Single-source version bump (backend/version.json) with frontend/package.json and
package-lock kept in sync (test_version_consistency). Marks the release that ships
the GHSA-7rhv / GHSA-3p5c / GHSA-3vh4 fixes.
Follow-up to the RCE/missing-auth/SSRF remediation, from a thorough multi-lens
review (3 agents + a black-box audit of all 201 routes). Backend-only; no
agent-script changes.
Regression fix (introduced by the previous commit):
- GET /api/agents was made JWT-only, but deployed agents call it WITH X-API-Key
(not a JWT) to read their applied_config_version and avoid re-applying config on
restart. It now accepts EITHER a valid operator JWT OR a valid agent X-API-Key,
so agents no longer get 401 (which caused a spurious HAProxy reload every restart).
Completeness (GHSA-3p5c siblings the first pass missed — same data class, now JWT):
- dashboard.py: GET /api/haproxy-cluster-pools/{id}/agents (full agent inventory —
a direct anonymous bypass of the GET /api/agents lockdown), /api/pools,
/api/haproxy-cluster-pools, /api/dashboard/stats, /api/dashboard/overview
(auth was optional -> leaked stats/names/health/alerts anonymously),
/api/haproxy/stats.
- waf.py: GET /api/waf/rules. health.py: GET /api/health/errors.
- agent.py: GET /api/agents/generate-uninstall-script/{platform} (agent-management
endpoint; was anonymous) now requires JWT or agent key, like generate-install-script.
- config.py: POST /api/config/{validate,optimize,templates/{id}/generate} were
optional-auth (logging only) and run a HAProxy validator on caller input; now
require a JWT. (bulk-create, parse-bulk, diff and configuration/request were
already mandatory-auth — verified.)
All newly-gated endpoints are frontend-only (axios sends the JWT) or unused;
agents never call them.
SSRF (GHSA-3vh4) gap:
- acme_service._get_nonce fetched directory['newNonce'] (from the attacker-
influenceable directory JSON) with a bare session, http allowed, dual-stack, and
BEFORE the guarded _signed_request POST. Now guarded (assert_public_url +
safe_connector + no redirects + timeout), matching the other ACME sinks.
Correctness:
- Three agent webhooks (config-applied, config-validation-failed, config-sync)
swallowed their auth 401 into a 200 error body via a bare `except Exception`.
Added `except HTTPException: raise` so the 401/403 propagates.
Audit result (live black-box, all 201 routes probed unauthenticated): no data
leak and no unauthenticated mutation anywhere; every sensitive route returns
401/403 (a pre-existing group of read handlers wraps the 401 into a 500 via a
broad except — no data is exposed; left as-is, documented as cosmetic).
Verified: full pytest tests/ (1145 passed, 0 failed; +16 regression tests) + live
localtest stack smoke — agent-key GET /api/agents=200, anonymous=401, all newly
gated endpoints reject anonymous and admit JWT, the 3 webhooks return 401.
Addresses three reported advisories, all verified against the code. Fixes are
entirely server-side — deployed agents already send a valid X-API-Key on every
call, so enforcing it does not require any agent-script change or upgrade.
GHSA-7rhv-c5pc-69r8 (CRITICAL RCE — agent script-template poisoning):
- POST/GET /api/agents/script-templates/{platform} now require the agents.version
permission (was authentication-only), matching POST /versions. Blocks a viewer
JWT from overwriting the root install/upgrade script.
GHSA-3p5c-m5m4-mjpx (missing authentication):
- Agent data-plane endpoints now REQUIRE a valid X-API-Key (was optional/skipped
when the header was absent), checked before any DB access: config,
ssl-certificates (private keys!), upgrade-status, heartbeat (by-name and the
previously auth-less by-id), configuration pending-requests. Removes keyless
heartbeat spoofing and keyless rogue-agent auto-registration.
- Operator/UI endpoints now require a JWT: GET /api/agents, the entire
/api/dashboard-stats router, /api/health/{deep,agents,clusters}, and
/api/ssl/certificates/{id}/config-versions. The simple /api/health liveness
probe stays public. Adds shared auth_middleware.require_authenticated_user.
GHSA-3vh4-gvxx-wm2p (SSRF via ACME directory_url):
- New utils/ssrf_guard.py (https-only + public-IP-only, IPv4-pinned, no redirects),
applied to settings test-connection, acme_service.get_directory and
_signed_request, and validated at Let's Encrypt account creation. The
test-connection response no longer reflects arbitrary upstream JSON keys
(information-disclosure oracle) — only fixed ACME field names.
Verified: full pytest tests/ (1128 passed, 0 failed) + live localtest stack smoke
(valid JWT/key paths return 200/404 as expected; anonymous requests 401; SSRF to
metadata/private/loopback refused). No changes to backend/utils/agent_scripts/*.
Follow-up to the consolidated security bump:
- websocket-driver -> 0.7.5 (CRITICAL, message corruption; dev/build tooling)
- resolve-url-loader -> 5.0.0 (pulls postcss ^8), resolving the last postcss<8.5.10
instance (#12) and #2 at the source. Project uses no SASS, so resolve-url-loader
v4->v5 is inert at build time.
Verified: full production docker build succeeds on node 18; postcss now resolves
to a single 8.5.10 across the tree; deferred dev-only deps unchanged.
Infra-only change: image tag bump in docker-compose and k8s manifest.
Backend redis-py client (redis>=5.0.0, resolves to 8.x) verified compatible
against Redis 8.8.0 for all commands in use (get/setex/incr/expire/delete/ping).
No application code or version change.
The manual Frontend editor, wizard and visual ACL builder hard-rejected the ACL
`-f <file>` flag while bulk import accepted it. Worse, a frontend imported with
an `-f` ACL could not be edited at all (422) until the ACL was dropped.
The original guard predated the fail-safe apply flow: the agent runs `haproxy -c`
before every reload, so a missing pattern file is rejected safely and the previous
config keeps running. Pattern files are operator-managed host files — the same
policy adopted for SPOE filter configs in v1.8.8.
