Files
haproxy-openmanager/backend/tests/test_site_wizard_drafts_perm.py
taylanbakircioglu 02b1cb2bca feat: v1.5.0 — Site Wizard (Issue #14) + ACME Diagnostic Panel (Issue #13)
Closes #13, Closes #14.

This release squashes the v1.4.0 → v1.5.0 development line. v1.4.0
shipped the ACME stability & enterprise audit (Issues #10/#11/#12).
v1.5.0 builds on that foundation with two co-equal headline features
plus a 22-round audit campaign hardening the prior configuration
surface. License remains MIT for v1.5.0 (relicense to AGPL-3.0
lands in v1.5.2).

------------------------------------------------------------------
HEADLINE FEATURE A — ACME Diagnostic Panel (Issue #13)
------------------------------------------------------------------
A live pre-flight + post-failure diagnostic surface for every ACME
order, reachable from the ACME Automation page. The panel exists
to make ACME failures legible to operators who do NOT have shell
access to the API host.

Endpoints (`backend/routers/acme_diagnostics.py`):
  POST /api/letsencrypt/orders/{order_id}/diagnostics
       Run the full 5-check suite (DNS / port-80 / routing /
       account / agents) and humanize the order's `error_detail`
       (>=11 RFC-8555 problem types, backwards compatible with
       legacy plain-string failures).
  POST /api/letsencrypt/orders/{order_id}/diagnostics/
                                {check_id}/rerun
       Re-run a single check in place — used by the "Re-run"
       button on every row of the modal's pre-flight table.
  GET  /api/letsencrypt/orders/{order_id}/events
       Merged event timeline combining the typed
       `acme_order_events` rows with correlated
       `user_activity_logs` entries (resource_type =
       'letsencrypt_order' AND resource_id = order_id). The
       diagnostic modal auto-tails this timeline every 5 seconds
       while open.

Service-level checks (`backend/services/acme_diagnostics.py`):
  * DNS resolution via stdlib socket.gethostbyname_ex through
    run_in_executor (intentionally avoiding an aiodns runtime
    dep for v1.5.0).
  * Port-80 HEAD probe, target locked to the order's domains,
    success on HTTP 200 OR 404, warns on egress timeout
    (corp egress policies routinely blackhole outbound 80 —
    fail-hard would be too noisy).
  * SSRF guard: probe refuses non-public IPs and surfaces the
    skip in the diagnostic result; IPv4-mapped IPv6 normalisation
    closes the `::ffff:169.254.169.254` cloud-metadata vector.
  * HAProxy routing presence check: matches the order's
    cluster_ids to a port-80 HTTP frontend.
  * ACME account validity check against `letsencrypt_accounts`.
  * Agent presence check (>=1 active agent in target cluster).
  * Every sub-check wrapped in a wall-clock timeout to bound
    impact on the API event loop.

RBAC: ssl.read for run, ssl.read for events. Per-user 5/min rate
limit on both run and rerun, backed by the (user_id, action,
created_at DESC) composite index.

Frontend (`frontend/src/components/ACMEAutomation.js`):
  * "Diagnose" button on every order row + the existing
    "stuck order" warning row.
  * Modal with two tabs:
    - Pre-flight Checks (Antd Table with status pills + Re-run
      buttons + humanized error banner)
    - Event Log (Antd Timeline with auto-tail polling, scroll-
      to-bottom, pause-on-hover)
  * Correlation IDs surfaced in error banners and individual
    check fail details for backend-log lookup.

------------------------------------------------------------------
HEADLINE FEATURE B — Site Setup Wizard (Issue #14)
------------------------------------------------------------------
A single guided flow that creates a Backend + Servers + HTTP
Frontend (and optional HTTPS Frontend) in one atomic transaction.

Endpoints (`backend/routers/site_wizard.py`):
  POST /api/site-wizard/preview     — diff-preview the changeset
  POST /api/site-wizard/create      — atomic execute
  POST /api/site-wizard/reject      — clean rollback (including
                                       any wizard_staged ACME
                                       orders)
  GET  /api/site-wizard/drafts      — draft persistence
  PUT  /api/site-wizard/drafts/{id} — save/update
  DELETE /api/site-wizard/drafts/{id}

Feature surface:
  * One screen captures both backend (mode + servers) AND
    frontend (http + optional https + SSL mode) inputs.
  * SSL modes: ACME (new order, HTTP-01 only for v1.5.0),
    Upload (existing PEM), Existing (link to a stored cert),
    or None.
  * ACME-staged path: wizard_staged_until watermark on the
    `letsencrypt_orders` row defers finalisation until agent
    confirmation; per-mode reject cleanly cancels and rolls
    back the staged order.
  * Live diff preview against the cluster's current generated
    config (renderer-evolution noise stripped — track-sc<N>
    dedup, per-server cookie strip, defaults-cookie
    inheritance, listen-block flattening).
  * Draft persistence with PEM stripped at save time (private
    keys never round-trip through the drafts table).
  * Per-cluster multi-tenancy: drafts and wizard_staged orders
    are isolated to the creating user's cluster scope.

