Files
haproxy-openmanager/backend/tests/test_site_wizard_step_validation.py
taylanbakircioglu 02b1cb2bca feat: v1.5.0 — Site Wizard (Issue #14) + ACME Diagnostic Panel (Issue #13)
Closes #13, Closes #14.

This release squashes the v1.4.0 → v1.5.0 development line. v1.4.0
shipped the ACME stability & enterprise audit (Issues #10/#11/#12).
v1.5.0 builds on that foundation with two co-equal headline features
plus a 22-round audit campaign hardening the prior configuration
surface. License remains MIT for v1.5.0 (relicense to AGPL-3.0
lands in v1.5.2).

------------------------------------------------------------------
HEADLINE FEATURE A — ACME Diagnostic Panel (Issue #13)
------------------------------------------------------------------
A live pre-flight + post-failure diagnostic surface for every ACME
order, reachable from the ACME Automation page. The panel exists
to make ACME failures legible to operators who do NOT have shell
access to the API host.

Endpoints (`backend/routers/acme_diagnostics.py`):
  POST /api/letsencrypt/orders/{order_id}/diagnostics
       Run the full 5-check suite (DNS / port-80 / routing /
       account / agents) and humanize the order's `error_detail`
       (>=11 RFC-8555 problem types, backwards compatible with
       legacy plain-string failures).
  POST /api/letsencrypt/orders/{order_id}/diagnostics/
                                {check_id}/rerun
       Re-run a single check in place — used by the "Re-run"
       button on every row of the modal's pre-flight table.
  GET  /api/letsencrypt/orders/{order_id}/events
       Merged event timeline combining the typed
       `acme_order_events` rows with correlated
       `user_activity_logs` entries (resource_type =
       'letsencrypt_order' AND resource_id = order_id). The
       diagnostic modal auto-tails this timeline every 5 seconds
       while open.

Service-level checks (`backend/services/acme_diagnostics.py`):
  * DNS resolution via stdlib socket.gethostbyname_ex through
    run_in_executor (intentionally avoiding an aiodns runtime
    dep for v1.5.0).
  * Port-80 HEAD probe, target locked to the order's domains,
    success on HTTP 200 OR 404, warns on egress timeout
    (corp egress policies routinely blackhole outbound 80 —
    fail-hard would be too noisy).
  * SSRF guard: probe refuses non-public IPs and surfaces the
    skip in the diagnostic result; IPv4-mapped IPv6 normalisation
    closes the `::ffff:169.254.169.254` cloud-metadata vector.
  * HAProxy routing presence check: matches the order's
    cluster_ids to a port-80 HTTP frontend.
  * ACME account validity check against `letsencrypt_accounts`.
  * Agent presence check (>=1 active agent in target cluster).
  * Every sub-check wrapped in a wall-clock timeout to bound
    impact on the API event loop.

RBAC: ssl.read for run, ssl.read for events. Per-user 5/min rate
limit on both run and rerun, backed by the (user_id, action,
created_at DESC) composite index.

Frontend (`frontend/src/components/ACMEAutomation.js`):
  * "Diagnose" button on every order row + the existing
    "stuck order" warning row.
  * Modal with two tabs:
    - Pre-flight Checks (Antd Table with status pills + Re-run
      buttons + humanized error banner)
    - Event Log (Antd Timeline with auto-tail polling, scroll-
      to-bottom, pause-on-hover)
  * Correlation IDs surfaced in error banners and individual
    check fail details for backend-log lookup.

------------------------------------------------------------------
HEADLINE FEATURE B — Site Setup Wizard (Issue #14)
------------------------------------------------------------------
A single guided flow that creates a Backend + Servers + HTTP
Frontend (and optional HTTPS Frontend) in one atomic transaction.