- models: remove the 5 `-f` hard rejects (frontend acl/redirect/use_backend
validators + wizard string/dict-redirect guards); `$(`/backtick and X!X
contradiction guards unchanged
- routers/frontend: `_pattern_file_warnings` helper; non-blocking warning on
create + update responses listing referenced pattern files (empty when no
rule uses `-f` — zero noise)
- routers/config: bulk-import preview advisory listing pattern files per
frontend (cluster config-dir aware, next to the SPOE advisories)
- React: remove the FrontendManagement submit gate and SiteWizard step gate;
ACLRuleBuilder renders informational notes instead of errors and re-adds
`-f (pattern file on host)` to the flag dropdown; create path now renders
server warnings like update
- tests: 4 reject-pins inverted to accept-pins; new test_acl_pattern_file_allow.py
(accept/guards-kept/zero-noise/advisory); full suite green (1094 passed)
Bulk import / manual edit silently dropped `filter spoe engine ...` (Coraza WAF)
and frontend `log-format` because the parser recognised only a fixed directive
set. The regenerated config then missed the SPOE engine, so HAProxy failed with
"unable to find SPOE engine 'coraza' used by the send-spoe-group".
- parser: capture `filter` + `log-format`/`log-format-sd` into new ParsedFrontend fields
- db: additive nullable `log_format` + `filters` TEXT columns on frontends (SCHEMA_VERSION 8->9)
- generator: new `filter` bucket flushed before http-request rules so `filter` precedes
`send-spoe-group`; `log-format` kept in prelude
- bulk import: preview dict, change-detection, persist (create + merge-update); cluster-aware
SPOE pre-flight advisories (missing-filter + host-prerequisite) surfaced in the UI
- manual CRUD: full round-trip (get/create/update) incl. React form fields (no null-wipe)
- reject/rollback: restore the new columns; restore path + wizard helper kept in parity
- backend `option spop-check` recognised (suppresses spurious warning for coraza-spoa)
- tests: test_spoe_filter_import.py; full suite green (1079 passed)
The version.json single-source move (v1.8.7) updated the version READ step but
missed the create-release step, which still ran jq against the deleted repo-root
version.json and failed the workflow. Point it at backend/version.json. This
release step is public-only (GitHub Releases), so it has no corporate counterpart.
The version shown in the UI (backend-sourced via /api/version) could lag the
real release. The canonical version lived at repo-root version.json, but the
backend image is built with context ./backend, so that file did not reach the
container unless a pipeline staged it; the backend then fell back to a hardcoded
constant in main.py that had to be bumped by hand and had drifted (it reported
1.8.4 after 1.8.5 and 1.8.6 shipped).
- version.json moves to backend/version.json (single source of truth), now
committed and co-located with main.py, so COPY . . bakes it into every image
directly - correct version in every deployment, no pipeline staging required.
- backend/main.py reads the co-located file; its in-code fallback is no longer a
real version ("unknown") so it can never silently drift again.
- docker-build.yml reads backend/version.json and drops the staging step;
docker-compose.localtest drops the stale root mount.
- backend/tests/test_version_consistency.py fails the build if main.py hardcodes
a real version, if the canonical file is missing/invalid, or if
frontend/package.json drifts from it.
Bumped to 1.8.7. No functional, schema, API, or agent change. Full suite green.
A user running the API on a 2-core/4GB host reported slow-feeling API
responses (Issue #35 follow-up). Review of the hot paths found no
pathological defect; the dominant factors are the single uvicorn worker
(one core serves all requests) and the constant agent-poll baseline
(4 requests per agent every 30s). Two zero-risk improvements:
- backend/Dockerfile: CMD now honors UVICORN_WORKERS, falling back to
WEB_CONCURRENCY and then 1. Flagless uvicorn natively honors
WEB_CONCURRENCY, so the fallback keeps any deployment that relied on it
byte-for-byte compatible; with the final default of 1 worker uvicorn runs
in-process exactly as before. >1 enables the multiprocess supervisor so
multi-core hosts can use all cores. Background tasks are already
multi-replica safe (FOR UPDATE SKIP LOCKED / advisory locks), as exercised
by the k8s HPA deployment (2-10 replicas). `exec` keeps uvicorn as PID 1
(clean SIGTERM, verified ~1s docker stop with 2 workers).
docker-compose.yml passes UVICORN_WORKERS through as empty-when-unset so a
user-set WEB_CONCURRENCY is never overridden; .env.template documents it.
- routers/agent.py heartbeat (by-name endpoint): the agent's
status/version/upgrade_status were read with three separate single-column
SELECTs against the same row; now one SELECT. Identical values and None
semantics (single consistent snapshot instead of three reads); saves two
round-trips per heartbeat per agent every 30s. The legacy by-id heartbeat
endpoint is untouched; the heartbeat API contract is unchanged for agents
of every version.
- README: new "Performance Tuning" section (worker/replica scaling, and how
to use the X-Response-Time header plus "Slow request detected" logs to
pinpoint slow endpoints).
Verification: full backend suite in docker green (1063 passed, 151 skipped;
also re-run by the runtime image build); worker-count expansion matrix
(unset->1, UVICORN_WORKERS=2->2, WEB_CONCURRENCY=3->3, both->UVICORN_WORKERS,
empty->fallback) all correct; default run confirmed single-process with
uvicorn as PID 1 and healthy API; UVICORN_WORKERS=2 confirmed parent + 2
workers, healthy API, clean shutdown; live heartbeats verified for
register + existing-agent paths AND degraded agents (no stats socket /
haproxy stopped / garbage stats CSV / unknown backend in server_statuses):
all return 200, agent row updates correctly, zero backend errors.
No schema, API, or agent changes.
The background order-completion task (complete_pending_acme_orders, 60s
cycle) failed on EVERY cycle since v1.8.0 with:
[ACME-COMPLETE] Error in completion task: syntax error at or near ")"
Root cause: the bounded DNS-01 retry OR-arm added to the atomic order-claim
query in v1.8.0 (13b65d9) carried one extra closing parenthesis, making the
whole SELECT invalid PostgreSQL. The claim is the task's first statement, so
the generic except swallowed it each minute and NO background ACME work ever
ran on v1.8.0-v1.8.4:
- orders were never claimed for finalize -> download -> save (http-01 too);
- advance_dns01_order never ran, so the DNS-01 TXT record was never
published - DNS-01 with an automated provider (e.g. Cloudflare) could
never validate (exactly the report in Issue #35);
- wizard-staged orders never left wizard_staged (same try block);
- retry_invalid_dns01 / reconcile_dns01_cleanup never executed;
- hourly-created renewal orders could never complete in the background.
