Bound private token input without terminal truncation

The executable overflow regression and a bounded Bash PTY probe show canonical terminals truncate long input before the size check. Read a bounded character count with echo held off, drain an invalid line before returning to the calling shell, and restore its modes on every exit. Pin maximum-size preservation, overflow history safety and terminal restoration.

Contract-Neutral: Repair bounded private terminal entry, overflow draining and mode restoration; no issuance, scope, install transport or response-shape delta.
Change-source: pulse-maintainer

internal/api/configapi/container_install_command_test.go

@@ -47,6 +47,52 @@ func TestContainerBootstrapHistoryAndShellData(t *testing.T) {
 	assertContainerBootstrapCleanup(t, root)
 }
 
+func TestContainerBootstrapOverflowDoesNotBecomeShellHistory(t *testing.T) {
+	root, env := bootstrapFixture(t, recordingInstaller)
+	token := strings.Repeat("x", 10000) + "-OVERFLOW_HISTORY_MARKER"
+	command := BuildContainerRuntimeAgentInstallCommand("https://pulse.example", "separate-issued-token", true)
+	history := filepath.Join(root, "shell-history")
+	payload, err := json.Marshal(map[string]string{"command": command, "input": token, "history": history})
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	cmd := exec.Command("python3", "-c", bootstrapPTYRunner)
+	cmd.Stdin = strings.NewReader(string(payload))
+	cmd.Env = append(os.Environ(), env...)
+	out, err := cmd.CombinedOutput()
+	if err == nil {
+		t.Fatal("overflowed input was accepted")
+	}
+	hist, err := os.ReadFile(history)
+	if err != nil || !strings.Contains(string(hist), command) {
+		t.Fatal("history control did not record the copied command")
+	}
+	for _, output := range []string{string(out), string(hist)} {
+		if strings.Contains(output, "OVERFLOW_HISTORY_MARKER") || strings.Contains(output, strings.Repeat("x", 512)) {
+			t.Fatal("discarded credential input was echoed or returned to shell history")
+		}
+	}
+	if _, err := os.Stat(filepath.Join(root, "captured-token")); !os.IsNotExist(err) {
+		t.Fatal("installer ran after overflowed input")
+	}
+	assertContainerBootstrapCleanup(t, root)
+}
+
+func TestContainerBootstrapPreservesMaximumAcceptedInput(t *testing.T) {
+	root, env := bootstrapFixture(t, recordingInstaller)
+	token := strings.Repeat("a", 4096)
+	command := BuildContainerRuntimeAgentInstallCommand("https://pulse.example", "separate-issued-token", true)
+	out, err := runBootstrap(t, command, token, env, true)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("maximum-size private input: %v\n%s", err, out)
+	}
+	captured, err := os.ReadFile(filepath.Join(root, "captured-token"))
+	if err != nil || string(captured) != token {
+		t.Fatal("terminal silently truncated an accepted token")
+	}
+	assertContainerBootstrapCleanup(t, root)
+}
+
 func assertContainerBootstrapCleanup(t *testing.T, root string) {
 	t.Helper()
 	directories, err := os.ReadFile(filepath.Join(root, "private-directories"))

internal/api/configapi/install_command.go

@@ -83,9 +83,18 @@ func privateBootstrapCommand(scriptURL, curlFlags, preflight, run string, needsT
 		privileged = append(privileged,
 			`token_dir=$(mktemp -d /tmp/pulse-agent-bootstrap.XXXXXX);`,
 			`token_file="$token_dir/token";`,
-			`cleanup() { unset pulse_token; rm -f -- "$token_file"; rmdir -- "$token_dir"; };`,
+			`unset pulse_token pulse_discard tty_state;`,
+			`cleanup() { unset pulse_token pulse_discard; if [ -n "${tty_state:-}" ]; then stty "$tty_state" </dev/tty 2>/dev/null || :; fi; rm -f -- "$token_file"; rmdir -- "$token_dir"; };`,
 			`trap cleanup EXIT; trap 'exit 129' HUP; trap 'exit 130' INT; trap 'exit 143' TERM;`,
-			`if ! IFS= read -r -s -p `+posixShellQuote(prompt+" (paste at this prompt, not in the command): ")+` pulse_token </dev/tty; then echo "A terminal is required to enter the token. No installation was attempted." >&2; exit 1; fi;`,
+			// A normal canonical tty silently truncates long lines (4095 bytes on
+			// Linux). Bounded character input preserves valid input and detects
+			// overflow; keep echo off while draining the rest of an invalid line
+			// so it cannot become a second command in the caller's shell history.
+			`if ! tty_state=$(stty -g </dev/tty); then echo "A terminal is required to enter the token. No installation was attempted." >&2; exit 1; fi;`,
+			`stty -echo </dev/tty;`,
+			`if ! IFS= read -r -s -p `+posixShellQuote(prompt+" (paste at this prompt, not in the command): ")+` -n 4097 pulse_token </dev/tty; then echo "Token input was interrupted. No installation was attempted." >&2; exit 1; fi;`,
+			`if [ "${#pulse_token}" -gt 4096 ]; then while IFS= read -r -s -n 4097 pulse_discard </dev/tty && [ "${#pulse_discard}" -eq 4097 ]; do :; done; unset pulse_discard; fi;`,
+			`stty "$tty_state" </dev/tty; unset tty_state;`,
 			`printf '\n' >/dev/tty;`,
 			`if [ -z "$pulse_token" ] || [ "${#pulse_token}" -gt 4096 ]; then echo "A non-empty token of at most 4096 characters is required." >&2; exit 1; fi;`,
 			`printf %s "$pulse_token" > "$token_file"; unset pulse_token;`,

internal/api/configapi/install_command_test.go

@@ -16,6 +16,8 @@ const bootstrapPTYRunner = `
 import errno, fcntl, json, os, pty, select, signal, subprocess, sys, termios, time
 p = json.load(sys.stdin)
 master, slave = pty.openpty()
+tty_watch = os.dup(slave)
+initial_tty = termios.tcgetattr(tty_watch)
 def session():
     os.setsid()
     fcntl.ioctl(0, termios.TIOCSCTTY, 0)
@@ -48,6 +50,12 @@ else:
     os.killpg(child.pid, signal.SIGKILL)
     output += b"\nPTY fixture deadline expired\n"
 code = child.wait()
+final_tty = termios.tcgetattr(tty_watch)
+mode_mask = termios.ECHO | termios.ICANON
+if (initial_tty[3] & mode_mask) != (final_tty[3] & mode_mask):
+    output += b"\nBootstrap did not restore terminal echo/canonical mode\n"
+    code = 1
+os.close(tty_watch)
 os.close(master)
 sys.stdout.buffer.write(output)
 sys.exit(code if code >= 0 else 128 - code)