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02b1cb2bca
Closes #13, Closes #14. This release squashes the v1.4.0 → v1.5.0 development line. v1.4.0 shipped the ACME stability & enterprise audit (Issues #10/#11/#12). v1.5.0 builds on that foundation with two co-equal headline features plus a 22-round audit campaign hardening the prior configuration surface. License remains MIT for v1.5.0 (relicense to AGPL-3.0 lands in v1.5.2). ------------------------------------------------------------------ HEADLINE FEATURE A — ACME Diagnostic Panel (Issue #13) ------------------------------------------------------------------ A live pre-flight + post-failure diagnostic surface for every ACME order, reachable from the ACME Automation page. The panel exists to make ACME failures legible to operators who do NOT have shell access to the API host. Endpoints (`backend/routers/acme_diagnostics.py`): POST /api/letsencrypt/orders/{order_id}/diagnostics Run the full 5-check suite (DNS / port-80 / routing / account / agents) and humanize the order's `error_detail` (>=11 RFC-8555 problem types, backwards compatible with legacy plain-string failures). POST /api/letsencrypt/orders/{order_id}/diagnostics/ {check_id}/rerun Re-run a single check in place — used by the "Re-run" button on every row of the modal's pre-flight table. GET /api/letsencrypt/orders/{order_id}/events Merged event timeline combining the typed `acme_order_events` rows with correlated `user_activity_logs` entries (resource_type = 'letsencrypt_order' AND resource_id = order_id). The diagnostic modal auto-tails this timeline every 5 seconds while open. Service-level checks (`backend/services/acme_diagnostics.py`): * DNS resolution via stdlib socket.gethostbyname_ex through run_in_executor (intentionally avoiding an aiodns runtime dep for v1.5.0). * Port-80 HEAD probe, target locked to the order's domains, success on HTTP 200 OR 404, warns on egress timeout (corp egress policies routinely blackhole outbound 80 — fail-hard would be too noisy). * SSRF guard: probe refuses non-public IPs and surfaces the skip in the diagnostic result; IPv4-mapped IPv6 normalisation closes the `::ffff:169.254.169.254` cloud-metadata vector. * HAProxy routing presence check: matches the order's cluster_ids to a port-80 HTTP frontend. * ACME account validity check against `letsencrypt_accounts`. * Agent presence check (>=1 active agent in target cluster). * Every sub-check wrapped in a wall-clock timeout to bound impact on the API event loop. RBAC: ssl.read for run, ssl.read for events. Per-user 5/min rate limit on both run and rerun, backed by the (user_id, action, created_at DESC) composite index. Frontend (`frontend/src/components/ACMEAutomation.js`): * "Diagnose" button on every order row + the existing "stuck order" warning row. * Modal with two tabs: - Pre-flight Checks (Antd Table with status pills + Re-run buttons + humanized error banner) - Event Log (Antd Timeline with auto-tail polling, scroll- to-bottom, pause-on-hover) * Correlation IDs surfaced in error banners and individual check fail details for backend-log lookup. ------------------------------------------------------------------ HEADLINE FEATURE B — Site Setup Wizard (Issue #14) ------------------------------------------------------------------ A single guided flow that creates a Backend + Servers + HTTP Frontend (and optional HTTPS Frontend) in one atomic transaction. Endpoints (`backend/routers/site_wizard.py`): POST /api/site-wizard/preview — diff-preview the changeset POST /api/site-wizard/create — atomic execute POST /api/site-wizard/reject — clean rollback (including any wizard_staged ACME orders) GET /api/site-wizard/drafts — draft persistence PUT /api/site-wizard/drafts/{id} — save/update DELETE /api/site-wizard/drafts/{id} Feature surface: * One screen captures both backend (mode + servers) AND frontend (http + optional https + SSL mode) inputs. * SSL modes: ACME (new order, HTTP-01 only for v1.5.0), Upload (existing PEM), Existing (link to a stored cert), or None. * ACME-staged path: wizard_staged_until watermark on the `letsencrypt_orders` row defers finalisation until agent confirmation; per-mode reject cleanly cancels and rolls