Fix: drop the stray ')' (one line). Query semantics are unchanged.
Why the suite missed it: the unit tests mock asyncpg, so raw SQL never
reaches a real parser. Added a regression test that AST-scans the ACME
modules' SQL string literals (comments/quoted literals stripped) and fails
on unbalanced parentheses - it is red on the pre-fix tree and would have
caught the v1.8.0 regression at commit time. Scanned all six ACME modules:
this query was the only unbalanced SQL.
Verification: full backend suite in docker green (1062 passed, 151
skipped); the fixed query EXPLAINs cleanly on postgres:15; live localtest
run shows zero completion-task errors and a seeded pending order is claimed
("[ACME-COMPLETE] Claimed 1 order(s)"). Backend-only, no schema/API/agent
changes; fully backward compatible.
Reported-by: @tkkost (GitHub Issue #35)
The Linux/macOS agent installer could abort during "pre-installation cleanup"
(terminal showed `Killing processes matching: haproxy-agent` then `Killed`,
returning to the prompt) when the install script's own command line contained
"haproxy-agent". The cleanup killed processes via `pgrep -f "$pattern"` starting
with the bare string "haproxy-agent", which also matched the running installer's
own command line and a sudo/PAM ancestor that the $$/$PPID self-exclusion did not
cover, so the installer terminated itself before installing.
- linux_install.sh / macos_install.sh: the cleanup kill loop now targets ONLY
the installed agent - "$INSTALL_DIR/haproxy-agent" (the daemon binary path) and
the agent service/label ("haproxy-agent.service" / "com.haproxy.agent") - never
the bare "haproxy-agent" substring. Neither pattern can match the installer's
own command line. The redundant bare pattern is dropped (the service is stopped
separately, and the binary-path pattern still catches a running daemon).
- frontend (AgentManagement.js): name the downloaded scripts
install-agent-<platform>.sh / uninstall-agent-<platform>.sh (matching the
backend's suggested filename) - defense in depth so this cannot resurface.
Installer-only change. The running agent and its privilege model are unchanged
(it runs as root for HAProxy reload, config writes, keepalived, and self-upgrade).
The cleanup runs only on a full interactive install (gated by SKIP_TO_DAEMON), so
daemon mode, self-upgrade, and config/version apply are unaffected. Both agent
scripts kept in sync. Scripts parse on bash 4.2-5.2; full backend suite green.
Addresses #31.
A self-hosted agent could fail every heartbeat with HTTP 400
`Invalid JSON: Expecting property name enclosed in double quotes` when the
system-info block it collects came back empty on an unusual host. The agent
builds the heartbeat JSON as text, so an empty `$system_info` collapsed the
`$system_info,` line to a bare comma and broke the payload.
- Agent script (linux + macos, kept in sync): guard the fragment-form
register_agent and send_heartbeat builders so an empty system_info falls back
to a valid key and can never emit a bare comma. Uses the most portable bash
glob test (no POSIX class / pattern substitution; verified on bash 3.2-5.2 and
on Ubuntu/Debian/Rocky/Alpine/Amazon Linux). True no-op for healthy agents.
- Backend heartbeat endpoint: parse the body as-is first and only run the
malformed-JSON repair when parsing fails, so a valid heartbeat from any agent
version is byte-for-byte untouched. The repair (now a testable helper) recovers
a leading or doubled comma (the empty-system_info artifact) in addition to the
existing empty-value / trailing-comma fixes.
No agent version bump; self-upgrade and daemon mode are unaffected. Healthy
agents of every version behave identically. Full backend suite green.
Addresses #31.
ZeroSSL/Google account registration failed with
`malformed: The Replay Nonce could not be base64url-decoded`: the ACME client
(a process-wide singleton) kept a single anti-replay nonce shared across
certificate authorities, so a nonce issued by one CA could be sent to another,
and the auto-retry only covered `badNonce`.
- Scope the nonce per CA (self._nonce_by_dir keyed by directory_url): a nonce
from one CA is never sent to another; account registration always uses a fresh
nonce from the target CA.
- Broaden the 400 retry to also recover from the nonce-malformed rejection.
- Fix _b64url_decode padding (used for the EAB HMAC key).
Backend-only; HTTP-01 and Let's Encrypt are unaffected.
Addresses #35.
Follow-up fixes for the DNS-01 feature reported on #35:
- Cloudflare: sanitize the API token (strip surrounding quotes + any non
token68 chars) so a pasted token with quotes/spaces no longer fails with
"Invalid request headers"; verify-on-save shows a precise hint when it
cleaned the input. Covers the automated orchestrator path too.
- ZeroSSL/Google EAB: enter the EAB Key ID and HMAC Key per-account in the
Register Account dialog (falls back to the global Settings value when blank);
base64-validate the HMAC key; humanize the externalAccountRequired failure;
and preserve the deliberate 409/422 instead of downgrading them to 400.
- Apply Management: cluster ACME enable/disable changes now show under a
dedicated "ACME Challenge Routing" section, are counted in the Apply/Reject
dialogs, and Apply/Reject All process them (previously "Rejected 0 HA/VIP
change(s)") - consistent with every other entity. Reject rolls acme_enabled
back to the original via ORDER BY created_at ASC over the snapshot chain.
- getErrorMsg surfaces field-level validation messages.
Backward compatible (additive / strict superset; HTTP-01 unchanged).
Addresses #35.
Add ACME DNS-01 (TXT-record) validation alongside the existing HTTP-01,
for internal/isolated clusters with no public port 80 and for wildcard
certificates. Opt-in via a global kill-switch (default off); HTTP-01 is
byte-for-byte unchanged, with zero agent or rendered-config changes.
- Pluggable DNS provider interface (Manual + Cloudflare). Per-account
credentials are Fernet-encrypted at rest, verified on save, and never
returned by the API or written to logs/events/error_detail.
- Non-blocking per-cycle orchestrator: publish (CAS) -> propagation grace
(across cycles, no in-loop sleep) -> respond -> finalize/download, with a
bounded fresh-order retry chain (1 original + 3 retries) on propagation lag.
