: grpc.health.v1 (optional ecosystem-compat only; needs a new
tonic-health dep and 3-way hybrid-service wiring — internal needs are met by the
existing Ping RPC).
Verification: cargo check/test on config, ecstore (105 rpc tests green incl.
disk_info now via the retry wrapper); clippy clean on touched files; make
pre-commit green.
Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
* feat(scripts): one-click internode gRPC A/B benchmark driver
Wrap the per-stage env matrix from the benchmark runbook into
scripts/run_internode_grpc_ab_bench.sh: given --stage <p0|p1|p2|p3> and --phase
<before|after>, it emits the stage/phase RUSTFS_INTERNODE_* server env to
<out-dir>/server-env.sh and runs the right underlying bench
(run_internode_transport_baseline.sh for p0/p1/p2, run_four_node_cluster_failover_bench.sh
for p3) into a labeled target/bench/internode-transport/<stage>-<phase>/.
Passthrough args after `--` reach the underlying bench; --dry-run previews the
env + command. The script is explicit that RUSTFS_INTERNODE_* are server env, so
for the load-driven stages the operator must restart rustfs with the emitted env
before the run; the docker four-node (p3) path exports them for a forwarding
compose. shellcheck-clean.
Runbook updated with a "One-click driver" section.
Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
* chore(compose): forward RUSTFS_INTERNODE_* into the four-node cluster
The four-node local-build compose only forwarded a fixed whitelist of env, so
the internode gRPC knobs (grpc-optimization P0-P3) never reached the containers
and the A/B bench driver's "after" phase was a no-op. Forward the full
RUSTFS_INTERNODE_* set with defaults matching the binary defaults, so leaving
them unset is a no-op and the A/B driver can toggle a stage per phase.
Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
* fix(internode): address Copilot review — retry health action + poison-safe peer health
Two review nits on #4337:
- P3-3 idempotent read retry (remote_disk.rs): execute_read_with_retry ran every
attempt through execute_with_timeout_for_op, which hardcodes
FailureHealthAction::MarkFailure. So the first transient error could flip the
disk faulty and short-circuit the remaining retries, and each attempt
over-counted the failure. Route all but the final attempt through
execute_with_timeout_for_op_and_health_action with IgnoreFailure; only the last
attempt marks faulty/evicts. No default impact (retries default 0).
- Peer-health helpers (io-metrics): record_peer_reachable/record_peer_unreachable,
cluster_peer_is_offline and cluster_peer_should_bypass early-returned on a
poisoned mutex, permanently stalling the offline gauge and bypass state after a
single panic. Recover via PoisonError::into_inner().
Verification: cargo check/test on io-metrics + ecstore (105 rpc tests green);
clippy clean on touched files; make pre-commit green.
Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
---------
Co-authored-by: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
feat(admin): add MinIO-compatible IAM/IDP admin endpoints
Register and implement MinIO admin API compatibility for IAM/IDP:
- PUT /v3/import-iam-v2 and POST /v3/revoke-tokens/{userProvider}
- generic /v3/idp-config/{type}[/{name}] CRUD mapped onto existing config
- LDAP/OpenID service-account, policy-entities, and list-access-keys flows
Adds IamSys::delete_temp_account primitive to back STS token revocation.
revoke-tokens requires the broader ListUsers admin capability for
cross-user revocation (self-revocation only needs RemoveServiceAccount),
mirroring the cross-user guard used by the service-account handlers.
Registers admin route-policy inventory entries for every new route.
Unsupported LDAP/OpenID backends return honest compatibility errors.
Refs rustfs/backlog#609 #610#616
feat(admin): add MinIO-compatible diagnostics and service-control endpoints
Register and implement MinIO admin API compatibility routes:
- POST /v3/service: restart/stop trigger the existing graceful-shutdown
path; freeze/unfreeze record advisory state (request admission is not
yet gated, surfaced honestly via effective=false)
- profiling/trace and healthinfo/obdinfo/log diagnostics endpoints
- GET /v3/top/locks and POST /v3/force-unlock, backed by new
FastObjectLockManager::list_locks()/force_unlock() introspection
- speedtest routes where feasible
Refs rustfs/backlog#604 #606#607#615
Add MinIO-compatible admin endpoints under the /v3 prefix, wired to real
RustFS subsystems where they exist and documented as compatibility-only
where they do not.
Replication (backlog#611):
- POST /v3/replication/diff: bounded on-demand scan of object versions,
returning versions whose replication status is PENDING or FAILED. Wired
to list_object_versions and the per-version replication status. Requires
the bucket to exist and have a replication configuration. The scan is
capped (REPLICATION_DIFF_MAX_SCAN) and reports IsTruncated when partial.
