fix(connect): preserve enrollment validation order

rustfs/src/connect/offline/enrollment.rs

@@ -380,6 +380,12 @@ impl OfflineEnrollment {
             return Err(EnrollmentError::MalformedDocument);
         }
         let issued_at = parse_timestamp(&routing.issued_at)?;
+
+        // The frozen decision order classifies the top-level signature before
+        // parsing any trust-link routing fields. Otherwise a malformed first
+        // link could mask a malformed artifact signature with DOCUMENT_MALFORMED.
+        let signature = decode_signature(&envelope.signature)?;
+
         let first = routing.trust_chain.first().ok_or(EnrollmentError::MalformedDocument)?;
         let first_bytes = decode_document_bytes(&first.bytes)?;
         let first_routing: TrustLinkRouting =
@@ -388,10 +394,6 @@ impl OfflineEnrollment {
             return Err(EnrollmentError::MalformedDocument);
         }
 
-        // Only after the document can route verification do we classify the
-        // top-level signature spelling and algorithm.
-        let signature = decode_signature(&envelope.signature)?;
-
         // Steps 3 to 5.
         let connect_key = verify_trust_chain(
             &routing.trust_chain,
@@ -585,7 +587,7 @@ fn decode_trust_link(entry: &SignedDocument) -> Result<(TrustLink, Vec<u8>), Enr
 }
 
 fn decode_document_bytes(value: &str) -> Result<Vec<u8>, EnrollmentError> {
-    if value.len() % 4 != 0 {
+    if !value.len().is_multiple_of(4) {
         return Err(EnrollmentError::MalformedDocument);
     }
 

rustfs/tests/connect_offline_enrollment.rs

@@ -575,6 +575,25 @@ fn every_challenge_boundary_mutation_fails_with_its_frozen_reason() {
     assert_eq!(covered, 16, "boundary-vectors.json publishes sixteen executable challenge mutations");
 }
 
+#[test]
+fn malformed_top_level_signature_precedes_malformed_first_link_routing() {
+    let source = accept_vector_named("challenge signed by a chained signing key under the pinned root");
+    let now = unix(field(&source, "evaluationTime"));
+    let mut challenge_envelope = source["document"].clone();
+    challenge_envelope["signature"]["algorithm"] = Value::String("ES384".to_string());
+
+    let mut challenge = signed_document(&challenge_envelope);
+    let first_envelope = &mut challenge["trustChain"].as_array_mut().expect("challenge carries a chain")[0];
+    let mut first_link = signed_document(first_envelope);
+    first_link["issuerKeyId"] = Value::String("not-a-key-id".to_string());
+    first_envelope["bytes"] = Value::String(encoded_document(&first_link));
+    challenge_envelope["bytes"] = Value::String(encoded_document(&challenge));
+
+    let error = OfflineEnrollment::verify_challenge(&envelope(&challenge_envelope), now)
+        .expect_err("a malformed top-level signature and first-link issuer must not verify");
+    assert_eq!(error.reason(), "SIGNATURE_MALFORMED");
+}
+
 #[test]
 fn unpinned_root_precedes_a_malformed_chain_shape() {
     let source = accept_vector_named("challenge signed by a chained signing key under the pinned root");