- Manual flow: user publishes the TXT record and confirms; manual DNS-01
cannot auto-renew unattended (auto-renew forced off and surfaced in the UI).
- Migration v8: additive, idempotent columns on letsencrypt_accounts/orders
and acme_challenges, plus a new letsencrypt_account_dns_credentials table.
- Challenge-type-aware diagnostics (port80/routing/DNS checks skipped for
DNS-01) and a DNS-01 event timeline in the order detail.
- Frontend: DNS-01 account + credentials management, cert wizard adaptation,
order-detail TXT records + verify, orders/renewal Method columns, and a
Settings kill-switch. README, release notes, and API docs updated.
Implements #35.
Two friction points surfaced in issue #31: (1) the default-login note said
admin/admin but the seeded password is admin123; (2) a reporter logged in at
:3000 (the raw static frontend, no /api behind it) instead of :8080 (nginx,
which serves the UI and proxies /api). Fix the credentials note and add a
clear pointer that :8080 is the single entry point, with the Quick Reference
table annotated accordingly.
Patches the critical shell-quote advisory (quote() does not escape
newlines in object .op values, CVSS 8.1). shell-quote is a dev/build-only
transitive dependency (react-dev-utils / launch-editor) and is not present
in the production image or the browser bundle, so there is no runtime
exposure; this clears the alert and the dev-time risk. Lockfile-only change
verified to install with shell-quote resolving to 1.8.4.
The build workflow tagged the Docker images with the product version but
never created the matching git tag, so the repo Tags/Releases drifted
behind (stuck at the last manual tag, v1.6.0) while Docker Hub had 1.7.8.
Add a step that, after the images are pushed, creates a Release (and its
tag) for the current version.json when one does not already exist, and
grant the job contents:write so it can do so.
Manage highly-available virtual IPs backed by Keepalived (VRRP) directly from the OpenManager
UI — no more SSHing into nodes to install/configure Keepalived by hand. Builds on the agent
pull-architecture: define the VIP centrally, click Apply, and the agents converge.
Highlights:
- New "HA / VIP" tab: create a virtual IP, pick a per-node interface, select which pool nodes
participate (MASTER/BACKUP roles + priorities); live MASTER/BACKUP/FAULT per node.
- On Apply, agents install & configure Keepalived (unicast VRRP, cloud-safe default) across the
major distros (Debian/Ubuntu, RHEL/CentOS/Alma/Rocky, Fedora, SUSE/openSUSE, Alpine) with a
HAProxy health-check, so the VIP fails over automatically when HAProxy drops.
- Single-node (a managed floating IP without failover) and multi-node VRRP failover both work.
- VIP changes ride the standard Apply Management flow with the standard "View Change" diff.
- Approval-gated deletion (safety): deleting a running VIP is staged for approval and the VIP
keeps running, untouched, until you approve it — an agent never tears a VIP down without an
explicit human approval. Per-VIP Diagnostics view; opt-in package uninstall (only on nodes
where OpenManager installed it). A node already running a hand-managed Keepalived is detected
and never overwritten ("externally managed").
- Fully opt-in and backward compatible: nodes/clusters without a VIP are unaffected. Adds
vip_instances + vip_members tables (idempotent SCHEMA_VERSION bump; existing data and
passwords unaffected) and a `vip` RBAC permission group.
- Also includes a HAProxy config-generator robustness fix: auto-inject a stick-table when a
frontend uses a stick counter (track-sc / sc_*_rate) but declares none.
On-prem / L2 (VRRP) scope; the UI notes the cloud caveat.
Supersedes the v1.6.4 stable pin (1.30.2-alpine) with the mainline
patched release. No config, schema, or behavior changes.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The bundled nginx reverse proxy was flagged for the nginx 'poolslip' advisory
(affected: mainline <=1.31.0; fixed: stable 1.30.2+ / mainline 1.31.1+). The
config-level mitigation (named capture groups instead of $1/$2 in rewrite) does
not apply — the product's nginx config (nginx/nginx.conf and the k8s configmap)
has no rewrite capture-group directives, only prefix locations + proxy_pass. So
the fix is the version: pin nginx:alpine -> nginx:1.30.2-alpine in
docker-compose.yml and k8s/manifests/10-nginx.yaml.
No config/schema/behavior change (nginx only reverse-proxies). Version bumped to
1.6.4 across all layers. Verified in Docker: nginx -v=1.30.2; nginx -t OK on both
the compose and production configmap configs; all proxied routes work through
nginx; no nginx errors.
A backend server toggled OFF (is_active=false) vanished from the UI with no way
to reactivate it: GET /api/backends honored include_inactive for backends but the
server sub-queries hardcoded 'AND is_active = TRUE'.
- get_backends: server sub-queries now honor include_inactive (default callers
unchanged); added last_config_status to the server payload so the UI can tell a
DISABLED server (re-enableable) from a DELETION (pending delete).
- toggle_server: persists an entity snapshot so an Apply-Management Reject rolls
back is_active (previously left the server stuck disabled).
- BackendServers.js: requests include_inactive, shows disabled servers with the
ON/OFF switch + an 'Inactive' tag, hides only DELETION-pending servers, and
keeps soft-deleted BACKENDS hidden (so include_inactive doesn't resurface them).
- Config generation unchanged: disabled servers stay '# DISABLED:' comments and
convert back to live lines when re-enabled.
Startup migration hardening (multi-replica / rolling-deploy safety): create_essential_tables
fails fast on lock contention and retries; run_all_migrations is serialized by a
session advisory lock and gated by a schema_migrations version marker, so an
already-current schema is skipped instead of issuing lock-heavy DDL that a serving
replica's traffic could block at startup. Idempotent and fail-open.
Version reported consistently across all layers (version.json, backend fallback,
frontend package) -> 1.6.3.
Assigning a HAProxy agent failed with '401: Authorization header missing'
on GET /api/clusters. A cluster-read hardening had made GET /api/clusters and
GET /api/clusters/{id} accept only a user JWT in the Authorization header;
agents authenticate with their agent token in the X-API-Key header, so the
token was never read.
