Govern deploy enrollment durability

Record the bootstrap-to-runtime credential replacement as one durable transition across API, agent lifecycle, security, and storage contracts. Document rollback, replay, and no-secret-on-failure guarantees proved by the deploy handler suite.\n\nChange-source: pulse-maintainer

docs/release-control/v6/internal/subsystems/agent-lifecycle.md

@@ -6674,3 +6674,22 @@ or re-enrollment authority. Its liveness marker observes only whether the
 monitor select loop is progressing; agent report success or failure cannot
 independently assert that Pulse is healthy. Agent-lifecycle behavior and proof
 routes remain unchanged.
+
+### Deploy enrollment swaps credentials as one durable transition
+
+A deploy bootstrap token remains the live credential until Pulse can durably
+replace it with the long-lived, host-bound runtime token. Enrollment prepares
+the runtime credential first, then removes the single-use bootstrap token and
+adds the runtime token under one configuration lock and one persistence write.
+Concurrent reuse loses the locked removal and returns `409`; persistence
+failure restores the complete prior token inventory and primary-token
+projection, returns `500`, discloses no runtime credential, and leaves the
+target enrolling so the same bootstrap credential can be retried safely.
+
+Bootstrap minting follows the same commit boundary: a token is returned only
+after its updated inventory is durably stored, and a failed write restores the
+prior live inventory. `TestHandleEnroll_Success`,
+`TestHandleEnroll_RollsBackBootstrapConsumptionWhenPersistenceFails`, and
+`TestMintBootstrapTokenForTarget_RollsBackWhenPersistenceFails` in
+`internal/api/deploy_handlers_test.go` pin the durable replacement and rollback
+paths.

docs/release-control/v6/internal/subsystems/api-contracts.md

@@ -9965,3 +9965,21 @@ failure count, sanitized error, and last interruption. It never returns the
 URL or endpoint fingerprint. A saved configuration that cannot be decrypted is
 `configuration_unavailable`, while explicit removal is immediately `disabled`
 even if cancellation of an older request is still unwinding.
+
+### Deploy enrollment reports only committed credentials
+
+`POST /api/agents/agent/enroll` returns a long-lived runtime token only after
+the authenticated single-use bootstrap token has been replaced in the durable
+API-token inventory. The replacement is one locked persistence transition;
+another request that already consumed the bootstrap token receives the stable
+`409 token_already_consumed` response. If persistence fails, the API restores
+the complete prior inventory and legacy primary-token projection, returns
+`500 token_persistence_error`, emits no runtime token, and does not advance the
+deployment target from `ENROLLING` to `VERIFYING`.
+
+The internal bootstrap-mint boundary likewise returns no raw token or token ID
+when persistence fails. `TestHandleEnroll_Success`,
+`TestHandleEnroll_RollsBackBootstrapConsumptionWhenPersistenceFails`, and
+`TestMintBootstrapTokenForTarget_RollsBackWhenPersistenceFails` in
+`internal/api/deploy_handlers_test.go` prove the persisted success state and
+both failed-commit responses.

docs/release-control/v6/internal/subsystems/security-privacy.md

@@ -2356,3 +2356,15 @@ tokens and primary-token projection, emits only a failed `token_deleted` audit
 event, and returns an error; a successful response identifies a deletion that
 will survive restart. Exact multi-token removal and persistence-failure
 rollback are exercised in `internal/api/security_tokens_lifecycle_test.go`.
+
+### Deploy enrollment never exposes an uncommitted credential
+
+The deploy bootstrap secret is single-use only at the durable API-token commit
+boundary. Pulse generates the host-bound runtime credential without admitting
+or returning it, then replaces the bootstrap record under one lock and persists
+the resulting inventory once. A concurrent replay cannot pass the locked
+removal. A failed persistence write restores the complete prior inventory and
+primary-token projection, returns an error, and discloses no runtime secret;
+failed bootstrap minting likewise returns no credential material. The success,
+replay, and forced-write-failure paths are exercised in
+`internal/api/deploy_handlers_test.go`.

docs/release-control/v6/internal/subsystems/storage-recovery.md

@@ -5642,3 +5642,16 @@ whose atomic/fsync discipline ensures a later process can report a Pulse
 monitoring gap; it contains endpoint fingerprint and timing only. Configuration
 export/import carries the watchdog URL solely inside the existing
 passphrase-encrypted bundle and advances that bundle contract to version 4.4.
+
+### Deploy credential replacement preserves restart-time truth
+
+The shared deploy enrollment path treats the persisted API-token inventory as
+the commit boundary when exchanging a bootstrap token for a runtime token. One
+locked write records the replacement; a failed write restores the complete
+prior inventory and primary-token projection, returns no new credential, and
+leaves the deployment target retryable. Bootstrap minting also restores live
+state and returns no token if its inventory write fails. These transitions add
+no backup, restore, retention, snapshot, or recovery authority; they prevent a
+successful enrollment response from describing credential state that a restart
+would undo. Their success and forced-write-failure proofs live in
+`internal/api/deploy_handlers_test.go`.