fix(kms): apply the configured skip-TLS-verify to every Vault client

VaultConnectionSettings carried no TLS state, so both backend constructors
dropped VaultConfig::tls on the floor and build_client never called
VaultClientSettingsBuilder::verify. vaultrs 0.8.0 then fell back to its own
default, leaving verification on: with RUSTFS_KMS_VAULT_SKIP_TLS_VERIFY=true
and RUSTFS_KMS_ALLOW_INSECURE_DEV_DEFAULTS=true against a self-signed Vault,
startup still failed the handshake with UnknownIssuer.

Carry skip_tls_verify on the connection settings and set verify explicitly on
every client generation, authenticated and login alike. Setting it
unconditionally also closes a bypass in the other direction: left unset, vaultrs
derives verify from its own VAULT_SKIP_VERIFY variable, so a stray value in the
environment disabled certificate verification without passing the KMS
insecure-defaults gate.

The restore path pins verification on: VaultRestoreTarget carries no TLS
settings, and recovery is the last path that should accept an unauthenticated
Vault. The remaining TlsConfig fields (ca_cert_path, client_cert_path,
client_key_path) are still unused, but no supported input can set them — every
constructor leaves them None.
This commit is contained in:
唐小鸭
2026-08-14 12:54:29 +08:00
parent ab7e777e55
commit e4781e763a
4 changed files with 51 additions and 0 deletions
+1
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@@ -550,6 +550,7 @@ impl VaultKmsClient {
address: config.address.clone(),
namespace: config.namespace.clone(),
attempt_timeout: kms_config.effective_timeout(),
skip_tls_verify: config.tls.as_ref().is_some_and(|tls| tls.skip_verify),
};
let source = token_source_for(&config.auth_method, &settings)?;
let policy = VaultCredentialPolicy::from_kms_config(
@@ -580,6 +580,9 @@ pub(crate) struct VaultConnectionSettings {
pub(crate) namespace: Option<String>,
/// Per-attempt HTTP timeout applied to the underlying reqwest client.
pub(crate) attempt_timeout: Duration,
/// Whether to accept an unverified Vault server certificate. Gated on
/// `allow_insecure_dev_defaults` by `KmsConfig::validate`.
pub(crate) skip_tls_verify: bool,
}
impl VaultConnectionSettings {
@@ -593,6 +596,11 @@ impl VaultConnectionSettings {
// operation-level retry policy.
settings_builder.timeout(Some(self.attempt_timeout));
settings_builder.token(token);
// Always set explicitly: left unset, vaultrs derives this from its own
// VAULT_SKIP_VERIFY variable, so a stray value in the environment would
// disable certificate verification behind the KMS configuration and its
// insecure-defaults gate.
settings_builder.verify(!self.skip_tls_verify);
if let Some(namespace) = &self.namespace {
settings_builder.namespace(Some(namespace.clone()));
@@ -969,6 +977,7 @@ mod tests {
address: "http://127.0.0.1:8200".to_string(),
namespace: Some("team-namespace".to_string()),
attempt_timeout: Duration::from_secs(30),
skip_tls_verify: false,
}
}
@@ -1164,6 +1173,42 @@ mod tests {
assert!(format!("{source:?}").contains("KubernetesLogin"));
}
/// The configured flag has to reach the HTTP client, not just the config
/// struct: every generation (authenticated and login) builds its own client,
/// and a Vault with a self-signed certificate fails the handshake unless
/// each one carries the setting.
#[test]
fn test_skip_tls_verify_reaches_every_vault_client_generation() {
for skip_tls_verify in [false, true] {
let settings = VaultConnectionSettings {
address: "https://vault.example.com:8200".to_string(),
namespace: None,
attempt_timeout: Duration::from_secs(30),
skip_tls_verify,
};
let authenticated = settings.build_client(TEST_TOKEN).expect("authenticated client must build");
assert_eq!(authenticated.settings.verify, !skip_tls_verify);
let login = settings.build_login_client().expect("login client must build");
assert_eq!(login.settings.verify, !skip_tls_verify);
}
}
/// vaultrs derives `verify` from its own VAULT_SKIP_VERIFY variable when the
/// builder leaves it unset, which would disable certificate verification
/// without passing the KMS insecure-defaults gate.
#[test]
fn test_vaultrs_skip_verify_env_cannot_override_the_configured_setting() {
temp_env::with_var("VAULT_SKIP_VERIFY", Some("true"), || {
let client = test_settings().build_client(TEST_TOKEN).expect("client must build");
assert!(
client.settings.verify,
"a stray VAULT_SKIP_VERIFY must not disable verification behind the KMS configuration"
);
});
}
/// The projected token is read fresh per login attempt and trimmed, so a
/// kubelet rotation is picked up without a restart and a trailing newline
/// does not corrupt the assertion sent to Vault.
+1
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@@ -415,6 +415,7 @@ impl VaultTransitKmsClient {
address: config.address.clone(),
namespace: config.namespace.clone(),
attempt_timeout: kms_config.effective_timeout(),
skip_tls_verify: config.tls.as_ref().is_some_and(|tls| tls.skip_verify),
};
let source = token_source_for(&config.auth_method, &settings)?;
let policy = VaultCredentialPolicy::from_kms_config(
+4
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@@ -450,6 +450,10 @@ impl VaultRestoreClient {
address: target.address.clone(),
namespace: target.namespace.clone(),
attempt_timeout: kms_config.effective_timeout(),
// A restore target carries no TLS settings, so certificates are
// always verified: recovery is the last path that should accept an
// unauthenticated Vault.
skip_tls_verify: false,
};
let source = token_source_for(&target.auth_method, &settings)?;
let policy = VaultCredentialPolicy::from_kms_config(