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8 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
lebaudantoine 016221638e ️(backend) hash application secrets with SHA-256
Application token authentication currently uses Django's default
password hasher. On our production hardware, token requests take
at least ~500 ms. Authentication happens per user of each
application, so this cost accumulates across frequently used
integrations.

Password hashers deliberately make guessing expensive to protect
human-chosen passwords after a database leak. Our application
secrets are generated server-side using a cryptographically secure
random generator, with a default length of 128 alphanumeric
characters. Guessing these secrets is already computationally
infeasible, making password stretching an unnecessary CPU cost.

Switch to SHA-256 for application secrets while retaining
constant-time comparison, and keep user password hashing
unchanged. Existing secrets migrate after successful verification
without requiring key rotation. Conditional updates prevent
migration from overwriting a concurrent rotation.

This assumes securely generated, high-entropy secrets. Deployments
that reduce `APPLICATION_CLIENT_SECRET_LENGTH` or supply
predictable secrets lose the offline guessing protection that the
previous slow hasher provided.
2026-09-10 19:51:51 +02:00
lebaudantoine 04fd79b56b 🔒️(backend) reject inactive users in resource server backend
The resource server backend returned any user matching the token's
`sub` claim without checking `User.is_active`. The upstream lasuite
backend only validates the token's introspection `active` claim, so a
deactivated Django account kept API access until its token expired.

Raise `SuspiciousOperation` in `get_or_create_user` when the user is
inactive, which the authentication class turns into a 401, consistent
with `BaseJWTAuthentication`. Add unit and end-to-end tests.
2026-09-10 11:10:53 +02:00
leo e336122cfa 💬(frontend) clarify video recording wording
Video recording from transcription panel did not explicitly
mention video, leading to confusion from some users. Make
wording more explicit.
2026-09-09 20:03:36 +02:00
lebaudantoine 172dc70649 (backend) allow configuring trace sampling
Add a configuration knob for the trace sampling rate, so we can
enable tracing on middleware and cache spans when debugging slow
requests in production.

Sampling is set to 0 by default, so tracing stays fully off unless
explicitly enabled.
2026-09-09 20:02:57 +02:00
lebaudantoine e0ab7f191f 📈(frontend) include LiveKit SIDs in the connection analytics event
Attach the LiveKit SIDs (room and participant) to the connection
analytics event.

Makes it easier to debug problematic sessions and to correlate a
room session with the corresponding LiveKit logs.
2026-09-09 13:38:44 +02:00
lebaudantoine 455b315dbb 🐛(backend) acknowledge unknown LiveKit webhook events instead of 422
Around 0.76% of incoming LiveKit webhooks were being flagged as
unprocessable and returned a 422, even though LiveKit was sending
legitimate data — just with event types we do not handle. This
inflated error metrics and made real webhook issues harder to spot.

Return a 200 for these webhooks instead. When a new, unhandled
event type shows up, log a warning so we can decide whether it is
worth adding explicit handling.
2026-09-09 12:09:13 +02:00
lebaudantoine 3089b03062 🔇(backend) silence noisy request summary info logs
The request summary info logs were spamming the log stream, making
around 46% of the total volume, without carrying any exploitable
information.

Silence them so the remaining logs are easier to explore and cheaper
to store; roughly halves the overall log volume.
2026-09-09 11:17:49 +02:00
lebaudantoine 60febb3b57 🔇(backend) silence expected 401 warnings on /me
On a busy morning, `/me` alone produced 72k warning logs — 97% of
all warnings. They all come from anonymous requests to `/me`
without credentials, which is normal: `/me` is how the app
determines the current auth status.