Frontend (`frontend/src/components/SiteWizard.js`):
  * 4-step Antd Steps flow: Backend → Frontend → SSL → Review.
  * Render the live diff preview inline before commit.
  * Antd Form-level validation mirrors backend Pydantic
    validators (numeric bounds, HAProxy reserved keywords, ALPN
    consistency, IPv6 scope-id, domain regex, server name
    dedup).

------------------------------------------------------------------
AUDIT CAMPAIGN — Rounds 1 → 22 (Bulgu #1#82)
------------------------------------------------------------------
v1.5.0 includes 22 adversarial review passes. Each round produced
its own commit set in the corporate development line; this squash
collapses those into the v1.5.0 release artefact. Highlights:

  Round 1-4   Site Wizard core: dry-run parity, single-line
              value injection guard, ACL -f pattern-file block,
              SSL parity, timeout regex, form-state pin.
  Round 5-7   defaults-cookie inheritance, server-named-cookie
              guard, fe/be mode mismatch, duplicate server
              names, health_check_uri + server_address
              validators.
  Round 8-10  cookie_name / cookie_options newline-injection
              guard, dry-run parity (round 9), TCP-mode HTTP-only
              feature blockers.
  Round 11    SSL name path traversal + health-check >= 1.
  Round 12-13 SSL & ACME deep dive (Bulgu #23-#32).
  Round 14    single-line value injection (Bulgu #33).
  Round 15-17 ACME multi-tenant UX, numeric bounds, HAProxy
              reserved keywords, ALPN/TLS consistency,
              all-backup, multi-domain & multi-user enterprise
              edges, drain/HSTS/post-completion (Bulgu
              #34-#53).
  Round 18-21 concurrency, agent state, TCP-mode HTTP-only,
              list size caps, IPv6 scope-id, preview account
              validation, TCP backend + balance uri reject
              (Bulgu #54-#61).
  Round 22    FE error visibility + 3x stale-data lockouts,
              referential integrity + cascade safety,
              authentication & authorization, multi-cluster
              isolation, apply_pending_changes concurrency,
              script injection + bulk import multi-tenancy,
              prefix-stripped signature comparison
              (Bulgu #62-#82).

------------------------------------------------------------------
NO CORPORATE-SPECIFIC ARTIFACTS
------------------------------------------------------------------
This squash deliberately sanitises corporate hostnames, container
registry references, and TLS secret names into generic
placeholders (`your-registry.example.com/your-org`,
`haproxy-openmanager*.example.com`, `wildcard-tls`,
`taylanbakircioglu/haproxy-openmanager-*`) so the public artefact
contains no internal infrastructure detail. Pilot / development
history that retained those values stays in the corporate fork
and is NOT part of this commit.
2026-05-14 00:04:19 +03:00

