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02b1cb2bca
Closes #13, Closes #14. This release squashes the v1.4.0 → v1.5.0 development line. v1.4.0 shipped the ACME stability & enterprise audit (Issues #10/#11/#12). v1.5.0 builds on that foundation with two co-equal headline features plus a 22-round audit campaign hardening the prior configuration surface. License remains MIT for v1.5.0 (relicense to AGPL-3.0 lands in v1.5.2). ------------------------------------------------------------------ HEADLINE FEATURE A — ACME Diagnostic Panel (Issue #13) ------------------------------------------------------------------ A live pre-flight + post-failure diagnostic surface for every ACME order, reachable from the ACME Automation page. The panel exists to make ACME failures legible to operators who do NOT have shell access to the API host. Endpoints (`backend/routers/acme_diagnostics.py`): POST /api/letsencrypt/orders/{order_id}/diagnostics Run the full 5-check suite (DNS / port-80 / routing / account / agents) and humanize the order's `error_detail` (>=11 RFC-8555 problem types, backwards compatible with legacy plain-string failures). POST /api/letsencrypt/orders/{order_id}/diagnostics/ {check_id}/rerun Re-run a single check in place — used by the "Re-run" button on every row of the modal's pre-flight table. GET /api/letsencrypt/orders/{order_id}/events Merged event timeline combining the typed `acme_order_events` rows with correlated `user_activity_logs` entries (resource_type = 'letsencrypt_order' AND resource_id = order_id). The diagnostic modal auto-tails this timeline every 5 seconds while open. Service-level checks (`backend/services/acme_diagnostics.py`): * DNS resolution via stdlib socket.gethostbyname_ex through run_in_executor (intentionally avoiding an aiodns runtime dep for v1.5.0). * Port-80 HEAD probe, target locked to the order's domains, success on HTTP 200 OR 404, warns on egress timeout (corp egress policies routinely blackhole outbound 80 — fail-hard would be too noisy). * SSRF guard: probe refuses non-public IPs and surfaces the skip in the diagnostic result; IPv4-mapped IPv6 normalisation closes the `::ffff:169.254.169.254` cloud-metadata vector. * HAProxy routing presence check: matches the order's cluster_ids to a port-80 HTTP frontend. * ACME account validity check against `letsencrypt_accounts`. * Agent presence check (>=1 active agent in target cluster). * Every sub-check wrapped in a wall-clock timeout to bound impact on the API event loop. RBAC: ssl.read for run, ssl.read for events. Per-user 5/min rate limit on both run and rerun, backed by the (user_id, action, created_at DESC) composite index. Frontend (`frontend/src/components/ACMEAutomation.js`): * "Diagnose" button on every order row + the existing "stuck order" warning row. * Modal with two tabs: - Pre-flight Checks (Antd Table with status pills + Re-run buttons + humanized error banner) - Event Log (Antd Timeline with auto-tail polling, scroll- to-bottom, pause-on-hover) * Correlation IDs surfaced in error banners and individual check fail details for backend-log lookup. ------------------------------------------------------------------ HEADLINE FEATURE B — Site Setup Wizard (Issue #14) ------------------------------------------------------------------ A single guided flow that creates a Backend + Servers + HTTP Frontend (and optional HTTPS Frontend) in one atomic transaction. Endpoints (`backend/routers/site_wizard.py`): POST /api/site-wizard/preview — diff-preview the changeset POST /api/site-wizard/create — atomic execute POST /api/site-wizard/reject — clean rollback (including any wizard_staged ACME orders) GET /api/site-wizard/drafts — draft persistence PUT /api/site-wizard/drafts/{id} — save/update DELETE /api/site-wizard/drafts/{id} Feature surface: * One screen captures both backend (mode + servers) AND frontend (http + optional https + SSL mode) inputs. * SSL modes: ACME (new order, HTTP-01 only for v1.5.0), Upload (existing PEM), Existing (link to a stored cert), or None. * ACME-staged path: wizard_staged_until watermark on the `letsencrypt_orders` row defers finalisation until agent confirmation; per-mode reject cleanly cancels and rolls back the staged order. * Live diff preview against the cluster's current generated config (renderer-evolution noise stripped — track-sc<N> dedup, per-server cookie strip, defaults-cookie inheritance, listen-block flattening). * Draft persistence with PEM stripped at save time (private keys never round-trip through the drafts table). * Per-cluster multi-tenancy: drafts and wizard_staged orders are isolated to the creating user's cluster scope. Frontend (`frontend/src/components/SiteWizard.js`): * 4-step Antd Steps flow: Backend → Frontend → SSL → Review. * Render the live diff preview inline before commit. * Antd Form-level validation mirrors backend Pydantic validators (numeric bounds, HAProxy reserved keywords, ALPN consistency, IPv6 scope-id, domain regex, server name dedup). ------------------------------------------------------------------ AUDIT CAMPAIGN — Rounds 1 → 22 (Bulgu #1 → #82) ------------------------------------------------------------------ v1.5.0 includes 22 adversarial review passes. Each round produced its own commit set in the corporate development line; this squash collapses those into the v1.5.0 release artefact. Highlights: Round 1-4 Site Wizard core: dry-run parity, single-line value injection guard, ACL -f pattern-file block, SSL parity, timeout regex, form-state pin. Round 5-7 defaults-cookie inheritance, server-named-cookie guard, fe/be mode mismatch, duplicate server names, health_check_uri + server_address