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shankar0123
d030c26914
Bundle 2 closure (2026-05-12 acquisition diligence audit). Closes the
"docker compose up == accidental production" hazard: pre-Bundle-2 the
base deploy/docker-compose.yml WAS the demo path (AUTH_TYPE=none +
DEMO_MODE_ACK=true + KEYGEN_MODE=server + DEMO_SEED=true + literal
change-me-... placeholder creds), the README claimed "drop the demo
overlay for a clean install", and ENVIRONMENTS.md table documented
auth-type default as api-key — three contradictory stories layered on
the same compose file.
Source findings closed:
R2 R3 C1 D9 finding-2 S9 (repo audit)
SEC-H2 SEC-M1 SEC-M3 OPS-M3 LOW-5 HIGH-6 (cowork audit)
Compose split (deploy/docker-compose.yml + deploy/docker-compose.demo.yml):
The base now ships production-shaped — no AUTH_TYPE override, no
KEYGEN_MODE override, no DEMO_MODE_ACK, no DEMO_SEED, no literal
placeholder fallbacks. POSTGRES_PASSWORD / CERTCTL_AUTH_SECRET /
CERTCTL_CONFIG_ENCRYPTION_KEY / CERTCTL_API_KEY / CERTCTL_AGENT_ID
must come from deploy/.env (sample template in deploy/.env.example +
root .env.example). The demo overlay carries the full demo posture
(every env var + every placeholder credential) so the
`-f docker-compose.demo.yml` one-flag flip remains a zero-config
populated-dashboard path.
Fail-closed startup guards (internal/config/config.go::Validate):
Three new gates layered on the existing HIGH-12 demo-mode listen-bind
guard. All three exempt CERTCTL_DEMO_MODE_ACK=true so the demo overlay
keeps working:
• HIGH-6: AUTH_SECRET = "change-me-in-production" → refuse
• HIGH-6: CONFIG_ENCRYPTION_KEY = "change-me-32-char..." → refuse
• LOW-5: CORS_ORIGINS contains "*" (CWE-942 + CWE-352) → refuse
Visible DEMO MODE banner (cmd/server/main.go): every boot under
DEMO_MODE_ACK=true now emits a prominent WARN line with a 6-step
production-promotion checklist. The 2026-04-19 incident (a screenshot
run that kept running for three days) drove this; the per-startup
banner makes the posture unmissable in any log scraper.
Agent enrollment doc alignment:
• docs/reference/configuration.md L83: corrected the non-existent
URL `POST /api/v1/agents/register` to the real route
`POST /api/v1/agents`; added the bootstrap-token note and the
install-agent.sh handoff sequence.
• docs/reference/architecture.md L154: replaced "agents register
themselves at first heartbeat" (false — cmd/agent/main.go fail-
fasts when CERTCTL_AGENT_ID is unset) with the actual two-step
operator-driven flow (REST or GUI registration first, returned ID
fed to install-agent.sh second).
Tests + CI guard:
• 9 new TestValidate_Bundle2_* cases in internal/config/config_test.go
covering: placeholder-secret refused + demo-ack exempt; placeholder
encryption-key refused + demo-ack exempt; real key not mistaken for
placeholder; wildcard CORS refused + demo-ack exempt; wildcard mixed
into a concrete allowlist still refused; concrete allowlist accepted.
• scripts/ci-guards/B2-compose-base-no-demo-env.sh: greps the base
compose for any of the demo-mode env vars + placeholder credentials.
Comments stripped before checking so the narrative header in the
base file can still reference the overlay's posture in prose.
Cold-DB CI smoke (.github/workflows/ci.yml::cold-db-compose-smoke):
Switched to layering -f docker-compose.demo.yml on top of the base —
the new production base requires real env vars the smoke doesn't have,
and the smoke's purpose (catch migration-on-cold-DB regressions + the
bootstrap-token mint path) is orthogonal to which auth posture the
boot lands in.