146 lines
5.8 KiB
Python

"""v1.5.0 R12 — Bug A regression: drafts permission relaxed.
After the v1.5.0 first deploy we observed `403 - Insufficient permissions`
for users who had ssl.read but no frontend.create / frontend.read. Drafts
are personal — every authenticated user with ANY of the
host-management permissions should be able to save / list / delete their
own drafts.
These tests are STATIC SOURCE assertions (no DB, no network) — they
verify that the routers/site_wizard.py module exposes a
`_can_use_wizard` helper and that the three draft endpoints are wired
through it instead of the original `check_user_permission(..., "frontend",
"create"/"read")` gate.
The point is to fail fast if a future refactor accidentally tightens the
RBAC again.
"""
from pathlib import Path
import pytest
SOURCE = (
Path(__file__).resolve().parent.parent
/ "routers"
/ "site_wizard.py"
).read_text()
def test_can_use_wizard_helper_exists():
assert "async def _can_use_wizard(" in SOURCE, (
"Bug A regression: routers/site_wizard.py must define "
"_can_use_wizard so drafts/suggest/preview share a single permission "
"check."
)
@pytest.mark.parametrize(
"endpoint_signature",
[
# GET /drafts
('@router.get("/drafts")', "_can_use_wizard"),
# POST /drafts
('@router.post("/drafts")', "_can_use_wizard"),
# DELETE /drafts/{draft_id}
('@router.delete("/drafts/{draft_id}")', "_can_use_wizard"),
# POST /preview
('@router.post("/preview"', "_can_use_wizard"),
],
)
def test_draft_endpoints_use_can_use_wizard(endpoint_signature):
decorator, expected_helper = endpoint_signature
idx = SOURCE.find(decorator)
assert idx >= 0, f"Decorator {decorator!r} missing from site_wizard.py"
# Look at the next ~60 lines after the decorator for the helper call.
snippet = SOURCE[idx : idx + 2200]
assert expected_helper in snippet, (
f"Bug A regression: endpoint at {decorator!r} no longer calls "
f"{expected_helper}. Drafts must remain accessible to read-only "
"wizard users."
)
def test_can_use_wizard_grants_read_only_users():
# The helper should accept frontends.read OR ssl.read — i.e. it must NOT
# be limited to *.create. We assert by looking for the literal tuple of
# candidate perms.
#
# R18c round 10 (CRITICAL): the resource keys MUST be PLURAL
# (frontends, backends) to match the seeded role permissions in
# database/migrations.py. Pre-round-10 this test pinned the
# singular form, which was technically present in the source
# but never matched any non-admin role's permissions JSONB at
# runtime — a textbook example of a static test passing while
# the runtime contract was broken. Now we assert both: the
# plural keys are PRESENT, and the singular keys are GONE.
assert '"frontends", "read"' in SOURCE
assert '"frontends", "create"' in SOURCE
assert '"backends", "create"' in SOURCE
assert '"backends", "read"' in SOURCE
assert '"ssl", "read"' in SOURCE
assert '"ssl", "create"' in SOURCE
# The legacy singular forms must NOT appear inside the
# _can_use_wizard candidate_perms tuple — but the SOURCE may still
# contain unrelated occurrences (e.g. `"frontend": {...}` in the
# preview response, `usage_type = "frontend"` SSL labels). We
# therefore narrow the check to the candidate_perms block via a
# balanced-paren walk identical to round 10's helper test.
start = SOURCE.find("candidate_perms = (")
assert start >= 0
open_at = SOURCE.find("(", start)
depth, end = 0, -1
for i in range(open_at, len(SOURCE)):
ch = SOURCE[i]
if ch == "(":
depth += 1
elif ch == ")":
depth -= 1
if depth == 0:
end = i
break
block = SOURCE[start:end + 1]
assert '"frontend", "read"' not in block
assert '"frontend", "create"' not in block
assert '"backend", "create"' not in block
assert '"backend", "read"' not in block
def test_can_use_wizard_admin_shortcut_present():
"""R12 perf fix (Bulgu #f9): admin users should bypass the roles query
entirely. The helper accepts an optional current_user dict and
short-circuits on `is_admin`."""
assert "current_user.get(\"is_admin\")" in SOURCE, (
"Bulgu #f9 regression: _can_use_wizard must short-circuit on "
"current_user['is_admin'] to avoid an unnecessary roles roundtrip "
"for admin callers."
)
def test_can_use_wizard_uses_single_get_user_permissions_call():
"""R12 perf fix: the helper must call get_user_permissions ONCE and
decide locally, not chain 6 sequential check_user_permission calls
(each opening a fresh DB connection)."""
# The new implementation imports get_user_permissions from
# auth_middleware and reads the dict in-memory.
assert "get_user_permissions" in SOURCE, (
"Bulgu #f9 regression: _can_use_wizard must use the bulk "
"get_user_permissions(user_id) helper, not 6 sequential "
"check_user_permission() round-trips."
)
def test_callers_pass_current_user_to_can_use_wizard():
"""Each call site must hand the current_user dict to _can_use_wizard
so the admin shortcut fires when applicable."""
# We expect every "_can_use_wizard(user_id, current_user=current_user)"
# call to appear at least once in the source. Less strict: the substring
# 'current_user=current_user' appears at least 5 times (suggest, preview,
# save_draft, list_drafts, delete_draft).
n = SOURCE.count("current_user=current_user")
assert n >= 5, (
f"Expected at least 5 _can_use_wizard call sites passing current_user; "
f"saw {n}. Did a refactor accidentally drop the kwarg from one of the "
"endpoints?"
)