validators. Round 8-10 cookie_name / cookie_options newline-injection guard, dry-run parity (round 9), TCP-mode HTTP-only feature blockers. Round 11 SSL name path traversal + health-check >= 1. Round 12-13 SSL & ACME deep dive (Bulgu #23-#32). Round 14 single-line value injection (Bulgu #33). Round 15-17 ACME multi-tenant UX, numeric bounds, HAProxy reserved keywords, ALPN/TLS consistency, all-backup, multi-domain & multi-user enterprise edges, drain/HSTS/post-completion (Bulgu #34-#53). Round 18-21 concurrency, agent state, TCP-mode HTTP-only, list size caps, IPv6 scope-id, preview account validation, TCP backend + balance uri reject (Bulgu #54-#61). Round 22 FE error visibility + 3x stale-data lockouts, referential integrity + cascade safety, authentication & authorization, multi-cluster isolation, apply_pending_changes concurrency, script injection + bulk import multi-tenancy, prefix-stripped signature comparison (Bulgu #62-#82). ------------------------------------------------------------------ NO CORPORATE-SPECIFIC ARTIFACTS ------------------------------------------------------------------ This squash deliberately sanitises corporate hostnames, container registry references, and TLS secret names into generic placeholders (`your-registry.example.com/your-org`, `haproxy-openmanager*.example.com`, `wildcard-tls`, `taylanbakircioglu/haproxy-openmanager-*`) so the public artefact contains no internal infrastructure detail. Pilot / development history that retained those values stays in the corporate fork and is NOT part of this commit.
146 lines
5.8 KiB
Python
146 lines
5.8 KiB
Python
"""v1.5.0 R12 — Bug A regression: drafts permission relaxed.
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After the v1.5.0 first deploy we observed `403 - Insufficient permissions`
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for users who had ssl.read but no frontend.create / frontend.read. Drafts
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are personal — every authenticated user with ANY of the
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host-management permissions should be able to save / list / delete their
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own drafts.
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These tests are STATIC SOURCE assertions (no DB, no network) — they
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verify that the routers/site_wizard.py module exposes a
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`_can_use_wizard` helper and that the three draft endpoints are wired
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through it instead of the original `check_user_permission(..., "frontend",
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"create"/"read")` gate.
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The point is to fail fast if a future refactor accidentally tightens the
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RBAC again.
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"""
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from pathlib import Path
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import pytest
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SOURCE = (
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Path(__file__).resolve().parent.parent
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/ "routers"
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/ "site_wizard.py"
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).read_text()
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def test_can_use_wizard_helper_exists():
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assert "async def _can_use_wizard(" in SOURCE, (
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"Bug A regression: routers/site_wizard.py must define "
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"_can_use_wizard so drafts/suggest/preview share a single permission "
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"check."
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)
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@pytest.mark.parametrize(
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"endpoint_signature",
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[
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# GET /drafts
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('@router.get("/drafts")', "_can_use_wizard"),
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# POST /drafts
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('@router.post("/drafts")', "_can_use_wizard"),
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# DELETE /drafts/{draft_id}
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('@router.delete("/drafts/{draft_id}")', "_can_use_wizard"),
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# POST /preview
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('@router.post("/preview"', "_can_use_wizard"),
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],
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)
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def test_draft_endpoints_use_can_use_wizard(endpoint_signature):
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decorator, expected_helper = endpoint_signature
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idx = SOURCE.find(decorator)
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assert idx >= 0, f"Decorator {decorator!r} missing from site_wizard.py"
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# Look at the next ~60 lines after the decorator for the helper call.