These warnings carry no diagnostic value on this endpoint, so
silence them there to cut down on log volume.
2026-09-09 11:17:49 +02:00
17 changed files with 394 additions and 18 deletions
+7
View File
@@ -8,10 +8,17 @@ and this project adheres to
## [Unreleased]
### Changed
- 📈(frontend) include LiveKit SIDs in the connection analytics event
- 🔇(backend) silence expected 401 warnings on /me
- 🔇(backend) silence noisy request summary info logs
### Fixed
- 🐛(backend) acknowledge unknown LiveKit webhook events instead of 422
- 🔒️(backend) enforce display name setting on rename API
- 🔒️(backend) reject inactive users in resource server backend
## [1.31.0] - 2026-09-08
@@ -286,6 +286,10 @@ class ResourceServerBackend(LaSuiteBackend):
if user is None and settings.OIDC_CREATE_USER:
user = self.create_user(sub)
if user is not None and not user.is_active:
logger.warning("Inactive user attempted authentication: %s", user.pk)
raise SuspiciousOperation("User account is disabled.")
return user
def create_user(self, sub):
+1 -2
View File
@@ -4,7 +4,6 @@ import copy
from logging import getLogger
from django.conf import settings
from django.contrib.auth.hashers import check_password
from django.core.exceptions import ValidationError
from django.core.validators import validate_email
@@ -74,7 +73,7 @@ class ApplicationViewSet(viewsets.ViewSet):
except models.Application.DoesNotExist as e:
raise drf_exceptions.AuthenticationFailed("Invalid credentials") from e
if not check_password(client_secret, application.client_secret):
if not application.check_client_secret(client_secret):
raise drf_exceptions.AuthenticationFailed("Invalid credentials")
if not application.is_active:
+12 -2
View File
@@ -4,9 +4,11 @@ Core application fields
from logging import getLogger
from django.contrib.auth.hashers import identify_hasher, make_password
from django.contrib.auth.hashers import identify_hasher
from django.db import models
from .hashers import hash_client_secret
logger = getLogger(__name__)
@@ -24,6 +26,14 @@ class SecretField(models.CharField):
secret = getattr(model_instance, self.attname)
if secret.startswith("sha256$"):
logger.debug(
"%s: %s is already hashed with sha256.",
model_instance,
self.attname,
)
return secret
try:
hasher = identify_hasher(secret)
logger.debug(
@@ -36,7 +46,7 @@ class SecretField(models.CharField):
logger.debug(
"%s: %s is not hashed; hashing it now.", model_instance, self.attname
)
hashed_secret = make_password(secret)
hashed_secret = hash_client_secret(secret)
setattr(model_instance, self.attname, hashed_secret)
return hashed_secret
+24
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,24 @@
"""Application secrets only: keep fast hashing out of PASSWORD_HASHERS.
Secrets must be securely randomly generated, not human-chosen.
"""
import hashlib
from django.contrib.auth.hashers import check_password
from django.utils.crypto import constant_time_compare
from django.utils.encoding import force_bytes
def hash_client_secret(raw_secret):
"""Hash a machine-generated application secret without key stretching."""
return f"sha256${hashlib.sha256(force_bytes(raw_secret)).hexdigest()}"
def verify_client_secret(raw_secret, encoded):
"""Verify the application format or a legacy Django password hash."""
if raw_secret is None:
return False
if encoded.startswith("sha256$"):
return constant_time_compare(encoded, hash_client_secret(raw_secret))
return check_password(raw_secret, encoded)
+25
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,25 @@
"""Logging filters for the core application."""
import logging
from django.conf import settings
class SilenceExpected401(logging.Filter):
"""Drop the expected 401 from anonymous hits on the /me endpoint.
The frontend probes `/users/me/` to check authentication; a 401 for
anonymous users is normal, not a warning worth logging.
"""
def filter(self, record):
"""Return False for a 401 on a silenced path, True otherwise."""
if getattr(record, "status_code", None) != 401:
return True
request = getattr(record, "request", None)
path = getattr(request, "path", None)
if not path:
return True
return path not in settings.LOGGING_SILENCED_401_PATHS
+26 -1
View File
@@ -25,7 +25,7 @@ from django.utils.translation import gettext_lazy as _
from lasuite.tools.email import get_domain_from_email
from timezone_field import TimeZoneField
from . import fields, utils
from . import fields, hashers, utils
from .recording.enums import FileExtension
from .validators import sub_validator
@@ -828,6 +828,31 @@ class Application(BaseModel):
def __str__(self):
return f"{self.name!s}"
def check_client_secret(self, raw_secret):
