* fix(rio): reject corrupted short compressed/encrypted blocks instead of panicking DecompressReader::poll_read and DecryptReader::poll_read sliced the block body with a fixed `[0..16]` index to read the length varint. The body length comes from an untrusted 24-bit header field, so a corrupted/truncated block shorter than 16 bytes made the slice panic and crash the request task — a read-path DoS on GET of tiered/corrupted data. Pass the whole (arbitrary-length-safe) slice to uvarint and reject a non-positive or out-of-range length prefix with InvalidData. Adds a repro test for each reader; all existing round-trip tests still pass. Refs rustfs/backlog#812 * fix(utils): close SSRF bypass via IPv4-mapped IPv6 addresses validate_outbound_ip branched on the IpAddr variant, and the V6 branch's is_loopback/is_unicast_link_local/is_unique_local checks never inspect the embedded IPv4 of an IPv4-mapped address (::ffff:a.b.c.d). The metadata guard also only matched the plain V4 169.254.169.254. So ::ffff:127.0.0.1, ::ffff:10.0.0.5 and ::ffff:169.254.169.254 all passed the outbound guard, letting an attacker reach loopback/private/metadata endpoints. Normalize IPv4-mapped IPv6 to its embedded IPv4 (via to_ipv4_mapped, which matches only the true mapped form) before classification. Adds reject tests for mapped loopback/private/metadata and an allow test for public IPv6. Refs rustfs/backlog#813 * fix(ecstore): streaming last-part loss, GCS tier Range/remove, stat_all_dirs alignment Four confirmed data-reliability defects: - put_object_multipart_stream: the CompleteMultipartUpload part-collection loop used exclusive `1..total_parts_count`, dropping the final part (and collecting zero parts for a single-part object) — silently truncating the completed object. Extracted collect_complete_parts (1..=total_parts_count) with unit tests. - GCS warm backend get() ignored the requested byte range, returning the whole object for a Range GET; now applies ReadRange::segment like the other backends. - GCS warm backend remove() was an empty stub, so deleting a tiered object left it on GCS forever; now deletes via StorageControl (added a control-plane client), and in_use() actually lists (prefix-scoped) instead of always returning false. - stat_all_dirs skipped None disk slots and dropped JoinErrors, returning a compressed, misaligned error vector; heal_object_dir then zipped it against the full disks array and could make_volume on the WRONG disk. Now returns one index-aligned entry per slot (None -> DiskNotFound), and heal no longer pre-fills the drive report (which would double it). Added an alignment test. Refs rustfs/backlog#807 * fix(kms): stop Vault backend from destroying/reviving keys on failure Two confirmed key-safety defects in the Vault KV2 backend: - get_key_material() 'self-healed' a decrypt or wrong-length failure by minting a fresh random master key and overwriting the stored value. That destroys the original key material, making every DEK ever wrapped by it permanently undecryptable. Decryption must never mutate the stored key: both branches now return a cryptographic_error instead. (The empty-material bootstrap path, which only fills a never-initialized key, is intentionally left intact.) - cancel_key_deletion() reset key_state to Enabled only in the returned response and never persisted it, so the key stayed PendingDeletion in storage and would still be reaped. It now writes the state back via update_key_metadata_in_storage and fails the request if the write fails. Adds ignored (Vault-requiring) integration tests documenting both behaviours. The third item (VaultTransit key state only in memory -> revived as Enabled after restart) is deferred: a fail-closed guard would break restart availability for all transit keys; the correct fix needs a persistent metadata store + Vault integration testing. Tracked in rustfs/backlog#808. Refs rustfs/backlog#808 * fix(admin): clamp STS AssumeRole duration; persist ImportBucketMetadata to disk Two confirmed admin-API defects: - Standard AssumeRole used the raw client-supplied DurationSeconds with no upper bound, so a caller could mint near-permanent temporary credentials. Clamp it to the AWS/MinIO STS window [900, 43200] (with 0 -> default 3600) via a shared clamp_assume_role_duration helper, and build the exp claim with saturating_add. This matches the existing AssumeRoleWithWebIdentity path. - ImportBucketMetadata only mutated an in-memory map and returned 200, silently dropping every imported config. It now persists each non-empty config via metadata_sys::update (which merges onto existing on-disk metadata) and returns InternalError if a write fails. Mapping extracted to imported_configs_to_persist with unit tests. Refs rustfs/backlog#809 * fix(heal): enqueue displacing request in release builds push_displacing_lower_priority folded the real enqueue call into debug_assert_eq!