back the staged order. * Live diff preview against the cluster's current generated config (renderer-evolution noise stripped — track-sc<N> dedup, per-server cookie strip, defaults-cookie inheritance, listen-block flattening). * Draft persistence with PEM stripped at save time (private keys never round-trip through the drafts table). * Per-cluster multi-tenancy: drafts and wizard_staged orders are isolated to the creating user's cluster scope. Frontend (`frontend/src/components/SiteWizard.js`): * 4-step Antd Steps flow: Backend → Frontend → SSL → Review. * Render the live diff preview inline before commit. * Antd Form-level validation mirrors backend Pydantic validators (numeric bounds, HAProxy reserved keywords, ALPN consistency, IPv6 scope-id, domain regex, server name dedup). ------------------------------------------------------------------ AUDIT CAMPAIGN — Rounds 1 → 22 (Bulgu #1 → #82) ------------------------------------------------------------------ v1.5.0 includes 22 adversarial review passes. Each round produced its own commit set in the corporate development line; this squash collapses those into the v1.5.0 release artefact. Highlights: Round 1-4 Site Wizard core: dry-run parity, single-line value injection guard, ACL -f pattern-file block, SSL parity, timeout regex, form-state pin. Round 5-7 defaults-cookie inheritance, server-named-cookie guard, fe/be mode mismatch, duplicate server names, health_check_uri + server_address validators. Round 8-10 cookie_name / cookie_options newline-injection guard, dry-run parity (round 9), TCP-mode HTTP-only feature blockers. Round 11 SSL name path traversal + health-check >= 1. Round 12-13 SSL & ACME deep dive (Bulgu #23-#32). Round 14 single-line value injection (Bulgu #33). Round 15-17 ACME multi-tenant UX, numeric bounds, HAProxy reserved keywords, ALPN/TLS consistency, all-backup, multi-domain & multi-user enterprise edges, drain/HSTS/post-completion (Bulgu #34-#53). Round 18-21 concurrency, agent state, TCP-mode HTTP-only, list size caps, IPv6 scope-id, preview account validation, TCP backend + balance uri reject (Bulgu #54-#61). Round 22 FE error visibility + 3x stale-data lockouts, referential integrity + cascade safety, authentication & authorization, multi-cluster isolation, apply_pending_changes concurrency, script injection + bulk import multi-tenancy, prefix-stripped signature comparison (Bulgu #62-#82). ------------------------------------------------------------------ NO CORPORATE-SPECIFIC ARTIFACTS ------------------------------------------------------------------ This squash deliberately sanitises corporate hostnames, container registry references, and TLS secret names into generic placeholders (`your-registry.example.com/your-org`, `haproxy-openmanager*.example.com`, `wildcard-tls`, `taylanbakircioglu/haproxy-openmanager-*`) so the public artefact contains no internal infrastructure detail. Pilot / development history that retained those values stays in the corporate fork and is NOT part of this commit.
122 lines
4.6 KiB
Python
122 lines
4.6 KiB
Python
"""v1.5.0 R17 — Wizard step-validation regression tests.
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Pre-R17 the `Next` button on Step 1 (Backend & Servers) called
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`form.validateFields(['servers'])` — Antd's behaviour for that path is to
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validate the Form.List wrapper itself, NOT the per-row required rules.
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Result: a user could leave Server Address blank and `Next` would happily
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advance, the error surfacing only at the final submit. R17 walks every
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required nested path explicitly via `serverRows.flatMap`.
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Same pattern extended to Step 3 (SSL): only when ssl.mode='upload' or
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'existing' do we validate the conditional required fields, so users in
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'acme' mode aren't blocked by upload-only validators.
