mirror of
https://github.com/taylanbakircioglu/haproxy-openmanager.git
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02b1cb2bca
Closes #13, Closes #14. This release squashes the v1.4.0 → v1.5.0 development line. v1.4.0 shipped the ACME stability & enterprise audit (Issues #10/#11/#12). v1.5.0 builds on that foundation with two co-equal headline features plus a 22-round audit campaign hardening the prior configuration surface. License remains MIT for v1.5.0 (relicense to AGPL-3.0 lands in v1.5.2). ------------------------------------------------------------------ HEADLINE FEATURE A — ACME Diagnostic Panel (Issue #13) ------------------------------------------------------------------ A live pre-flight + post-failure diagnostic surface for every ACME order, reachable from the ACME Automation page. The panel exists to make ACME failures legible to operators who do NOT have shell access to the API host. Endpoints (`backend/routers/acme_diagnostics.py`): POST /api/letsencrypt/orders/{order_id}/diagnostics Run the full 5-check suite (DNS / port-80 / routing / account / agents) and humanize the order's `error_detail` (>=11 RFC-8555 problem types, backwards compatible with legacy plain-string failures). POST /api/letsencrypt/orders/{order_id}/diagnostics/ {check_id}/rerun Re-run a single check in place — used by the "Re-run" button on every row of the modal's pre-flight table. GET /api/letsencrypt/orders/{order_id}/events Merged event timeline combining the typed `acme_order_events` rows with correlated `user_activity_logs` entries (resource_type = 'letsencrypt_order' AND resource_id = order_id). The diagnostic modal auto-tails this timeline every 5 seconds while open. Service-level checks (`backend/services/acme_diagnostics.py`): * DNS resolution via stdlib socket.gethostbyname_ex through run_in_executor (intentionally avoiding an aiodns runtime dep for v1.5.0). * Port-80 HEAD probe, target locked to the order's domains, success on HTTP 200 OR 404, warns on egress timeout (corp egress policies routinely blackhole outbound 80 — fail-hard would be too noisy). * SSRF guard: probe refuses non-public IPs and surfaces the skip in the diagnostic result; IPv4-mapped IPv6 normalisation closes the `::ffff:169.254.169.254` cloud-metadata vector. * HAProxy routing presence check: matches the order's cluster_ids to a port-80 HTTP frontend. * ACME account validity check against `letsencrypt_accounts`. * Agent presence check (>=1 active agent in target cluster). * Every sub-check wrapped in a wall-clock timeout to bound impact on the API event loop. RBAC: ssl.read for run, ssl.read for events. Per-user 5/min rate limit on both run and rerun, backed by the (user_id, action, created_at DESC) composite index. Frontend (`frontend/src/components/ACMEAutomation.js`): * "Diagnose" button on every order row + the existing "stuck order" warning row. * Modal with two tabs: - Pre-flight Checks (Antd Table with status pills + Re-run buttons + humanized error banner) - Event Log (Antd Timeline with auto-tail polling, scroll- to-bottom, pause-on-hover) * Correlation IDs surfaced in error banners and individual check fail details for backend-log lookup. ------------------------------------------------------------------ HEADLINE FEATURE B — Site Setup Wizard (Issue #14) ------------------------------------------------------------------ A single guided flow that creates a Backend + Servers + HTTP Frontend (and optional HTTPS Frontend) in one atomic transaction. Endpoints (`backend/routers/site_wizard.py`): POST /api/site-wizard/preview — diff-preview the changeset POST /api/site-wizard/create — atomic execute POST /api/site-wizard/reject — clean rollback (including any wizard_staged ACME orders) GET /api/site-wizard/drafts — draft persistence PUT /api/site-wizard/drafts/{id} — save/update DELETE /api/site-wizard/drafts/{id} Feature surface: * One screen captures both backend (mode + servers) AND frontend (http + optional https + SSL mode) inputs. * SSL modes: ACME (new order, HTTP-01 only for v1.5.0), Upload (existing PEM), Existing (link to a stored cert), or None. * ACME-staged path: wizard_staged_until watermark on the `letsencrypt_orders` row defers finalisation until agent confirmation; per-mode reject cleanly cancels and rolls back the staged order. * Live diff preview against the cluster's current generated config (renderer-evolution noise stripped — track-sc<N> dedup, per-server cookie strip, defaults-cookie inheritance, listen-block flattening). * Draft persistence with PEM stripped at save time (private keys never round-trip through the drafts table). * Per-cluster multi-tenancy: drafts and wizard_staged orders are isolated to the creating user's cluster scope. Frontend (`frontend/src/components/SiteWizard.js`): * 4-step Antd Steps flow: Backend → Frontend → SSL → Review. * Render the live diff preview inline before commit. * Antd Form-level validation mirrors backend Pydantic validators (numeric bounds, HAProxy reserved keywords, ALPN consistency, IPv6 scope-id, domain regex, server name dedup). ------------------------------------------------------------------ AUDIT CAMPAIGN — Rounds 1 → 22 (Bulgu #1 → #82) ------------------------------------------------------------------ v1.5.0 includes 22 adversarial review passes. Each round produced its own commit set in the corporate development line; this squash collapses those into the v1.5.0 release artefact. Highlights: Round 1-4 Site Wizard core: dry-run parity, single-line value injection guard, ACL -f pattern-file block, SSL parity, timeout regex, form-state pin. Round 5-7 defaults-cookie inheritance, server-named-cookie guard, fe/be mode mismatch, duplicate server names, health_check_uri + server_address validators. Round 8-10 cookie_name / cookie_options newline-injection guard, dry-run parity (round 9), TCP-mode HTTP-only feature blockers. Round 11 SSL name path traversal + health-check >= 1. Round 12-13 SSL & ACME deep dive (Bulgu #23-#32). Round 14 single-line value injection (Bulgu #33). Round 15-17 ACME multi-tenant UX, numeric bounds, HAProxy reserved keywords, ALPN/TLS consistency, all-backup, multi-domain & multi-user enterprise edges, drain/HSTS/post-completion (Bulgu #34-#53). Round 18-21 concurrency, agent state, TCP-mode HTTP-only, list size caps, IPv6 scope-id, preview account validation, TCP backend + balance uri reject (Bulgu #54-#61). Round 22 FE error visibility + 3x stale-data lockouts, referential integrity + cascade safety, authentication & authorization, multi-cluster isolation, apply_pending_changes concurrency, script injection + bulk import multi-tenancy, prefix-stripped signature comparison (Bulgu #62-#82). ------------------------------------------------------------------ NO CORPORATE-SPECIFIC ARTIFACTS ------------------------------------------------------------------ This squash deliberately sanitises corporate hostnames, container registry references, and TLS secret names into generic placeholders (`your-registry.example.com/your-org`, `haproxy-openmanager*.example.com`, `wildcard-tls`, `taylanbakircioglu/haproxy-openmanager-*`) so the public artefact contains no internal infrastructure detail. Pilot / development history that retained those values stays in the corporate fork and is NOT part of this commit.