(self.push(request), Accepted). In release builds (debug_assertions off) the whole macro — including its argument — is compiled out, so after evicting a lower-priority queued item the new high-priority request was silently dropped and never healed. Hoist self.push(request) out of the assertion so the side effect runs in all builds. Adds a --release regression test. Refs rustfs/backlog#811 * fix(iam): propagate real delete_policy backend errors instead of swallowing them delete_policy's is_from_notify path had its error handling inverted: a real backend failure (disk IO / insufficient quorum) evicted the cache and returned Ok(()), reporting a phantom success while policy.json survived on disk (to be reloaded on the next full IAM reload); NoSuchPolicy — which should be idempotent success — returned Err. Propagate real errors and let NoSuchPolicy fall through to the idempotent cache-evict + Ok, matching delete_user / the notification handler in the same file. Adds a backend-error-injection regression test. Refs rustfs/backlog#810 * fix(utils): also normalize IPv4-compatible IPv6 in the SSRF guard The initial fix only unwrapped IPv4-mapped (::ffff:a.b.c.d) addresses; the deprecated IPv4-compatible form (::a.b.c.d, e.g. ::127.0.0.1 / ::169.254.169.254) still bypassed the guard. Reject pure-IPv6 specials (::, ::1, fe80::, fc00::) first, then normalize BOTH embedded-IPv4 forms before the IPv4 rules. Adds tests for compatible-form loopback/metadata and confirms ::1 / :: stay rejected. Found by adversarial review of the initial fix. Refs rustfs/backlog#813 * fix(ecstore): fix the same last-part loss in the parallel streaming path put_object_multipart_stream_parallel had the identical off-by-one (1..total_parts_count) that truncated the last part / produced zero parts for a single-part upload — reachable when concurrent stream parts are enabled. Reuse collect_complete_parts, which now returns an error instead of panicking on a gap in the parts map. Adds a missing-part error test. Found by adversarial review of the initial fix. Refs rustfs/backlog#807 * fix(kms): local backend must preserve key material on status change LocalKmsClient (the default KMS backend) regenerated the master key material on enable_key/disable_key/schedule_key_deletion/cancel_key_deletion — a pure status change. A single disable+enable cycle therefore destroyed the original key, making every DEK ever wrapped by it permanently undecryptable (silent data loss, no network needed). Preserve the existing material via get_key_material and re-save with only the status changed. Adds a hermetic regression test that wraps a DEK, cycles all four status methods, and asserts the DEK still decrypts. Found by adversarial review of the Vault fix. Refs rustfs/backlog#808 * test(rio): cover the length-prefix guard; correct its comment Add a DecompressReader test that feeds an unterminated length varint so uvarint returns 0 and the new guard (not the downstream codec) produces the InvalidData error, and reword the guard comment which overclaimed that the > len bound prevents a reachable panic (it is belt-and-suspenders). No behavior change. Found by adversarial review. Refs rustfs/backlog#812 * test(rio): build test block headers via vec! to satisfy clippy The new corrupted-block tests built the header with Vec::new() + repeated push, tripping clippy::vec_init_then_push (-D warnings in CI). Construct the fixed header bytes with vec![] instead. No behavior change. --------- Co-authored-by: houseme <housemecn@gmail.com>
RustFS is a high-performance distributed object storage software built using Rust
Getting Started · Docs · Bug reports · Discussions
English | Simplified Chinese
RustFS is a high-performance distributed object storage software built using Rust, one of the most popular languages worldwide. Along with MinIO, it shares a range of advantages such as simplicity, broad S3 API compatibility for supported features, open-source nature, support for data lakes, AI, and big data. Furthermore, it has a better and more user-friendly open-source license in comparison to other storage systems, being constructed under the Apache license. As Rust serves as its foundation, RustFS provides faster speed and safer distributed features for high-performance object storage.