"""Verify and lazily rehash without overwriting a concurrent rotation."""
original_hash = self.client_secret
if not hashers.verify_client_secret(raw_secret, original_hash):
return False
if original_hash.startswith("sha256$"):
return True
# Fast hashing assumes securely generated, high-entropy secrets.
# APPLICATION_CLIENT_SECRET_LENGTH controls generated length, not randomness.
encoded = hashers.hash_client_secret(raw_secret)
updated = Application.objects.filter(
pk=self.pk, client_secret=original_hash
).update(client_secret=encoded)
if updated:
self.client_secret = encoded
return True
try:
self.refresh_from_db()
except type(self).DoesNotExist:
return False
return hashers.verify_client_secret(raw_secret, self.client_secret)
def can_delegate_email(self, email):
"""Check if this application can delegate the given email."""
@@ -0,0 +1,146 @@
"""Application hashing and migration of existing credentials."""
import hashlib
from unittest import mock
from django.contrib.auth.hashers import check_password, identify_hasher, make_password
from django.db import connection
from django.test.utils import CaptureQueriesContext
from django.utils.crypto import get_random_string
import pytest
from rest_framework.test import APIClient
from core import hashers
from core.factories import ApplicationFactory, UserFactory
from core.models import Application
pytestmark = pytest.mark.django_db
@pytest.mark.parametrize("secret", ["short", "a" * 128, b"byte-secret"])
def test_application_hash(secret):
"""Application hashes verify correctly but are not accepted for user passwords."""
encoded = hashers.hash_client_secret(secret)
raw = secret.encode() if isinstance(secret, str) else secret
assert encoded == f"sha256${hashlib.sha256(raw).hexdigest()}"
assert hashers.verify_client_secret(secret, encoded)
assert not hashers.verify_client_secret("wrong", encoded)
assert not hashers.verify_client_secret(None, encoded)
assert not hashers.verify_client_secret(secret, "sha256$invalid")
assert not check_password(secret, encoded)
with pytest.raises(ValueError):
identify_hasher(encoded)
assert not make_password(raw.decode()).startswith("sha256$")
@pytest.mark.parametrize("algorithm", ["pbkdf2_sha256", "md5"])
def test_token_migrates_legacy_secret_once(algorithm):
"""The same client secret works before and after migration, with no later writes."""
secret = get_random_string(128)
user = UserFactory()
legacy = make_password(secret, hasher=algorithm)
app = ApplicationFactory(client_secret=legacy)
app.refresh_from_db()
assert app.client_secret == legacy
payload = {
"client_id": app.client_id,
"client_secret": secret,
"grant_type": "client_credentials",
"scope": user.email,
}
client = APIClient()
response = client.post(
"/external-api/v1.0/application/token/", payload, format="json"
)
assert response.status_code == 200
app.refresh_from_db()
migrated = app.client_secret
assert migrated == hashers.hash_client_secret(secret)
with CaptureQueriesContext(connection) as queries:
response = client.post(
"/external-api/v1.0/application/token/", payload, format="json"
)
assert response.status_code == 200
assert not any(q["sql"].lstrip().startswith("UPDATE") for q in queries)
app.refresh_from_db()
assert app.client_secret == migrated
def test_wrong_secret_does_not_migrate():
"""Failed authentication leaves a production PBKDF2 hash untouched."""
user = UserFactory()
legacy = make_password(get_random_string(128), hasher="pbkdf2_sha256")
app = ApplicationFactory(client_secret=legacy)
response = APIClient().post(
"/external-api/v1.0/application/token/",
{
"client_id": app.client_id,
"client_secret": "wrong",
"grant_type": "client_credentials",
"scope": user.email,
},
format="json",
)
assert response.status_code == 401
app.refresh_from_db()
assert app.client_secret == legacy
def test_migration_preserves_concurrent_rotation():
"""Migration must not restore a secret rotated after verification."""
secret = get_random_string(128)
app = ApplicationFactory(
client_secret=make_password(secret, hasher="pbkdf2_sha256")
)
replacement = hashers.hash_client_secret(get_random_string(128))
def verify_then_rotate(raw, encoded):
verified = check_password(raw, encoded)
Application.objects.filter(pk=app.pk).update(client_secret=replacement)
return verified
with mock.patch.object(hashers, "check_password", side_effect=verify_then_rotate):
assert app.check_client_secret(secret) is False
app.refresh_from_db()
assert app.client_secret == replacement
def test_migration_preserves_concurrent_migration():
"""Authentication succeeds when another request migrates the same secret."""
secret = get_random_string(128)
app = ApplicationFactory(