Receipts:
• Current first-run truth table
compose flag → posture
-f docker-compose.yml (production)
→ requires .env;
fail-fasts on
missing AUTH_SECRET
/ CONFIG_ENCRYPTION
_KEY / POSTGRES
_PASSWORD; agent
fail-fasts on
missing AGENT_ID
-f docker-compose.yml -f docker-compose.demo.yml (demo)
→ zero-config;
AUTH_TYPE=none +
DEMO_MODE_ACK=true
+ KEYGEN=server +
DEMO_SEED=true;
boot banner WARN
-f docker-compose.yml -f docker-compose.dev.yml (dev)
→ base + PgAdmin
+ debug logging
-f docker-compose.test.yml (test, standalone)
→ production-shape
posture, real CA
backends
• Verification (PATH=/tmp/go/bin export GO* paths to /tmp):
gofmt -l # clean (no diffs)
go vet ./internal/config ./cmd/server # clean
go test -short -count=1 ./internal/config/... # PASS (cumulative +
all 9 new Bundle 2
cases green)
go test -short -count=1 # PASS (no regression
./internal/connector/target/configcheck in the Bundle 1 -
closure tests)
go build ./cmd/server ./cmd/agent # clean
./cmd/cli ./cmd/mcp-server
bash scripts/ci-guards/B2-compose-base-no-demo-env.sh # clean
bash scripts/ci-guards/H-1-encryption-key-min-length.sh # clean
bash scripts/ci-guards/G-3-env-docs-drift.sh # clean
Remaining operator warnings (not blocking; tracked in CLAUDE.md
"Open decisions"):
• The first `docker compose -f docker-compose.yml up -d` against a
pre-Bundle-2 .env (placeholder values still in place) will now
fail-fast. This is the intended posture but operators upgrading
from v2.0.x via .env-from-old-master need to rotate before
upgrading. The CHANGELOG note for the v2.1.0 release should
call this out alongside Auth Bundle 2's other breaking changes.
Audit-Closes: BUNDLE-2 R2 R3 C1 D9 S9 SEC-H2 SEC-M1 SEC-M3 OPS-M3 LOW-5 HIGH-6
40 lines
1.8 KiB
Bash
40 lines
1.8 KiB
Bash
# certctl Docker Compose environment variables (Bundle 2 — 2026-05-12)
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#
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# Copy this file to deploy/.env and customize. The production-shaped base
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# compose (docker-compose.yml) requires every variable below to be set;
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# the Bundle 2 fail-closed startup guards REFUSE TO BOOT if any value
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# remains at a "change-me-..." or "replace-with-..." placeholder outside
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# demo mode (CERTCTL_DEMO_MODE_ACK=true).
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#
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# DEMO PATH (zero-config, populated dashboard, demo-mode auth):
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# docker compose -f deploy/docker-compose.yml \
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# -f deploy/docker-compose.demo.yml up -d --build
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# The demo overlay supplies its own placeholder values plus DEMO_MODE_ACK
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# so this .env is NOT needed.
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#
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# PRODUCTION PATH (this .env is required):
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# docker compose -f deploy/docker-compose.yml up -d
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# PostgreSQL password — openssl rand -hex 32
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POSTGRES_PASSWORD=replace-with-openssl-rand-hex-32
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# Server API-key secret — openssl rand -base64 32
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CERTCTL_AUTH_SECRET=replace-with-openssl-rand-base64-32
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# Bundled-agent API key (matches one of the server's AUTH_SECRET rotation
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# values). Generate with: openssl rand -base64 32
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CERTCTL_API_KEY=replace-with-openssl-rand-base64-32
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# AES-256-GCM key for encrypting issuer/target config secrets at rest.
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# Minimum 32 bytes. Generate with: openssl rand -base64 32
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CERTCTL_CONFIG_ENCRYPTION_KEY=replace-with-openssl-rand-base64-32
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# Agent ID returned from `POST /api/v1/agents` during agent enrollment.
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# Without this the bundled certctl-agent service fail-fasts at startup.
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# CERTCTL_AGENT_ID=agent-from-registration-response
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# Day-0 admin bootstrap token (optional — generate with: openssl rand -hex 32).
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# When set, POST /api/v1/auth/bootstrap mints the first admin actor + API
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# key. When unset (default), that endpoint returns 410 Gone.
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# CERTCTL_BOOTSTRAP_TOKEN=
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