- GET /v3/replication/mrf: reports the failed-replication backlog (MinIO's
MRF concept) from the replication stats handle: aggregate failed count and
size per target plus in-queue counters. RustFS records failed replications
as aggregate counters and persists MRF entries without a runtime query API,
so per-object MRF rows are not enumerable; PerObjectEntriesAvailable is
always false to make that explicit.
Batch jobs (backlog#613):
- POST /v3/start-job, GET /v3/list-jobs, GET /v3/status-job,
GET /v3/describe-job, DELETE /v3/cancel-job.
- RustFS has no batch-job execution engine (no scheduler, queue, or worker),
so these implement MinIO request/response/error semantics only and never
fake execution or success: start-job parses and validates the job
definition then returns NotImplemented for known job types and
InvalidRequest for unknown ones; list-jobs returns an empty list;
status/describe/cancel validate jobId and return a no-such-job error.
All routes are registered with admin auth using existing AdminAction
variants (ReplicationDiff, GetReplicationMetricsAction, StartBatchJobAction,
ListBatchJobsAction, DescribeBatchJobAction, CancelBatchJobAction) and are
covered by the admin route-registration matrix and new handler unit tests.
Refs rustfs/backlog#611 #613
The peer `DeleteBucketMetadata` RPC handler was a stub that returned
success without doing anything, and the delete-bucket flow never sent
the notification in the first place. As a result, after a bucket was
deleted other nodes kept serving its stale cached metadata.
Wire the whole path end to end:
- ecstore: add an in-memory `remove_bucket_metadata` (free fn) and
`BucketMetadataSys::remove`, the counterpart to `set_bucket_metadata`,
and export it through the `api::bucket::metadata_sys` facade.
- node_service: `handle_delete_bucket_metadata` now validates the bucket
name and actually drops the cached metadata for it.
- bucket_usecase: after a successful delete_bucket, notify peers via
`notification_sys.delete_bucket_metadata` in the background, symmetric
to the existing `notify_bucket_metadata_reload` path.
Also update the delete-bucket-metadata unit test to assert the
empty-bucket rejection instead of the old always-success stub, and drop
an unused `tracing::debug` test import left over from #4322.
Verified: cargo fmt; cargo check -p rustfs-ecstore; cargo test -p rustfs
--lib --features rio-v2 test_delete_bucket_metadata_empty_bucket; arch
guardrail scripts pass.
Second TODO-convergence round over the current tree (backlog#646). All
line numbers in the old inventory had gone stale after the set_disk /
diagnostics / cluster refactors, so this re-scans and reduces the marker
count from 144 to 99.
STALE removals (comment describes already-implemented behavior, or dead
commented-out blocks) across ecstore (set_disk ops/core, store,
cluster/rpc, bucket/metadata_sys, services), iam, filemeta, s3select and
rustfs auth/object_usecase. No behavior change.
Safe fills, each verified:
- filemeta: replication_info_equals now also compares
replication_state_internal (function currently has no callers; adds a
regression test).
- bitrot: drop the confirmed-unused `_want` parameter from bitrot_verify
and the now-unused `sum` on LocalDisk::bitrot_verify, removing a
Bytes::copy_from_slice allocation. Streaming verify uses the file's
embedded per-shard hash, never the passed sum.
- signer: rename v4_ignored_headers -> V4_IGNORED_HEADERS and drop the
non_upper_case_globals allow.
- admin/heal: test_decode was #[ignore]d and used serde_urlencoded on a
JSON body (would panic); rewire to serde_json::from_slice to match the
production decode path, add assertions, un-ignore.
Verified: cargo fmt; cargo check on touched crates; tests pass
(filemeta, signer, bitrot, heal::test_decode); arch guardrail scripts
pass.
* fix(rio): reject corrupted short compressed/encrypted blocks instead of panicking
DecompressReader::poll_read and DecryptReader::poll_read sliced the block
body with a fixed `[0..16]` index to read the length varint. The body length
comes from an untrusted 24-bit header field, so a corrupted/truncated block
shorter than 16 bytes made the slice panic and crash the request task — a
read-path DoS on GET of tiered/corrupted data.
Pass the whole (arbitrary-length-safe) slice to uvarint and reject a
non-positive or out-of-range length prefix with InvalidData. Adds a repro
test for each reader; all existing round-trip tests still pass.