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snippet = SOURCE[idx : idx + 2200]
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assert expected_helper in snippet, (
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f"Bug A regression: endpoint at {decorator!r} no longer calls "
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f"{expected_helper}. Drafts must remain accessible to read-only "
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"wizard users."
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)
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def test_can_use_wizard_grants_read_only_users():
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# The helper should accept frontends.read OR ssl.read — i.e. it must NOT
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# be limited to *.create. We assert by looking for the literal tuple of
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# candidate perms.
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#
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# R18c round 10 (CRITICAL): the resource keys MUST be PLURAL
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# (frontends, backends) to match the seeded role permissions in
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# database/migrations.py. Pre-round-10 this test pinned the
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# singular form, which was technically present in the source
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# but never matched any non-admin role's permissions JSONB at
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# runtime — a textbook example of a static test passing while
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# the runtime contract was broken. Now we assert both: the
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# plural keys are PRESENT, and the singular keys are GONE.
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assert '"frontends", "read"' in SOURCE
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assert '"frontends", "create"' in SOURCE
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assert '"backends", "create"' in SOURCE
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assert '"backends", "read"' in SOURCE
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assert '"ssl", "read"' in SOURCE
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assert '"ssl", "create"' in SOURCE
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# The legacy singular forms must NOT appear inside the
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# _can_use_wizard candidate_perms tuple — but the SOURCE may still
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# contain unrelated occurrences (e.g. `"frontend": {...}` in the
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# preview response, `usage_type = "frontend"` SSL labels). We
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# therefore narrow the check to the candidate_perms block via a
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# balanced-paren walk identical to round 10's helper test.
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start = SOURCE.find("candidate_perms = (")
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assert start >= 0
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open_at = SOURCE.find("(", start)
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depth, end = 0, -1
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for i in range(open_at, len(SOURCE)):
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ch = SOURCE[i]
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if ch == "(":
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depth += 1
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elif ch == ")":
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depth -= 1
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if depth == 0:
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end = i
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break
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block = SOURCE[start:end + 1]
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assert '"frontend", "read"' not in block
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assert '"frontend", "create"' not in block
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assert '"backend", "create"' not in block
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assert '"backend", "read"' not in block
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def test_can_use_wizard_admin_shortcut_present():
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"""R12 perf fix (Bulgu #f9): admin users should bypass the roles query
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entirely. The helper accepts an optional current_user dict and
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short-circuits on `is_admin`."""
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assert "current_user.get(\"is_admin\")" in SOURCE, (
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"Bulgu #f9 regression: _can_use_wizard must short-circuit on "
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"current_user['is_admin'] to avoid an unnecessary roles roundtrip "
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"for admin callers."
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)
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def test_can_use_wizard_uses_single_get_user_permissions_call():
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"""R12 perf fix: the helper must call get_user_permissions ONCE and
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decide locally, not chain 6 sequential check_user_permission calls
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(each opening a fresh DB connection)."""
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# The new implementation imports get_user_permissions from
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# auth_middleware and reads the dict in-memory.
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assert "get_user_permissions" in SOURCE, (
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"Bulgu #f9 regression: _can_use_wizard must use the bulk "
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"get_user_permissions(user_id) helper, not 6 sequential "
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"check_user_permission() round-trips."
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)
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def test_callers_pass_current_user_to_can_use_wizard():
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"""Each call site must hand the current_user dict to _can_use_wizard
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so the admin shortcut fires when applicable."""
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# We expect every "_can_use_wizard(user_id, current_user=current_user)"
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# call to appear at least once in the source. Less strict: the substring
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# 'current_user=current_user' appears at least 5 times (suggest, preview,
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# save_draft, list_drafts, delete_draft).
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n = SOURCE.count("current_user=current_user")
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assert n >= 5, (
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f"Expected at least 5 _can_use_wizard call sites passing current_user; "
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f"saw {n}. Did a refactor accidentally drop the kwarg from one of the "
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"endpoints?"
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)
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