Exercise authoritative guest-lock admission in VM diagnostics fixtures

The required API shard failed because its healthy filesystem fixture omitted VM config. Supply a verified unlocked config instead of bypassing the guard, and cover backup/snapshot locks, absent or malformed config, permission refusals and locks appearing in flight through the real diagnostic client.

Contract-Neutral: Diagnostic fixtures and connected safety assertions only; production guest admission, APIs and polling behavior are unchanged.
Change-source: pulse-maintainer
This commit is contained in:
pulse-triage[bot]
2026-10-03 20:24:47 +01:00
parent ee069f2144
commit 091f987798
+76 -3
View File
@@ -8,6 +8,7 @@ import (
"net/http"
"net/http/httptest"
"strings"
"sync/atomic"
"testing"
"time"
@@ -668,9 +669,11 @@ func TestBuildAIChatDiagnostic_WithService(t *testing.T) {
func TestCheckVMDiskMonitoring_Success(t *testing.T) {
responses := map[string]proxmoxTestResponse{
"/api2/json/nodes": {body: `{"data":[{"node":"pve1","status":"online"}]}`},
"/api2/json/nodes/pve1/qemu": {body: `{"data":[{"vmid":100,"name":"vm-100","node":"pve1","status":"running","template":0}]}`},
"/api2/json/nodes/pve1/qemu/100/status/current": {body: `{"data":{"agent":1}}`},
"/api2/json/nodes": {body: `{"data":[{"node":"pve1","status":"online"}]}`},
"/api2/json/nodes/pve1/qemu": {body: `{"data":[{"vmid":100,"name":"vm-100","node":"pve1","status":"running","template":0}]}`},
"/api2/json/nodes/pve1/qemu/100/status/current": {body: `{"data":{"agent":1}}`},
// Guest admission must independently verify the authoritative config lock.
"/api2/json/nodes/pve1/qemu/100/config": {body: `{"data":{}}`},
"/api2/json/nodes/pve1/qemu/100/agent/get-fsinfo": {body: `{"data":{"result":[{"name":"root","type":"ext4","mountpoint":"/","total-bytes":100,"used-bytes":50}]}}`},
}
server := newProxmoxTestServer(t, responses)
@@ -752,3 +755,73 @@ func TestCheckPhysicalDisks_PermissionDenied(t *testing.T) {
t.Fatalf("expected permissions recommendation")
}
}
func TestCheckVMDiskMonitoring_BackupAdmission(t *testing.T) {
for _, tc := range []struct {
name string
config proxmoxTestResponse
agentStatus int
lockInFlight bool
wantAgentCalls int32
wantPermission bool
}{
{name: "backup-only-in-config", config: proxmoxTestResponse{body: `{"data":{"lock":"backup"}}`}},
{name: "snapshot-lock", config: proxmoxTestResponse{body: `{"data":{"lock":"snapshot"}}`}},
{name: "lock-permission-denied", config: proxmoxTestResponse{status: http.StatusForbidden}},
{name: "lock-unavailable", config: proxmoxTestResponse{status: http.StatusNotFound}},
{name: "lock-null", config: proxmoxTestResponse{body: `{"data":null}`}},
{name: "lock-malformed", config: proxmoxTestResponse{body: `{"data":{"lock":true}}`}},
{name: "lock-starts-in-flight", config: proxmoxTestResponse{body: `{"data":{}}`}, lockInFlight: true, wantAgentCalls: 1},
{name: "completed-agent-permission-refusal", config: proxmoxTestResponse{body: `{"data":{}}`}, agentStatus: http.StatusForbidden, wantAgentCalls: 2, wantPermission: true},
} {
t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
var calls atomic.Int32
var locked atomic.Bool
server := newIPv4HTTPServer(t, http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
switch r.URL.Path {
case "/api2/json/nodes":
_, _ = w.Write([]byte(`{"data":[{"node":"pve1","status":"online"}]}`))
case "/api2/json/nodes/pve1/qemu":
_, _ = w.Write([]byte(`{"data":[{"vmid":100,"name":"vm-100","node":"pve1","status":"running","template":0}]}`))
case "/api2/json/nodes/pve1/qemu/100/status/current":
// As on the failed CI fixture, current status alone has no lock field.
_, _ = w.Write([]byte(`{"data":{"agent":1}}`))
case "/api2/json/nodes/pve1/qemu/100/config":
if locked.Load() {
_, _ = w.Write([]byte(`{"data":{"lock":"backup"}}`))
return
}
if tc.config.status != 0 {
w.WriteHeader(tc.config.status)
}
_, _ = w.Write([]byte(tc.config.body))
case "/api2/json/nodes/pve1/qemu/100/agent/get-fsinfo":
calls.Add(1)
if tc.lockInFlight {
locked.Store(true)
}
if tc.agentStatus != 0 {
w.WriteHeader(tc.agentStatus)
return
}
_, _ = w.Write([]byte(`{"data":{"result":[{"name":"root","type":"ext4","mountpoint":"/","total-bytes":100,"used-bytes":50}]}}`))
default:
t.Errorf("unexpected diagnostic request: %s", r.URL.Path)
http.NotFound(w, r)
}
}))
defer server.Close()
result := (&Router{}).checkVMDiskMonitoring(context.Background(), newProxmoxClient(t, server.URL), "")
if result.VMsFound != 1 || result.VMsWithAgent != 1 || result.VMsWithDiskData != 0 || strings.Contains(result.TestResult, "SUCCESS") {
t.Fatalf("locked/unverified/refused data must not become successful diagnostics: %+v", result)
}
if calls.Load() != tc.wantAgentCalls {
t.Fatalf("guest requests = %d, want %d", calls.Load(), tc.wantAgentCalls)
}
if tc.wantPermission && result.TestResult != "Permission denied accessing guest agent" {
t.Fatalf("completed permission refusal lost: %q", result.TestResult)
}
})
}
}