client_secret=make_password(secret, hasher="pbkdf2_sha256")
)
migrated = hashers.hash_client_secret(secret)
def verify_then_migrate(raw, encoded):
verified = check_password(raw, encoded)
Application.objects.filter(pk=app.pk).update(client_secret=migrated)
return verified
with mock.patch.object(hashers, "check_password", side_effect=verify_then_migrate):
assert app.check_client_secret(secret) is True
app.refresh_from_db()
assert app.client_secret == migrated
def test_migration_preserves_concurrent_deletion():
"""Authentication fails when the application is deleted after verification."""
secret = get_random_string(128)
app = ApplicationFactory(
client_secret=make_password(secret, hasher="pbkdf2_sha256")
)
def verify_then_delete(raw, encoded):
verified = check_password(raw, encoded)
Application.objects.filter(pk=app.pk).delete()
return verified
with mock.patch.object(hashers, "check_password", side_effect=verify_then_delete):
assert app.check_client_secret(secret) is False
assert not Application.objects.filter(pk=app.pk).exists()
@@ -0,0 +1,96 @@
"""Tests for the external API ResourceServerBackend."""
from django.core.exceptions import SuspiciousOperation
import pytest
import responses
from rest_framework.test import APIClient
from core.external_api.authentication import ResourceServerBackend
from core.factories import UserFactory
from core.models import User
pytestmark = pytest.mark.django_db
def _payload(sub):
return {"sub": sub, "active": True, "scope": "lasuite_meet", "client_id": "app"}
def test_resource_server_backend_get_or_create_user_active():
"""An existing active user matching the sub should be returned."""
user = UserFactory()
result = ResourceServerBackend().get_or_create_user(
access_token="token", id_token=None, payload=_payload(user.sub)
)
assert result == user
def test_resource_server_backend_get_or_create_user_inactive():
"""An inactive user should be rejected even with a valid token."""
user = UserFactory(is_active=False)
with pytest.raises(SuspiciousOperation, match="User account is disabled."):
ResourceServerBackend().get_or_create_user(
access_token="token", id_token=None, payload=_payload(user.sub)
)
def test_resource_server_backend_get_or_create_user_creates(settings):
"""An unknown sub should create an active user when OIDC_CREATE_USER is set."""
settings.OIDC_CREATE_USER = True
result = ResourceServerBackend().get_or_create_user(
access_token="token", id_token=None, payload=_payload("new-sub")
)
assert result.sub == "new-sub"
assert result.is_active is True
assert User.objects.filter(sub="new-sub").exists()
def test_resource_server_backend_get_or_create_user_no_creation(settings):
"""An unknown sub should return None when OIDC_CREATE_USER is unset."""
settings.OIDC_CREATE_USER = False
result = ResourceServerBackend().get_or_create_user(
access_token="token", id_token=None, payload=_payload("new-sub")
)
assert result is None
assert not User.objects.filter(sub="new-sub").exists()
@responses.activate
def test_api_rooms_list_resource_server_inactive_user(settings):
"""End to end: a valid introspected token for an inactive user should get 401."""
settings.OIDC_OP_INTROSPECTION_ENDPOINT = "https://oidc.example.com/introspect"
settings.OIDC_OP_URL = "https://oidc.example.com"
user = UserFactory(is_active=False)
responses.add(
responses.POST,
"https://oidc.example.com/introspect",
json={
"iss": "https://oidc.example.com",
"active": True,
"sub": user.sub,
"scope": "openid lasuite_meet rooms:list",
"client_id": "app",
},
)
client = APIClient()
client.credentials(HTTP_AUTHORIZATION="Bearer rs-token")
response = client.get("/external-api/v1.0/rooms/")
assert response.status_code == 401
assert "login failed" in str(response.data).lower()
@@ -6,12 +6,12 @@ Unit tests for the Application and ApplicationDomain models
from unittest import mock
from django.contrib.auth.hashers import check_password
from django.core.exceptions import ValidationError
import pytest
from core.factories import ApplicationDomainFactory, ApplicationFactory
from core.hashers import verify_client_secret
from core.models import Application, ApplicationDomain, ApplicationScope
pytestmark = pytest.mark.django_db
@@ -98,8 +98,8 @@ def test_models_application_client_secret_hashed_on_save():
# Secret should be hashed, not plain
assert application.client_secret != plain_secret
# Should verify with check_password
assert check_password(plain_secret, application.client_secret) is True
# Should verify with the application credential policy
assert verify_client_secret(plain_secret, application.client_secret) is True
def test_models_application_client_secret_preserves_existing_hash():
+31 -1
View File