Both endpoints now accept either a user JWT (Authorization) or an agent token
(X-API-Key via validate_agent_api_key), mirroring the existing dual-auth on
POST /api/agents/generate-install-script. Anonymous access is still rejected,
so the original hardening is preserved. The auth guard is placed before the
try block so the failure surfaces as a clean 401 (not the 500-wrapped-401 in
the report). Agent install scripts now consistently send the token via
X-API-Key (pre-flight cluster check on linux/macos, and macOS get_cluster_paths
which previously used the wrong Authorization: Bearer header).
Also normalizes the platform in the uninstall-script generator so macOS agents
(which report platform 'darwin') no longer get a 400 from
GET /api/agents/generate-uninstall-script/darwin.
version 1.6.0 -> 1.6.2.
Adds opt-in TOTP-based Multi-Factor Authentication that is fully
backwards compatible with existing logins. Operators choose to enable
MFA per account; nothing changes for users who do not opt in.
Highlights
==========
* RFC 6238 TOTP (6 digits, 30s period, SHA1) with ±30s skew tolerance,
compatible with Microsoft / Google Authenticator, Authy, Duo, 1Password.
* Per-step replay protection (`mfa_last_used_totp_step`) so a captured
code cannot be reused inside the same window.
* Fernet-encrypted TOTP secrets at rest, key resolution via
`MFA_ENCRYPTION_KEY` env (HKDF-derived from `SECRET_KEY` as fallback).
* 10 single-use, bcrypt-hashed backup codes per user, formatted
`XXXX-YYYY` from a confusion-free alphabet (no 0/O/1/I/L).
* Two-step login flow: `POST /api/auth/login` returns `mfa_required`
+ `mfa_token`, then `POST /api/auth/login/mfa-verify` accepts a TOTP
code OR a backup code. JWT is minted only after MFA succeeds.
* Self-service: users enable / disable MFA from their own row in the
Users page; admins reset (single user or bulk) but never enable on
behalf of someone else (matches AWS IAM / GitHub / Google Workspace).
* Bulk emergency reset CLI: `scripts/admin-mfa-reset-all.sh`.
Security hardening
==================
* Atomic transactions with `SELECT … FOR UPDATE` on `mfa_pending_logins`
and `users` rows so concurrent verify / enroll calls cannot race.
* `/api/mfa/enroll/start` refuses re-enrollment when MFA is already on
(prevents silent secret rotation via a stolen JWT).
* Pydantic `ValidationError` messages are sanitized before reaching the
audit log so request bodies (TOTP / backup codes in flight) never
appear in plaintext.
* Slowapi rate limits are per-USER, not per-IP, with a trusted-proxy
XFF strategy so a single ingress address cannot exhaust the bucket
for thousands of operators (`MFA_TRUSTED_PROXY_CIDRS`,
`MFA_RATE_LIMIT_*` env-overridable).
* Login query now scopes to `is_active = TRUE` so a soft-deleted row
with the same username can no longer occlude the active user
(also closes a small account-enumeration side channel).
Database
========
Additive migrations (idempotent `ADD COLUMN IF NOT EXISTS`,
`CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS`):
- users: mfa_enabled, mfa_method, mfa_secret_encrypted,
mfa_enrolled_at, mfa_last_used_at, mfa_last_used_totp_step
- mfa_backup_codes (user_id ON DELETE CASCADE)
- mfa_pending_logins (user_id ON DELETE CASCADE, challenge_token,
attempts, expires_at)
- mfa_pending_enrollments (user_id ON DELETE CASCADE)
Frontend
========
* Login page becomes a 3-phase state machine
(credentials → MFA → submitting); legacy single-step login is
preserved for users who haven't enrolled.
* New MFAEnrollModal (3-step wizard: QR + secret → verify → backup
codes) using `qrcode.react`.
* Users page shows MFA column + per-row enable/disable/reset actions.
Admins viewing other users with MFA off see a non-actionable info
icon explaining that only the user themselves can enable MFA.
Deployment
==========
* `MFA_ENCRYPTION_KEY` is added to `k8s/manifests/03-secrets.yaml` as
a placeholder; `SECRET_KEY` is also placeholder-ized so both are
injected by the existing pipeline pattern (sed-replace + apply).
* No new build-time env vars are required for the frontend. The SPA
uses `window.location.host` for `/api/*` and is routed by the
existing nginx ingress configuration.
* `frontend/.dockerignore` ensures host `.env*` files cannot bleed
into the production bundle.
Tests
=====
* New unit suites:
- `test_mfa_service.py` (TOTP, encryption, backup codes)
- `test_mfa_backwards_compat.py` (regression — non-MFA flow unchanged)
- `test_mfa_rate_limits.py` (env override + dataclass immutability)
- `test_mfa_rate_limit_key.py` (JWT key, trusted-proxy XFF, fallbacks)
* All existing 1000+ unit tests continue to pass.
Documentation
=============
* README MFA section (overview, day-to-day operations, emergency
reset CLI, env variables, rate-limit tuning).
* `scripts/README.md` documents the bulk reset script.
Issue: #18
The backend Docker image is built with `context: ./backend`, so the
repo-root `version.json` is outside the build context and never
reaches the container. Backend `main.py` falls back to a compile-
time `_version_info` constant when `/app/version.json` is missing.
In practice this produced a real production drift: a successful
redeploy of the v1.5.2 tree silently reported `"v1.5.0"` in
`/api/version` for a window of releases because the constant in
main.py had not been bumped in lockstep with `version.json`, and
the canonical file was never available to read inside the
container.
Fix is workflow-only:
* New "stage version.json into backend build context" step
(between `read product version` and `set up qemu`) that runs
`cp version.json backend/version.json` so the next
`docker buildx build` includes it.
* `.gitignore` entry for `backend/version.json` keeps `git status`
clean for developers (the canonical file remains at repo root;
`backend/version.json` is a transient CI artefact).
Backend reading logic is unchanged: the loop in `main.py` first
tries `/app/version.json`, then falls back to the constant.
Post-fix, the first path WILL find the file and produce the
correct response; the constant becomes a pure defensive fallback
(rather than the production hot path it accidentally became).
No code or test changes needed: existing tests assert against the
`_version_info` dict regardless of whether it was populated from
JSON or the fallback constant.
A focused hardening pass on the v1.5.0 ACME Diagnostic Panel
surface, exercised against a live production deployment (Round-25
+ Round-26 audits) and supplemented by an AGPL-3.0 relicense.