Endpoints (`backend/routers/site_wizard.py`):
  POST /api/site-wizard/preview     — diff-preview the changeset
  POST /api/site-wizard/create      — atomic execute
  POST /api/site-wizard/reject      — clean rollback (including
                                       any wizard_staged ACME
                                       orders)
  GET  /api/site-wizard/drafts      — draft persistence
  PUT  /api/site-wizard/drafts/{id} — save/update
  DELETE /api/site-wizard/drafts/{id}

Feature surface:
  * One screen captures both backend (mode + servers) AND
    frontend (http + optional https + SSL mode) inputs.
  * SSL modes: ACME (new order, HTTP-01 only for v1.5.0),
    Upload (existing PEM), Existing (link to a stored cert),
    or None.
  * ACME-staged path: wizard_staged_until watermark on the
    `letsencrypt_orders` row defers finalisation until agent
    confirmation; per-mode reject cleanly cancels and rolls
    back the staged order.
  * Live diff preview against the cluster's current generated
    config (renderer-evolution noise stripped — track-sc<N>
    dedup, per-server cookie strip, defaults-cookie
    inheritance, listen-block flattening).
  * Draft persistence with PEM stripped at save time (private
    keys never round-trip through the drafts table).
  * Per-cluster multi-tenancy: drafts and wizard_staged orders
    are isolated to the creating user's cluster scope.

Frontend (`frontend/src/components/SiteWizard.js`):
  * 4-step Antd Steps flow: Backend → Frontend → SSL → Review.
  * Render the live diff preview inline before commit.
  * Antd Form-level validation mirrors backend Pydantic
    validators (numeric bounds, HAProxy reserved keywords, ALPN
    consistency, IPv6 scope-id, domain regex, server name
    dedup).

------------------------------------------------------------------
AUDIT CAMPAIGN — Rounds 1 → 22 (Bulgu #1#82)
------------------------------------------------------------------
v1.5.0 includes 22 adversarial review passes. Each round produced
its own commit set in the corporate development line; this squash
collapses those into the v1.5.0 release artefact. Highlights:

  Round 1-4   Site Wizard core: dry-run parity, single-line
              value injection guard, ACL -f pattern-file block,
              SSL parity, timeout regex, form-state pin.
  Round 5-7   defaults-cookie inheritance, server-named-cookie
              guard, fe/be mode mismatch, duplicate server
              names, health_check_uri + server_address
              validators.
  Round 8-10  cookie_name / cookie_options newline-injection
              guard, dry-run parity (round 9), TCP-mode HTTP-only
              feature blockers.
  Round 11    SSL name path traversal + health-check >= 1.
  Round 12-13 SSL & ACME deep dive (Bulgu #23-#32).
  Round 14    single-line value injection (Bulgu #33).
  Round 15-17 ACME multi-tenant UX, numeric bounds, HAProxy
              reserved keywords, ALPN/TLS consistency,
              all-backup, multi-domain & multi-user enterprise
              edges, drain/HSTS/post-completion (Bulgu
              #34-#53).
  Round 18-21 concurrency, agent state, TCP-mode HTTP-only,
              list size caps, IPv6 scope-id, preview account
              validation, TCP backend + balance uri reject
              (Bulgu #54-#61).
  Round 22    FE error visibility + 3x stale-data lockouts,
              referential integrity + cascade safety,
              authentication & authorization, multi-cluster
              isolation, apply_pending_changes concurrency,
              script injection + bulk import multi-tenancy,
              prefix-stripped signature comparison
              (Bulgu #62-#82).

------------------------------------------------------------------
NO CORPORATE-SPECIFIC ARTIFACTS
------------------------------------------------------------------
This squash deliberately sanitises corporate hostnames, container
registry references, and TLS secret names into generic
placeholders (`your-registry.example.com/your-org`,
`haproxy-openmanager*.example.com`, `wildcard-tls`,
`taylanbakircioglu/haproxy-openmanager-*`) so the public artefact
contains no internal infrastructure detail. Pilot / development
history that retained those values stays in the corporate fork
and is NOT part of this commit.
2026-05-14 00:04:19 +03:00