Refs rustfs/backlog#812
* fix(utils): close SSRF bypass via IPv4-mapped IPv6 addresses
validate_outbound_ip branched on the IpAddr variant, and the V6 branch's
is_loopback/is_unicast_link_local/is_unique_local checks never inspect the
embedded IPv4 of an IPv4-mapped address (::ffff:a.b.c.d). The metadata guard
also only matched the plain V4 169.254.169.254. So ::ffff:127.0.0.1,
::ffff:10.0.0.5 and ::ffff:169.254.169.254 all passed the outbound guard,
letting an attacker reach loopback/private/metadata endpoints.
Normalize IPv4-mapped IPv6 to its embedded IPv4 (via to_ipv4_mapped, which
matches only the true mapped form) before classification. Adds reject tests
for mapped loopback/private/metadata and an allow test for public IPv6.
Refs rustfs/backlog#813
* fix(ecstore): streaming last-part loss, GCS tier Range/remove, stat_all_dirs alignment
Four confirmed data-reliability defects:
- put_object_multipart_stream: the CompleteMultipartUpload part-collection loop
used exclusive `1..total_parts_count`, dropping the final part (and collecting
zero parts for a single-part object) — silently truncating the completed object.
Extracted collect_complete_parts (1..=total_parts_count) with unit tests.
- GCS warm backend get() ignored the requested byte range, returning the whole
object for a Range GET; now applies ReadRange::segment like the other backends.
- GCS warm backend remove() was an empty stub, so deleting a tiered object left
it on GCS forever; now deletes via StorageControl (added a control-plane client),
and in_use() actually lists (prefix-scoped) instead of always returning false.
- stat_all_dirs skipped None disk slots and dropped JoinErrors, returning a
compressed, misaligned error vector; heal_object_dir then zipped it against the
full disks array and could make_volume on the WRONG disk. Now returns one
index-aligned entry per slot (None -> DiskNotFound), and heal no longer
pre-fills the drive report (which would double it). Added an alignment test.
Refs rustfs/backlog#807
* fix(kms): stop Vault backend from destroying/reviving keys on failure
Two confirmed key-safety defects in the Vault KV2 backend:
- get_key_material() 'self-healed' a decrypt or wrong-length failure by minting a
fresh random master key and overwriting the stored value. That destroys the
original key material, making every DEK ever wrapped by it permanently
undecryptable. Decryption must never mutate the stored key: both branches now
return a cryptographic_error instead. (The empty-material bootstrap path, which
only fills a never-initialized key, is intentionally left intact.)
- cancel_key_deletion() reset key_state to Enabled only in the returned response
and never persisted it, so the key stayed PendingDeletion in storage and would
still be reaped. It now writes the state back via update_key_metadata_in_storage
and fails the request if the write fails.
Adds ignored (Vault-requiring) integration tests documenting both behaviours.
The third item (VaultTransit key state only in memory -> revived as Enabled after
restart) is deferred: a fail-closed guard would break restart availability for all
transit keys; the correct fix needs a persistent metadata store + Vault integration
testing. Tracked in rustfs/backlog#808.
Refs rustfs/backlog#808
* fix(admin): clamp STS AssumeRole duration; persist ImportBucketMetadata to disk
Two confirmed admin-API defects:
- Standard AssumeRole used the raw client-supplied DurationSeconds with no upper
bound, so a caller could mint near-permanent temporary credentials. Clamp it to
the AWS/MinIO STS window [900, 43200] (with 0 -> default 3600) via a shared
clamp_assume_role_duration helper, and build the exp claim with saturating_add.
This matches the existing AssumeRoleWithWebIdentity path.
- ImportBucketMetadata only mutated an in-memory map and returned 200, silently
dropping every imported config. It now persists each non-empty config via
metadata_sys::update (which merges onto existing on-disk metadata) and returns
InternalError if a write fails. Mapping extracted to imported_configs_to_persist
with unit tests.
Refs rustfs/backlog#809
* fix(heal): enqueue displacing request in release builds
push_displacing_lower_priority folded the real enqueue call into
debug_assert_eq!(self.push(request), Accepted). In release builds
(debug_assertions off) the whole macro — including its argument — is compiled
out, so after evicting a lower-priority queued item the new high-priority
request was silently dropped and never healed. Hoist self.push(request) out of
the assertion so the side effect runs in all builds. Adds a --release regression
test.
Refs rustfs/backlog#811
* fix(iam): propagate real delete_policy backend errors instead of swallowing them
delete_policy's is_from_notify path had its error handling inverted: a real
backend failure (disk IO / insufficient quorum) evicted the cache and returned
Ok(()), reporting a phantom success while policy.json survived on disk (to be
reloaded on the next full IAM reload); NoSuchPolicy — which should be idempotent
success — returned Err. Propagate real errors and let NoSuchPolicy fall through
to the idempotent cache-evict + Ok, matching delete_user / the notification
handler in the same file. Adds a backend-error-injection regression test.
