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proto: detect stateless resets in authed and unprotected packets

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RFC9000 says: endpoints MUST treat any packet ending in a valid
stateless reset token as a Stateless Reset

Previously, we did not detect stateless resets that appeared to be
unprotected packets (e.g. Retry or Version Negotiation) or which were
successfully decrypted (astronomically unlikely with TLS, but possible
with custom cryptographic layers).

(cherry picked from commit 7f26029284)
This commit is contained in:
Benjamin Saunders
2023-08-23 13:21:58 -07:00
parent 487bae6ef2
commit dfe9176b3c
1 changed files with 18 additions and 23 deletions
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quinn-proto/src/connection/mod.rs
+18 -23
View File
@@ -2007,29 +2007,28 @@ impl Connection {
.map(move |number| (packet, number)),
};
let result = match decrypted {
_ if stateless_reset => {
debug!("got stateless reset");
Err(ConnectionError::Reset)
}
Err(Some(e)) => {
warn!("illegal packet: {}", e);
Err(e.into())
}
Err(None) => {
if stateless_reset {
debug!("got stateless reset");
Err(ConnectionError::Reset)
debug!("failed to authenticate packet");
self.authentication_failures += 1;
let integrity_limit = self.spaces[self.highest_space]
.crypto
.as_ref()
.unwrap()
.packet
.local
.integrity_limit();
if self.authentication_failures > integrity_limit {
Err(TransportError::AEAD_LIMIT_REACHED("integrity limit violated").into())
} else {
debug!("failed to authenticate packet");
self.authentication_failures += 1;
let integrity_limit = self.spaces[self.highest_space]
.crypto
.as_ref()
.unwrap()
.packet
.local
.integrity_limit();
if self.authentication_failures > integrity_limit {
Err(TransportError::AEAD_LIMIT_REACHED("integrity limit violated").into())
} else {
return;
}
return;
}
}
Ok((packet, number)) => {
@@ -2041,12 +2040,8 @@ impl Connection {
let is_duplicate = |n| self.spaces[packet.header.space()].dedup.insert(n);
if number.map_or(false, is_duplicate) {
if stateless_reset {
Err(ConnectionError::Reset)
} else {
warn!("discarding possible duplicate packet");
return;
}
warn!("discarding possible duplicate packet");
return;
} else if self.state.is_handshake() && packet.header.is_short() {
// TODO: SHOULD buffer these to improve reordering tolerance.
trace!("dropping short packet during handshake");