122 lines
4.6 KiB
Python

"""v1.5.0 R17 — Wizard step-validation regression tests.
Pre-R17 the `Next` button on Step 1 (Backend & Servers) called
`form.validateFields(['servers'])` — Antd's behaviour for that path is to
validate the Form.List wrapper itself, NOT the per-row required rules.
Result: a user could leave Server Address blank and `Next` would happily
advance, the error surfacing only at the final submit. R17 walks every
required nested path explicitly via `serverRows.flatMap`.
Same pattern extended to Step 3 (SSL): only when ssl.mode='upload' or
'existing' do we validate the conditional required fields, so users in
'acme' mode aren't blocked by upload-only validators.
"""
import re
from pathlib import Path
import pytest
_WIZARD_JS = (
Path(__file__).resolve().parent.parent.parent
/ "frontend"
/ "src"
/ "components"
/ "SiteWizard.js"
)
def _wizard_src():
if not _WIZARD_JS.exists():
pytest.skip(
"frontend tree not mounted — backend-only test environments "
"skip JS source assertions"
)
return _WIZARD_JS.read_text()
# ----------------- Step 1: per-row server validation -----------------
def test_step1_validates_each_server_row_explicitly():
"""The flatMap over serverRows must expand the required server
paths — without it Antd's validateFields(['servers']) only walks the
Form.List metadata, leaving Address-blank rows undetected."""
src = _wizard_src()
assert "serverRows.flatMap" in src, (
"R17 regression: per-row server validation pattern missing — "
"Step 1 Next will not catch blank Address until submit time"
)
# The three required paths must all be covered.
for field in ("server_name", "server_address", "server_port"):
assert re.search(
rf"\['servers',\s*i,\s*'{field}'\]",
src,
), f"R17 regression: server.{field} dropped from per-row validation"
def test_step1_validation_still_includes_backend_name():
"""We must still validate the Backend Name on Step 1 — otherwise
advancing to the Frontend step with a blank backend.name would only
fail at submit."""
src = _wizard_src()
assert re.search(
r"validateFields\(\s*\[\s*\['backend',\s*'name'\]",
src,
), "R17 regression: backend.name validation dropped from Step 1 Next"
# ----------------- Step 3: SSL conditional validation -----------------
def test_step3_validates_upload_required_fields():
"""When ssl.mode='upload' the Next button must validate name +
certificate_content + private_key_content. Without this, users get
bounced back to the SSL step from Review with cryptic Pydantic
errors."""
src = _wizard_src()
# The conditional block must check upload mode and validate all 3 PEM-related fields.
assert re.search(r"mode\s*===\s*'upload'", src), (
"R17 regression: Step 3 Next no longer branches on ssl.mode='upload'"
)
for field in ("name", "certificate_content", "private_key_content"):
assert re.search(
rf"\['ssl',\s*'{field}'\]",
src,
), f"R17 regression: ssl.{field} dropped from Step 3 upload-mode validation"
def test_step3_validates_existing_mode_picks_cert_id():
"""ssl.mode='existing' must validate ssl.ssl_certificate_id. Skipping
this lets users advance with no cert selected and crash at submit."""
src = _wizard_src()
assert re.search(r"mode\s*===\s*'existing'", src), (
"R17 regression: Step 3 Next no longer branches on ssl.mode='existing'"
)
assert re.search(
r"\['ssl',\s*'ssl_certificate_id'\]",
src,
), "R17 regression: ssl.ssl_certificate_id dropped from Step 3 existing-mode validation"
def test_step3_does_not_block_acme_with_upload_only_validators():
"""Important: ssl.mode='acme' has none of name/certificate_content/
private_key_content/ssl_certificate_id — those validators must NOT
run when mode='acme'. We verify by ensuring the upload/existing
blocks are guarded by mode equality checks (i.e. they don't run
unconditionally)."""
src = _wizard_src()
# Look for a Step 3 (step === 3) block that gates by mode equality.
block_match = re.search(
r"if\s*\(\s*step\s*===\s*3\s*\)\s*\{(.*?)\}\s*setStep",
src,
re.DOTALL,
)
assert block_match, "R17 regression: Step 3 validation block not found"
block = block_match.group(1)
# Must NOT validate certificate_content unconditionally.
assert "if (mode" in block or "mode ===" in block, (
"R17 regression: Step 3 validation runs unconditionally — would "
"block ACME users from leaving the SSL step"
)