Refs rustfs/backlog#810
* fix(utils): also normalize IPv4-compatible IPv6 in the SSRF guard
The initial fix only unwrapped IPv4-mapped (::ffff:a.b.c.d) addresses; the
deprecated IPv4-compatible form (::a.b.c.d, e.g. ::127.0.0.1 / ::169.254.169.254)
still bypassed the guard. Reject pure-IPv6 specials (::, ::1, fe80::, fc00::)
first, then normalize BOTH embedded-IPv4 forms before the IPv4 rules. Adds tests
for compatible-form loopback/metadata and confirms ::1 / :: stay rejected.
Found by adversarial review of the initial fix. Refs rustfs/backlog#813
* fix(ecstore): fix the same last-part loss in the parallel streaming path
put_object_multipart_stream_parallel had the identical off-by-one
(1..total_parts_count) that truncated the last part / produced zero parts for a
single-part upload — reachable when concurrent stream parts are enabled. Reuse
collect_complete_parts, which now returns an error instead of panicking on a gap
in the parts map. Adds a missing-part error test.
Found by adversarial review of the initial fix. Refs rustfs/backlog#807
* fix(kms): local backend must preserve key material on status change
LocalKmsClient (the default KMS backend) regenerated the master key material on
enable_key/disable_key/schedule_key_deletion/cancel_key_deletion — a pure status
change. A single disable+enable cycle therefore destroyed the original key,
making every DEK ever wrapped by it permanently undecryptable (silent data loss,
no network needed). Preserve the existing material via get_key_material and
re-save with only the status changed. Adds a hermetic regression test that wraps
a DEK, cycles all four status methods, and asserts the DEK still decrypts.
Found by adversarial review of the Vault fix. Refs rustfs/backlog#808
* test(rio): cover the length-prefix guard; correct its comment
Add a DecompressReader test that feeds an unterminated length varint so uvarint
returns 0 and the new guard (not the downstream codec) produces the InvalidData
error, and reword the guard comment which overclaimed that the > len bound
prevents a reachable panic (it is belt-and-suspenders). No behavior change.
Found by adversarial review. Refs rustfs/backlog#812
* test(rio): build test block headers via vec! to satisfy clippy
The new corrupted-block tests built the header with Vec::new() + repeated push,
tripping clippy::vec_init_then_push (-D warnings in CI). Construct the fixed
header bytes with vec![] instead. No behavior change.
---------
Co-authored-by: houseme <housemecn@gmail.com>
* fix(object-capacity): stop cancelled/remote-disk refreshes from corrupting capacity
Two independent capacity-refresh bugs (backlog rustfs/backlog#805):
- refresh_or_join set the singleflight `running` flag then awaited the
refresh future with no drop guard. When the admin request that became
leader was cancelled (client disconnect) mid-await, `running` stayed true
forever: joiners blocked indefinitely and the 120s scheduled refresh could
never start again. catch_unwind covered panics but not cancellation. A
RefreshLeaderGuard now resets the state and publishes an error on drop.
- capacity_disk_refs mapped the cluster-wide storage_info disk list without
filtering non-local disks, so admin-triggered refreshes ran a local WalkDir
over remote disks' drive_path. On multi-node clusters this double-counted
local bytes (shared mount layout) or hit NotFound (per-node layouts), and
poisoned the per-disk cache the scheduled local-only refresh depends on,
making the cached total oscillate. Filter to local disks.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(rio): harden internode HTTP client build, cache, and PUT body integrity
Follow-ups from the internode HTTP review (backlog rustfs/backlog#805):
- handle_put_file accepted a truncated body as success: a HttpWriter dropped
mid-stream closes the chunked body cleanly, indistinguishable from EOF, and
the server never compared bytes copied against the declared size. Reject
size mismatches on the create path (append/unknown-size writes send size<=0
and are exempt).
- build_http_client used `.expect()` on ClientBuilder::build(), which runs
lazily on the first request and on every TLS generation bump (cert
rotation), so a build failure panicked a serving task. It now returns an
io::Error; get_http_client falls back to the previous TLS generation when a
rebuild fails instead of failing the request.
- CLIENT_CACHE was a tokio::Mutex taken on every stream open (data_shards
times per GET). Replaced with arc_swap::ArcSwapOption for lock-free reads on
the hot path; the generation-monotonic replacement guard is preserved via rcu.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
---------
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Zhengchao An