Features
- High Performance: Built with Rust, ensuring speed and efficiency.
- Distributed Architecture: Scalable and fault-tolerant design for large-scale deployments.
- S3 Compatibility: Integration with common S3-compatible applications; current coverage is tracked in the S3 compatibility matrix.
- Data Lake Support: Optimized for big data and AI workloads.
- Open Source: Licensed under Apache 2.0, encouraging community contributions and transparency.
- User-Friendly: Designed with simplicity in mind, making it easy to deploy and manage.
RustFS vs MinIO
Stress test server parameters
| Type | parameter | Remark |
|---|---|---|
| CPU | 2 Core | Intel Xeon(Sapphire Rapids) Platinum 8475B , 2.7/3.2 GHz |
| Memory | 4GB | |
| Network | 15Gbp | |
| Driver | 40GB x 4 | IOPS 3800 / Driver |
https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/2e4979b5-260c-4f2c-ac12-c87fd558072a
RustFS vs Other object storage
| RustFS | Other object storage |
|---|---|
| Powerful Console | Simple and useless Console |
| Developed based on Rust language, memory is safer | Developed in Go or C, with potential issues like memory GC/leaks |
| Does not report logs to third-party countries | Reporting logs to other third countries may violate national security laws |
| Licensed under Apache, more business-friendly | AGPL V3 License and other License, polluted open source and License traps, infringement of intellectual property rights |
| S3-compatible core, with coverage tracked in the compatibility matrix | Variable S3 support and local cloud vendor coverage |
| Rust-based development, strong support for secure and innovative devices | Poor support for edge gateways and secure innovative devices |
| Stable commercial prices, free community support | High pricing, with costs up to $250,000 for 1PiB |
| No risk | Intellectual property risks and risks of prohibited uses |
Quickstart
To get started with RustFS, follow these steps:
-
One-click installation script (Option 1)
curl -O https://rustfs.com/install_rustfs.sh && bash install_rustfs.sh -
Docker Quick Start (Option 2)
# Docker Hub (recommended)
docker run -d -p 9000:9000 -v /data:/data rustfs/rustfs:latest
# Alternative using Podman
podman run -d -p 9000:9000 -v /data:/data rustfs/rustfs:latest
- Access the Console: Open your web browser and navigate to
http://localhost:9001to access the RustFS console, default username and password isrustfsadmin. - Create a Bucket: Use the console to create a new bucket for your objects.
- Upload Objects: You can upload files directly through the console or use S3-compatible APIs to interact with your RustFS instance.
Documentation
For detailed documentation, including configuration options, API references, and advanced usage, please visit our Documentation.
Getting Help
If you have any questions or need assistance, you can:
- Check the FAQ for common issues and solutions.
- Join our GitHub Discussions to ask questions and share your experiences.
- Open an issue on our GitHub Issues page for bug reports or feature requests.
Links
- Documentation - The manual you should read
- Changelog - What we broke and fixed
- GitHub Discussions - Where the community lives
Contact
- Bugs: GitHub Issues
- Business: hello@rustfs.com
- Jobs: jobs@rustfs.com
- General Discussion: GitHub Discussions
- Contributing: CONTRIBUTING.md
Contributors
RustFS is a community-driven project, and we appreciate all contributions. Check out the Contributors page to see the amazing people who have helped make RustFS better.
License
RustFS is a trademark of RustFS, Inc. All other trademarks are the property of their respective owners.