------------------------------------------------------------------
LICENSE — Relicense to AGPL-3.0-or-later
------------------------------------------------------------------
Effective v1.5.2 the project is licensed under the **GNU Affero
General Public License v3.0 (or later)**. v1.5.0 and v1.5.1
remain under the prior MIT terms.
The relicense is consistent with the project's intent as a
community-operated HAProxy management surface: forks that run
HAProxy OpenManager as a network service for third parties are
now required to publish their modifications under the same
license (AGPL §13). Day-to-day single-tenant deployments,
internal corporate use, and ordinary forks-for-fixes are
unaffected.
Changes:
* LICENSE replaced with full AGPL-3.0 text.
* README "## License" section rewritten with the AGPL summary
+ the network-service obligation.
* frontend/package.json gains `"license": "AGPL-3.0-or-later"`.
------------------------------------------------------------------
BULGU #94 / #95 — Diagnostic Panel Must Never Opaque-500
------------------------------------------------------------------
Live exercise of the v1.5.0 Diagnostic Panel against a deployed
build surfaced two opaque-500 paths. The panel exists to make
ACME failures legible; producing an opaque HTTP 500 defeats the
entire feature. Fix shape: every endpoint now returns either a
canonical 4xx (auth / not-found / rate-limit) or an HTTP 200
"structured failure envelope" that the React UI knows how to
render — never a 500 for an in-suite failure.
Affected paths:
POST /api/letsencrypt/orders/{order_id}/diagnostics
Pre-fix: a UndefinedColumnError or DB-connectivity failure
inside `run_checks` bubbled out of the bare try/finally and
surfaced as a generic 500 with no operator-actionable detail.
Post-fix: setup-stage and run-stage failures are caught
separately and converted to a `status: diagnostics_unavailable`
envelope carrying `error_stage`, `error_type`, `error_message`,
and a `correlation_id` that the operator can grep in the
backend log. Individual checks are wrapped in `_safe_check`
so one broken check (e.g. DNS lookup timeout) never crashes
the suite — the failing check shows up as `status: "fail"`
with its message, the others still run.
GET /api/letsencrypt/orders/{order_id}/events
Pre-fix: the SQL `SELECT … status FROM user_activity_logs`
referenced a column that did not exist in the canonical
migration; every diagnostic-panel open against an order with
any user-activity-log correlation got an `UndefinedColumnError`
500. Post-fix: the endpoint now introspects
`information_schema.columns` and projects only the columns
actually present. Partial failures (one source dies, the
other works) are reported via `meta.errors[]` rather than
collapsing the whole timeline.
POST /api/letsencrypt/orders/{order_id}/diagnostics/{check_id}/rerun
Same structured-envelope contract as the full-suite POST,
scoped to a single check row.
Frontend (`frontend/src/components/ACMEAutomation.js`):
* Distinct `diagRunError` / `diagEventsError` / `diagMeta`
states so the modal can render the cause inline (Antd Alert)
instead of a silent dropdown.
* Event-log auto-tail polling backs off after 3 consecutive
failures so the Network tab does not get spammed with 500s
every 5s.
* Correlation IDs visible in every error banner.
------------------------------------------------------------------
BULGU #96 — Clean 404 for Out-Of-Range order_id
------------------------------------------------------------------
A live exercise of the post-#94 diagnostic panel against the
deployed build surfaced one remaining contract gap. A path-
param `order_id` outside the Postgres int4 range
(e.g. > 2_147_483_647) caused `_load_order` to raise
`asyncpg.exceptions.DataError: invalid input for query
argument $1: 2147483648 (value out of int32 range)`. Round-25
correctly surfaced this in a `diagnostics_unavailable`
envelope — but that envelope leaked SQL implementation detail
("query argument $1", "int32 range", DataError class name)
into the operator-facing response body.
Semantically an out-of-range integer can never reference a
real order — it's just "not found". `_load_order` now catches
`asyncpg.exceptions.DataError` and re-raises a canonical
`HTTPException(404, "Order {id} not found")`. Because all
three endpoints re-raise `HTTPException` from their outer
try/except (the Round-25 envelope only fires for non-
HTTPException crashes), the canonical 404 path now wins
end-to-end across /diagnostics, /events, and /rerun.
------------------------------------------------------------------
TEST / LINT / LIVE VERIFICATION
------------------------------------------------------------------
* Backend pytest 1104/1104 (the +20 vs v1.5.1's 1084 are the
Round-25 and #96 contract pins; see
test_acme_diagnostics_router_round25.py).
* Live prod-canary verification: every endpoint return shape
confirmed against the deployed build — int4 overflow returns
clean 404 with no SQL leak, normal paths return Round-25
envelopes, HTTP method matrix returns 405 on wrong verbs,
no auth returns 401, invalid `check_id` returns 400, and
`meta.correlation_id` is present on every diagnostic
response.
------------------------------------------------------------------
COMPATIBILITY
------------------------------------------------------------------
* No breaking API contract changes: `status` field on the
diagnostic response can now be `"diagnostics_unavailable"`
in addition to the existing pass-through of the
underlying order status (`pending` / `valid` / `invalid` /
`cancelled` / …) — older UIs that only switch on the
existing values render the `diagnostics_unavailable`
case as "unknown status" rather than crashing.
* Frontend handles the new envelope shape AND the legacy
HTTP 4xx/5xx paths.
A live-deployment audit pass over the v1.5.0 Site Wizard + ACME
Diagnostic Panel surface. Two adversarial review rounds (R23, R24)
each capped by an end-to-end smoke test against a multi-cluster
staging deployment.
Bulgu #83 — Frontend Management page warned about stale data
without a clear retry CTA. The toast now carries an in-place
"Reload" action and the page-level Empty state surfaces the same
recovery affordance, so operators never get stuck on a stale-data
view without an obvious way out.
Bulgu #84 — ACME diagnostics ran with the wrong "last_heartbeat"
column reference against the agents table. Aligned the SELECT
with the actual schema column (`last_seen`); pinned by an idempotent
regression test in `test_acme_diagnostics.py`.
Bulgu #85 — ACME order error_detail rendering could leak the raw
asyncpg/SQL exception class name when humanize_error_detail
encountered an unhandled CA response shape. Added a backwards-
compatible fallback branch that emits an "ACME error (raw)" panel
without exposing parse_error class name to the user.
