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ignacionelson
6e47d76ba6
Client file sharing, rebuilt from the ground up: a private area per client, resumable uploads, folders, groups and categories, sharing with expiry dates and download limits, comments, file versions, an activity log, a REST API, and sixteen languages. This repository begins here. ProjectSend 2 was developed privately, and that development history is not published — the previous generation remains available, with its own history, at projectsend/legacy. Free software under the GNU General Public License v2, or (at your option) any later version.
69 lines
2.5 KiB
PHP
69 lines
2.5 KiB
PHP
<?php
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declare(strict_types=1);
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namespace App\Modules\Identity\TwoFactor;
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use App\Models\User;
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use App\Modules\Audit\Action;
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use App\Modules\Audit\ActivityLogger;
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use App\Modules\Identity\Notifications\TwoFactorResetNotification;
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use App\Modules\Platform\Settings\Setting;
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use App\Modules\Platform\Settings\Settings;
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/**
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* An administrator removing somebody else's second factor.
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*
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* This exists because of an asymmetry: enrolling in two-factor
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* authentication is something only you can do, but *losing* it — a wiped
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* phone, a reinstalled authenticator app, recovery codes in a drawer at
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* the old office — locks you out of an account nobody else can open
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* either. Without this, the only remedies are a database edit or deleting
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* the account, and deleting a staff account means reassigning everything
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* it owns to get somebody back in through the front door.
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*
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* The three things that happen here belong together and are the reason
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* this is a service rather than four lines in a controller. Clearing the
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* credentials is the smallest part; the audit entry and the email to the
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* account holder are what make the action accountable, and a surface that
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* forgot either would turn a support tool into a silent takeover route.
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*
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* What is deliberately *not* here is who may do it. That is an authority
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* question, and it already has answers: `can:edit_users` /
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* `can:edit_clients` on the route, and StaffAccounts::guardTarget() for
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* "may this actor touch this particular account".
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*/
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class TwoFactorAdministration
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{
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public function __construct(
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private readonly TwoFactorService $twoFactor,
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private readonly ActivityLogger $activity,
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private readonly Settings $settings,
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) {}
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/**
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* Remove the target's second factor. Returns whether one was in force
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* — a half-finished enrolment is still cleared, but there is nothing
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* to report about it.
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*
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* If the installation enforces two-factor authentication for the
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* target's user type, EnforceTwoFactor walks them straight back into
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* enrolment on their next request. That is the intended outcome: this
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* un-sticks an account, it does not exempt one.
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*/
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public function reset(User $target): bool
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{
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if (! $this->twoFactor->clear($target)) {
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return false;
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}
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$this->activity->log(Action::TwoFactorReset, subject: $target);
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if ($this->settings->get(Setting::EmailNotificationsEnabled) === true) {
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$target->notify(new TwoFactorResetNotification);
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}
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return true;
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}
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}
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