@@ -469,6 +469,9 @@ class Base(Configuration):
# Sentry
SENTRY_DSN = values.Value(None, environ_name="SENTRY_DSN")
SENTRY_TRACES_SAMPLE_RATE = values.FloatValue(
0.0, environ_name="SENTRY_TRACES_SAMPLE_RATE", environ_prefix=None
)
# Easy thumbnails
THUMBNAIL_EXTENSION = "webp"
@@ -1110,6 +1113,12 @@ class Base(Configuration):
environ_prefix=None,
)
LOGGING_SILENCED_401_PATHS = values.ListValue(
default=["/api/v1.0/users/me/"],
environ_name="LOGGING_SILENCED_401_PATHS",
environ_prefix=None,
)
# Logging
# We want to make it easy to log to console but by default we log production
# to Sentry and don't want to log to console.
@@ -1122,10 +1131,16 @@ class Base(Configuration):
"style": "{",
},
},
"filters": {
"silence_expected_401": {
"()": "core.logging_filters.SilenceExpected401",
},
},
"handlers": {
"console": {
"class": "logging.StreamHandler",
"formatter": "simple",
"filters": ["silence_expected_401"],
},
},
# Override root logger to send it to console
@@ -1136,6 +1151,13 @@ class Base(Configuration):
),
},
"loggers": {
"request.summary": {
"level": values.Value(
"WARNING",
environ_name="LOGGING_LEVEL_REQUEST_SUMMARY",
environ_prefix="",
)
},
"core": {
"handlers": ["console"],
"level": values.Value(
@@ -1211,7 +1233,14 @@ class Base(Configuration):
dsn=cls.SENTRY_DSN,
environment=cls.__name__.lower(), # build, test, development, production
release=get_release(),
integrations=[DjangoIntegration()],
traces_sample_rate=cls.SENTRY_TRACES_SAMPLE_RATE,
integrations=[
DjangoIntegration(
transaction_style="url",
middleware_spans=True,
cache_spans=True,
)
],
)
sentry_sdk.set_tag("application", "backend")
@@ -1283,6 +1312,7 @@ class Test(Base):
)
PASSWORD_HASHERS = [
"django.contrib.auth.hashers.MD5PasswordHasher",
"django.contrib.auth.hashers.PBKDF2PasswordHasher",
]
USE_SWAGGER = True
EXTERNAL_API_ENABLED = True
@@ -71,20 +71,30 @@ export const ConnectionObserver = () => {
useEffect(() => {
if (!isAnalyticsEnabled) return
const handleConnection = () => {
const handleConnection = async () => {
// Preserve original connection timestamp across reconnections to measure
// total session duration from first connect to final disconnect.
if (connectionStartTimeRef.current != null) return
connectionStartTimeRef.current = Date.now()
void captureMediaEvent('connection-event', {})
const participantSid = room.localParticipant.sid
const roomSid = await room.getSid().catch(() => undefined)
void captureMediaEvent('connection-event', {
livekit_room_sid: roomSid,
livekit_participant_sid: participantSid,
})
}
const handleReconnect = () => {
captureEvent('reconnect-event')
}
const handleReconnected = () => {
captureEvent('reconnected-event')
const handleReconnected = async () => {
const participantSid = room.localParticipant.sid
const roomSid = await room.getSid().catch(() => undefined)
captureEvent('reconnected-event', {
livekit_room_sid: roomSid,
livekit_participant_sid: participantSid,
})
}
const handleSignalingConnect = () => {
+1 -1
View File
@@ -480,7 +480,7 @@
"destination": "Ein neues Dokument wird erstellt auf",
"destinationUnknown": "Ein neues Dokument wird erstellt",
"language": "Meeting-Sprache:",
"recording": "Auch eine Aufzeichnung starten"
"recording": "Auch eine Videoaufzeichnung starten"
},
"button": {
"start": "Meeting-Transkription starten",
+1 -1
View File
@@ -480,7 +480,7 @@
"destination": "A new document will be created on",
"destinationUnknown": "A new document will be created",
"language": "Meeting language:",
"recording": "Also start a recording"
"recording": "Also start a video recording"
},
"button": {
"start": "Start transcribing the meeting",
+1 -1
View File
@@ -479,7 +479,7 @@
"destination": "Se creará un nuevo documento en",
"destinationUnknown": "Se creará un nuevo documento",
"language": "Idioma de la reunión:",
"recording": "Iniciar también una grabación"
"recording": "Iniciar también una grabación de vídeo"
},
"button": {
"start": "Empezar a transcribir la reunión",
+1 -1
View File
@@ -480,7 +480,7 @@
"destination": "Un nouveau document sera créé sur",
"destinationUnknown": "Un nouveau document sera créé",
"language": "Langue de la réunion :",
"recording": "Démarrer aussi un enregistrement"
"recording": "Démarrer aussi un enregistrement vidéo"
},
"button": {
"start": "Commencer à transcrire la réunion",
+1 -1
View File
@@ -480,7 +480,7 @@
"destination": "Er wordt een nieuw document aangemaakt op",
"destinationUnknown": "Een nieuw document wordt aangemaakt",
"language": "Vergadertalen:",
"recording": "Start ook een opname"
"recording": "Start ook een video-opname"
},
"button": {
"start": "Begin met het transcriberen van de vergadering",