Bulgu #86 — Multi-cluster apply with concurrent rejects could
leave wizard_staged orders dangling without their parent draft.
Pinned via reject_order_with_cluster_orphan test.
Bulgu #87 — Frontend Management page list virtualization
mis-keyed during a re-sort + stale-row replace race; fixed by
keying rows on `id + version` so React reconciler does not reuse
DOM for a logically different row.
Bulgu #88 — Site Wizard "Cancel" mid-flow now surfaces an
unsaved-draft prompt with explicit Save / Discard buttons (and
the same prompt on browser tab close), so the operator never
loses 5 steps of input to an accidental ESC.
Bulgu #89 — Existing-cert SSL mode showed an empty dropdown when
the cluster had >100 certs because the listing endpoint
default-limited results. Endpoint now exposes pagination AND
the wizard switches to client-side filtering above 50 rows.
Bulgu #90 — ACME pre-check on the wizard preview path did NOT
re-validate the account against `letsencrypt_accounts` if the
operator stepped Back/Forward between SSL and Review. Added a
debounced re-validation on Review entry.
Bulgu #93 — Site Wizard hsts_enabled toggle in HTTPS frontend
was idempotent-by-name (the generated `http-response set-header
Strict-Transport-Security` line could duplicate across a Save +
Apply cycle). The renderer now upserts the header in place.
Cumulative outcome: backend pytest 1084/1084, frontend lint
clean, and a 6-hour live-deployment smoke session against staging
with no regressions reported.
Closes#13, Closes#14.
This release squashes the v1.4.0 → v1.5.0 development line. v1.4.0
shipped the ACME stability & enterprise audit (Issues #10/#11/#12).
v1.5.0 builds on that foundation with two co-equal headline features
plus a 22-round audit campaign hardening the prior configuration
surface. License remains MIT for v1.5.0 (relicense to AGPL-3.0
lands in v1.5.2).
------------------------------------------------------------------
HEADLINE FEATURE A — ACME Diagnostic Panel (Issue #13)
------------------------------------------------------------------
A live pre-flight + post-failure diagnostic surface for every ACME
order, reachable from the ACME Automation page. The panel exists
to make ACME failures legible to operators who do NOT have shell
access to the API host.
Endpoints (`backend/routers/acme_diagnostics.py`):
POST /api/letsencrypt/orders/{order_id}/diagnostics
Run the full 5-check suite (DNS / port-80 / routing /
account / agents) and humanize the order's `error_detail`
(>=11 RFC-8555 problem types, backwards compatible with
legacy plain-string failures).
POST /api/letsencrypt/orders/{order_id}/diagnostics/
{check_id}/rerun
Re-run a single check in place — used by the "Re-run"
button on every row of the modal's pre-flight table.
GET /api/letsencrypt/orders/{order_id}/events
Merged event timeline combining the typed
`acme_order_events` rows with correlated
`user_activity_logs` entries (resource_type =
'letsencrypt_order' AND resource_id = order_id). The
diagnostic modal auto-tails this timeline every 5 seconds
while open.
Service-level checks (`backend/services/acme_diagnostics.py`):
* DNS resolution via stdlib socket.gethostbyname_ex through
run_in_executor (intentionally avoiding an aiodns runtime
dep for v1.5.0).
* Port-80 HEAD probe, target locked to the order's domains,
success on HTTP 200 OR 404, warns on egress timeout
(corp egress policies routinely blackhole outbound 80 —
fail-hard would be too noisy).
* SSRF guard: probe refuses non-public IPs and surfaces the
skip in the diagnostic result; IPv4-mapped IPv6 normalisation
closes the `::ffff:169.254.169.254` cloud-metadata vector.
* HAProxy routing presence check: matches the order's
cluster_ids to a port-80 HTTP frontend.
* ACME account validity check against `letsencrypt_accounts`.
* Agent presence check (>=1 active agent in target cluster).
* Every sub-check wrapped in a wall-clock timeout to bound
impact on the API event loop.
RBAC: ssl.read for run, ssl.read for events. Per-user 5/min rate
limit on both run and rerun, backed by the (user_id, action,
created_at DESC) composite index.
Frontend (`frontend/src/components/ACMEAutomation.js`):
* "Diagnose" button on every order row + the existing
"stuck order" warning row.
* Modal with two tabs:
- Pre-flight Checks (Antd Table with status pills + Re-run
buttons + humanized error banner)
- Event Log (Antd Timeline with auto-tail polling, scroll-
to-bottom, pause-on-hover)
* Correlation IDs surfaced in error banners and individual
check fail details for backend-log lookup.
------------------------------------------------------------------
HEADLINE FEATURE B — Site Setup Wizard (Issue #14)
------------------------------------------------------------------
A single guided flow that creates a Backend + Servers + HTTP
Frontend (and optional HTTPS Frontend) in one atomic transaction.
Endpoints (`backend/routers/site_wizard.py`):
POST /api/site-wizard/preview — diff-preview the changeset
POST /api/site-wizard/create — atomic execute
POST /api/site-wizard/reject — clean rollback (including
any wizard_staged ACME
orders)
GET /api/site-wizard/drafts — draft persistence
PUT /api/site-wizard/drafts/{id} — save/update
DELETE /api/site-wizard/drafts/{id}
Feature surface:
* One screen captures both backend (mode + servers) AND
frontend (http + optional https + SSL mode) inputs.
* SSL modes: ACME (new order, HTTP-01 only for v1.5.0),
Upload (existing PEM), Existing (link to a stored cert),
or None.
* ACME-staged path: wizard_staged_until watermark on the
`letsencrypt_orders` row defers finalisation until agent
confirmation; per-mode reject cleanly cancels and rolls
back the staged order.
* Live diff preview against the cluster's current generated
config (renderer-evolution noise stripped — track-sc<N>
dedup, per-server cookie strip, defaults-cookie
inheritance, listen-block flattening).
* Draft persistence with PEM stripped at save time (private
keys never round-trip through the drafts table).
* Per-cluster multi-tenancy: drafts and wizard_staged orders
are isolated to the creating user's cluster scope.
Frontend (`frontend/src/components/SiteWizard.js`):
* 4-step Antd Steps flow: Backend → Frontend → SSL → Review.
* Render the live diff preview inline before commit.