120 lines
4.4 KiB
Python
120 lines
4.4 KiB
Python
"""
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apply_service: programmatic invocation of the cluster apply pipeline.
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Used by:
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- routers/site_wizard.py (atomic create flow with apply_immediately=true)
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- routers/letsencrypt.py _complete_certificate (post-completion auto-apply)
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Design (Section 4.5 of v1.5.0 plan):
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- Reuses the existing /api/clusters/{id}/apply-changes route handler so that
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the response shape (`latest_version`, `consolidated_version_id`,
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`sync_results`, `applied_count`, `agents_notified`) and transaction
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boundary are byte-identical to UI-driven applies.
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- M23/M46 (R65): when user_id is None (e.g. ACME completion auto-apply with
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legacy created_by NULL), falls back to a short-lived JWT minted for the
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first active admin user (`is_admin=TRUE AND is_active=TRUE`).
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- This file deliberately delegates rather than duplicating the ~800 LOC apply
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pipeline; that keeps drift impossible. The wrapper only injects auth.
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"""
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import logging
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from datetime import timedelta
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from typing import Any, Dict, Optional
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from database.connection import close_database_connection, get_database_connection
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from utils.auth import create_access_token
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logger = logging.getLogger(__name__)
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async def _resolve_user_id(user_id: Optional[int]) -> Optional[int]:
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"""If user_id is provided AND still valid (active), return it; else
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return the first active admin user's id. Returns None if no admin user
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exists (extreme edge case).
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M46/R65: schema accuracy — `users.is_super_admin` does NOT exist; the
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correct columns are `is_admin` (BOOLEAN) and `is_active` (BOOLEAN).
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Bulgu #27 fix: when a wizard-staged ACME order's `created_by` user has
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been deleted/deactivated by the time the post-completion auto-apply
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fires (could be 24h+ later), do NOT mint a JWT for that ghost user —
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we'd just produce a 401 from get_current_user_from_token. Fall through
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to the admin fallback instead.
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"""
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conn = await get_database_connection()
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try:
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if user_id is not None:
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valid = await conn.fetchval(
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"SELECT id FROM users WHERE id = $1 AND is_active = TRUE",
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user_id,
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)
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if valid:
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return valid
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logger.warning(
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"apply_service: requested user_id=%s no longer exists or is inactive — "
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"falling back to admin", user_id,
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)
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admin_id = await conn.fetchval(
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"""
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SELECT id FROM users
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WHERE is_admin = TRUE AND is_active = TRUE
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ORDER BY id ASC LIMIT 1
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"""
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)
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if not admin_id:
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logger.error(
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"apply_service: no active admin user found (is_admin=TRUE AND is_active=TRUE)"
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)
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return admin_id
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finally:
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await close_database_connection(conn)
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def _mint_internal_jwt(user_id: int) -> str:
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"""Mint a short-lived JWT for an internal apply call. Token uses the
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standard claim shape (`sub`/`user_id`) accepted by
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auth_middleware.get_current_user_from_token.
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"""
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return create_access_token(
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{"sub": str(user_id), "user_id": user_id},
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expires_delta=timedelta(minutes=5),
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)
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async def apply_cluster_pending(
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cluster_id: int,
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*,
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user_id: Optional[int] = None,
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apply_request: Optional[Dict[str, Any]] = None,
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) -> Dict[str, Any]:
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"""Programmatic equivalent of POST /api/clusters/{cluster_id}/apply-changes.
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Returns the same response dict the HTTP endpoint returns:
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{
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"message": str,
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"applied_count": int,
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"latest_version": str,
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"consolidated_version_id": int,
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"sync_results": list,
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"agents_notified": int,
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...optionally global_ssl_applied...
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}
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"""
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# Local import to avoid cluster.py <-> apply_service circular import at
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# module load (cluster.py uses apply_service indirectly via routers/__init__).
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from routers.cluster import apply_pending_changes # noqa: WPS433 (intentional)
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resolved = await _resolve_user_id(user_id)
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if resolved is None:
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raise RuntimeError(
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"apply_service.apply_cluster_pending: no admin user available for system context apply"
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)
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auth_header = f"Bearer {_mint_internal_jwt(resolved)}"
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return await apply_pending_changes(
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cluster_id=cluster_id,
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apply_request=apply_request or {},
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authorization=auth_header,
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)
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