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"""
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import re
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from pathlib import Path
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import pytest
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_WIZARD_JS = (
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Path(__file__).resolve().parent.parent.parent
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/ "frontend"
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/ "src"
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/ "components"
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/ "SiteWizard.js"
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)
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def _wizard_src():
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if not _WIZARD_JS.exists():
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pytest.skip(
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"frontend tree not mounted — backend-only test environments "
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"skip JS source assertions"
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)
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return _WIZARD_JS.read_text()
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# ----------------- Step 1: per-row server validation -----------------
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def test_step1_validates_each_server_row_explicitly():
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"""The flatMap over serverRows must expand the required server
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paths — without it Antd's validateFields(['servers']) only walks the
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Form.List metadata, leaving Address-blank rows undetected."""
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src = _wizard_src()
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assert "serverRows.flatMap" in src, (
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"R17 regression: per-row server validation pattern missing — "
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"Step 1 Next will not catch blank Address until submit time"
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)
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# The three required paths must all be covered.
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for field in ("server_name", "server_address", "server_port"):
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assert re.search(
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rf"\['servers',\s*i,\s*'{field}'\]",
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src,
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), f"R17 regression: server.{field} dropped from per-row validation"
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def test_step1_validation_still_includes_backend_name():
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"""We must still validate the Backend Name on Step 1 — otherwise
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advancing to the Frontend step with a blank backend.name would only
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fail at submit."""
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src = _wizard_src()
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assert re.search(
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r"validateFields\(\s*\[\s*\['backend',\s*'name'\]",
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src,
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), "R17 regression: backend.name validation dropped from Step 1 Next"
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# ----------------- Step 3: SSL conditional validation -----------------
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def test_step3_validates_upload_required_fields():
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"""When ssl.mode='upload' the Next button must validate name +
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certificate_content + private_key_content. Without this, users get
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bounced back to the SSL step from Review with cryptic Pydantic
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errors."""
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src = _wizard_src()
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# The conditional block must check upload mode and validate all 3 PEM-related fields.
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assert re.search(r"mode\s*===\s*'upload'", src), (
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"R17 regression: Step 3 Next no longer branches on ssl.mode='upload'"
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)
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for field in ("name", "certificate_content", "private_key_content"):
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assert re.search(
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rf"\['ssl',\s*'{field}'\]",
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src,
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), f"R17 regression: ssl.{field} dropped from Step 3 upload-mode validation"
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def test_step3_validates_existing_mode_picks_cert_id():
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"""ssl.mode='existing' must validate ssl.ssl_certificate_id. Skipping
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this lets users advance with no cert selected and crash at submit."""
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src = _wizard_src()
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assert re.search(r"mode\s*===\s*'existing'", src), (
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"R17 regression: Step 3 Next no longer branches on ssl.mode='existing'"
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)
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assert re.search(
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r"\['ssl',\s*'ssl_certificate_id'\]",
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src,
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), "R17 regression: ssl.ssl_certificate_id dropped from Step 3 existing-mode validation"
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def test_step3_does_not_block_acme_with_upload_only_validators():
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"""Important: ssl.mode='acme' has none of name/certificate_content/
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private_key_content/ssl_certificate_id — those validators must NOT
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run when mode='acme'. We verify by ensuring the upload/existing
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blocks are guarded by mode equality checks (i.e. they don't run
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unconditionally)."""
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src = _wizard_src()
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# Look for a Step 3 (step === 3) block that gates by mode equality.
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block_match = re.search(
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r"if\s*\(\s*step\s*===\s*3\s*\)\s*\{(.*?)\}\s*setStep",
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src,
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re.DOTALL,
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)
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assert block_match, "R17 regression: Step 3 validation block not found"
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block = block_match.group(1)
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# Must NOT validate certificate_content unconditionally.
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assert "if (mode" in block or "mode ===" in block, (
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"R17 regression: Step 3 validation runs unconditionally — would "
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"block ACME users from leaving the SSL step"
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)
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