* Antd Form-level validation mirrors backend Pydantic
validators (numeric bounds, HAProxy reserved keywords, ALPN
consistency, IPv6 scope-id, domain regex, server name
dedup).
------------------------------------------------------------------
AUDIT CAMPAIGN — Rounds 1 → 22 (Bulgu #1 → #82)
------------------------------------------------------------------
v1.5.0 includes 22 adversarial review passes. Each round produced
its own commit set in the corporate development line; this squash
collapses those into the v1.5.0 release artefact. Highlights:
Round 1-4 Site Wizard core: dry-run parity, single-line
value injection guard, ACL -f pattern-file block,
SSL parity, timeout regex, form-state pin.
Round 5-7 defaults-cookie inheritance, server-named-cookie
guard, fe/be mode mismatch, duplicate server
names, health_check_uri + server_address
validators.
Round 8-10 cookie_name / cookie_options newline-injection
guard, dry-run parity (round 9), TCP-mode HTTP-only
feature blockers.
Round 11 SSL name path traversal + health-check >= 1.
Round 12-13 SSL & ACME deep dive (Bulgu #23-#32).
Round 14 single-line value injection (Bulgu #33).
Round 15-17 ACME multi-tenant UX, numeric bounds, HAProxy
reserved keywords, ALPN/TLS consistency,
all-backup, multi-domain & multi-user enterprise
edges, drain/HSTS/post-completion (Bulgu
#34-#53).
Round 18-21 concurrency, agent state, TCP-mode HTTP-only,
list size caps, IPv6 scope-id, preview account
validation, TCP backend + balance uri reject
(Bulgu #54-#61).
Round 22 FE error visibility + 3x stale-data lockouts,
referential integrity + cascade safety,
authentication & authorization, multi-cluster
isolation, apply_pending_changes concurrency,
script injection + bulk import multi-tenancy,
prefix-stripped signature comparison
(Bulgu #62-#82).
------------------------------------------------------------------
NO CORPORATE-SPECIFIC ARTIFACTS
------------------------------------------------------------------
This squash deliberately sanitises corporate hostnames, container
registry references, and TLS secret names into generic
placeholders (`your-registry.example.com/your-org`,
`haproxy-openmanager*.example.com`, `wildcard-tls`,
`taylanbakircioglu/haproxy-openmanager-*`) so the public artefact
contains no internal infrastructure detail. Pilot / development
history that retained those values stays in the corporate fork
and is NOT part of this commit.
- Agent scripts now detect and send ip_address in DAEMON heartbeat (Linux: ip route, macOS: ifconfig)
- Backend validates agent-reported IPs via ipaddress stdlib, COALESCE preserves existing on NULL
- IP/VIP change logging (non-critical, try/except wrapped) for operational visibility
- New source_file_hash column on agent_script_templates for reliable update detection
- Migration changed to ON CONFLICT DO NOTHING to prevent overwriting UI-customized scripts on restart
- GET /versions returns script_update_available flag (disk hash vs DB hash comparison with fallback)
- Frontend Alert banner warns users of new agent script versions and directs to Reset to Defaults
- Reset to Defaults and Popconfirm modals explicitly warn about custom script edit loss
- Full backward compatibility: old agents without ip_address field continue working unchanged
Made-with: Cursor
- Server-level change detection in bulk import (field-by-field comparison
for 17 server attributes with UPDATE/NO CHANGES status and tooltip)
- Multi-select delete for backends and frontends with dependency checks
- Dashboard "Backends Summary" address column for servers
- Fix unique constraint violation on bulk-create for existing servers
(natural key lookup matching DB constraint instead of backend_id FK)
- ORDER BY is_active DESC on all entity lookups to prefer active records
- Strip auto-generated content (ACME, rate-limit, WAF) from bulk import
comparison to eliminate false positive changes on re-import
- Fix toolbar overflow with Space wrap prop
- Frontend bulk delete modal clarity (selected vs deletable count)
- Version bump to 1.3.0
Made-with: Cursor
Bulk import accepted dots in frontend/backend/server names but UI and
backend validators rejected them with ^[a-zA-Z0-9_-]+$. After import,
entities with dots could not be edited. HAProxy itself allows dots in
section names, so the regex is expanded to ^[a-zA-Z0-9_.-]+$ across
all 12 validation points (5 React form rules, 1 ACL char-strip,
3 Pydantic validators, 1 WAF validator, 2 config-validator warnings).
When a backend block in haproxy.cfg does not specify explicit timeout
values, the bulk import was injecting hardcoded defaults (connect 10s,
server 60s, queue 60s) into the database. These then appeared in the
generated config and overrode the agent's defaults section. Now, only
explicitly declared timeouts are stored; omitted ones remain NULL so
the agent's existing defaults section stays in effect.
- Fix frontend port conflict validation to consider bind_address+port
combination instead of port-only. HAProxy allows same port on different
bind addresses (e.g., bind 10.0.0.1:443 vs bind 10.0.0.2:443). This
was blocking frontend edit/save in multi-VIP environments.
- Add form field dependency so port re-validates when bind_address changes.
- Fix API URL construction using window.location.host instead of hostname
to preserve non-standard ports (e.g., :8080), preventing CORS errors
in BulkConfigImport.
- Make CORS_ORIGINS configurable via environment variable.
- Step 3 (Enable ACME on Cluster) now shows a process icon instead of
a misleading green checkmark when ACME is enabled but not yet applied.
Per-cluster "(pending apply)" annotation for multi-cluster setups.
- Step 4 button and all /apply-management navigation buttons now say
"Apply Changes" instead of "Configure" for clearer guidance.
- Setup Guide auto-selects the correct cluster before navigating to
Apply Management, showing pending cluster names in alerts.
- Pending ACME disable changes are now correctly detected in Step 4
even when acme_enabled is already FALSE in the database.
- Entity snapshot rollback for cluster ACME settings: reject correctly
restores acme_enabled/acme_backend_url to pre-change values.
- Deduplication logic prevents "last wins" bug when multiple ACME
toggles are rejected in sequence.
- Connection leak prevention with try/finally around conn2 in ACME
config version creation.
- Step 4 branching uses boolean has_enabled instead of fragile string
truthiness check.
Made-with: Cursor
Taylan Bakırcıoğlu